library  of  Che  Cheologtcal  ^emmarjp 

PRINCETON  • NEW  JERSEY 


FROM  THE  LIBRARY  OF 
ROBERT  ELLIOTT  SPEER 


FZ23L 

.A3I 


* 


A HISTORY  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


https://archive.org/details/historyofsoutham00aker_0 


[Frontispiece. 


1 


l oc 

A HISTORY  OF 
SOUTH  AMERICA 

1854-1904 

WITH  AN  ADDITIONAL  CHAPTER  BRINGING 
THE  HISTORY  TO  THE  PRESENT  DAY 


/ 

BY  CHARLES  EDMOND  AKERS 


WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS 


E.  P. 


NEW 

DUTTON 


YORK 

AND  COMPANY 


1912 


First  Edition  . . . August  1904 

Second  Edition  . . . September  1912 


PREFACE 


A residence  of  fourteen  years  in  South  America,  in  con- 
nection with  journalistic  work  throughout  that  continent, 
brought  home  to  me  the  need  of  a concise  history  of 
the  various  South  American  States  since  they  attained 
independence  from  Spanish  control.  True,  such  infor- 
mation can  be  obtained  from  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
chroniclers  and  authors  of  other  nationalities.  But  to 
seek  for  descriptions  of  many  different  events  and  periods 
in  diverse  directions  and  varied  tongues  is  always  weari- 
some and  often  impossible  unless  a well-stocked  library 
be  near  at  hand  for  reference.  To  meet  this  want  has 
been  the  purpose  and  aim  of  the  present  work,  which 
although  dealing  more  particularly  with  the  past  fifty 
years,  is  intended  also  for  purposes  of  general  reference 
by  students  of  Latin- American  history  and  civilisation 
from  the  date  of  the  emancipation  of  the  Spanish 
colonies  to  the  present  day. 

I have  compressed  into  small  compass  the  facts  which 
have  tended  to  mould  the  destinies  of  the  South  American 
Republics,  and  I have  endeavoured  to  show  how  the 
national  character  of  the  people  of  each  State  has 
assumed  distinctive  features  as  the  result  of  local 


VI 


PREFACE 


surroundings,  modified  by  foreign  immigration  and  the 
accompanying  influence  of  methods  of  civilisation  other 
than  those  of  Spanish  or  Portuguese  origin. 

To  extract  from  many  sources  the  requisite  facts, 
and  to  marshall  these  into  order,  was  no  easy  task.  It 
was  due  to  the  aid  and  encouragement  of  many  friends 
that  I persevered  when  my  path  seemed  beset  by  insuper- 
able obstacles.  I owe  much  to  the  friendly  advice  of 
Charles  W.  Gould  and  the  late  Lloyd  M‘Kim  Garrison, 
both  of  New  York,  in  the  earlier  stages  of  this  work. 
In  the  final  revision  of  the  manuscript  I was  so  exceed- 
ingly fortunate  as  to  enlist  the  help  and  sympathy  of 
A.  J.  Wilson,  and  his  assistance  to  me  was  invaluable. 

Some  excuse  is  necessary  for  the  illustrations.  I 
regret  that  they  are  not  more  artistic  in  general  char- 
acter, and  in  defence  I must  plead  that  they  are  the 
best  I could  obtain  under  the  circumstances.  They 
are  inserted  to  give  to  readers  of  the  book  some  idea 
of  the  personal  appearance  of  the  men  who  play  a 
prominent  part  in  it,  a purpose  I trust  they  will 
accomplish. 

June  1904. 


C.  E.  AKERS. 


CONTENTS 


PART  I 


INTRODUCTION 

Some  Traits  of  Spanish  Character.  Ferdinand  and  Isabella.  Treatment  PA0E 
of  Moors  and  Jews.  The  Inquisition  and  Intellectual  Expansion. 
Population  of  Spain  in  the  Fifteenth  Century.  First  Spanish  Colonists. 
Treatment  of  Natives  in  South  America.  Examples  of  Spanish  Cruelty 
and  Treachery.  Destruction  of  Astec  and  Inca  Civilisation.  Dissen- 
sions in  South  America.  Spanish  Bravery.  Catholicism  in  South 
America.  Immigration  to  the  Colonies.  Introduction  of  Negroes. 
Turbulent  Settlers.  Political  Parties  in  South  America.  Spain  and 
Decentralisation.  Trade  Restrictions.  Causes  of  Dissatisfaction. 
Spanish  Monopbly  of  Official  Posts.  Incidents  of  Brazilian  History. 
British,  French  and  Dutch  Action.  Plot  for  Brazilian  Independence. 

The  Peninsular  Wars  and  Brazil.  The  Empire  Proclaimed.  Abdica- 
tion of  Pedro  I.  Indian  Population.  The  Tupi-Guarani  Stock. 
Araucanians  and  Patagonians.  Aymara  and  Quichua.  Natural 
Resources  of  the  Continent.  Geographical  Features  ...  3 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


Colonial  Discontent.  Weakness  of  the  Spanish  Government.  Efforts  of 
Spain  to  Conciliate  the  Colonies.  Action  of  the  Regency  of  Cadiz. 
Caracas  and  the  Separatist  Movement.  Simon  Bolivar  and  the 
Struggle  for  Independence.  General  Paez.  Proclamation  of  Colom- 
bian Independence.  Bolivar  frees  Ecuador  and  marches  to  Peru. 

The  Revolt  in  Argentina.  Treaty  between  Argentina  and  Great 
Britain.  Anarchy  in  Montevideo.  Paraguay  effects  a Bloodless 
Revolution.  The  Struggle  in  Chile.  The  Monroe  Doctrine.  Mr 
Canning  and  the  Holy  Alliance.  South  America  after  Independence. 
Bolivar  and  his  Political  Enemies.  Disintegration  of  Colombia. 
Venezuela  as  a Republic.  Ecuadorian  Affairs.  Dissensions  in  Peru. 
Friction  in  Chile  over  Form  of  Government.  Bolivia  and  General 
Sucre.  Uruguayan  Developments.  Conflict  in  Argentina  between 
Federalists  and  Unitarians.  Advent  to  Power  of  Rosas  . . .19 

vii 


Vlll 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  IT 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 

Savage  Brutality  of  Rosas.  Revolution  against  Rosas.  Economic  and 
Social  Conditions.  Ambition  of  the  Provinces  to  Dominate  Buenos 
Aires.  Wish  of  Buenos  Aires  to  Secede.  Determination  of  Buenos 
Aires  to  Appeal  to  Arms.  Revolution  under  General  Mitre.  Victory 
of  the  Insurgents  at  Pavon.  General  Mitre  Installed  as  President. 
The  National  Capital.  Revolutionary  Movements.  Aggressiveness 
of  Lopez.  War  with  Paraguay.  Political  Consequences  of  the  War. 
Cholera  in  Buenos  Aires.  Election  of  Dr  Sarmiento  to  the  Pre- 
sidency. Educational  Progress.  Efforts  to  Advance  Industrial 
Development.  Yellow  Fever  Epidemic.  The  Administration  of 
Sarmiento.  The  Political  Situation  in  1874.  Cordoba  and  the 
Presidential  Election  of  1874.  Election  of  Dr  Nicolas  Avellaneda. 
The  Presidential  Election  of  1871.  Mitre  and  Revolutionary  Pro- 
jects. Conspiracy  against  the  Government.  Seditious  Outbreaks. 
Political  Aims  of  Buenos  Aires.  Attitude  of  Avellaneda.  Position 
in  1878.  Propaganda  of  the  Cordoba  League.  Meetings  in  Buenos 
Aires.  The  “ Tiro  Nacional.”  Buenos  Aires  and  Cordoba.  National 
Government  Alarmed.  Minister  of  War  and  the  “Tiro  Nacional.” 
President  determines  to  Suppress  the  “Tiro  Nacional.”  Popular 
Demonstrations  in  Buenos  Aires.  Troops  Protect  the  National 
Authorities.  Compromise  between  President  and  Citizens.  Second 
Mass  Meeting  in  Buenos  Aires.  Advice  of  Dr  Sarmiento.  Confer- 
ence between  Governor  of  Buenos  Aires  and  President.  Temporary 
Compromise.  Presidential  Election  of  1880.  Issues  of  Electoral 
Campaign.  Presidential  Candidates.  General  Roca.  -Dr  Pellegrini 
as  Minister  of  War.  The  Cordoba  League.  Popular  Excitement. 
Situation  Strained.  Buenos  Aires  buys  War  Material.  Military 
Preparations.  Delay  in  arrival  of  Arms  and  Ammunition. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC — continued 

Military  Preparations.  Attempt  to  seize  Cordoba.  National  Troops  in 
Buenos  Aires.  Provincial  Authorities  and  the  Minister  of  War.  Riot- 
ing in  Buenos  Aires.  The  National  Government  and  the  Provincial 
Administration.  Avellaneda  abandons  'Buenos  Aires.  Hostilities 
Commence.  Strength  of  National  Troops.  Preparations  for  Defence 
of  Buenos  Aires.  Disposition  of  Provincial  Forces.  Scarcity  of  War 
Material  in  Buenos  Aires.  Leaders  of  the  Rebellion.  Political  Dis- 
sensions. Dr  Pellegrini.  Skirmishing  between  National  Troops  and 
Revolutionary  Forces.  Colonel  Arias  and  the  Volunteers.  Engage- 
ment near  Olivera.  Colonel  Arias  reaches  Lujan.  Defence  of 
Buenos  Aires.  Attack  upon  Buenos  Aires.  Hostilities  on  July  21. 
Ammunition  exhausted  in  Buenos  Aires.  Conference  of  Revolutionary 
Leaders.  Armistice  on  July  23.  Peace  Negotiations.  Terms  of 
Surrender.  Buenos  Aires  declared  the  National  Capital.  General 
Roca  elected  President.  The  New  Administration.  Cordoba  and 


CONTENTS 


IX 


Roca.  Buenos  Aires  and  the  new  President.  The  National  page 

Policy.  Absolute  Power  of  Roca  in  1881.  Restraint  on  Military. 
National  Feeling.  Improvement  in  Means  of  Communication. 
Railway  Construction.  Foreign  Immigration.  Assisted  Passages 
for  Immigrants.  National  Land  Sales.  Public  Works.  Revolu- 
tionary Outbreaks.  Expansion  of  Agricultural  and  Pastoral  Industry. 
Foreign  Loans.  Dr  Pellegrini  appointed  Minister  of  War.  Political 
Intrigues.  Discontent  in  Buenos  Aires.  Attitude  of  the  Adminis- 
tration in  Electoral  Matters.  Foundation  of  La  Plata.  The  Port 
of  Ensenada.  Presidential  Election.  Presidential  Candidates.  Eco- 
nomic and  Industrial  Progress.  Financial  Policy.  Suspension  of 
Specie  Payments.  Inconvertible  Currency  . . . .51 


CHAPTER  IY 

THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC — continued 

Presidential  Election.  The  Cordoba  Cliqueand  the  Provisional  Governors. 

Dr  Juarez  Celman.  Cordoba  supports  Celman.  Celman  Elected. 

Roca  and  Celman.  Uneasy  Feeling.  Currency  Conversion.  Paper 
Money  Issues.  Carpet-bagging  Politicians.  Political  Conditions. 
Corruption  in  National  Administration.  Concessions  and  Monopolies. 
Corrupt  Provincial  Governments.  Position  of  Pellegrini.  Adminis- 
tration and  Banking.  Provincial  Loans.  Sale  of  Gold  Reserves. 
Financial  Necessities.  The  “ Union  Civiea.”  Dr  Alem.  Aristobulo 
del  Valle.  Bernardo  Irigoyen.  Dr  Lopez.  Lucio  Lopez.  Provin- 
cial Branches  of  “Union  Civiea.”  Feeling  against  Celman.  The 
Mortgage  Banks.  Policy  of  the  Administration.  Foreign  Residents. 
Meeting  of  “ Union  Civiea.”  Indictment  of  National  Administration. 

The  “ Union  Civiea  ” and  Celman.  The  “ Union  Civiea  ” and  Revolu- 
tionary Measures.  The  Army  and  the  “ Union  Civiea.”  Date  fixed 
for  Revolt.  Revolution  of  July  26,  1890.  Action  of  National 
Authorities.  Attack  on  the  Plaza  Lavalle.  Numerous  Casualties. 
Scarcity  of  Ammunition.  Naval  Action.  Bombardment  of  Buenos 
Aires.  Attitude  of  Foreign  Warships.  Reinforcements  from  Northern 
Provinces.  Consultation  of  Rebel  Leaders.  Majority  favour  Nego- 
tiation. Armistice  Arranged.  Peace  Propositions.  Advice  of 
Roca  and  Pellegrini.  Peace  Concluded.  Dispersion  of  Revolutionary 
Forces.  Casualties.  Resignation  of  Celman.  Public  Temper  in 
Buenos  Aires.  European  Opinion.  Accession  of  Pellegrini  . . 69 


CHARTER  Y 

THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC — continued 

Ministry  under  Pellegrini.  Attitude  of  Roca.  Public  Opinion.  National 
Finances.  Political  Situation.  Economic  Conditions.  Cedula  Issues. 
Inconvertible  Currency.  Policy  of  Pellegrini.  Depreciation  in  Currency. 
Argentina  and  Baring  Brothers.  Suspension  of  Foreign  Debt  Service. 


X 


CONTENTS 


Banking  Crisis.  Patriotic  Loan.  Banco  Nacional  and  Banco  de  la  p'oe 
Provincia.  Attempted  Assassination  of  Roca.  Pellegrini’s  Adminis- 
tration. Discontented  Feeling.  Influence  of  Mitre.  Mitre  Returns 
from  Europe.  Cordoba  and  Mitre.  Roca  and  Mitre.  The  “ Union 
Civica  Radical.”  A new  State  Bank.  Pellegrini  and  the  “Union 
Civica  Radical.”  Nomination  of  Dr  Luis  Saenz  Pena.  Dr  Bernardo 
Irigoyan  and  the  “ Union  Civica  Radical.”  Political  Situation  in  1892. 

State  of  Siege.  Arrest  of  Alem.  Alem  Deported.  Dr  Luis  Saenz 
Pena  elected  President.  Dr  Jose  Uriburu.  Roca  resigns  Portfolio  of 
Interior.  Saenz  Pena  accedes  to  Office.  Public  Opinion  and  Pellegrini. 

Loss  of  the  Rosales.  Officers  of  the  Rosales  sentenced  to  Death. 

Saenz  Pena  and  Congress.  Ministerial  Crisis.  Obstruction  in  Con- 
gress. Ministry  of  Dr  del  Valle.  Alem  and  Political  Agitation. 
Congress  and  the  Administration.  Excitement  in  Buenos  Aires. 

Revolt  in  San  Luis.  Revolutionary  Preparations  in  Buenos  Aires. 
National  Government  and  Governor  Costa.  National  Troops  and 
Revolutionary  Forces.  Alem  in  Santa  Fe.  Rosario  captured  by 
Insurgents.  Roca  commands  in  Santa  Fe.  Surrender  of  Alem  . 87 


CHAPTEE  VI 

TIIE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC — rontinued 

Political  Conditions  in  1893.  Financial  Policy  of  Saenz  Pena.  Attitude 
of  Congress.  The  Executive  and  the  Chambers.  The  Provincial 
Mortgage  Bank.  Dr  Lopez  and  Colonel  Sarmiento.  Death  of  Lopez. 
Hostility  to  Saenz  Pena.  Ministerial  Crisis.  Position  in  December, 
1894.  Death  Sentence  upon  Officers  of  Rosales.  Resignation  of 
Saenz  Pena.  Dr  Jose  Uriburu.  The  New  Administration.  Chilian 
Boundary  Question.  Argentine  Authorities  Alarmed.  Secret 

Sessions  of  Congress.  Credit  of  Fifty  Million  Gold  Dollars.  Con- 

gress and  Railway  Guarantees.  Financial  Policy  of  Uriburu.  Cash 
Payments  on  External  Debt.  Political  Situation  in  1897.  Presidential 
Candidates.  Nomination  of  Roca.  Roca  Elected.  Dr  Quirno  Costa 
Vice-President.  Roca  and  the  Buenos  Aires  Merchants.  The  Puno 
de  Atacama.  Chilian  Ultimatum.  Arbitration.  The  Chilian  Ques- 
tion. Purchase  of  War  Material.  Legislation  during  Uriburu 
Administration.  Roca  assumes  Presidency.  Contrast  between 
1880  and  1898.  Expectations  from  Roca.  Arbitration  and  the  Puno 
de  Atacama.  Meeting  between  Roca  and  Errazuriz.  Visit  of  Roca 
to  Patagonia.  Welsh  Colony  at  Chubut.  Congress  in  1899.  Roca  and 
the  administration  of  Justice.  Magnasco  and  Judicial  Reform.  Com- 
position of  the  Chambers.  Journey  of  Roca  to  Brazil.  Rumours  of 
Offensive  and  Defensive  Alliance  with  Brazil.  Commercial  Treaty 
with  Brazil.  Complications  in  the  Provinces.  Irigoyen  and  the 
Buenos  Aires  Legislature.  Intervention  in  Buenos  Aires.  Outbreaks 
in  La  Rioja  and  Catamarca.  Roca  and  National  Legislation.  The 
Conversion  Law.  Roca  and  Public  Works.  Visit  of  President  of 
Brazil  to  Argentina.  Area  of  Argentina.  Population.  Immigration. 
Foreign  Residents.  Italians.  Spaniards.  Basques.  Other  Nation- 
alities. Predominance  of  Latin  Blood.  Climate.  Growth  of  Cities. 
Gregarious  Nature  of  Argentines.  Landed  Proprietors.  Crowded 
Centres.  Education.  Minister  Magnasco.  Incompetency  of  Teachers. 
Lack  of  Discipline  in  Scholastic  Establishments.  Missionary  Efforts 
for  Education.  Administration  of  Justice.  Roca  and  the  Argentine 
Courts.  Codified  Law.  Tedious  Procedure.  Corrupt  Lower  Courts. 


CONTENTS 


xi 


Religious  Conditions.  The  Catholic  Church.  Report  of  Sir  John  page 
Hunter  Blair.  National  Character.  Hospitality.  Agricultural  and 
Pastoral  Industry  104,  105 


CHAPTER  VII 


PARAGUAY 

Origin  of  the  Paraguayan  War.  Political  Disturbances  in  Uruguay. 
General  Flores  lands  near  Salto.  Severe  Measures  increase  Rebel 
Popularity.  Strained  Relations  between  Uruguay  and  Argentina. 
Complications  between  Brazil  and  Uruguay.  Entente  between 
Uruguay  and  Paraguay.  Proclamation  by  Lopez.  Mission  of  Con- 
selheiro  Saraiva.  Invasion  of  Uruguay.  The  Villa  del  Salto.  The 
Brazilian  Flag  Insulted.  Brazil  supports  Revolt.  Siege  of  Paysandii. 
Murder  of  Colonel  Gomez.  Attitude  of  Argentina.  Uruguayan 
Expedition  to  Rio  Grande.  March  of  Brazilians  and  Rebels  upon 
Montevideo.  Montevideo  Capitulates.  Withdrawal  of  Brazilian 
Army.  Attitude  of  Lopez.  The  Marques  d'Olinda.  War  between 
Paraguay  and  Brazil.  Invasion  of  Matto  Grosso.  Engagement  at 
Neuva  Coimbra.  Paraguayan  Administration  in  Matto  Grosso. 
Consternation  in  Rio.  Brazil  prepares  for  War.  Schemes  of  Lopez. 
Paraguayan  Congress.  Lopez  and  Urquiza.  Paraguayan  Army  in 
1865.  Attack  upon  Corrientes.  Paraguayan  occupation  of  Corrientes. 
Excitement  in  Buenos  Aires.  Proclamation  of  General  Mitre.  Alliance 
between  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Uruguay.  Warlike  Preparations. 

Phases  of  the  War.  Importance  of  the  Parana  and  Paraguay.  Plan 
of  Campaign.  No  forward  movement  possible  before  June.  Dis- 
tribution of  the  Paraguayans.  Lopez  neglects  to  advance  beyond 
Corrientes.  The  Paraguayans  in  Corrientes.  Capture  of  Corrientes 
by  the  Argentines.  Battle  of  the  Riachuelo.  Paraguayan  Advance 
towards  Uruguay.  Operations  near  San  Borge.  Invasion  of  Rio 
Grande.  Mutiny  in  Entre  Rios.  Flores  appointed  to  command 
the  Allied  Vanguard.  Conditions  in  Uruguay.  Paraguayans  march 
down  the  Upper  Uruguay.  Battle  of  Yatay.  Defeat  of  the  Para- 
guayans. Occupation  of  Uruguayana.  Surrender  of  Colonel 
Estigarribia.  Preparations  for  Defence  of  Paraguay.  Modification 
in  Plan  of  Campaign.  Advance  of  Allied  Forces.  Matto  Grosso  . 130 


CHARTER  VIII 


Paraguay — continued 

Public  Feeling  in  South  America.  Consultation  of  Argentine,  Brazilian, 
and  Uruguayan  Representatives.  Corrientes  the  Base  of  Operations. 
Defences  of  the  Parana.  Engagement  at  Paso  de  la  Patria.  Con- 
duct of  the  Argentine  National  Guard.  Raid  to  Itati.  Reconnais- 
sance of  Paraguayan  Positions.  Paso  de  la  Patria.  Crossing  of  the 
Parana.  Over-confidence  of  Allies.  Surprise  of  Allies.  Advance 
into  Paraguay.  Battle  of  May  20.  Camp  at  Tuyuti.  Lines  of  Rojas. 


Xll 


CONTENTS 


Discontent  in  Allied  Array.  Engagements  July  15  and  20.  Arrival  vAQE 
of  Reinforcements.  Expedition  against  Curupaitf.  Engagement  at 
Curuzu.  Garrison  of  Curuzu.  Conference  between  Mitre  and  Lopez. 

Effect  of  Peace  Proposals.  Attack  upon  Curupaiti.  Inefficient  Recon- 
naissance. Paraguayan  Victory.  Breakdown  of  Plans.  Military 
Changes.  Public  Opinion  in  Argentina  and  Brazil.  Paralisation  of  the 
Operations.  Revolution  in  Mendoza.  Marshal  Caxias’  Invasion. 
Arrival  of  General  Osorio  at  Tuyuti.  Forward  movement.  Occupation 
of  Rio  Hondo.  Advance  under  Marshal  Caxias.  Situation  in  Matto 
Grosso.  General  Mitre.  Attack  upon  Convoy  at  Humaita.  Squadron 
forces  passage  at  Curupaiti.  Unsatisfactory  situation  of  the  Fleet. 
Difficult  Transport.  Operations  at  Humaita.  Effort  of  Paraguayans 
to  recapture  Tayi.  Attack  of  Paraguayans  upon  Tuyuti.  Heavy 
Losses.  Revolt  in  Argentina.  Assassination  of  Flores.  Squadron 
forces  the  Humaita  passage.  Attack  on  Humaita.  Squadron 
reaches  Asuncion  . . . . . . . .150 


CHAPTER  IX 

PARAGUAY — continued 

Paraguayan  Attempt  to  Destroy  Squadron.  Capture  of  Rojas.  Capitu- 
lation of  Curupaiti.  Concentration  of  the  Paraguayans  in  Humaita. 
Bombardment  of  Humaita.  Attempt  to  Seize  the  Monitor  Rio 
Grand e.  Assault  on  Humaita.  Passage  of  Humaita  again  Forced. 
Evacuation  of  Humaita.  Attack  on  the  Allies.  Booty  in  Humaita. 
Asuncion  the  Objective  Point.  Humaitd  the  Base  of  Supplies. 
Paraguayans  abandon  Riverside  Towns.  The  Allied  Army  leaves 
Villa  del  Pilar.  Passage  of  the  River  Tibicuari.  Paraguayans  fall 
back.  Conditions  at  Tibicuari.  Victims  of  Lopez.  Paraguayans 
in  Force  near  the  River  Carabe.  Passage  of  the  River  Paraguay. 

Plan  of  Campaign.  Attack  upon  Villeta.  Renewal  of  Hostilities. 
Capture  of  Villeta  .......  167 


CHAPTER  X 

PARAGUAY — contimi  d 

Resumption  of  Hostilities  on  December  20.  Work  of  Allied  Cavalry. 
Paraguayan  Camp  in  the  Valentine  Hills.  Action  of  December  27. 
Defeat  of  the  Paraguayans.  Surrender  of  Angostura.  Occupation  of 
Asuncion.  Disorderly  Conduct  of  the  Allied  Troops.  Delay  in 
Operations.  Mission  of  Senhor  Parunhos.  Provisional  Government 
at  Asuncion.  A new  National  Capital.  Concentration  at  Oscurra. 
Engagement  at  the  River  Manduvira.  Arrival  of  the  Conde  d’Eu. 
Military  Reorganisation.  Operations  against  Lopez  in  July,  1869. 
Fight  at  Sapucay.  Attack  on  Peribebuy.  Lopez  evacuates 
Oscurra.  Plan  of  Campaign  of  Conde  d’Eu.  Retreat  of  Lopez  to 
Caraguatay.  Engagement  at  Yagari.  Action  at  Campo  Grande. 
Lopez  seeks  Refuge  in  the  Forests.  Paraguayan  Encampment  near 
the  Aquidaban.  Colonel  Silva  Tavares  and  Major  Oliveira.  Death 
of  Lopez.  Madame  Lynch.  Treaty  of  Peace.  Withdrawal  of 
Argentine  and  Uruguayan  Troops.  Election  of  President  Iiivarola. 


CONTENTS 


xiii 


Political  Representation  under  the  Constitution  of  1870.  Difficulties  of  page 
President  Rivarola.  Vice-President  Salvador  Jovellanos.  Assassination 
of  Rivarola.  Election  of  President  Gill.  Brazilian  Policy  in  Paraguay. 
Assassination  of  President  Gill.  Senor  Unarte.  Election  of  President 
Baredo.  Death  of  the  President.  Vice-President  Saguier.  Revolu- 
tion in  1881.  Saguier  Deposed.  General  Caballero  named  Pro- 
visional President.  General  Caballero  elected  President.  Election  of 
President  Escobar.  Condition  of  Country.  Election  of  President 
Gonzalez.  Attempts  at  Reform.  Deposition  of  President  Gonzalez. 
Vice-President  Morinigo  takes  Office.  Election  of  President  Egus- 
quiza.  Rupture  with  Uruguay.  Election  of  President  Aceval. 
Oligarchy  in  Control.  Political  Rights.  Economic  Conditions  after 
1870.  Natural  Causes  and  Reaction.  Idleness  of  Male  Population. 
Improvement  in  General  Conditions.  Population  during  Thirty 
Years.  Immigration.  Australian  Socialistic  Colony.  Sicilian  Coloni- 
sation. Educational  System  . . . . . .178 


CHAPTER  XI 


URUGUAY 

Color  ados  and  Blancos.  Flores  refuses  Re-election.  Revolt  of  Colonel 
Fortunato  Flores.  Presidency  of  Dr  Pedro  Varela.  Blanco  Con- 
spiracy. Assassination  of  General  Flores.  Execution  of  Rebels. 
General  BatUe  becomes  President  Cholera  Epidemic,  1868.  Forced 
Currency.  Insurrections  under  Maximo  Perez  and  General  Caraballo. 

Blanco  Revolution.  Insurgent  Successes.  Engagement  near  Santa 
Lucia.  Government  Defeat.  Engagement  near  Corralito.  Retreat 
of  General  Caraballo.  Insurgent  Losses.  Siege  of  Montevideo. 
Capture  of  the  Cerro.  Public  Opinion  in  Montevideo.  Sortie  from 
Montevideo.  Siege  of  Montevideo  Raised.  Operations  near  Puerto 
del  Ingles.  Decisive  Battle.  Government  Victory.  Reorganisation 
of  Rebel  Forces.  Further  Insurgents  Defeat.  Senor  Gomensoro 
accedes  to  Presidency.  Restoration  of  Peaceful  Conditions.  Con- 
gressional Elections.  Dr  Jose  Ellauri.  Election  of  Dr  Ellauri. 
Complicated  Situation.  Threatening  Attitude  of  Military.  Adminis- 
tration of  Ellauri.  Conspiracy  of  Colorados  netos.  Assassination  of 
Colonel  Castillo.  Revolt  in  Soriano.  Municipal  Election  in  Monte- 
video. Ministers  Resign.  Military  Revolt.  Deposition  of  Ellauri. 
Provisional  Administration.  Senor  Pedro  Varela  elected  President. 
Unsettled  Conditions.  Political  Arrests.  Revolution  in  May,  1875. 
Revolutionary  Committee  in  Buenos  Aires.  Military  join  Insurgents. 
Fighting  in  Soriano  and  Paysandu.  Measures  against  the  Rebels. 

Defeat  of  Insurgents.  Financial  Difficulties.  Dictatorship  of  Colonel 
Latorre.  Praetorian  Administration  Established.  Public  Education. 
Election  of  Latorre.  Latorre  Resigns.  Dr  Vidal  as  President 
Colonel  Santos.  Attack  on  Independent  Newspapers.  Increase  of 
Militarism.  President  Vidal  Resigns.  Santos  succeeds  to  Presi- 
dency. Discontent  Spreads.  Question  with  Italy.  Irresponsible 
Administration.  Paraguayan  Debt.  Preparations  for  Revolt  against 
Santos.  Dr  Vidal  again  Elected.  Revolt  in  Western  Part  of  Republic. 

Defeat  of  Rebels  by  General  Tajes.  Title  of  Captain-General  granted 
to  Santos.  General  Santos  again  President.  Attempt  to  Assassinate 
Santos.  Ministry  of  Dr  Ramirez.  Santos  resigns  Office.  Suppres- 
sion of  Militarism.  Decree  exiling  Santos.  Election  of  Herrera  y 
Obes  ........  196,  197 


XIV 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XII 

URUGU  AY — continued 

Foreign  Capital  in  Uruguay.  Corrupt  Administration.  Revival  of  Mili-  PAGE 
tarism.  Extravagant  Financial  Policy.  Discontented  Feeling. 
Economic  and  Financial  Crisis.  Temporary  Administration  of  Senor 
Duncan  Stewart.  Election  of  Senor  Borda.  The  Borda  Administra- 
tion. Revival  of  Corruption.  Formation  of  Revolutionary  Committee 
in  Buenos  Aires.  Depots  of  War  Material.  Congressional  Elections. 
Outbreak  of  Revolt.  Aparicio  Saraiva  and  Colonel  Diego  Lamas. 
Condition  of  Insurgent  Forces.  Engagement  at  Arbolito.  Government 
Forces  Augmented.  Engagements  at  Tres  Arboles,  Cerro  Colorado, 
and  Cerros  Blancos.  Insurgent  Expedition  in  Venus.  Peace 
Negotiations.  Assassination  of  Borda.  Accession  of  Senor  Cuestas. 

Fresh  Peace  Negotiations.  Peaceful  Conditions  Re-established. 
Festivities  in  Montevideo.  Death  of  Lamas.  Policy  of  New  Adminis- 
tration. Attitude  of  Congress.  Cuestas  dissolves  the  Chambers. 
Congress  elects  Cuestas  to  the  Presidency.  Military  Revolt.  Blanco 
Majority  in  Senate.  Political  Situation.  Cuestas  and  Economic 
Situation.  Climate  Conditions.  Area  of  Territory.  Density  of  Popu- 
lation. F'oreign  Residents.  Immigration.  Apathy  regarding  Educa- 
tion. Secondary  and  Higher  Education.  School  of  Arts  and  Trades. 
Administration  of  Justice.  Criminal  Courts.  Uruguayan  National 
Character.  Influence  of  the  Church.  Means  of  Communication  and 
Economic  Progress.  Industrial  Enterprise.  Cattle-breeding.  Importa- 
tion of  Foreign  Stock.  Sheep  Farming.  Export  of  Sheep.  Agricul- 
ture. Viticulture.  Olive  Orchards.  Tobacco  Cultivation.  Industry 
and  Taxation.  Landed  Proprietors.  Values  of  Foreign  Holdings. 
Tendency  of  Foreign  Landowners  to  Decrease  ....  214 


CHAPTER  XIII 


BRAZIL 

Brazil  after  the  Paraguayan  War.  Influence  of  Dom  Pedro  II.  His 
Reputation  in  Europe.  Quick  Recovery  in  Economic  Conditions. 
Dom  Pedro  visits  Europe.  Immigration  Projects.  Personality  of 
Dom  Pedro.  His  wish  to  benefit  Brazil.  His  admiration  for  the 
United  States.  Princess  Isabel  and  the  Conde  d’Eu.  Church 
Influence  and  the  Princess.  Unpopularity  of  the  Conde.  Brazil  and 
Imperial  Regime.  Political  Situation,  1870-1880.  Effect  of  August 
Comte  on  Brazilian  Character.  Sao  Paulo  and  Republican  Doctrines. 
The  Emperor  and  Republican  Ideas.  Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  Reason 
for  German  Settlements  in  the  Southern  Provinces.  The  Emperor  and 
Railway  Extension.  Public  Instruction.  The  Emperor  and  Higher 
Education.  The  Clergy  and  Education.  Internal  Development  of 
Brazil.  Third  Visit  of  Dom  Pedro  to  Europe.  Abolition  of  Slavery. 
Acts  in  Relation  to  Emancipation.  Treatment  of  Brazilian  Slaves. 


CONTENTS 


xv 


Troubles  in  Sao  Paulo.  Enmity  of  Plantation  Owners  to  Emancipa-  page 
tion.  Seditious  Feeling  gaining  ground.  Return  of  Uom  Pedro  to 
Rio.  Inconsistencies  in  the  Parliamentary  System.  The  Ouro  Preto 
Ministry.  Unpopularity  of  Cabinet.  Ouro  Preto  supported  by 
Dora  Pedro.  Political  Position  strained.  Plot  to  overthrow  Ministry. 
Younger  Officers  urge  Deposition  of  Emperor.  Seditious  Feeling 
runs  Riot  Military  Conspirators.  Generals  da  Fonseca  and 
Floriano  Peixoto  Leaders  of  the  Movement.  The  Fete  in  Rio  de 
Janeiro.  The  Palace  surrounded.  Arrest  of  Dom  Pedro.  Public 
Buildings  occupied  by  Rebels.  Barao  de  Ladario  Wounded.  Pro- 
clamation of  General  da  Fonseca.  Provincial  Governors  support 
Republic.  Fonseca  proclaimed  Provisional  President.  Dom  Pedro 
sent  to  Portugal.  Country  accepts  Change  with  Indifference.  Dis- 
content in  Sao  Paulo.  Monarchists  and  Public  Life.  Brazilians 
condone  Revolution.  Praetorian  Administration.  Reaction  in  Sao 
Paulo.  Imaginary  Plot  against  Government.  Arbitrary  Measures. 

New  Banking  Laws.  Misiones  Question.  Congress  Summoned. 

Law  of  Constitution.  Presidential  Election  ....  231 


CHAPTEE  X I Y 

BRAZIL — continued 

Autocratic  Administration.  Sao  Paulo  dissatisfied.  Manifesto  con- 
demning Federal  Authorities.  Second  Manifesto  accusing  the 
President.  Severity  of  Praetorian  Regime.  Chambers  Hostile  to 
President.  Congress  refuses  Supplies.  Coup  d’etat  of  da  F’onseca. 

The  Chambers  Dissolved.  Martial  Law.  President  da  F'onseca  as 
Dictator.  Monarchist  Conspiracies.  The  Public  and  the  President. 
General  Peixoto  becomes  Prominent.  Sao  Paulo  disappoints 
Public  Expectation.  Rio  Grande  against  the  Dictatorship.  Para 
follows  the  lead  of  Rio  Grande.  Naval  Revolution  in  Rio.  Arrests 
of  Prominent  Persons.  President  Resigns.  Vice-President  Peixoto 
succeeds  to  the  Presidency.  Riots  in  the  Capital.  Congress  Re- 
assembles. Death  of  Dom  Pedro  II.  New  Electoral  Law.  Militarism 
Dominant  Mutiny  at  Santa  Cruz.  Intervention  in  Local  Affairs. 
Question  of  New  Presidential  Election.  Protest  of  Officers.  Presi- 
dent and  Congress.  Military  Despotism.  Insurrection  in  Rio  Grande 
do  Sul.  General  Peixoto  and  Governors  of  States.  Resignation  of 
Marine  and  Finance  Ministers.  Affairs  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul. 
Admiral  Wandelkolk  and  the  Insurgents.  Naval  Revolt.  Govern- 
ment Surprised.  Admiral  de  Mello.  Prolonged  Conflict  not  expected. 
Determination  of  Peixoto.  Defence  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  and 

Nictheroy.  Rebel  Squadron  and  Resources.  Bombardment  of  Rio. 

Panic  amongst  Inhabitants.  Italian  Incident.  Indemnity  Paid.  Rebel 
Ships  leave  Rio.  Object  of  sending  Expedition  to  South.  Formation 
of  Provisional  Government  Situation  in  Rio  Harbour.  Ville- 

gaignon  joins  Revolt.  Explosion  at  Gouvernador  Island.  The 
Aquidaban  and  Hsperanqa  leave  Harbour.  Saldanha  da  Gama  joins 
Revolt.  Supporters  of  Peixoto  assert  da  Gama  attempting  Restora- 
tion of  Monarchy  .......  . 250 


XVI 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XV 

brazil — continued 

Position  in  December  1893.  Many  Persons  Emigrate.  Precautions  to  stop  page 
Rebel  Supplies.  Peixoto  orders  Daily  Firing  against  Rebel  Ships. 

Troops  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Nictheroy.  The  Government  Flotilla. 
Admiral  da  Gama.  Strain  of  Continuous  Fighting.  Ilha  Gouver- 
nador.  General  Telles  Killed.  Capture  of  Ilha  Moeangue.  Person- 
ality of  da  Gama.  Question  of  Belligerent  Rights.  Journey  of  Mello 
to  the  South.  Saraiva  marches  Northwards.  Personality  of  Saraiva. 

Rebel  Plan  of  Campaign.  Saraiva  reaches  Parana.  Mello  captures 
Paranagua.  Successes  raise  Revolutionary  Prestige.  Lapa  Sur- 
renders. War  Material  captured  at  Curityba.  Scarcity  of  Ammuni- 
tion. Rebel  Casualties.  Artillery  Fire  more  effective.  Government 
Flotilla  sails  from  Europe.  Foreign  Trade  Suffers.  Insurgent 
Hospital  Bombarded.  Admiral  da  Gama  urges  Mello  to  send  Rein- 
forcements. The  Aquidaban  reaches  Harbour.  Rebels  attack  the 
Armacao.  Incident  of  U.S.  Admiral  Staunton.  Arrival  of  U.S. 
Admiral  Benham.  Threat  if  United  States  Merchantmen  Molested. 
Situation  of  Rebels.  Council  of  War.  Cruiser  Republica  Appears. 
Aquidaban  and  Republica  sail  Northwards.  Government  Flotilla 
Arrives.  Population  advised  to  leave  City.  Rebel  Situation 
Desperate.  Captain  Castilhos  grants  asylum  on  Portuguese  Men-of- 
War.  Rebel  Positions  Abandoned.  Peixoto  demands  Surrender  of 
Refugees  from  Castilhos.  Portuguese  Vessels  convey  Rebels  to 
Montevideo.  Diplomatic  Relations  interrupted  with  Portugal.  Inci- 
dent of  H.M.S.  Sirius.  Brutal  Treatment  of  Insurgent  Wounded  . 267 


CHAPTER  XVI 

brazil — continued 

The  Voyage  of  the  Aquidaban  and  the  Republica.  Saraiva  deceived  as  to 
the  Position.  Mello  and  Saraiva.  Discontent  with  Provisional  Govern- 
ment. Presidential  Election.  Dr  Prudente  Moraes.  News  reaches 
Saraiva.  Parana  Evacuated.  Mello  organises  Expedition  to  Rio 
Grande.  Curityba  occupied  without  Resistance.  Rebel  Cause  col- 
lapses. Naval  Expedition  against  Desterro.  Rebel  Expedition 
enters  Rio  Grande.  Threatened  Bombardment  of  Rio  Grande.  Attack 
on  Rio  Grande.  Insurgent  Troops  landed  in  Uruguay.  Mello  delivers 
Rebel  Ships  to  Argentine  Authorities.  Argentine  Government  returns 
Vessels  to  Brazil.  Naval  Expedition  at  Desterro.  Aquidaban  sunk. 
Desterro  occupied.  Insurgents  shot  by  Military  Authorities.  French- 
men executed.  Indemnity  demanded  by  French  Government.  Fate 
of  Saraiva.  Revolution  crushed.  President  Moraes  accedes  to  Office. 

Policy  of  new  President  Militarism  decreases.  Opposition  to  Moraes. 
Amnesty  for  Rebels.  Law  of  Constitution  strictly  observed.  Misiones 
Boundary  settled.  Outbreak  at  Military  School.  Firm  Attitude  of 
President.  Diplomatic  Relations  with  Portugal  resumed.  Disturb- 
ances in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  Admiral  da  Gama  joins  Insurgents. 
Atrocities  by  Troops  and  Rebels  in  Rio  Grande.  Battle  at  Campo 
Osorio.  Death  of  da  Gama.  Suspension  of  Hostilities.  The  Trinidade 
Question.  Peace  arranged  with  Insurgents.  Amnesty  for  Officers. 
Suppression  of  Praetorian  Methods.  Italian  Claims.  Financial  Legis- 
lation. President  Moraes  temporarily  vacates  Office  . . . ^82 


CONTENTS 


xvn 


CHAPTEE  XVII 

BRAZIL — continued 


Sudden  return  of  President  Moraes  to  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Plot  against  the  page 
President.  Story  of  Antonio  Maciel.  The  Canudos  Settlement  The 
Jagunc(os  and  the  Bahia  Police.  Bahia  Government  ask  help  against 
Conselheiro.  Troops  sent  to  Canudos  and  defeated  by  Jctguncos. 
Another  Expedition  to  Canudos  under  Colonel  Moreiar  Caesar.  Riots 
in  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Murder  of  Colonel  Gentil  de  Castro.  Strong  force 
organised  against  Canudos.  General  Oscar  in  charge  of  Military 
Operations.  Situation  of  Expedition  unsatisfactory.  Heavy  Casual- 
ties amongst  Troops.  Followers  of  Conselheiro  attack  Troops  under 
General  Oscar.  Situation  saved  by  General  Savaget.  Minister  of 
War  at  the  front.  Power  of  Religious  Fanaticism.  Failure  to  storm 
Canudos.  Siege  of  the  Stronghold.  Canudos  captured,  October  3. 
Atrocities  of  Canudos.  Withdrawal  of  Troops.  Final  Report  of  Opera- 
tions. Accusations  of  Military  Clique  in  Rio  against  Moraes. 

Plot  to  Assassinate  President  Moraes.  Murder  of  Minister  of  War. 
Arrests  made.  Public  Opinion  and  Attempt  upon  Life  of  President. 
Presidential  Candidates.  Campos  Salles  supported  by  President. 

Dr  Campos  Salles  elected.  Personality  of  President-elect.  Critical 
financial  situation.  Mission  of  Campos  Salles  to  London.  Fund- 
ing Loan  Agreement.  Campos  Salles  accedes.  Contrast  between 
1894  and  1898.  The  Amapa  Question.  Nebuco  represents 
Brazil.  Policy  of  President  Campos  Salles.  Brazilians  satisfied. 
President  of  Argentine  visits  Brazil.  Fiscal  Legislation.  Lack  of 
strong  Political  Parties.  Bubonic  Plague  in  Santos  and  Rio. 
Economic  Development  and  Political  Disturbances.  State  Govern- 
ments. Illegitimate  Taxation.  Federal  Courts.  States  and  Railways. 
Distribution  of  Population.  Italians.  State-aided  Immigration. 

Sao  Paulo  and  the  Italian  Colony.  German  Settlements  in  Brazil. 
German  Colonists  during  Revolution.  Portuguese  Immigrants. 
Brazilian  National  Character.  Positivist  Tendencies.  Public  Instruc- 
tion. Number  of  “Illiterates.”  Apathy  concerning  Education. 

Administration  of  Justice.  Condition  of  Prisons.  Capital  of  Minas 
Geraes.  Depreciation  of  Currency.  Means  of  Communication. 
Inadequate  Railway  System.  State  Control  of  Railways.  Central 
Railway  a Political  Machine.  Telegraphs  and  Cables.  Inefficiency 
of  the  State  Lines.  Brazilian  Waterways  . . . 295,  296 


PART  II 

CHAPTEE  XVIII 

CHILE 

Law  of  Constitution.  Congress.  The  Executive.  State  Council.  Adminis- 
tration from  1833  to  1861.  President  Bulnes.  President  Month 

0 


XV11I 


CONTENTS 


President  Perez.  Liberal  Administration.  Disaster  to  the  Com-  page 
pania  Church.  War  with  Spain.  Blockade  of  Valparaiso.  Capture 
of  the  Covadonya.  Bombardment  of  Valparaiso.  Truce  with  Spain. 
Foundation  of  Chilian  Navy.  Re-election  of  President  Perez. 
Economic  Progress.  President  Errazuriz.  Construction  of  the 
Cochrane  and  Blanco  Encalada.  Railway  Expansion.  Presidential 
Candidates  in  1876.  President  Pinto.  Relations  between  Chile  and 
Bolivia.  Economic  Crisis.  Inconvertible  Currency.  Relations  with 
Argentina.  Quarrel  with  Bolivia  and  Peru.  President  Pinto  and  the 
War.  Presidential  Contest  in  1881.  Election  of  Santa  Maria.  Con- 
gressional Elections.  Treaty  with  Peru.  Truce  with  Bolivia.  Laws 
of  Civil  Registry  and  Marriage.  The  Cemeteries.  Presidential  Election 
in  1886.  Origin  of  Parliamentary  System.  Early  Days  of  Balmaeeda. 
Special  Mission  to  Lima.  His  connection  with  Politics.  Election  to 
Congress.  Programme  of  Reformistas.  Opposition  to  new  Political 
Movement.  Balmaeeda  appointed  Minister  in  Buenos  Aires.  Balma- 
ceda  in  1882  and  1885.  Election  to  Presidency.  Political  Intrigues. 
Ministry  of  Seiior  Carlos  Antunez.  Zanartii  Cabinet.  Congressional 
Elections,  1888.  Resignation  of  Zanartii.  Ministerial  Changes. 

Policy  concerning  Church  and  Education.  Conflict  between  Congress 
and  Executive.  Political  situation  in  1890.  Dictatorial  attitude  of 
Balmaeeda.  Senor  Vicuna  proclaimed  Presidential  Candidate. 
Resolutions  by  Mass  Meetings.  The  Comision  Conse>~vadora.  Pretext 
for  Revolt  .........  321 


CHAPTER  XIX 

CHILE — continued 

Preparations  for  Rebellion.  The  Navy  Revolts.  Capture  of  War  Material. 
Skirmish  in  Valparaiso.  Occupation  of  Coquimbo.  Engagement  at 
Pisagua.  Attitude  of  Balmaeeda.  Measures  against  Revolution. 
Position  in  January,  1891.  Public  Opinion.  Capture  of  Pisagua. 
Revolutionary  Troops.  Fight  near  Dolores.  Congressionalists 
Defeated  at  Huara.  Occupation  of  Iquique.  Attempt  to  Recapture 
Iquique.  Intervention  of  Admiral  Hotham.  Congressionalists  at 
Iquique.  Defeat  of  Robles  at  Pozo  Almonte.  Capture  of  Arica. 
Reinforcements  for  Tarapaca.  Antofagasta  Blockaded.  Evacuation 
of  Antofagasta.  Colonel  Camus  Retires  into  Bolivia.  Occupation  of 
Caldera.  The  Blanco  Encalada.  Lull  in  Hostilities.  Treatment  of 
Suspected  Persons.  Financial  Difficulties.  The  Junta  de  Gobierno. 
Revolutionary  Agents.  The  ltata  Incident.  Peace  Negotiations. 
Meeting  of  Commissioners  in  Santiago.  Attempt  to  Assassinate 
Balmaeeda.  Optimistic  Feeling.  The  Condell  and  Lynch.  Dicta- 
torial Tendencies  of  Balmaeeda.  Election  of  Senor  Claudio  Vicuna. 
Richard  Cumming.  Revolutionary  Propaganda  in  Europe.  Sym- 
pathy with  Revolutionary  Cause.  Armaments  reach  Iquique. 
Congressionalist  Army.  Revolutionary  Committee  in  Santiago  and 
Valparaiso.  Embarkation  of  Revolutionary  Army.  Balmaeeda  and 
the  Invasion.  Insurgents  near  Santiago.  Execution  of  Prisoners. 
Massacre  of  Lo  Cafias.  Tyrannical  Conduct  of  Balmaeeda.  The 
Esmeralda  off  Valparaiso.  Landing  of  Congressionalists.  'The  Central 
and  Southern  Districts  ....... 


345 


CONTENTS 


xix 


CHAPTER  XX 

chile — continued 

Country  round  Quinteros.  Congressionalist  Army.  Tactics  of  Defence.  PAQE 
Battle  of  Concon.  Congressionalist  Victory.  Heavy  Casualties. 
Reorganisation  of  Government  Troops.  Reinforcements  from  Santiago. 
Defence  of  Vina  del  Mar.  Faulty  Information  Concerning  Valparaiso. 
Advance  on  Vina  del  Mar.  Concentration  at  Quilpue.  Preparations 
for  Attacking  Valparaiso.  March  to  Placilla.  Defence  of  Plaeilla. 
Strength  of  the  Armies.  Battle  of  Placilla.  Severe  Losses.  Occu- 
pation of  Valparaiso.  Riotous  Scenes.  Message  to  Balmaceda.  The 
President  Resigns  his  Powers.  Decree  of  General  Baquedano. 
Political  Prisoners.  Unprotected  state  of  Santiago.  Arrival  of  the 
Junta  de  Gobierno.  Disarmament  of  Troops  ....  370 


CHAPTER  XXI 

chile — continued 

General  Baquedano  Surrenders  Powers.  Proclamation  by  Admiral  Month 
Work  of  Reconstruction.  Unsettled  Conditions.  Disappearance  of 
Balmaceda.  Suicide  of  Balmaceda.  Political  Testament  of  Balmaceda. 
Explanation  of  Suicide.  New  Congress.  Junta  de  Gobierno  Resigns. 
Admiral  Montt  as  Presidential  Candidate.  Cost  of  the  Revolution. 
Election  of  Montt.  Promotions  for  Services.  Actions  concerning 
Supporters  of  Balmaceda.  Law  of  Amnesty.  Chile  and  the  United 
States.  The  Baltimore  Incident.  Message  of  President  Harrison  to 
the  U.S.  Congress.  Telegram  from  Santiago  to  Chilian  Minister  in 
Washington.  United  States  Ultimatum.  Excitement  in  Chile. 
Apology  to  U.S.  Government  ......  383 


CHAPTER  XXII 

chile — continued 

Real  Issues  of  the  Civil  War.  Political  Situation  in  1892.  Comisi&n 
Conservadora.  Increase  of  Naval  Strength.  Military  Reorganisation. 
Congressional  Elections  in  1894.  Political  Situation.  Domestic 

Legislation.  Municipal  Law.  Conversion  of  the  Currency. 
Political  Parties  in  Congress.  Coalition  Cabinet.  Complications 
with  Argentina.  Sale  of  the  Esmeralda  to  Japan.  Understanding 
with  Peru  re,  Tacna  and  Arica.  Treaty  with  Bolivia.  A Diplomatic 
Blunder.  Presidential  Contest  in  189G.  Election  of  Senor  Federico 
Errazuriz.  Congressional  Elections  in  1897.  The  Boundary  Question 
with  Argentina.  War  Imminent.  Attitude  of  Errazuriz.  Arbitration 
re  Tacna  and  Arica.  The  Bolivian  Question.  The  Kiinig  Note.  Presi- 
dential Contest  in  1901  ...... 


397 


XX 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

CHILE — continued 

Effect  of  Foreign  Wars  and  Internal  Disturbances.  Movement  of  Popula-  page 
tion.  Infantile  Mortality.  Immigration.  Araucanian  Indians. 
Physical  Qualities.  Tendency  to  Drift  to  the  Cities.  Spread  of 
Alcoholism.  Drunkenness  in  Valparaiso  and  London.  Regulation  of 
Liquor  Traffic.  Chilians  and  the  Government.  Educational  Facilities. 
Primary  Instruction.  Educational  Statistics.  German  Schools. 
Secondary  and  Higher  Education.  Religious  Liberty.  Church 
Influence.  Administration  of  Justice.  Brigandage.  National  Char- 
acter. Aggressive  Nature  of  Chilians.  Means  of  Communication. 

State  and  Private  Railways.  Patagonia  and  Tierra  del  Fuego. 
Industrial  Zones.  Mining  Industry.  Nitrate  of  Soda.  Development 
of  Tarapaca.  Copper  Mining.  Want  of  Transport  Facilities.  Silver 
Mining.  Gold  and  Manganese.  Specimens  of  Minerals  at  Santiago. 

Coal  and  Iron.  Borax.  Proportion  of  Minerals  to  remainder  of 
Exports.  Agricultural  Enterprise.  Rapid  Decadence  after  1893. 
Production  of'  Wheat.  The  Government  and  Agricultural  Industry. 
Viticulture.  Pastoral  Industry.  Sheep-breeding  in  Patagonia.  The 
Lumber  Trade.  The  Fishing  Industry.  Manufactures.  Lack  of 
Skilled  Labour.  Cloth  and  Cotton  Factories.  Sugar  Refineries. 
Protection  for  Manufacturing  Interests  .....  410 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


TIIE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 

Position  of  Atacama.  Chile  and  Bolivia.  The  Guano  Deposits.  Bolivian 
Claims.  Dispute  in  1861.  Situation  in  1864.  War  between  Peru 
and  Spain.  Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Chile.  Bad  Faith  of  Bolivia. 
Intrigues  by  Peru.  Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Peru.  Relations 
between  Bolivia  and  Chile.  Chilian  Capital  in  Atacama.  Violation 
of  Treaty  of  1874.  Peruvian  Intrigues  in  Bolivia.  Duty  on  Nitrate 
of  Soda.  Ultimatum  of  Chile  to  Bolivia.  Occupation  of  Antofagasta 
by  Chilians.  Declaration  of  War  by  Bolivia.  Peru  proposes  Arbi- 
tration. Chile  declares  War  on  Peru.  Relations  between  Argentina 
and  Chile.  Illusions  of  Bolivia  and  Peru.  Naval  Armaments. 
Equipment  of  Chilian  and  Peruvian  Vessels.  Military  Forces  of  the 
Three  Countries.  Chilian  Preparations.  Inaction  of  Bolivia  and 
Peru.  Embarkation  of  Chilian  Troops.  Occupation  of  Antofagasta. 

Attack  on  Calama.  Occupation  of  Toeopilla  and  Cobija.  Blockade 
of  Iquique.  Peruvian  Seaboard  Harried  by  Chilians.  Bombardment 
of  Pisagua.  Reconnaissance  to  Callao.  Peruvians  attempt  to  raise 
Blockade  of  Iquique.  Attack  of  the  Huascar  and  Independencia  on 
the  Esmeralda  and  Covadonga.  Loss  of  the  Esmeralda  and  the 
Independencia.  Preponderance  of  Chilian  Sea-power.  Peruvian 
Reprisals.  Chilian  Discontent.  Capture  of  the  Huascar  and 
Pilcumayo .........  433 


CONTENTS 


xxi 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE  CIIILIAN-PERUVIAN  AVAR — continued 

Third  Phase  of  the  War.  Chilians  at  Antofagasta.  Embarkation  of  page 
Expeditionary  Forces.  Peruvians  defend  Tarapaca.  Attack  on 
Pisagua.  Retreat  to  San  Roberto.  Occupation  of  Junin.  Skirmish 
near  Agua  Santa.  Attack  on  Chilians  near  Dolores.  Chilian  Victory. 
Retreat  to  Tarapaca.  Occupation  of  Iquique.  Stand  at  Tarapaca. 
Expedition  under  Colonel  Arteaga.  Battle  of  Tarapaca.  Peruvian 
Victory.  Peruvians  fall  back  on  Arica.  Defence  of  Arica.  The 
Chilian  Advance.  Engagement  at  Torata.  Taena  and  Arica 
Isolated.  Skirmish  near  the  River  Sama.  Battle  of  Tacna.  Rout  of 
Defenders.  Heavy  Casualties.  Battle  of  Arica.  Sinking  of  the 
Manco  Capac  ........  458 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE  CIIILIAN-PERUVIAN  AVAR — continued 

Internal  Dissensions.  President  Prado  leaves  Peru.  Senor  Pierola  heads 
a Revolt.  Blockade  of  Callao.  Bombardment  of  Callao.  Sinking 
of  the  Jumqueo.  Loss  of  the  Loa.  Sinking  of  the  Covadonqa. 
Bombardment  of  Chancay,  Ancon,  and  Chorillos.  Expedition  to 
the  Northern  Coast.  Protests  from  Foreign  Representatives.  Efforts 
of  United  States  for  Peace.  Conference  on  U.S.  Warship  Lackawana. 
Conditions  of  Chile.  Chilian  Preparations  for  Advance  on  Lima. 

Army  of  Invasion.  Occupation  of  Pisco  and  Yea.  Landing  at 
Curayaco.  Naval  Operations  off  Callao.  Defences  of  Lima. 

Fourth  Phase  of  War.  Advance  on  Peruvian  Positions.  Battle  of 
Chorillos.  Fighting  on  Morro  Solar.  Armistice  arranged  by  Foreign 
Diplomats.  Battle  of  Miraflores.  Lima  Surrenders.  Occupation  of 
the  Peruvian  Capital  . . . . . . .474 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

THE  CHILIAN -PERUVIAN  AVAR — continued 

Panic  in  Lima.  Asylum  given  by  the  Legations.  Action  of  British  and 
French  Admirals.  Urban  Guard.  General  Saavedra  re-establishes 
Order.  Conduct  of  Chilians.  Entry  of  General  Baquedano  into  Lima. 
Vessels  Destroyed  at  Callao.  Admiral  Lynch  Commands  in  Peru. 
Government  of  Dr  Calderon.  Recognition  of  Calderon  Administra- 
tion by  United  States.  Admiral  Lynch  overturns  Calderon.  The 
Montero  Government.  Situation  in  1882.  Caceres  and  Guerilla 
Warfare.  Peruvian  Army  at  Arequipa.  Expedition  against  Arequipa. 
Peruvians  Defeated.  Government  of  General  Iglesias.  Conditions  of 
Peace.  Treaty  between  Chile  and  Peru.  Evacuation  of  Lima.  Ratifi- 
cation of  Treaty.  Negotiations  between  Chile  and  Bolivia.  Text  of 
Agreement  between  Chile  and  Bolivia.  Result  of  the  War  . . 490 

b 2 


XXII 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

PERU 

Constitution  of  1860.  President  San  Roman.  Revolution  against  Pezet.  PA0K 
Dispute  with  Spain.  Squadron  under  Admiral  Pinzon.  Incident  at 
Talambo.  Memorandum  of  Spanish  Commissioner.  The  Chincha 
Islands.  Action  of  Bolivia,  Chile,  and  Ecuador.  Loss  of  the  Triunfo. 

Treaty  between  Peru  and  Spain.  Pezet  driven  from  Office.  War 
with  Spain.  Capture  of  the  Covadonga.  Suicide  of  Spanish  Admiral. 

Naval  Eight  near  Abtao.  Bombardment  of  Callao.  Withdrawal  of 
Spanish  Squadron.  Dictatorship  of  Prado.  Revision  of  Constitution. 

Prado  proclaimed  President.  Revolution  against  Prado.  Reforms 
of  1867.  Election  of  Colonel  Balta.  Financial  Embarrassments. 

The  Dreyfus  Contract.  Railway  Construction.  Presidential  Candi- 
dates in  1872.  The  Gutierrez  Conspiracy.  Death  of  Colonel  Silvestre 
Gutierrez.  Assassination  of  Balta.  Death  of  Colonel  Tomas  Gutierrez. 
Presidency  of  Manuel  Pardo.  Economic  Conditions.  Revolutionary 
Attempts  of  Pierola.  Foreign  Policy.  Alliance  with  Bolivia.  Election 
of  Prado.  Revolutionary  Outbreak.  The  Huascar  and  the  Shah 
and  Amethyst.  Treaty  with  Spain.  Murder  of  Pardo.  Complications 
with  Chile.  Outbreak  of  Hostilities.  President  Prado  commands 
the  Army.  The  President  abandons  Peru.  Revolution  under  Pierola. 
Fighting  in  Lima.  Pierola  proclaimed  Supreme  Chief.  Occupation 
of  Lima.  Pierola  leaves  Peru.  Administration  of  Iglesias.  Revolu- 
tion under  Caceres.  Insurgents  attack  Lima.  Second  Assault  on  Lima. 
Iglesias  Resigns.  Election  of  Caceres.  Quiet  Conditions.  Economic 
Crisis.  Presidency  of  Bermudez.  Death  of  Bermudez.  Colonel 
Borgoho  assumes  Office.  Revolutionary  Rising.  Chambers  Dis- 
solved. Caceres  again  President.  Spread  of  Revolution.  Pierola 
attacks  Lima.  Caceres  Defeated.  Provisional  Administration. 
Pierola  Elected.  Insurrection  at  Iquitos.  Reforms  under  Pierola. 
Revolution  in  1898.  Election  of  Romaha.  International  Questions  . 505 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

Peru — continue  d 

Movement  ot  Population.  Effect  of  Wars  and  Revolutions.  Decrease 
of  Inhabitants.  Races  of  Peru.  Conflicting  Elements  in  Population. 
Japanese  Immigration.  Infantile  Mortality.  Unhygienic  Conditions. 
Alcoholism.  National  Language.  Similarity  with  Semitic  Customs  and 
Words.  Topographical  Zones.  Education.  Primary  Instruction. 
Educational  Statistics.  Secondary  and  Higher  Education.  Justice. 

Legal  Procedure.  Influence  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  National 
Character.  Municipal  Government.  Typical  Spanish  Features  in 
Lima.  City  of  Arequipa.  The  Commercial  Situation.  Trade  Con- 
ditions. Financial  Situation.  Contract  with  Bondholders.  The 
Peruvian  Corporation.  Internal  Debt.  Taxation.  The  Currency 
Question.  Industrial  Occupations.  Sugar  Enterprise.  Labour 
Question.  Cotton  Production.  Coffee  and  Cacao.  Minor  Agricul- 
tural Products.  Pastoral  Industry.  Llamas  and  Alpacas.  Minerals. 
Difficulties  of  Mining  Enterprise.  Cerro  de  Pasco.  Silver  Production. 
Petroleum.  Coal.  Borax.  Mining  Laws.  The  Rubber  Districts. 
Manufacturing  Industry.  Cotton  and  Woollen  Mills.  Panama  Hats. 

Motive  Power  for  Manufacturing.  Development  and  Transport  . 530 


CONTENTS 


xxiii 


CHAPTEE  XXX 


BOLIVIA 

Political  Conditions  before  War  with  Chile.  Conservatives  and  Liberals.  PAOE 
Peruvian  Intrigues.  President  Daza.  Situation  of  Bolivia  when 
Hostilities  Ceased.  President  Campero.  Reform  of  the  Constitution. 
Negotiations  with  Chile.  Presidency  of  Sehor  Pacheco.  President 
Arce.  Argentine  and  Chilian  Pretensions.  Treaty  with  Argentina. 

Indian  Outbreak.  President  Baptista.  Attitude  of  Chile.  Senor 
Severo  Alonzo  succeeds  Baptista.  Sedition  fomented  by  Liberals. 
Outbreak  of  Insurrection.  Abdication  of  Alonzo.  Provisional  Govern- 
ment under  Pando.  Casualties  during  the  Revolution.  Election  of 
Pando.  Question  with  Chile.  The  Konig  Note.  The  Acre  Dispute. 

The  National  Capital.  Means  of  Communication  and  Seditious  Out- 
breaks. Internal  Polities.  The  White  Population.  The  Political 
Significance  of  the  Indians.  Stories  of  Indian  Ferocity.  Geographical 
Position.  Disturbed  Internal  Conditions  and  Economic  Progress. 

Area  and  Population.  Classification  of  Inhabitants.  Bolivian  Cities. 
Topographical  Features.  The  Four  Zones.  Bolivian  Languages. 

Local  Colour.  Native  Customs.  Education.  Primary  Instruction. 
Secondary  and|Higher  Education.  Administration  of  Justice.  National 
Character.  Communication  with  Bolivia.  Lack  of  Internal  Trans- 
port Facilities.  Industrial  Enterprise.  Agriculture.  The  Mining 
Industry.  Silver  Production.  Indiarubber.  Pastoral  Industry.  The 
Financial  Situation.  Commercial  Conditions  ....  554 


CHAPTEE  XXXI 


ECUADOR 

Acts  of  Constitution.  Administration  of  President  Moreno,  and  his  Assassi- 
nation. Presidency  of  Dr  Borrero.  Revolt  under  General  Veintemilla. 

Defeat  of  the  Government.  Provisional  Administration.  Election  of 
Veintemilla.  Yeintemilla  declared  Dictator.  Revolt  against  Veinte- 
milla,  and  his  Flight.  Administration  of  Dr  Placido  Caamano.  Sedi- 
tious Conspiracies.  Election  of  Dr  Flores,  and  his  Policy.  Presidency 
of  Dr  Luis  Cordero.  The  Esmeralda  Incident.  Indignation  against 
Cordero.  Revolution  under  General  Alfaro.  Fight  of  Cordero. 
Provisional  Government  under  Alfaro,  and  his  Election.  Alfaro  and 
the  Clergy.  Conspiracies  against  Alfaro.  Laws  regarding  Sedition. 
Political  Conditions  and  Economic  Progress.  Lack  of  Immigration. 

Area  and  Population.  Cities  of  Ecuador.  Fires  in  Guayaquil. 
Topography  of  Ecuador.  Educational  Progress.  Justice.  National 
Character.  Indian  Characteristics.  Means  of  Communication. 
Industrial  Enterprise.  Pastoral  Pursuits.  Mineral  Wealth.  Financial 
Situation.  Revenue  and  Expenditure.  Commercial  Situation.  Future 
Prospects  .......  . 577 


XXIV 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XXXII 


COLOMBIA 

Various  Titles  of  Colombia.  Internal  Political  Troubles.  Political  Parties,  page 
Election  of  Senor  Rafael  Nunez.  Revolution  in  1881.  Settlement 
with  Costa  Rica.  President  Laldua.  General  Obaldra.  Liberals 
support  Senor  Nunez.  Boundary  Question  with  Venezuela.  President 
Nunez  in  1884.  Nunez  and  the  Conservatives.  Rebellion  in  1885.  Re- 
establishment of  Peace.  Occupation  of  Panama  and  Colon  by  United 
States  Forces.  President  Nunez  at  Cartagena.  Revision  of  the  Law  of 
Constitution.  Discontent  between  1888  and  1892.  Nunez  again  elected. 

Senor  Miguel  Caro  Vice-President.  Death  of  Nunez.  Revolt  in  1895. 
Election  of  Senor  Sandemente.  Senor  Marroquin  as  Vice-President. 
Revolution  in  1898.  President  Sandemente  temporarily  Resigns.  Vice- 
President  Marroquin  supercedes  Sandemente.  Panama  Secedes. 
Incapacity  of  Colombians  for  Independent  Government.  Topography 
and  Revolutionary  Practices.  Reason  of  Present  Political  Conditions. 
Economic  Progress  and  Political  Disturbances.  Topographical  Features. 
Climate.  Area  and  Population.  Hygienic  Conditions.  Education. 
Primary  Instruction.  The  Peasant  Class  and  Education.  Secondary 
and  Higher  Education.  Justice.  The  Roman  Catholic  Church. 
Religious  Seminaries.  Missionary  Work  and  the  Indians.  National 
Character.  Alcoholism.  Industrial  Enterprise.  Mining.  Manu- 
factures. The  Pradera  Iron  Works.  The  Panama  Canal.  Financial 
Situation.  Future  Prospects  ......  591 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 


VENEZUELA 

Internal  Dissensions.  Struggle  between  the  “ Yellows  ” and  the  “ Blues.” 
General  Blanco.  Revolt  under  General  Salazar.  Policy  of  Blanco. 
Conspiracy  in  1889.  Blanco  Overthrown.  Election  of  General  Palacios. 
Revolt  under  Crespo.  Provisional  Government.  Crespo  Elected. 
Revolution  under  Dr  Rojas  Paul.  Boundary  Question  with  Great 
Britain.  The  Uruan  Incident.  Venezuela  and  the  United  States. 
Mr  Olney  and  the  Marquess  of  Salisbury.  The  Monroe  Doctrine. 
The  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  The  Cleveland  Message. 
Venezuela  and  British  Trade.  Dignified  Attitude  of  Crespo.  Boundary 
Dispute  Centres  in  Washington.  The  Cleveland  Commission.  The 
Arbitration  Tribunal.  The  Award.  Diplomatic  Relations  between 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela.  The  Crespo  Administration.  Election 
of  Senor  Andrade.  Revolt  against  Andrade  Administration.  Death 
of  Crespo.  Victory  of  the  Revolution.  Election  of  President  Castro. 
Modification  of  the  Constitution.  Political  Division  of  Venezuela. 
Seditious  Practices.  Revolutionary  Tendencies.  Climate  and  Topog- 
raphy. Statistics  of  Population.  Immigration.  Municipalities. 
Public  Education.  Justice.  Influence  of  the  Church.  Aversion  to 
the  Marriage  Ceremony.  The  Priesthood.  National  Character. 
Indian  Characteristics.  Industrial  Enterprise.  Mining  Enterprise. 


CONTENTS 


VXV 


Manufacturing  Industry.  Means  of  Communication.  Financial  PAGE 
Situation.  Estimates  for  1899-1900.  The  Commercial  Situation. 

Low  Prices  for  Coffee.  Imported  Merchandise.  Exports.  Com- 
parison of  British  and  United  States  Trades.  German  Competition. 

Future  Prospects  ........  617 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 


CONCLUSION 

The  Republics  and  Internal  Dissensions.  Spanish  and  Portuguese  Influ- 
ence on  the  Inhabitants.  South  America  and  Cuba.  Spanish  Traits 
Modified.  More  Peaceful  Future  Conditions.  Measures  for  Consoli- 
dation. Necessity  of  Closer  Relations  between  South  American 
Republics.  Free  Interchange  of  Commodities.  Europe  and  South 
America.  Reasons  why  Progress  Watched.  Outlet  for  Emigration 
from  Latin  Countries.  Wheat,  Maize,  Beef,  Mutton  and  Coffee. 

Simon  Bolivar  and  the  Spanish  Colonies.  The  Ideals  of  Sucre  and 
San  Martin.  The  Development  of  South  America.  United  States 
Influence.  The  Panama  Canal.  Chilian  Influence  on  the  Pacific 
Coast.  The  United  States  and  Chile.  Bolivian  Mineral  Wealth  and 
"oreign  Immigration  .......  647 


ADDITIONAL  CHAPTER 

BRINGING  UP  TO  DATE  THE  POLITICAL  AND  ECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS 

General  conditions.  Political  relations  between  Europe  and  South 
America.  Relations  with  the  United  States.  Activity  in  Washington 
concerning  South  American  affairs.  South  American  suspicion  of 
United  States  policy.  Progress  in  Argentina.  President  Roque 
Saenz  Pena  and  Dr  Victorino  de  la  Plaza.  Bolivian  boundary 
incident.  Argentine  Centenary  of  Independence.  Development  of 
agricultural  and  pastoral  wealth  in  Argentina.  Increased  transport 
facilities.  Position  in  Brazil.  Extension  of  public  works.  Improve- 
ments in  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Chile  and  Brazil  reach  an  understanding. 
The  coffee  industry  and  the  valorisation  scheme.  Past  and  present 
rubber  production.  Naval  revolt  at  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Agricultural 
development  in  Southern  Brazil.  The  situation  in  Chile.  Effects 
of  the  disaster  at  Valparaiso.  Administration  of  President  Pedro 
Montt.  Chilian  policy  in  connection  with  Peru.  Tacna  and  Arica. 
Chile  and  Bolivia.  Economic  conditions  in  Chile.  The  nitrate  of 
soda  industry.  Character  of  the  Chilians.  Conditions  in  Peru. 
Foreign  capital  and  Peruvian  mineral  resources.  Relations  with 
Chile  hinder  progress.  Internal  dissensions.  Bolivia  and  President 
Pando.  Great  value  of  Bolivian  mineral  deposits.  Disturbed 
situation  in  Paraguay.  Probable  future  of  Paraguay.  Venezuela 
and  President  Castro.  Colombia  and  increased  facilities  of  transport. 


XXVI 


CONTENTS 


The  Panama  Republic.  Education  and  Immigration  the  two  most 
important  questions  to-day  in  South  America.  Necessity  for  properly 
conducted  colonisation  methods.  Value  of  the  tropical  sections  of 
South  America.  The  question  of  Chinese  immigration  for  Northern 
Brazil.  Comparison  between  Eastern  and  Western  methods  in 
regard  to  production  ....... 


Index 


PAGE 

658 

679 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


Simon  Bolivar  ..... 

Jose  San  Martin  .... 

Juan  Martin  de  Puyredon 

Map  of  Southern  Section  of  South  America 

Jose  J.  de  Urquiza  .... 

Mitre,  Sarmiento,  Alem,  del  Valle  . 

Roca  ...... 

Juarez  Celman  ..... 

Pellegrini  ..... 

Uriburu  ..... 

Map  of  Paraguay  .... 

Flores,  Latorre,  Santos 

Borda,  Cuestas,  Aparicio  Saraiva,  Lamas 

Dom  Pedro  II.  . 

Fonseca,  Moraes,  Campos  Salles,  Bittencourt 
Map  of  Brazil  ..... 
Peixoto,  da  Gama,  Mello,  Gumercindo  Saraiva 
Map  of  Peru,  Bolivia,  and  Northern  Chile  . 
Chilian  Celebrities  .... 
Balmaceda  ..... 
Montt,  Bariios  Luco,  Canto,  Koiiner  . 

Map  of  Valparaiso  and  District 
Baquedano,  Pedro  Montt,  Eiirazuriz,  IIiesco 
An  Araucanian  Type  .... 


Frontispiece 
Face  page  24 
„ 32 

„ 34 

„ 38 

„ 42 

„ 54 

„ 70 

„ 86 

„ 108 

„ 130 

„ 198 

„ 218 

„ 232 

„ 244 

„ 250 

„ 262 

„ Part  II 
„ 322 

,,  334 

„ 350 

„ 372 

„ 384 

„ 416 


xxvil 


xxviii  LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATION  S 


Natives  of  Tierra  del  Fuego  . 

PlEROLA  ...... 

Caceres  ...... 

Bermudez,  Candamo  .... 

Romana  ...... 

Inca  Cup  ..... 

Indian  Hut  ..... 

Indians  in  Gala  Costume 

Map  of  Northern  Section  of  South  America 
Map  of  South  America  . 


Face  page  430 


>> 

>) 


476 

492 

526 

530 

546 

562 

572 

576 


At  the  end 


PART  I 


INTRODUCTION 


Some  Traits  of  Spanish  Character.  Ferdinand  and  Isabella.  Treat- 
ment of  Moors  and  Jews.  The  Inquisition  and  Intellectual 
Expansion.  Population  of  Spain  in  the  Fifteenth  Century.  First 
Spanish  Colonists.  Treatment  of  Natives  in  South  America. 
Examples  of  Spanish  Cruelty  and  Treachery.  Destruction  of 
Astec  and  Inca  Civilisation.  Dissensions  in  South  America. 
Spanish  Bravery.  Catholicism  in  South  America.  Immigration 
to  the  Colonies.  Introduction  of  Negroes.  Turbulent  Settlers. 
Political  Parties  in  South  America.  Spain  and  Decentralisation. 
Trade  Restrictions.  Causes  of  Dissatisfaction.  Spanish  Monopoly 
of  Official  Posts.  Incidents  of  Brazilian  History.  British,  French 
and  Dutch  Action.  Plot  for  Brazilian  Independence.  The 
Peninsular  Wars  and  Brazil.  The  Empire  Proclaimed.  Abdica- 
tion of  Pedro  I.  Indian  Population.  The  Tupi-Guarani  Stock. 
Araucanians  and  Patagonians.  Aymara  and  Quichua.  Natural 
Resources  of  the  Continent.  Geographical  Features. 


A destructive  tendency  was  ever  a prominent  trait 
of  the  Spaniards,  as  indeed  it  lias  been,  and  is,  of  most 
conquering  races ; and  it  had  far-reaching  influences 
over  the  countries  falling  under  Spanish  dominion  at 
the  latter  end  of  the  fifteenth  century.  Their  inclination 
was  to  crush  out  the  civilisation  of  a conquered  foe, 
never  to  absorb  its  useful  features.  No  consideration 
was  extended  to  established  customs  in  regions  where 
Spanish  arms  proved  victorious,  no  effort  made  to  adapt 
existing  forms  to  a higher  standard  of  moral  and 
material  progress.  The  monarchs  of  Spain  governed 
by  absolute  authority,  and  this  system  was  accepted  by 
the  Spanish  people.  Everything  foreign  was  regarded 
with  distrust,  and,  where  opportunity  offered,  was  sup- 
pressed to  make  room  for  Spanish  practices. 


4 


INTRODUCTION 


The  period  under  Ferdinand  and  Isabella  is  regarded 
by  Spaniards  as  the  most  noteworthy  epoch  in  the 
national  life,  and  it  was  certainly  replete  with  striking 
historical  events.  It  resounded  with  the  clash  of  arms. 
Supremacy  over  the  Moors  was  won  by  unstinting 
sacrifice  of  blood  and  treasure.  In  industrial  arts  the 
vanquished  foe  was  more  advanced  than  the  victor. 
But  the  Spaniard  could  not  stay  his  destroying  hand. 
He  had  no  monopoly  of  savagery  during  an  epoch  when 
brutality  was  a feature  of  the  age,  but  his  barbarity  left 
so  deep  an  impress  on  South  American  character,  that 
it  is  necessary  to  make  full  reference  to  it  in  any  en- 
deavour to  understand  the  condition  of  the  people  of 
that  continent.  Without  thought  of  future  benefit  to 
Spain  from  Moorish  industry  under  Castilian  rule  the 
conquered  enemy  was  driven  from  the  land,  his  civil- 
isation eliminated,  the  accumulated  wealth  of  centuries 
irretrievably  dispersed.  Never  an  effort  was  made  to 
assimilate  what  was  best  in  the  Moorish  community. 
The  self-satisfied  and  unreasoning  dogma  of  the 
Spaniard  ordained  that  Spanish  methods  and  ideas 
alone  should  be  tolerated. 

The  treatment  of  the  Jewish  population  of  Spain 
has  a strong  bearing  upon  the  national  character. 
Under  the  thinly  veiled  pretext  of  religion,  these 
unfortunate  people  were  mulcted  of  goods  and  chattels, 
and  threatened  with  untold  penalties  if  they  refused  to 
embrace  Christianity.  They  were  denounced  as  heretics 
when  they  did  abjure  the  faith  of  their  forefathers.  To 
obtain  wealth,  Spaniards  married  into  Jewish  families 
to  such  an  extent,  that  a strain  of  Jewish  blood  had 
become  a marked  racial  trait  in  Spain  at  the  close  of 
the  fifteenth  century.  Yet  blood  relationship  availed 
nothing  when  the  fiat  went  forth  at  the  instigation  of 
the  Holy  Inquisition  that  Jews  should  be  driven  from 
Spanish  territory.  Authentic  records  attest  that  33,000 
families  were  expelled  under  circumstances  of  most 
repulsive  cruelty.  So  hard  were  the  conditions  imposed, 
that  many  of  these  exiles  died  by  the  wayside,  starved 


INTRODUCTION 


5 


to  death  in  consequence  of  Spanish  authorities  forbid- 
ding them  to  carry  away  from  their  plenty  a sufficiency 
to  sustain  life,  until  the  haven  of  a foreign  country  was 
reached.  That  was  four  centuries  ago.  How  little  the 
national  character  has  changed,  can  be  judged  by  the 
treatment  meted  out  by  Spaniards  to  Cubans  yesterday. 

Nor  is  it  strange  that  when  other  European  nations 
were  awakening  to  the  demands  of  progressing  civilisa- 
tion, Spain  should  have  shown  none  of  the  intellectual 
expansion  which  forced  other  communities  onwards  and 
upwards.  The  iron  hand  of  the  Inquisition  checked  all 
forward  movement.  That  dread  tribunal  controlled  the 
mental  faculties  of  Spaniards,  and  literature  and  art  were 
subordinated  to  its  tyranny.  It  formed  the  medium  of 
spiteful  revenge  for  every  person  ill  disposed  against  his 
neighbour.  Its  power  was  omnipotent,  crushing  all 
individual  initiative.  It  was  the  custodian  of  every 
Spaniard’s  conscience.  Resistance  to  its  dictates 
entailed  torture  and  death,  and  generation  after  genera- 
tion grew  to  manhood  with  this  awful,  mysterious  force 
pervading  public  and  private  life,  so  that  the  constant 
terror  of  its  workings  dwarfed  national  personality. 

It  was  no  passing  phase  this  effort  of  the  Church  in 
Spain  to  terrorise  men  and  women.  It  lasted  for 
centuries,  and  made  an  indelible  impress  upon  the 
national  mind.  It  was  unsparingly  used  for  political 
purposes  when  occasion  required.  From  it  arose  the 
tyrannical  spirit  and  lust  of  killing  that  afterwards 
found  wide  scope  in  the  vast  colonial  possessions  of 
Spain.  The  Inquisition  fostered  the  destructive 
tendency  in  the  national  character  emanating  from 
the  internal  dissension  and  constant  warfare  to  which 
Spain  has  been  a prey  from  earliest  ages.  It  en- 
couraged every  form  of  cruelty  under  pretence  of 
protection  for  religious  belief ; therefore  it  brutalised 
and  degraded  where  it  professed  to  purify  and  upraise  : 
and  it  was  under  such  guidance  that  Spain  was  destined 
to  impose  her  sway  over  the  new  world  which  Columbus 
opened  to  her  knowledge. 


6 


INTRODUCTION 


At  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century  the  people  of 
Spain  were  of  mixed  blood,  for  the  Spanish  stock  was 
diluted  with  Jewish  and  Moorish  strains.  Moreover, 
the  national  character  had  been  formed  under  malignant 
influences,  and  the  outcome  was  narrow-minded  fanati- 
cism, carelessness  as  to  human  life,  despotic  conduct 
towards  all  of  lower  rank,  an  absence  of  any  impartial 
sense  of  justice.  A lower  standard  of  the  relation  of 
man  to  man,  a narrower  conception  of  public  morality, 
it  would  even  in  those  days  have  been  difficult  to  find 
anywhere.  It  was  from  the  scum  of  this  fanatical 
population  that  the  first  colonists  came.  Adventurers 
who  had  nothing  to  lose  at  home  were  willing  enough 
to  risk  their  lives  in  the  hope  of  substantial  reward  for 
their  services.  From  such  elements  was  drawn  the 
nucleus  of  the  Spanish  population  of  a continent  already 
claiming  many  millions  of  inhabitants  and  teeming  with 
enormous  natural  resources.  In  such  circumstances  it 
was  natural  that  the  worst  characteristics  of  the 
Spaniards  should  become  abnormally  developed.  Out- 
casts in  their  own  country,  they  now  enjoyed  unbridled 
license,  and  their  cupidity  was  unduly  excited  by  riches 
in  the  new  countries  open  to  the  free  exercise  of  their 
evil  passions.  To  these  men  killing  was  no  murder, 
theft  no  crime,  treachery  an  everyday  occurrence. 

The  Spanish  expeditions  to  America  and  the  West 
Indies,  as  recorded  by  Spanish  chroniclers,  were  marked 
by  ferocious  cruelty,  unlimited  bloodshed,  unparalleled 
lust  for  treasure.  A kindly  reception  by  natives  was 
recompensed  by  the  wholesale  enslavement  of  the  people 
for  enforced  labour  in  the  search  for  gold  and  other 
wealth.  Nor  was  any  vestige  of  humanity  shown  in 
the  treatment  of  the  various  tribes  thrown  into  bondage. 
If  food  was  scarce  they  were  allowed  to  starve  whilst 
their  masters  feasted.  Padre  Casas  relates  how,  when 
lack  of  provisions  threatened  a disastrous  famine  amongst 
the  slaves,  many  of  these  unfortunates  were  butchered, 
and  the  victims  served  out  to  the  survivors  to  keep 
them  alive  to  work  as  beasts  of  burthen.  Yet  these 


INTRODUCTION 


7 


expeditions  were  conducted  under  the  pretence,  of 
advancing  civilisation  and  hallowed  by  the  presence  of 
priests.  The  hideous  barbarities  committed  were 
cloaked  over  by  the  fact  that  the  Holy  Cross  was 
planted  on  Pagan  shores  and  the  heathen  forced  to 
accept  the  outward  forms  of  Christianity.  Can  we 
wonder  that  these  creatures  of  misfortune  at  times  rose 
up  in  their  agony  and  slew  their  oppressors  ? 

Nowhere  does  history  record  a more  pitiful  picture 
than  when  the  Spaniards  depopulated  Cuba  of  an 
inoffensive  and  friendly  race.  Or  turn  to  the  action  of 
Cortes  towards  Montezuma,  or  of  Pizarro  towards 
Atahualpa.  Yet  the  Church  condoned  the  atrocious 
cruelty  practised  upon  the  representatives  of  Astec  and 
Inca  royalty.  Upholders  of  Spanish  traditions  plead 
that  the  barbarities  attending  the  conquest  of  Mexico 
and  South  America  were  in  accordance  with  the  spirit 
of  the  age.  Such  excuse  is  less  than  half  true,  and 
avails  nothing  when  the  effect  upon  the  character  of 
succeeding  generations  is  considered. 

Nothing  can  be  said  in  favour  of  the  absolute 
destruction  of  Astec  and  Inca  civilisation.  The 
Spaniards  could  offer  no  better  system  of  administration 
to  replace  the  empires  so  wantonly  destroyed.  Fear 
that  the  conquered  nations  might  rise  and  drive  the 
Spanish  hordes  into  the  sea  decided  the  leaders  of  the 
invading  hosts  to  smite  their  victims  hip  and  thigh. 
The  narrow-minded  ideas  of  Cortes,  Pizarro,  and  their 
colleagues  never  recognised  that  the  civilisation  they 
found  could  be  turned  to  the  inestimable  advantage  of 
the  Spanish  Crown  and  these  new  countries  governed 
by  expanding  a system  already  established.  The  Astecs 
and  Incas  belonged  undoubtedly  to  a barbaric  period. 
They  were  pagans.  In  customs  and  habits  of  thought 
they  had  little  in  common  with  the  Spaniards,  who 
swept  like  a thunderbolt  over  their  territories.  But 
they  had  developed  a form  of  government  well  adapted 
for  the  needs  of  the  people  and  countries  over  which 
they  claimed  jurisdiction.  Justice  was  administered  by 


8 


INTRODUCTION 


responsible  chiefs,  rapid  communication  between  the 
seat  of  the  central  power  and  the  different  sections  of 
the  Empire  was  maintained,  and  peace  so  far  assured 
as  to  admit  of  agricultural  and  other  pursuits  to  be 
followed. 

With  full  knowledge  of  the  conditions  surrounding 
the  imperial  rule  of  Astec  and  Inca,  the  Spaniards 
deliberately  tore  down  the  whole  fabric  of  existing 
order.  On  the  principle  that  they  were  few  and  the 
inhabitants  of  these  countries  many,  the  Spanish  leaders 
determined  that  the  position  of  themselves  and  their 
followers  would  be  better  secured  if  anarchy  replaced 
stable  administration  in  Mexico,  Peru,  and  elsewhere  in 
South  America.  The  seed  of  unrest  was  thus  sown 
broadcast.  It  matured  with  amazing  rapidity,  and  is 
not  quelled  to  this  day. 

When  the  fear  of  immediate  danger  from  the  con- 
quered nations  was  removed,  the  Spaniards  allowed  their 
hatred  and  jealousies  of  one  another  to  emerge.  The 
disputes  between  the  brothers  Pizarro  and  the  leader 
Almagro  are  typical  of  the  state  of  affairs  prevailing  in 
South  America  in  the  first  half  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
Bloody  battles  were  fought  by  rival  factions.  When 
Almagro  was  defeated  and  captured  near  Cuzco  in  April 
1538,  his  speedy  execution  followed  as  a natural  con- 
sequence. For  Spaniard  or  Indian  death  was  the  penalty 
for  opposition  to  the  clique  in  power. 

One  quality  these  Spaniards  had  to  aid  them  in  their 
conquests.  There  was  no  lack  of  personal  courage. 
Ignorant  they  were,  but  of  their  bravery  no  question 
can  be  raised,  and  the  long  marches  of  those  bands  of 
armed  men  over  vast  stretches  of  arid  desert  compel 
admiration.  Although  often  days  without  a drop  of 
water  to  moisten  throats  parched  by  the  burning  rays 
of  a tropical  sun,  they  never  * despaired,  but  pushed 
onwards  until  the  goal  was  reached.  As  soldiers, 
they  presented  an  undaunted  front,  and  won  their 
way  in  the  face  of  incredible  hardships  through 
countries  where  progress  was  ever  threatened  by  a 


INTRODUCTION  9 

hostile  population,  smarting  under  the  knowledge  of 
cruel  wrongs. 

While  it  is  hard  to  view  with  leniency  the  attitude 
of  the  Catholic  priesthood  during  the  subjugation  of 
South  America,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  in  subsequent 
years  the  clergy  helped  to  inculcate  orderly  ways  amongst 
the  natives.  The  Jesuits  were  active  in  founding  settle- 
ments where  agriculture  was  encouraged  and  mechanical 
arts  taught.  Schools  and  churches  were  established  in 
every  section  of  South  America.  Even  Paraguay  and 
the  desolate  regions  of  Patagonia  were  not  too  distant 
to  receive  the  earnest  attention  of  these  preachers  of 
Christianity,  and  missionaries  were  never  lacking  for 
the  task  of  exploration  in  these  unknown  districts. 
The  policy  of  the  Church  in  South  America  is  full 
of  curious  contradiction.  An  almost  indiscriminate 
slaughter  of  the  inhabitants  was  countenanced  as  a 
necessary  prelude  to  the  foundation  of  Christianity. 
This  was  succeeded  by  the  offer  of  thousands  of  indi- 
vidual members  of  the  priesthood  to  risk  their  lives  and 
suffer  exile  to  spread  the  faith  in  which  they  professed 
such  earnest  belief.  Sword  in  one  hand,  crucifix  in  the 
other,  these  missionaries  accomplished  work  of  stupen- 
dous magnitude.  And  it  is  due  to  unparalleled  efforts 
by  these  stalwart  pioneers  of  the  gospel  in  the  sixteenth 
and  two  succeeding  centuries  that  Roman  Catholicism 
has  now  so  firm  a grip  in  South  America. 

For  three  centuries  after  the  discovery  of  South 
America,  immigration  from  Europe  was  restricted  to 
natives  of  Spain.  There  was  no  desire  to  encourage 
settlers  from  other  countries,  and  obstacles  were 
thrown  in  the  path  of  travellers  of  other  nationalities 
desirous  of  visiting  territories  under  Spanish  control. 
It  was  only  by  special  permission  that  foreign  explorers 
were  allowed  to  reach  the  interior  of  the  continent. 
Even  as  late  as  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  these 
restrictions  were  maintained,  so  that  it  was  with  difficulty 
Humboldt  obtained  the  privilege  of  journeying  through 
Spanish  America  for  scientific  purposes.  And  as  for 


INTRODUCTION 


. 10 

the  immigrants  from  Spain,  they  were  principally  men 
attracted  by  tales  of  great  wealth  in  New  Granada,  Peru, 
Chile,  and  the  Rio  de  la  Plata.  These  adventurous 
spirits  intermarried  freely  with  the  native  women. 
Another  racial  element  was  introduced  into  South 
America  during  this  period,  for  the  importation  of 
slaves  from  Africa  attained  large  proportions,  and  this 
traffic  continued  until  the  commencement  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  From  the  mixture  of  Spanish,  Indian, 
and  negro  blood  thus  brought  about,  sprang  up  the  people 
who  now  form  the  principal  population  of  the  continent. 
It  is  only  since  the  dominion  of  Spain  was  cast  off  that 
any  considerable  influx  of  other  nationalities  has 
occurred,  and  even  that  has  taken  place  to  an  impor- 
tant extent  only  during  the  last  thirty  years.  In  these 
circumstances  it  is  too  soon  to  expect  to  see  any  radical 
alteration  from  the  dominant  traits  of  Spanish  character. 
In  Brazil  the  state  of  affairs  was  almost  identical, 
Portugal  following  the  example  of  Spain  in  her  colonial 
policy. 

Unsatisfactory  conditions  prevailed  in  these  colonies 
during  the  sixteenth  century.  In  the  vice-royalties  of 
New  Granada  and  Peru,  where  great  mineral  wealth 
abounded,  the  Spanish  population  was  defiant  of 
authority.  The  representatives  of  the  Spanish  Crown 
held  absolute  power,  and  frequently  adopted  towards 
Spaniards  as  well  as  Indians  an  attitude  which  could  not 
fail  to  raise  bitter  resentment.  Provided  that  a Viceroy 
could  remit  large  sums  of  treasure  to  fill  the  royal  purse 
he  was  assured  that  small  fault  would  be  found  with  the 
methods  he  employed  in  his  administration.  With  no 
redress  from  the  Crown,  the  colonists  often  took  the 
remedy  of  their  grievances  into  their  own  hands.  Such 
a case  was  the  assassination  of  Francisco  Pizarro  in 
June,  1541.  From  time  to  time  similar  fate  befell  other 
prominent  officials,  for  sacrifice  of  human  life  to  satisfy 
revengeful  feelings  was  a common  means  to  an  end.  In 
154*2  the  promulgation  of  new  laws  for  the  colonies 
caused  a storm  of  indignation,  and  the  first  Viceroy  of 


INTRODUCTION 


11 


Peru,  Velasco  Nunez  de  Vela,  sent  out  to  enforce  them, 
was  defeated  by  the  revolutionary  party  under  Gonzalo 
Pizarro,  and  killed  near  Quito  in  January,  1546.  It  was 
not  until  eight  years  later  that  Spanish  dominion  was 
again  established  over  the  disaffected  districts  by  the 
third  Viceroy,  Don  Andres  Hurtado  de  Mendoza,  and 
then  only  after  heavy  losses. 

The  gradual  development  of  the  population  and 
wealth  of  the  colonies  during  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  resulted  in  a situation  little  under- 
stood  in  Spain.  Two  principal  political  parties  arose. 
The  first  and  more  numerous  comprised  the  native-born 
colonials,  and  a certain  section  of  Spaniards  wishing 
greater  freedom  for  self-government  than  the  Crown 
was  prepared  to  grant ; the  second  was  composed  of 
the  official  element,  and  those  Spaniards  who  were 
opposed  to  any  measure  of  decentralisation.  Repre- 
sentations from  the  Colonial  Party  met  with  scant 
consideration  at  the  hands  of  the  Spanish  Crown.  To 
some  extent  this  was  because  communications  passed 
through  the  officials  in  South  America,  and  complaints 
were  reported  upon  and  smothered  before  reaching  their 
destination.  The  spirit  of  the  age  in  Spain,  moreover, 
was  distinctly  averse  to  any  extension  of  autonomy  for 
the  colonies.  Absolute  power  at  home  and  abroad  was 
the  policy  of  the  Spanish  Crown,  and  this  alienated 
Colonial  sympathy  from  the  mother  country. 

As  the  natural  resources  of  South  America  became 
better  known  in  Spain,  the  desire  of  the  Crown  to  be 
the  principal  beneficiary  of  the  riches  existing  in  these 
new  territories  was  increased.  Trade  with  foreign 
nations  was  not  permitted,  and  severe  restrictions  were 
placed  upon  intercolonial  commerce.  In  1602  a custom- 
house was  established  at  Cordoba  for  the  purpose  of 
levying  duties  equivalent  to  50  per  cent,  of  the  value  of 
all  commodities  passing  between  Peru  and  the  River 
Plate.  It  was  not  until  1665  that  this  irritating  restraint 
on  commercial  business  was  relaxed,  and  only  in  1774 
were  many  of  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  trade  be- 


12 


INTRODUCTION 


tween  the  various  South  American  colonies  removed. 
Naturally,  the  interference  of  the  Home  Government 
with  the  normal  expansion  of  the  South  American 
settlements  raised  violent  criticism  and  bitter  feeling  on 
the  part  of  the  colonists.  From  these  causes  began 
that  wish  for  independence,  which  became  increasingly 
evident  towards  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

Another  element  in  the  Spanish  regime  which  caused 
acute  dissatisfaction  was  the  exclusive  nomination  of 
Spanish  officials  to  all  public  offices,  the  claims  of 
colonial-born  aspirants  to  take  part  in  local  administra- 
tion being  ignored.  Moreover,  the  tendency  of  the 
scattered  Spanish-speaking  population  which  had  grown 
up  during  three  centuries  was  for  decentralisation. 
This  sentiment  met  with  the  extreme  disapproval  at 
home.  Peru  was  the  principal  stronghold  of  Spanish 
power,  and  the  jurisdiction  granted  to  the  Viceroy  there 
was  more  widely  extended  than  the  powers  invested  in 
the  governments  of  Rio  de  la  Plata  or  elsewhere ; but 
the  determination  of  the  Spanish  authorities  to  maintain 
a monopoly  of  official  appointments  for  Spaniards  at 
the  expense  of  colonials,  applied  to  all  Spanish  posses- 
sions in  South  America,  and  was  not  restricted  to  Peru. 
A distinct  line  was  created  between  Spaniards  and 
colonials,  and  a feeling  of  animosity  thereby  developed 
which  made  possible  the  outbreak  against  Spanish 
dominion  at  the  commencement  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  and  finally  led  to  the  independence  of  the 
colonies. 

Brazil  boasts  a more  chequered  history  than  any 
other  South  American  republic.  It  was  originally  taken 
possession  of  in  the  name  of  the  Spanish  Crown  by 
Vincent  Yanez  Pincon.  In  1500  Pedro  Cabral  annexed 
a portion  of  its  territory  to  Portugal,  but  attempted  no 
settlement.  A little  later  Amerigo  Vespucci  was  sent  to 
found  a colony  in  the  vicinity  of  the  district  now  known 
as  Bahia.  Between  1500  and  1578  some  progress  in 
the  work  of  colonisation  was  made,  but  in  the  latter 
year  these  territories  passed  under  control  of  Spain,  and 


INTRODUCTION 


10 

O 

remained  under  Spanish  jurisdiction  until  1640.  It 
was  during  this  period  of  sixty -two  years  that  Brazil  was 
subject  to  constant  attacks  from  English,  French  and 
Dutch  adventurers.  The  Dutch  took  possession  of 
Bahia  in  1624,  and  for  more  than  a score  of  years 
Holland  was  the  dominant  power  over  the  provinces  of 
the  north.  In  1649,  however,  an  expedition  commanded 
by  Vieyra  was  despatched  from  Portugal,  and  after 
severe  fighting  ; for  half  a dozen  years,  Portuguese 
authority  was  re-established.  No  further  foreign  inva- 
sion of  a serious  character  took  place  until  1710,  when 
a French  squadron  under  Duclerc  attacked  the  city  of 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  but  half  the  invading  force  was  killed, 
and  the  remainder,  to  the  number  of  500  men,  captured. 
In  the  following  year  a French  fleet  under  Admiral 
Duguay  Trouin  appeared,  and  Rio  de  Janeiro  was 
occupied  in  September  1711,  after  four  days  of  desper- 
ate fighting.  But  the  French  admiral  merely  levied 
substantial  ransom  and  withdrew,  and  from  thence- 
forth no  attempt  was  made  to  wrest  the  colony  from 
Portugal. 

In  1789  a movement  was  set  afoot  to  establish  the 
independence  of  Brazil  from  Portuguese  dominion,  but 
the  conspiracy  failed,  and  Tiradentes,  the  leader  of  the 
plot,  was  arrested  and  hanged,  while  other  prominent 
persons  implicated  in  the  movement  were  banished  to 
Africa. 

The  Peninsular  war  brought  a crisis  of  far-reaching 
importance  in  Brazilian  affairs.  To  begin  with,  the 
invasion  of  Portugal  by  Napoleon  in  1807  forced  King 
Joao  VI.  to  fly  the  country.  The  monarch,  with  a 
following  of  prominent  Portuguese,  including  the 
cabinet  ministers,  left  Lisbon  in  November,  1807,  and 
reached  Bahia  in  January  1808,  thence  proceeding  to 
Rio  de  Janeiro.  Consequently  for  some  years  the 
colony  became  the  seat  of  the  parent  Government.  As 
retaliation  for  the  invasion  of  Portugal,  Joao  VI.  ordered 
an  expedition  to  attack  French  Guiana,  obtaining 
possession  of  that  territory,  which,  however,  was  restored 


14 


INTRODUCTION 


to  the  French  by  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  in  1815.  The 
same  year  saw  the  title  of  Brazil  changed  from  a colony 
to  that  of  the  Kingdom  of  Portugal,  Brazil  and 
Alagarves.  In  1817  Brazil  entered  upon  a war  of 
aggression  in  the  south,  and  succeeded  in  capturing 
Montevideo,  but  lost  it  again  in  1823. 

Additional  taxation  had  been  imposed  by  King 
Joao  VI.  to  obtain  the  necessary  funds  to  sustain  his 
court,  and  this  led  to  dissatisfaction.  Nor  was  the 
subversive  spirit  thus  generated  allayed  when  the  king 
threw  Brazilian  commerce  open  to  the  world.  An 
agitation  for  independence  sprang  up  and  rapidly  gained 
ground.  In  1821  King  Joao  went  to  Portugal,  leaving 
his  son  Pedro  as  Regent  of  Brazil.  For  a few  months 
Pedro  was  able  to  stay  the  progress  of  the  revolutionary 
movement,  but  in  the  following  year  the  leaders  decided 
to  offer  the  Regent  the  title  of  Emperor,  provided  that 
independence  from  the  mother  country  was  accepted. 
The  proclamation  of  Pedro  as  first  Emperor  of  Brazil 
took  place  on  October  12,  1822,  and  from  that  date 
Portuguese  dominion  in  Brazil  was  ended,  notwith- 
standing efforts  from  Lisbon  to  enforce  re-establishment 
of  colonial  authority.  In  1825  the  independence  of 
Brazil  was  recognised  by  King  Joao  VI. 

The  reign  of  Pedro  I.  was  not  happy.  His  auto- 
cratic administration  ‘of  public  affairs  was  unpopular. 
The  question  of  republic  or  monarchy  was  discussed 
openly,  while  matters  drifted  generally  from  bad  to 
worse.  On  the  death  of  Joao  VI.  the  crown  of  Por- 
tugal descended  to  Pedro,  but  wras  renounced  by  him 
in  favour  of  his  daughter  Maria.  The  popularity  he 
gained  by  this  act  was  only  temporary,  and  in  1831  the 
political  situation  became  more  complicated,  and  as  a 
result  the  Emperor  abdicated  in  favour  of  his  five- 
year- old  son,  and  embarked  for  Europe. 

A Regency  was  formed  to  administer  the  government 
during  the  minority  of  Pedro  II.  The  council  was 
elective,  and  based  on  thoroughly  democratic  principles, 
but  was  uot  a success.  Bitter  jealousy  arose  against 


INTRODUCTION 


15 


the  men  who  controlled  the  central  power,  and  it  was 
decided  to  proclaim  Pedro  II.  as  Emperor,  although  he 
was  only  fourteen  years  of  age.  On  July  23,  1840, 
the  solemn  announcement  of  his  accession  to  the  throne 
was  made — the  beginning  of  a reign  destined  to  last  for 
nearly  half  a century. 

When  the  European  colonisation  of  South  America 
began,  the  Indian  population  of  the  continent  consisted, 
broadly  speaking,  of  two  great  racial  divisions,  together 
with  a group  of  tribes  dwelling  in  Araucania  and 
Patagonia,  where  conditions  of  climate  and  surroundings 
produced  different  physical  characteristics.  On  the 
Atlantic  slope  of  the  Andes  the  Indians  belonged  to 
the  Tupi- Guarani  stock,  the  many  sections  of  population 
from  Venezuela  in  the  north  to  the  pampas  of  Argentina 
in  the  south  showing  certain  similarities  in  customs  and 
language  that  leave  small  doubt  of  their  common  origin. 
Naturally,  in  this  widely  separated  area,  the  features  of 
the  various  tribes  became  modified  by  local  circum- 
stances, but  throughout  the  tropical  and  semi-tropical 
latitudes  of  the  eastern  section  of  the  continent  the 
main  racial  characteristics  indicate  a common  root. 
These  tribes  were  nomadic,  and  existed  principally  on 
the  products  of  the  chase  or  the  wild  fruits  of  the 
forests.  There  is  little  evidence  of  husbandry  previous 
to  the  arrival  of  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  conquerors. 
Three  hundred  years  of  contact  with  European  civilisa- 
tion completely  changed  the  chief  characteristics  of  the 
mass  of  this  Indian  population.  The  conquerors  taught 
the  natives  the  value  of  agriculture  and  many  of  the 
industrial  arts.  In  those  three  centuries  the  mingling 
of  Portuguese  and  Spanish  blood  with  that  of  the 
Indians  was  so  great  that  the  bulk  of  the  population 
plainly  showed  the  foreign  strains.  In  the  centre  of  the 
continent  there  are  still  tribes  that  modern  civilisation 
has  not  touched,  but  they  are  few,  and  each  year  the 
number  lessens. 

The  Araucanian  and  Patagonian  also  were  nomadic 
and  of  fiercer  temperament  than  the  majority  of  the 


16 


INTRODUCTION 


tribes  living  further  to  the  north.  They  levied  constant 
warfare  against  the  Spanish  colonists,  and  in  consequence 
their  numbers  dwindled  to  insignificant  proportions.  In 
recent  years  the  Araucanian  has  accepted  the  outlines 
of  modern  civilisation  in  that  he  cultivates  the  ground 
for  his  food,  and  barters  the  produce  of  his  flocks  and 
herds  with  his  Spanish-speaking  neighbour,  but  his 
picturesque  identity  is  disappearing  rapidly  as  settle- 
ment from  the  north  encroaches  on  the  area  over  which 
formerly  he  held  undisputed  sway.  The  advance  of 
civilisation  into  Patagonia  is  marked  by  the  rapid 
extinction  of  the  Indian  inhabitant  in  that  quarter ; for 
he  will  not  adapt  himself  to  any  form  of  industry,  and 
as  his  hunting  grounds  every  year  become  more  con- 
tracted, his  final  elimination  can  be  only  a matter  of  a 
very  few  years. 

On  the  Pacific  slope  of  the  Andes  the  Spaniards 
found  very  different  conditions  on  their  arrival  early  in 
the  sixteenth  century.  From  north  of  Quito  to  as  far 
south  of  Cuzco  as  the  Rio  Maule  in  Chile,  the  Incas  had 
welded  the  many  tribes,  chief  amongst  these  being  the 
Canas,  the  Quichuas,  the  Chancas,  the  Huancas,  the 
Rucanas,  the  Collas,  or  Aymaras,  the  Conchucos,  the 
Huamachucos  and  Ayahuecas,  into  a great  community 
over  which  they  exercised  supreme  power.  The  two 
languages  in  common  use  were  Quichua  and  Aymara, 
the  latter  being  confined  to  a comparatively  limited  area 
of  which  Lake  Titicaca  and  Arequipa  were  the  principal 
centres.  The  people  lived  under  settled  conditions, 
built  towns  and  roads,  and  were  proficient  in  agricultural 
and  other  industries.  Evidences  of  the  public  works 
executed  by  them  before  the  Spanish  conquest  are 
extant  to-day  at  Cuzco,  Trujillo,  and  many  other 
localities  throughout  Peru  and  Ecuador.  Encouraged 
to  preserve  their  ancient  institutions  and  develop  their 
existing  industrial  pursuits,  these  people  might  have 
adopted  modern  civilisation  and  formed  a great  nation ; 
but  their  individuality  was  so  far  crushed  out  of  them 
by  their  conquerors  that  they  relapsed  into  a condition 


INTRODUCTION  17 

of  serfdom  without  ambition  for  any  effort  on  their  own 
behalf. 

The  great  natural  resources  of  South  America  are 
dealt  with  more  particularly  in  connection  with  each 
individual  state,  but  it  can  well  be  understood  how 
the  great  mineral  wealth  of  the  continent  attracted  the 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  adventurers  who  led  the  expedi- 
tions to  this  new  world.  Gold,  silver,  and  precious 
stones  tempted  them  to  face  the  most  terrible  hardships 
in  their  desire  to  attain  wealth.  Minerals  still  form  one 
of  the  principal  sources  of  riches  in  South  America,  but 
they  have  been  outdistanced  by  the  astounding  develop- 
ment of  agricultural  and  pastoral  industry  which  has 
taken  place  in  recent  years. 

The  geographical  position  of  South  America  is  proof 
of  its  value  for  commercial  and  productive  purposes. 
There  is  a choice  of  climate  from  tropical  to  extreme 
cold,  and  the  series  of  great  plateaux  rising  from  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  Andine  ranges  allow  settlers 
from  Europe  to  find  congenial  surroundings  even  in 
tropical  latitudes.  The  great  Andine  chain  divides  the 
continent  from  north  to  south.  On  the  east  the  country 
from  Venezuela  to  the  delta  of  the  Orinoco  generally 
rises  abruptly  from  the  seaboard,  and  between  each  suc- 
cessive mountain  range  lie  fertile  valleys  where  soil  and 
climate  are  fitted  for  semi-tropical  cultivation  until 
increasing  altitude  brings  a lower  temperature.  Gold, 
silver,  and  other  minerals  are  found  in  this  region.  From 
the  Orinoco  to  the  Amazon  there  is  an  immense  area 
watered  by  the  tributaries  of  these  two  mighty  streams 
and  largely  covered  by  heavy  forests  of  valuable  timber 
containing  many  millions  of  rubber  trees,  and  embracing 
also  open  grass-covered  plains  known  as  the  llanos. 
South  from  the  Amazon  until  the  borders  of  Rio  Grande 
do  Sul  are  reached,  the  land  rises  rapidly  from  the  ocean, 
and  the  open,  rolling  plateaux  are  the  characteristic 
feature.  South  of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  to  the  borders 
of  Patagonia  are  the  grass  plains  of  the  Pampas  formed 
by  the  rich  alluvial  deposits  washed  down  from  the 

B 


18 


INTRODUCTION 


Andes  by  the  waters  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata,  the  Uru- 
guay, the  Parana  and  their  tributaries.  Patagonia, 
although  rugged  and  broken  as  a rule,  contains  many 
fertile  plains  and  valleys  as  well  as  vast  stretches  of 
alkaline,  arid  desert. 

On  the  western  side  of  the  continent  spurs  of  the 
Andes  run  down  to  the  coast-line,  and  these  are  inter- 
spersed with  valleys  of  amazing  fertility.  Even  in  the 
rainless  section  which  embraces  the  greater  part  of  Peru 
and  a large  portion  of  Chile  irrigation  has  converted 
into  gardens  most  of  the  bottom  lands  of  the  valleys. 
In  this  rainless  district  lie  enormous  deposits  of  mineral 
wealth  in  the  shape  of  nitrate  of  soda,  borax,  copper, 
gold,  silver  and  other  commodities.  It  was  from  Peru 
and  Bolivia  that  the  Spanish  Crown  obtained  fabulous 
riches  in  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth,  and  eighteenth 
centuries. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


Colonial  Discontent.  Weakness  of  the  Spanish  Government.  Efforts 
of  Spain  to  Conciliate  the  Colonies.  Action  of  the  Regency  of 
Cadiz.  Caracas  and  the  Separatist  Movement.  Simon  Bolivar 
and  the  Struggle  for  Independence.  General  Paez.  Proclama- 
tion of  Colombian  Independence.  Bolivar  frees  Ecuador  and 
marches  to  Peru.  The  Revolt  in  Argentina.  Treaty  between 
Argentina  and  Great  Britain.  Anarchy  in  Montevideo. 
Paraguay  effects  a Bloodless  Revolution.  The  Struggle  in  Chile. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine.  Mr  Canning  and  the  Holy  Alliance. 
South  America  after  Independence.  Bolivar  and  his  Political 
Enemies.  Disintegration  of  Colombia.  Venezuela  as  a Republic. 
Ecuadorian  Affairs.  Dissensions  in  Peru.  Friction  in  Chile 
over  Form  of  Government.  Bolivia  and  General  Sucre. 
Uruguayan  Developments.  Conflict  in  Argentina  between 
Federalists  and  Unitarians.  Advent  to  Power  of  Rosas. 


The  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  found  the 
Spanish  colonies  seething  with  discontent  against  the 
rule  of  the  mother  country,  and  so  ripe  for  revolt  that 
a spark  only  was  necessary  to  fire  the  train.  The 
Napoleonic  wars  had  shown  the  colonists  the  weakness 
of  the  Spanish  Crown  at  home,  and  the  confusion 
resulting  from  the  orders  sent  simultaneously  by  Carlos 
IV.,  Joseph  Bonaparte,  and  Ferdinand  VII.  served  to 
loosen  materially  the  ties  between  South  America  and 
Spain.  Moreover,  an  appeal  from  Buenos  Aires  for  aid 
in  repelling  British  aggression  had  met  with  the  reply 
that  the  colonists  must  protect  themselves  as  no 
assistance  could  be  given.  This  incident  set  men  think- 
ing of  the  position  of  the  colonies  towards  Spain,  and 


20  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


when  the  residents  of  the  River  Plate  had  driven  out  the 
British  by  their  own  unassisted  exertions,  the  trend  of 
opinion  everywhere  in  South  America  pronounced  de- 
cidedly in  favour  of  separation  from  Spanish  control. 

The  Spanish  authorities  were  not  altogether  blind 
to  popular  feeling  in  South  America,  and  an  effort  was 
made  to  quell  the  rising  spirit  of  rebellion  by  the  grant 
of  various  concessions.  There  is,  moreover,  no  doubt  that 
the  revolutionary  outbreak  at  Quito  in  1809  thoroughly 
roused  Spaniards  at  home  to  the  immediate  danger  of  the 
loss  of  the  colonies,  the  more  so  as  this  occurred  after  the 
enactment  of  certain  measures  which  were  intended  to 
conciliate  the  disaffected  section  of  the  population. 
This  movement  at  Quito  was  suppressed,  but  it  is 
noteworthy  as  the  first  attempt  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
to  secure  their  emancipation  by  force  of  arms. 

By  royal  decree  on  January  22,  1809,  it  was 
announced  that  the  South  American  colonies  were  an 
integral  part  of  the  monarchy,  and,  as  provinces,  entitled 
to  direct  representation  in  the  Cortes.  Three  individuals 
for  each  capital  were  to  be  selected  by  the  municipalities, 
and  from  these  three  persons  the  representative  to  the 
Cortes  was  to  be  chosen.  Ordinances  were  passed, 
mitigating  the  existing  restrictions  on  colonial  commerce 
and  trade.  This  change  of  policy  was  well  received,  but 
came  too  late  to  eradicate  the  bitter  resentment  created 
in  the  past.  When,  therefore,  a year  later  the  Regency 
of  Cadiz  abolished  these  Ordinances,  the  colonists 
determined  to  make  a supreme  effort  to  obtain  for 
themselves  the  freedom  of  government  hitherto  denied 
to  them  by  the  mother  country. 

Caracas  was  the  scene  of  the  beginning  of  the 
movement  which  led  to  emancipation.  On  April  19, 
1810,  the  Municipal  Council  was  constituted  into  a 
Junta  of  Government,  and  refused  to  obey  the  authority 
of  the  Regency,  but  expressed  willingness  to  recognise 
the  sovereignty  of  Ferdinand  VII.  The  movement  was 
aggravated  by  the  arrival  of  emissaries  from  Joseph 
Bonaparte,  to  request  the  recognition  of  his  right  to  the 


1810] 


SIMON  BOLIVAR 


21 


Spanish  crown.  Revolutionary  outbreaks  followed  in 
quick  succession  in  Bogota,  Quito,  Buenos  Aires,  Monte- 
video and  Chile ; in  Bolivia  an  insurrection  against  the 
authorities  became  a separatist  campaign,  but  Peru 
remained  loyal  to  Spain  until  a later  period. 

In  Venezuela  the  real  leader  of  the  rebellion  was 
Simon  Bolivar,  a man  of  European  education  and  great 
wealth.  Born  at  Caracas  in  1785,  he  was  a very  young 
man  at  the  time  his  compatriots  decided  to  enter  on  the 
struggle  for  the  control  of  their  future  destiny.  Bolivar 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  revolt  visited  England  as  the 
rebel  envoy,  but  was  received  coldly,  and  shortly  after- 
wards returned  to  Venezuela,  bringing  a small  supply  of 
arms  and  ammunition.  At  first  the  Spaniards  were 
unable  to  cope  with  the  revolutionary  movement,  but 
two  years  later  General  Monteverde,  at  the  head  of  a 
strong  force  of  royalist  troops,  recovered  control  of  the 
greater  portion  of  the  province,  and  in  1812  the  cause  of 
the  rebels  looked  gloomy  from  all  points.  In  that  year 
Bolivar,  who  had  sought  asylum  in  Curacao,  collected 
all  the  refugees  from  Venezuela  and  New  Granada,  and 
landed  with  800  men  at  Cartagena.  Marching  from 
that  town  into  Venezuela,  he  was  joined  by  many  thou- 
sands of  volunteers,  and  routed  the  Spanish  forces  in  a 
series  of  battles.  On  August  4,  1813,  Bolivar  entered 
Caracas  in  triumph,  and  was  proclaimed  dictator  until 
such  time  as  Venezuela  could  unite  with  New  Granada. 

But  the  Spaniards  were  not  yet  beaten.  Under  Buy 
and  Bover  a bloody  and  energetic  campaign  was  com- 
menced which  ended  in  the  defeat  of  Bolivar  and  his 
flight  by  sea  to  Cartagena  in  1813.  He  offered  his 
services  to  New  Granada,  and  the  Congress  at  Bogota 
accepted  them  on  condition  that  Venezuela,  when  free, 
should  join  that  confederation.  In  1814  came  news  that 
Ferdinand  VII.  was  sending  a force  of  10,000  men  to 
protect  the  royal  interests  in  New  Granada  and  Vene- 
zuela. Bolivar,  now  appointed  Captain-General  for  New 
Granada  and  Venezuela,  marched  through  Magdalena, 
where  he  inflicted  serious  losses  on  the  Spaniards.  But 


22  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


dissensions  broke  out  between  him  and  the  revolutionary 
authorities,  with  the  result  that  the  Captain-General 
embarked  for  Jamaica;  while  on  December  6,  1815, 
General  Morilla,  at  the  head  of  a Spanish  army,  occupied 
Cartagena.  Once  again  the  outlook  for  the  rebels  was 
gloomy. 

Bolivar  now  saved  the  situation  for  the  insurgents. 
He  organised  a naval  expedition,  and  defeated  the 
Spanish  flotilla ; then,  landing  in  Venezuela,  he  recruited 
a large  body  of  men  under  the  Indian  Paez  and  pushed 
operations  energetically  and  successfully  against  the 
Spaniards.  Campaign  followed  campaign  with  varying 
fortune  until  the  end  of  1818,  when  Lopez  Mendez 
recruited  and  equipped  in  Europe  some  9000  men  to 
fight  for  the  revolutionary  cause.  From  1818  the 
success  of  the  rebellion  was  never  in  doubt.  Victory 
after  victory  was  gained  by  the  revolutionary  arms,  and 
in  December  1819  New  Granada  and  Venezuela  were 
united  under  the  name  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia. 
For  a time  the  Spaniards  attempted  to  retrieve  the 
position,  but  in  1821  they  were  crushed  at  the  battle  of 
Carabobo,  the  remnants  of  their  army  retiring  to  Puerto 
Cabello,  and  surrendering  to  General  Paez  some  two 
years  later.  Paez  was  one  of  the  most  remarkable 
figures  in  the  War  of  Independence,  and  is  credited  with 
extraordinary  heroism.  It  is  stated  that  he  captured 
a flotilla  of  Spanish  gunboats  on  the  Apure  river  by 
swimming  his  cavalry  out  and  boarding  the  ships. 
On  another  occasion  he  is  credited  with  killing  40 
Spaniards  single  handed  in  one  fight. 

On  August  30,  1821,  the  constitution  of  Colombia 
was  formally  ratified,  and  Bolivar  was  proclaimed  Presi- 
dent. He  determined  to  free  Ecuador  from  Spanish 
control,  as  he  had  New  Granada  and  Venezuela,  and  he 
organised  an  expedition  to  Quito  for  that  purpose.  The 
turning-point  of  this  campaign  was  the  battle  of  Pichincha 
in  1822,  where  General  Sucre  destroyed  the  Spanish 
army  and  left  the  road  to  Quito  open  for  the  advance 
of  Bolivar.  The  Ecuadorian  capital  was  occupied  on 


1822] 


SIMON  BOLIVAR 


June,  1822,  and  the  country  thenceforth  emancipated 
from  Spanish  dominion. 

Bolivar  now  determined  to  march  from  Quito  to 
Peru  to  aid  in  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  power  in 
that  country.  Chile  and  Argentina  had  combined  to 
drive  the  Spaniards  out  of  Peru,  and  in  1820  a fleet 
under  command  of  Lord  Cochrane  had  defeated  the 
Spanish  squadron  and  landed  a force  of  5000  men  com- 
manded by  the  Argentine  General,  San  Martin,  on  the 
Peruvian  coast.  This  army  had  occupied  Lima  on  July 
28,  1821,  but  the  Spaniards  maintained  a stout  resist- 
ance at  Callao  and  other  points.  It  was  not  until  1824 
that  the  final  battles  were  fought  which  broke  down  the 
Spanish  power.  On  August  6 of  that  year  the  forces 
under  Bolivar  met  the  Spaniards  at  Junin,  and  gained  a 
decisive  victory,  due  in  great  part  to  a brilliant  cavalry 
charge  led  by  Colonel  Suarez.  After  this  action  Bolivar 
left  the  army  in  charge  of  General  Sucre,  and  at 
Ayacucho,  on  December  9,  1824,  this  officer  inflicted  a 
crushing  defeat  on  the  Spanish  forces  under  General 
Canterac,  capturing  all  the  principal  Spanish  civil  ?tnd 
military  officials,  and  putting  an  end  to  the  power  of 
Spain  in  this  section  of  South  America.  General  Sucre 
then  proceeded  to  Bolivia,  or  Upper  Peru  as  it  then 
was  called,  and  in  a very  short  time  overcame  such  resist- 
ance as  the  Spaniards  were  able  to  offer,  and  in  1825  he 
was  proclaimed  the  first  President  of  that  republic. 

In  the  south  of  the  continent  the  struggle  for 

~u 

independence  was  severe,  but  it  was  more  difficult  for 
Spain  to  send  troops  and  supplies  to  sustain  her  cause 
in  those  far-away  regions,  and  had  the  colonists  on  both 
sides  of  the  River  Plate  acted  in  unison,  the  conflict 
would  have  been  short.  Unfortunately,  individual 
ambitions  amongst  the  leaders  of  the  movement  in 
Montevideo  and  Buenos  Aires  constantly  occurred,  and 
proved  of  material  assistance  to  the  Spanish  cause, 
these  internal  dissensions  preventing  a decisive  blow 
for  emancipation. 

In  the  provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  the  leaders 


24  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


of  the  movement  were  Moreno,  Rivadavia,  Castelli, 
Belgrano,  and  Valcarcel.  In  1810  an  assembly  of  600 
notables  deposed  the  Viceroy  Baltasar  de  Cisneros,  and 
he  retired  to  Montevideo,  still  under  Spanish  dominion. 
In  1814  a revolutionary  army  from  Buenos  Aires 
captured  Montevideo,  but  this  did  not  end  the  struggle, 
and  for  another  two  years  hostilities  continued  between 
the  partizans  of  Spain  and  the  supporters  of  the 
rebellion.  On  March  25,  1816,  a congress  assembled 
at  Tucuman  proclaimed  Puyredon  dictator,  and  on  July 
9 of  the  same  year  the  Act  of  Independence  of  the 
United  Provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  was  ratified. 
A National  Convention  for  the  States  forming  the 
present  Argentine  Confederation  assembled  in  Buenos 
Aires  on  January  23,  1825,  and  on  February  2 Sir 
Woodbine  Parish,  acting  under  instructions  from  Mr 
Canning,  signed  a treaty  of  commerce  and  friendship  by 
which  the  independence  of  the  new  republic  was 
acknowledged. 

Meanwhile  Montevideo  had  been  a centre  of  anarchy 
and  strife.  General  Artigas  had  been  declared  dictator 
of  Uruguay,  and  was  recognised  by  the  authorities  of 
Buenos  Aires  as  the  head  of  the  republic  of  the  Banda 
Oriental.  Portuguese  aggression,  which  aimed  at  per- 
manently annexing  Uruguay  to  Brazil,  brought  about  a 
conflict  between  Brazil  and  Buenos  Aires,  and  the 
struggle  continued  until  August  27,  1828,  when,  through 
the  mediation  of  Great  Britain,  a treaty  was  signed  at 
Rio  de  Janeiro  acknowledging  Uruguayan  independence, 
and  was  ratified  at  Santa  Fe  on  October  4 of  the  same 
year. 

Paraguay  secured  emancipation  from  Spain  without 
any  sanguinary  conflicts  with  the  representatives  of  the 
mother  country.  Isolated  in  the  interior  of  the  continent, 
it  took  some  time  for  the  revolutionary  ideas  of  the 
period  to  permeate  the  principal  centres  of  population, 
and  when  General  Belgrano  appeared  in  1810,  with  an 
Argentine  force,  to  aid  a revolution  against  Spanish 
dominion,  he  was  received  in  a most  hostile  spirit  and 


Jose  San  Martin. 


[Face  }xigc  24. 


1818]  THE  river  PLATE  AND  CHILE  25 


defeated  in  battle  some  forty  miles  from  Asuncion.  Not 
long  afterwards  the  Paraguayan  leaders  reconsidered 
their  attitude,  with  the  result  that  on  May  14,  1811,  a 
bloodless  revolution  was  accomplished,  and  Dr  Rodri- 
guez de  Francia  and  Fulgencio  Yegros  were  nominated 
First  Consuls  of  the  New  Republic.  In  1841  Francia 
was  succeeded  by  his  nephew,  Don  Carlos  Lopez,  and 
he  by  his  son  the  notorious  General,  Solano  Lopez,  in 
1862. 

In  Chile  the  separatist  movement  became  active  in 
1810,  and  at  first  the  colonists  achieved  many  successes  ; 
but  in  1813  an  army  under  General  Paroja  re-established 
the  authority  of  the  Spanish  Crown.  The  Chilians 
begged  for  help  from  the  Government  at  Buenos  Aires, 
and  in  1817  General  San  Martin  crossed  the  Andes 
with  an  army  of  4000  strong,  and  on  February  12,  1817, 
gave  battle  to  the  royalist  forces  at  Chacabuco  and  won 
a decisive  victory.  Three  days  afterwards  San  Martin 
with  his  troops  and  the  Chilian  revolutionary  army 
entered  Santiago.  A new  Government  was  formed, 
with  General  O’Higgins  at  its  head,  and  on  January  1, 
1818,  the  independence  of  Chile  was  formally  pro- 
claimed. But  the  fighting  was  not  yet  over,  and  the 
royalists,  commanded  by  General  Osorio,  and  reinforced 
by  5000  men  from  Peru,  prepared  to  make  another 
desperate  effort  to  regain  supremacy.  In  the  valley  of 
Concha  Rayada  he  inflicted  a serious  defeat  on  the 
troops  under  General  San  Martin ; but  the  insurgents 
rallied,  and  on  April  5,  1818,  succeeded  in  crushing 
General  Osorio  at  Maypu,  by  this  victory  finally  securing 
the  independence  of  their  country. 

As  a rule  South  Americans  give  too  little  importance 
to  the  influence  the  Monroe  doctrine  exercised  upon  the 
final  outcome  of  their  struggle  for  liberty.  It  is  true 
that  no  public  announcement  of  the  United  States 
policy  was  made  until  December,  1823,  when  the 
Spaniards  had  been  defeated  in  nearly  all  the  colonies ; 
but  this  fact  detracts  nothing  from  its  paramount  im- 
portance for  the  South  American  republics.  Its  effect 


26  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


was  to  prevent  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  mother 
country  to  reconquer  the  Spanish  colonies  by  her  own 
single-handed  exertions  or  in  combination  with  other 
European  powers. 

The  idea  of  America  for  the  Americans  was  not  new 
when  Mr  Monroe  enunciated  it  in  the  United  States 
Congress.  We  know  that  the  formulation  of  that  policy 
was  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  Washington  and 
Alexander  Hamilton,  and  Benjamin  Franklin  after 
the  separation  of  the  American  colonies  from  Great 
Britain  — indeed,  it  may  be  said  that  only  the 
opportunity  was  awaited  to  announce  it  to  the 
world.  When  the  danger  arose  of  the  intervention 
of  the  Holy  Alliance  to  aid  Spain  to  regain  her 
lost  possessions,  Mr  Canning  saw  an  occasion  to 
further  British  interests  by  the  recognition  of  South 
American  independence  as  a means  of  adjusting  the 
balance  of  power,  and  so  counteracting  the  influence  of 
that  league  of  despotisms.  At  his  instigation  the 
popular  sentiment  in  the  United  States  was  expressed 
in  the  memorable  message  of  President  Monroe.  It  is 
said  that  Canning  even  went  so  far  as  personally  to 
draft  the  portion  of  the  message  which  dealt  with  the 
neutrality  of  the  United  States  in  European  political 
affairs,  and  the  abstention  of  European  aggression  in 
N orth  and  South  America ; but  that  oft-repeated  tale 
is  improbable,  for  Monroe  did  little  more  than  formulate 
a sentiment  which  had  been  gaining  ground  steadily  in 
America  for  fifty  years.  That  Canning  thoroughly 
approved  of  the  United  States  policy  is  proved  by  the 
fact  that,  by  his  advice,  Great  Britain  was  the  first 
European  power  to  recognise  the  independence  of  the 
South  American  States.  The  first  South  American 
minister  accredited  to  the  Court  of  St  James  was  sent 
by  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  and  Mr  Canning  in 
presenting  him  to  George  IV.  used  the  dramatic 
expression,  “ Sire,  I bring  to  you  the  representative  of 
a new  world.” 

The  years  immediately  succeeding  the  struggle  for 


1827] 


INTERNAL  DISSENSIONS 


27 


independence  were  troublous  times  in  South  America. 
The  former  colonists  had  no  clear  idea  of  the  responsi- 
bility entailed  by  the  liberty  for  which  they  had  fought 
and  sacrificed  their  blood  and  treasure.  So  long  as 
Spain  was  the  common  enemy,  a sense  of  patriotism 
held  in  check,  to  a great  extent,  the  internal  dissensions 
which  always  existed.  Once  the  common  danger  dis- 
appeared, intrigue  and  personal  ambition  ran  riot,  and 
led  to  a condition  of  affairs  bordering  upon  anarchy  in 
many  of  the  new  republics. 

Simon  Bolivar,  the  Liberator,  after  the  extinction 
of  Spanish  rule  in  Peru,  endeavoured  to  bring  about  a 
federation  of  the  South  American  republics  into  one 
great  community,  but  his  action  was  unacceptable  to 
Chile  and  Buenos  Aires,  and  aroused  bitter  jealousy  in 
those  states.  Finding  it  impossible  to  realise  his  project, 
he  returned  to  Colombia  in  1826,  internal  disturbances 
in  that  country  demanding  his  prompt  attention. 
Revolutions  against  his  authority  had  broken  out  in 
Venezuela  and  various  districts  of  Colombia,  and  in  the 
following  year  a war  ensued  between  Peru  and  Colombia, 
the  former  insisting  that  Bolivar  had  attempted  to  bring 
that  country  under  Colombian  authority.  From  1827 
to  the  date  of  his  death  in  December,  1830,  the  Liberator 
was  the  object  of  bitter  enmity  in  Colombia,  and  was 
accused  repeatedly  of  harbouring  designs  to  found  an 
imperial  dynasty  for  his  own  benefit.  He  died  a poor 
man,  when  only  forty-seven,  at  Santa  Marta,  thoroughly 
disheartened  by  the  turmoil  of  internal  political  dissen- 
sion which  embittered  his  latter  years. 

Immediately  after  the  death  of  Bolivar,  the  Republic 
of  Colombia  broke  up  into  the  three  divisions  which 
now  form  Venezuela,  Ecuador,  and  Colombia,  the  last 
named  assuming  at  first  the  name  of  Nueva  Granada, 
and  after  various  intermediate  changes,  finally  calling 
itself  the  United  States  of  Colombia.  At  the  first 
election  in  1831  General  Santander,  who  had  been  Vice- 
President  under  Bolivar,  was  chosen  as  chief  magistrate, 
and  during  his  term  treaties  were  made  with  Venezuela 


28  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


and  Ecuador  to  determine  the  frontiers  of  those  states, 
and  with  the  Holy  See  to  secure  the  recognition  of  the 
republic.  Panama  and  Colon  were  declared  free  ports 
for  twenty  years  to  all  friendly  nations,  and  a special 
treaty  secured  to  the  United  States  the  privilege  of 
transporting  war  material  across  the  isthmus.  In 
exchange  the  United  States  guaranteed  Colombian 
sovereignty  over  the  isthmus  against  any  foreign 
government.  That  treaty  was  renewed  in  1865. 

vVhen  Santander  completed  his  term  of  office  in 
1836,  he  endeavoured  to  secure  the  election  of  General 
Ovando  as  his  successor  in  the  Presidency,  but  his 
nominee  was  defeated  by  the  civilian  candidate  Dr 
Marquez,  and  this  brought  about  a friction  of  the  different 
political  parties  which  resulted  in  civil  war  from  1839 
to  1841,  that  ended  in  the  triumph  of  Marquez.  General 
Herran  succeeded  Marquez,  and  in  turn  was  followed 
by  General  Mosquera.  In  1858,  under  President  Mariano 
Ospina,  a Conservative,  the  seeds  of  discord  between 
Liberals  and  Conservatives  were  sown  in  connection 
with  the  question  of  a Federal  or  Unitarian  form  of 
Government,  and  resulted  in  that  political  dissension 
which  has  embroiled  Colombia  in  civil  war  lasting  with 
short  intermissions  to  the  present  day. 

The  first  President  of  Venezuela  after  the  separation 
from  Colombia  in  1830,  was  General  Paez,  the  hero  of 
the  War  of  Independence.  Through  his  influence  fairly 
peaceful  conditions  were  maintained  until  1847,  when 
General  Monagas,  nominated  by  Paez,  was  elected. 
From  that  date  until  the  accession  to  power  of  Guzman 
Blanco,  the  country  was  devastated  by  civil  war  pro- 
moted by  ambitious  politicians  or  military  officers. 
President  after  President  was  deposed,  the  treasury 
depleted,  industrial  development  paralysed,  during  the 
thirty  years  following  the  advent  of  General  Monagas  to 
the  Presidency. 

Ecuador  fared  little  better  than  Venezuela  after 
separation  from  Colombia,  for  under  the  first  President, 
General  Flores,  revolutionary  movements  were  set  afoot, 


1830]  SOUTH  AMERICAN  PRESIDENTS 


29 


but  a compromise  was  effected,  and  until  1843  fairly 
tranquil  conditions  prevailed.  The  second  President 
was  Vicente  Rocafuerte,  an  able  and  highly  educated 
man  of  liberal  ideas,  and  who  attempted  to  organise  a 
civil  administration  and  a system  of  public  education. 
During  his  term  of  office  the  independence  of  the 
republic  was  recognised  by  Spain.  In  1839  General 
Flores  was  chosen  once  more,  and  was  re-elected  for  a 
third  term  in  1843,  but  overthrown  in  1845  by  a 
revolutionary  movement,  which  broke  out  at  Guayaquil, 
and  which  was  instigated  by  Rocafuerte.  From  now  on 
Ecuador  was  torn  by  internal  strife,  only  varied  occasion- 
ally by  disputes  with  Colombia  and  Peru,  and  her 
economic  condition  became  lamentable  in  spite  of  the 
occasional  efforts  by  such  men  as  President  Moreno  to 
improve  matters.  Moreno,  relying  always  on  the  support 
of  the  clergy  in  political  affairs,  made  many  enemies,  and 
on  August  6,  1875,  he  was  assassinated  at  Quito. 

The  first  President  of  Peru  was  Jose  de  la  Riva 
Aguero,  who  was  appointed  on  February  26,  1823,  while 
the  Spaniards  still  controlled  a large  section  of  the 
country.  He  was  deposed,  and  in  1827  General  Lamar 
was  elected  and  remained  in  office  until  1829,  when  he 
was  overthrown,  and  General  Gamarra  nominated  in  his 
stead.  For  the  next  fifteen  years  the  Government  was 
in  the  hands  of  various  military  cliques,  whose  leaders 
knew  little  of  the  principles  of  Civil  Administration, 
and,  as  a consequence,  internal  strife  was  the  order  of 
the  day,  revolution  following  revolution  in  rapid  succes- 
sion. The  chief  actors  during  this  stormy  period  were 
Generals  Gamarra,  Santa  Cruz,  and  Salaverry,  and  they 
or  their  nominees  held  power  from  1829  to  1844.  In 
that  year  General  Ramon  Castilla  restored  order  in  the 
republic,  and  in  1845  he  was  elected  to  the  Presidency. 
During  the  term  of  Castilla  many  public  works  were 
undertaken  and  the  national  finances  were  placed  on  an 
improved  footing.  He  was  succeeded  by  General 
Echenique,  who  was  deposed  by  a revolutionary  move- 
ment in  1855  on  account  of  certain  unpopular  measures 


30  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


introduced  by  him  in  connection  with  the  internal  indebt- 
edness. Castilla  then  returned  to  power,  and  remained 
in  office  until  1862,  comparative  peace  being  maintained 
for  the  seven  years  he  governed.  Two  revolutions  were 
attempted  against  his  administration,  but  both  were 
suppressed.  He  was  succeeded  in  1862  by  Colonel 
Balta. 

Chile  nominated  General  O’Higgins,  the  patriot  leader 
in  the  War  of  Independence,  as  head  of  the  Government 
after  her  emancipation  from  Spain  in  1817,  and  he  con- 
tinued in  power  until  1S23.  He  was  succeeded  by 
General  Freire,  who  held  office  for  three  years,  during 
which  period  the  country  was  a constant  prey  to  internal 
dissension  and  armed  insurrection,  and  here,  as  in 
Colombia,  the  nominal  cause  of  these  uprisings  was  the 
question  of  the  adoption  of  a Federal  or  Unitarian  form 
of  Government.  In  1827  General  Pinto  was  elected, 
but  resigned  in  1829,  and  was  succeeded  by  General 
Lastera.  The  opposition,  headed  by  General  Pinto  and 
General  Portales,  successfully  attacked  the  Government 
in  December,  1829,  and  this  brought  Pinto  again  to 
power  until  1831,  when  he  was  succeeded  by  General 
Prieto,  under  whose  administration  the  present  constitu- 
tion of  Chili  was  promulgated  in  1833.  Prieto  was 
re-elected  in  1835,  and  continued  in  office  until  1841, 
when  General  Bullies  was  nominated  to  the  Presidency, 
and  remained  at  the  head  of  affairs  for  ten  years. 
During  his  term  the  independence  of  Chile  was 
recognised  by  Spain.  Various  revolutionary  outbreaks 
occurred  against  Bullies,  but  all  were  suppressed,  and  in 
1851  his  friend  and  supporter  Don  Manuel  Montt  was 
elected  to  the  chief  magistracy. 

After  gaining  her  freedom,  Bolivia  in  1826  appointed 
General  Sucre  President  for  life,  but  repeated  insurrec- 
tions occurred  against  his  authority,  and  finally  he  was 
driven  from  the  country  in  1827.  General  Santa  Cruz 
now  succeeded  to  power  until  June,  1839,  when  he  was 
overthrown  by  a Peruvian  force  under  General  Gamarra, 
and  General  V elasco  was  made  head  of  the  Government, 


1840]  SOUTH  AMERICAN  PRESIDENTS 


31 


but  in  turn  was  ousted  by  a revolutionary  movement 
which  brought  General  Ballivian  into  office  in  1841. 
He  likewise  was  deposed,  and  Velasco  reappeared,  but 
only  to  give  place  to  General  Belzu  at  the  head  of  a 
successful  revolt.  In  1855  General  Cordoba  was  pro- 
claimed President,  but  deposed  in  favour  of  Dr  Linares 
in  1858,  who  was  deprived  of  office  by  a military  con- 
spiracy in  1861.  General  Acha  was  the  next  chief 
magistrate,  and  for  four  stormy  years  he  maintained  his 
position  against  his  enemies,  but  in  1865  he  was  driven 
out  by  Belzu,  who  in  turn  was  killed  at  La  Paz  when 
resisting  an  insurgent  attack  led  by  Colonel  Melgarejo. 
The  latter,  although  his  position  was  assailed  constantly, 
maintained  himself  in  power  until  1869. 

Uruguay  elected  Fructuoso  Ribera  as  her  first 
President  in  1830,  and  his  term  of  office  was  a record 
of  internal  turmoil  which  led  to  great  sacrifice  of  human 
life.  He  was  succeeded  by  Manuel  Oribe  in  1835,  but 
he  gave  place  to  his  brother  Ignacio  Oribe.  Constant 
warfare  against  the  Government  was  sustained  by  ex- 
President  Ribera,  Oribe  being  aided  by  the  dictator  of 
Buenos  Aires,  Juan  Manuel  Rosas.  In  1838  Ribera 
succeeded  in  capturing  Montevideo,  Oribe  taking  refuge 
with  Rosas  in  Buenos  Aires.  With  the  help  of  Rosas, 
the  refugee  invaded  Uruguay  in  1842,  and  laid  siege  to 
Montevideo  in  February,  1843.  The  city  was  defended 
by  the  Italian  and  French  legions,  and  a Brazilian 
regiment  commanded  by  Garibaldi,  and  the  conflict  was 
maintained  until  1851,  Oribe  then  being  completely 
defeated  by  the  Argentine  General  Urquiza,  who  had 
advanced  against  him  with  a strong  body  of  troops  from 
Eutre  Rios.  It  was  not  until  the  disappearance  of  Oribe 
that  any  semblance  of  peace  came  to  Uruguay,  and  that 
was  of  short  duration,  for  a conflict  arose  with  Great 
Britain,  France  and  Italy  over  claims  for  damages  done 
to  foreign  residents  during  the  revolution.  President 
Berro  was  forced  to  give  way  to  the  demands,  and  by 
doing  so,  incurred  the  hostility  of  his  countrymen,  but 
he  remained  in  office  until  the  expiry  of  his  term,  and 


32  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


in  1864  was  succeeded  by  Anastasio  Aguirre,  a member 
of  the  Blanco  Party. 

Argentina  was  better  prepared  for  self-government 
than  the  other  South  American  states,  but  here,  as  else- 
where on  the  continent,  the  liberty  gained  by  emancipa- 
tion from  Spanish  rule  was  imperfectly  understood. 
Such  men  as  Puyredon,  Rivadavia  and  Moreno  were 
statesmen  capable  of  directing  the  destinies  of  a nation 
far  more  advanced  in  civilisation  than  the  La  Plata 
provinces,  but  they  did  not  estimate  accurately  the  char- 
acter of  their  own  countrymen  when  it  expanded  after 
the  abrupt  cessation  of  despotic  control.  Rivadavia 
succeeded  Puyredon,  being  formally  appointed  President 
in  1825,  and  it  was  during  his  term  of  office  that  the 
question  of  Unitarian  or  Federal  Government,  which 
caused  such  serious  dissensions  in  Colombia  and  Chile, 
first  took  definite  shape.  He  failed  to  grasp  the  fact 
that  in  allowing  this  important  point  to  drift  he  opened 
the  door  for  a controversy  that  subsequently  formed 
the  pivot  round  which  a struggle  arose  and  caused  a 
heavy  sacrifice  of  life,  and  seriously  checked  the  develop- 
ment of  the  resources  of  the  country  for  more  than  half 
a century.  Rivadavia  was  in  favour  of  Unitarian 
Government,  but  at  that  period  this  meant  the  absolute 
supremacy  of  Buenos  Aires,  and  so  was  rejected  by  the 
provinces.  Lopez  in  Santa  Fe,  Bustos  in  Cordoba,  and 
Quiroga  in  the  western  territories,  declined  to  recognise 
the  right  of  Buenos  Aires  to  predominate  in  Argentine 
affairs,  and  were  ever  ready  to  throw  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  administration  there,  even  to  the  extent  of 
refusing  to  send  deputies  to  the  National  Congress,  or 
assisting  in  the  war  with  Brazil  then  in  progress.  Under 
these  circumstances  Rivadavia  resigned  office  and  was 
succeeded  by  Vicente  Lopez,  and  a compromise  wTas 
established  between  the  parties.  The  centre  of  Govern- 
ment was  moved  from  Buenos  Aires  to  Santa  Fe,  where 
a treaty  of  peace  proclaiming  the  independence  of 
Uruguay  was  made  with  Brazil. 

While  the  question  with  Brazil  was  open  the  various 


Juan  Martin  de  Puyredon. 


[Face  page  32. 


1832] 


ROSAS  AS  DICTATOR 


political  parties  had  agreed  to  some  sort  of  unity,  but  the 
moment  that  incident  closed  the  friction  was  renewed. 
The  Unitarians  again  demanded  the  supremacy  of 
Buenos  Aires,  and  in  December,  1828,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  General  Lavalle,  they  seized  the  Government 
Palace.  Dorrego,  a Federalist,  then  at  the  head  of  the 
administration,  marched  to  Santa  Fe  to  ask  support 
from  Congress,  but  he  was  overtaken  by  Lavalle  and 
shot.  For  the  next  two  years  a fierce  conflict  raged 
between  the  Federalists  under  Lopez  and  Quiroga  and 
the  Unitarians  led  by  Lavalle.  It  was  during  this  period 
that  Juan  Manuel  Rosas,  at  the  head  of  a body  of 
Gaucho  cavalry,  lent  valuable  aid  to  the  Federalist 
cause. 

In  December,  1829,  after  Rosas  had  defeated  Lavalle, 
the  Federalists  appointed  him  Governor  and  Captain- 
General  of  Buenos  Aires.  Shortly  afterwards  the 
Unitarians  were  defeated  in  Entre  Rios  and  Cordoba, 
and  when  Rosas  opened  the  legislature  in  1832  the 
majority  of  the  provinces  pronounced  in  favour  of  the 
Federal  cause.  From  now  on  the  power  of  Rosas 
became  absolute,  and  the  Unitarians  were  hunted  down 
like  wild  beasts.  But  Rosas  became  suspicious  of  his 
own  generals,  and  one  by  one  they  disappeared.  Quiroga 
was  assassinated  at  Cordoba.  Lopez  died  suddenly  in 
Buenos  Aires ; and  Cullen,  Reiuafe  and  Heredia  were 
sentenced  to  death.  Although  Rosas  now  exercised 
dictatorial  power  he  was  not  satisfied,  and  on  March  8, 
1835,  he  arranged  for  a plebiscite  which  put  all  public 
authority  into  his  hands. 

Rosas  attempted  to  close,  and  for  a time  succeeded 
in  closing,  the  River  Parana  to  foreign  commerce,  and 
this  led  to  the  blockade  of  Buenos  Aires  by  an  English 
and  French  fleet  in  1845  and  the  forcing  of  the  passage 
of  the  river ; but  he  realised  the  uselessness  of  such  pro- 
ceedings, and  in  1849  he  signed  a convention  agreeing  to 
the  free  navigation  of  this  waterway  and  also  to  the 
independence  of  Uruguay,  which  country  he  had 
endeavoured  to  annex  to  Argentina.  These  negotia- 

c 


34  EMANCIPATION  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 


tions  the  French  Chambers  refused  to  ratify  in  1851, 
and  went  so  far  as  to  authorise  the  despatch  of  an 
expeditionary  force  to  ensure  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  French  settlers  and  French  commercial 

o 

interests. 


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ReslingaK  CanqtosdaYaccord 


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MAP  OF  THE 
SOUTHERN  SECTION 


English  Miles 


WMtQoa 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 

Savage  Brutality  of  Rosas.  Revolution  against  Rosas.  Economic 
and  Social  Conditions.  Ambition  of  the  Provinces  to  Dominate 
Buenos  Aires.  Wish  of  Buenos  Aires  to  Secede.  Determina- 
tion of  Buenos  Aires  to  Appeal  to  Arms.  Revolution  under 
General  Mitre.  Victory  of  the  Insurgents  at  Pavon.  General 
Mitre  Installed  as  President.  The  National  Capital.  Revolu- 
tionary Movements.  Aggressiveness  of  Lopez.  War  with  Para- 
guay. Political  Consequences  of  the  War.  Cholera  in  Buenos 
Aires.  Election  of  Dr  Sarmiento  to  the  Presidency.  Educational 
Progress.  Efforts  to  Advance  Industrial  Development.  Yellow 
Fever  Epidemic.  The  Administration  of  Sarmiento.  The 
Political  Situation  in  1874.  Cordoba  and  the  Presidential 
Election  of  1S74.  Election  of  Dr  Nicolas  Avellaneda.  The 
Presidential  Election  of  1871.  Mitre  and  Revolutionary  Pro- 
jects. Conspiracy  against  the  Government.  Seditious  Out- 
breaks. Political  Aims  of  Buenos  Aires.  Attitude  of  Avellaneda. 
Position  in  1878.  Propaganda  of  the  Cordoba  League.  Meet- 
ings in  Buenos  Aires.  The  “ Tiro  Nacional.”  Buenos  Aires 
and  Cordoba.  National  Government  Alarmed.  Minister  of 
War  and  the  “Tiro  Nacional.”  President  determines  to  Sup- 
press the  “ Tiro  Nacional.”  Popular  Demonstrations  in  Buenos 
Aires.  Troops  Protect  the  National  Authorities.  Compromise 
between  President  and  Citizens.  Second  Mass  Meeting  in 
Buenos  Aires.  Advice  of  Dr  Sarmiento.  Conference  between 
Governor  of  Buenos  Aires  and  President.  Temporary  Compro- 
mise. Presidential  Election  of  1880.  Issues  of  Electoral  Cam- 
paign. Presidential  Candidates.  General  Roca.  Dr  Pellegrini 
as  Minister  of  War.  The  Cordoba  League.  Popular  Excite- 
ment. Situation  Strained.  Buenos  Aires  buys  War  Material. 
Military  Preparations.  Delay  in  arrival  of  Arms  and  Ammuni- 
tion. 

The  lengthy  period  for  which  General  Rosas  exercised 
absolute  control  over  Argentina  produced  many  evil 

35 


36 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


results.  At  a time  when  a steady  advance  in  civilisa- 
tion and  a due  respect  for  law  and  order  should  have 
developed,  the  reverse  actually  occurred,  for  Rosas  had 
strangled  collective  and  individual  initiative  in  public 
and  private  life. 

Under  the  tyranny  of  Rosas  human  life  had  small 
value.  If  any  man  was  a danger  to  the  dictatorial 
regime  he  was  murdered  by  a band  of  assassins  retained 
for  this  purpose.  Expression  of  public  opinion  was 
thus  rendered  impossible.  Men  dared  not  think  for 
themselves,  much  less  put  into  words  their  abhorrence 
of  the  savage  brutality  of  the  Dictator.  With  all  his 
grim  ferocity  Rosas  was  not  devoid  of  a sense  of  humour. 
When  relations  were  critical  between  his  Government 
and  the  British  Minister,  he  made  a wager  that  the  latter 
would  be  doing  menial  work  in  his  household  before 
many  hours  elapsed.  His  daughter  Manuelita  aided 
the  plot.  Next  day  the  Minister  entered  the  Palace 
courtyard  and  found  Manuelita  in  tears  and  pounding 
maize  for  “ masamora.”  H.M.’s  representative  con- 
doled with  her  on  her  father’s  harshness  in  forcing 
such  drudgery  on  his  daughter,  and  begged  leave  to 
assist  her.  While  the  Minister  was  busily  breaking  up 
the  corn  Rosas  appeared  with  a group  of  friends  and 
claimed  payment  of  the  wager.  It  was  in  the  province 
of  Buenos  Aires,  the  wealthiest  and  most  populous 
section  of  the  Confederation,  that  the  ferocity  of  the 
tyrant  was  felt  with  greatest  severity,  and  it  was  from 
Buenos  Aires  that  Rosas  most  feared  an  uprising ; 
therefore  was  he  ruthless  in  his  treatment  of  city  and 
province.  After  all,  however,  it  was  from  the  interior 
provinces  that  the  movement  emanated  which  finally 
overthrew  his  tyrannical  power.  But  that  did  not  come 
until  he  had  held  the  country  in  his  iron  grasp  for 
eighteen  years. 

When  the  revolutionary  forces  under  General  Urquiza 
entered  Buenos  Aires  in  1852  Rosas  fled  the  country. 
When  he  found  his  power  broken  and  his  life  in  peril 
he  turned  to  the  British  Minister  for  protection.  He 


1852] 


DOWNFALL  OF  ROSAS 


37 


lay  concealed  through  the  day  at  the  Legation,  then, 
disguised  as  an  English  sailor,  he  slipped  after  nightfall 
on  board  a British  man-of-war  and  was  conveyed  to  a 
place  of  safety.  Until  his  death  on  March  14,  1877,  he 
lived  on  a farm  near  Southampton.  His  daughter  Manu- 
elita  survived  him,  and  died  in  London  in  1892.  Under 
this  man’s  dictatorship  social  and  economic  conditions 
had  sunk  low  compared  to  the  standard  of  civilisation 
elsewhere  in  South  America.  The  people  had  been  so 
ground  down  by  Rosas  that  there  was  little  public  spirit 
left  to  come  to  the  front  when  participation  in  political 
affairs  once  more  became  possible.  He  left  city  and  pro- 
vince prostrate,  and  the  provincial  representatives,  whilst 
entertaining  most  vindictive  feelings  towards  Rosas,  had 
no  real  sympathy  with  the  Portehos,  as  the  inhabitants 
of  Buenos  Aires  were  called.  The  up-country  provinces 
were  as  eager  as  Rosas  had  been  to  dominate  Buenos 
Aires.  They  wanted  her  resources  to  sustain  an  Ad- 
ministration of  which  they  held  the  control.  The  people 
of  Buenos  Aires  were  opposed  naturally  to  this  policy. 
They  wished  to  be  the  leading  element  in  the  Confedera- 
tion, or,  failing  this,  to  secede  and  be  independent. 
Equally  determined  was  the  Provincial  Party  to  prevent 
control  or  secession. 

The  immediate  effect  of  the  downfall  of  Rosas  was  a 
feeling  of  intense  relief  in  Buenos  Aires,  and  at  first  no 
efforts  were  made  to  safeguard  the  position  of  the 
Portenos  in  the  Administration.  This  condition  was 
only  of  short  duration,  for  the  people  soon  realised  that 
it  was  necessary  to  bestir  themselves  if  they  did  not 
wish  their  interests  to  be  subordinated  completely  to 
ambitious  provincial  politicians.  Between  1852  and 
1860,  however,  the  direction  of  public  affairs  was  con- 
trolled by  General  Urquiza  in  spite  of  various  attempts 
by  Buenos  Aires  to  assert  her  position.  It  was  the 
dictatorship  of  Urquiza  following  that  of  Rosas,  but  in 
modified  form.  From  time  to  time  revolutionary  out- 
breaks occurred,  but  were  premature  and  unsuccessful, 
and  meanwhile  Buenos  Aires  rapidly  gained  strength. 


38 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


Evidently  a serious  struggle  between  the  Portenos  and 
the  rest  of  the  Confederation  must  come. 

In  1860  the  tension  between  Buenos  Aires  and  the 
provinces  became  unbearable,  and  Buenos  Aires  deter- 
mined to  appeal  to  arms  to  settle  the  position  it  was  to 
occupy  in  the  future.  Amongst  the  prominent  Portenos 
was  Colonel  Bartolome  Mitre.  To  this  officer  was 
confided  the  organisation  and  command  of  the  forces 
raised.  Preparations  for  this  struggle  had  been  in 
progress  for  years  before  the  actual  outbreak,  and  funds 
had  been  freely  subscribed  for  purchasing  arms  and 
ammunition.  For  once  the  Portenos  were  united.  The 
defence  of  the  National  Government  was  in  the  hands 
of  General  Urquiza,  who  spared  no  effort  to  stem  the 
tide  of  insurrection.  The  feeling  in  the  province  of 
Buenos  Aires,  however,  was  unanimous  when  hostilities 
began  in  1861,  and  the  position  of  the  Federal  or 
National  Government  at  once  became  untenable.  Both 
city  and  province  were  evacuated  by  it,  and  the  head- 
quarters transferred  to  Rosario  in  the  province  of  Santa 
Fe.  General  Mitre  moved  northwards  to  attack  the 
national  troops,  and  at  Pavon  a decisive  victory  was 
gained  by  the  revolutionary  forces  in  October,  1861. 
This  led  to  the  evacuation  of  Rosario  by  Urquiza,  and 
practically  ended  the  campaign.  Peace  was  established 
shortly  afterwards,  and  General  Mitre  installed  in  the 
Presidency. 

After  the  victory  at  Pavon,  Buenos  Aires  had  her 
opportunity  to  decide  her  future  position  in  regard  to 
the  rest  of  Argentina.  General  Mitre  did  introduce 
some  modifications  of  the  National  Constitution. 
Nothing  was  done,  however,  to  restrict  the  action  of  the 
Provinces.  Precautions  were  not  taken  to  assure  the 
proper  representation  of  Buenos  Aires  in  the  national 
policy  in  after  years,  nor  were  any  practical  efforts  made 
to  settle  the  vexed  problem  of  the  site  of  the  national 
capital. 

This  question  of  the  seat  of  the  central  administra- 
tion was  consequently  provocative  of  constant  friction 


Josii  J.  DE  UrQUIZA. 


[Face  page  38. 


1861] 


PRESIDENT  MITRE 


39 


between  the  provincial  government  of  Buenos  Aires 
and  the  national  representatives.  President  Mitre 
was  aware  of  the  jealous  feeling  aroused  in  connection 
with  the  claim  of  the  National  Government  to  permanent 
residence  in  Buenos  Aires,  but  he  allowed  the  matter  to 
drift.  Unexpected  complications  arose  in  other  direc- 
tions to  occupy  public  attention,  and  this  troublesome 
source  of  inquietude  remained  unsolved  for  another 
twenty  years. 

Disturbances  now  occurred  in  several  of  the 
provinces.  The  Provincial  Administrations  foresaw 
that  if  the  Portehos  were  allowed  to  remain  long  in 
control  of  the  National  Administration  the  result  would 
be  such  an  addition  to  their  powrer  that  the  national 
policy  would  be  dictated  by  Buenos  Aires,  and  it  was 
to  check  porteno  influence  that  the  majority  of  the 
provinces  joined  hands  against  Mitre.  They  fomented 
seditious  outbreaks  to  hamper  development  and  progress 
in  the  country  as  a means  to  an  end. 

In  addition  to  the  complications  from  unsettled 
internal  conditions  Mitre  was  confronted  by  a new 
difficulty  in  the  aggressive  attitude  of  General  Lopez, 
the  dictator  of  Paraguay.  The  belligerent  policy  of 
Lopez  was  apparent  between  1860  and  1865,  but  the 
Argentines,  in  common  with  Brazil,  were  inclined  to 
underestimate  the  strength  of  this  small  inland  state. 
Events  showed,  however,  that  warlike  operations  against 
Paraguay  were  inevitable  in  the  near  future,  and  so 
negotiations  for  the  joint  action  of  Argentina,  Uruguay 
and  Brazil,  against  Paraguay,  were  set  afoot.  An 
agreement  was  reached,  and  it  was  determined  to  use 
force  to  defeat  the  ambitious  projects  of  Lopez.  In 
1865  the  hostile  proceedings  of  the  Paraguayan  dictator 
decided  the  three  Governments  to  invade  Paraguay,  and 
the  events  of  the  war  wall  be  described  under  the 
section  devoted  to  Paraguayan  history.  They  were 
destined  to  produce  important  consequences  to  the 
Portehos,  for  they  distracted  the  attention  of  Mitre 
from  internal  affairs,  and  permitted  the  provinces  to 


40 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


undermine  the  political  strength  of  Buenos  Aires.  The 
long  absence  of  Mitre  in  Paraguay,  where  he  was 
commander-in-chief  of  the  allied  army,  and  his  inability 
to  attend  to  his  presidential  duties,  enabled  provincial 
politicians  to  counteract  his  personal  influence.  There- 
fore, as  the  time  approached  for  the  fresh  presidential 
term  it  became  evident  that  the  victory  of  Buenos  Aires 
on  the  battlefield  of  Pavon  in  1861  was  not  enough  to 
ensure  to  the  Portenos  the  preponderating  power  in 
Argentine  politics. 

A severe  visitation  of  cholera  fell  upon  the  city  and 
province  of  Buenos  Aires  in  1868,  and  proved  to  be 
an  important  factor  in  the  presidential  election.  For 
months  Buenos  Aires  was  almost  deserted,  a calamity 
that  favoured  the  efforts  of  the  provincial  organisations. 
So  when  the  election  was  held  in  1868,  Dr  Sarmiento,  a 
native  of  San  Juan,  obtained  a substantial  majority. 
An  attempt  was  made  to  dispute  the  validity  of  the 
election,  but  the  opposition  was  feeble,  and  the  new 
President  assumed  office  on  October  12,  1868. 

Small  fault  could  be  found  with  the  attitude  and 
policy  of  Sarmiento,  and  the  animosity  of  the  Portenos 
quickly  subsided  when  he  became  better  known. 
Sarmiento’s  most  bitter  opponents  were  forced  to  admit 
that  his  Government  was  characterised  by  upright  deal- 
ing, and  a desire  to  promote  the  best  interests  of 
Argentina.  During  his  presidential  term  he  established 
a system  of  public  education  of  wider  scope  than  existed 
anywhere  in  South  America.  Unfortunately  this  educa- 
tional development  was  not  maintained  in  later  years, 
but  the  measures  taken  between  1868  and  1874  bear 
testimony  of  his  broad-minded  policy  in  national  affairs. 

Amongst  other  difficulties  confronting  the  Adminis- 
tration, not  the  least  was  the  final  settlement  of  the 
Paraguayan  question.  The  sacrifice  in  blood  and 
treasure  during  the  conflict  had  been  heavy,  but  the 
full  effect  of  this  expenditure  was  not  thoroughly 
appreciated  until  after  Dr  Sarmiento  acceded  to  power 
and  the  struggle  was  ended.  To  expand  industrial 


. 1871] 


PRESIDENT  SARMIENTO 


41 


enterprise  in  Argentina  was  the  only  remedy  for  the 
situation,  and  the  development  of  the  great  natural 
pastoral  and  agricultural  resources  was  never  lost  sight 
of  by  Sarmiento.  For  the  first  time  in  Argentine 
history  the  fact  that  peace  and  prosperity  travel  hand 
in  hand  was  borne  home  to  the  minds  of  the  people. 

In  1871  an  epidemic  of  yellow  fever  made  its 
appearance  and  spread  rapidly.  The  population  of 
Buenos  Aires  was  then  estimated  at  300,000  persons, 
and  the  number  of  victims  created  panic  so  acute  that 
five-sixths  of  the  residents  left  the  town.  For  months 
commercial  business  was  paralysed.  According  to 
official  returns  the  deaths  in  Buenos  Aires  between 
January  and  June  of  1871  reached  24,000.  Two 
members  of  the  Municipality,  Dr  Hector  Varela  and 
Dr  Roque  Perez,  were  conspicuous  for  heroic  efforts  to 
alleviate  the  terrible  distress.  The  conduct  of  these 
two  officials  was  depicted  by  Seiior  J.  M.  Blanes  in  a 
painting  showing  them  entering  a small  room  in  the 
poorer  section  of  the  city.  On  a bed  lies  the  dead 
father ; on  the  floor  is  the  body  of  the  mother,  and 
near  her  an  infant  crying  for  food.  It  is  to  the  credit 
of  the  European  medical  men  in  Buenos  Aires  that  they 
remained  to  fight  the  disease.  Recovery  from  the 
disturbance  occasioned  to  commerce  and  trade  by  this 
disaster  was  slow,  and  the  evil  results  crippled  the 
efforts  of  President  Sarmiento  to  place  economic  condi- 
tions on  a satisfactory  basis. 

In  1874  Sarmiento’s  Presidency  terminated.  In 
spite  of  all  difficulties,  progress  since  1868  had  been 
substantial.  Education  had  advanced ; railways  had 
been  extended,  and  respect  for  law  and  >order  had 
increased.  The  administration  of  justice  had  also 
improved,  and  there  was  a revival  of  confidence  in 
commerce  and  industry.  Public  attention  now  turned 
to  the  question  of  Sarmiento’s  successor.  Bitter  feeling 
was  exhibited  by  both  Portenos  and  representatives  of 
the  provinces  in  the  new  election.  The  provinces  fully 
realised  that  if  the  choice  for  the  Presidency  lay  with 


42 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


Buenos  Aires,  the  Portenos  would  dominate  the  national 
policy,  and  they  therefore  united  to  defeat  the  porteno 
candidate. 

The  political  status  of  Argentina  in  1874  was  very 
different  from  that  now  existing,  for  then  the  Confedera- 
tion was  a loosely  jointed  organisation  of  fourteen  States, 
each  enjoying  sovereign  rights  under  the  national  Law 
of  Constitution,  and  each  inevitably  jealous  of  control 
by  the  National  Government.  Danger  of  secession  con- 
sequently existed  always,  and  was  the  principal  cause 
of  civil  war  in  this  section  of  South  America.  The 
question  of  any  change  in  the  constitutional  law  was  a 
matter  of  constant  dispute.  A proposal  for  Unitarian 
in  place  of  Federal  Administration  raised  a storm  of 
protest,  and  so  acute  did  the  controversy  become  during 
the  dictatorship  of  Rosas,  that  the  motto  used  by  the 
supporters  of  the  tyrant,  and  appearing  on  many  official 
documents,  was — Viva  la  Confederation  Argentina. 
Mueran  los  Salvajes  Unitarios  (Long  life  to  the 
Argentina  Confederation.  Death  to  the  Unitarian 
savages).  This  party  cry  was  emphasised  by  the 
assassination  of  prominent  persons  in  favour  of  a 
Unitarian  system.  Attempts  were  made  by  Mitre  and 
Sarmiento  to  unite  the  Confederation  more  closely,  but 
without  success,  for  the  suspicious  nature  of  the  pro- 
vincial politicians  prevented  any  cordial  understanding 
between  themselves  and  the  Portenos.  Moreover,  the 
people  of  Buenos  Aires  were  afraid  that  closer  union 
with  the  remainder  of  Argentina  would  tend  to  augment 
provincial  influence.  Another  impediment  was  the  diffi- 
culty of  communication  between  the  different  provinces. 
There  we  no  few  railways,  no  roads,  no  telegraphs.  A 
journey  from  the  interior  provinces  to  the  city  of 
Buenos  Aires  was  a matter  of  weeks,  sometimes  months. 
Amid  such  conditions  it  is  easy  to  appreciate  how 
restricted  the  intercourse  was,  and  how  distorted 
rumours  gave  rise  to  misunderstandings. 

The  city  of  Cordoba  was  the  headquarters  of  the 
provincial  political  organisations.  It  was  by  Cordoba 


President  Mitre. 


President  Sarmiento. 


Leandro  Alem. 


Aristobulo  del  Valle. 


[ Face  page  42. 


1874] 


PROVINCIAL  POLITICS 


43 


that  Sarmiento  had  been  elected  in  1868,  and  round 
this  centre  the  provincial  representatives  rallied  in  1874. 
The  provinces  claimed  official  aid  in  the  presidential 
campaign.  President  Sarmiento  had  been  their  candi- 
date, and  by  South  American  ethics  must  render  them 
assistance  for  the  election  of  their  nominee ; but  here 
the  provincial  leaders  reckoned  without  their  host. 
Sarmiento  refused  to  make  use  of  his  official  position. 
Nor  did  he  evince  any  marked  sympathy  for  the  aims 
of  the  Provincial  Party.  During  his  term  of  office  he 
had  realised  that  the  antagonism  between  Buenos  Aires 
and  the  rest  of  Argentina  was  the  greatest  obstacle  to 
the  progress  of  the  country.  He  considered  a more 
compact  form  of  government  with  Buenos  Aires  at  the 
head  was  the  true  solution  of  the  problem.  The  pro- 
vincial representatives  were  not  opposed  to  a consolidated 
National  Administration,  but  only  on  condition  that  the 
provinces  had  sufficient  representation  to  outvote  Buenos 
Aires.  Cordoba  was  disappointed  at  the  attitude  of 
Sarmiento,  but  did  not  lose  heart,  and  the  President 
was  so  far  influenced  that  he  promised  to  remain  neutral, 
and  strictly  maintained  this  pledge.  Other  high  officials 
in  his  Administration  had  no  such  conscientious  scruples. 
They  used  all  their  influence  in  favour  of  the  Cordoba 
clique.  It  was,  therefore,  a surprise  to  nobody  when 
Dr  Nicolas  Avellaneda,  a native  of  Tucuman,  was 
elected. 

The  situation  after  the  election  of  1874  was  full  of 
complications.  The  Portenos  were  dissatisfied.  They 
claimed  that  General  Mitre,  the  porteno  candidate,  had  a 
majority  of  votes,  and  that  the  returns  had  been  falsified. 
Not  improbably  this  was  the  case. 

It  is  certain  the  representatives  of  Buenos  Aires  with 
their  allies  from  other  provinces  ought  to  have  carried  the 
day.  On  the  other  hand  it  was  not  clear  that  the  pro- 
vincial contingent  promising  aid  to  the  Portenos  kept 
faith  with  Buenos  Aires  when  the  voting  took  place. 
Once  the  election  of  President  Avellaneda  had  been 
announced  by  the  Congress  there  was  no  means  short  of 


44 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


armed  force  by  which  the  decision  could  be  reversed. 
The  relations  between  Buenos  Aires  and  the  provinces 
were  so  strained  that  many  Portenos  strongly  advocated 
a revolutionary  movement.  General  Mitre  was  not  in 
favour  of  a rising,  and,  as  no  other  strong  man  was  forth- 
coming to  take  his  place,  the  conspiracy  did  not  assume 
a really  serious  character.  It  was  promptly  suppressed 
by  the  Government. 

Many  revolutionary  disturbances,  however,  signal- 
ised the  first  three  years  of  the  Avellaneda  Administra- 
tion. In  some  instances  these  outbreaks  originated  in 
local  circumstances,  and  had  no  connection  with  the 
National  Government.  In  others  they  arose  from  the 
disposition  of  the  Administration  to  intervene  unduly  in 
provincial  affairs.  Buenos  Aires  and  the  provinces  were 
alike  convinced  the  critical  struggle  for  the  final  control 
of  the  Confederation  would  take  place  at  the  next  pre- 
sidential election.  Preparations  were  made  by  both 
parties  to  resort  to  arms  if  necessary. 

The  two  factors  in  the  political  situation  were  the 
Portenos  of  Buenos  Aires,  supported  by  the  province  of 
Corrientes,  and  the  National  Administration  representing 
the  remainder  of  Argentina.  Buenos  Aires  and  her  one 
sympathiser  in  point  of  population  and  resources  were  a 
match  for  the  rest  of  the  Confederation  if  competent 
leaders  could  be  found. 

Avellaneda  relied  on  a show  of  force  to  deter 
seditious  conspiracy  from  blazing  out  into  open  revolt 
and  involving  the  country  in  Civil  War.  The  national 
army  was  strengthened  by  recruits  from  the  inland 
sections  of  the  republic.  Supplies  of  arms  and  ammu- 
nition were  obtained,  and  other  precautions  observed  as 
the  situation  became  more  strained.  Each  party  was 
inclined  to  underrate  the  strength  of  the  other,  but  the 
attitude  of  the  leaders  on  both  sides  was  so  aggressive 
as  to  leave  small  hope  of  a peaceful  solution  of  the 
controversy.  Ostentatious  parade  of  military  strength 
was  made  to  intimidate  the  Portenos,  and  the  position 
was  complicated  further  by  the  provincial  politicians 


1880]  BUENOS  AIRES  AND  PROVINCES  45 


proposing  to  form  the  city  of  Buenos  Aires  into  a Federal 
District.  The  porteno  population  was  determined  to 
resist  this  proposition.  A meeting  of  citizens  was  held, 
and  included  General  Bartolome  Mitre ; Dr  Carlos 
Tejedor,  the  Governor  of  the  province ; Colonel  Arias, 
the  representative  of  the  province  of  Corrientes  ; General 
Martin  Gainza,  and  General  Emilio  Mitre.  After  lengthy 
discussion  of  ways  and  means  for  Buenos  Aires  to  defend 
her  rights,  it  was  decided  to  found  an  association  for  rifle 
shooting.  All  able-bodied  men  were  urged  to  become 
members  of  this  club,  which  was  incorporated  as  the 
“Tiro  Nacional.”  In  reality  it  was  a military  volunteer 
organisation  for  training  those  who  would  be  called  to 
arms  when  hostilities  began.  The  enthusiasm  of  the 
younger  men  in  Buenos  Aires  for  the  “ Tiro  Nacional  ” 
was  unbounded.  Every  Sunday  thousands  attended  the 
parade  grounds  to  undergo  instruction.  It  was  placed 
in  charge  of  Colonel  Julio  Campos,  an  able  and  energetic 
officer. 

The  National  Government  was  alarmed  at  the 
development  of  the  “ Tiro  Nacional.”  Avellaneda  called 
a council  of  ministers  to  consider  what  steps  should  be 
taken  to  counteract  its  effect.  It  was  decided  that  the 
Minister  of  War  should  demand  an  explanation  from  the 
principal  military  officers  associated  with  the  movement. 
On  February  13,  1880,  he  accordingly  requested  the 
attendance  at  his  office  of  General  Mitre,  his  brother 
Emilio,  Colonel  Arias,  Colonel  Julio  Campos,  Colonel 
Lagos,  and  other  officers.  The  views  of  the  National 
Administration  concerning  the  attitude  of  Buenos  Aires 
were  stated,  and  the  officers  were  informed  that  their 
association  with  revolutionary  societies  laid  them  open 
to  a charge  of  treason,  and  that  in  supporting  the  action 
of  the  Portehos  they  were  conspiring  against  the  Govern- 
ment they  served.  The  answer  by  these  officers  was  the 
resignation  of  their  commissions.  They  asserted  that 
separation  from  the  national  service  absolved  them  from 
any  ties  binding  them  to  the  Administration.  Hot  words 
followed,  and  Colonel  Julio  Campos  left  the  minister  in 


46 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


no  doubt  as  to  the  course  to  be  taken  by  Buenos  Aires. 
Before  the  meeting  closed,  he  explained  the  situation  in 
these  words  : — “ If  there  are  rebels  it  is  the  National 
Government  who  are  the  instigators  of  sedition.  You 
are  striking  at  the  liberty  of  Buenos  Aires  and  the 
Argentine  Confederation.  It  is  our  duty  to  defend 
both  with  all  our  strength.” 

Avellaneda  thereupon  determined  to  use  force  to 
suppress  the  Buenos  Aires  military  organisation.  On 
February  15,  1880,  2000  members  of  the  “Tiro 
Nacional  ” were  to  assemble  at  Palermo  on  the  outskirts 
of  Buenos  Aires.  A division  of  the  regular  army  was 
encamped  near  the  Chacarita  cemetery,  and  orders  were 
issued  by  the  Minister  of  War  for  these  troops  to  take 
up  positions  to  command  all  roads  leading  to  the  parade 
ground  of  the  “Tiro  Nacional.”  Batteries  of  artillery 
were  stationed  to  cover  the  approaches  from  Buenos 
Aires.  The  leaders  of  the  “Tiro  Nacional”  were 
advised  of  this  movement,  and  changed  the  rendezvous 
to  the  Plaza  Lorea.  A demonstration  through  the 
streets  of  Buenos  Aires  followed,  and  was  supported 
enthusiastically  by  the  whole  population  of  the  city. 
The  Government  was  frightened,  and  orders  were  issued 
for  the  troops  at  Palermo  to  march  into  Buenos  Aires. 
A collision  between  the  two  factions  appeared  inevi- 
table. Later  in  the  day,  however,  a compromise  was 
effected.  The  troops  were  withdrawn  beyond  the  city 
limits,  and  the  Portenos  quietly  dispersed. 

On  February  16,  the  day  following  this  excitement  in 
Buenos  Aires,  a meeting  of  prominent  citizens  was  sum- 
moned, at  which  violent  denunciations  of  the  Administra- 
tion were  made.  Then  Dr  Sarmiento  advised  Buenos 
Aires  to  disarm  on  condition  that  the  other  provinces  con- 
sented to  similar  measures  ; but  the  Portenos  refused  to 
accept  this  proposal,  alleging  that  disarmament  would 
place  Buenos  Aires  at  the  mercy  of  the  Cordoba  clique. 
The  result  of  the  meeting  was  the  nomination  of  a com- 
mittee composed  of  Senor  Felix  Frias,  Senor  Rufino 
Varela,  and  Dr  Aristobulo  del  Valle  to  confer  with  the 


1880]  THE  AVELLANEDA  ADMINISTRATION  47 


Governor  of  the  province,  Dr  Carlos  Tejedor,  and  arrange 
a Hindus  vivendi  between  the  National  and  Provincial 
Governments.  At  this  conference,  the  Governor  de- 
manded that  the  army  should  be  withdrawn  from  the  city 
of  Buenos  Aires,  and  fair  representation  for  the  Portenos 
be  given  in  all  questions  of  national  policy.  The  Presi- 
dent inquired  if  Buenos  Aires  would  disarm  if  the 
conditions  asked  were  granted.  He  was  told  that  dis- 
armament would  not  be  accepted,  but  that  no  parade  of 
military  strength  would  be  attempted.  Avellaneda  was 
not  strong  enough  to  force  an  open  rupture,  and  he 
therefore  agreed  to  the  proposals  of  Tejedor  in  order  to 
gain  time  to  mature  his  plans  for  future  action.  Thus 
for  the  moment  open  warfare  between  the  Portenos  and 
the  National  Administration  was  averted. 

Public  attention  now  centred  upon  the  choice  of  a 
successor  to  Avellaneda.  The  issue  at  stake  was 
whether  Buenos  Aires  or  the  provinces,  as  represented 
by  the  Cordoba  clique,  should  dominate  Argentina. 
General  Bartolome  Mitre  was  the  porteno  leader,  and 
Buenos  Aires  would  have  nominated  him  for  the  Presi- 
dency, but  he  refused.  His  attitude  led  to  the  selection 
of  Dr  Carlos  Tejedor  as  the  porteno  candidate.  Dr 
Tejedor  had  been  Governor  of  the  province  of  Buenos 
Aires  since  1878,  a position  which  had  ranked  as  equal 
to  the  President  of  the  Republic.  General  Julio  Roca 
was  the  candidate  nominated  by  the  provinces.  He 
was  destined  to  become  a prominent  character  in 
Argentine  history. 

General  Roca  was  an  officer  who  had  distinguished 
himself  in  campaigns  against  the  Indians  and  in  com- 
mand of  troops  employed  to  suppress  revolutionary  out- 
breaks. He  was  born  in  1843  in  Tucuman,  but  educated 
in  Cordoba.  In  his  professional  career  he  had  shown 
ability  for  organisation  and  tact  in  dealing  with  his 
colleagues.  The  Portenos  therefore  regarded  his 
military  influence  as  a dangerous  element  in  the  present 
situation.  His  prestige  gained  against  the  Indians  in 
the  south  of  the  province  of  Buenos  Aires  in  1879  was, 


48 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


on  the  other  hand,  a powerful  weapon  in  the  hands  of 
his  political  supporters  in  the  election.  The  result  of 
this  southern  campaign  had  been  to  open  to  colonisation 
a vast  area  of  territory  extending  as  far  as  the  Rio 
Negro,  beyond  which  lay  the  unexplored  regions  of 
Patagonia.  It  was  claimed  for  Roca  that  he  was  a 
national  benefactor,  but  his  friends  credited  him  with 
little  knowledge  of  politics.  In  this  respect,  however, 
they  considered  him  all  the  more  suitable,  because  they 
wanted  a leader  who  would  not  be  afraid  to  show  a bold 
front  to  any  movement  the  Portenos  might  set  afoot. 
Roca  was  not  slow  to  see  that  existing  circumstances 
offered  many  opportunities  for  his  own  advancement, 
and  at  once  accepted  the  situation,  although  he  under- 
stood more  clearly  than  his  supporters  that  conflict  with 
the  Portenos  must  be  decided  by  an  appeal  to  arms. 
Accordingly,  his  attention  in  1880  was  devoted  to  the 
better  organisation  of  the  national  army. 

Amongst  the  supporters  of  Roca  was  Carlos  Pelle- 
grini, then  a comparatively  young  man,  having  been 
born  in  Buenos  Aires  in  1847.  As  Minister  of  War 
under  Avellaneda,  he  had  held  high  political  office,  and 
as  Secretary  to  the  Chambers  he  had  acquired  know- 
ledge of  political  methods.  Through  his  father,  Pelle- 
grini inherited  Italian  blood,  and  on  his  mother’s  side  he 
was  connected  with  Mr  John  Bright.  He  was  educated 
at  Harrow.  It  was  Pellegrini  who  protested  against  the 
resignation  of  Avellaneda  when  the  national  authorities 
were  threatened  by  Buenos  Aires  in  February,  1880, 
and  it  was  Pellegrini  again,  when  Minister  of  War,  who 
advocated  the  use  of  the  troops  by  the  National  Govern- 
ment to  crush  any  attempt  of  the  Portenos  to  enforce  the 
demands  made  through  Dr  Tejedor.  His  resourceful 
character  made  him  an  invaluable  ally  to  the  Cordoba 
clique  in  their  struggle  for  supremacy,  and  they  displayed 
a keen  knowledge  of  human  nature  in  inducing  the  pro- 
vincial representatives  to  combine  the  political  ability  of 
Pelligrini  with  the  soldierly  qualities  of  Roca  in  the 
contest.  In  the  former  they  had  a clever  organiser  and 


1880J 


THE  COED OB A LEAGUE 


49 


a shrewd  adviser,  who  understood  the  weak  points  of 
his  fellow-countrymen.  In  the  latter,  they  could  depend 
upon  an  able  soldier  to  whom  the  national  army  was 
devoted. 

The  “ League,”  as  the  Cordoba  clique  was  generally 
called,  comprised  many  remarkable  men.  Possibly  they 
were  not  over-scrupulous  in  their  methods ; but  indi- 
vidually and  collectively  they  possessed  far  more  energy 
and  acuteness  than  the  Porteiios.  The  most  prominent 
names  in  the  “ League  ” where  Dr  Miguel  Juarez  Celman, 
afterwards  President  of  the  Eepublic  ; Dr  Marcos  Juarez 
Celman ; Dr  Iriondo,  the  Governor  of  Santa  Fe ; Dr 
Antelo  of  Entre  Rios ; Dr  Munecas  of  Tucuman  ; Dr 
Almonacid  of  La  Rioja ; Dr  Yiso  of  Cordoba ; Dr 
Navarro  of  Catamarca ; Dr  Dardo  Rocha,  and  many 
others  who  played  leading  parts  subsequently  in  Argen- 
tine politics.  The  “ League  ” was  afforded  assistance 
and  protection  by  Avellaneda,  and  this  official  influence 
was  a source  of  undoubted  strength. 

As  the  date  of  the  election  approached,  excitement 
increased.  The  National  Party  in  Cordoba  openly 
advocated  the  confiscation  of  the  city  of  Buenos  Aires, 
and  its  conversion  into  the  federal  capital.  Although  it 
had  long  been  understood  that  this  policy  was  the  aim 
of  the  provinces,  it  had  not  been  definitely  announced  as 
one  of  the  issues  of  the  electoral  campaign,  but  the  fact 
that  the  election  of  Roca  inferred  the  immediate  execu- 
tion of  this  scheme  tended  to  irritate  the  Porteiios  to  an 
extent  which  threatened  an  immediate  outbreak.  It 
was  to  this  point  the  Cordoba  “ League  ” wished  to  drive 
their  opponents.  They  were  convinced  they  could  cope 
successfully  with  any  armed  conflict,  because  they  were 
better  prepared  than  their  adversaries  in  military  organi- 
sation and  warlike  stores. 

In  April  of  1880  it  was  evident  the  Porteiios  must 
accept  the  Cordoba  programme  or  fight,  and  the  majority 
were  in  favour  of  fighting.  War  would  therefore  have 
been  declared  against  the  National  Government  without 
hesitation  if  the  necessary  supplies  had  been  forthcoming, 

D 


50 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


but  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  money  was  available 
for  the  purchase  of  artillery,  rifles,  and  ammunition,  the 
Buenos  Aires  leaders  had  neglected  to  obtain  the 
requisite  material.  Orders,  however,  were  despatched 
to  Europe  for  military  equipment,  and  little  could  be 
done  pending  its  arrival.  Meanwhile  another  effort  was 
made  to  avoid  hostilities.  General  Campos  was  sent  to 
Cordoba  to  endeavour  to  persuade  the  “League”  to 
withdraw  the  candidature  of  Roca  for  the  Presidency, 
and  to  substitute  some  person  to  be  mutually  agreed 
upon  by  representatives  of  both  political  factions. 
Colonel  Lagos  went  to  the  northern  provinces  to  attempt 
to  induce  the  politicians  of  that  section  to  declare  in 
favour  of  this  policy  of  conciliation.  These  missions 
proved  futile,  and  both  delegates  returned  to  Buenos 
Aires  convinced  that  the  only  alternative  to  complete 
submission  to  the  political  supremacy  of  the  provinces 
was  open  warfare.  Preparations  for  the  struggle  were 
now  pushed  ahead.  The  able-bodied  men  of  Buenos 
Aires  were  organised  into  regiments,  and  many  thousands 
of  recruits  from  all  grades  of  society  came  forward  to 
fill  the  ranks.  A small  portion  of  the  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion arranged  for  reached  the  porteno  leaders  in  the  month 
of  May,  1880,  and  it  was  stated  that  the  remainder  was 
expected  shortly.  Under  the  impression  that  it  would  be 
delivered,  the  Buenos  Aires  Government  refused  an  offer 
of  10,000  Remington  rifles.  Failure  to  take  advantage 
of  this  opportunity  to  increase  the  stock  of  arms  proved 
a fatal  error  of  judgment,  for,  in  spite  of  most  urgent  in- 
structions, one  delay  after  another  occurred  to  prevent 
the  arrival  of  the  war  material,  which  was  accordingly 
not  available  when  the  crisis  culminated. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC — continued 

Military  Preparations.  Attempt  to  seize  Cordoba.  National  Troops 
in  Buenos  Aires.  Provincial  Authorities  and  the  Minister  of 
War.  Rioting  in  Buenos  Aires.  The  National  Government  and 
the  Provincial  Administration.  Avellaneda  abandons  Buenos 
Aires.  Hostilities  Commence.  Strength  of  National  Troops. 
Preparations  for  Defence  of  Buenos  Aires.  Disposition  of 
Provincial  Forces.  Scarcity  of  War  Material  in  Buenos  Aires. 
Leaders  of  the  Rebellion.  Political  Dissensions.  Dr  Pellegrini. 
Skirmishing  between  National  Troops  and  Revolutionary  Forces. 
Colonel  Arias  and  the  Volunteers.  Engagement  near  Olivera. 
Colonel  Arias  reaches  Lujan.  Defence  of  Buenos  Aires.  Attack 
upon  Buenos  Aires.  Hostilities  on  July  21.  Ammunition 

exhausted  in  Buenos  Aires.  Conference  of  Revolutionary 
Leaders.  Armistice  on  July  23.  Peace  Negotiations.  Terms 
of  Surrender.  Buenos  Aires  declared  the  National  Capital. 
General  Itoca  elected  President.  The  New  Administration. 
Cordoba  and  Roca.  Buenos  Aires  and  the  New  President.  The 
National  Policy.  Absolute  Power  of  Roca  in  1881.  Restraint 
on  Military.  National  Feeling.  Improvement  in  Means  of 
Communication.  Railway  Construction.  Foreign  Immigration. 
Assisted  Passages  for  Immigrants.  National  Land  Sales.  Public 
Works.  Revolutionary  Outbreaks.  Expansion  of  Agricultural 
and  Pastoral  Industi'y.  Foreign  Loans.  Dr  Pellegrini  appointed 
Minister  of  War.  Political  Intrigues.  Discontent  in  Buenos 
Aires.  Attitude  of  the  Administration  in  Electoral  Matters. 
Foundation  of  La  Plata.  The  Port  of  Ensenada.  Presidential 
Election.  Presidential  Candidates.  Economic  and  Industrial 
Progress.  Financial  Policy.  Suspension  of  Specie  Payments. 
Inconvertible  Currency. 

While  the  military  preparations  were  in  progress  in 
Buenos  Aires  in  May,  1880,  a coup  d'etat  was  attempted. 
This  was  to  seize  the  city  of  Cordoba  and  make  prisoners 


52 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


of  the  most  prominent  members  of  the  “League.”  It 
was  a bold  scheme. 

In  Cordoba  a certain  section  of  the  inhabitants  were 
opposed  to  Avellaneda.  It  was  with  this  discontented 
faction  that  the  porteno  leaders  arranged  their  plan  of 
action.  The  conspirators  in  Cordoba  agreed  to  advise 
Buenos  Aires  when  the  time  was  ripe.  Nothing 
occurred  to  interfere  with  the  project,  and  in  due 
course  notice  was  given  that  all  now  required  was  a 
determined  man  to  direct  the  outbreak.  Colonel 
Lisandro  Olmos  and  a few  companions  went  to  Cordoba 
to  head  the  plot. 

The  National  Authorities  were  not  ignorant  of  the 
conspiracy.  But  the  details  of  the  proposed  coup 
(fetal  had  been  carefully  concealed,  so  that  the  Govern- 
ment had  no  definite  information  to  act  upon,  and  no 
measures  were  taken  to  prevent  the  arrival  of  Colonel 
Olmos  at  Cordoba.  After,  however,  a cursory  examina- 
tion of  the  conditions,  Olmos  found  that  the  support  he 
could  count  upon  was  limited,  and  the  extent  of  discon- 
tented feeling  exaggerated.  The  Governor,  Dr  Viso, 
and  his  right  hand  man,  Dr  Miguel  Juarez  Celman, 
were  unpopular ; but  the  real  dissatisfaction  did  not 
reach  beyond  a desire  to  be  rid  of  these  two  men.  In 
spite  of  this  Olmos  determined  to  make  an  attempt  to 
fulfil  his  mission,  hoping  that  the  feeling  against  the 
Governor  would  bring  support  if  his  first  efforts  were 
successful.  Accompanied  by  a dozen  fellow-conspirators, 
he  sallied  into  the  streets.  Each  man  was  armed  with 
a carbine,  but  had  only  twenty  rounds  of  ammunition. 
The  point  of  attack  was  the  “ Cabildo,”  or  Government 
offices,  where  the  Governor  and  Juarez  Celman  were 
known  to  be.  The  building  was  occupied,  and  the 
Governor  and  other  officials  captured.  Thus  for  the 
moment  the  revolutionary  party  controlled  the  situation. 
Colonel  Olmos  thereupon  insisted  that  Dr  Viso  and  Dr 
Juarez  Celman  should  resign  their  posts,  but  while  the 
negotiations  were  proceeding  firing  was  heard  in  the 
central  square.  This  came  from  the  provincial  troops 


1880] 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS 


53 


called  to  the  assistance  of  the  authorities.  Olmos  and 
his  followers  endeavoured  to  defend  the  Government 
buildings,  but  their  supply  of  ammunition  ran  short ; 
they  were  overpowered  and  imprisoned  for  several 
months. 

The  Cordoba  incident  naturally  increased  the  strain 
between  Avellaneda  and  the  Portehos.  The  troops  in 
Buenos  Aires  committed  many  outrages  without  being 
checked.  In  consequence  of  friction  between  the 
soldiery  and  the  inhabitants,  the  Governor  demanded 
the  withdrawal  of  the  7th  regiment,  but  his  request 
passed  unnoticed.  Porteno  officials  now  refused  to  hold 
further  communication  with  the  Minister  of  War. 
Neither  side,  however,  was  ready  for  open  hostilities. 
The  National  Government  ordered  the  concentration  of 
all  available  troops,  but  did  not  wish  to  move  until  a 
strong  force  in  the  held  gave  confidence  of  success.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Portehos  awaited  further  supplies  of 
arms  and  ammunition  to  equip  several  thousands  of 
volunteers,  but  the  acquisition  of  this  war  material 
became  more  difficult  as  the  vigilance  of  the  National 
Authorities  increased. 

In  June,  1880,  a climax  was  reached.  A riot  occurred 
in  the  streets  of  Buenos  Aires  between  the  presidential 
escort  and  a group  of  residents.  Shots  were  exchanged 
before  the  interference  of  the  police  quelled  the  dis- 
turbance. The  incident  was  magnified  into  an  attempt 
to  assassinate  Avellaneda,  and  the  National  Government 
demanded  the  immediate  punishment  of  the  Portehos 
concerned.  This  brought  the  final  rupture.  Arms  were 
served  out  to  the  volunteers.  It  was  arranged  that 
Tejedor  should  seize  the  President  and  his  Ministers, 
but  Avellaneda  received  warning  of  the  intended  move- 
ment ; and  with  the  troops  stationed  in  the  city  he 
managed  to  join  the  main  body  of  the  army  a few  miles 
beyond  the  municipal  limits.  With  his  departure  from 
Buenos  Aires  war  commenced. 

The  Government  forces  numbered  between  7000  and 
8000  men,  recruited  principally  from  the  interior  pro- 


54 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


vinces.  A large  proportion  of  these  troops  had  been 
employed  on  active  service  in  campaigns  against  the 
Indians,  and  were  seasoned  soldiers.  General  Roca 
commanded  and  was  seconded  by  Dr  Carlos  Pellegrini, 
the  Minister  of  War.  Care  had  been  taken  to  see  to  the 
efficient  equipment  of  the  army,  and  the  artillery  com- 
prised Krupp  field  batteries,  while  the  small  arm  was 
the  Remington  rifle.  In  addition  to  the  forces  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  city  of  Buenos  Aires  reserves  were  held 
in  readiness  at  Cordoba,  Rosario,  and  other  places.  On 
the  River  Plate  were  several  gunboats,  which,  while  not 
formidable  fighting  machines,  rendered  valuable  aid  by 
cutting  off1  supplies.  Buenos  Aires  city  itself  was 
unfortified,  and  depended  for  safety  on  the  measures  the 
porteno  leaders  might  improvise  after  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities.  All  the  advantages  were  thus  with  the 
National  Government,  and  Roca  was  confident  that  the 
reduction  of  the  city  could  be  accomplished. 

When  the  rupture  with  the  National  Government 
was  announced,  the  Portenos  prepared  for  the  defence 
with  enthusiasm.  Intrenchments  were  thrown  up  at  all 
likely  points.  Some  15,000  men  were  armed,  and  Colonel 
Arias  was  despatched  to  the  outlying  districts  to  raise 
additional  forces.  The  organisation  of  the  cavalry  was 
confided  to  Colonel  Hilario  Lagos.  Money  was  plentiful 
but  of  little  use,  as  further  supplies  could  not  be 
purchased.  The  cry  everywhere  was  for  more  arms  and 
ammunition,  but  these  two  essential  factors  were  only 
forthcoming  in  limited  quantities. 

The  leaders  of  the  “ Tiro  Nacional  ” movement  now 
assumed  control  in  Buenos  Aires,  and  the  people  looked 
to  General  Mitre  for  guidance  in  the  present  crisis. 
Colonel  Julio  Campos  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
military  operations,  and  no  efforts  were  spared  by  this 
officer  to  strengthen  the  defences  of  the  city.  His  task 
was  not  easy,  for  the  porteno  troops  lacked  military 
training  and  discipline,  a want  which  proved  a source  of 
continual  weakness  throughout  the  campaign.  The  civil 
authorities  of  Buenos  Aires  rendered  little  aid,  were  in 


President  Roca. 


[Fact  page  54. 


1880] 


CIVIL  WAR  BEGINS 


55 


some  ways  rather  a hindrance,  for  Governor  Tejedorand 
his  companions  allowed  political  discussions  to  breed 
dissension.  A section  of  porteno  politicians  believed 
that  the  show  of  force  already  made  by  Buenos  Aires 
would  secure  the  resignation  of  Avellaneda  and  the  with- 
drawal of  the  candidature  of  Roca  for  the  Presidency. 
Others  argued  that  the  real  chance  of  success  lay  in 
attacking  the  national  troops  before  they  were  joined  by 
reinforcements  known  to  be  expected.  The  majority  of 
the  military  officers  favoured  this  bold  course.  Wrang- 
ling and  vacillation  then  ensued,  and  a decision  was 
deferred  pending  news  from  Colonel  Arias  as  to  the 
outcome  of  his  recruiting  expedition. 

Conditions  in  Buenos  Aires  were  known  to  Roca  and 
Pellegrini,  and  nobody  could  judge  better  the  weak  points 
of  the  Portehos  than  the  Minister  of  War.  A native  of 
Buenos  Aires,  he  was  cognisant  of  the  character  and  fibre 
of  the  local  political  disputes,  and  therefore  counselled 
bringing  up  reinforcements  to  make  a general  assault  on 
the  city,  urging  that  with  the  capture  of  Buenos  Aires 
all  resistance  would  end.  Roca  agreed  with  Pellegrini 
on  this  point,  and  Colonel  Racedo  was  ordered  to  advance 
from  Rosario  with  2500  men  ; but  a delay  was  necessary 
to  execute  these  plans,  and  hence  it  was  not  until  the 
middle  of  July  that  serious  skirmishing  took  place 
between  the  national  troops  and  the  Portenos.  The 
suburb  of  Flores,  to  the  north  of  the  city  of  Buenos 
Aires,  was  forthwith  occupied  by  the  national  troops, 
and  communication  cut  between  the  city  and  the  pro- 
vince. 

Colonel  Arias  had  succeeded  better  than  he  expected, 
and  sent  word  to  Buenos  Aires  that  he  had  recruited 
10,000  able-bodied  men,  ready  and  willing  to  fight  as 
soon  as  arms  and  ammunition  were  provided.  Colonel 
Charras  accordingly  left  the  city  with  an  escort  conveying 
a small  supply  of  military  equipment.  Knowledge  of 
this  move  reached  the  enemy,  who  acted  with  such  vigour 
that  the  train  conveying  Colonel  Charras  was  stopped 
near  the  railway  station  of  Lanus,  the  Colonel  wounded 


56 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


and  captured  and  the  convoy  seized.  Colonel  Arias 
now  decided  to  march  to  Buenos  Aires  with  his  contingent 
and  endeavour  to  break  through  the  investing  lines. 
When  near  Olivera,  some  fifty  miles  from  the  city,  Arias, 
however,  found  himself  in  the  vicinity  of  the  troops  from 
Rosario  commanded  by  Colonel  Racedo  and  marching 
to  Buenos  Aires,  and  in  the  encounter  that  followed  both 
sides  claimed  the  victory.  Arias  at  any  rate  succeeded 
in  accomplishing  his  immediate  object — that  of  reaching 
Lujan,  and  from  there  the  road  to  Buenos  Aires  was 
comparatively  clear.  Once  at  Lujan  he  resolved  to  push 
forward  and  enter  Buenos  Aires  through  Flores,  attack- 
ing the  national  troops  at  that  point,  and  he  accordingly 
asked  that  simultaneously  a sortie  from  the  city  should 
be  made.  The  porteno  leaders,  however,  in  Buenos 
Aires,  did  not  approve  his  plans,  and  instructions  were 
despatched  to  him  not  to  attempt  the  Flores  road,  but 
to  make  his  entry  by  the  Alsina  Bridge,  because  a very 
strong  force  of  the  enemy  occupied  Flores. 

This  advance  of  Arias  upon  Buenos  Aires  was  the 
signal  for  the  general  action  that  decided  the  campaign. 
Carrying  out  his  instructions  from  porteno  headquarters, 
Arias  left  Lujan  and  marched  in  a southerly  direction 
to  pass  to  the  westward  of  Flores  and  cross  the 
Riachuelo  River  at  the  Alsina  Bridge.  By  a rapid 
movement  the  revolutionary  division  was  able  to  avoid 
contact  with  the  main  body  of  the  national  troops,  and 
the  only  fighting  during  the  march  was  a series  of 
unimportant  skirmishes.  The  vicinity  of  the  Riachuelo 
was  thus  reached  without  serious  hindrance,  and  com- 
munication established  with  the  garrison  of  Buenos 
Aires.  Supplies  of  arms  and  ammunition  were  again 
requested,  and  a small  quantity  was  received.  The 
main  positions  of  the  defence  were  the  Alsina  Bridge, 
the  Barracas  Bridge,  both  crossing  the  Riachuelo  River, 
and  the  point  known  as  the  “Meseta  de  los  Corales.” 
Covering  the  former  was  Arias  and  the  men  he  had 
brought  from  outside ; at  the  second  was  Colonel 
Morales  with  several  battalions,  and  at  the  “ Meseta  de 


1880] 


BUENOS  AIRES  ASSAULTED 


57 


los  Corales”  Colonel  Lagos  was  stationed  with  the 
revolutionary  cavalry  and  some  detachments  of  infantry. 
So  far  as  possible  these  positions  were  strengthened  by 
entrenchments  and  such  other  defensive  measures  as  the 
scanty  supply  of  tools  and  material  permitted. 

Meanwhile  the  national  army  was  making  prepara- 
tions to  attack,  and  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Racedo 
brought  its  available  strength  up  to  10,000  men,  a 
number,  in  the  opinion  of  Roca,  sufficient.  It  was  there- 
fore decided  to  attack  on  July  20,  1880,  and  a disposition 
of  the  forces  was  made  accordingly.  The  principal 
resistance  was  expected  at  the  Barracas  Bridge,  and  on 
the  high  ground  in  the  vicinity  of  the  “ Meseta  de  los 
Corales,”  the  latter  position  acting  as  a support  to  the 
bridge.  For  the  assault  at  these  two  points,  a strong 
division  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Lavalle.  Another 
force  was  detailed  to  attack  Arias  near  the  Alsina 
Bridge,  with  instructions  to  make  an  entry  into  the  city 
from  that  quarter.  If  this  could  be  done,  the  positions 
at  the  “Meseta  de  los  Corales”  and  the  Barracas  Bridge 
would  be  untenable. 

The  assault  commenced  early  in  the  morning,  and 
shortly  after  daybreak  the  porteno  picquets  were  driven 
in.  The  national  troops  found,  however,  the  entrench- 
ments at  the  Barracas  Bridge  more  formidable  than 
anticipated.  They  were  first  checked,  then  compelled 
to  retire  and  await  reinforcements,  and  the  division 
detached  to  rush  the  position  held  by  Arias  near  the 
Puente  Alsina  met  no  better  fate.  Repeatedly  the  men 
advanced  to  the  attack,  but  the  defence  stubbornly 
resisted  their  onslaughts,  and  at  the  close  of  the  day 
no  permanent  advantage  had  been  gained  by  the  national 
forces.  On  both  sides  the  losses  had  been  heavy,  but 
specially  so  on  that  of  the  Portehos,  and  for  them  also 
the  question  of  ammunition  had  become  most  serious. 
On  the  part  of  the  National  Government  the  measures 
taken  ensured  the  necessary  supplies,  but  the  Portenos 
had  no  reserve  stores,  and  therefore,  in  spite  of  the 
heavy  casualty  list  amongst  the  national  troops,  condi- 


58 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


tions  were  in  their  favour  when  the  attack  was  resumed 
on  July  21. 

The  instructions  to  Colonel  Lavalle  now  were  to 
force  the  passage  of  the  Barracas  Bridge  at  all  costs, 
and  so  open  a way  into  the  city.  Repeated  attempts 
were  accordingly  made  to  carry  this  position,  but  the 
defence  rendered  it  no  easy  matter.  Colonel  Morales 
knew  that  if  he  could  not  stop  the  advance  of  the  enemy 
into  Buenos  Aires,  the  porteno  cause  was  lost.  There- 
fore every  effort  was  made  by  the  defenders,  and  all  avail- 
able reinforcements  were  brought  up.  A foreign  legion, 
principally  Italians,  was  posted  near  the  bridge,  and  did 
excellent  service  throughout  the  day.  After  a concen- 
tration of  fire  by  the  field  batteries  late  in  the  afternoon, 
Lavalle  ordered  another  infantry  charge.  By  this  time 
the  defence  had  been  so  weakened  as  to  be  unable  to 
withstand  this  final  assault,  and  the  bridge  was  carried 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The  Italian  regiment 
defended  it  to  the  last,  and  was  almost  annihilated. 

At  the  Puente  Alsina  the  situation  was  more 
favourable  for  the  Portenos,  for  there  Colonel  Arias  had 
held  his  position  against  superior  numbers  during 
the  early  part  of  the  fight,  and  so  vigorously  was  the 
defence  maintained  that  the  national  troops  showed 
signs  of  demoralisation.  Arias  saw  his  advantage,  and 
sent  to  Campos  for  reinforcements  in  order  to  make  a 
sortie,  but  by  the  time  this  request  had  reached  head- 
quarters news  had  been  received  from  Colonel  Morales 
that  he  considered  his  position  at  the  Barracas  Bridge 
untenable.  General  Campos  accordingly  ordered  Colonel 
Arias  to  fall  back  over  the  Puente  Alsina,  and  with  the 
capture  of  the  Barracas  Bridge  by  Lavalle  fighting 
ceased  for  a day.  All  advantage  thus  remained  with 
the  National  Government. 

In  the  two  days’  fighting,  the  casualties  amongst  the 
national  troops  amounted  to  2000  officers  and  men  killed 
and  wounded,  but  this  heavy  loss  was  not  sufficiently 
serious  to  interfere  with  the  resumption  of  hostilities. 
The  defence  had  suffered  more  severely,  for  the  number 


1880]  CAPITULATION  OF  BUENOS  AIRES  59 


of  all  ranks  dead  and  injured  was  calculated  at  3000. 
A factor,  however,  of  greater  importance  to  Buenos 
Aires  than  loss  of  men  was  the  scarcity  of  ammunition. 
The  gaps  in  the  ranks  could  be  filled  without  difficulty, 
but  the  limited  reserve  of  ammunition  for  the  small 
arms  and  artillery  was  barely  sufficient  to  carry  on  the 
conflict  for  another  twenty-four  hours.  In  these  circum- 
stances it  was  deemed  advisable  to  call  a conference  of 
the  porteno  leaders  to  discuss  the  situation.  On  July 
22  both  sides  rested.  A little  skirmishing  between  the 
outposts  took  place,  but  no  attempt  was  made  to  force 
another  general  engagement. 

The  meeting  of  the  porteno  leaders  resulted  in  a 
lengthy  discussion  as  to  the  possibility  of  further  effective 
resistance.  Opinions  were  divided,  but  the  final  out- 
come was  that  the  Papal  Nuncio,  Monsignor  Gigi 
Mattera,  and  the  German  Minister,  Baron  von  Holleben, 
were  authorised  to  arrange  an  armistice  to  allow  the 
initiation  of  peace  negotiations.  A suspension  of 
hostilities  was  immediately  announced,  and  communica- 
tion opened  between  the  leaders. 

The  National  Government  thoroughly  understood 
that  Buenos  Aires  was  powerless,  and  consequently  the 
terms  the  Portenos  were  forced  to  accept  deprived  the 
city  and  province  of  any  power.  The  conditions 
were  : — 

“ 1.  The  separation  of  the  leaders  from  positions  of 
authority. 

“ 2.  Disbandment  of  the  Buenos  Aires  forces,  and 
surrender  of  arms  and  war  material. 

“ 3.  Participators  in  the  revolt  not  to  be  liable  to 
legal  procedure,  but  if  in  official  employment  to  be 
dismissed. 

“ 4.  Pending  a normal  situation  personal  rights  to 
be  respected,  except  where  a modification  was  necessary 
in  consequence  of  the  state  of  siege  declared  in  force.” 

Onerous  as  these  conditions  were,  the  people  of 
Buenos  Aires  had  no  alternative  but  to  accept  them. 
The  National  Government  had  conquered,  and  the 


GO 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


Portenos  could  raise  no  objections.  Dr  Jose  M.  Moreno 
was  nominated  Governor  of  the  Province  in  place  of  Dr 
Tejedor,  the  other  officials  in  the  Provincial  Government 
were  changed,  and  quiet  was  once  more  restored,  while 
the  Provincial  Legislature  was  dissolved. 

The  National  Government  now  had  a free  hand  to 
proclaim  the  city  of  Buenos  Aires  the  federal  capital 
of  the  Republic.  A National  Congress  assembled  a few 
weeks  after  the  conclusion  of  the  revolution,  and  one 
of  the  principal  measures  it  passed  was  a law  making 
the  municipality  of  Buenos  Aires  the  Federal  District. 
This  was  sanctioned  on  September  21,  1880.  The  Con- 
gress also  ratified  the  election  of  Roca  to  the  Presidency, 
and  thus  the  Cordoba  “ League  ” had  accomplished  all 
they  had  set  out  to  do.  They  were  masters  of  the 
political  situation  ; they  had  wrested  Buenos  Aires  from 
the  Portenos,  and  insured  the  election  of  their  candidate 
for  the  Presidency. 

With  the  accession  of  General  Roca  the  political 
situation  changed.  Previous  to  1880  practically  each 
province  was  independent.  The  right  of  the  National 
Government  to  exercise  authority  was  recognised  only 
when  such  intervention  was  supported  by  armed  strength, 
for  the  same  feeling  that  led  Buenos  Aires  to  open 
resistance  was  dominant  in  the  provinces. 

The  Cordoba  clique  had  succeeded  in  creating 
jealousy  between  the  provinces  and  Buenos  Aires  to 
the  end  they  should  combine  to  crush  her.  This  action, 
however,  did  not  infer  the  right  of  the  National  Govern- 
ment to  exact  obedience  and  respect  in  disputes  with 
Provincial  Administrations.  Continual  political  friction 
was  one  of  the  principal  obstacles  to  economic  develop- 
ment. No  national  policy  was  possible  in  such  circum- 
stances. This  had  been  recognised  and  appreciated  in 
Buenos  Aires.  It  was  this  fact  that  helped  to  bring 
about  the  revolt  in  1880.  The  Portenos  wished  to 
dominate  the  Republic  or  separate  from  the  Confedera- 
tion. On  the  other  hand,  the  provinces  as  represented 
by  the  Cordoba  clique  desired  to  crush  Buenos  Aires, 


1880]  ROCA  ASSUMES  THE  PRESIDENCY  61 


but  had  no  intention  that  their  action  should  produce 
a strong  central  administration  which  they  would  be 
forced  to  obey.  The  result  of  the  struggle  was  a strong 
central  government,  the  real  aim  of  the  porteno  policy. 
It  was  attained  by  the  support  accorded  to  the  National 
Administration  by  the  provinces  to  serve  other  purposes. 

To  reduce  chaotic  conditions  to  order  ; to  consolidate 
provincial  interests  and  ensure  unquestioned  allegiance 
to  the  National  Administration ; to  teach  the  people  of 
Argentina  that  they  were  Argentines — this  was  the  task 
that  Roca  set  himself. 

Roca  was  an  unknown  political  quantity  to  friends 
and  foes.  The  Cordoba  politicians  saw  in  him  a soldier 
who  had  been  necessary  to  their  cause,  and  who,  from 
motives  of  expediency,  they  had  selected  as  their  presi- 
dential candidate.  These  provincial  representatives  con- 
sidered that,  as  he  had  reached  power  through  their 
influence,  he  would  be  their  instrument  in  all  matters 
affecting  their  interests ; while  the  Portenos  regarded 
him  as  a man  who  would  have  no  consideration  for  his 
conquered  enemy,  and  be  dictatorial  where  Buenos 
Aires  was  concerned.  They  realised,  also,  that  they 
were  unable  to  protest  against  any  policy  he  initiated. 
How  far  both  parties  misjudged  him  was  soon  demon- 
strated. He  astonished  his  supporters  and  opponents 
alike  by  the  regime  he  established. 

President  Roca  was  reserved  in  manner,  but  a close 
and  shrewd  observer  of  affairs  and  men.  He  never 
forgot  services  rendered  him  publicly  or  privately,  and 
yet  he  seldom  quarrelled  with  his  opponents.  Appar- 
ently slow  to  act,  he  kept  his  ear  to  the  ground  waiting 
his  opportunity,  an  attitude  that  earned  him  the  sobriquet 
of  “el  zorro”  (the  fox).  It  was  appropriate,  as  his 
opponents  frequently  discovered.  His  military  experi- 
ences had  taught  him  to  handle  men  and  exact  obedience. 
The  Portenos  criticised  him  on  account  of  many  cautious 
traits  of  the  Argentine  gaucho  he  showed  in  dealing 
with  complicated  questions.  This  tendency  was  not  a 
matter  for  regret.  It  enabled  him  to  appreciate  fully 


62 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


intrigues  against  his  Administration.  The  President 
had  visited  the  greater  portion  of  Argentina,  and  been 
deeply  impressed  with  the  enormous  undeveloped 
resources.  How  to  populate  these  fertile  lands,  was  a 
subject  to  which  he  devoted  careful  consideration,  and 
the  foundation  of  his  policy  was  the  expansion  of  the 
national  wealth.  So  long  as  friction  between  Buenos 
Aires  and  the  rest  of  the  Republic  constituted  an  open 
sore,  no  broad-minded  measures  for  the  general  advance- 
ment of  Argentina  were  practicable,  and  Roca  saw  that 
political  ambitions  must  be  sacrificed  for  the  future  good. 
Buenos  Aires  had  attempted,  and  failed,  to  solve  the 
difficulty,  and  Roca  decided  it  was  sound  policy  to 
deprive  the  Portenos  of  all  power  for  further  effort  to 
obtain  political  supremacy.  Naturally,  this  caused  irri- 
tation in  Buenos  Aires,  an  irritation  which  found 
expression  in  the  repeated,  though  ungrounded,  charge 
of  vindictiveness  made  against  the  President  by  the 
Portenos.  Confronted  with  a complicated  political 
situation  at  the  outset  of  his  Administration,  he  was  not 
dismayed,  nor  did  he  ever  forget  that  the  ultimate  con- 
ciliation of  the  Portenos  Avas  expedient  and  necessary. 
Therefore,  no  undue  harshness  was  shown  to  the  Buenos 
Aires  politicians,  and  they  had  no  real  cause  for  com- 
plaint. Roca,  by  his  handling  of  this  delicate  situation, 
demonstrated  clearly  that  underlying  the  ability  he  had 
shown  as  a soldier,  and  which  had  been  instrumental 
in  bringing  him  so  prominently  before  the  country,  he 
possessed  many  statesmanlike  qualities. 

In  1881  Roca’s  power  throughout  Argentina  was 
absolute.  The  army  Avas  unanimous  in  his  favour, 
officers  and  men  alike  prepared  to  support  any  action 
his  Administration  proposed.  This  knowledge  might 
Avell  have  led  to  oppressive  measures,  but  nothing  of  the 
kind  occurred,  and  militarism  Avas  never  allowed  to 
become  obnoxious  to  the  general  public.  The  federalisa- 
tion  of  the  municipality  of  Buenos  Aires  was  denounced 
as  arbitrary  by  the  Portenos.  But  it  Avas  the  price  of 
victory,  and  doubtless  it  A\ras  intended  also  to  humiliate 


1881]  A NATIONAL  POLICY  ESTABLISHED  63 


the  vanquished.  Roca  enjoyed  greater  freedom  from 
outside  pressure  than  former  Presidents,  and  was  at 
liberty  to  consider  the  interests  of  the  whole  Republic 
in  laying  down  the  basis  of  the  national  policy.  He 
was  therefore  in  a position  to  exercise  more  power  than 
Rosas  could  boast  of  in  the  most  secure  days  of  his 
dictatorship,  and  his  acts,  reviewed  after  a lapse  of 
twenty  years,  reveal  no  desire  to  establish  a despotic 
regime.  Under  Roca  national  feeling  displaced  the 
local  bickerings  which  had  been  constantly  in  evidence 
and  retarded  progress.  Hence  from  1881  Argentina 
entered  on  a stage  of  evolution  destined  to  create  unity 
out  of  the  former  loosely -jointed  confederation  of  semi- 
independent States.  Roca  established  a strong  central 
Government  and  a national  policy  based  on  the  needs 
of  all  classes.  It  was  a complete  unmooring  from  the 
conditions  existing  when  Cordoba  and  Buenos  Aires 
were  the  two  poles  round  which  an  inchoate  Argentina 
revolved. 

Lack  of  adequate  means  of  communication  had  been 
one  of  the  principal  obstacles  to  a close  union  of  the 
Argentine  provinces.  In  revolutionary  outbreaks,  weeks 
often  elapsed  before  national  troops  could  reach  the 
scene  of  disturbance.  This  fact  was  conducive  to  rebel- 
lious practices.  The  difficulty  of  communication  served 
also  to  exaggerate  local  feeling,  and  lessen  interest 
in  the  progress  of  the  country  as  a whole.  Sarmiento 
had  recognised  these  conditions,  and  endeavoured 
to  remedy  them  by  railways  and  roads,  but  the  time 
was  not  opportune  for  the  inauguration  of  great  public 
works,  and  his  ideas  were  carried  out  only  to  a limited 
extent.  Under  Avellaneda,  however,  the  railways  pro- 
jected by  Sarmiento  were  opened  to  public  service, 
but  the  stormy  political  era  between  1876  and  1880 
deterred  capitalists  from  further  ventures.  Roca  de- 
cided that  the  only  efficient  method  of  holding  the 
provinces  in  check  was  to  establish  means  whereby  the 
National  Government  could  despatch  military  contin- 
gents to  disturbed  localities  at  short  notice.  He  accord- 


64 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


ingly  proposed  linking  up  and  extending  the  existing 
railway  system,  and  this  railway  extension  throughout 
Argentina  was  a notable  feature  in  his  policy.  As  a 
result  of  it  every  province  of  the  Republic  is  at  the 
present  time  within  easy  access  of  Buenos  Aires. 

Together  with  his  policy  of  railway  extension,  Roca 
devoted  close  attention  to  foreign  immigration.  Agencies 
were  opened  in  European  centres  for  spreading  informa- 
tion of  the  advantages  that  Argentina  offered  to  settlers. 
Assisted  passages  were  provided  for  desirable  immi- 
grants, and  arrangements  made  to  ensure  occupation 
for  fresh  arrivals.  The  lands  to  the  south  and  west  of 
the  province  of  Buenos  Aires  in  the  possession  of  the 
National  Government  were  sold  by  auction  at  low  rates 
to  open  them  to  civilisation.  Public  works  were  inaugu- 
rated. Docks  were  built  at  Buenos  Aires,  and  the 
water  supply  and  drainage  of  the  federal  capital  was 
undertaken. 

Industry  grew  apace  now  that  the  National  Govern- 
ment was  able  and  willing  to  lend  a helping  hand 
towards  the  material  welfare  of  the  people.  The  petty 
jealousies  of  various  political  groups  which  had  kept  the 
country  in  a state  of  turmoil  were  restrained,  and  the 
instigators  promptly  called  to  account.  It  was  tran- 
quillity that  Argentina  needed  to  allow  the  development 
of  her  vast  natural  resources.  Both  agricultural  and 
pastoral  enterprise  rapidly  expanded.  Foreign  capital 
was  attracted  to  the  country.  The  changed  conditions 
were  due  to  Roca’s  initiative.  When  the  Cordoba 
politicians  had  selected  him  as  their  candidate  they  had 
no  thought  of  a national  policy,  nor  was  any  such  idea 
in  the  minds  of  the  Portenos  when  they  attempted  the 
overthrow  of  Avellaneda. 

To  permit  of  Roca’s  progressive  policy  ample  funds 
were  required,  and  in  1884  Dr  Carlos  Pellegrini  visited 
London  to  explain  existing  circumstances  in  Argentina 
and  negotiate  for  an  issue  of  bonds.  He  was  able  to 
demonstrate  satisfactorily  the  economic  and  industrial 
progress  under  Roca,  and  a loan  was  made  for  £8,333,000. 


1881]  PELLEGRINI  AS  MINISTER  OF  WAR  65 


Credit  was  due  to  him  for  his  tact  in  these  financial 
negotiations,  and  on  his  return  to  Buenos  Aires  in  1885, 
in  recognition  of  his  services  he  was  offered,  and 
accepted,  the  portfolio  of  Minister  of  War,  which  he 
had  held  before  under  the  old  administration.  His 
appointment  tended  further  to  strengthen  the  position 
of  President  Roca,  for  the  country  had  not  forgotten 
the  part  the  new  Minister  had  played  in  a similar 
capacity  under  Avellaneda  in  1880. 

In  view  of  the  general  prosperity,  it  would  seem  that 
politicians  could  have  small  scope  for  opposition  to  the 
Administration.  There  was,  however,  a discontented 
element  in  the  community.  Unsuccessful  candidates  for 
official  offices,  or  those  who  found  no  pickings  from  the 
existing  situation,  were  ready  to  make  trouble.  In 
Corrientes  and  Catamarca,  in  Santa  Fe  and  Entre  Rios, 
disturbances  of  a revolutionary  character  were  attempted, 
but  the  prompt  action  taken  by  Roca  never  allowed 
matters  to  assume  serious  dimensions.  In  the  province 
of  Buenos  Aires,  however,  where  the  bitter  feelings 
aroused  in  1880  had  not  yet  died  away,  .the  situation  in 
1885  threatened  to  culminate  in  open  rebellion.  The 
bone  of  contention  was  interference  in  the  elections,  and 
the  Provincial  Administration  assumed  an  aggressive 
attitude  towards  the  National  Authorities,  but  in  the 
end  the  Portenos  abandoned  their  pretensions. 

In  1881  the  Government  of  the  Province  of  Buenos 
Aires  had  selected  La  Plata  as  the  site  of  the  provincial 
capital.  There  was  no  settlement  in  the  vicinity,  a few 
mud  cottages  only  denoting  the  locality  of  the  future 
city.  Plans  were  drawn  up  on  a magnificent  scale.  All 
public  buildings  were  to  be  of  large  dimensions  and 
costly  in  construction,  and  before  they  were  finished  the 
liabilities  incurred  were  £10,000,000.  Nor  did  this 
satisfy  the  province.  Having  lost  control  of  the  port  of 
Buenos  Aires  its  Administration  determined  to  create 
another  shipping  centre  within  the  sphere  of  provincial 
authority ; and  in  furtherance  of  this  design  a series  of 
docks  were  constructed  at  Ensenada,  five  miles  from  La 

E 


66 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


Plata.  Before  the  work  was  concluded  an  additional 
£4,000,000  had  been  expended.  The  vanity  of  the 
Portenos  could  only  be  appeased  by  thus  squandering 
the  provincial  resources  ; but  in  this  folly  of  the  Provincial 
Administration  Roca  had  no  part,  although  the  con- 
struction of  both  capital  and  port  is  frequently  laid  at 
his  door. 

In  1885  the  question  of  the  next  presidential  election 
again  came  up.  In  Argentina,  as  in  most  Latin  countries, 
there  is  much  talk  of  free  voting,  but  official  influence 
with  a near  semblance  to  coercion  is  in  the  majority  of 
cases  the  practice.  Naturally,  therefore,  in  the  present 
instance  it  was  stated  by  the  Portenos  that  Roca  would 
not  hesitate  to  make  use  of  his  opportunities  to  his  own 
advantage,  and  he  thought  it  expedient  to  issue  a public 
declaration  that  he  would  maintain  absolute  neutrality 
in  regard  to  the  Presidency. 

The  possible  candidates  were  Dr  Mignel  Juarez 
Celman,  Dr  Bernardo  Irigoyen,  Dr  Benjamin  Gorostiaga, 
Dr  Leandro  Alein  and  Dr  Dardo  Rocha.  The  first  had 
been  prominent  for  some  years  in  Cordoba,  and  was  a 
member  of  the  National  Congress.  Mention  of  him  has 
already  been  made  in  connection  with  the  abortive 
attempt  of  Olmos  to  obtain  control  of  Cordoba  in 
February,  1880.  Dr  Celman  and  General  Roca  had 
married  sisters,  and  on  the  ground  of  this  relationship  he 
was  regarded  as  sure  of  Roca’s  influence ; so  the  fact 
that  Roca  had  declared  his  intention  of  neutrality  carried 
little  weight.  That  the  Administration  should  abstain 
from  exerting  its  influence  was  foreign  to  tradition  in 
Argentina.  In  1886  Dr  Juarez  Celman  was  therefore 
before  the  country  to  all  intents  and  purposes  as  the 
official  candidate,  and  if  Roca  did  not  actively  assist  the 
Cordoba  representative  he  did  little  to  alter  public 
feeling.  This  tacit  acceptance  of  the  popular  idea  con- 
cerning the  candidature  of  Dr  Celman  was  tantamount 
to  lending  him  official  countenance.  It  was  an  attitude 
that  Roca  subsequently  had  reason  to  regret. 

Of  the  others  the  best  known  were  Dr  Bernardo 


1885]  PRESIDENTIAL  CANDIDATES  IN  1886  67 


Irigoyen  and  Dr  Leandro  Alem.  The  former  had  held 
office  as  a Minister  under  Roca,  and,  although  widely 
separated  on  various  points  of  policy  from  the  Admini- 
stration in  power,  he  was  not  out  of  touch  with  the 
National  Authorities.  Dr  Alem  was  a totally  different 
character.  He  was  a Radical  leader,  advocating  drastic 
methods  to  ensure  greater  purity  in  public  life,  urging 
that  no  means,  even  that  of  armed  revolution,  should  be 
left  untried  to  attain  reforms.  Alem,  however,  was  not 
in  favour  with  the  majority  of  the  electors,  and  his  chance 
of  success  in  the  contest  was  hardly  considered  as  a 
serious  factor,  but  he  came  to  the  front  so  prominently 
at  a later  date  that  his  appearance  on  the  scene  in  1885 
is  worthy  of  record.  The  fourth  aspirant  was  Dr 
Benjamin  Gorostiaga,  a judge  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
and  a man  widely  respected  for  his  common  - sense 
political  views ; but  although  accorded  some  support,  at 
no  period  of  the  campaign  had  he  any  real  prospect  of 
success.  The  remaining  candidate  was  Dr  Dardo  Rocha, 
who  had  been  Governor  of  the  Province  of  Buenos 
Aires.  His  followers  were  carpet-baggers,  keenly  alive 
to  the  benefit  of  holding  office  for  the  sake  of  the  spoils. 
Little  sympathy  was  extended  to  him. 

The  five  years  of  Roca’s  Administration  had  given 
ample  time  for  the  country  to  judge  him.  From  a political 
point  of  view  there  was  no  reason  for  dissatisfaction. 
The  attitude  of  the  President  towards  the  Provincial 
Governments  had  brought  happier  results  than  was 
expected.  Economic  progress  and  industrial  develop- 
ment had  made  substantial  advances.  The  weak  point 
was  his  financial  policy,  and  more  particularly  was  this 
the  case  in  January,  1885,  in  connection  with  the  bank- 
note circulation,  when  the  notes  issued  amounted  to 
$6 1,000, 000.  These  were  principally  for  the  account 

of  the  Banco  Nacional  and  the  Banco  de  la  Provincia 
de  Buenos  Aires,  although  some  small  sums  belonged 
to  the  provincial  banks  of  Cordoba,  Santa  Fe,  Salta,  and 
some  private  concerns.  These  notes  were  convertible 
into  gold  on  presentation.  In  the  latter  part  of  1884 


68 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


the  President  was  induced  to  assent  to  a decree 
declaring  this  note  issue  inconvertible  for  a period 
of  two  years.  The  grounds  taken  were  that  the  banks 
would  be  in  financial  difficulties  if  this  relief  was  not 
afforded.  Roca  resisted  for  a time,  but  in  the  end 
allowed  himself  to  be  won  over,  and  in  January,  1885, 
authorised  the  suspension  of  specie  payments.  Congress 
was  not  in  session  when  these  decrees  were  published, 
but  the  measure  was  approved  and  ratified  by  Senate 
and  Chamber  on  October  5 of  the  same  year.  Whatever 
the  influences  used  to  bring  about  this  result,  there  can 
be  no  question  that  a grave  error  was  committed,  for 
the  door  was  thereby  opened  to  the  jobbery  from  which 
the  country  suffered  severely  in  after  years.  Roca  may 
have  been  convinced  in  his  own  mind  that  specie  pay- 
ments would  be  resumed  at  the  date  mentioned  in  the 
decrees.  But,  knowing  his  countrymen  as  he  did,  he 
must  also  have  been  alive  to  the  dangerous  nature  of 
the  weapon  he  placed  in  their  hands.  At  the  time  this 
sinister  stroke  was  proposed  Dr  Victorino  de  la  Plaza 
was  Finance  Minister.  When  he  placed  the  scheme 
before  Roca  the  President  refused  to  consider  it,  saying 
“ I will  cut  off  my  right  hand  before  I sign  any  such 
decree.”  Yet  in  a few  weeks  he  had  signed  and  pro- 
mulgated the  law  out  of  which  such  mischief  grew. 


CHAPTER  IV 

the  argentine  republic — continued 

Presidential  Election.  The  Cordoba  Clique  and  the  Provisional 
Governors.  Dr  Juarez  Celman.  Cordoba  supports  Celman. 
Celman  Elected.  Roca  and  Celman.  Uneasy  Feeling.  Currency 
Conversion.  Paper  Money  Issues.  Carpet-bagging  Politicians. 
Political  Conditions.  Corruption  in  National  Administration. 
Concessions  and  Monopolies.  Corrupt  Provincial  Governments. 
Position  of  Pellegrini.  Administration  and  Banking.  Provincial 
Loans.  Sale  of  Gold  Reserves.  Financial  Necessities.  The 
“Union  Civica.”  Dr  Alem.  Aristobulo  del  Valle.  Bernardo 
Irigoyen.  Dr  Lopez.  Lucio  Lopez.  Provincial  Branches  of 
“Union  Civica.”  Feeling  against  Celman.  The  Mortgage 
Banks.  Policy  of  the  Administration.  Foreign  Residents. 
Meetings  of  “ Union  Civica.”  Indictment  of  National  Adminis- 
tration. The  “Union  Civica”  and  Celman.  The  “Union 
Civica”  and  Revolutionary  Measures.  The  Army  and  the  “ Union 
Civica.”  Date  fixed  for  Revolt.  Revolution  of  July  26,  1890. 
Action  of  National  Authorities.  Attack  on  the  Plaza  Lavalle. 
Numerous  Casualties.  Scarcity  of  Ammunition.  Naval  Action. 
Bombardment  of  Buenos  Aires.  Attitude  of  Foreign  Warships. 
Reinforcements  from  Northern  Provinces.  Consultation  of  Rebel 
Leaders.  Majority  favour  Negotiation.  Armistice  Arranged. 
Peace  Propositions.  Advice  of  Roca  and  Pellegrini.  Peace 
Concluded.  Dispersion  of  Revolutionary  Forces.  Casualties. 
Resignation  of  Celman.  Public  Temper  in  Buenos  Aires. 
European  Opinion.  Accession  of  Pellegrini. 

As  the  date  for  the  presidential  election  approached,  it 
was  clear  there  would  be  no  contest.  The  supporters 
of  Dr  Mignel  Juarez  Celman  had  matters  their  own  way, 
and  the  Portenos  made  no  attempt  to  challenge  the 
issue. 

Iu  Argentina  the  selection  of  the  President  rests  with 

69 


70 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


electors  chosen  by  ballot  throughout  the  provinces  and 
the  federal  district.  Each  province  and  the  federal 
district  nominates  a body  of  electors  equal  to  twice  the 
number  of  representatives  returned  to  the  National 
Congress.  These  representatives  assemble  on  June  12 
of  the  last  year  of  the  presidential  term,  and  vote  for 
President  and  Vice-President.  The  record  of  the  voting 
is  signed  by  the  electors  and  sent  to  the  President  of  the 
Senate.  Copies  are  deposited  also  with  the  Presidents 
of  the  provincial  legislatures,  and  in  the  federal  capital 
with  the  President  of  the  Municipality.  The  returns 
from  the  provinces  are  opened  by  the  President  of  the 
Senate  in  the  presence  of  Congress.  Four  members 
form  a committee  to  scrutinise  the  ballot  papers,  and 
this  committee  announces  the  number  of  votes  accorded 
to  each  candidate.  The  scrutiny  and  announcement  of 
the  result  must  be  completed  in  one  sitting  of  Congress, 
but  for  all  practical  purposes  the  election  is  decided 
when  the  electors  are  nominated  in  the  provinces,  the 
subsequent  votation  being  a matter  of  form  only. 

In  1886  a combination  of  provincial  governors  of 
different  provinces  was  arranged  by  the  Cordoba  clique 
to  decide  the  presidential  question,  and  the  official 
influence  exerted  by  the  provincial  authorities  ensured 
the  success  of  the  Cordoba  candidate.  In  this  situation 
the  Opposition  was  powerless,  and  toleration  of  such 
conditions  by  Roca  gave  grounds  for  complaint  on  the 
part  of  the  Portenos.  Buenos  Aires  alone  amongst  the 
provinces  had  been  warned  the  previous  year  that 
attempts  to  make  use  of  her  official  influence  in  electoral 
matters  would  be  severely  punished. 

No  sooner  were  the  electors  chosen  than  Dr  Celman 
became  an  object  of  solicitous  interest  to  numbers  of 
politicians  and  others  with  favours  to  ask.  A banquet 
at  which  500  guests  attended  was  organised  in  his 
honour.  These  manifestations  continued  in  rapid  suc- 
cession, and  unlimited  adulation  was  showered  upon 
him,  on  a man  unusually  susceptible  to  flattery.  As 
Governor  of  Cordoba,  Celman  had  shown  no  adminis- 


President  Juarez  Celman. 


[Face  page  70. 


18S6]  ELECTION  OF  JUAREZ  CELMAN 


71 


trative  ability,  nor  subsequently  in  the  National  Congress 
had  he  been  distinguished  for  legislative  capacity.  There 
was  thus  little  really  to  recommend  him,  and  he  had 
been  selected  by  his  Cordoba  friends  as  a pliant  tool  to 
serve  their  purpose. 

In  Spanish,  as  in  some  other,  countries,  interest  is 
quickly  diverted  from  the  setting  sun  to  the  rising  star ; 
so,  naturally,  the  attention  hitherto  devoted  to  Roca 
was  now  transferred  to  Juarez  Celman.  On  October 
12,  1886,  President  Roca  completed  his  six  years  of 
office.  Taking  a broad  view,  there  can  be  small  doubt 
that  his  Government  between  1880  and  1886  was  a 
decided  advance,  for  the  main  lines  of  Roca’s  policy 
were  directly  beneficial  to  the  Argentines,  and  the  fact 
was  patent  to  everybody  that  the  country  had  progressed 
wonderfully  under  his  guidance.  In  1880  he  had  found 
the  Confederation  composed  of  hostile  units,  and  he 
left  it  knit  together  by  strong  ties  to  the  Central 
Government.  The  mistakes  he  made  in  connection 
with  financial  legislation,  and  his  attitude  in  regard  to 
the  election  of  his  successor,  were  both,  errors  of  judg- 
ment. They  mar  the  record  of  his  Administration,  but 
with  these  two  exceptions  there  is  no  cause  to  cavil  at 
his  direction  of  public  affairs. 

It  was  supposed  that  Roca  would  be  the  power 
behind  the  throne  during  the  Celman  Administration. 
Many  persons  who  disliked  the  new  President  refrained 
from  expressing  their  feelings  on  account  of  their  con- 
fidence in  the  influence  Roca  would  still  exert  in  the 
national  policy.  Dr  Juarez  Celman  was  not  devoid  of 
cleverness,  and  in  all  probability  he  would  have  sought 
the  advice  of  Roca  under  other  circumstances,  but  his 
head  had  been  turned  by  the  servility  shown  to  him. 
His  shallow  nature  was  overcome  with  vanity  when  he 
found  himself  safely  seated  in  the  Presidency,  and  Roca’s 
moderate  views  became  irksome  to  him.  Imagining 
himself  fully  capable  of  managing  national  affairs  by  his 
own  initiative,  he  soon  chafed  at  the  idea  of  any 
restraining  hand ; and  in  his  desire  to  break  loose  from 


72 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


control  he  was  deftly  encouraged  by  political  adventurers, 
who  regarded  Roca  as  an  obstacle  to  their  designs. 
Amongst  such  surroundings  it  was  only  a question 
of  time  for  a disagreement  to  spring  up  between  the 
ex-President  and  his  successor.  No  open  breach 
occurred,  but  in  1887  it  was  apparent  that  a coolness 
had  arisen,  and  that  Roca  would  no  longer  dominate 
Celman’s  Administration.  When  this  stage  was  reached, 
anxiety  as  to  the  future  course  of  the  National  Govern- 
ment was  expressed  in  many  directions. 

Sober-minded  citizens  had  reason  for  alarm.  In 
November,  1886,  the  President  applied  to  Congress 
for  authority  to  postpone  the  date  of  the  bank-note 
conversion.  The  Chambers  agreed  to  a measure  defer- 
ring it  indefinitely,  and  a decree  fixed  two  years  from 
January  9,  1887.  Meanwhile  the  Provincial  Bank  of 
Buenos  Aires  was  authorised  to  issue  a further  $7, 000, 000, 
bringing  the  total  in  circulation  to  $85,294,000  according 
to  an  official  statement  in  1887.  This  increase  in  the 
volume  of  bank-notes,  with  no  addition  to  the  gold 
reserves,  wrent  far  to  destroy  hopes  of  sound  financial 
legislation. 

An  epoch  of  carpet-bagging  politicians  now  developed. 
The  Cordoba  clique  had  failed  to  mould  Roca  to  its 
wishes,  but  it  succeeded  with  Juarez  Celman.  No 
sooner  had  Roca’s  influence  been  thrown  aside  than  the 
true  situation  became  apparent.  Political  adventurers 
filled  every  lucrative  post,  and  elections  for  senators 
and  deputies  were  manipulated,  and  the  developments 
in  1887  proved  the  adage  that  to  the  victors  belong  the 
spoils.  Cordoba  obtained  absolute  control  of  the 
Government,  and  the  “ clique  ” exploited  the  country 
for  its  individual  benefit.  Bribery  and  corruption 
characterised  the  Administration  to  such  an  extent 
that  no  business  was  possible  with  official  departments 
without  palm-oil.  Concessions  for  railways  or  other 
public  works,  grants  of  national  lands,  monopolies  for 
industrial  undertakings,  were  scattered  widecast.  The 
national  resources  were  squandered  in  appointments 


1887]  FINANCIAL  ADMINISTRATION 


73 


and  pickings  for  the  host  of  greedy  political  followers 
who  swarmed  from  the  provinces.  It  was  a debauchery 
of  the  public  credit. 

The  example  of  the  National  Administration  was 
naturally  copied  by  the  Provincial  Governments.  Cor- 
ruption of  former  days  sank  into  insignificance  beside 
the  orgy  which  now  dominated  local  official  institutions. 
The  restraining  influence  of  Roca  had  kept  provincial 
authorities  within  bounds.  His  attitude  and  example 
lent  no  encouragement  to  extravagant  folly  ; but  under 
Celman  all  was  changed.  Local  politicians  were  able 
to  go  their  way  without  fear  of  after  consequences,  and 
the  good  work  Roca  had  accomplished  during  his  six 
years  of  office  was  threatened  with  obliteration,  and  no 
wonder  that  the  spirit  of  anarchy  so  marked  previous  to 
1880  showed  signs  of  revival  in  an  insolent  assumption 
of  sovereign  rights  by  provincial  governors.  They  main- 
tained large  bodies  of  troops  and  levied  taxation  in  a 
manner  wholly  inconsistent  with  the  Law  of  Constitution. 

Pellegrini  at  this  juncture  of  affairs  was  an  enigma. 
He  had  been  elected  to  the  Vice-Presidency  in  1886,  and 
in  that  capacity  was  also  President  of  the  Senate.  The 
important  part  he  had  played  in  Argentine  politics 
marked  him  as  a man  of  ability  and  strength  of  char- 
acter. It  was  felt  that  he  should  protest  against  the 
conduct  of  the  National  Administration,  but  he  made 
no  effort  to  avert  the  ruinous  situation  into  which  the 
country  was  rapidly  drifting.  The  fact  of  his  silence  in 
regard  to  Celman’s  policy  was  a blot  on  his  public 
career  which  can  never  be  eradicated. 

Celman,  untrammelled,  reached  the  climax  of  folly 
when,  in  November,  1887,  he  asked  Congress  to  sanction 
the  establishment  of  banks  of  issue  throughout  the 
Republic,  whose  notes  should  be  guaranteed  by  national 
bonds.  Congress,  absolutely  servile,  approved  the  pro- 
position, and  the  Banco  Nacional,  thirteen  provincial 
State  banks,  and  six  private  banking  concerns,  all  came 
under  the  new  law,  in  virtue  of  which  the  inconvertible 
notes  were  increased  immediately  to  $161,700,000,  and 


74 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


shortly  afterwards  still  further  augmented  by  an  addi- 
tional $35,000,000,  emitted  by  the  Banco  Nacional  for 
account  of  the  National  Government.  In  order  to  comply 
with  this  law  the  banks  were  required  to  purchase 
national  bonds  from  the  Government,  the  latter  retaining 
in  specie  the  value  received.  To  obtain  the  necessary 
cash  the  Provincial  Governments  borrowed  abroad. 
Celman  was  pressed  for  funds  to  meet  the  ever-increasing 
expenditure,  and  forthwith  utilised  the  specie  thus 
amassed  and  lying  in  the  vaults.  Soon  the  whole  of 
the  cash  was  exhausted,  and  the  National  Government 
was  responsible  for  a note  issue  of  $196,000,000.  In- 
directly it  was  liable  also  for  the  amounts  owing  by  the 
provinces  to  their  foreign  creditors. 

The  action  of  the  President  in  this  matter  is  the 
keynote  to  his  methods  in  the  direction  of  public  affairs. 
His  aim  was  to  obtain  money  to  satisfy  his  vicious 
political  circle,  no  matter  how  much  he  prostituted  the 
national  credit  in  doing  so.  His  action  in  connection 
with  the  banks  of  emission  was  one  of  deliberate  fraud 
upon  the  country,  and  one  from  which  Argentina  is 
still  suffering. 

In  many  directions  mutterings  of  discontent  were 
heard,  and  the  more  conservative  element  looked  with 
dismay  upon  the  conduct  of  the  Administration.  This 
feeling  was  not  confined  to  Buenos  Aires.  It  spread 
throughout  the  Republic,  and  by  the  close  of  1887  was 
unanimous  except  among  the  clique  controlling  the 
President.  As  this  spirit  of  dissatisfaction  increased,  it 
became  evident  that  only  a rallying-point  was  required 
for  a reaction  to  set  in.  Meetings  were  held  to  discuss 
the  situation,  but  the  discontented  centres  were  not 
sufficiently  in  touch  with  one  another  to  ensure  com- 
bined action  in  event  of  a revolutionary  outbreak. 
Moreover,  the  troops  of  the  National  Government  and 
of  the  provinces  supporting  Celman  were  armed  with 
modern  weapons  and  well  supplied  with  ammunition, 
while  the  Opposition  were  without  rifles  or  cartridges, 
and  the  acquisition  of  war  material  required  time  and 


1888]  FOUNDATION  OF  “UNION  CIVIC  A”  75 


money.  After  many  consultations  the  leaders  of  the 
movement  against  the  President  determined  to  act 
entirely  within  their  constitutional  rights.  A central 
league  was  formed  with  branches  in  the  provinces,  and 
an  agitation  begun  for  the  establishment  of  a National 
Administration  free  from  corruption  and  jobbery. 
Prominent  in  connection  with  the  foundation  ot  this 
league,  hereafter  known  as  the  “Union  Civica,”  were 
Dr  Leandro  Alem,  Dr  Aristobulo  del  Valle,  Dr  Bernardo 
Irigoyen,  Dr  Vicente  Lopez,  Dr  Lucio  Lopez,  Senor 
Leonardo  Pereyra,  and  Dr  Oscar  Liliedale. 

It  was  Alem  who  undertook  the  principal  work  of 
organisation,  and  his  energy  fitted  him  for  this  difficult 
task.  His  personality  merits  some  description.  The 
father  of  this  remarkable  man  had  opposed  the  tyranny 
of  the  Dictator  Rosas,  and  was  executed  as  a conspirator. 
The  son  never  forgot  his  father’s  fate.  He  vowed 
vengeance  against  all  authority  not  within  the  letter  of 
the  Law  of  Constitution,  and  in  memory  of  his  vow 
dressed  invariably  in  black.  Tall  and  slim,  with  a 
beard  reaching  to  his  waist,  his  striking  appearance 
always  attracted  attention,  while  his  agreeable  manner 
secured  him  many  admirers  and  friends.  In  this 
organisation  of  the  “ Union  Civica  ” he  saw  a possible 
means  to  avenge  his  father’s  death,  and  he  threw 
himself  into  the  work  with  untiring  zest. 

Dr  Aristobulo  del  Valle  was  a man  of  quite  different 
mould.  He  was  a lawyer,  and  widely  trusted  and 
respected,  whose  power  as  an  orator  was  admitted 
by  friends  and  foes.  In  giving  his  services  to  the 
“Union  Civica”  he  was  actuated  by  purely  patriotic 
motives.  His  acts  are  evidence  of  the  honesty  of 
purpose  that  impelled  him  to  participate  in  the  move- 
ment against  the  Celman  Administration.  Dr  Bernardo 
Irigoyen,  also  closely  connected  with  the  “Union 
Civica,”  was  wealthy  and  well-known  in  political  and 
social  life.  He  had  held  office  under  Roca,  and  was 
another  prominent  citizen  not  actuated  by  personal 
considerations. 


76 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


Dr  Vicente  Lopez  and  his  son,  Dr  Lucio  Lopez, 
were  both  lawyers  of  high  standing  in  Buenos  Aires. 
They,  too,  joined  the  Opposition  to  Celman  as  the  only 
means  of  saving  their  country  from  financial  and  political 
ruin.  Senor  Leonardo  Pereyra  lent  his  aid  from  similar 
motives,  and  his  wealth  and  social  influence  made  him 
invaluable,  especially  as  he  was  never  backward  in 
supplying  resources  for  the  campaign.  Dr  Oscar 
Liliedale  was  Alem’s  right  hand  in  the  work  required  to 
build  up  the  “ Union  Civica.”  An  able  lawyer,  Liliedale 
resigned  his  usual  occupations  to  devote  himself  to 
these  new  duties. 

With  the  assistance  of  such  men  there  was  little 
reason  to  fear  failure.  The  decision  to  form  the  “ Union 
Civica”  was  reached  in  the  end  of  1887,  and  throughout 
the  two  following  years  the  work  of  organisation  was 
pushed  forward  with  energy.  The  headquarters  of  the 
association  were  in  the  city  of  Buenos  Aires,  but  in 
nearly  every  town  and  village  throughout  the  country 
local  clubs  were  founded  to  propagate  the  doctrines  and 
ideas  emanating  from  the  central  committee.  Meet- 
ings were  held  in  different  localities,  and  all  classes  of 
society  were  urged  to  attend.  Dr  del  Valle  and  other 
prominent  men  made  frequent  speeches  to  explain 
the  present  condition  of  the  Republic,  and  the  object 
of  the  “Union  Civica”  in  raising  opposition  to  the 
National  Administration.  Pamphlets  were  also  circu- 
lated calling  upon  all  Argentines  to  protest  against 
the  danger  threatened  to  their  rights  by  the  policy  of 
Celman. 

In  the  city  and  province  of  Buenos  Aires  the  inhabi- 
tants promised  active  support  to  the  “Union  Civica,” 
and  in  Santa  Fe  and  other  provinces  adhesion  was 
given.  xVt  the  beginning  of  1889,  there  was  no  longer 
doubt  that  public  feeling  was  aroused,  and  it  became 
more  marked  every  day.  So  the  work  of  the  “Union 
Civica  ” was  pushed  all  the  more  vigorously  under  these 
hopeful  indications  until,  at  the  close  of  1889,  the 
organisers  of  the  movement  found  they  could  count  on 


1389]  DEVELOPMENT  OF  -‘UNION  CIVICA  ” 77 


the  moral  support  of  the  majority  of  the  population  in 
any  action  they  took. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  this  development  of  the 
“Union  Civica”  was  allowed  to  pass  unmolested  by  the 
National  Authorities.  Meetings  were  broken  up,  fre- 
quently by  armed  force,  on  the  ground  that  they  were 
convened  for  seditious  purposes.  Newspapers  were 
gagged,  and  editors  threatened  who  dared  to  criticise 
the  doings  of  the  Executive.  Members  of  the  “Union 
Civica  ” were  insulted  by  the  police  and  soldiery.  This 
attitude  was  taken  by  Celman  in  the  hope  of  terrorising 
his  enemies,  but,  blinded  by  his  vanity,  he  under-rated 
the  strength  of  the  feeling  against  himself  and  his 
methods,  and  failed  to  realise  that  he  was  driving  the 
people  to  extremes,  jeopardising  his  own  future  by  not 
temporising  with  the  Opposition. 

The  last  straw  to  break  down  public  patience  was 
the  policy  adopted  by  the  President  in  regard  to  the 
Mortgage  Banks.  These  institutions  had  been  launched 
for  legitimate  purposes — to  make  advances  to  land- 
owners  against  real  estate.  Loans  made  by  them  were 
secured  on  one  half  the  market  value  of  the  pledged 
properties.  Under  Celman,  hoivever,  these  banks 
liecame  political  instruments  of  corruption.  A note  to 
the  manager  signed  by  a high  political  personage, 
ensured  satisfactory  negotiation  of  large  loans  on  repre- 
sented, not  actual,  property  valuations,  and  the  result- 
ing issue  of  “cedillas”  was  naturally  almost  unlimited, 
threatening  serious  disaster  to  financial  credit.  In  the 
case  of  the  National  Hypothecary  Bank  the  bonds 
were  guaranteed  by  the  National  Government ; and  for 
those  of  the  Provincial  Mortgage  Bank  the  Provincial 
Government  was  responsible.  By  the  former  institution 
§135,000,000  was  emitted,  by  the  latter  §374,000,000. 
These  loans  were  made,  principally,  between  1887  and 
1890,  and  for  the  most  part  they  were  the  outcome  of 
political  influence  brought  to  bear  upon  the  directors. 

The  members  of  the  “Union  Civica”  were  convinced 
of  the  justice  of  their  cause,  and  determined  to  uphold 


78 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


their  principles.  Their  opposition  to  the  National 
Government  was  conducted  and  organised  upon  lines 
which  left  the  authorities  no  valid  excuse  for  inter- 
ference. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  both  Pellegrini  and  Roca  saw 
clearly  the  danger  of  the  situation,  but  their  advice  was 
not  asked  by  Celman.  The  President  also  was  aware 
of  the  general  discontent  with  his  direction  of  public 
affairs  apart  from  the  opinions  of  the  leaders  of  the 
“Union  Civica,”  where  no  attempt  at  concealment  was 
made.  He,  however,  regarded  public  sentiment  with 
contemptuous  indifference,  relying  on  the  armed  forces  at 
his  disposal  to  quell  any  outbreak  against  his  authority. 
His  ministers  and  political  intimates  assured  him  that 
his  position  was  impregnable,  and  that  the  wave  of  dis- 
satisfaction would  disappear  completely.  Their  repeated 
assertions  that  no  real  cause  for  alarm  existed  dispelled 
his  anxiety,  and  he  made  no  effort  to  check  the  glaring 
abuses  of  his  Administration. 

The  attitude  of  the  foreign  residents  in  this  crisis  is 
interesting.  In  the  city  of  Buenos  Aires  they  numbered 
one  half  of  the  inhabitants.  Throughout  the  Republic 
the  population  was  estimated  at  4,000,000,  and  of  these 
no  fewer  than  *2,000,000  were  aliens,  or  of  foreign 
extraction.  In  electoral  questions  these  people  had 
no  legal  standing,  but  in  their  hands  was  the  great 
source  of  national  wealth,  as  regards  both  agricultural 
and  pastoral  industry.  The  railways  were  owned  by 
foreign  companies,  and  creditors  abroad  held  the  public 
debt.  Therefore  the  conduct  of  the  National  Govern- 
ment was  a matter  of  grave  concern  to  foreign  resi- 
dents and  European  investors.  The  attitude  of  President 
Celman  threatened  imminent  danger  to  these  important 
interests,  and  when  matters  were  approaching  a crisis 
in  1890,  foreign  sympathy  was  given  unanimously  to 
the  cause  of  the  “Union  Civica.”  This  condemnation 
of  the  Administration  by  the  foreign  element  lent  addi- 
tional strength  to  the  Opposition.  It  showed  clearly 
that  Celman ’s  methods  were  considered  intolerable 


1S90] 


FOREIGN  OPINION 


79 


by  a numerous  class  removed  from  local  Argentine 
politics,  and  that  any  decisive  action  for  reform  would 
be  regarded  as  a necessary  measure  worthy  of  en- 
couragement. 

Early  in  1890  several  popular  meetings  were  held  in 
Buenos  Aires  by  the  “Union  Civica.”  At  one  of  these, 
attended  by  10,000  people  at  the  Buenos  Aires  Fronton, 
feeling  against  Celman  reached  a culminating  pitch.  An 
address  was  delivered  by  Alem  in  which  he  recapitulated 
the  object  of  the  “Union  Civica”  and  denounced  in 
violent  terms  the  policy  of  the  National  Government. 
A more  moderate  speech  by  Dr  Vicente  Lopez  explained 
the  injustice  practised  towards  Argentina.  The  crux 
was  reached  when  Dr  del  Valle,  in  temperate  terms,  drew 
up  an  indictment  of  the  National  Authorities.  Their 
corrupt  methods  were  specified  in  detail,  the  deliberate 
sacrifice  of  the  national  interests  to  allow  the  President 
and  his  friends  to  secure  wealth  was  described,  and  the 
right  of  the  inhabitants  to  save  their  country  from  ruin 
urged.  Also  the  determination  of  the  “Union  Civica” 
to  obtain  redress  was  emphatically  expressed.  This 
speech  was  received  with  enthusiastic  applause.  It 
roused  public  appreciation  of  the  situation. 

This  meeting  at  the  Buenos  Aires  Fronton  was  con- 
sidered a declaration  of  open  hostility  to  the  Celman 
Administration,  both  by  the  “ Union  Civica  ” and  the 
supporters  of  the  President.  In  view  of  the  specific 
charges  of  corruption  and  mal-administration  preferred 
by  Dr  del  Valle,  it  was  thought  that  some  attempt  would 
be  made  by  the  Government  to  amend  the  worst  faults 
to  which  public  attention  had  been  called.  Quite  the 
reverse  actually  occurred,  for  Celman  and  his  followers 
became  still  more  autocratic,  and  corruption  was  more 
undisguised.  No  opportunity  was  lost  either  to  inter- 
fere with  the  “Union  Civica.”  The  President  clung  to 
the  idea  that  he  could  maintain  his  position  by  force  of 
arms ; and  additional  troops  were  brought  to  Buenos 
Aires  and  at  the  same  time  the  police  was  increased. 
On  the  one  side  was  the  tyrannical  power  of  a small 


80 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


group  of  office-holders ; on  the  other,  the  spontaneous 
protest  of  public  opinion. 

The  determination  of  the  Administration  to  attempt 
no  reforms  resulted  in  further  conferences  of  the  prin- 
cipal members  of  the  “ Union  Civica  ” to  decide  a course 
of  action.  An  uprising  was  advocated.  Assertions 
were  made  that  in  the  present  state  of  the  public  temper 
Celman  and  his  gang  would  be  driven  from  office  at  the 
first  announcement  of  a revolutionary  outbreak.  But 
before  reaching  a definite  decision  it  was  determined  to 
ascertain  the  feelings  of  the  military  officers  in  Buenos 
Aires.  Moreover,  to  ensure  the  success  of  any  popular 
rising  it  was  necessary  to  have  a store  of  arms  and 
ammunition,  for  it  was  thought  improbable  that  the 
downfall  of  the  President  could  be  accomplished  without 
some  bloodshed.  Now  the  “Union  Civica”  had  no 
control  of  warlike  material,  the  movement  hitherto 
having  been  conducted  strictly  within  the  legal  rights 
of  the  members  as  citizens,  and  it  was  only  by  the  seizure 
of  one  or  other  of  the  national  arsenals  that  arms  could 
be  acquired.  During  June,  1890,  the  military  and  naval 
officers  in  Buenos  Aires  were  therefore  sounded  in 
reference  to  participation  in  a revolt.  The  navy  showed 
no  reluctance  to  give  active  support,  but  with  the  army 
negotiations  were  not  so  happy.  In  many  individual 
instances  assistance  was  promised,  and  in  the  case  of 
the  artillery  at  the  arsenal  and  barracks  of  the  Plaza 
Lavalle  adhesion  was  assured.  This  was  of  vital  import- 
ance to  the  plans  of  the  “ Union  Civica,”  since  it  meant 
a supply  of  rifles  and  550,000  rounds  of  ball  cartridge, 
besides  a battery  of  field  guns  with  ammunition.  So  in 
July,  1890,  the  “Union  Civica”  decided  the  time  was 
ripe,  and  the  movement  from  that  time  developed  into  a 
conspiracy  against  the  Administration,  whose  leaders 
only  waited  an  opportune  moment  to  proclaim  a 
revolution. 

July  26  was  fixed  finally  for  the  revolt.  To  ensure 
against  opposition  from  the  officer  in  command  at  the 
Plaza  Lavalle  arrangements  were  made  to  drug  him  on 


1890] 


REVOLUTION  IN  1890 


81 


the  previous  evening.  Before  daybreak  the  leaders  of 
the  “Union  Civica”  and  a number  of  the  Opposition 
joined  the  garrison  at  the  arsenal,  and  the  revolutionary 
forces,  numbering  in  all  some  1500  men,  then  took 
possession  of  the  Plaza,  which  was  converted  into  a 
military  camp.  Arms  were  served  out  to  the  volunteers, 
and  other  preparations  made  to  repel  attack  by  the 
Government  troops — barricades  thrown  up  and  guns 
posted  to  command  the  approaches,  etc.  The  rebels 
then  determined  to  await  developments,  believing  the 
position  in  the  Plaza  Lavalle  sufficiently  strong  to  resist 
assault.  This  inactivity  was  an  error  of  judgment,  for 
the  way  to  the  Government  Palace  was  unimpeded,  and 
the  distance  less  than  a mile,  so  that  the  rebels  could 
easily  have  seized  it  and  placed  themselves  in  a much 
more  favourable  situation.  Opinions,  however,  in  the 
revolutionary  camp  were  divided  as  to  tactics,  with  the 
result  that  no  move  from  the  Plaza  Lavalle  was 
attempted.  Information  soon  reached  the  National 
Authorities  of  the  outbreak ; and  the  police  and  the 
garrison  were  called  to  arms.  A part  of  the  national 
force  was  immediately  marched  to  the  Plaza  Libertad, 
situated  only  some  three  hundred  yards  from  the  Plaza 
Lavalle,  and  a strong  detachment  was  stationed  in  the 
Plaza  Victoria  to  protect  the  national  buildings.  Skir- 
mishers were  likewise  posted  on  the  housetops  with 
orders  to  shoot  down  all  persons  suspected  of  connection 
with  the  revolt.  When  daylight  broke  Buenos  Aires 
was  transformed,  and  signs  of  armed  conflict  were 
everywhere  in  evidence. 

The  insurgents  had  not  long  to  wait  before  they 
were  aware  of  the  proximity  of  the  troops,  for  shortly 
after  8 a.m.  the  attack  upon  the  Plaza  Lavalle  began  in 
earnest.  National  forces  advanced  from  the  Plaza 
Libertad,  and,  after  a few  rounds  from  a field  battery, 
attempted  to  storm  the  rebel  barricades,  but  these  were 
defended  staunchly,  and  in  spite  of  repeated  assaults, 
the  troops  were  unable  to  break  through  the  insurgent 
lines.  At  mid-day  the  attacking  force  was  withdrawn 

F 


82 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


from  the  streets  leading  into  the  Plaza  Lavalle.  On 
both  sides  the  firing  was  wild,  and  the  execution  done 
was  not  in  proportion  to  the  expenditure  of  ammunition, 
but  the  assailants  were  much  exposed  in  their  efforts  to 
force  the  barricades,  and  suffered  more  heavily  than 
the  defenders.  Casualties,  however,  were  sufficiently 
numerous  to  show  the  men  in  the  Plaza  Lavalle  that 
no  child’s  play  was  intended. 

Reinforcements  were  now  sent  by  the  Government 
to  the  Plaza  Libertad  with  instructions  to  renew  the 
attack  and  carry  the  rebel  position  at  all  costs,  and  next 
day  repeated  attempts  were  made  to  render  the  situation 
of  the  insurgents  untenable.  But  the  defence  was  well 
maintained,  and  although  the  list  of  killed  and  wounded 
was  long,  the  defendants  were  able  to  hold  their 
entrenchments.  The  rebels,  however,  now  discovered 
that  the  small  arm  ammunition  was  running  short. 
Only  30,000  rounds  remained,  and  investigation  showed 
that  in  place  of  550,000  rounds  of  ball  cartridge  in  the 
arsenal  when  hostilities  commenced  there  had  been  but 
200,000.  The  wild  and  continuous  firing  by  civilian 
volunteers  during  the  past  two  days  had  resulted  in  the 
expenditure  of  170,000  cartridges.  This  failure  of 
ammunition  made  necessary  an  immediate  consultation 
of  the  leaders. 

Meanwhile  the  fleet  had  endeavoured  to  assist  the 
rebel  cause.  Gn  July  27  the  ships  opened  fire  on  the 
city  of  Buenos  Aires,  ostensibly  to  bombard  the  Govern- 
ment buildings  where  the  President  and  his  Ministers 
were  known  to  be,  but  the  shells  flew  wide  of  the  mark, 
and  while  the  Government  Palace  was  untouched 
several  private  dwellings  and  one  hotel  in  the  vicinity 
were  struck.  Then  the  officers  in  command  of  the 
foreign  warships  decided  that  the  bombardment  was 
unjustified,  and  the  senior  officer  of  the  Argentine 
vessels,  Captain  O’Connor,  was  notified  that  if  the 
firing  did  not  cease  the  commanders  of  the  foreign  men- 
of-war  in  port  would  use  force  to  prevent  its  continuance. 
Captain  O’Connor,  much  against  his  inclination,  therefore 


1 890]  GOVERNMENT  REINFORCEMENTS  83 


suspended  further  action.  Steps  were  now  taken  by 
the  National  Government  to  strengthen  the  garrison  by 
bringing  troops  from  the  northern  provinces.  The 
Governor  of  Cordoba  was  Dr  Marcos  Juarez  Celman, 
a brother  of  the  President  of  the  Republic.  Cordoba 
maintained  an  armed  force  of  4000  men,  and  Dr  Marcos 
Celman  lost  no  time  in  despatching  2000  of  these  to  his 
brother’s  assistance.  Further  reinforcements  of  1000 
men  were  brought  from  Tucuman,  and  these  two  con- 
tingents were  ready  to  enter  the  city  of  Buenos  Aires 
on  the  morning  of  July  28.  The  prompt  manner  in 
which  this  support  from  the  provinces  was  hurried  to 
the  National  Capital  was  not  without  moral  effect  on 
sympathisers  with  the  “Union  Civica,”  and  it  deterred 
open  adherence  to  the  revolution  on  the  part  of  the 
unarmed  civilian  section  of  the  population.  Further- 
more, with  the  arrival  of  these  troops  Celman  believed 
his  position  secure.  He  estimated  that  the  strength  of 
the  Opposition  was  the  comparatively  small  group  in 
the  Plaza  Lavalle,  and  he  left  out  of  his  calculation  the 
deep-rooted  feeling  of  discontent  against  himself  and 
his  methods  throughout  the  Republic. 

The  leaders  in  the  Plaza  Lavalle  were  informed  of 
the  arrival  of  the  national  reinforcements,  and  an 
immediate  decision  as  to  future  tactics  became  an 
imperative  necessity.  Some  of  the  military  officers  were 
in  favour  of  an  attempt  to  cut  a way  through  the 
Government  lines,  and  continue  the  revolt  outside  the 
National  Capital.  In  this  proposal  a few  prominent 
civilians  acquiesced,  but  the  principal  members  of  the 
“Union  Civica”  were  in  favour  of  opening  negotiations 
with  the  National  Authorities  to  ascertain  on  what  terms 
a modus  vivendi  could  be  arranged.  A somewhat  acri- 
monious discussion  then  took  place,  but  in  the  end  the 
majority  decided  to  treat  with  the  National  Government 
for  the  re-establishment  of  peace  on  condition  that  certain 
concessions  were  granted  to  the  participators  in  the 
revolutionary  movement. 

Accordingly,  on  July  28  an  armistice  was  arranged 


84 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


to  allow  negotiations.  Dr  Maximo  Paz,  the  Governor 
of  the  Province  of  Buenos  Aires,  acted  as  mediator,  and 
Celman  called  upon  Pellegrini  and  Roca  for  their  advice 
as  to  the  course  he  should  take.  The  terms  proposed 
by  the  “Union  Civica”  were  that  Dr  Celman  should 
resign  office,  and  that  an  amnesty  be  granted  to  all 
persons  actively  participating  in  the  revolt.  When  this 
proposition  was  communicated  to  the  President  he  was 
inclined  to  treat  it  with  contempt.  He  called  attention 
to  the  fact  that  the  garrison  had  been  strongly  reinforced, 
and  it  was  only  a question  of  a few  hours  when  the 
unconditional  surrender  of  the  insurgents  must  take 
place  unless  they  were  to  be  absolutely  annihilated. 
For  the  rebels  to  demand  concessions,  he  added,  was  to 
recognise  them  as  victors  in  the  struggle.  The  more 
sober-minded,  however,  among  the  advisers  of  the 
President  obliged  him  to  listen  to  a different  view  of 
the  case.  They  said  that  the  suppression  of  the  armed 
force  in  the  Plaza  Lavalle  offered  no  great  difficulties, 
but  that  this  was  only  a fractional  part  of  the  movement, 
since  feeling  throughout  the  Republic  was  so  embittered 
that  his  continuance  in  office  would  assuredly  lead  to 
civil  war.  In  the  face  of  these  plain  truths  Celman’s 
attitude  changed.  The  confidence  he  had  expressed  of 
his  ability  to  hold  his  own  in  the  face  of  popular  opinion 
disappeared,  and  after  further  discussion  the  represen- 
tatives of  the  “ Union  Civica  ” were  informed  their  terms 
would  be  accepted  with  slight  modifications.  On  July 
29  the  negotiations  were  concluded,  and  the  insurgents 
dispersed  after  delivering  up  their  arms  to  the  National 
Authorities.  Thus  the  “Union  Civica”  had  forced  the 
resignation  of  the  President. 

When  the  comparatively  small  number  of  combatants 
is  taken  into  consideration  the  casualty  list  on  both  sides 
was  abnormally  high.  The  number  of  Government  forces 
engaged  was  under  3000,  and  the  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  was  700  officers  and  men,  and  the  strength  of 
the  rebels,  counting  the  armed  civilians  and  the  detach- 
ment of  the  army  participating  in  the  revolt,  was  about 


1890] 


RESIGNATION  OF  CELMAN 


85 


1500.  Of  these  400  were  killed  or  injured,  and  a few 
civilians  having  no  part  in  the  quarrel  were  shot  down 
by  the  armed  police.  Little  trouble  was  taken  to  verify 
the  intentions  of  any  casual  wanderers  through  the 
streets  during  the  hostilities.  The  usual  treatment  for 
these  inoffensive  persons  was  a volley  in  their  direction. 
It  is  deserving  of  mention  that  several  leading  doctors 
joined  the  rebels  in  the  Plaza  Lavalle  to  lend  their  pro- 
fessional services  to  their  compatriots. 

On  July  30  Celman’s  resignation  was  officially  an- 
nounced. It  was  not  until  this  event  was  known  publicly 
that  the  real  extent  of  the  opposition  to  his  Administra- 
tion could  be  gauged.  A scene  of  the  wildest  excitement 
ensued,  and  by  common  consent  holidays  were  kept  for 
three  days.  Everywhere  evidence  was  seen  of  satisfaction 
at  the  turn  events  had  taken.  The  depressing  influence 
of  the  past  two  years  was  eliminated,  and  Dr  Juarez 
Celman  disappeared  completely,  few  persons  caring 
what  became  of  him.  With  the  downfall  of  the  Presi- 
dent the  power  of  his  political  clique  was  broken.  In 
no  quarter  was  a good  word  heard  for  any  official  act  of 
the  recent  Administration. 

In  Europe,  where  keen  interest  was  taken  in  Argen- 
tine affairs  in  consequence  of  the  heavy  investments  at 
stake,  the  agitation  promoted  by  the  “Union  Civica” 
was  regarded  as  the  uprising  of  a deeply  injured  people 
against  a tyrannical  and  corrupt  system  of  Government, 
and  was  approved  accordingly.  That  Celman  had  been 
compelled  to  resign  was  accepted  as  evidence  of  a 
determination  in  Argentina  to  insist  on  honesty  in  the 
conduct  of  national  affairs. 

As  Vice-President  of  the  Republic,  Pellegrini  acceded 
to  the  duties  vacated  by  Celman.  He  had  already 
acquired  a varied  experience  in  connexion  with  public 
administration,  and  his  advent  was  hailed  with  general 
satisfaction.  Yet  Pellegrini  had  many  political  enemies 
in  Buenos  Aires,  where  the  part  he  played  as  Minister 
of  War  under  Aveilaneda  was  not  forgotten,  and  his 
conduct  in  making  no  protest  against  the  proceedings  of 


86 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


the  Celman  clique  had  served  also  to  bring  him  discredit. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  claimed  a wide  circle  of  personal 
friends,  and  could  rely  on  them  for  support.  The  public 
also  recognised  in  the  new  President  a man  of  ability. 
He  had  no  desire  for  the  Presidency,  but  accepted  it  as 
a duty.  The  responsibility  of  reducing  chaos  to  order 
offered  indeed  little  inducement,  for  the  administrative 
departments  were  in  the  utmost  confusion.  A complete 
reorganisation  of  the  governmental  machinery  was 
necessary,  and  this  could  not  be  an  easy  task. 


President  Pellegrini. 


[Face  page  S6. 


CHAPTER  V 


the  argentine  republic — continued 

Ministry  under  Pellegrini.  Attitude  of  Roca.  Public  Opinion. 
National  Finances.  Political  Situation.  Economic  Conditions. 
Cedula  Issues.  Inconvertible  Currency.  Policy  of  Pellegrini. 
Dep  reciation  in  Currency.  Argentina  and  Baring  Brothers. 
Suspension  of  Foreign  Debt  Service.  Banking  Crisis.  Patriotic 
Loan.  Banco  Nacional  and  Banco  de  la  Provincia.  Attempted 
Assassination  of  Roca.  Pellegrini’s  Administration.  Discontented 
Feeling.  Influence  of  Mitre.  Mitre  returns  from  Europe. 
Cordoba  and  Mitre.  Roca  and  Mitre.  The  “Union  Civica 
Radical.”  A new  State  Bank.  Pellegrini  and  the  “Union 
Civica  Radical.”  Nomination  of  Dr  Luis  Saenz  Pena.  Dr 
Bernardo  lrigoyan  and  the  “ Union  Civica  Radical.”  Political 
Situation  in  1892.  State  of  Siege.  Arrest  of  A Jem.  Alem 
Deported.  Dr  Luis  Saenz  Pena  elected  President.  Dr  Jose 
Uriburu.  Roca  resigns  Portfolio  of  Interior.  Saenz  Pena 
accedes  to  Office.  Public  Opinion  and  Pellegrini.  Loss  of  the 
Rosales.  Officers  of  the  Rosales  sentenced  to  Death.  Saenz 
Pena  and  Congress.  Ministerial  Crisis.  Obstruction  in  Con- 
gress. Ministry  of  Dr  del  Valle.  Alem  and  Political  Agitation. 
Congress  and  the  Administration.  Excitement  in  Buenos  Aires. 
Revolt  in  San  Luis.  Revolutionary  Preparations  in  Buenos  Aires. 
National  Government  and  Governor  Costa.  National  Troops  and 
Revolutionary  Forces.  Alem  in  Santa  Fe.  Rosario  captured  by 
Insurgents.  Roca  commands  in  Santa  Fe.  Surrender  of  Alem. 


The  first  duty  of  Pellegrini  was  to  form  a ministry  that 
would  conciliate  the  angry  passions  aroused  by  recent 
events.  It  was  no  easy  matter  to  combine  a representa- 
tion of  the  principal  political  elements  with  such  inde- 
pendent strength  as  would  ensure  respect  for  law  and 
order. 

An  attempt  at  reaction  from  Cordoba  was  possible, 

87 


88 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


and  it  was  necessary  to  guard  against  any  danger  from 
this  source.  The  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  therefore,  was 
undoubtedly  the  most  important  portfolio  in  the  Cabinet. 
It  was  also  the  most  difficult  to  fill.  One  man  combined 
the  necessary  qualifications — General  Roca.  To  induce 
the  former  President  to  re-enter  public  life  in  a sub- 
ordinate capacity,  Pellegrini  urged  patriotism.  He  asked 
Roca  to  aid  in  restoring  the  national  prestige,  and  that 
statesman  ultimately  consented  to  undertake  the  duties 
until  the  danger  from  provincial  politicians  had  passed. 
The  provincial  representatives  could  raise  no  objection 
to  this  appointment.  Roca  had  been  their  own  choice 
for  the  Presidency  in  1880,  and  his  Administration  had 
been  successful.  Cordoba  and  other  provinces  now 
required  a strong  hand  to  check  their  political  intrigues, 
and  because  this  was  the  case  Pellegrini  appealed  to  his 
former  chief  for  assistance. 

The  other  portfolio  requiring  special  qualifications 
was  Finance.  The  Exchequer  was  in  dire  confusion, 
and  a reorganisation  of  the  department  was  necessary 
to  ascertain  exactly  the  extent  of  the  inroads  upon  the 
national  purse  under  the  late  Administration.  In 
appointing  Dr  Vicente  Lopez  to  this  post,  Pellegrini 
acted  wisely.  Dr  Lopez  had  no  great  financial  ability, 
but  he  was  a man  of  absolute  integrity  and  untiring  in 
his  attention  to  detail ; his  appointment  was  also  a con- 
cession to  the  “ Union  Civica,”  and  was  fully  appreciated 
by  that  association. 

No  difficulty  was  found  in  filling  the  remaining  port- 
folios, and  on  the  whole  this  first  ministry  of  Pellegrini 
was  a happy  combination  of  various  political  elements. 
Except  by  Cordoba  satisfaction  was  felt  on  all  sides. 
Relief  at  the  suppression  of  the  Celman  Administration 
was  everywhere  else  profound,  and  assured  approval  for 
any  honest  Government.  That  the  evil  influence  of  the 
past  four  years  would  take  time  to  eradicate  was  patent 
to  everybody,  and  no  miracles  were  expected  from 
Pellegrini,  so  that  he  assumed  his  presidential  duties 
amidst  general  goodwill. 


1890]  THE  financial  situation 


89 


It  was  not  until  some  weeks  later  that  the  compli- 
cations of  the  situation  were  understood.  Celman  had 
left  an  empty  treasury  and  a legacy  of  indebtedness  far 
beyond  the  resources  of  the  country.  Concessions 
carrying  money  guarantees  for  annual  interest  on  capital 
invested  had  been  scattered  broadcast.  Congress  had 
been  packed  with  representatives  elected  through  official 
influence,  and  with  neither  capability  or  desire  to  legislate 
for  the  national  interests.  Had  the  “Union  Civica” 
gained  a complete  victory  in  July  the  intention  was  to 
dissolve  the  Chambers.  It  was  hardly  within  the 
province  of  Pellegrini  to  advise  any  such  drastic  proceed- 
ing, and  he  found  himself  confronted  by  a political 
representation  lacking  in  intelligence  and  energy  to 
initiate  useful  legislation  to  assist  the  country  in  this 
crisis.  The  economic  situation  was  a source  of  even 
greater  anxiety  than  financial  conditions.  Extravagance 
in  public  administration  produced  spendthrift  habits  in 
private  life.  Everywhere  the  shoe  pinched  now  that 
credit  was  contracted,  and  the  inflation  in  commercial 
concerns  in  Argentina  between  1887  and  1890  had  been 
disastrous  to  the  sound  economic  progress  of  the  country. 
Both  the  National  and  Provincial  Mortgage  Banks  had 
made  borrowing  easy,  but  if  the  money  obtained  from 
the  issue  of  “ Cedulas  ” had  been  legitimately  applied  no 
harm  would  have  been  done.  Unfortunately,  in  the 
great  majority  of  cases  where  loans  were  made,  the 
money  was  squandered,  so  that  when  the  crisis  came  in 
1890  this  profligacy  further  complicated  the  situation. 
Landowners  could  obtain  no  more  advances.  In  these 
circumstances  it  was  not  surprising  that  real  poverty 
was  not  infrequent. 

An  examination  of  existing  conditions  by  the  new 
Finance  Minister  was  productive  of  unpleasant  revela- 
tions. The  Government  had  no  funds  to  meet  the 
ordinary  expenses  of  the  Administration.  Obligations 
contracted  were  overdue  ; disorder  was  rampant  in  every 
department,  and  national  bankruptcy  threatened  in  the 
immediate  future.  Resources  had  been  mortgaged  to 


90 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


such  an  extent  that  there  was  small  hope  of  obtaining 
foreign  financial  assistance.  In  his  dilemma  the 
President  listened  to  short-sighted  advisers  who  proposed 
to  issue  large  sums  in  inconvertible  notes  guaranteed 
by  the  National  Treasury.  To  follow  advice  of  this 
nature  showed  disinclination  to  face  the  difficulties  in 
which  the  country  was  involved,  and  yet  the  public  was 
willing  to  support  Pellegrini  in  any  policy  for  the  full 
exposure  of  the  corrupt  system  in  vogue  under  Celman. 
Argentine  credit  abroad  would  not  have  suffered  from 
such  action.  The  President,  however,  averse  to  such 
thorough  measures,  cast  about  for  a temporary  reprieve 
from  the  day  of  reckoning,  and  in  an  emission  of  paper 
currency  found  the  fatal  way  to  defer  any  public  explan- 
ation of  the  true  state  of  affairs.  He  used  the  printing 
press  and  flooded  the  country  with  inconvertible  paper  in 
order  to  extricate  himself  momentarily  from  his  difficult 
position,  and  in  September,  1890,  asked  permission  of 
Congress  to  issue  notes  for  $60,000,000.  This  proposition 
was  sanctioned  and  the  emission  made.  It  tended  for 
the  moment  to  relieve  the  embarrassments  of  the 
Administration,  but  unhappily  and  inevitably  served 
also  to  shake  confidence  in  the  President  and  to  pave 
the  way  for  greater  financial  complications  to  follow. 

The  immediate  result  of  this  note  emission  was  a 
rapid  depreciation  in  the  purchasing  value  of  the  currency. 
Argentine  credit  suffered,  and  foreign  creditors  became 
more  exigent  for  a settlement  of  outstanding  accounts, 
so  that  the  financial  crisis  was  at  once  aggravated,  and 
in  proportion  to  its  acuteness  reacted  uniformly  upon  the 
national  resources.  In  the  matter  of  the  service  of  the 
external  debt  the  Administration  was  largely  in  the  hands 
of  Baring  Brothers,  its  financial  agents  in  London. 
Other  agents  attended  to  the  service  of  various  provincial 
and  municipal  obligations,  but  it  was  to  the  Barings  the 
National  Government  looked  for  assistance.  In  dealing 
with  Argentina  the  Barings  had  become  heavily  involved, 
and  when  the  depreciation  of  Argentine  credit  occurred 
they  were  naturally  the  first  to  feel  the  situation  acutely. 


1891]  SUSPENSION  OF  DEBT  SERVICE  91 


So  great  did  the  pressure  upon  them  become  in  conse- 
quence of  their  Argentine  connection,  that  although,  as 
it  turned  out,  perfectly  solvent,  they  were  forced  into 
liquidation  in  November,  1890.  This  catastrophe 
enormously  increased  the  difficulties  of  Argentina,  and 
when  the  Administration  was  called  upon  to  provide 
funds  to  meet  the  service  of  the  debt  foiling  due  on 
January  1,  1891,  it  could  nowhere  obtain  the  required 
accommodation.  Matters  dragged  along  until  the  end 
of  the  year,  when,  without  previous  notification,  default 
was  made. 

The  full  effect  of  the  four  years  of  Celman’s  Adminis- 
tration now  became  apparent.  First  of  all  the  suspen- 
sion of  the  debt  service  drew  public  attention  to  the 
condition  of  the  Banco  Nacional,  and  disquieting  rumours 
as  to  its  stability  were  persistently  circulated.  It  was 
urged  that  the  Government  must  support  the  bank,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  argued  that  if  the  Administration 
was  unable  to  meet  the  national  obligations  no  money 
would  be  forthcoming  if  the  bank’s  own  resources  were 
insufficient  to  meet  its  liabilities.  While  arrangements 
with  the  foreign  creditors  were  pending  the  crash  came. 
During  March,  1891,  the  depositors  in  nearly  all  the 
banks  became  uneasy,  and  large  sums  were  withdrawn, 
more  especially  from  the  Banco  Nacional  and  the  Banco 
de  la  Provincia  de  Buenos  Aires ; and  in  the  beginning 
of  April  the  alarm  became  general,  until  it  developed 
into  panic,  which  forced  the  Banco  Nacional  and  the 
Banco  de  la  Provincia  de  Buenos  Aires  to  close  their 
doors,  several  private  banks  following  suit.  The  re- 
sources of  the  London  and  River  Plate  Bank  and  the 
English  Bank  of  the  River  Plate  were  severely  taxed, 
but  the  former  promptly  met  every  obligation.  The 
English  Bank  also  faced  the  run  at  the  time,  but  failed 
immediately  after  pressure  relaxed.  Pellegrini  attempted 
to  save  the  Banco  Nacional  from  bankruptcy.  An  in- 
ternal loan  was  raised,  and  838,000,000  subscribed,  but 
this  assistance  was  of  no  avail,  and  as  a banking  con- 
cern that  institution  ceased  to  exist.  The  Banco 


92 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


National  was  afterwards  declared  in  liquidation,  but  the 
Banco  de  la  Provincia  de  Buenos  Aires  struggled  on 
for  a time,  although  if  possible  more  completely  ruined. 
This  banking  crisis  violently  disturbed  the  economic 
situation,  and  increased  the  difficulty  of  Pellegrini’s 
position. 

Early  in  1891  an  attempt  was  made  to  assassinate 
Roca.  It  was  never  clearly  ascertained  if  the  would-be 
assassin  was  prompted  by  political  motives,  or  whether 
the  crime  was  the  outcome  of  the  misery  and  poverty 
now  a common  feature.  Roca  was  in  his  carriage,  when 
a shot  was  fired,  and  the  bullet  slightly  wounded  him  in 
the  back,  but  inflicted  no  serious  injury.  The  man  was 
arrested,  but  refused  any  account  of  his  motives  other 
than  that  he  had  intended  to  kill  the  ex-President. 
There  was  at  this  time  a very  strong  sentiment  against 
Roca,  as  the  populace  held  him  responsible  in  great 
measure  for  the  hard  conditions  now  ruling.  They 
attributed  their  sufferings  to  him  on  the  ground  that 
through  his  influence  Celman  had  been  elected  to  the 
Presidency. 

It  was  evident  to  close  observers  that  Pellegrini  was 
discouraged  by  the  obstacles  in  his  path.  He  felt  that  he 
was  only  a stop-gap  in  the  presidential  office,  and  that 
his  short  tenure  was  inadequate  to  admit  any  measures 
he  initiated  maturing.  Therefore  no  drastic  reforms 
were  attempted  by  him.  The  Government  just  drifted 
without  definite  policy  aiming  at  a permanent  solution 
of  any  economic  and  financial  problems,  and  naturally 
this  attitude  did  not  satisfy  the  country.  In  less  than 
twelve  months  from  the  date  of  Pellegrini’s  inauguration, 
all  signs  of  the  popular  enthusiasm  with  which  he  had 
been  greeted  disappeared,  and  public  opinion  in  Buenos 
Aii  *es  and  many  other  sections  of  the  Republic  rallied 
round  General  Bartolome  Mitre  as  the  only  man  able  to 
save  the  situation. 

Mitre  had  been  abroad  when  the  revolutionary  out- 
break occurred  in  1890,  and  did  not  return  until  May, 
1891,  when  the  landing  of  the  leader  of  porteno  political 


1891] 


GENERAL  MITRE  RETURNS 


93 


life  was  made  the  occasion  of  a remarkable  exhibition 
of  public  rejoicing.  By  common  consent  the  day  was 
observed  as  a holiday,  and  more  than  50,000  persons 
assembled  near  the  docks  and  in  the  streets  to  bid  him 
welcome.  The  way  to  his  residence  was  strewn  with 
flowers.  A meeting  was  convened  in  the  Plaza  San 
Martin,  and  a petition  presented  to  him  to  become  a 
candidate  for  the  Presidency.  At  first  Mitre  demurred 
on  the  grounds  of  old  age,  but  in  view  of  the  unanimous 
support  tendered  he  finally  consented.  For  the  moment 
the  political  horizon  cleared,  and  the  public  became  con- 
tented to  allow  the  remaining  eighteen  months  Pellegrini 
had  to  serve  to  drag  out  without  further  indication  of 
hostile  feeling. 

It  was  soon  evident,  however,  that  Cordoba  would 
not  accept  the  porteno  representative,  because  Mitre  in 
power  would  block  the  ambitions  of  the  “ clique.” 
Roca  was  the  traditional  political  enemy  of  the  Portenos, 
and  it  was  intimated  to  him  that  every  effort,  even  civil 
war,  would  be  used  to  prevent  the  election  of  the  porteno 
leader.  A meeting  was  therefore  arranged  between 
Mitre  and  Roca.  They  held  a conference  known  as 
“ El  Acuerdo ,”  which  resulted  in  Mitre  withdrawing  on 
condition  that  a non-party  candidate  was  nominated, 
and  that  the  provincial  politicians  should  support  him. 
This  agreement  again  changed  the  situation,  and  was 
subsequently  the  cause  of  important  political  events. 

Dr  Leandro  Alem  was  the  central  figure  of  the 
opposition  to  the  agreement  between  Mitre  and  Roca. 
He  immediately  organised  a campaign  against  the 
“Acuerdo,”  but  the  “Union  Civica”  was  divided  on  the 
question,  and  the  two  sections  separated,  the  partisans 
of  Dr  Alem  forming  the  “Union  Civica  Radical.”  The 
others  continued  as  the  “Union  Civica,”  but  quickly 
dropped  into  obscurity.  Associated  with  Alem  were 
Irigoyen,  Leonardo  Pereyra,  Oscar  Liliedale,  and  other 
prominent  citizens.  The  principles  followed  by  Alem 
and  Lis  colleagues  were  to  insist  upon  registration  of 
voters  and  endeavour  to  obtain  an  election  in  which  no 


94 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


compulsion  or  official  influence  was  used.  It  was  a 
policy  which  attracted  the  younger  section  of  the  popu- 
lation, and  many  recruits  flocked  to  the  new  platform. 
As  Alem  found  his  support  increasing,  he  enlarged  his 
sphere  of  operations,  and  before  the  end  of  1891  there 
was  not  a district  in  the  Republic  where  branches  of 
the  “Union  Civica  Radical”  had  not  been  established. 

The  cause  of  the  “Union  Civica  Radical”  was 
strengthened  by  the  financial  legislation  initiated  in 
October  of  1891.  Finding  that  all  attempts  to  revive 
the  Banco  Nacional  were  abortive,  Pellegrini  determined 
to  found  a new  bank,  which  he  named  the  Banco  de  la 
Nation  Argentina,  and  it  was  launched  with  an  additional 
note  issue  of  $50,000,000.  State  banking  had  conduced 
to  bring  about  the  existing  economic  and  financial 
difficulties,  and  had  enabled  Celman  to  squander  the 
national  resources.  No  wonder,  then,  that  the  new  bank 
was  regarded  as  but  another  method  to  revive  those 
practices,  and  adverse  comment  was  heard  from  every 
quarter.  Discontent  with  the  Administration  was  inten- 
sified, and  served  to  bring  converts  to  the  “Union 
Civica  Radical  ” with  its  cry  for  economic  and  political 
reform. 

One  effect  of  the  agitation  promoted  by  Alem  was 
to  throw  the  influence  of  the  Government  in  favour  of 
the  agreement  between  Roca  and  Mitre.  This  changed 
the  position  of  the  “Union  Civica  Radical.”  At  first 
it  was  only  opposed  to  the  “ Acuerdo,”  but  now  it  became 
the  centre  of  opposition  to  the  National  Government, 
and  was  credited  with  revolutionary  designs  whenever 
a new  publication  attacking  the  national  policy  was 
issued  or  a meeting  summoned.  Occasionally  seditious 
measures  were  advocated,  but  seldom  of  such  character 
as  to  warrant  police  interference.  Yet  at  various  times 
the  meetings  were  dispersed  by  armed  force,  and  more 
than  once  volleys  were  fired  by  the  police  into  the  head- 
quarters of  the  association. 

After  many  vacillations  the  “Acuerdo”  Party  decided 
to  nominate  Dr  Luis  Saenz  Pena  for  the  Presidency. 


1892]  THE  “UNION  CIVICA  RADICAL” 


95 


Other  names  were  brought  forward  and  rejected,  and 
Dr  Luis  Saenz  Pena  combined  the  conditions  of  the 
“ Acuerdo.”  A Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  for  many 
years,  Dr  Pena  was  removed  from  political  controversies. 
In  his  high  judicial  capacity  he  had  won  the  respect  of 
Argentines  and  foreigners.  He  was  sixty-eight  years 
of  age,  and  with  his  experience  of  men  and  matters 
it  was  thought  that  the  national  welfare  would  be  safe 
in  his  hands. 

Under  other  conditions  it  is  possible  Alem  and  the 
“Union  Civica  Radical”  might  have  supported  the 
candidature  of  Saenz  Pena.  He  and  his  followers, 
however,  found  fault  with  the  system  that  had  brought 
Dr  Pena  forward,  and  they  refused  to  accept  him. 
They  argued  that  the  machinery  at  work  for  the  presi- 
dential election  was  a continuance  of  the  practice 
previously  in  vogue  in  Argentina,  when  the  outgoing 
President  named  his  successor.  This  was  claimed  to 
be  at  the  root  of  the  political  trouble  in  the  past,  and 
in  these  circumstances  the  “Union  Civica  Radical”  put 
forward  Dr  Bernardo  Irigoyen  as  their  candidate. 

At  the  beginning  of  1892  there  were  only  two 
political  parties.  On  one  side  were  Mitre,  Roca,  and 
the  Administration,  and  on  the  other  Alem  and  the 
“Union  Civica  Radical.”  Had  Alem  expressed  himself 
more  moderately  as  to  the  means  he  proposed  to  employ 
to  obtain  electoral  and  other  reforms  he  would  have 
secured  many  more  adherents,  especially  amongst  the 
higher  social  classes. 

As  the  election  drew  closer,  Alem  saw  his  efforts 
thwarted  by  the  official  influence  of  Pellegrini,  and  this 
evoked  violent  speeches  in  favour  of  armed  rebellion 
which  frightened  people  with  large  vested  interests  at 
stake.  They  preferred  to  support  the  candidate  of  the 
“ Acuerdo  ” rather  than  risk  a revolutionary  outbreak. 
Pellegrini  was  quick  to  see  how  the  drift  of  events 
enabled  him  to  control  the  situation,  and  he  had  no  hesi- 
tation in  acting  promptly  when  an  opportunity  occurred 
for  a decisive  move  against  Alem. 


96 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


Soon,  therefore,  it  became  evident  that  no  real 
contest  would  take  place  over  the  presidential  election, 
because  no  opportunity  would  be  allowed  for  the 
opposition  to  vote.  The  “Union  Civica  Radical” 
would  not  be  debarred  from  going  to  the  polling 
stations,  but  it  was  understood  their  vote  was  to  be 
returned  in  the  minority.  This  tempted  Alem  and  his 
friends  to  advise  a revolutionary  rising  as  the  only 
means  of  protesting  against  such  injustice.  That  an 
insurrectionary  movement  could  succeed  was  regarded 
as  only  a remote  possibility,  but  Alem  argued  that  such 
action  would  strengthen  his  cause.  The  intention  of 
the  Opposition  was  reported  to  Pellegrini,  who  forth- 
with determined  on  a sensational  course  to  checkmate 
Alem.  In  April  rumours  of  impending  revolutionary 
tactics  were  circulated,  but  the  National  Authorities 
apparently  gave  little  heed  to  them,  although  in  reality 
the  Government  was  completing  its  arrangements. 
Orders  were  issued  to  confine  all  troops  to  barracks. 
A Cabinet  meeting  was  summoned  at  which  a short 
decree  was  drawn  up  declaring  the  city  and  province  of 
Buenos  Aires  in  a state  of  siege.  This  suspended 
constitutional  privileges,  and  the  chief  of  police  was 
instructed  to  arrest  Alem  and  his  friends  as  dangerous 
to  the  public  peace.  Within  a few  hours  the  leaders  of 
the  Opposition  were  in  prison.  For  three  days  the 
Government  kept  control  of  the  telegraphs,  and  travellers 
were  allowed  only  to  enter  and  leave  the  national 
capital  under  surveillance,  so  that  the  discontented 
faction  could  make  no  movement  towards  rebellion. 
Then  it  was  decided  to  place  the  prisoners  on  board  a 
transport,  where  they  were  confined  for  some  weeks. 
When  all  danger  of  a rising  was  over,  a proclamation 
was  issued  exiling  Alem  and  his  colleagues  from 
Argentine  territory  pending  the  President’s  pleasure ; 
and  by  such  high-handed  action  was  the  growing  power 
of  the  “ Union  Civica  Radical  ” paralysed. 

In  due  course  Saenz  Pena  was  elected,  but  he  had 
no  hand  in  the  action  taken  to  prevent  an  electoral 


1892] 


ELECTION  OF  SAENZ  PENA 


97 


contest,  and  never  expressed  any  keen  desire  to  occupy 
the  Presidency.  Urged  by  Mitre  and  Roca,  he  accepted 
the  nomination,  and,  except  among  the  “Union  Civica 
Radical  ” sympathisers,  the  presidential  question  was  re- 
garded with  comparative  apathy  outside  the  “ Acuerdo  ” 
circle.  Most  people  were  adverse  to  developments 
which  might  raise  again  the  standard  of  armed 
revolution,  and  were  satisfied  if  the  election  of  Pena 
conduced  to  freedom  from  political  disturbances.  The 
“Acuerdo”  policy  was  viewed  as  expedient  to  save 
friction  between  the  Portenos  and  the  Cordoba  clique. 

In  accordance  with  this  policy,  a man  with  no 
marked  political  tendencies,  Dr  Jose  Uriburu,  was 
nominated  for  the  Vice-Presidency.  For  twenty  years 
he  had  been  absent  on  diplomatic  missions,  and  at  the 
time  of  his  selection  was  Minister  in  Chile.  The  choice 
was  influenced  by  the  fact  that  relations  between  Chile 
and  Argentina  were  strained  in  connection  with  the 
delimitation  of  the  frontier  between  the  two  countries, 
and  it  was  held  to  be  advisable  to  have  Uriburu’s 
experience  at  hand  in  case  grave  complications 
occurred. 

With  the  election  of  Pena,  R oca’s  work  in  the 
Administration  ended,  and  he  announced  his  resignation. 
There  can  be  little  doubt  that  his  services  during  the 
two  years  he  was  Minister  of  Interior  were  of  immense 
value.  The  provinces,  always  inclined  to  be  turbulent, 
would  have  resumed  gladly  the  quarrel  with  the  Portenos 
after  the  resignation  of  Celman,  but  Roca  prevented  an 
outbreak.  Whenever  revolutionary  practices  were 
threatened  he  struck  promptly  and  decisively,  but  with 
the  action  against  the  leaders  of  the  “Union  Civica 
Radical  ” he  had  small  connection,  although  the  matter 
properly  came  within  his  jurisdiction. 

On  October  12,  1892,  Saenz  Pena  assumed  his  pre- 
sidential duties,  and  Dr  Pellegrini  left  the  Government 
Palace  after  the  usual  ceremony  almost  unnoticed. 
The  wildest  enthusiasm  had  greeted  him  when  he  took 
the  place  of  Celman  two  years  before,  and  now  the 

G 


98 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


changed  temper  of  the  populace  was  marked.  Excep- 
tional difficulties  had  beset  his  Administration,  and  that 
he  should  overcome  them  completely  was  not  to  be 
expected.  Nobody,  indeed,  anticipated  that  the  disas- 
trous results  of  the  Celman  period  could  be  eradicated 
immediately,  but  all  required  a clear  statement  of  the 
condition  of  affairs  so  that  the  complications  might  be 
boldly  faced.  Pellegrini  hesitated  to  take  this  straight- 
forward course,  and  his  efforts  to  temporise  served  to 
plunge  the  country  deeper  into  the  mire.  His  patch- 
work  policy  aggravated  the  difficulties  and  alienated 
the  sympathy  of  the  more  wealthy  classes,  who  saw 
in  his  acts  danger  to  their  interests.  His  treatment 
of  Alem  and  his  associates  was  likewise  viewed  with 
little  favour  because  it  savoured  too  much  of  the  old 
despotism. 

In  1892  an  incident  occurred  in  connection  with  the 
Argentine  navy  that  merits  mention.  A squadron  was 
ordered  on  a cruise,  and  amongst  the  vessels  was  the 
torpedo -catcher  Rosales,  commanded  by  Commander 
Victorica,  with  Commander  Funes  acting  as  second  in 
authority.  Off  the  coast  of  Uruguay  a heavy  gale  was 
encountered,  by  Avhich  the  ships  were  separated.  Next 
day  the  officers  of  the  Rosales  landed  and  reported  that 
the  torpedo-catcher  had  foundered  and  that  the  crew 
had  been  embarked  in  boats  and  life-rafts  belonging 
to  the  ship.  At  the  time  it  was  remarked  that  the 
officers  had  come  ashore  together  instead  of  being  dis- 
tributed amongst  the  boats,  but  no  doubt  was  cast  upon 
the  facts  as  related  by  the  two  commanders,  Victorica 
and  Funes.  All  the  greater,  therefore,  was  the  sensa- 
tion excited  a few  days  later  when  a fireman  of  the 
Rosales  stated  that  the  officers  had  deserted  the  vessel 
during  the  storm,  leaving  the  crew  to  perish.  At  first 
the  story  received  little  credence,  but  an  investigation 
was  ordered,  and  a categorical  statement  obtained  from 
the  fireman  of  an  appalling  nature.  According  to  this 
witness,  when  the  gale  was  at  its  height  the  Rosales 
showed  signs  of  distress,  whereupon  the  officers  ordered 


1892] 


WRECK  OF  THE  ROSALES 


99 


the  crew  below,  and  rations  of  rum  were  served  out. 
Whilst  the  men  were  drinking  the  hatches  were  battened 
down.  No  attention  was  paid  to  their  cries,  and  the 
attempt  made  to  force  the  hatches  was  for  some  hours 
without  avail,  but  finally  they  made  their  way  on  deck, 
only  to  find  the  ship  in  a sinking  condition  and  aban- 
doned by  the  officers.  All  boats  and  life-rafts  had  dis- 
appeared, the  crew  were  helpless,  and  the  Rosales  sank 
soon  after  they  reached  the  deck.  This  one  fireman  had 
clung  to  some  wreckage  when  the  ship  foundered,  and 
been  washed  ashore  next  day.  Forthwith  the  arrest  of 
Victorica  and  Funes  was  ordered,  but  both  had  influen- 
tial friends,  the  former  being  a son  of  the  Minister  of 
War,  and  pressure  was  put  upon  the  judge  before  whom 
the  case  was  tried  to  bring  in  a verdict  of  acquittal. 
To  his  credit  the  judge  stood  firm,  and  the  two  officers 
were  condemned  to  death,  but  the  sentence  was  delayed 
and  in  the  end  not  executed.  The  affair  had  an  impor- 
tant bearing  subsequently  upon  the  Pena  Adminis- 
tration. 

Saenz  Pena’s  accession  to  the  Presidential  Chair 
brought  to  the  front  political  conditions  previously 
unknown  in  Argentina.  Hitherto  the  National  Con- 
gress had  represented  the  political  affinities  of  the 
President,  but  the  new  President  had  no  political  follow- 
ing upon  whom  he  could  depend  for  support.  At  first 
the  new  position  thus  created  was  not  understood  either 
by  Pena  or  Congress,  and  his  idea  was  to  administer 
public  affairs  for  the  general  good  without  reference  to 
political  exigencies.  This  had  been  the  ostensible  plat- 
form of  the  “Acuerdo,”  but  Pena  did  not  appreciate 
the  character  of  Congress,  and  unforeseen  obstacles  arose 
to  paralyse  his  efforts.  Both  Senate  and  Chamber  of 
Deputies  were  opportunist,  and  wanted  benefits  for  them- 
selves, to  secure  which  they  sought  an  excuse  to  embar- 
rass the  President.  His  first  Cabinet  needed  but  a few 
months  of  office  to  satisfy  it  of  the  practicable  impos- 
sibility of  carrying  out  his  policy.  The  President  was 
unversed  in  political  life,  and  unprepared  to  use  his 


100 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


official  position  to  influence  the  opinions  of  others.  For 
thirty  years  he  had  been  a member  of  the  Judiciary,  and 
his  long  experience  in  the  Supreme  Court  had  imbued 
him  with  a habit  of  routine  which  made  him  endeavour 
to  conduct  political  business  on  hard-and-fast  rules,  a 
method  doomed  to  failure.  Concessions  were  expected 
in  return  for  support,  and  without  such  inducement 
Congress  was  more  inclined  to  throw  obstacles  in  his 
path  than  to  consider  any  executive  act  upon  its  merits. 
In  vain  ministers  urged  the  necessity  of  using  the  Presi- 
dential prerogative  to  create  a political  majority  in 
Congress.  The  President  stolidly  clung  to  his  resolve 
to  make  no  effort  in  this  direction,  socially  or  politically, 
and  rumours  were  soon  afloat  that  the  Cabinet  would 
resign  on  the  pretext  that  a group  in  Congress  had 
determined  on  a policy  of  obstruction.  This  political 
opposition  took  definite  shape  in  the  begining  of  1893, 
and  shortly  afterwards  the  Ministry  found  its  position 
untenable. 

To  form  a new  Cabinet  was  no  easy  matter,  for  the 
men  eligible  for  ministerial  appointments  were  disinclined 
to  come  forward,  and  so  acute  did  the  political  crisis 
become,  that  the  question  of  the  resignation  of  the 
President  was  discussed  as  the  only  way  out  of  a dead- 
lock. But  Dr  Saenz  Pena  refused  to  entertain  the  idea 
of  leaving  office,  and  announced  that  no  consideration 
would  induce  him  to  alter  his  determination. 

After,  however,  some  weeks  had  elapsed,  Dr  Aristo- 
bulo  del  Valle,  well  known  in  connexion  with  the  move- 
ment of  the  “Union  Civica”  previous  to  1890,  extricated 
the  President  from  his  dilemma,  by  forming  a Cabinet 
moderate  in  respect  to  the  opinions  held  by  the  various 
Ministers,  but  with  a predominant  povteno  influence. 
Forthwith,  provincial  members  of  the  National  Congress 
assumed  a hostile  attitude. 

It  was,  however,  from  another  cause  than  the  porteno 
preponderance  in  the  Cabinet  that  the  most  violent 
opposition  arose.  Alem  returned  from  exile  and  was 
elected  to  represent  the  Federal  District  in  the  National 


1893]  CONGRESS  AND  SAENZ  PENA 


101 


Legislature.  The  leader  of  the  “ Union  Civica  Radical  ” 
had  not  forgiven  Dr  del  Valle  for  his  acceptance  of  the 
“ Acuerdo  ” policy,  and  lost  no  opportunity  of  attacking 
his  former  colleague.  The  “ Union  Civica  Radical  ” was 
reorganised.  The  treatment  of  Alem  and  his  com- 
panions in  1892  added  incentive  to  strike  a blow  at  the 
Administration.  Alem  was  not  in  accord  with  the  policy 
of  the  provincial  members  of  Congress,  but  as  a matter 
of  expediency  he  joined  hands  with  them  whenever 
occasion  offered  to  embarrass  the  Executive,  and  again 
there  came  a deadlock. 

In  Buenos  Aires,  Santa  Fe,  and  San  Luis,  the  spirit 
of  revolution  developed  rapidly,  aided  by  the  fact  that 
their  Governors  had  raised  local  troops  in  defiance  of 
the  Law  of  Constitution.  These  armed  forces  were 
enrolled  for  the  sole  purpose  of  preventing  any  attempt 
of  the  residents  to  insist  upon  just  treatment  on  electoral 
questions  or  resistance  to  the  illegal  taxation  levied  by 
the  Provincial  Governments.  The  worst  offender  was 
Dr  Costa,  Governor  of  Buenos  Aires,  who,  in  spite  of 
repeated  protests  from  the  National  Government,  per- 
sisted in  maintaining  a force  of  3000  men,  and  the  leaders 
of  the  “ Union  Civica  Radical  ” urged  action  against  him, 
arguing  that  if  the  Administration  was  too  feeble  to 
enforce  obedience  to  constitutional  laws,  it  was  time  for 
all  good  citizens  to  rise  in  arms  and  demand  respect  for 
their  rights.  In  the  excited  condition  of  public  opinion 
the  Governor  thought  it  wise  to  promise  acquiescence  to 
the  demands  of  the  National  Government,  but  he  made 
no  move  to  fulfil  his  pledge. 

A revolutionary  rising  in  San  Luis  set  the  match  to 
the  train.  Tired  of  waiting  for  action  by  the  National 
Administration,  the  people  there  took  matters  into  their 
own  hands  and  ejected  the  Governor,  an  example  Buenos 
Aires  was  not  slow  to  follow.  Near  Campana  and  other 
places  not  far  from  the  National  Capital,  thousands  of 
citizens  assembled  to  take  up  arms  against  the  Provincial 
Governor ; and  in  Barracas,  a suburb  of  the  city  of  Buenos 
Aires,  a revolutionary  committee  was  formed  and  such 


102 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


arms  as  could  be  obtained  served  out.  By  the  beginning 
of  August,  1893,  the  Opposition  to  Costa  counted  on 
15,000  able-bodied  men  anxious  to  take  the  field,  and 
the  limited  supply  of  rifles  and  ammunition  alone  pre- 
vented an  immediate  movement  upon  La  Plata.  Excite- 
ment ran  so  high  at  the  turn  of  events  as  to  force  the 
Administration  to  take  action.  The  revolutionary  leaders 
had  explained  to  the  National  Government  that  the 
movement  was  solely  against  the  Provincial  Administra- 
tion, and  expressed  willingness  to  lay  down  their  arms 
if  the  resignation  of  Costa  was  assured,  and  the  provincial 
troops  disbanded.  The  National  Government  saw  no 
other  course  open  than  to  accept  these  terms,  and  an 
ultimatum  was  despatched  to  La  Plata ; but  before  a 
settlement  could  be  effected,  a misunderstanding  occurred 
between  the  national  troops  at  La  Plata  and  the  revolu- 
tionary forces,  resulting  in  a fight  and  a number  of 
casualties  on  both  sides.  No  sooner,  however,  was  the 
news  of  the  disbanding  of  the  provincial  troops  and  the 
resignation  of  Costa  known  than  the  insurgents  dispersed 
to  their  homes,  leaving  the  National  Government  to  take 
temporary  control  of  the  province,  which  it  placed  in 
charge  of  Dr  Lucio  V.  Lopez. 

In  Santa  Fe  discontent  was  stronger  than  in  Buenos 
Aires,  and  the  leaders  of  the  “Union  Civica  Radical” 
hoped  to  convert  the  rising  there  into  a general  rebellion 
against  the  National  Government.  “Union  Civica 
Radical”  agents  had  conveyed  supplies  of  arms  and  ammu- 
nition to  convenient  localities  not  far  from  the  city  of 
Rosario,  and  arrangements  had  been  made  through  Colonel 
Espina  for  a section  of  naval  officers  in  Buenos  Aires  to 
seize  some  of  the  torpedo  flotilla  and  other  vessels  lying  in 
the  Tigre  River,  and  assist  in  the  capture  of  Rosario,  at 
which  town  it  was  proposed  to  establish  revolutionary 
headquarters.  At  first  the  outbreak  in  Santa  Fe  thus 
arranged  for  was  successful,  and  after  severe  fighting  the 
insurgents  captured  Rosario.  This  thoroughly  frightened 
the  National  Administration,  and  it  begged  Roca  to 
command  the  troops.  To  this  request  he  acceded,  and 


1893] 


REVOLT  IN  BUENOS  AIRES 


103 


after,  as  usual,  making  deliberate  preparations,  he  took 
the  field,  advancing  with  a strong  force  upon  the  revolu- 
tionary positions.  The  immediate  collapse  of  the  in- 
surgents followed,  and  Alem  and  other  leaders  of  the 
movement  surrendered.  They  were  exiled  to  State 
Island,  an  Argentine  penal  settlement,  for  the  term  of 
one  year.  In  1895  they  were  permitted  to  return  to 
Buenos  Aires,  and  there  Alem  died  in  1896.  With  his 
disappearance  the  “ Union  Civica  Radical  ” lost  all  power 
as  a political  factor. 


CHAPTER  YI 

the  argentine  republic — continued 

Political  Conditions  in  1893.  Financial  Policy  of  Saenz  Pena.  Atti- 
tude of  Congress.  The  Executive  and  the  Chambers.  The 
Provincial  Mortgage  Bank.  Dr  Lopez  and  Colonel  Sarmiento. 
Death  of  Lopez.  Hostility  to  Saenz  Pena.  Ministerial  Crisis. 
Position  in  December,  1894.  Death  Sentence  upon  Officers  of 
Rosales.  Resignation  of  Saenz  Pena.  Dr  Jose  Uriburu.  The 
New  Administration.  Chilian  Boundary  Question.  Argentine 
Authorities  Alarmed.  Secret  Sessions  of  Congress.  Credit  of 
Fifty  Million  Gold  Dollars.  Congress  and  Railway  Guarantees. 
Financial  Policy  of  Uriburu.  Cash  Payments  on  External  Debt. 
Political  Situation  in  1897.  Presidential  Candidates.  Nomina- 
tion of  Roca.  Roca  Elected.  Dr  Quirno  Costa  Vice-President 
Roca  and  the  Buenos  Aires  Merchants.  The  Puno  de  Atacama. 
Chilian  Ultimatum.  Arbitration.  The  Chilian  Question.  Pur- 
chase of  War  Material.  Legislation  during  Uriburu  Administra- 
tion. Roca  assumes  Presidency.  Contrast  between  1880  and 
1898.  Expectations  from  Roca.  Arbitration  and  the  Puno  de 
Atacama.  Meeting  between  Roca  and  Errazuriz.  Visit  of  Roca 
to  Patagonia.  Welsh  Colony  at  Chubut.  Congress  in  1899. 
Roca  and  the  administration  of  Justice.  Magnasco  and  Judicial 
Reform.  Composition  of  the  Chambers.  Journey  of  Roca  to 
Brazil.  Rumours  of  Offensive  and  Defensive  Alliance  with 
Brazil.  Commercial  Treaty  with  Brazil.  Complications  in  the 
Provinces.  Irigoyen  and  the  Buenos  Aires  Legislature.  Inter- 
vention in  Buenos  Aires.  Outbreaks  in  La  Rioja  and  Catamarca. 
Roca  and  National  Legislation.  The  Conversion  Law.  Roca 
and  Public  Works.  Visit  of  President  of  Brazil  to  Argentina. 
Area  of  Argentina.  Population.  Immigration.  Foreign  Resi- 
dents. Italians.  Spaniards.  Basques.  Other  Nationalities. 
Predominance  of  Latin  Blood.  Climate.  Growth  of  Cities. 
Gregarious  Nature  of  Argentines.  Landed  Proprietors.  Crowded 
Centres.  Education.  Minister  Magnasco.  Incompetency  of 
Teachers.  Lack  of  Discipline  in  Scholastic  Establishments. 
104 


1894] 


POLITICAL  CONDITIONS 


105 


Missionary  Efforts  for  Education.  Administration  of  Justice. 
Roca  and  the  Argentine  Courts.  Codified  Law.  Tedious  Pro- 
cedure. Corrupt  Lower  Courts.  Religious  Conditions.  The 
Catholic  Church.  Report  of  Sir  John  Hfinter  Blair.  National 
Character.  Hospitality.  Agricultural  and  Pastoral  Industry. 


Quiet  was  re-established  at  the  end  of  September  1893, 
but  the  events  in  Santa  Fe  had  tended  to  shake  confi- 
dence in  the  stability  of  the  National  Government,  and 
it  became  evident,  from  the  general  state  of  public 
opinion  and  the  aggressive  attitude  of  Congress,  that  the 
Administration  of  Saenz  Pena  would  soon  be  disturbed 
by  further  political  complications.  For  one  thing  the 
President  was  determined  to  effect  economies  in  the 
national  expenditure,  and  in  accordance  with  this  policy 
the  estimates  submitted  to  Congress  for  1894  proposed 
to  cut  down  expenses.  Revolutionary  troubles  had  been 
the  cause  of  extraordinary  charges  upon  the  exchequer, 
and  had  prevented  any  very  substantial  reductions. 
Congress  opposed  this  policy,  and  the  budget  was  not 
sanctioned  until  it  had  been  so  far  altered  that  the  out- 
goings for  1894  were  higher  than  for  the  previous  year. 
The  President  had  no  alternative  but  to  accept  this 
action  of  Congress,  but  he  took  care  to  explain  that  he 
was  not  bound  to  expend  in  full  the  amounts  sanctioned. 
This  incident  showed  the  strained  relations  between 
Saenz  Pena  and  the  Chambers,  and  demonstrated  clearly 
that  he  had  no  political  following  to  rely  upon  in  carry- 
ing out  his  proposed  reforms. 

During  the  latter  part  of  1893  and  the  beginning  of 
1894  the  province  of  Buenos  Aires  was  administered 
by  the  representative  of  the  National  Government,  Dr 
Lucio  Y.  Lopez,  and  order  was  restored  in  the  official 
departments.  One  duty  assigned  to  Lopez  was  an 
investigation  into  the  condition  of  the  Provincial  Mort- 
gage Bank,  in  connection  with  which  many  accusations 
had  been  made  against  Dr  Julio  Costa.  A careful 
examination  of  the  books  resulted  in  evidence  of  colossal 
frauds.  Millions  of  dollars  had  been  advanced  against 
worthless  security,  loans  having  been  effected  through 


106 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


the  direct  influence  of  high  officials,  and  prosecutions 
were  ordered  by  Lopez  in  consequence  of  the  facts 
brought  to  light.  Amongst  these  facts  was  a loan  to 
Colonel  Sarmiento,  an  officer  in  the  National  Army,  then 
stationed  in  the  province  of  Entre  Rios,  where  he  received 
news  of  a warrant  issued  against  him.  On  his  return 
to  La  Plata  some  weeks  afterwards  he  was  arrested  and 
confined  in  the  provincial  prison,  where  he  lay  for  several 
months,  until  tried  and  acquitted.  No  sooner  was  he 
at  liberty  than  he  grossly  insulted  Lopez,  thus  provoking 
a duel.  Although  full  particulars  were  known  to  the 
police,  no  effort  was  made  to  hinder  the  encounter,  which 
took  place  in  December,  1894.  Lopez  was  shot  through 
the  liver,  and  died  the  same  evening.  Colonel  Sarmiento, 
nominally  a prisoner  for  a few  days,  was  permitted  to 
go  unpunished. 

Throughout  1894  uneasy  political  feeling  became 
more  accentuated,  and  in  Entre  Rios,  Corrientes,  and 
Santiago  del  Estero  disturbances  took  place  that  required 
national  intervention  to  restore  order.  These  outbreaks 
were  caused  by  dissatisfaction  with  the  local  authorities, 
but  more  or  less  were  a constant  source  of  anxiety  to 
the  Administration. 

When  Congress  met,  in  June,  1894,  the  attitude  of 
Senators  and  Deputies  was  soon  apparent  in  marked 
hostility  to  every  act  of  the  Executive.  This  opposition 
was  not  founded  on  political  principles.  At  the  root  of 
it  lay  the  fact  that  Saenz  Pena  was  not  identified  with 
any  party  in  Congress.  He  had  made  no  effort  to 
organise  a following,  wishing  to  leave  himself  a free 
hand  to  initiate  reforms  ; but  in  Argentina,  as  elsewhere, 
it  is  impossible  to  govern  without  a controlling  influence, 
political  or  dictatorial.  A President  is  therefore  forced 
either  to  use  his  prerogative  to  secure  a majority  in  the 
Chambers,  or  to  impose  his  will  by  force.  During  the 
last  six  months  of  1894,  Congress  did  no  legislative  work, 
and  both  Chambers  were  waiting  their  opportunity 
to  bring  about  the  resignation  of  Saenz  Pena.  This 
deliberate  hostility  of  Congress  did  not  at  first  alter  the 


1395]  RESIGNATION  OF  SAENZ  PENA  107 


President’s  determination  to  retain  office,  but  a ministerial 
crisis  opened  Pena’s  eyes  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
and  he  found  the  utmost  difficulty  in  the  formation  of  a 
Cabinet. 

The  budget  for  1895  had  not  been  voted  in  January 
of  that  year,  so  its  omission  left  the  President  without 
legal  authority  for  the  expenditure  of  public  monies. 
This  was  the  issue  for  which  the  Chambers  had  waited, 
and  the  impeachment  of  the  President  was  advocated 
if  he  disbursed  public  funds  without  the  sanction  of 
Congress.  Another  incident  occurred  to  increase  the 
friction.  The  two  senior  officers  of  the  Rosales  had 
been  condemned  to  death,  and  the  sentence  required  the 
President’s  approval  before  it  could  be  executed.  At 
the  end  of  1894  no  further  excuse  for  delay  in  this 
matter  could  be  found,  and  when  the  subject  was  brought 
before  the  Executive  the  President  insisted  that  the 
verdict  was  just,  and  that  no  extenuating  circumstances 
existed  to  mitigate  the  sentence.  Ministers  were  divided, 
and  two  members  of  the  Cabinet  resigned.  Interpella- 
tions in  Congress  followed,  and  a majority  in  the  Chambers 
opposed  the  death  penalty.  Saenz  Pena  remained  un- 
shaken in  his  conviction  that  the  verdict  must  be  con- 
firmed. Excitement  ran  high,  and  friction  between 
Congress  and  the  President  was  intense,  indications 
pointing  towards  an  armed  outbreak  against  the  Presi- 
dent if  the  execution  of  the  two  officers  was  approved. 
Saenz  Pena  carefully  considered  his  position,  and  con- 
cluded that  it  was  untenable.  He  therefore  called  a 
special  meeting  of  Congress  and  presented  his  resignation, 
which  was  immediately  accepted.  The  sentence  on  the 
two  officers  was  commuted  to  a term  of  imprisonment. 

Saenz  Pena  accompanied  his  resignation  with  a 
dignified  message  addressed  to  Congress  explaining  his 
reasons.  He  pointed  out  he  had  been  nominated  on  a 
non-party  platform,  and  that  he  had  endeavoured  to 
conduct  his  Administration  in  such  manner  as  to  give 
the  country  time  to  recuperate  from  recent  violent 
political  disturbances ; but  he  was  now  convinced  an 


108 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


Administration  without  a strong  political  following  was 
impossible.  He  showed  that  the  financial  situation  had 
improved  since  he  assumed  office,  and  that  his  Adminis- 
tration had  been  conducted  honestly  and  economically, 
and,  finally,  his  only  thought  to  have  been  the  just 
performance  of  his  duty  towards  Argentina,  and  that 
rather  than  provoke  violent  extremes  he  retired  into 
private  life.  This  message,  moderate  in  tone,  casting 
recriminations  at  no  particular  persons,  accurate  as  to 
facts,  was  generally  well  received.  With  his  resignation 
Saenz  Pena  disappeared  completely  from  public  life. 

The  unfinished  portion  of  the  presidential  term  was 
three  years  and  nine  months,  and  there  was  a widespread 
belief  that  Dr  Uriburu,  who  at  once  took  the  vacant 
post,  would  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  his  predecessor, 
since  the  new  President  was  no  better  acquainted  with 
political  methods  than  Saenz  Pena,  and  had  spent  much 
of  his  life  in  foreign  countries,  so  that  few  personal 
friends  existed  to  rally  round  him.  Unexpected  influ- 
ences, however,  came  into  play,  for  Roca  and  Pellegrini 
understood  that  a repetition  of  the  Pena  fiasco  would 
assuredly  bring  disastrous  consequences,  and  mutually 
agreed  to  support  the  Administration.  This  made 
certain  a working  majority  in  the  Chambers. 

President  Uriburu  was  hardly  settled  in  office  before 
serious  international  complications  threatened  to  involve 
Argentina  in  a struggle  in  which  her  sovereignty  over 
large  sections  of  outlying  territory  was  at  stake.  The 
boundary  between  Argentina  and  Chile  had  been  a 
subject  for  diplomatic  negotiation  for  several  years,  and 
a protocol  signed  in  1884  had  laid  down  that  the 
frontier  should  be  established  where  “ the  highest  peaks 
of  the  Andine  ranges  divide  the  watershed.”  This 
wording  gave  rise  to  constant  misunderstanding.  The 
Argentine  representatives  insisted  the  line  should  run 
from  highest  peak  to  highest  peak,  while  the  Chilians 
argued  that  the  term  “ highest  peak  ” inferred  only  the 
highest  points  in  the  watershed.  The  origin  of  the 
dispute  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  the  framers  of 


President  I'riburu. 


[Face  page  10S. 


1895]  BOUNDARY  QUESTION  WITH  CHILE  109 

the  treaty  was  that  the  Ancline  chain  ran  north  and 
south  in  one  compact  and  massive  range  of  mountains, 
and  not  in  separate  and  distinct  ridges  as  is  the  case. 
In  view  of  the  difficulty  of  the  boundary  commissioners 
to  agree,  the  matter  was  referred  to  the  respective 
governments,  and  in  1895  angry  recriminations  were 
indulged  in  by  both  nationalities.  Chile  was  accused 
of  assuming  an  aggressive  attitude,  and  the  Argentine 
authorities  became  thoroughly  alarmed  at  the  turn 
affairs  had  taken,  and  it  was  finally  decided  by  the 
Cabinet  to  request  Congress  to  convene  secret  sessions 
at  which  the  Executive  could  explain  the  gravity  of  the 
complications.  These  explanations  were  that  the 
Chilian  Government  threatened  war  unless  their 
demands  were  satisfied,  and  Congress  was  further 
informed  that  the  National  Administration  was  advised 
that  Chile  was  preparing  for  war.  It  was  pointed  out 
that  Argentina  lacked  reserves  of  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion. The  excitement  in  Congress  was  intense  when 
these  disclosures  were  made,  and  the  outcome  was  a 
credit  of  fifty  million  gold  dollars  for  defensive  purposes. 

Early  in  1895  a settlement  was  reached  between 
Argentina  and  Brazil,  in  regard  to  the  territory  of 
“Misiones.”  After  intermittent  negotiations  over  a 
period  of  fifteen  years  this  question  had  been  submitted 
to  arbitration.  In  March,  1895,  President  Grover 
Cleveland  gave  his  verdict,  by  which  the  pretensions  of 
the  Argentine  Government  were  disallowed,  the  award 
admitting  Brazilian  claims  in  full.  Anger  at  this  result 
was  expressed  in  many  quarters,  but  the  Government 
accepted  it  without  demur. 

One  of  the  most  disturbing  political  questions  in 
1895  arose  from  the  action  of  Congress  in  reference  to 
the  guaranteed  railway  companies.  When  default  had 
been  made  in  the  service  of  the  public  debt  the  subven- 
tions to  the  companies  also  fell  into  arrear,  and  in 
several  cases  traffic  was  insufficient  to  earn  enough 
income  to  provide  for  the  maintenance  of  the  roads. 
Uriburu  recommended  to  Congress  the  issue  of 


110 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


$50,000,000  in  bonds  to  enable  the  Government  to 
compound  with  the  companies  for  past  and  future 
claims.  Violent  debates  ensued  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  during  which  many  members  expressed 
undisguised  hostility  to  the  undertakings  because  they 
were  owned  by  foreigners,  and  it  was  only  by  the 
insistence  of  the  Administration,  supported  by  Roca 
and  Pellegrini,  that  measures  were  finally  sanctioned  of 
a kind  calculated  to  enable  the  Government  to  come  to 
terms  with  the  companies. 

Next  year  was  occupied  chiefly  in  endeavours  to 
consolidate  the  financial  position  of  the  National 
Government,  A bill  was  sent  to  Congress  for  power  to 
unify  the  provincial  external  liabilities  through  the  issue 
of  national  bonds.  This  assumption  of  the  provincial 
external  indebtedness  was  a necessary  step  towards  the 
rehabilitation  of  Argentine  credit  abroad,  and  was  a 
proof  that  the  Executive  was  honest  in  its  intention  to 
meet  all  obligations  the  Republic  had  contracted.  By 
the  beginning  of  1897  the  financial  position  was  so  far 
in  order  that  Uriburu  was  able  to  resume  cash  payments 
on  the  whole  foreign  debt,  and  the  country  now  began 
to  recover  from  the  disastrous  consequences  entailed  by 
Celman’s  administration.  No  sooner  was  this  accom- 
plished than  the  presidential  election  again  began  to 
occupy  public  attention,  but  the  various  political  parties 
were  so  divided  that  it  was  no  easy  matter  to  find 
anybody  except  Roca  or  Pellegrini  able  to  command  a 
really  important  following.  The  majority  favoured 
Roca,  and  although  hostile  feeling  still  existed  against 
him  on  account  of  his  connection  with  Celman,  it  had 
considerably  toned  down,  and  the  foreign  residents 
unanimously  supported  him.  Pellegrini  again  was 
popular  amongst  a large  circle  of  political  and  social 
friends,  but  his  former  Administration  had  made 
influential  people  sceptical  of  the  views  he  held  in 
regard  to  financial  questions.  Soon,  however,  it 
became  evident  that  if  Roca  accepted  the  nomination 
no  serious  opposition  would  be  attempted.  He  did  so ; 


1898] 


ELECTION  OF  ROCA 


111 


the  vote  of  the  country  was  unanimous  in  his  favour, 
and  after  the  usual  formalities  he  was  declared  elected. 
For  the  Vice-President  the  choice  fell  upon  Dr  Quirno 
Costa,  a representative  member  of  a well-known  family 
in  Buenos  Aires,  and  a man  who  had  rendered  important 
services  to  the  Republic  in  connection  with  the  boundary 
question  with  Chile. 

Barely  was  the  electoral  question  settled  before 
another  excitement  arose.  F or  several  years  the  boundary 
commissioners  had  been  at  work  on  the  northern  frontier 
line  between  Argentina  and  Chile,  and  the  general 
impression  was,  that  since  the  strained  relations  in  1895, 
the  Argentine  and  Chilian  representatives  had  been  on 
amicable  terms.  But  in  July,  1898,  a controversy  arose 
in  connection  with  the  delimitation  of  the  district  known 
as  the  Puno  de  Atacama,  and  the  commissioners  could 
not  agree.  The  Chilian  representative  claimed  the 
district  absolutely  for  his  Government  on  the  grounds 
it  was  in  Chilian  occupation.  In  itself  this  territory 
had  small  intrinsic  value.  Some  borax  deposits  and  the 
prospects  of  minerals  comprised  all  the  visible  wealth, 
but  the  policy  of  Chile  was  not  to  give  way  in  any 
direction  where  territorial  expansion  was  concerned. 
The  Argentine  Government  was  convinced  it  had  right 
on  its  side,  and  in  Buenos  Aires  the  territory  had  been 
regarded  as  Argentine,  although  there  was  some  doubt  as 
to  whether  Bolivia  might  not  lay  claim  to  a portion  of 
it.  A treaty  had  indeed  been  made  with  the  Bolivian 
Government  deciding  the  partition  of  the  Puno  de 
Atacama  so  far  as  the  portion  on  the  Atlantic  slopes 
of  the  Andes  was  concerned,  and  it  was  in  connection 
with  the  part  allotted  to  Argentina  by  this  arrangement 
that  Chile  objected.  So  hot  waxed  the  dispute  that  in 
August,  1898,  the  relations  between  Chile  and  Argentina 
became  critical,  and  war  appeared  likely.  Both  sides 
pushed  forward  preparations  for  hostilities,  but  towards 
the  end  of  August  an  ultimatum  was  delivered  by 
the  Chilian  Government  demanding  arbitration.  The 
Administration  at  first  hesitated,  but  finally,  acting  on 


112  THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 

the  advice  of  Roca,  the  demand  was  accepted  and  war 
averted. 

Such  conditions  were  arranged  with  Chile  that  no 
further  trouble  ought  to  have  been  possible.  The 
agreement  provided  for  the  submission  of  the  Puno  de 
Atacama  dispute  to  arbitration  by  the  United  States 
minister  in  Argentina  with  one  Chilian  representative 
and  one  Argentine  commissioner,  and  the  two  republics 
decided  to  refer  the  southern  frontier  question  to  Her 
Britannic  Majesty,  Queen  Victoria.  Notwithstanding 
these  arrangements,  an  uneasy  feeling  still  prevailed 
that  hostilities  might  break  out,  and  neither  State  made 
any  pretence  of  stopping  military  and  naval  preparations. 
Orders  for  arms,  ammunition,  and  warships  were  not 
countermanded,  and  men  on  both  sides  of  the  Andes 
began  to  declaim  strongly  against  the  heavy  expenditure 
thus  entailed.  The  reply  to  such  remonstrances 
invariably  was  that  until  the  question  of  the  boundary 
was  settled,  it  was  necessary  to  maintain  both  powers 
on  a war  footing.  Thus  the  resources  of  Argentina  and 
Chile  were  strained  to  the  utmost,  and  public  works 
neglected  in  order  that  funds  might  be  forthcoming  to 
pay  for  guns  and  ships  bought  in  Europe. 

Uriburu  left  the  Presidency  in  October,  1898.  His 
was  a stop-gap  administration  from  which  little  impor- 
tant legislation  had  been  expected.  Some  useful 
measures,  however,  were  passed  between  1895  and  1898, 
and  the  financial  arrangement  in  regard  to  the  provincial 
external  indebtedness  marked  one  important  step  in  the 
rehabilitation  of  Argentine  credit  abroad,  and  the  settle- 
ment of  the  railway  guarantees  another.  The  quiet 
dignity  with  which  the  adverse  award  in  the  “ Misiones  ” 
boundary  dispute  had  been  accepted  was  a matter  for 
congratulation,  and  in  the  negotiations  with  Chile  the 
purpose  was  to  avoid  armed  conflict.  These  episodes 
served  to  make  patent  the  fact  that  Uriburu  was  acting 
for  the  true  interests  of  Argentina.  In  all  important 
questions  the  way  was  thus  left  clear  for  the  ensuing 
Administration,  and  perhaps  the  most  satisfactory  change 


1898] 


ROCA  ACCEDES  TO  OFFICE 


113 


was  that  Congress  abandoned  the  irresponsible  attitude 
assumed  under  Saenz  Pena.  Both  Chambers  had  been 
inclined  to  continue  against  Uriburu  the  tactics  pursued 
with  his  predecessor,  but  the  influence  of  Roca  and 
Pellegrini  prevailed,  and  through  their  efforts  obstruc- 
tion to  useful  legislation  was  avoided. 

Roca  assumed  the  Presidency  once  more  in  October 
1898.  Eighteen  years  had  passed  since  he  had  first 
taken  control  of  Argentine  affairs,  and  the  contrast 
between  then  and  now  was  most  marked.  In  1880  he 
was  a man  untried  in  politics,  and  cordially  disliked  by 
a large  section  of  the  population,  but  in  1898  it  was 
by  the  almost  unanimous  wish  of  the  country  that  he 
returned  to  power.  On  all  sides  he  was  assured  that 
his  direction  of  national  affairs  was  an  absolute  necessity 
in  view  of  the  complications  of  the  boundary  question. 
It  was  felt  that  the  Republic  needed  a man  who  could  con- 
trol both  Congress  and  the  Provincial  Administrations, 
and  the  idea  predominated  that  Roca’s  return  to  office 
portended  a wave  of  prosperity  throughout  the  country. 

The  boundary  question  was  the  most  important 
matter  confronting  him  at  the  outset,  and  arrangements 
were  made  for  the  necessary  representation  before  the 
Arbitration  Tribunal  in  England.  Dr  Moreno  was 
selected  for  this  post  in  view  of  his  great  experience  as 
the  Chief  of  the  Boundary  Commission.  Early  in  1899 
all  preliminary  preparations  for  an  examination  of  the 
different  claims  were  completed,  and  first  of  all  the 
dispute  concerning  the  Puno  de  Atacama  was  submitted 
to  the  Commission,  as  noted  above,  with  a representative 
of  the  Argentine  Republic  and  one  Chilian  commissioner, 
the  initiation  of  proceedings  being  left  to  the  United 
States  minister,  Mr  Buchanan.  In  case  of  disagree- 
ment the  vote  of  the  majority  was  final. 

Minister  Buchanan  followed  a plan,  novel  but 
effective.  The  documents  were  subjected  to  careful 
investigation,  and  a map  was  marked  with  a line  between 
the  two  Republics  in  such  localities  as  he  considered 
just  on  the  evidence  before  him.  This  sketched  boundary 

H 


114 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


was  divided  into  sections  and  the  Commission  then 
summoned,  to  whom  the  United  States  Minister  ex- 
plained his  ideas.  There  was  much  opposition  on  both 
sides  to  his  conclusion,  for  the  boundary  line  he  inserted 
cut  off  Argentine  pretensions  in  some  directions  and 
Chilian  in  others  ; but  Mr  Buchanan  found  a simple  way 
out  of  the  difficulty,  by  proposing  that  a vote  should  be 
taken  concerning  the  line  in  each  zone.  Where  the 
boundary  was  adverse  to  Chile  the  Argentine  com- 
missioner voted  for  it,  and  Mr  Buchanan  siding  with 
him  gave  a majority  against  the  Chilian  representative. 
Where  the  conditions  were  reversed,  Mr  Buchanan  agreed 
with  the  Chilian  commissioner.  In  this  manner  the 
work  was  concluded  in  three  days.  The  justice  of  this 
course  was  questioned,  but  in  the  end  it  was  conceded 
that  the  matter  had  been  treated  from  a practical  and 
common-sense  standpoint,  and  both  Governments  ac- 
cepted the  award. 

The  better  understanding  now  established  with  Chile 
induced  Roca  to  propose  a personal  meeting  with  Presi- 
dent Errazuriz  to  discuss  the  situation,  and  it  took  place 
at  Punta  Arenas  in  the  Straits  of  Magellan.  Roca, 
escorted  by  a squadron  of  the  Argentine  navy,  met  the 
Chilian  President  there,  and  at  their  conference  there 
was  much  diplomatic  fencing,  each  seeking  to  ascertain 
the  other’s  opinions  as  to  future  developments.  But  one 
most  practical  and  enlightened  resolve  was  come  by. 
The  question  of  expenditure  on  naval  and  military  arma- 
ments was  discussed,  and  a mutual  understanding  reached 
to  restrict  additional  expenses  in  this  direction.  Promises 
were  also  made  that  every  endeavour  would  be  used  for 
a peaceable  solution  of  all  causes  of  international  trouble. 

During  this  journey  to  the  south,  Roca  visited  some 
of  the  colonies  recently  established  in  Argentine  territory, 
and  among  others  the  Welsh  settlement  on  the  river 
Cliubut.  The  colonists  were  asked  to  state  any  cause 
of  complaint,  and  the  establishment  of  better  means  of 
communication  with  the  north  was  the  principal  request 
preferred.  The  President  promised  to  give  this  matter 


1899]  roca  AND  ERRAZURIZ  CONFER  115 


his  earnest  attention,  a pledge  he  subsequently  made 
good.  Several  minor  abuses  were  suppressed,  and  the 
right  of  the  National  Guard  to  drill  on  week  days  instead 
of  Sunday  was  granted,  a concession  made  because  of 
the  majority  of  the  settlers  being  Protestants.  Visits 
were  paid  also  to  settlements  on  the  Gallegos  and  Santa 
Cruz  rivers,  and  altogether  the  interest  shown  by  Roca 
in  Patagonia  gave  decided  encouragement  to  residents 
there.  Hitherto  the  welfare  of  these  southern  colonies 
had  been  neglected,  as  they  had  never  been  regarded  as 
a factor  of  national  importance  ; but  this  action  of  Roca 
brought  to  notice  the  fact  that  civilisation  was  spreading 
to  them,  and  that  great  areas  of  land,  formerly  regarded 
as  worthless,  were  now  producing  live  stock  and  cereals. 

Roca  severely  criticised  the  administration  of  justice 
in  Argentina  in  his  message  to  Congress  in  May  1899, 
and  pronounced  the  existing  condition  of  the  courts  to  be 
disgraceful  and  in  need  of  drastic  measures  of  reform. 
A discussion  in  Congress  ensued,  and  the  Minister  of 
Justice,  Dr  Magnasco,  was  called  upon  for  his  opinion 
concerning  the  direction  reforms  should  take.  In 
response,  he  laid  bare  some  of  the  flagrant  abuses 
practised  in  the  Federal  Courts,  and  made  charges 
against  certain  judges,  which,  when  proved,  led  to  a few 
of  the  worst  offenders  being  turned  out  of  office. 

The  attitude  of  Congress  in  this  question  of  justice 
was  typical,  for  the  debates  showed  clearly  that  members 
of  both  Senate  and  Chamber  cared  little  for  the  interests 
they  represented,  but  much  for  the  monthly  salary  of 
$1000,  an  inducement  of  no  small  importance  to  pro- 
vincial politicians.  When  to  this  is  added  incidental 
expenses  in  the  shape  of  travelling  allowances  and 
other  extraordinary  charges,  the  income  derived  is  of  a 
sufficient  amount  to  make  the  post  eagerly  sought  after. 
However,  the  influence  of  Roca  was  strong  enough  to 
ensure  sanction  for  Government  measures,  although 
intelligent  initiation  of  legislative  action  by  senators 
and  deputies  to  assist  national  progress  was  rarely 
attempted.  Under  existing  conditions  the  President  is 


116 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


responsible,  not  only  for  all  executive  acts,  but  also  for 
every  legislative  development. 

In  July  1899  the  President  determined,  from  motives 
never  clearly  stated,  on  an  official  visit  to  Brazil.  Some 
hostile  feeling  still  remained  there  as  a result  of  the 
bitter  recriminations  of  the  Argentine  press  over 
the  arbitration  award  of  the  “ Misiones  ” territory,  and 
one  object  of  the  visit  undoubtedly  was  to  eliminate 
any  remnant  of  this  hostile  sentiment.  Moreover, 
the  Chilian  squadron,  en  route  from  Europe  to  South 
America,  had  made  a lengthy  call  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  in 
1897,  and  the  voyage  of  Roca  was  to  some  extent  a set- 
off against  the  closer  relations  established  subsequently 
between  Brazil  and  Chile.  It  was  the  first  time  in  South 
American  history  that  an  official  visit  had  been  paid  by 
one  president  of  a republic  to  another.  Early  in 
August  of  1898,  the  squadron  escorting  Roca  and  his 
suite  arrived  at  Rio  de  Janeiro.  The  Brazilians  were 
lavish  in  their  hospitality,  making  the  occasion  more  like 
a royal  progress  than  an  exhibition  of  republican 
simplicity.  Rio  was  en  fete  for  fourteen  days,  but,  so 
far  as  practical  results  went,  little  was  achieved.  A 
commercial  treaty,  to  be  sure,  was  signed,  but  the  details 
had  been  settled  by  the  representatives  of  the  respective 
Governments  before  the  visit  of  the  Argentine  President 
took  place. 

A complicated  situation  meanwhile  arose  in  Buenos 
Aires  province,  where,  in  succession  to  Dr  Udaondo, 
the  choice  for  Provincial  Governor  in  1898  fell  upon  Dr 
Bernardo  Irigoyen,  whose  attempt  at  reforms  roused 
the  enmity  of  many  members  of  the  Provincial  Legisla- 
ture. So,  presently,  the  local  Chambers  refused  to 
sanction  measures  proposed  by  the  Governor,  and  this 
led  Irigoyen  into  acts  of  an  illegal  character,  although 
admittedly  necessary  in  the  conduct  of  the  provincial 
affairs.  When,  therefore,  the  elections  for  the  provincial 
Chamber  of  Deputies  took  place  in  1899,  a scrutiny  of 
the  returns  proved  that  the  vacancies  had  been  filled  by 
candidates  of  the  party  in  opposition  to  the  Governor. 


1899]  PROVINCIAL  POLITICAL  UNREST  117 


This  did  not  satisfy  Irigoyen,  who  pronounced  the 
returns  falsified  and  ordered  new  elections.  Taking  no 
notice  of  this  order  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  assembled 
to  allow  the  usual  oath  to  be  taken  by  the  new  members, 
whereupon  the  Governor  ordered  a battalion  of  con- 
stabulary to  occupy  the  legislative  buildings,  and  resist 
the  ingress  or  egress  of  any  person  not  specially 
authorised  by  the  Executive.  Some  members  of  the 
Chamber  were  in  the  building  before  this  order  was  put 
into  force  and  were  detained  inside.  Both  Governor 
and  Opposition  appealed  to  the  National  Government 
to  intervene,  and  after  much  hesitation  Roca  agreed  to 
this  request,  so  that  for  some  months  the  Provincial 
Administration  remained  under  national  control,  pending 
fresh  elections  for  the  local  Chambers.  The  result  of 
the  voting  again  showed  a majority  for  the  Opposition, 
and  it  was  supposed  Irigoyen  would  now  resign,  but, 
through  the  influence  of  Roca  and  Pellegrini,  a modus 
vivendi  was  established,  in  virtue  of  which  he  remained 
in  office  to  complete  his  triennial  term,  the  representative 
of  the  National  Government  being  withdrawn.  The 
incident  showed  that  provincial  politics  were  still  a 
cause  for  anxiety. 

Nor  was  Buenos  Aires  the  only  quarter  in  which 
these  provincial  disturbances  occurred,  for  subversive 
movements  were  attempted  in  both  La  Rioja  and 
Catamarca,  and  the  matter  became  so  serious  in  Cata- 
marca  as  to  necessitate  a strong  force  of  national  troops 
to  restore  order,  but  before  normal  conditions  were 
re-established  a collision  took  place.  In  both  States  the 
bone  of  contention  was  electoral,  the  Opposition  main- 
taining that  official  influences  were  used  to  prevent  any 
free  voting,  and  that  the  returns  were  invariably  falsified 
if  unfavourable  to  the  authorities.  This  was  probably 
true  enough,  but  in  all  these  provincial  disputes  Roca’s 
usual  policy  was  to  support  the  Governors. 

During  his  first  two  years  of  office  Roca  attempted 
little  new  legislation,  but  the  initiative  of  Uriburu  in 
regard  to  the  provincial  external  indebtedness  was 


118 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


followed,  and  the  last  of  these  liabilities  arranged  for  in 
1900.  A measure  was  brought  before  Congress  by 
Pellegrini  in  August,  1899,  and  supported  by  Roca,  for 
dealing  with  the  currency  question.  It  masqueraded  as 
a law  of  conversion,  and  by  it  complicated  provisions 
were  to  be  made  for  the  accumulation  of  funds  for  the 
repayment  of  the  inconvertible  paper  money ; but  its 
real  object  was  to  check  a too  rapid  appreciation  of  the 
notes,  and  for  this  purpose  the  official  premium  on  gold 
was  fixed  at  127  per  cent.  The  excuse  urged  for  this 
law  was  that  wages  and  other  charges  were  based  on  a 
high  gold  premium,  and  that  if  the  value  of  the  dollar 
suddenly  increased,  the  producing  industries  of  the 
country,  and  especially  agriculture,  would  be  ruined 
before  readjustment  of  general  prices  could  take  place. 
After  sharp  criticism,  the  measure  was  sanctioned,  and 
the  official  value  of  the  dollar  became  fixed  at  fortv-four 

ml 

cents  gold  for  all  government  purposes. 

The  policy  which  Roca  had  followed  in  regard  to  public 
works  during  his  first  Administration  was  not  neglected 
during  his  second  term,  and  in  several  directions  efforts 
were  made  to  provide  better  means  of  communication 
with  outlying  districts,  especially  in  opening  up  facilities 
of  transport  in  Patagonia.  It  is  due  to  him  also  that 
port  works  at  Rosario  are  in  course  of  construction. 

In  October,  1900  the  President  of  Brazil,  Dr  Manoel 
F.  Campos  Salles,  paid  a visit  to  Buenos  Aires,  and  as  the 
aggressive  policy  of  Chile  had  been  clearly  demonstrated 
shortly  before,  special  care  was  taken  to  make  his  recep- 
tion as  imposing  as  possible,  to  encourage  belief  that  an 
entente  existed  between  Argentina  and  Brazil.  To  this 
end,  three  public  holidays  were  declared,  and  entertain- 
ments, illuminations,  and  decorations  were  arranged  at  a 
cost  of  $2,000,000.  Out  of  all  this  display  and  junketing 
the  only  result  was  a proposal  for  the  elimination  of  the 
war  debt  due  to  Brazil  and  Argentina  by  Paraguay. 
Both  Governments  agreed  to  consider  the  matter. 

The  Arbitration  Tribunal  in  London  practically 
concluded  the  investigation  of  the  Argentine  and  Chilian 


1901] 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHILE 


119 


frontier  claims  at  the  end  of  1901,  but  the  final  settle- 
ment of  the  boundary  dispute  was  not  reached  without 
considerable  difficulty  and  excitement.  In  both  Argen- 
tina and  Chile  feeling  gained  ground  that  exception 
would  be  taken  to  the  award  and  lead  to  the  finding 
being  rejected,  thanks  to  extravagant  rumours  circulated 
about  the  sections  of  territory  claimed  by  each  country. 
Thus  the  latent  jealousy  between  the  two  nationalities 
was  fanned  to  fever  heat,  and  the  understanding  arrived 
at  in  1899  for  restricting  purchases  of  additional  arma- 
ments was  forgotten.  Both  Governments  began  warlike 
preparations  on  so  extensive  a scale  that  throughout 
December,  1901,  a rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  was 
daily  anticipated.  Senor  Alcorta,  the  Argentine  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  stated  roundly  he  would  not  give  way 
to  Chilian  pretensions,  and  indications  in  January,  1902, 
all  pointed  to  war. 

No  wonder,  therefore,  that  representatives  of  the 
principal  British  interests  in  both  Republics  appealed  to 
our  Government  to  use  its  influence  for  a friendly 
solution  of  the  impending  trouble.  In  response  to  this 
appeal  energetic  action  was  taken,  and  Sir  Thomas 
Holdich  was  sent  to  inspect  the  disputed  territory.  He 
reached  Buenos  Aires  at  the  end  of  February,  Argentina 
and  Chile  being  meanwhile  warned  that  if  hostile 
preparations  were  continued  His  Majesty,  King  Edward 
VII.,  would  refuse  further  participation  in  the  questions 
now  under  consideration  by  the  Arbitration  Tribunal.  It 
was  left  to  H.B.M.’s  Ministers  in  Buenos  Aires  and  San- 
tiago to  impress  on  the  two  Governments  the  disastrous 
effect  on  Argentine  and  Chilian  credit  if  His  Majesty 
was  obliged  to  withdraw  his  good  offices  as  arbitrator. 

While  the  issue  of  peace  or  war  was  still  hovering  in 
the  balance,  Senor  Alcorta  died  suddenly.  He  had  been 
the  strongest  opponent  of  a conciliation  policy,  and  his 
death  left  the  President  free  to  deal  with  the  question. 
Roca’s  position  during  the  critical  stage  of  the  negotia- 
tions with  Chile  was  most  difficult.  His  countrymen 
were  excited  and  insisted  on  military  preparations  to 


120 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


resist  Chilian  demands,  no  matter  to  what  extent  such 
warlike  demonstrations  tended  to  complicate  the 
situation.  On  the  other  hand,  constant  pressure  was 
brought  to  bear  by  the  British  Government  to  prevent 
an  outbreak  of  hostilities.  Between  these  two  currents 
of  influence  Roca  steered  his  way  with  consummate 
tact.  In  the  end  he  was  obliged  to  give  way  to  Chile 
on  certain  points,  but  he  did  so  in  a manner  that  left 
the  Argentines  small  cause  for  complaint,  and  only 
made  such  concessions  as  were  necessary  to  ensure 
British  influence  being  used  in  Santiago  to  facilitate  an 
equitable  settlement  and  restrain  extreme  Chilian  pre- 
tensions. Roca  deserves  a large  meed  of  credit  for  his 
quiet  energy  and  dignified  bearing  during  this  crisis  in 
the  national  fortunes.  He  decided  for  peace,  and  nego- 
tiations were  immediately  opened  for  a treaty  to  restrict 
further  armaments.  The  treaty  was  signed  in  June, 
1902,  and  immediately  ratified,  and  when,  some  months 
later,  the  award  of  the  Arbitration  Tribunal  was  made 
public,  it  was  accepted  unreservedly  by  both  Governments. 

President  Roca  completes  his  term  of  office  in 
October,  1904,  and  in  June  of  this  year  the  election  of 
his  successor  takes  place,  but  on  this  occasion  there  is 
no  cut  and  dried  issue  to  the  presidential  campaign. 
The  principal  candidates  are  ex-President  Uriburu,  Dr 
Quintana,  Dr  Udaondo,  and,  possibly,  ex-President 
Pellegrini ; all  four  are  able  men,  but  the  latter  disap- 
pointed public  expectations  when  he  assumed  control 
after  the  disastrous  administration  of  Dr  Juarez  Celman. 
Many  people  assert  that  none  of  the  four  candidates 
mentioned  will  be  successful,  but  that  a “ dark  horse  ” 
will  be  elected.* 

* On  June  12,  1904,  Dr  Manuel  Quintana  and  Dr  Jose  Figueroa 
Alcorta  were  elected  President  and  Vice-President  of  the  Republic. 
Dr  Quintana  is  68  years  of  age,  a native  of  Buenos  Aires,  a well- 
known  politician,  and  the  legal  adviser  of  several  of  the  principal 
railway  and  other  companies  in  Argentina ; Dr  Alcorta  is  aged  42,  is 
a National  Senator,  and  a native  of  Cordoba;  the  friendly  influence 
of  President  Roca  was  an  important  factor  in  the  election  of  both 
candidates. 


19001  MOVEMENT  OF  POPULATION 


121 


The  area  of  Argentina  is  1,212,000  square  miles,  and 
the  population  by  the  census  of  1895  was  3,954,911. 
This  is  a density  of  only  3 3 persons  to  the  square  mile. 
A fertile  soil  and  kindly  climate  offer  inducements  for 
expansion  to  ten  times  the  present  number,  but  the 
increase  of  population  has  not  been  rapid  in  Argentina 
in  spite  of  many  natural  advantages  for  settlement. 
In  1869  the  number  of  inhabitants  was  returned  at 
1,837,000,  and  by  1882  they  had  risen  to  2,942,600. 
Between  that  date  and  1895  the  census  showed  an 
increase  of  only  1,000,000.  The  disturbed  conditions 
prevailing  between  1870  and  1880  drove  many  foreigners 
away,  and  the  economic  crisis  in  1890  was  responsible 
for  the  exodus  of  many  settlers  who  had  come  with  the 
intention  of  making  a home  in  the  country.  Between 
1857  and  1897  the  number  of  immigrants  was  1,597,299. 
When  these  figures  are  compared  with  the  total  popu- 
lation at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century,  it  is  easy  to 
form  an  idea  of  the  many  persons  frightened  away  by 
troublous  times. 

Yet  the  racial  features  of  Argentines  are  changing 
with  the  influx  of  foreign  blood,  although  this  is  not  so 
marked  in  the  more  isolated  provinces  as  in  Buenos 
Aires  or  other  centres.  In  the  Andine  territories  the 
original  Spanish  and  Indian  types  remain,  while  in 
Mendoza,  Tucuman,  Salta,  and  Jujuy  the  wealthy  classes 
are  not  unlike  the  people  in  the  more  inaccessible  dis- 
tricts of  the  Spanish  Peninsula.  In  these  localities  the 
labouring  classes  are  typically  Indian. 

Of  foreign  residents  Italians  are  numerically  the 
strongest,  numbering  800,000.  As  labourers  for  railway 
construction,  agriculture,  wherever  manual  labour  is 
necessary,  it  is  the  Italian  who  is  employed.  In  retail 
trade  and  minor  industrial  undertakings  they  have 
become  an  established  factor.  Next  in  numerical 
strength  is  the  Spanish  colony  of  250,000.  They  are 
engaged  in  all  classes  of  industrial  and  commercial 
occupations,  and  form  a thrifty,  orderly,  and  sound 
element  in  the  population.  After  the  Carlist  War 


122 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


many  Basques  emigrated  to  the  River  Plate,  and  a large 
proportion  of  these  people  are  now  wealthy  and  influ- 
ential. The  French  colony  of  70,000  persons  are  prin- 
cipally engaged  in  wholesale  and  retail  trading,  or  as 
employees  and  servants.  There  are  likewise  25,000 
Germans  connected  with  commercial  undertakings,  and 
British  subjects,  although  only  35,000  in  number,  form 
a powerful  element  as  owners  of  property  and  repre- 
sentatives of  British  investments. 

An  analysis  of  the  population  shows  that  only  70,000 
persons  are  not  of  Latin  origin,  or  do  not  inherit  Latin 
blood  through  father  or  mother.  This  is  not  surprising 
when  the  recruiting  grounds  for  immigration  are  con- 
sidered. It  shows  conclusively  that  Latin  traditions  and 
customs  are  destined  to  prevail  in  the  future  in  this 
section  of  South  America.  Italy,  Spain,  and,  to  a lesser 
degree,  France  are  the  main  sources  of  immigration,  and 
the  incomers  from  these  countries  are  easily  assimilated. 
With  the  existing  population  of  4,000,000,  essentially 
Latin  in  thought  and  habit,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  immigration  will  fail  to  affect  the  national  char- 
acteristic features  of  to-day  to  any  marked  extent.  The 
result  may  be  to  leave  the  impress  of  Italian  or  French 
civilisation  more  apparent  than  the  traits  of  the  Spanish 
original  stock ; but  it  will  be  none  the  less  Latin. 

The  growth  of  cities  and  towns  in  Argentina  has 
been  out  of  proportion  to  the  increase  in  the  population. 
The  census  of  1869  gave  the  inhabitants  of  Buenos 
Aires  city  as  177,800,  and  by  1882  they  had  increased 
to  295,000 ; but  the  returns  of  1900  showed  812,000 
living  within  the  municipal  limits.  This  means  that 
more  than  one-fifth  of  the  entire  population  reside  in 
the  metropolis,  a massing  together  which  by  no  means 
indicates  a healthy  condition.  Buenos  Aires  is  not  a 
manufacturing  district,  nor  has  it  other  attributes  to 
justify  a concentration  of  the  population,  whose  effect 
is  to  hinder  economic  development.  The  principal 
industries  are  pastoral  and  agricultural,  and  therefore 
every  man  withdrawn  from  farm  work  is  a loss  to  the 


1900] 


GREGARIOUS  PROPENSITY 


123 


producing  power.  In  a country  where  land  is  lying 
idle  this  gregarious  characteristic  of  the  population  is 
all  the  more  to  be  regretted. 

This  disposition  of  the  people  to  reside  in  crowded 
centres  rather  than  the  country  districts,  is  also  apparent 
in  Rosario,  Cordoba,  Tucuman,  and  all  other  cities.  Too 
often  the  owners  of  valuable  properties  are  content  to 
mortgage  their  land  to  obtain  means  to  dwell  in  the 
towns.  In  many  cases  the  rate  of  interest  paid  is  out 
of  proportion  to  the  rental  a property  yields.  If  any 
portion  of  this  borrowed  money  was  expended  on  the 
land  some  progress  would  be  made,  but  this  is  not  the 
case ; these  loans  are  squandered,  and  the  properties 
starved,  to  permit  the  proprietors  to  eke  out  existence 
in  some  local  centre  of  civilisation.  But  until  the  bulk 
of  the  land  is  alienated  from  the  present  owners  to 
people  prepared  to  work  on  it,  present  conditions  will 
continue  to  check  progress.  Gradually,  however,  the 
alienation  of  property  from  large  holders  is  taking  place, 
and  it  is  principally  to  this  change  that  we  owe  the  ex- 
pansion in  agricultural  and  pastoral  industry  which  has 
become  visible  during  the  past  decade. 

Probably  no  one  element  in  the  economic  situation 
is  deserving  of  greater  attention  than  primary  and 
secondary  education,  yet  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say 
that  no  subject  arouses  less  general  interest.  During 
the  administration  of  President  Sarmiento,  from  1868 
to  1874,  the  initiative  of  the  Executive  was  conducive  to 
a liberal  policy  in  regard  to  public  instruction.  The 
President  was  deeply  interested  in  the  problem,  and  his 
attitude  caused  the  necessity  of  the  establishment  of 
schools,  especially  of  a primary  character,  to  be  con- 
sidered. Many  grants-in-aid  were  made  by  the  National 
Administration,  and  teachers  were  imported  to  inculcate 
more  advanced  methods.  Provincial  and  municipal 
authorities  also  were  encouraged  to  establish  an  efficient 
system,  and  the  work  of  Sarmiento  took  root  in  the 
country.  In  the  six  years  of  his  administration  the 
cause  of  both  primary  and  secondary  instruction  made 


124 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


substantial  progress,  but  subsequent  Presidents  showed 
no  such  interest,  and  gradually  the  ideas  of  Sarmiento 
have  dropped.  Occasionally  some  agitation  is  set  afoot 
for  more  adequate  public  schools,  but  hitherto  small 
support  has  been  accorded  to  such  movements.  The 
proposal  of  Dr  Magnasco,  Minister  of  Justice  and 
Public  Instruction  in  1900,  to  give  more  practical  form 
to  the  educational  course  by  suppressing  certain  estab- 
lishments maintained  for  secondary  education  in  order 
to  substitute  technical  schools,  was  rejected  by  Congress. 

At  bottom,  however,  the  little  public  interest  shown 
in  educational  questions  is  responsible  for  the  absence 
of  an  effective  system  of  instruction.  A smattering  of 
many  subjects  is  taught,  a sound  knowledge  of  any  one 
is  the  exception.  It  is  not  that  pupils  are  deficient  in 
intelligence,  but  rather  that  teachers  are  lacking  in 
experience  and  ability.  Nor  can  any  other  result  be 
expected  under  existing  circumstances.  The  payment 
of  officials  is  inadequate,  and  frequently  salaries  are 
months  in  arrear,  while  lack  of  discipline  in  primary, 
secondary,  and  higher  education  is  conspicuous.  Pro- 
visions for  the  orderly  exercise  of  authority  in  colleges 
and  schools  are  also  most  defective.  Not  long  ago 
regulations  were  enacted  at  the  University  of  Buenos 
Aires  restricting  the  practice  of  smoking,  and  by  way  of 
protest  against  these  the  students  refused  to  attend  any 
classes.  Lately,  however,  an  interesting  experiment  in 
elementary  education  has  been  commenced  in  Buenos 
Aires  by  private  missionary  effort,  and  it  promises  to 
develop  into  a movement  of  national  importance.  A 
Protestant  clergyman,  Mr  Morris,  established  in  1897 
a school  based  on  lines  similar  to  those  of  the  so-called 
ragged  schools  in  London.  He  met  with  many  obstacles, 
and  little  success  was  anticipated  for  this  new  departure, 
but  he  persevered,  with  the  result  that  to-day  he  has 
three  schools  and  a mission  hall  for  his  work,  and  these 
are  attended  by  1000  pupils  of  the  poorest  classes  in 
the  city.  All  instruction  is  in  Spanish  and  is  non- 
sectarian. Extracts  from  the  Bible  are  read  daily,  and 


1900] 


EDUCATIONAL  FACILITIES 


125 


certain  moral  precepts  inculcated  without  interfering 
with  any  creed.  Voluntary  contributions  support  this 
movement,  and  its  expansion  has  only  been  checked  by 
lack  of  additional  buildings  and  teachers.  The  Catholic 
clergy  in  Buenos  Aires  attacked  this  experiment  on  the 
grounds  that  it  tended  to  proselytise  the  children  of 
Catholic  parents,  but  the  National  Administration  did 
not  take  this  view,  and  the  movement  received  en- 
couragement in  official  quarters.  In  1899  the  Minister 
of  Justice  and  Instruction,  Dr  Magnasco,  in  his  annual 
memorial  to  Congress  recommended  the  adoption  of  Mr 
Morris’s  ideas  so  far  as  to  constitute  the  reading  of  the 
Bible  part  of  the  daily  instruction  in  every  national 
school. 

Administration  of  justice  in  Argentina  leaves  much 
to  be  desired.  A quarter  of  a century  ago  the  reputa- 
tion of  the  Supreme  Court  was  excellent.  It  was  noted 
for  freedom  from  bribery  and  corruption,  but  this 
standard  has  not  been  maintained  in  recent  years. 
President  Boca  in  his  message  to  Congress  in  May  of 
1899,  called  special  attention  to  the  subject,  and  certain 
notoriously  venal  judges  were  removed  from  office,  but 
there  the  matter  dropped.  The  legal  system  is  based 
on  Spanish  law,  and  the  civil,  criminal,  and  commercial 
statutes  are  codified,  but  procedure  is  cumbersome  and 
tedious,  leading  to  unnecessary  delay  in  litigation,  and 
heavy  expenditure.  In  the  minor  branches  opportunities 
for  corrupt  practices  are  widespread,  and  complaints 
are  heard  in  all  quarters  of  the  ignorance  and  venality 
of  magistrates  and  minor  officials.  To  some  extent  tins 
is  due  to  the  scanty  and  irregular  payment  of  judicial 
representatives,  for  the  salaries  are  insufficient  for  the 
duties  assigned  to  these  officials. 

The  practice  of  religion  in  Argentina  is  free  to  all 
creeds,  the  State  imposing  no  restrictions  on  the 
establishment  of  places  of  worship.  To  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church,  however,  the  National  Government 
lends  strong  support,  and  the  influence  of  the  Catholic 
clergy  is  powerful  amongst  the  lower  classes.  Super- 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


1-26 


stitious  dread  of  the  unknown  induces  reverence  towards 
the  outward  symbols  of  Christianity,  but  even  amongst 
educated  Argentines  clerical  influence  has  gained  ground 
of  late  years,  especially  with  the  women.  That  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church  in  Argentina  is  on  a satisfactory 
footing  is,  nevertheless,  an  open  question.  Sir  John 
Hunter  Blair  was  sent  a few  years  ago  to  report  on  the 
general  standing  of  the  Argentine  clergy,  and  the  fruit 
of  his  investigations  was  not  flattering  to  the  priesthood. 
Protestants,  moreover,  have  a strong  following  in  Buenos 
Aires  and  other  parts  of  the  republic,  supporters  of  this 
form  of  Christianity  representing  a large  proportion  of 
the  wealth  of  the  country.  Scotch,  American,  and  Greek 
colonies  all  have  well-supported  places  of  worship  in  the 
national  capital,  and  even  the  Salvation  Army  has 
established  headquarters  in  Buenos  Aires  with  branches 
in  other  cities. 

Argentine  national  character  bears  the  impress  of 
Spanish  traditions,  and  the  conservative  tendency  ap- 
parent in  the  Spanish  Peninsula  still  militates  against  the 
rapid  evolution  of  civilisation  in  these  newer  countries. 
The  provincial  inhabitants  cling  to  the  customs  of  their 
forefathers  with  persistent  disregard  of  the  benefits  of 
more  advanced  ideas.  In  the  Argentine,  as  in  the 
Spaniard,  there  is  a dislike  to  close  attention  to  detail 
in  public  and  private  life.  Hospitality  is  a characteristic 
trait  in  all  classes  of  Argentine  society,  alike  in  city  and 
country,  and  rich  and  poor  never  fail  to  offer  to  the  chance 
guest  the  best  that  their  home  contains.  In  the  more 
isolated  districts  the  people  are  simple  and  superstitious 
to  an  unusual  degree.  Quick  to  resent  real  or  fancied 
injury,  the  Argentine  is  prone  to  be  equally  impulsive 
in  forgetting  any  cause  of  dispute.  No  better  example 
of  these  characteristics  could  be  found  than  the  facts 
in  connection  with  the  many  outbreaks  of  civil  war 
and  revolutionary  disturbances,  and  the  comparatively 
small  amount  of  bad  blood  these  conflicts  have  left 
behind. 

The  past  two  decades  have  seen  a complete  change 


1900]  INDUSTRIAL  DEVELOPMENT 


127 


in  the  conditions  of  industrial  development  in  the 
Argentine  Republic.  In  the  year  1880  the  exportation 
of  produce  was  confined  to  wool,  tallow,  grease  in 
various  forms,  hides,  and  horns,  and  agricultural  pro- 
duction was  barely  sufficient  to  supply  the  home  demand. 
Occasionally  an  abundant  maize  crop  left  a surplus  for 
shipment  abroad,  but  previous  to  1880  wheat  and  flour 
were  purchased  in  foreign  countries  to  meet  the  deficit 
for  home  consumption.  Agricultural  industry  was  con- 
fined to  the  western  section  of  the  province  of  Buenos 
Aires,  the  cost  of  transport  in  other  districts  being 
prohibitive  ; but  the  policy  of  railway  extension  initiated 
by  Roca  in  1881  rapidly  altered  all  this,  and  in  the  five 
subsequent  years  the  development  of  agricultural  industry 
substantially  increased.  Not  only  did  production  suffice 
for  local  wants,  but  a surplus  became  available  for  export 
to  Brazil  and  Europe,  and  from  1885  until  the  present 
date,  such  a steady  expansion  has  taken  place,  that  in 
1900  the  total  yield  of  wheat  exceeded  100,000,000 
bushels,  of  which  75,000,000  bushels  was  exported  to 
foreign  markets.  The  cultivation  of  maize  and  linseed 
has  augmented,  so  that  agricultural  products,  which 
formed  so  small  a proportion  of  the  national  wealth 
twenty  years  ago,  are  now  a most  valuable  export. 

Sheep-farming  is  another  of  the  principal  sources  of 
wealth,  and  the  province  of  Buenos  Aires  is  the  main 
centre  of  the  industry.  Within  its  boundaries  the  flocks 
contain  70,000,000  head.  Entre  Rios,  Cordoba,  the 
territories  of  the  Pampa  Central,  the  Rio  Negro,  and 
parts  of  Patagonia  also  possess  fair  sheep  lands,  some 
20,000,000  head  being  scattered  over  these  districts. 
The  conditions  of  this  branch  of  Argentine  farming  have 
undergone  marked  changes  during  the  last  two  decades. 
Formerly  wool  was  the  only  product  to  which  the  sheep- 
farmer  paid  attention,  the  tallow  and  skins  exported 
being  only  by-products.  A radical  improvement,  how- 
ever, was  made  in  the  class  of  the  stock  between  the 
years  1880  and  1890,  and  in  1890  the  question  of  the 
export  of  mutton  began  to  occupy  public  attention. 


128 


THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 


Experiments  in  this  direction  had  been  in  progress  for 
some  time,  and  from  1890  the  exportation  of  frozen 
meat  rapidly  increased. 

Cattle-ranching  is  confined  to  no  particular  districts. 
In  every  province  and  national  territory  are  estancias 
(live  stock  farms)  with  larger  or  smaller  herds.  An 
accurate  return  of  the  number  of  horned  cattle  has  not 
been  compiled,  but  the  estimate  of  25,000,000  is  accepted 
as  not  far  from  the  mark.  This  calculation  is  based  on 
the  number  of  hides  exported,  and  the  relative  numbers 
of  animals  shipped  abroad  or  slaughtered  for  the 
saladeros,  frozen  meat  and  butchering  establishments. 
That  the  increase  in  the  herds  has  been  large  of  late 
years  is  proved  by  the  additional  areas  of  land  recently 
stocked,  and  there  is  small  reason  to  suppose  this 
increase  will  cease  in  the  immediate  future  in  view  of 
the  great  extension  of  natural  pasturage  still  unoccupied 
and  the  greater  grazing  capacity  of  the  settled  districts 
brought  about  by  the  sowing  of  alfalfa  (lucern). 

Previous  to  1880  value  was  placed  on  horned  cattle 
only  in  connection  with  the  saladero  establishments 
where  the  meat  was  converted  into  tasajo  (jerked  beef), 
or  for  the  hides  and  horns.  The  idea  of  selling 
Argentine  beef  in  Europe  had  not  penetrated  to  the 
River  Plate,  but  between  1880  and  1885  Durham  and 
Hereford  bulls  were  imported,  and  these  gave  excellent 
results  when  crossed  with  native  cows.  Then  owners 
of  herds  began  to  think  seriously  of  exporting  Argentine 
cattle  for  European  consumption,  and  many  herds  were 
refined  year  after  year  to  such  an  extent,  that  in  1890 
there  were  many  thousands  of  pure  Durhams  or 
Herefords,  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  half  or  three- 
quarter  bred  animals. 

In  1889  the  first  trial  shipment  of  live  cattle  was 
sent  to  Europe,  but  the  animals  were  not  well  selected, 
and  the  result  was  not  encouraging  as  a business  trans- 
action. The  exporters  determined,  however,  to  fully 
test  the  idea  of  placing  live  stock  in  foreign  markets. 
Cargo  after  cargo  was  despatched  between  1889  and 


1900] 


PASTORAL  INDUSTRY 


129 


1893  to  such  good  purpose  that  the  trade  was  estab- 
lished. Fine  stock  was  poured  into  the  country  to 
improve  the  herds,  and  met  with  ready  sale,  and  from 
1895  to  1900  the  animal  export  of  beeves  exceeded 
130,000  animals,  valued  at  £2,000,000  sterling. 


CHAPTER  VII 


PARAGUAY 

Origin  of  the  Paraguayan  War.  Political  Disturbances  in  Uruguay. 
General  Flores  lands  near  Salto.  Severe  Measures  increase  Rebel 
Popularity.  Strained  Relations  between  Uruguay  and  Argentina. 
Complications  between  Brazil  and  Uruguay.  Entente  between 
Uruguay  and  Paraguay.  Proclamation  by  Lopez.  Mission  of 
Conselheiro  Saraiva.  Invasion  of  Uruguay.  The  Villa  del 
Salto.  The  Brazilian  Flag  Insulted.  Brazil  supports  Revolt. 
Siege  of  Paysandu.  Murder  of  Colonel  Gomez.  Attitude  of 
Argentina.  Uruguayan  Expedition  to  Rio  Grande.  March  of 
Brazilians  and  Rebels  upon  Montevideo.  Montevideo  Capitulates. 
Withdrawal  of  Brazilian  Army.  Attitude  of  Lopez.  The 
Marques  d'Olinda.  War  between  Paraguay  and  Brazil.  In- 
vasion of  Matto  Grosso.  Engagement  at  Neuva  Coimbra.  Para- 
guayan Administration  in  Matto  Grosso.  Consternation  in  Rio. 
Brazil  prepares  for  War.  Schemes  of  Lopez.  Paraguayan  Con- 
gress. Lopez  and  Urquiza.  Paraguayan  Army  in  1865.  Attack 
upon  Corrientes.  Paraguayan  occupation  of  Corrientes.  Excite- 
ment in  Buenos  Aires.  Proclamation  of  General  Mitre.  Alliance 
between  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Uruguay.  Warlike  Preparations. 
Phases  of  the  War.  Importance  of  the  Parana  and  Paraguay. 
Plan  of  Campaign.  No  forward  movement  possible  before  June. 
Distribution  of  the  Paraguayans.  Lopez  neglects  to  advance 
beyond  Corrientes.  The  Paraguayans  in  Corrientes.  Capture  of 
Corrientes  by  the  Argentines.  Battle  of  the  Riachuelo.  Para- 
guayan Advance  towards  Uruguay.  Operations  near  San  Borge. 
Invasion  of  Rio  Grande.  Mutiny  in  Entre  Rios.  Flores  appointed 
to  command  the  Allied  Vanguard.  Conditions  in  Uruguay.  Para- 
guayans march  down  the  Upper  Uruguay.  Battle  of  Yatay. 
Defeat  of  the  Paraguayans.  Occupation  of  Uruguayana.  Sur- 
render of  Colonel  Estigarribia.  Preparations  for  Defence  of 
Paraguay.  Modification  in  Plan  of  Campaign.  Advance  of 
Allied  Forces.  Matto  Grosso. 


The  war  between  Paraguay  and  the  allied  forces  of 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Uruguay  is  one  of  the  most  re- 

130 


[ Face  page  130. 


1863]  ORIGIN  OF  PARAGUAYAN  WAR  131 


markable  events  in  South  American  history.  It  con- 
vulsed the  south-eastern  portion  of  the  continent  for 
several  years,  and  was  ended  only  by  the  annihilation 
of  the  male  population  of  Paraguay.  The  origin  of  the 
struggle  requires  explanation. 

A political  party  known  as  the  Blancos  had  gained 
control  of  Uruguay  by  a successful  revolution  against 
President  Flores,  who  was  driven  out  and  sought  asylum 
in  Buenos  Aires.  In  April,  1863,  Flores  with  a few 
companions,  incited  by  the  cold-blooded  murder  of  a 
number  of  Colorado  prisoners  at  Quinteros,  landed  at 
Salto,  and  there  raised  the  standard  of  revolt.  Collect- 
ing a force  of  1700  men,  he  succeeded  in  defeating  a 
column  of  Government  troops  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Rio 
Negro.  This  success  brought  Flores  many  recruits.  In 
March,  1864,  the  Blancos  elected  Dr  Aguirre  to  the 
Presidency,  and  the  severe  measures  taken  against  all 
persons  suspected  of  revolutionary  tendencies  increased 
the  popularity  of  the  revolt. 

Relations  between  Argentina  and  Uruguay  there- 
upon became  strained,  and  President  Aguirre  openly 
accused  the  Argentine  authorities  of  aiding  the  rebels. 
Complications  were  also  threatened  between  Uruguay 
and  Brazil,  in  consequence  of  the  ill-treatment  of 
Brazilians  for  their  supposed  sympathy  with  rebel  out- 
breaks. Being  thus  on  bad  terms  with  both  Argentina 
and  Brazil,  the  Uruguayan  President  thought  to 
strengthen  his  position  by  establishing  an  entente  with 
General  Lopez,  the  Dictator  of  Paraguay.  Lopez  had 
organised  a formidable  army,  and  was  credited  with  the 
ambitious  design  of  conquering  the  Brazilian  province 
of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  thus  to  obtain  an  outlet  to  the 
sea  for  Paraguay.  Naturally,  therefore,  the  proposals 
of  President  Aguirre  were  received  by  Lopez  in  friendly 
spirit,  and  help  was  promised  in  case  of  hostile  action 
by  Brazil  against  Uruguay.  Brazil  threatened  to  send 
troops  into  Uruguayan  territory  if  protection  for  resident 
Brazilians  was  not  accorded,  and  when  this  communica- 
tion was  known  to  Lopez,  he  issued  a proclamation  to 


132 


PARAGUAY 


the  effect,  that  if  an  invasion  of  Uruguay  took  place 
Paraguay  would  declare  war  against  Brazil. 

Scant  courtesy  was  extended  to  Consellieiro  Saraiva, 
the  envoy  credited  by  Brazil  to  Uruguay  in  connection 
with  the  complaints  of  Brazilian  residents,  in  spite  of  a 
squadron  sent  to  Montevideo  and  an  army  of  4000  men 
concentrated  on  the  northern  frontier  to  emphasise  the 
Brazilian  demands.  Relations  between  the  two 
Governments  became  further  strained,  and  finally 
Conselheiro  Saraiva  was  instructed  to  return,  his 
mission  having  failed.  The  army  concentrated  in  Rio 
Grande  was  marched  into  Uruguay  to  protect  Brazilian 
interests,  but  the  Uruguayan  troops  retired  from  the 
northern  districts.  Then  the  Brazilian  Government 
ordered  a suspension  of  the  advance  in  the  belief  that 
President  Aguirre  would  come  to  terms  now,  when  the 
serious  nature  of  the  situation  had  become  plain.  But 
other  events  meanwhile  happened  to  bring  the  dispute 
to  an  acute  stage.  Admiral  Tamandare  with  a 
squadron  of  three  men-of-war  ascended  the  river 
Uruguay,  where  he  encountered  the  Uruguayan  warship 
Villa  del  Salto,  upon  which  he  opened  fire,  forcing  her 
to  seek  shelter  at  Concordia  in  Argentine  waters.  The 
Uruguayan  vessel  afterwards  attempted  to  run  past  the 
Brazilians  and  make  for  Paysandii,  and  being  in  danger 
of  capture  was  set  on  fire  by  her  commander.  Immedi- 
ately the  news  of  this  incident  reached  the  President  he 
cancelled  all  exequaturs  of  Brazilian  Consuls ; all 
treaties  between  the  two  Governments  were  burned  in 
public,  and  the  Brazilian  flag  was  insulted  and  dragged 
through  the  streets.  Brazil  at  once  ordered  General 
Menna  Barreto,  in  command  of  the  Brazilian  forces  in 
Uruguay,  to  join  hands  with  the  revolt  under  General 
Flores  against  Aguirre  and  attack  both  Montevideo  and 
Paysandu.  Admiral  Tamandare  with  one  steamer  and 
four  gun-boats  was  also  instructed  to  aid  the  operations 
against  the  latter  town. 

Paysandii  was  held  by  2000  men  under  Colonel 
Leandro  Gomez,  and  every  possible  precaution  was 


1864]  EVENTS  PRECEDING  THE  WAR  133 


taken  for  the  defence  of  the  city.  The  attacking  force 
consisted  of  5000  rebels,  P200  Brazilian  troops  under 
General  Netto,  and  the  squadron  under  Tamandare, 
from  which  a small  naval  brigade  was  landed.  The 
assault  commenced  on  December  6,  1864,  and  continued 
throughout  the  day,  but  on  December  7,  hostilities  were 
suspended  at  the  request  of  the  naval  officers  in 
command  of  several  foreign  warships  in  order  to  allow 
women,  children,  and  non-combatants  to  be  conveyed  to 
a place  of  safety.  Then  the  bombardment  of  the 
city  was  resumed.  News  that  a column  of  Uruguayan 
troops  under  General  Saa  was  advancing  to  relieve 
Paysandu  was  received  on  December  9,  and  General 
Flores,  with  the  approval  of  the  officers  of  the 
besieging  army,  decided  to  move  out  and  give  it 
battle.  But  the  two  forces  did  not  meet,  for 

President  Aguirre  ordered  General  Saa  to  return  to 
Montevideo  to  aid  in  the  defence  of  that  city.  Flores 
accordingly  went  back  to  Paysandu,  where,  meanwhile, 
Colonel  Gomez  had  obtained  fresh  supplies  of  ammuni- 
tion and  provisions,  and  was  prepared  to  make  a 
desperate  resistance.  Fighting  recommenced  on 
December  31,  and  the  garrison  attempted  to  cut  through 
the  investing  lines,  but  was  driven  back.  Reinforce- 
ments of  Brazilian  troops  arrived  on  January  1,  1865, 
and  on  January  2 the  place  was  carried  by  assault, 
Colonel  Gomez  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Brazilian 
contingent.  To  avoid  being  sent  to  Brazil  as  a prisoner, 
Gomez  begged  he  might  be  delivered  to  the  division 
under  General  Flores.  This  request  was  granted,  but 
he  was  no  sooner  given  up  than  he  was  murdered  in 
cold  blood,  without  the  knowledge  of  Flores.  After 
the  fall  of  Paysandu  the  rebels  under  Flores  and  the 
Brazilian  forces  marched  to  form  a junction  with  the 
army  under  Generals  Menna  Barreto  and  Osorio  to  attack 
Montevideo.  The  squadron  under  Admiral  Tamandare 
sailed  down  the  river  to  land  the  sick  and  wounded  in 
Buenos  Aires,  thence  to  proceed  to  assist  in  the  opera- 
tions against  the  Uruguayan  capital. 


134 


PARAGUAY 


The  attitude  of  Argentina,  while  these  events  were 
passing  in  Uruguay,  had  an  important  bearing  upon 
subsequent  developments  in  regard  to  Paraguay. 
President  Mitre,  the  head  of  the  Administration,  was  a 
personal  friend  of  General  Flores,  and  had  extended  a 
large  measure  of  protection  to  the  latter  during  his 
exile  in  Buenos  Aires.  Many  Argentines  had  joined 
the  revolutionary  cause  in  Uruguay  with  Flores,  and 
these  influences  drew  Argentine  sympathy  towards  the 
rebellion.  Nominally,  Argentina  was  neutral  in  the 
conflict ; but,  in  reality,  Buenos  Aires  and  other  points  in 
Argentine  territory  formed  the  base  of  operations  for 
the  revolution. 

President  Aguirre,  to  deter  an  immediate  advance 
upon  Montevideo  after  the  capture  of  Paysandu, 
despatched  an  expedition  to  the  eastern  section  of  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul,  a move  also  prompted  by  promises  of 
assistance  from  General  Lopez.  Aguirre  relied  on  an 
army  from  Paraguay  invading  the  western  section  of 
Rio  Grande,  simultaneously  with  the  entry  of  Uruguayan 
troops  into  the  eastern  districts.  This  expedition  was 
commanded  by  Colonel  Munoz  and  Colonel  Aparicio, 
and  it  crossed  the  Brazilian  frontier  near  the  Lake 
Mirim,  occupying  the  town  of  Yaguaron.  The  utmost 
cruelty  was  practised  towards  the  Brazilians,  and  neither 
life  nor  property  were  respected.  But  the  continued 
occupation  of  this  Brazilian  district  was  impossible, 
because  the  aid  Aguirre  looked  for  from  Paraguay  was 
not  forthcoming,  and  Colonel  Munoz  was  obliged  to 
retreat  after  defeat  by  a Brazilian  force  commanded  by 
Colonel  Fidelis.  Alarmed  at  the  threatened  invasion 
by  Lopez,  the  authorities  of  Rio  Grande  called  out 
29  battalions  of  the  National  Guard,  and  this 
force  was  the  nucleus  of  the  army  taking  part  in  the 
Paraguayan  War  at  a later  date. 

While  these  events  were  happening  on  the  borders 
of  Rio  Grande,  the  march  of  the  Brazilian  and  rebel 
forces  upon  Montevideo  continued.  Many  recruits  had 
joined  the  revolutionary  cause,  so  that  when  the  com- 


1865]  PARAGUAY  DECLARES  WAR 


135 


bined  forces  invested  the  capital  in  February,  1865, 
they  numbered  14,000.  The  position  of  President 
Aguirre  was  untenable  when  the  blockade  was 
established,  and  accompanied  by  a small  group  of 
followers  he  sought  refuge  in  Buenos  Aires ; but  before 
his  flight  he  issued  various  proclamations,  in  one  of 
which  the  perfidious  conduct  of  the  Paraguayans  was 
denounced  in  bitter  terms.  With  the  flight  of  the 
President  from  Montevideo  active  resistance  ceased. 
Dr  Villalba,  President  of  the  Senate,  opened  peace 
negotiations  with  General  Flores,  and  on  February  22, 
1865,  Flores  entered  the  capital.  Shortly  afterwards  he 
was  proclaimed  President  of  the  Republic.  The 
Brazilian  army  was  withdrawn  after  the  capitulation. 

Meanwhile,  General  Lopez  had  made  good  his 
menace  and  revealed  his  ambitious  designs  by  declaring 
war  against  Brazil.  A Brazilian  vessel,  the  Marques 
dOlinda,  bound  for  Matto  Grosso,  and  carrying  a new 
Governor  for  that  province,  was  seized  at  Asuncion,  the 
capital  of  Paraguay,  the  official  arrested,  and  the  ship 
incorporated  into  the  Paraguayan  fleet.  The  Brazilian 
Minister,  Viana  de  Lima,  was  given  his  passports,  and 
the  invasion  of  Matto  Grosso  followed.  Previously 
12,000  men  had  been  concentrated  near  Cerro  Leon  in 
the  north  of  Paraguay.  From  these  troops  a division 
was  detached  under  General  Barrios  and  embarked  for 
Matto  Grosso  on  December  13,  1864. 

A fortnight  later  this  expedition  arrived  off  Nueva 
Coimbra,  an  old  Portuguese  fort  situated  in  the  extreme 
south  of  Matto  Grosso.  It  stood  on  high  ground 
commanding  the  river,  and  was  garrisoned  by  150 
soldiers.  Its  surrender  was  demanded,  but  refused. 
Bombardment  followed,  and  troops  were  landed  to 
assault  the  position  on  December  30,  but  the  attack 
proved  unsuccessful.  Nevertheless,  the  commandant 
decided  that  further  resistance  was  useless,  and  during 
the  night  embarked  his  men  on  the  Amambahy  and 
escaped. 

After  the  capture  of  Nueva  Coimbra  the  expedition 


136 


PARAGUAY 


advanced  up  the  river.  No  resistance  was  made,  and 
the  towns  of  Albuquerque,  Tage,  Miranda,  Dourado, 
and  Corumba  were  occupied,  so  that  by  the  middle  of 
January  the  southern  portion  of  Matto  Grosso  was  in 
the  hands  of  the  Paraguayans.  A Provincial  Admini- 
stration was  established,  the  name  of  the  province  being 
changed  to  Alto  Paraguay,  and  the  emancipation  of  the 
slaves  proclaimed,  General  Lopez  thinking  such  action 
would  induce  the  negroes  to  make  common  cause  with 
the  Paraguayans  against  the  Brazilians.  In  this  he  was 
mistaken  and  gained  few  recruits. 

Lopez  had  good  reasons  for  making  his  first  campaign 
against  Brazil  in  Matto  Grosso.  There  was  no  strong 
force  in  this  province  to  hinder  the  Paraguayan  advance. 
From  Asuncion  to  Matto  Grosso  was  only  a ten  days’ 
voyage,  whilst  from  Rio  de  Janeiro  it  necessitated  a 
journey  of  eight  weeks  through  a country  difficult  for 
transport.  Then,  again,  a dispute  existed  between 
Brazil  and  Bolivia  concerning  the  boundary  line  between 
the  two  countries,  and  Lopez  hoped  this  fact  might 
cause  Bolivia  to  join  with  him  against  the  Brazilians. 
An  alliance  with  Bolivia  and  possession  of  Matto 
Grosso  were  strong  points  before  invading  Rio  Grande. 
With  Argentina  no  quarrel  was  intended  when  Lopez 
first  conceived  the  idea  of  conquering  new  territory  for 
Paraguay.  As  matters  eventually  developed  the  com- 
bination which  Lopez  relied  upon  failed.  The  occupation 
of  Matto  Grosso  proved  a severe  strain  upon  Paraguay, 
and  Bolivia  refused  to  join  in  hostilities  against  Brazil. 

It  was  some  time  before  news  of  the  invasion  of 
Matto  Grosso  reached  Rio  de  Janeiro,  but  when  it 
became  known  there  that  Lopez  had  seized  a section  of 
Brazilian  territory,  popular  excitement  became  intense. 
Hitherto  the  threat  of  Paraguay  to  open  hostilities  if 
the  Brazilian  troops  were  sent  into  Uruguay  had  not 
been  taken  seriously,  but  now  military  and  naval  pre- 
parations were  immediately  undertaken  for  an  expedition 
of  sufficient  strength  to  enable  Brazil  to  avenge  the  insult 
offered  to  her  flag.  The  army  in  Rio  Grande  was  re- 


1865]  BRAZIL  PREPARES  TO  ATTACK  137 


inforced,  and  instructions  given  it  to  be  in  readiness 
to  attack  Paraguay.  But  to  reach  Paraguay  it  was 
necessary  to  cross  Misiones,  and  permission  for  this  was 
requested  from  Argentina.  General  Mitre,  then  Presi- 
dent of  Argentina,  replied  that  the  rivers  Parana  and 
Uruguay  were  open  to  both  parties  to  the  conflict,  but 
that  no  license  could  be  granted  to  the  belligerents  to 
traverse  Argentine  territory.  Simultaneously  with  this 
Brazilian  request  came  one  of  like  character  from  General 
Lopez,  which  was  answered  in  the  same  terms.  This 
refusal  was  a greater  disadvantage  to  Paraguay  than 
Brazil,  for  the  latter  was  the  stronger  in  naval  equipment. 
Moreover,  an  army  of  20,000  men  under  General  Robles 
had  been  concentrated  by  order  of  Lopez  at  Candelaria, 
ready  to  invade  Rio  Grande.  Paraguay  met  with  little 
outside  support.  Peru  and  Chile  to  some  extent 
sympathised  with  the  object  Lopez  had  in  view,  but  lent 
no  active  assistance,  and  President  Melgarejo  of  Bolivia 
had  already  notified  the  Paraguayan  Government  that 
he  would  take  no  part  in  the  struggle.  Argentina  had 
shown  clearly  that  the  attitude  of  Paraguay  was  un- 
favourably regarded,  while  the  Administration  of 
General  Flores  in  Uruguay  was  prepared  to  render  all 
possible  aid  to  the  Brazilian  cause.  Paraguay  was 
therefore  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  hostility  to  the 
aggressive  policy  of  Lopez. 

A Congress  was  now  called  in  Asuncion  for  the 
nominal  purpose  of  voting  supplies  and  passing  resolu- 
tions for  the  continuance  of  the  war.  It  conferred  on 
Lopez  the  title  of  Marshal  of  the  Army  in  place  of 
Brigadier-General,  but  all  such  meetings  under  Lopez 
were  absolutely  subservient  to  his  personal  influence, 
and  every  act  approved,  or  resolution  passed,  was  by  his 
direct  instructions.  He  possessed  absolutely  dictatorial 
powers  before  this  Congress  was  held,  but  it  suited  his 
purpose  to  be  proclaimed  publicly  the  supreme  authority 
in  all  matters  connected  with  the  war. 

Lopez  now  began  negotiations  with  General  Urquiza 
for  a combination  against  the  Color  ados  in  Uruguay  and 


138 


PARAGUAY 


the  Brazilians,  the  compact  including  the  assistance  of 
General  Urquiza  in  the  passage  of  the  Paraguayans 
through  the  Argentine  provinces  of  Corrientes  and  Entre 
Rios.  The  position  of  General  Urquiza  at  this  time  was 
one  of  declared  hostility  to  President  Mitre,  and  he  was 
a strong  factor  in  the  situation  on  account  of  his  powerful 
armed  following. 

When  the  crisis  in  1865  was  reached,  the  Paraguayan 
army  was  on  a stronger  footing  than  that  of  any  other 
South  American  State.  The  force  under  arms  consisted 
of  12,000  troops  of  six  years’  service;  6000  men  who 
had  served  with  the  colours  and  passed  to  the  reserve  ; 
22,000  national  guards  under  the  leadership  of  trained 
officers ; and  20,000  in  recently  raised  levies  undergoing 
instruction.  Altogether,  the  army  comprised  45,000 
infantry,  10,000  cavalry,  and  5000  artillery,  and  the 
supply  of  war  material  was  large,  purchases  having  been 
effected  abroad  and  establishments  for  its  manufacture 
founded  at  home.  With  these  conditions  in  his  favour, 
Lopez  boldly  determined  to  take  the  offensive  and 
endeavour  to  carry  out  his  policy. 

In  view  of  the  hostile  attitude  of  Paraguay  two 
Argentine  warships,  the  25  de  Mayo  and  the  Gaide- 
guay,  had  been  despatched  to  Corrientes  to  watch  events, 
and  on  April  13,  1865,  a Paraguayan  squadron  of  five 
steamers  attacked  them  and  bombarded  the  city  of 
Corrientes.  Taken  by  surprise  both  vessels  were  cap- 
tured. The  city  attempted  resistance,  but  being  in  no 
condition  for  defence  presently  surrendered  also,  and  six 
days  later  an  expedition  of  22,000  men  under  General 
Robles  was  in  possession  of  the  whole  province  of 
Corrientes,  and  a base  of  operations  secured  for  an 
advance  upon  Uruguay  and  Rio  Grande.  This  suc- 
cess encouraged  Lopez,  and  he  cared  little  what  the 
effect  of  his  invasion  of  Argentine  territory  might  be 
when  the  news  reached  Buenos  Aires,  relying  on  the 
fact  that  the  Argentine  Government  was  unprepared 
for  war. 

The  Argentines,  however,  had  no  intention  of  sub- 


1865] 


INVASION  OF  CORRIENTES 


139 


mitting  quietly  to  the  outrage  committed  by  the  Para- 
guayan Dictator.  After  the  first  surprise,  the  inhabitants 
of  Buenos  Aires  held  a mass  meeting  and  marched  to 
the  Government  Palace  to  demand  prompt  chastisement 
of  the  enemy.  It  was  a difficult  situation,  for  the  regular 
army  consisted  only  of  6000  men  scattered  over  the 
different  provinces.  The  President,  however,  issued  a 
proclamation  calling  for  volunteers  to  take  the  field  in 
a few  weeks,  and  in  other  directions  the  effect  of  the 
occupation  of  Corrientes  was  more  far  reaching  than 
could  have  been  anticipated  by  Lopez.  President 
Flores  of  Uruguay  crossed  to  Buenos  Aires  to  confer 
with  Mitre,  and  offered  to  make  common  cause  against 
Paraguay,  and  the  Brazilian  Minister,  Senhor  Almeida 
Rosa,  assured  the  Argentine  Government  of  the  wish 
of  Brazil  for  joint  action.  General  Urquiza,  although 
known  to  be  on  most  friendly  terms  with  General  Lopez, 
also  offered  his  services.  The  result  of  the  deliberations 
between  Mitre,  Flores,  and  Almeida  Rosa  was  an  offensive 
and  defensive  alliance  between  Brazil,  Uruguay,  and 
Argentina.  President  Mitre  was  given  the  chief  com- 
mand of  the  allied  forces,  because  warlike  operations 
had  begun  in  Argentine  territory,  but  it  was  provided, 
in  case  hostilities  should  change  to  Brazilian  or 
Uruguayan  soil,  that  a general  of  one  or  other  of  these 
nationalities  should  assume  the  command.  All  naval 
operations  were  confided  to  Admiral  Tamandare.  The 
allies  agreed  not  to  withdraw  from  the  conflict  until 
after  the  conquest  of  Paraguay,  and  then  only  by 
common  consent,  but  the  independence  of  Paraguay 
was  to  be  respected  after  the  war,  and  the  free  naviga- 
tion of  the  rivers  Parana  and  Paraguay  was  to  be 
established  for  commerce  and  warships.  Paraguay  was 
to  be  held  liable  for  the  cost,  and  the  boundaries  between 
Brazil  and  Paraguay  and  Argentina  and  Paraguay  were 
also  defined  in  the  treaty,  which  was  signed  in  Buenos 
Aires  on  May  1,  1865.  A protocol  was  subsequently 
agreed  to,  by  which  provision  was  made  for  razing  the 
fortifications  of  Humaita,  and  the  distributions  of  all 


140  PARAGUAY 

loot  and  trophies  captured,  an  easy  victory  being  taken 
as  a thing  of  course. 

Don  Francisco  Solano  Lopez,  whose  ambition  had 
brought  on  this  drama  of  blood,  was  born  in  1827,  and 
was,  therefore,  in  the  prime  of  manhood  when  this  crisis 
occurred.  His  father,  Don  Carlos  Lopez,  was  President 
of  Paraguay  at  his  death  in  March,  1857,  and  the  son 
succeeded  him.  As  a young  man  Francisco  Lopez  had 
travelled  in  foreign  countries,  and  he  received  his  educa- 
tion in  Paris.  It  was  in  France  that  he  met  Madame 
Lynch  who  became  his  mistress,  and,  returning  with 
him  to  Paraguay,  fostered  in  his  mind  the  ambitious 
policy  that  resulted  in  this  disastrous  war.  Lopez  had 
unbounded  confidence  in  his  own  ability,  regarding 
himself  as  the  Napoleon  of  South  America. 

Preparations  for  the  campaign  were  matured  rapidly 
in  Brazil,  Argentina,  and  Uruguay.  The  war  assumed 
three  distinct  phases,  and  it  is  under  these  that  the  long 
struggle  can  be  most  conveniently  reviewed.  The  first 
stage  was  confined  to  the  operations  in  Corrientes,  Rio 
Grande,  and  Matto  Grosso ; the  second  to  the  fighting 
on  the  rivers  Parana  and  Paraguay ; and  the  third  to 
the  desperate  effort  of  General  Lopez  to  maintain  his 
position  in  Paraguay.  Ultimate  victory  was  only 
achieved  by  the  allies  through  the  facilities  afforded  by 
the  rivers  Parana  and  Paraguay,  which  permitted  naval 
operations  in  concert  with  the  land  forces,  and  gave 
means  of  transport  for  men  and  supplies.  Yet  the 
struggle  lasted  from  1865  until  1870,  it  being  prolonged 
by  the  difficult  nature  of  the  country.  In  favour  of  the 
Paraguayans  was  the  thick  forest,  and  local  topo- 
graphical knowledge  enabled  Lopez  both  to  draw  the 
allied  forces  into  ambush  and  to  make  rapid  marches 
by  ways  unknown  to  them.  In  many  of  the  districts 
where  the  invaders  encamped,  the  air  was  charged  with 
malaria,  which  told  its  tale  in  the  heavy  mortality,  and 
it  was  aggravated  by  constant  exposure  to  tropical 
rains. 

Under  their  first  plan  of  campaign,  the  allies  concen- 


1865J 


WARLIKE  PREPARATIONS 


141 


trated  all  available  Argentine  troops  in  Entre  Rios  and 
the  south  of  Corrientes.  The  Brazilian  squadron  was 
to  proceed  up  the  river  Parana  and  aid  the  land  forces, 
while  General  Urquiza  was  despatched  to  Entre  Rios 
to  organise  an  irregular  cavalry  division.  Both  the 
Brazilian  and  the  Uruguayan  contingents  were  to  be 
thrown  upon  the  banks  of  the  river  Uruguay  with 
instructions  to  march  northwards,  cross  the  river  in  the 
vicinity  of  Candelaria,  and  thence  move  upon  Asuncion, 
the  capital  of  Paraguay,  as  soon  as  the  Argentines  had 
driven  the  enemy  out  of  Corrientes.  The  strength  of 
the  allied  army  was  : — Brazil  45,000,  Argentina  25,000, 
and  Uruguay  5000  men.  Near  Concordia,  in  Entre 
Rios,  a camp  of  instruction  was  formed.  It  was  con- 
sidered probable  that  Lopez  would  make  a dash  into 
Rio  Grande  and  attempt  to  reach  Montevideo,  so,  to 
prevent  surprise,  observation  posts  were  established 
between  Paysandu  in  Uruguay,  and  San  Borge  in  the 
north  of  Rio  Grande.  In  Rio  Grande  national  guards 
were  under  arms  and  volunteer  cavalry  regiments  had 
been  raised.  These  troops  were  commanded  by  Generals 
Netto  and  Cannevaro,  and  were  to  join  the  army  when 
the  movement  to  the  north  was  begun,  but  unexpected 
circumstances  arose  to  prevent  the  execution  of  this 
plan  of  campaign.  The  equipment  of  the  troops  was 
deficient,  transport  was  difficult,  and  supplies  scarce. 
Therefore  it  was  not  until  the  end  of  June  that  prepara- 
tions had  advanced  sufficiently  to  warrant  a forward 
movement. 

The  distribution  of  the  Paraguayan  army  consisted 
of  6000  men  in  Matto  Grosso ; 22,000  troops  in  the 
north  of  the  province  of  Corrientes ; a third  division  of 
20,000  strong  encamped  at  Cerro  Leon  and  Humaita 
in  a position  to  support  the  forces  in  Corrientes ; and  a 
fourth  division  of  17,000  men  mobilised  as  a final  reserve. 
After  occupying  Corrientes  in  April,  1865,  Lopez  hesi- 
tated to  advance  further,  it  is  difficult  to  say  why,  since 
at  the  end  of  April  there  was  no  force  between  Corri- 
entes and  the  frontier  of  Rio  Grande  to  offer  resistance. 


142 


PARAGUAY 


Anyhow,  the  fact  that  no  advance  was  made  enabled 
the  concentration  of  the  allied  forces.  A probable 
explanation  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  inhabitants  of  Corri- 
entes  showed  a bitter  hostility,  which,  combined  with 
the  defection  of  General  Urquiza  in  Entre  Rios  on 
whose  assistance  Lopez  had  counted,  increased  the 
danger  of  a forward  movement.  Moreover,  the  reports 
from  Matto  Grosso  were  not  encouraging,  and  General 
Barrios  stated  that  the  unfriendly  attitude  of  the  natives 
there  made  reinforcements  necessary  if  the  sphere  of  the 
Paraguayan  influence  was  to  be  extended. 

The  main  body  of  the  Paraguayans  in  Corrientes 
was  concentrated  near  the  river  Riachuelo,  and  in  June, 
1865,  a force  of  2000  men  under  General  Paunero 
opposed  their  advance.  To  draw  Paunero  into  a fight, 
Lopez  ordered  the  Paraguayan  forces  to  make  a feint 
of  retiring,  at  the  same  time  sending  a cavalry  division 
to  outflank  the  Argentines.  General  Paunero  was  not 
caught  in  this  trap.  He  embarked  his  troops  on  the 
Brazilian  squadron,  proceeding  up  the  Parana  until 
opposite  Corrientes,  the  garrison  of  which  had  been 
reduced,  and  then  decided  to  endeavour  to  seize  the 
town.  A force  of  800  troops  was  landed,  supported 
by  a strong  detachment  of  marines  from  the  warships. 
On  the  morning  of  May  25,  the  positions  outside  the 
city  were  assaulted,  and  before  nightfall  the  town  was 
captured,  but  not  without  severe  fighting  which  involved 
a loss  to  the  Paraguayans  of  500  officers  and  men  killed 
and  wounded,  besides  80  prisoners  and  three  guns,  with 
a quantity  of  arms  and  ammunition  captured.  The 
casualties  on  the  Argentine  side  were  23  officers  and 
250  men  killed  and  wounded.  Next  day  outposts 
reported  the  Paraguayans  advancing  in  force  towards 
the  city,  so  General  Paunero  re- embarked  his  troops  in 
view  of  the  overwhelming  odds  by  which  he  was 
threatened.  Many  of  the  residents  took  advantage  of 
this  opportunity  to  escape,  and  the  squadron  dropped 
down  the  river  to  a section  of  the  province  not  invested 
by  the  enemy.  This  victory  helped  to  counteract  the 


1865] 


A NAVAL  BATTLE 


143 


impatient  feeling  in  Buenos  Aires  caused  by  the  delay 
in  the  advance  of  the  allies  from  Concordia. 

Lopez  now  made  plans  for  the  destruction  of  the 
Brazilian  squadron  on  the  Parana.  Twenty  Brazilian 
war  vessels  were  anchored  off  the  mouth  of  the  Ria- 
chuelo  on  June  11,1865,  when,  without  warning,  a hostile 
fleet  of  eight  steamers  and  six  gunboats  was  seen 
approaching.  These  Paraguayan  ships  passed  the 
anchorage  of  the  Brazilians  without  discharging  a shot, 
then  circled  round  and  opened  a heavy  fire  with 
artillery  and  musketry.  Although  inferior  in  numbers, 
the  Paraguayan  squadron  was  well  equipped,  and 
the  action  continued  with  heavy  losses  on  both 
sides  for  ten  hours.  At  one  time  the  Paraguayans  had 
every  prospect  of  victory,  and  the  commander  of  the 
only  Brazilian  ironclad  recognised  that  the  sole  hope  of 
saving  the  day  was  to  sink  some  of  the  hostile  vessels. 
He  accordingly  steamed  into  the  thick  of  the  enemy’s 
squadron  and  successfully  rammed  four  of  the  Para- 
guayan ships.  This  turned  the  day  in  favour  of  the 
Brazilians,  and  the  engagement  ended  with  the  total 
defeat  of  the  Paraguayans,  four  of  their  steamers  and 
six  gunboats  being  sunk  and  a thousand  officers  and  men 
killed  or  wounded.  The  commander  of  the  Paraguayan 
squadron  escaped,  but  was  imprisoned  by  General  Lopez, 
and  the  four  Paraguayan  steamers  left  afloat  retreated 
to  Humaita  and  took  no  further  part  in  the  war  until 
two  years  later.  In  this  engagement  the  Brazilians  lost 
two  vessels,  and  the  remainder  of  the  fleet  was  so  much 
damaged  that  it  had  to  be  taken  to  Esquina  for  repairs. 

Simultaneously  with  the  attack  on  the  Brazilian 
squadron,  12,000  Paraguayans  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  Estigarribia  and  Major  Duarte  were  despatched 
from  Candelaria  to  Misiones.  This  force  arrived  at  San 
Borge,  a place  only  weakly  garrisoned,  on  June  15,  1865. 
Colonel  Asumpcao  was  in  command,  and  after  a siege 
of  five  days  he  capitulated.  The  city  was  sacked. 
Colonel  Estigarribia  did  not  delay  at  San  Borge,  but 
pushed  southwards  distributing  his  division  on  both 


144 


PARAGUAY 


banks  of  the  river  Uruguay.  The  Brazilians  made  no 
attempt  to  check  the  invasion,  but  occasionally  a 
reconnaissance  in  force  led  to  skirmishes  with  the 
invaders.  In  the  most  important  of  these  the  Brazilians 
were  defeated  and  suffered  heavy  casualties,  besides 
losing  much  valuable  equipment.  Lopez  had  anticipated 
that  his  appearance  in  Rio  Grande  would  be  the  signal 
for  a general  rising  of  the  slaves,  to  whom  he  had  pro- 
mised freedom;  but  his  expectations  were  disappointed, 
the  negroes  showing  no  desire  to  revolt. 

Lopez  left  no  stone  unturned  to  ensure  the  success 
of  the  march  through  Brazilian  territory.  Knowing  the 
hostility  of  the  natives  of  Entre  Rios  to  Brazilians, 
emissaries  were  sent  to  the  camps  of  the  irregular 
cavalry  raised  by  General  Urquiza  to  stir  up  seditious 
feeling.  This  was  not  difficult,  and  suddenly  news 
reached  the  headquarters  of  the  allied  forces  in  Con- 
cordia that  the  Entre  Rios  contingent  had  mutinied.  A 
council  of  war  was  summoned,  at  which  General  Urquiza 
promised  to  proceed  to  the  camp  and  put  matters  right. 
By  what  influence  his  conduct  was  guided,  whether  by 
jealousy  of  General  Mitre  or  disgust  at  the  attitude 
of  his  followers,  is  not  clear,  but  he  left  Concordia 
apparently  to  fulfil  his  promises,  and  instead  of 
doing  so,  retired  to  his  estate,  declining  to  take 
further  part  in  the  campaign.  Left  without  a leader, 
the  men  of  the  Entre  Rios  contingent  dispersed  to 
their  homes. 

Urquiza’s  defection  made  it  necessary  for  the  allies 
to  appoint  an  officer  in  his  place.  Urquiza  had  com- 
manded the  vanguard  of  the  invading  army,  and  General 
Flores,  the  representative  of  Uruguay,  begged  for  the 
position,  proposing  that  the  Uruguayan  contingent 
should  form  the  vanguard.  The  offer  was  accepted  by 
Mitre  and  his  colleagues,  and  at  the  end  of  June  the 
Uruguayan  division  of  5000  men  under  Flores  marched 
from  Concordia  to  support  General  Paunero,  the  main 
body  of  the  allied  army  remaining  at  Concordia. 

In  Uruguay  the  Blancos  saw  in  the  Paraguayan 


1865] 


BATTLE  OF  YATAY 


145 


troops  a means  to  regain  the  control  they  lost  when 
Aguirre  was  ousted.  Their  leaders,  accordingly,  assured 
Lopez  that  when  his  forces  entered  Uruguayan  territory 
they  would  rise  and  make  common  cause  with  the 
Paraguayans  against  the  Uruguayan  Government.  An 
outbreak  in  Uruguay,  moreover,  would  have  entailed 
serious  complications  for  the  allied  forces  at  Concordia, 
for  it  meant  that  the  flank  of  the  army  resting  on  the 
river  Uruguay  would  be  open  to  attack.  This  was  not 
lost  upon  Lopez,  and  he  ordered  Colonel  Estigarribia  to 
move  with  all  speed  down  the  banks  of  the  Upper 
Uruguay. 

The  two  columns  of  the  Paraguayan  army,  marching 
on  either  side  of  the  river,  made  quick  progress,  and  by 
the  second  week  in  August,  1865,  the  division  under 
Colonel  Estigarribia  on  the  left  bank  had  reached  a 
position  close  to  Uruguay  ana,  a town  only  a few  miles 
from  the  frontier.  Here  he  ordered  the  column  on  the 
right  bank  to  make  preparations  to  cross  the  river. 
General  Flores  with  his  5000  men  was  encamped  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  Uruguay  River  at  Yatay,  nearly  opposite 
Uruguayana,  and  when  informed  of  the  Paraguayan 
advance  he  at  once  arranged  to  give  battle,  imagining 
the  approaching  force  to  be  the  main  body  of  the 
Paraguayan  army.  Word  was  sent  to  General  Paunero, 
then  in  the  south-west  of  the  province  of  Corrientes,  to 
move  up  to  his  support.  Paunero  responded  by  a series 
of  forced  marches,  and  joined  Flores  on  August  15. 
Next  day  the  Paraguayan  column  under  Major  Duarte 
was  sighted,  and  on  August  17  the  opposing  forces 
collided  in  a hard-fought  battle  that  ended  in  the  rout  of 
the  invaders.  The  action  is  described  in  the  following 
terms  by  Colonel  Palleja  : — 

The  troops  were  paraded  at  an  early  hour  and  quickly  marched 
off  in  parallel  columns.  The  General-in-chief  gave  me  command  of 
four  regiments  of  the  Uruguayan  brigade.  Moving  in  the  formation 
mentioned  we  arrived  in  sight  of  the  town.  The  irregular  cavalry  of 
the  enemy  were  concentrated  near  some  farms  at  a distance  of  half  a 
league  from  Restauracion  (Yatay).  The  General  ordered  a halt  and 

K 


146 


PARAGUAY 


summoned  a council  of  war  to  determine  how  the  action  should  be 
fought.  My  brigade  was  ordered  to  deploy  by  battalions,  covering 
the  advance  with  a line  of  skirmishers,  and  to  attack  the  enemy’s 
front.  The  Brazilian  and  Argentine  columns  followed  in  rear,  inclin- 
ing towards  the  left  to  outflank  the  enemy.  The  Paraguayans 
occupied  a slope  which  fell  away  until  lost  in  a swamp  about  a league 
in  extent  formed  by  the  Uruguay  and  another  stream.  The  Para- 
guayan skirmishers  and  sharpshooters  were  posted  in  trenches  near 
the  ridge  of  the  hill.  The  effective  strength  of  the  force  under  Major 
Duarte  comprised  3000  men,  consisting  of  three  regiments  of  infantry 
and  two  of  cavalry. 

My  brigade  deployed,  the  24th  Regiment  in  the  centre,  the 
Florida  Regiment  on  the  right,  and  the  “ Voluntarios  Garabaldinos  ” 
on  the  left.  The  “ Libertad  ” Regiment  acted  as  skirmishers  in  front 
of  the  line.  The  band  played  the  national  hymn  and  we  moved  for- 
ward to  the  attack.  The  enemy’s  sharpshooters  in  the  trenches 
received  us  with  a heavy  fire,  but  did  not  check  us.  We  succeeded 
in  occupying  the  first  line  of  the  Paraguayan  defence,  inflicting  severe 
loss  on  the  defenders.  The  Florida  Regiment  cut  off  the  retreat  of  a 
detachment  of  the  enemy.  When  this  first  line  was  driven  in  we 
discovered  the  main  body  of  the  Paraguayans  in  strong  positions,  and 
were  exposed  to  a storm  of  musketry  fire.  My  men  charged  and 
drove  the  Paraguayans  back  to  their  encampment.  Here  the  enemy 
attempted  to  re-form,  but  were  prevented  by  another  bayonet  charge 
and  by  the  attack  of  our  cavalry  on  both  flanks,  with  the  result  that 
they  fell  back  to  the  edge  of  the  swamp.  At  this  period  of  the  fight 
several  Argentine  regiments  came  up  on  the  left  in  support  of  the 
24th  Regiment  and  the  “ Voluntaries  Garabaldinos.”  The  Florida 
Regiment  now  broke  through  the  Paraguayan  line  and  made  prisoners 
of  a section  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  The  remainder  of  the  enemy 
dashed  into  the  swamp  and  attempted  to  wade  or  swim  to  a place  of 
safety  on  the  other  side,  but  unsuccessfully.  About  a hundred  of  the 
enemy  swam  out  into  the  Uruguay  and  succeeded  in  reaching  an 
island  in  mid-stream.  At  2.30  p.m.  the  fight  was  over.  Some  250 
Paraguayans  were  left  dead  on  the  field,  the  majority  of  the  remainder 
taken  prisoners.  Our  losses  were  1 officer  killed,  10  wounded, 
and  250  men  killed  or  wounded.  The  wounded  were  numerous  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy,  and  special  care  was  taken  by  General  Flores  to 
see  that  they  were  given  proper  attention. 


This  defeat  of  the  Paraguayan  forces  was  the  most 
serious  reverse  Lopez  had  so  far  encountered,  and 
practically  put  an  end  to  his  plan  for  the  invasion  of 
Rio  Grande. 

When  news  of  the  disaster  to  Major  Duarte  reached 
Colonel  Estigarribia  he  occupied  the  city  of  Uruguay  ana 


1865]  OCCUPATION  OF  URUGUAYANA  147 

and  made  preparations  to  hold  that  place  pending  further 
instructions  from  Lopez.  The  allied  forces  determined 
to  invest  it,  and  a Brazilian  division  under  General 
Cannevaro  consisting  of  8000  mounted  troops,  1500 
infantry,  and  eight  guns,  took  up  a position  north  of  the 
town.  General  Flores,  with  1400  men,  was  detached 
to  aid  in  the  siege,  and  Argentine  forces  under  General 
Paunero  also  assisted.  The  Paraguayans  were  thus 
hemmed  in  so  completely  that  unless  help  came  their 
surrender  was  only  a question  of  a few  weeks,  for  their 
provisions  and  ammunition  were  scarce.  To  make 
certain  they  should  not  escape,  a further  reinforcement 
of  1000  men  was  brought  up  at  the  end  of  August  by 
Mitre,  and  on  September  11,  1865,  Dom  Pedro  II.  and 
his  son-in-law  the  Conde  d’Eu  appeared  with  still  more 
troops.  Up  to  then  Colonel  Estigarribia  had  refused  to 
entertain  any  proposals  for  capitulation,  relying  on  aid 
being  sent  to  him  by  General  Lopez ; but  when,  on 
September  16,  the  Emperor  made  another  proposition 
the  Colonel  decided  to  accept  it,  although  it  was  uncon- 
ditional surrender.  On  September  18,  Estigarribia  and 
his  troops  therefore  marched  out  of  the  city  as  prisoners 
of  war.  Eight  guns,  seven  standards,  and  all  the  mili- 
tary equipment  of  the  Paraguayan  army  of  invasion 
was  captured,  and  when  Lopez  was  informed  of  it 
all,  he  declared  Estigarribia  to  be  a traitor  to  his 
country. 

And  well  he  might,  for  the  loss  of  this  division  of 
the  Paraguayan  army  was  a severe  blow.  Not  only  did 
it  reduce  the  troops  available  for  active  service,  but  all 
hopes  of  an  occupation  of  Rio  Grande  were  annihilated, 
and  the  project  of  controlling  Uruguay  by  a revolution 
of  the  Blancos  against  Flores  was  frustrated.  But  the 
Paraguayan  dictator  did  not  despair.  Recognising  the 
many  difficulties  attending  an  invasion  of  Paraguay  by 
the  allies,  he  forthwith  turned  his  whole  attention  to  the 
problem  of  resisting  it.  The  strong  positions  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Parana  were  fortified  and  garrisoned 
by  trustworthy  troops.  Near  the  Parana  were  27,000 


148 


PARAGUAY 


Paraguayans  under  General  Robles  with  60  guns,  and 
General  Barrios,  Avith  10,000  men,  AATas  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Candelaria.  A force  of  5000  men  was  in 
Corrientes,  and  Lopez  himself  was  at  the  strongly 
fortified  position  of  Humaita,  from  which  central  point 
he  was  able  to  keep  in  touch  with  the  progress  of 
events. 

The  destruction  of  the  column  under  Colonel  Esti- 
garribia  and  Major  Duarte  on  the  Uruguay  modified 
the  allied  plan  of  campaign.  The  route  proposed  for 
the  advance  upon  Asuncion  entailed  a long  and  tedious 
march  through  difficult  country,  in  which  few  supplies 
could  be  obtained.  General  Mitre  therefore  proposed 
that  joint  action  should  be  taken  by  the  army  on  shore 
and  the  squadron  on  the  river.  The  plan  was  to  drive 
the  enemy  out  of  Corrientes  and  then  advance  across 
the  Parana  into  Paraguay,  while  the  squadron  was  to 
keep  the  river  open  for  transport  purposes.  After 
some  opposition  this  plan  was  accepted  and  prepara- 
tions for  the  advance  were  commenced,  although  lack 
of  transport  animals  was  such  a severe  hindrance,  that 
not  until  November  could  the  allied  army  of  40,000 
approach  Corrientes.  Small  opposition  was  en- 
countered on  the  march  from  the  river  Uruguay.  A 
few  skirmishes  took  place  with  small  bodies,  but  the 
enemy  always  fell  back,  and  when  the  allied  army 
appeared  near  the  city  of  Corrientes,  Lopez  ordered  all 
Paraguayan  troops  to  withdraw  across  the  Parana. 
Thus,  at  the  end  of  1865,  the  enemy  had  entirely 
evacuated  Argentine  territory,  and  the  failure  of  General 
Robles  to  make  any  effective  resistance  to  the  advance 
of  the  enemy  through  the  province  of  Corrientes  so 
irritated  Lopez  that  he  ordered  his  arrest.  Six  months 
after  he  was  shot. 

Affairs  in  Matto  Grosso  were  just  as  unsatisfactory 
to  Paraguay,  for  the  inhabitants  had  risen  against  the 
Lopez  Administration,  and  the  position  of  the  army  of 
occupation  became  precarious,  the  more  so  as  Lopez 
was  obliged  to  withdraw  a large  proportion  of  troops  in 


1865]  EVACUATION  OF  CORRIENTES  149 


order  to  strengthen  his  line  of  defence  on  the  Parand. 
It  thus  came  about  that  at  the  end  of  1865  the  Para- 
guayan forces  in  Brazilian  territory  were  only  strong 
enough  to  make  Paraguayan  authority  respected  in  such 
towns  as  were  garrisoned. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


Paraguay — continued 

Public  Feeling  in  South  America.  Consultation  of  Argentine, 
Brazilian,  and  Uruguayan  Representatives.  Corrientes  the  Base 
of  Operations.  Defences  of  the  Parana.  Engagement  at  Paso 
de  la  Patria.  Conduct  of  the  Argentine  National  Guard.  Raid 
to  Itati.  Reconnaissance  of  Paraguayan  Positions.  Paso  de  la 
Patria.  Crossing  of  the  Parana.  Over-confidence  of  Allies. 
Surprise  of  Allies.  Advance  into  Paraguay.  Battle  of  May  20. 
Camp  at  Tuyuti.  Lines  of  Rojas.  Discontent  in  Allied  Army. 
Engagements,  July  15  and  20.  Arrival  of  Reinforcements. 
Expedition  against  Curupaiti.  Engagement  at  Curuzu.  Garrison 
of  Curuzu.  Conference  between  Mitre  and  Lopez.  Effect  of 
Peace  Proposals.  Attack  upon  Curupaiti.  Inefficient  Recon- 
naissance. Paraguayan  Victory.  Breakdown  of  Plans.  Military 
Changes.  Public  Opinion  in  Argentina  and  Brazil.  Paralisation 
of  the  Operations.  Revolution  in  Mendoza.  Marshal  Caxias’ 
Invasion.  Arrival  of  General  Osorio  at  Tuyuti.  Forward  move- 
ment. Occupation  of  Rio  Hondo.  Advance  under  Marshal 
Caxias.  Situation  in  Matto  Grosso.  General  Mitre.  Attack 
upon  Convoy  at  Humaita.  Squadron  forces  passage  at  Curupaiti. 
Unsatisfactory  situation  of  the  Fleet.  Difficult  Transport. 
Operations  at  Humaita.  Effort  of  Paraguayans  to  recapture 
Tayi.  Attack  of  Paraguayans  upon  Tuyuti.  Heavy  Losses. 
Revolt  in  Argentina.  Assassination  of  Flores.  Squadron  forces 
the  Humaita  Passage.  Attack  on  Humaita.  Squadron  reaches 
Asuncion. 


The  retreat  of  the  Paraguayans  across  the  Parana 
caused  a revulsion  of  feeling  in  Argentina.  Hitherto 
public  sentiment  had  demanded  strong  action  against 
Lopez,  but  when  the  enemy  had  been  expelled  from 
Argentine  territory  the  standpoint  taken  was  that  the 

150 


1866]  BRAZIL  REJECTS  PEACE  PROPOSALS  151 

national  honour  was  satisfied,  and  further  sacrifice  of 
blood  and  treasure  unnecessary. 

Urquiza  was  in  favour  of  immediate  peace  negotia- 
tions with  Lopez,  and  his  influence  was  not  without 
effect  on  public  opinion.  In  Uruguay  also  the  Blancos 
agitated  for  a suspension  of  hostilities,  and  Chile  and 
Peru  intimated  to  Argentina  that  they  considered  action 
against  Paraguay  had  gone  far  enough.  The  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  and  France  were  of  the  same 
opinion,  and  a discussion  took  place  between  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  allies,  but  Brazil  decided  the  policy  to 
be  followed.  The  Emperor  declined  to  treat  with  Lopez. 
He  reminded  the  Argentine  and  Uruguay  representatives 
of  the  treaty,  and  particularly  called  attention  to  the 
clause  stating  that  warlike  operations  should  not  cease 
until  the  Paraguayans  had  been  driven  out  of  all 
territory  invaded.  It  had  also  been  stipulated  in  the 
treaty  that  no  one  party  to  the  compact  could  retire  ex- 
cept by  mutual  consent,  and  in  conclusion  Dom  PedroII. 
declared  that  as  the  Paraguayans  were  still  in  the 
Brazilian  province  of  Matto  Grosso  he  felt  the  necessity 
of  continuing  the  campaign,  and  that  in  case  Argentina 
and  Uruguay  decided  for  peace  he  should  abdicate  in 
favour  of  his  daughter,  as  a protest  against  any  such 
policy.  This  determined  attitude  carried  the  day,  and 
the  invasion  of  Paraguay  was  undertaken. 

For  this,  the  second  phase  of  the  war,  the  base  of 
operations  was  the  city  of  Corrientes,  where  large 
deposits  of  war  material  and  stores  were  collected  and 
hospitals  erected.  The  allied  army  was  distributed 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Parana  from  the  town  of 
Corrientes  to  Misiones.  In  the  arrangements  the 
squadron  played  an  important  part,  being  allotted  the 
duties  of  keeping  the  river  free  for  navigation,  making 
constant  reconnaissances  as  far  north  as  Humaita,  and 
providing  transport. 

During  these  preparations  the  Paraguayans  were 
not  idle.  The  defence  of  the  right  bank  of  the  river 
was  strengthened.  Reinforcements  were  brought  up  to 


152 


PARAGUAY 


resist  the  passage  of  the  Parana,  and  a body  of  troops 
was  in  readiness  for  a raid  into  Corrientes.  At  the  end 
of  1885,  information  was  brought  into  the  Paraguayan 
camp  that  the  vigilance  of  the  allies  had  been  relaxed 
at  the  Paso  de  la  Patria.  General  Hornos  was  the 
officer  in  command  at  this  point,  and  it  was  owing  to 
his  over-confidence  in  safety  from  attack  by  the  Para- 
guayans that  a raid  was  possible.  On  January  1,  1866, 
1000  Paraguayans  crossed  the  river  and  drove  in  the 
Argentine  picquets.  The  main  body  of  this  division 
was  then  brought  into  action,  and  a desperate  fight 
ensued.  The  Paraguayans,  reinforced,  continued  the 
attack  for  the  greater  part  of  the  day,  but  a bayonet 
charge  by  the  National  Guard  forced  them  finally  to 
retreat.  On  the  side  of  the  allies  the  casualties  were 
returned  as  402  officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded, 
and  the  Paraguayans  lost  about  1000  men.  This 
engagement  excited  particular  attention  in  Buenos  Aires 
for  the  reason  that  the  rank  and  file  of  the  National 
Guard,  upon  whom  fell  the  brunt  of  the  fighting  and 
the  majority  of  the  casualties,  were  recruited  from  well- 
known  families  in  that  city. 

In  February,  3000  Paraguayans  were  sent  on  another 
expedition  which  crossed  the  Parand,  to  Itatl,  where  the 
vanguard  of  the  allied  army  was  encamped.  General 
Flores  was  absent,  having  left  General  Suarez  in  charge. 
The  Paraguayans  were  inferior  in  strength  to  the 
division  under  Suarez,  but  the  latter  received  orders 
from  General  Mitre  to  avoid  any  engagement,  and  fell 
back  upon  San  Cosme.  No  attempt  was  made  by  the 
enemy  to  follow ; they  simply  destroyed  the  camp  and 
looted  the  town. 

March  was  spent  by  the  squadron  in  sounding  the 
river  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Paso  de  la  Patria  and 
reconnoitring  the  Paraguayan  defences.  Occasionally 
skirmishes  occurred  between  the  ships  and  the  shore, 
but  no  serious  engagements.  The  defences  of  the  Paso 
de  la  Patria  consisted  of  a fort  called  Itapiru,  situated 
on  a high  point  known  as  Diamante.  To  the  left  was 


1866]  engagements  NEAE  THE  PAEANA  153 


the  mouth  of  a stream  where  two  barges,  mounted  with 
artillery,  a steamer,  and  a number  of  canoes  were  placed. 
In  front  of  Paso  de  la  Patria  were  two  long  islands,  the 
western  of  which  was  commanded  by  the  guns  of  the 
Itapiru  fort.  On  April  5 a Brazilian  detachment  seized 
this  latter  island  and  fortified  it.  Five  days  later  a 
force  of  1200  Paraguayans  was  despatched  by  Lopez  to 
retake  the  position,  but  failed,  being  driven  back  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet,  losing  800  killed  and  wounded. 
The  Brazilian  losses  were  also  heavy,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Cabrita  and  several  officers  and  men  being  killed,  and 
a large  number  wounded. 

During  the  first  two  weeks  in  April,  preparations  for 
the  passage  of  the  Parana  had  matured.  The  allied 
army  consisted  of  75  battalions  of  infantry,  70  squadrons 
of  cavalry,  with  8 batteries  of  light  and  2 of  heavy 
artillery,  and  the  plan  was  to  effect  the  passage  at  Paso 
de  la  Patria  while  the  squadron  bombarded  the  Itapiru 
fort  to  distract  attention.  On  the  morning  of  April  16, 
1866,  a Brazilian  contingent  commanded  by  General 
Osorio  was  landed  on  the  Paraguayan  bank  of  the  river. 
The  Argentine  division  under  General  Mitre  followed, 
and  this  combined  force  drove  back  the  Paraguayans, 
who  retreated  to  a strongly  entrenched  camp  a little  to 
the  north  of  Fort  Itapiru.  Next  day  an  attack  in  force 
was  made  on  this  camp,  the  squadron  bombarding  the 
position  before  the  assault,  and,  after  resisting  success- 
fully for  several  days,  the  Paraguayans  set  fire  to  the 
camp,  destroyed  all  ammunition  and  provisions  they 
were  unable  to  remove,  and  evacuated  it.  Thus,  by 
April  25,  the  allies  were  in  possession  of  the  right  bank 
of  the  Parana,  an  advantage  gained  with  trifling  loss. 
From  this  position  it  was  possible  to  realise  some  of  the 
difficulties  of  a march  to  Asuncion.  Between  the  Parana 
and  the  strongly  fortified  position  of  Humaita  was  a 
heavily  wooded  mountain  range.  To  the  west  was  thick 
scrub  and  undergrowth  bordering  on  the  river  Paraguay, 
and  to  the  east  the  almost  impenetrable  swamps  of  the 
Estero  Yellaco.  All  advantage  was  with  the  defenders. 


154 


PARAGUAY 


No  wonder  that  the  difficulty  of  transport  was  carefully 
considered  by  General  Mitre  before  deciding  when  the 
advance  should  take  place. 

Yet  the  ease  with  which  the  passage  of  the  Parana 
had  been  accomplished  and  the  retreat  of  the  Para- 
guayans from  Fort  Itapiru  made  the  allies  over-confident, 
as  was  illustrated  by  the  position  selected  by  Flores  for 
his  division.  It  was  chosen  more  with  a view  to  general 
convenience  than  for  strategic  purposes,  and  picquets 
were  thrown  out  in  forest  country  where  observation 
was  difficult.  The  Paraguayans  were  quick  to  see  the 
weak  points  of  this  situation,  and  Lopez  sent  a force  of 
6000  men  to  advance  through  the  forest  from  different 
quarters,  with  the  result  that  at  mid-day  on  May  2,  the 
outposts  of  the  allies  were  surrounded  and  cut  to  pieces. 
The  Uruguayan  brigade  was  the  first  to  get  under  arms, 
and  it  checked  the  assault  before  the  encampment  of  the 
main  body  was  reached,  but  matters  grew  desperate, 
and  to  save  the  situation  Colonel  Palleja  ordered 
the  Florida  regiment  to  fix  bayonets  and  charge.  He 
was  not  supported  and  the  regiment  was  surrounded, 
but  after  an  hour  of  desperate  fighting  the  main  body 
came  into  action  and  the  Paraguayans  were  repulsed. 
When  pursuit  was  attempted  the  allies  were  brought 
face  to  face  with  extensive  entrenchments,  known  as 
the  “ Lines  of  Rojas,”  and  the  cause  subsequently  of 
severe  fighting.  In  this  engagement  the  Paraguayans 
lost  3000  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  abandoned  4 
field  guns  in  their  retreat.  The  allies  had  800  casual- 
ties, and  4 Brazilian  guns  were  captured  and  carried 
off. 

On  May  20  the  general  advance  into  Paraguay  began, 
but  progress  was  slow,  and  four  days  later,  while  the 
allies  were  throwing  up  entrenchments,  a sudden  assault 
was  made  upon  them  by  9000  Paraguayans,  who  attacked 
in  three  columns,  advancing  against  the  centre  and  the 
two  flanks.  To  the  right  were  the  Argentines,  in  the 
centre  the  Uruguayans  under  Flores,  on  the  left  the 
Brazilians.  The  column  attacking  the  centre  was  de- 


1866]  ALLIES  ADVANCE  INTO  PARAGUAY  155 


layed  by  unexpected  obstacles,  only  arriving  after  the 
action  had  begun  on  the  right  and  left.  Flores  was 
better  prepared,  therefore,  to  resist  than  the  other 
divisions.  The  Paraguayans  made  a desperate  attempt 
to  break  through  his  lines,  but  were  repulsed.  The 
Argentines,  however,  were  surrounded  on  the  right,  and 
on  the  left  the  enemy  succeeded  in  breaking  through  the 
Brazilian  defences  and  reached  the  outskirts  of  the  camp. 
In  this  emergency  Flores  detached  two  regiments  to 
support  the  left  wing,  when  suddenly  an  outburst  of  firing 
was  heard  in  rear  of  the  allies.  This  proved  to  be  a 
fourth  Paraguayan  column  which  had  crept  round  the 
flanks  whilst  the  allies  were  occupied  in  repelling  the 
frontal  attack.  The  cavalry  contingent  under  General 
Netto  from  Rio  Grande  was  in  rear  of  the  main  body, 
and  upon  it  fell  the  brunt  of  this  fresh  attack,  but 
the  Paraguayans  were  repulsed  finally  at  all  points  with 
a loss  of  5000  killed  and  wounded  and  4 guns  and  5 
standards.  The  casualties  of  the  allies  were  400  killed 
and  1500  wounded. 

These  two  engagements  opened  the  eyes  of  General 
Mitre  to  the  real  difficulties  of  the  situation.  The  army 
was  some  distance  from  the  river  and  unable  to  co- 
operate with  the  squadron,  and  it  was  hampered  by  the 
sick  and  wounded.  Convoys  from  the  Parand  were  con- 
stantly attacked,  and  the  nature  of  the  country  rendered 
long  marches  an  impossibility.  Little  resistance  had 
been  anticipated  south  of  Humaita  on  the  river  Paraguay, 
and  at  this  point  the  aid  of  the  squadron  would  facilitate 
land  operations,  but  calculations  made  before  the  advance 
had  proved  erroneous,  and  nothing  had  been  known  of 
the  “Lines  of  Rojas,”  which  now  confronted  the  allies. 
What  wonder  then  that  the  army  generally  was  dis- 
heartened at  the  obstacles  before  it.  In  the  councils 
of  war  two  courses  were  discussed — either  to  retire  to 
the  Parand,  or  to  entrench  the  camp  and  hold  the 
position  until  the  “Lines  of  Rojas”  were  captured. 
The  first  proposition  was  abandoned  on  the  ground  that 
it  would  entail  political  complications,  and  the  second 


156 


PARAGUAY 


adopted.  Trenches  and  fortifications  were  constructed 
to  ensure  the  camp  against  surprise.  Preparations  were 
made  for  reducing  the  Paraguayan  position  by  bombard- 
ment, and  no  assault  was  to  be  attempted  until  the 
arrival  of  the  reinforcements  now  en  route  under  the 
Brazilian  General  Porto  Alegre. 

All  this  time  Lopez  was  at  Humaita  elaborating 
defensive  measures  against  the  invasion.  The  heavy 
losses  of  the  Paraguayan  army  during  the  first  year  of 
the  war  were  made  good  by  enlisting  all  males  capable 
of  bearing  arms,  this  including  boys  of  fourteen  and  men 
of  sixty  years  of  age,  and  the  misery  this  caused  was 
widespread.  But  the  Dictator  was  determined  to  resist 
the  advance  of  the  allies  as  long  as  he  could  obtain  men 
to  fight. 

Discontent  now  broke  out  between  the  allies,  and 
General  Osorio  resigned  his  command.  Flores  threatened 
to  follow  this  example  unless  supplies  and  reinforcements 
were  forthcoming  from  Montevideo.  In  the  second 
week  of  July  there  was  no  sign  of  General  Porto 
Alegre  and  his  12,000  men,  but  to  prevent  the  mischief 
from  spreading  Mitre  decided  to  go  on  without  him. 
So,  on  July  15,  the  4th  Infantry  Division  under  General 
Guillermo  Souza,  supported  by  the  Argentine  Division 
under  Colonel  Conessa,  attacked  at  daybreak  and  carried 
the  Paraguayan  trenches  after  severe  fighting.  Beyond 
the  trenches  was  an  open  space  defended  by  a redoubt 
and  communicating  with  the  fortifications  protecting  the 
Paraguayan  camp.  The  Brazilians  attempted  to  advance 
and  storm  this  redoubt,  but  were  driven  back  with  heavy 
loss.  Beyond  some  cannonading  and  skirmishing  nothing 
further  occurred  until  the  18th,  when  the  allies  again 
attacked  the  Paraguayan  defences  and  the  redoubt  was 
captured,  but  at  great  sacrifice  of  life.  Amongst  the 
killed  was  Colonel  Palleja,  the  officer  commanding  the 
Uruguayan  brigade.  After  several  days’  further  skirmish- 
ing the  Paraguayans  were  forced  to  retire  within  the 
“ Lines  of  Rojas,”  but  General  Mitre  did  not  consider 
his  force  strong  enough  to  advance,  for  the  prolonged 


1866]  PARAGUAYAN  DEFENCES  157 

fighting  had  cost  the  allies  2000  officers  and  men  killed 
and  wounded. 

Another  period  of  inactivity  therefore  followed  until 
the  arrival  of  General  Porto  Alegre  in  August,  when  the 
unsatisfactory  results  at  Rojas  led  to  a proposal  to  send 
an  expedition  up  the  river  Paraguay  to  attack  the 
fortified  town  of  Curupaiti  in  combination  with  the 
squadron  thence  moving  northwards  against  Humaita. 
Success  in  this,  it  was  argued,  would  compel  Lopez  to 
withdraw  his  forces  from  Rojas  to  support  Humaita, 
upon  which  the  allied  army  could  then  converge. 
General  Porto  Alegre  with  9000  men,  and  accompanied 
by  six  cruisers,  was  accordingly  told  off  to  carry  out  this 
plan,  and  started  on  September  1.  An  example  now 
illustrated  the  faulty  information  of  the  allies  concern- 
ing the  nature  of  the  Paraguayan  defences.  On  the 
first  day  the  warships  and  transports  advanced  up  the 
river  Paraguay  they  were  checked  by  heavy  artillery  and 
musketry  fire,  and  obliged  to  seek  shelter  behind  some 
islands  in  mid-river.  Then  it  was  discovered  that  in  a 
clear  space  in  the  scrub  a fort  had  been  erected  com- 
manding the  river,  and  a force  of  2000  men  forthwith 
landed  below  this  position,  another  1000  strong  being 
disembarked  as  a support,  the  squadron  covering  all  by 
bombarding  the  Paraguayan  position.  Aided  by  this 
cannonade  the  Brazilians  endeavoured  to  advance 
towards  the  fort,  and  as  they  did  so  the  squadron  was 
obliged  to  cease  firing  for  fear  of  hitting  its  own  side, 
whereupon  the  Paraguayans  at  once  attacked  the 
invaders.  Fighting  continued  for  several  hours,  and 
then  reinforcements  of  3000  men  were  landed.  Next 
morning  the  assault  upon  this  fortified  position,  known 
as  Curuzu,  was  renewed,  and  shortly  after  fighting  had 
begun  a torpedo  launched  from  the  river  bank  exploded 
under  the  ironclad  Rio  de  Janeiro,  which  foundered  with 
the  majority  of  her  officers  and  crew.  The  vessel  had 
cost  7,000,000  francs,  and  was  considered  the  finest  ship 
in  the  Brazilian  navy.  The  Paraguayans  stubbornly 
defended  their  position,  but  were  out-numbered  and  in 


158 


PARAGUAY 


the  end  retreated,  leaving  the  fort  in  the  hands  of  the 
invaders.  Pursuit  was  continued  by  the  Brazilians  up 
to  the  walls  of  Curupaitl,  but  this  place  was  so  strongly 
held  that  they  returned  to  Curuzu.  It  was  a dearly- 
bought  victory,  for  the  expedition  lost  1000  men  killed 
and  wounded,  in  addition  to  the  disaster  to  the  Rio  de 
Janeiro.  Lopez  was  furious  when  he  learned  that 
Curuzu  was  taken,  and  immediately  ordered  one  half  of 
the  officers  and  ten  per  cent,  of  the  other  survivors  to 
be  executed.  General  Porto  Alegre  now  requisitioned 
reinforcements  to  attack  Curupaitl,  but  the  commander- 
in-chief  hesitated  to  accede  to  this  request,  on  the 
grounds  that  to  weaken  the  force  opposite  Rojas  would 
expose  the  army  to  serious  danger.  All  the  Brazilian 
generals,  however,  were  in  favour  of  the  attack  upon 
Curupaitl  as  a means  to  open  the  road  to  Humaita. 
Admiral  Tamandare,  on  the  other  hand,  opposed  an 
immediate  advance,  asserting  that  he  was  not  prepared 
to  risk  the  loss  of  another  cruiser.  So  General  Porto 
Alegre  entrenched  his  camp  at  Curuzu  and  awaited 
developments. 

Meanwhile  Lopez  had  sent  a flag  of  truce  to  Mitre 
proposing  terms  for  peace.  These  were  rejected  by  the 
allies  after  a conference  between  Mitre,  Flores,  and  the 
Paraguayan  representative.  The  senior  Brazilian  officer, 
General  Polidoro,  was  invited  to  be  present,  but  refused, 
stating  that  his  Government  had  instructed  him  to  make 
war  against  the  tyrant  of  Paraguay  and  not  to  cease 
until  the  Dictator  was  overthrown.  Lopez’s  proposal 
was  to  make  peace  with  Argentina  and  Uruguay,  but 
not  with  Brazil.  The  discussion  Avas  of  short  duration, 
the  first  condition  laid  down  by  Mitre  for  any  negotia- 
tions being  the  absolute  separation  of  Lopez  from  further 
participation  in  the  Government  of  Paraguay.  When 
this  was  made  clear  to  the  representative  of  Lopez,  he 
refused  to  treat. 

Although  General  Mitre  had  brusquely  cut  short  the 
peace  negotiations  proposed  by  Lopez,  they  influenced 
his  judgment  of  the  position,  leading  him  to  see  in  the 


1866] 


LOPEZ  PROPOSES  PEACE 


159 


fact  that  Lopez  had  taken  the  first  step,  the  sign  of  a 
lessened  confidence  in  his  absolute  power  to  resist  as 
expressed  at  the  commencement  of  hostilities.  Many 
councils  of  war  were  then  held,  at  which  the  Brazilian 
generals  continued  strongly  in  favour  of  supporting 
General  Porto  Alegre  in  Curuzu,  and  from  that  point 
making  the  advance  northwards  to  Curupaiti  and 
Humaita.  In  the  end  Mitre  agreed  to  this  plan  of 
campaign,  and  arranged  that  the  camp  at  Tuyuti,  the 
position  so  long  occupied  by  the  allies,  should  be 
entrusted  to  General  Polidoro,  and  that  Flores  with  the 
Uruguayan  division  should  keep  open  communication 
between  Tuyuti  and  Curuzu.  Mitre  with  the  Argentine 
troops  immediately  proceeded  to  Curuzu.  When  the 
advance  to  Curupaiti  was  begun  General  Polidoro  was 
to  assault  the  Paraguayan  position  at  Rojas. 

The  march  to  Curupaiti  commenced  on  September  22. 
Scouting  parties  sent  out  previously  had  reported 
the  vicinity  clear  and  the  main  road  between  the  two 
places  free  from  all  obstacles,  except  a few  entrench- 
ments near  the  Paraguayan  positions.  Owing  to  recent 
rains  the  difficulty  of  transport  was  increased,  especially 
in  regard  to  artillery,  and  it  was  found  necessary  to 
reduce  the  number  of  guns.  The  squadron  was  in- 
structed to  take  up  a position  on  the  river  opposite 
Curupaiti  and  prepare  the  way  by  bombarding  the  forti- 
fications, but  the  remembrance  of  the  disaster  to  the 
Rio  de  Janeiro  was  fresh  in  the  mind  of  Admiral 
Tamandare,  and  to  avoid  any  possibility  of  a repetition 
of  this  misforture  he  ordered  the  ships  to  lay  off  at  a 
distance  to  ensure  safety  from  torpedoes.  As  a matter 
of  fact  the  squadron  kept  so  far  away  that  the  naval 
guns  did  no  damage  to  the  fort  or  garrison.  This 
aroused  bitter  recriminations  by  the  military  officers. 

It  was  a tedious  march.  A mile  from  the  Para- 
guayan fortifications  the  road  was  cut  by  a fosse  twelve 
feet  deep  and  extending  across  country  for  three  miles. 
The  Argentine  troops  forming  the  left  wing  were  able, 
however,  to  cross  this  impediment  without  great  diffi- 


160 


PARAGUAY 


culty,  but  on  the  far  side  another  surprise  was  in  store. 
The  intervening  space  to  the  fortifications  was  marshy 
ground  full  of  pitfalls  and  entanglements,  the  whole 
commanded  by  artillery,  which  opened  fire  to  such  good 
purpose  that  the  column  was  forced  back.  The  guns  of 
the  allies  were  now  brought  into  action,  and  under  cover 
of  their  fire  another  attempt  was  made  to  storm  the 
position,  but  it  proved  useless  and  the  allies  were 
repulsed.  Mitre  retreated  to  Curuzu  with  a loss  of 
5000  killed  and  wounded.  The  casualties  of  the 
defenders  of  Curupaitf  were  trifling. 

The  operations  assigned  by  General  Mitre  to  Flores 
and  Polidoro  had  also  miscarried.  General  Flores  had 
failed  to  establish  communication  with  Curuzu,  and 
Polidoro  did  not  dare  to  attack  the  position  at  Rojas 
until  connection  with  Curuzu  was  assured.  At  the  end 
of  September,  1866,  therefore,  the  position  was  most  un- 
satisfactory, the  more  so  that  Lopez  strengthened  the 
garrison  of  Rojas.  Several  changes  in  the  higher  posts 
of  the  allied  army  now  took  place.  Mitre  returned  to 
Tuyuti,  Porto  Alegre  resuming  command  of  the  forces 
at  Curuzu,  and  Flores  left  Paraguay  for  Montevideo, 
while  the  Brazilian  Government  recalled  Admiral 
Tamandare. 

Indignation  was  aroused  in  Argentina  and  Brazil 
at  the  mishaps  to  the  allies,  and  discontent  with  the 
policy  of  the  two  Governments  in  continuing  the  war 
rapidly  spread.  The  loss  of  life  and  heavy  expenditure 
were  the  principal  reasons  urged  for  peace  with  Paraguay, 
but  the  Emperor  of  Brazil  would  not  listen  to  any  such 
proposition,  and  a further  contingent  of  10,000  men  of 
the  Brazilian  National  Guard  was  embodied.  More 
ships  also  were  fitted  out,  Marshal  Caxias  was  given 
command  of  the  Brazilian  forces,  and  Admiral  Ignacio 
ordered  to  replace  Admiral  Tamandare.  In  the  middle 
of  December  these  two  officers  reached  Tuyuti. 

Another  long  period  of  inactivity  now  ensued,  and 
the  result  of  many  conferences  was  the  conviction  that 
no  further  advance  was  possible  without  strong  rein- 


1867]  WAITING  FOR  REINFORCEMENTS  161 


forcements  for  both  army  and  navy.  Despatches  were 
sent  by  Caxias  and  Ignacio  to  the  Brazilian  Government 
stating  what  troops  and  vessels  they  considered  necessary 
to  attempt  a forward  movement,  and  meantime  the  work 
of  the  allies  was  confined  to  reconnaissance  of  the 
Paraguayan  lines  at  Rojas,  and  preparations  for  the 
advance  when  reinforcements  did  come.  An  interrup- 
tion, however,  from  an  unexpected  quarter  occurred  to 
complicate  matters,  for  a revolution  broke  out  in  the 
Argentine  province  of  Mendoza,  and  developed  to  such 
formidable  extent  that  Mitre  was  obliged  to  order 
Paunero  with  3000  men  to  embark  immediately  for 
Rosario,  and  thence  march  against  the  rebels.  Soon 
affairs  became  so  serious  that  Mitre  himself  decided  to 
take  the  field,  and  left  Paraguay  for  that  purpose. 

The  suppression  of  this  revolutionary  movement  in 
Argentina  directly  concerned  the  war  against  Paraguay, 
for  its  leaders  insisted  on  the  conclusion  of  the  war,  the 
denouncement  of  the  alliance  with  Brazil  and  Uruguay, 
and,  finally,  the  secession  of  the  State  of  Mendoza  from 
the  Argentine  Confederation.  San  Juan,  San  Luis,  and 
La  Rioja  provinces  joined  the  movement,  and  the  rising 
threatened  imminent  danger  to  the  National  Government. 
Hence  General  Mitre,  as  President  of  Argentina,  felt 
obliged  to  abandon  command  of  the  allies  to  go  and 
face  the  storm  by  which  his  administration  was  con- 
fronted. He  gone,  the  post  of  Commander-in-chief  of 
the  allied  army  devolved  upon  Marshal  Caxias. 

The  army  now  had  a total  effective  strength  of 
35,000  men,  and  reinforcements  of  10,000  more  were 
expected.  So  Marshal  Caxias  decided  to  attempt  to 
outflank  the  Paraguayan  position  at  Rojas,  certain 
weakly  guarded  sections  along  the  lines  of  the  enemy’s 
trenches  having  been  discovered.  Therefore,  when  in 
July,  General  Osorio,  with  reinforcements  of  7000  men, 
reached  Tuyutl — his  march  from  Candelaria  having  been 
delayed  by  an  outbreak  of  Asiatic  cholera — Marshal 
Caxias  saw  no  reason  to  wait  any  longer. 

He  began  his  campaign  on  July  22,  1867,  and  a 

L 


162 


PARAGUAY 


division  of  6000  men  was  thrown  forward  under  General 
Osorio  as  a vanguard,  22,000  men  under  the  Marshal 
himself  following.  A force  of  9000  men  was  left  at 
Tuyuti  with  General  Porto  Alegre.  The  advance  was 
to  the  east  of  the  fortified  positions  at  Rojas,  through 
swampy  country,  and  the  Paraguayans,  abandoning 
their  trenches,  marched  parallel  to  the  allies.  By  night- 
fall Caxias  reached  the  village  of  Rio  Honda,  a few 
miles  to  the  north  of  Humaita,  where  he  cut  the  telegraph 
line  between  that  place  and  Asuncion.  A road  was 
now  opened  to  Tuyuti  to  allow  transport  of  provisions, 
and  strong  protection  given  to  this  line  of  communica- 
tion. Humaita  was  thus  cut  off  from  the  remainder  of 
Paraguay,  the  only  other  connection  with  Asuncion 
being  by  water,  and  that  too  was  to  be  closed  by  the 
advance  of  the  squadron. 

This  move  of  the  Marshal’s  was  the  turning-point  of 
the  war.  For  fifteen  months  the  allies  had  failed  to 
push  forward,  but  now  the  dangerous,  if  skilful,  tactics 
of  the  Brazilian  Commander-in-chief  proved  successful, 
and  obliged  Lopez  to  withdraw  his  outlying  posts 
towards  Humaita.  Marshal  Caxias  was  quite  aware  of 
the  animosity  that  would  be  stirred  up  should  he  be 
forced  to  abandon  his  advantageous  position,  and  every 
precaution  was  taken. 

Meanwhile,  in  Matto  Grosso  the  cause  of  Paraguay 
had  steadily  lost  ground.  A fight  took  place  between 
two  Brazilian  ships  and  three  Paraguayan,  in  which  the 
latter  were  worsted.  Senhor  Coelho  Magalhaes,  the 
Brazilian  Governor  of  Matto  Grosso,  thereupon  ordered 
his  ships  to  Corumba  and  demanded  its  surrender.  It 
was  refused,  but  after  severe  fighting  the  city  capitulated. 

General  Mitre  resumed  command  of  the  allies  on 
July  28,  the  revolutionary  movement  in  Mendoza  having 
been  suppressed,  leaving  the  President  of  Argentina 
free  to  take  the  field  again.  The  last  days  of  July  and 
the  beginning  of  August  passed  with  occasional  skir- 
mishes between  detachments  of  the  invading  army  and 
scattered  groups  of  Paraguayans,  and  on  August  11 


1867]  THE  advance  to  humaita 


163 


some  excitement  was  caused  by  an  attempt  to  capture  a 
convoy  of  the  allies  on  its  way  from  Tuyuti.  The  fact 
that  the  Paraguayans  waited  until  only  a small  escort 
was  despatched  proved  them  to  be  well  informed  of  the 
movements  of  their  enemies,  and  in  this  respect  they 
showed  superior  organisation  to  the  allies.  A small 
force  of  400  men  was  sent  by  Lopez  to  intercept  a 
valuable  provision  train,  and  the  Brazilian  escort  was 
surprised,  but  some  of  the  men  escaped  and  gave  informa- 
tion of  the  disaster.  General  Porto  Alegre  immediately 
set  out  with  a strong  force  to  the  scene  of  the  mishap, 
and  eventually  recovered  a portion  of  the  stores. 

The  allies  now  proposed  closing  in  upon  Humaita 
towards  the  south.  To  accomplish  this  the  squadron 
was  ordered  to  ascend  the  river  Paraguay  to  a position 
near  Humaita,  and  did  so  on  August  15,  but  its  position 
was  not  satisfactory  or  free  from  danger.  In  front  were 
the  guns  of  Humaita,  and  the  passage  was  blocked  by  a 
great  iron  chain  stretching  from  shore  to  shore.  In 
rear,  towards  the  neighbourhood  of  Curuzu,  heavily 
armed  batteries  were  erected  by  Lopez  to  command  the 
river  below  the  squadron.  To  force  the  passage  at 
Humaita  was  therefore  no  easy  matter,  and  if  any  disaster 
occurred  to  the  army,  the  ships  would  have  to  run  the 
gauntlet  of  the  guns  at  Curupaiti,  as  well  as  overcome 
the  formidable  obstacles  of  recent  construction  near 
Curuzu. 

Difficulty  of  transport  now  hampered  the  allies, 
especially  in  the  matter  of  food  supplies  and  medical 
stores.  Large  deposits  had  been  accumulated  in  Corrie- 
entes,  but  carriage  to  Tuyuti  and  thence  to  the  troops  in 
the  field  was  not  easy.  So  to  increase  facilities  of 
transportation  every  effort  was  made  to  establish 
communication  with  the  squadron  to  the  south  of 
Humaita.  This  done,  the  positions  of  the  Paraguayans 
below  that  point  would  become  untenable,  and  the  river 
be  available  for  transport.  Accordingly,  the  lines  of  the 
invading  army  were  gradually  pushed  westwards  towards 
the  river,  but  progress  was  siow  owing  to  the  stubborn 


164 


PARAGUAY 


resistance  of  the  Paraguayan  outposts,  and  because  a 
large  number  of  troops  were  required  to  the  north  of 
Humaita  to  prevent  the  re-establishment  of  communica- 
tion by  land  between  Humaita  and  Asuncion.  To 
isolate  Humaita  further  a force  under  Generals  Hornos 
and  Barreto  was  sent  to  the  north  of  the  Rio  Hondo  to 
occupy  Villa  del  Pilar,  which  was  captured  on  September 
24,  1867.  From  this  point  an  advance  was  made  to 
Tayi,  a town  to  the  south  of  Villa  del  Pilar,  and  this 
was  also  captured  after  severe  fighting,  several  batteries 
of  heavy  guns  being  mounted  at  this  place  by  General 
Barreto  to  command  the  passage  of  the  river,  thus 
severing  communication  by  water  between  Asuncion 
and  Humaita.  The  Paraguayans  made  a desperate 
effort  to  retake  Tayi.  On  the  morning  of  November  2, 
three  steamers  and  a barge  conveying  3000  men  appeared 
near  the  town  and  were  disembarked,  but  General 
Barreto  attacked  this  force  and  inflicted  a severe  defeat 
upon  it. 

The  knowledge  that  the  allies  were  closing  in  upon 
Humaita  induced  Lopez  to  make  a strong  effort.  He 
learnt  that  a valuable  convoy  escorted  by  three  regiments 
of  cavalry  and  three  battalions  of  infantry  would  leave 
Tuyuti  early  in  November,  and  determined  to  send  an 
expedition  to  intercept  it.  The  Paraguayans  numbered 
6000  under  General  Barrios,  and  on  the  night  of 
November  2,  1867,  they  lay  hidden  near  Tuyuti.  Recent 
successes  had  made  the  allies  careless,  and  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  was  unknown  until  the  convoy  and  escort 
were  suddenly  attacked.  Panic  ensued,  and  the  cavalry 
and  infantry  regiments  were  cut  to  pieces.  The  Para- 
guayans then  moved  forward  in  three  columns  upon 
Tuyuti,  and  entered  it  without  opposition,  shooting  down 
the  troops,  looting  the  camp,  and  capturing  the  whole 
position  before  daybreak,  with  the  exception  of  an 
entrenched  section  in  the  centre.  Here  the  remnants  of 
the  allies  resisted  until  assistance  arrived.  The  news  of 
the  disaster  reached  Marshal  Caxias  through  refugees 
who  escaped  from  the  convoy,  and  all  available  troops 


1868] 


DISASTEK  AT  TUYUTI 


165 


were  despatched  to  Tuyuti.  For  some  hours  after  the 
arrival  of  these  reinforcements  the  Paraguayans  con- 
tinued the  fight,  but  seeing  themselves  outnumbered 
they  finally  withdrew  towards  Humaita.  The  losses  to 
the  allied  army  in  killed  and  wounded  were  270  officers, 
3300  men,  500  prisoners,  3 standards,  10  pieces  of 
artillery,  and  an  immense  stock  of  ammunition  and 
stores.  On  the  Paraguayan  side  the  casualties  were  78 
officers  and  2271  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  151 
prisoners.  The  effect  of  this  defeat  was  mitigated  to 
the  allies  by  the  fact  that  Lopez  could  not  follow  up  his 
advantage  owing  to  lack  of  troops. 

Still  this  disaster  at  Tuyuti  threatened  to  create 
complications  similar  to  those  in  Mendoza.  Urquiza 
raised  the  standard  of  revolt  in  Cordoba,  demanding  the 
dissolution  of  the  alliance  between  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Uruguay  and  immediate  peace  negotiations  with 
Paraguay,  and  that  revolutionary  outbreak  again  required 
the  presence  of  General  Mitre  in  Argentina.  Once 
more  the  chief  command  of  the  troops  in  the  field  was 
left  to  Marshal  Caxias,  the  Argentine  division  being  in 
charge  of  General  Geliy  y Obes.  Matters  in  Uruguay 
also  were  not  satisfactory,  for  the  Blancos  hatched  a 
conspiracy  there  against  the  Administration,  which 
resulted  in  the  assassination  of  General  Flores. 

Some  weeks  elapsed  before  the  allies  were  able  to 
resume  active  hostilities,  but  towards  the  close  of  1867 
preparations  were  made  to  attack  Humaita,  Curupaitl, 
and  other  places.  It  was  decided  that  part  of  the 
squadron  should  force  a passage  past  Humaita  to  co- 
operate with  the  land  forces.  The  vessels  available  for 
action  consisted  of  43  ships  of  war,  mounting  223  guns, 
and  with  a total  complement  of  702  officers  and  3779 
men.  On  February  19,  1868,  at  3 a.m.,  they  steamed 
opposite  the  fortifications,  where  they  were  exposed  to 
heavy  fire  from  the  batteries.  The  guns  of  the  fleet 
were  concentrated  upon  the  two  barges  which  sustained 
the  ends  of  the  great  chain  stretching  across  the  river, 
anti  so  effectual  was  their  fire,  that  both  barges  were 


166 


PARAGUAY 


sunk  in  a few  minutes.  This  left  the  river  free  to 
navigation,  and  the  vessels  steamed  ahead,  meeting  a 
hail  of  projectiles  as  they  passed.  During  this  firing, 
the  cable  by  which  the  Bahia  was  towing  the 
Alagoa  parted,  and  thirty  canoes  filled  with  Para- 
guayans immediately  surrounded  and  captured  her. 
The  remaining  vessels  reached  the  port  of  Tayf,  but  the 
Para  and  the  Tamandare  were  so  severely  damaged 
as  to  be  rendered  unserviceable.  Whilst  the  squadron 
was  forcing  the  passage  of  Humaita  the  Argentines 
made  an  attack  on  the  Paraguayan  outposts  on  the 
eastern  side.  On  the  south-east  General  Osorio  also 
advanced,  while  to  the  south  General  Argollo  drove  in 
the  enemy’s  picquets,  and  on  the  north  Marshal  Caxias, 
with  3000  men,  attacked  the  town  of  Timbo  and 
captured  this  place  with  a loss  of  600  officers  and  men 
killed  and  wounded. 

After  this  general  attack  there  was  a lull  in  the 
hostilities.  The  allied  army  had  gained  decided  advan- 
tages, and  the  cordon  round  Humaita  had  been  drawn 
much  closer.  Meanwhile  the  squadron  steamed  up  the 
river  and  reached  Asuncion,  the  Paraguayan  national 
capital,  on  February  28.  A few  shots  were  fired,  but 
the  bombardment  ceased  on  the  arrival  of  a flag  of  truce 
from  Sehor  Berges,  the  minister  in  charge  of  the 
Government,  with  a request  not  to  fire  on  an  unfortified 
city.  A detachment  was  then  landed  to  take  possession 
of  the  town,  but  the  men  were  shortly  afterwards 
re-embarked,  and  the  squadron  proceeded  down  the  river 
to  Tayi. 


CHAPTER  IX 


Paraguay — continues 


Paraguayan  Attempt  to  Destroy  Squadron.  Capture  of  Rojas. 
Capitulation  of  Curupaiti.  Concentration  of  the  Paraguayans  in 
Humaita.  Bombardment  of  Humaita.  Attempt  to  Seize  the 
Monitor  Rio  Grande.  Assault  on  Humaita.  Passage  of  Humaita 
again  Forced.  Evacuation  of  Humaita.  Attack  on  the  Allies. 
Booty  in  Humaita.  Asuncion  the  Objective  Point.  Humaita 
the  Base  of  Supplies.  Paraguayans  abandon  Riverside  Towns. 
The  Allied  Army  leaves  Villa  del  Pilar.  Passage  of  the  river 
Tibicuari.  Paraguayans  fall  Back.  Conditions  at  Tibicuari. 
Victims  of  Lopez.  Paraguayans  in  Force  near  the  river  Carabe. 
Passage  of  the  river  Paraguay.  Plan  of  Campaign.  Attack 
upon  Villeta.  Renewal  of  Hostilities.  Capture  of  Villeta. 


For  Lopez  the  situation  was  now  gloomy  enough,  but 
the  Dictator  of  Paraguay  was  full  of  resources,  and 
forthwith  conceived  a plan  for  the  destruction  of  the 
portion  of  the  allied  fleet  lying  below  Humaita.  In  the 
rivers  Paraguay  and  Parana  masses  of  verdure  float 
with  the  current.  These  camalotes,  or  floating  islands, 
usually  excite  little  attention,  and  Lopez  formed  the 
idea  of  lashing  canoes  in  batches  of  four  and  covering 
them  with  similar  herbage.  By  embarking  armed  men 
in  these  canoes  and  floating  them  down  the  river 
amongst  the  allied  fleet,  they  might  be  able,  when  they 
reached  the  vessels,  to  board  the  ships  and  kill  every- 
body offering  resistance.  On  the  night  of  March  1, 
1868,  this  extraordinary  plan  was  put  into  execution, 
and  at  break  of  day  the  first  of  these  batches  of  canoes 
was  abreast  of  the  cruiser  Lima  when  a guard  boat 


168 


PARAGUAY 


stationed  a hundred  yards  off  became  suspicious  and 
gave  the  alarm.  The  Paraguayans  nevertheless  boarded 
the  Lima  and  killed  a number  of  the  men  on  deck,  but 
the  crew  rallied  after  the  first  onslaught  and  regained 
possession  of  the  vessel.  The  other  ships  of  the  fleet, 
now  on  the  alert,  opened  fire  on  the  camalotes  as  they 
drifted  along,  and  few  of  the  1000  men  in  the  canoes 
escaped  death. 

Soon  after  this  abortive  attempt  against  the  allied 
fleet,  the  weak  points  of  the  Paraguayan  defence  became 
more  apparent.  The  remaining  positions  in  the  “ Lines 
of  Rojas”  were  captured  by  General  Argollo,  and  all 
resistance  in  this  district  ceased.  A few  days  later 
Curupaitf  capitulated.  This  allowed  a closer  investment 
of  Humaita,  and  the  allies  advanced  their  entrenched 
positions  from  the  south,  but  this  entailed  severe  fight- 
ing with  the  Paraguayan  outposts,  and  200  officers  and 
men  were  killed  and  wounded. 

On  March  22,  1868,  the  Paraguayan  detachments  to 
the  south  and  east  of  Humaitd  concentrated  inside  the 
fortifications,  setting  fire  to  the  different  camps  they 
evacuated.  The  allied  army  immediately  invested  the 
stronghold.  Humaita  was  considered  impregnable  by 
the  Paraguayans.  Its  parapets  were  of  earth  surrounded 
by  ditches  15  feet  deep  and  10  feet  wide,  filled  with 
water,  and  the  approaches  were  commanded  by  300 
guns.  The  iron  chain  across  the  river  had  been  replaced, 
and  at  each  end  formidable  batteries  established.  So, 
after  withdrawing  all  outposts  and  issuing  instructions 
for  the  defence,  Lopez  left  for  Tibicuarf  to  construct 
another  stronghold  in  that  locality. 

In  the  beginning  of  April  a steady  bombardment  of 
Humaita  was  commenced  by  the  allies,  and  continued 
with  little  intermission  for  three  months.  At  first  the 
Paraguayans  returned  the  fire,  but  after  a few  weeks  their 
supply  of  powder  ran  short.  Occasional  sorties,  how- 
ever, were  made  by  the  garrison,  and,  although  unable 
to  affect  the  position  of  the  allied  troops,  considerable 
losses  wrere  inflicted.  To  shut  off  means  of  communica- 


1868] 


INVESTMENT  OF  HUMAITA 


169 


tion  between  Humaita  and  the  north,  a division  of  3500 
men  of  the  allied  army  under  General  Ignacio  Rivas 
was  disembarked  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river  Paraguay 
to  occupy  the  country  between  the  town  of  Timbo  and 
Humaita.  A small  column  despatched  to  join  General 
Rivas  in  May  was  surprised  and  cut  to  pieces  by  a 
Paraguayan  force.  In  July  the  Paraguayans  made  an 
attempt  to  seize  the  monitor  Rio  Grande  by  again 
resorting  to  the  device  of  embarking  in  canoes  disguised 
as  floating  islands,  and  on  this  occasion  they  succeeded 
in  reaching  the  vessel  undiscovered,  and  wrought  no 
small  havoc  amongst  the  crew  before  the  other  ships 
came  to  the  rescue  and  drove  them  into  the  water. 

Marshal  Caxias,  becoming  impatient,  now  determined 
to  make  an  attempt  to  carry  Humaita  by  assault.  General 
Osorio  was  directed  to  detach  10  battalions  of  infantry 
and  storm  the  section  known  as  the  Londres  battery. 
He  reached  the  parapets  of  the  fort  on  July  15,  but  was 
driven  back  with  heavy  loss.  The  effort  was  repeated, 
but  only  to  meet  a similar  fate.  Osorio  then  despatched 
messengers  to  Marshal  Caxias,  asking  for  reinforcements, 
but  was  ordered  to  retire.  A few  days  later  another 
engagement  occurred  in  which  the  allies  suffered  severely. 
Five  battalions  of  infantry  were  en  route  from  the  head- 
quarter camp  to  join  General  Rivas,  then  near  Timbo, 
when  a sudden  attack  was  made  by  the  Paraguayans. 
The  allies  were  thrown  into  confusion  and  the  casualties 
were  heavy.  Fortunately  a detachment  sent  out  by 
General  Rivas  arrived  in  time  to  render  assistance,  but 
the  total  losses  of  killed  and  wounded  in  this  fight  were 
500. 

On  July  21,  1868,  Marshal  Caxias  ordered  the  passage 
of  the  river  Paraguay  in  front  of  Humaita  again  to  be 
forced.  The  purpose  was  to  search  the  river  for  three 
Paraguayan  ships,  and  three  vessels  successfully  carried 
out  the  movement  without  suffering  serious  damage. 
No  sign  of  the  hostile  ships  could  be  discovered,  but 
the  moral  effect  of  again  forcing  the  passage  of  the 
river  was  not  without  value.  Five  days  later  some 


170 


PARAGUAY 


further  skirmishing  occurred,  but  it  was  evident  from 
the  lessening  energy  shown  by  the  garrison  that  the 
defence  of  Humaita  was  weakening. 

Its  collapse,  indeed,  was  closer  than  the  allies 
imagined,  for  during  the  night  of  July  26,  the  Para- 
guayans evacuated  the  town,  using  canoes  to  cross  to 
the  right  bank  of  the  Paraguay,  where  heavy  forest 
concealed  their  presence.  Next  morning,  the  advanced 
picquets  of  the  besieging  army  reported  that  positions 
usually  occupied  by  sentries  on  the  fortifications  were 
deserted,  and  Marshal  Caxias  ordered  the  troops  to  be 
formed  up  in  readiness  for  a general  assault.  The 
allies  did  not  believe  the  evacuation  was  an  accomplished 
fact,  and  every  precaution  was  taken  against  surprise, 
but  no  resistance  was  offered.  Humaita  was  aban- 
doned, the  few  remaining  inhabitants  disappearing  into 
the  forest  to  the  north  with  the  entrance  of  the  allies 
into  the  town.  More  than  two  years  had  passed  since 
the  allied  army  had  crossed  the  river  Parana,  and  all 
progress  had  been  checked  by  the  stand  at  this  place 
in  combination  with  its  auxiliary  positions  at  Rojas  and 
Curupaiti. 

But  the  occupation  of  Humaita  did  not  prove  to  be 
the  end  of  the  fighting  in  this  neighbourhood,  for  on 
the  night  of  August  2,  the  left  wing  of  the  allies  was 
unsuccessfully  attacked  in  order  to  clear  a way  for 
some  canoes  laden  with  provisions.  In  the  swamps, 
moreover,  to  the  north  of  Humaita  the  effort  of  the 
allied  forces  to  capture  the  Paraguayans  led  to  sanguin- 
ary encounters,  and  General  Rivas,  to  avoid  further  loss 
of  life,  sent  a flag  of  truce  to  the  senior  Paraguayan 
officer  proposing  terms  of  surrender,  but  they  were 
refused.  A bombardment  of  the  forest  where  the 
Paraguayans  were  concealed  was  ordered,  and  resulted 
in  1000  of  the  enemy  being  killed  or  wounded.  On 
August  4 another  flag  of  truce  was  sent  to  the  Para- 
guayans, and  two  days  later  the  capitulation  was 
arranged,  officers  being  permitted  to  retain  their  arms, 
and  all  ranks  allowed  to  reside  in  the  territories  of 


1868] 


OCCUPATION  OF  HUMAITA 


171 


the  allies,  except  in  the  Argentine  provinces  of  Corrientes 
and  Entre  Rios.  The  total  number  of  persons  who 
surrendered  was  1230,  many  of  them  women  and  children. 
When  Humaita  was  evacuated,  the  total  had  been  3730. 
Nearly  1000  had  been  killed  or  died  of  wounds,  and 
1500  had  escaped  by  swimming  the  river. 

Little  was  found  in  Humaita  beyond  a small  stock 
of  provisions  and  some  ammunition.  About  two  hundred 
pieces  of  artillery,  all  rendered  useless  for  service,  were 
left  in  the  fortifications,  and  sixty  guns  were  extracted 
subsequently  from  the  river  bottom.  The  great  chain 
was  cut  into  three  lengths  and  delivered  to  the  Govern- 
ments of  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Uruguay.  In  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  the  fortifications 
of  Humaitd  were  razed  to  the  ground.  The  allies 
considered  that  once  Humaita  fell  the  end  of  the  war 
was  in  sight,  but  Marshal  Caxias  differed  from  this 
opinion  and  insisted  that  the  campaign  was  not  nearly 
over.  It  was,  however,  only  in  the  face  of  strong 
opposition  in  Buenos  Aires  and  Brazil  that  the  war 
was  continued  and  the  necessary  expenditure  for  the 
army  provided.  Reconnaissance  by  the  squadron  dis- 
pelled all  doubts  as  to  the  real  situation.  The  popula- 
tion, undismayed  by  their  misfortunes,  were  determined 
to  continue  the  struggle,  and  all  proposals  for  the 
establishment  of  a liberal  form  of  government  under 
representative  administration  were  rejected.  Whether 
love  of  country  or  dread  of  Lopez  was  the  motive  of 
this  attitude  of  the  Paraguayans  has  not  been  explained, 
but  for  the  one  reason  or  the  other  the  population  was 
fanatical  in  its  determination  to  prolong  the  war. 

Consequently,  the  only  course  open  to  the  allies  was 
to  push  on  towards  the  north,  with  Asuncion  as  the 
objective  point,  it  being  the  general  opinion  that  the 
occupation  of  the  national  capital  would  be  accepted 
by  the  Paraguayans  as  the  signal  for  surrender.  With 
the  squadron  in  control  on  the  river,  this  advance  pre- 
sented no  very  formidable  difficulties,  and  the  base  of 
supplies  was  changed  from  Corrientes  to  Humaita.  An 


172 


PARAGUAY 


arsenal  for  naval  purposes  was  constructed  at  Tayi,  and 
the  main  body  of  the  army  was  concentrated  at  Villa 
del  Pilar  in  the  middle  of  August,  1868. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  Asuncion  and  other  un- 
defended towns  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  invaders, 
Lopez  ordered  the  population  on  the  river  banks  to 
abandon  their  houses  and  retire  to  the  interior,  and 
so  great  was  his  power  that  the  Paraguayans  obeyed 
this  mandate  without  question,  although  it  meant  total 
ruin  to  them.  To  some  extent  Lopez  was  influenced 
by  the  belief  that  the  allies  would  hesitate  to  proceed 
inland  on  account  of  difficulty  of  transport  when  separ- 
ated from  the  squadron.  Another  reason  was  that  he 
required  every  available  person  to  aid  in  the  construction 
of  the  lines  of  defence  he  had  planned.  All  the  male 
population  were  enrolled  already  in  the  ranks,  and  re- 
course was  necessary  to  the  women  and  children  for 
digging  entrenchments,  and  as  carriers  for  transporting 
ammunition  and  stores. 

On  August  26,  1868,  the  allies  marched  from  Villa 
del  Pilar  in  a northerly  direction,  keeping  in  touch  with 
the  river  Paraguay.  The  total  number  of  troops  was 
31,000.  Marshal  Caxias  was  Commander-in-chief, 
General  Osorio  in  command  of  the  vanguard,  and  General 
de  Bettancourt  of  the  rearguard.  A garrison  of  2000 
men  was  left  at  Humaita.  The  forward  movement  met 
with  no  resistance  for  the  first  two  days.  The  rivers  of 
Njembuca  and  Montuoso  were  passed,  and  it  was  not 
until  arrival  at  the  river  Yacare  that  any  sign  of  the 
enemy  was  visible.  At  this  point  a small  fort  formed 
the  advanced  post  of  the  Paraguayan  position  on  the 
river  Tibicuari,  but  on  the  approach  of  the  allies  the 
garrison  retired  after  firing  a few  shots,  and  the  river 
Tacuari  was  reached  on  the  28th.  On  the  northern  side 
of  this  river  the  allies  found  a redoubt  for  the  protection 
of  the  right  wing  of  the  Paraguayan  defence.  Flanking 
this  were  trenches,  and  here  13,000  men  had  been  con- 
centrated by  Lopez.  Marshal  Caxias  expected  to  meet 
with  a determined  resistance,  and  decided  to  make  a 


1868]  LOPEZ  RETIRES  TO  VILLETA 


173 


general  assault.  The  artillery  prepared  the  way  for  the 
attack,  and  a heavy  bombardment  was  commenced,  but 
met  with  small  response  from  the  Paraguayans,  so  the 
troops  moved  forward  to  storm  the  position,  and  occupied 
the  redoubt  without  difficulty. 

On  September  1 the  Paraguayans  made  a feint  of 
attacking  the  allies,  but  retired  without  any  serious 
engagement,  and  Marshal  Caxias  directed  a general 
advance  on  the  Paraguayan  defences,  whose  lines  were 
captured.  From  these  the  allies  pushed  forward  to  the 
main  camp  of  the  Paraguayan  forces  and  found  it 
deserted.  Lopez  had  fallen  back  on  strong  positions  at 
Angostura  and  Yilleta. 

Explanation  of  the  reason  for  the  abandonment  of 
the  trenches  at  Tibicuari  without  a struggle  was  found 
in  the  camp.  Dead  and  dying  bodies  strewed  the  centre. 
Some  had  died  of  bullet  wounds,  others  from  throat 
cutting  ; lance  and  bayonet  thrusts  had  caused  death  in 
many  cases,  and  the  groans  of  the  mortally  wounded 
added  ghastly  effect  to  the  scene.  A real  or  imaginary 
plot  against  the  life  of  Lopez  had,  it  seemed,  been  dis- 
covered, and  he  had  wreaked  a summary  and  terrible 
vengeance  upon  all  persons  he  suspected  of  implication 
in  this  conspiracy.  Amongst  the  victims  were  Senor 
Carreras,  formerly  Minister  to  Uruguay,  and  who  signed 
the  treaty  in  1864  between  Lopez  and  President  Aguirre ; 
Senor  Berges,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs;  Bishop 
Palacios  ; the  Portuguese  Consul,  Senor  Leite  Pereira  ; 
Colonel  Alen ; Captain  Fidanza ; the  mother  and  wife 
of  Colonel  Martinez ; Senor  Benigno  Lopez,  brother  of 
the  Dictator  ; General  Barrios,  his  brother-in-law  ; and 
the  priest  Borgado.  In  addition  to  these  well-known 
people  were  several  merchants,  some  prisoners  of  war, 
and  many  Paraguayans  serving  in  the  army.  It  was  a 
massacre  of  most  ferocious  character  which  stamped 
Lopez  as  a bloodthirsty  tyrant  unworthy  of  the  slightest 
sympathy.  He  was  a patriot ; he  became  an  assassin. 
During  the  years  of  warfare  against  the  allies  many 
instances  of  his  severe  methods  had  come  to  light,  and 


174 


PARAGUAY 


it  was  known  that  the  penalty  of  death  was  enforced  for 
trifling  offences ; but  such  acts  had  been  condoned  in 
view  of  the  necessity  for  discipline,  essential  in  the 
management  of  large  bodies  of  troops  engaged  in  a 
desperate  struggle  against  overwhelming  odds.  For 
this  wholesale  massacre  no  excuse  can  be  found,  and 
from  this  time  forth  public  opinion  in  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Uruguay  declined  to  accept  any  solution  for  the 
termination  of  the  war  that  did  not  include  the  death 
of  the  Dictator. 

After  a few  days  at  Tibicuari,  the  allies  marched 
towards  Asuncion,  where  Marshal  Caxias  and  his  prin- 
cipal advisers  thought  small  resistance  would  be  offered. 
This  proved  entirely  erroneous.  On  the  arrival  of  the 
army  at  the  river  Canabe,  the  enemy  was  discovered  in 
force  in  strong  positions  near  Angostura  and  Villeta. 
Two  weeks  were  devoted  to  reconnoitring  these  defences, 
and  the  information  obtained  convinced  Marshal  Caxias 
that  the  task  of  driving  the  Paraguayans  from  the 
neighbourhood  would  be  no  easy  one. 

The  towns  of  Villeta  and  Angostura  were  situated 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  river  Paraguay.  Both  had  been 
fortified  by  Lopez  and  were  defended  by  artillery.  The 
headquarter  camp  of  the  Paraguayans  was  to  the  south 
of  Villeta,  and  35  miles  distant  from  Asuncion.  Protect- 
ing the  camp  was  the  fortified  position  of  Angostura,  with 
similar  characteristics  to  Humaita,  and  to  the  east  of 
these  positions  was  the  ridge  of  hills  known  as  the 
“Lomas  Valentinas,”  covered  with  heavy  forest.  In 
front  of  Angostura  and  this  range  of  hills  was  the  river 
Canabe,  the  shores  of  the  stream  spreading  out  into 
extensive  swamps.  Through  the  eastern  section  ran  the 
railway  uniting  Asuncion  with  Cerro-Leon  and  Villa 
Rica.  On  the  north  were  a series  of  small  rivers  and 
large  swamps,  making  any  attack  difficult. 

The  strength  of  the  Paraguayan  position  was  un- 
expectedly exhibited  on  September  23,  by  a skirmish 
near  the  river  Canabe,  where  a dam  had  been  formed  to 
flood  the  approaches  to  the  trenches  in  front  of  Angos- 


1868]  HEAVY  FIGHTING  ON  THE  CANABE  175 


tura.  Here  the  allies  met  with  strong  opposition,  and 
when  reinforcements  came  were  subjected  to  heavy 
artillery  fire  and  compelled  to  retire.  Marshal  Caxias 
then  ordered  the  squadron  to  force  the  passage  of  the 
river  past  the  fortifications,  the  army  at  the  same  time 
advancing  to  attack  the  Paraguayans  by  land.  Seven 
ships  succeeded  in  passing  the  Paraguayan  position, 
but  not  without  a long  list  of  casualties  and  some  serious 
injuries  to  the  vessels.  Simultaneously  Marshal  Caxias, 
at  the  head  of  20,000  men,  assaulted  the  Paraguayan 
trenches,  but  met  with  most  stubborn  resistance.  At 
one  period  of  the  fight  the  Paraguayans  showed  signs 
of  giving  way,  and  the  allies  seized  some  of  the  outer 
trenches.  The  Paraguayan  artillery  fire,  however, 
became  so  severe,  that  the  attacking  force  was  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss.  At  the  close  of  the  day’s  fighting,  and 
in  view  of  the  serious  nature  of  the  situation,  Marshal 
Caxias  summoned  a council  of  war,  at  which  it  was 
decided  that  General  Argollo,  with  2000  men,  should 
cross  the  river  Paraguay,  open  a road  northwards  to 
Santa  Helena,  and  remain  there  under  the  protection  of 
the  squadron.  When  the  road  was  reported  open  troops 
were  to  be  sent  forward  and  the  combined  forces  were 
to  cross  the  river  in  the  Paraguayan  rear  near  Villeta, 
at  the  same  time  cutting  communication  between  Lopez 
and  Asuncion.  General  Argollo  left  on  October  10,  to 
carry  out  the  first  part  of  this  plan. 

Lopez  was  well  informed,  and  did  not  long  remain  in 
ignorance  of  the  tactics  of  Marshal  Caxias.  Under- 
standing the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  expedition  to 
Santa  Helena,  he  was  satisfied  to  send  isolated  groups 
to  act  as  guerillas  and  interfere  with  the  construction  of 
the  road  by  firing  on  the  working  parties.  The  broken 
nature  of  the  country  served  to  protect  these  small 
parties  from  danger  of  capture.  It  was  a land  inter- 
spersed with  swamps  and  divided  by  tributaries  of  the 
river  Paraguay,  where  the  thick  undergrowth  had  to  be 
chopped  away  before  the  column  could  advance.  The 
tropical  nature  of  the  climate  was  adverse  to  severe 


176 


PARAGUAY 


physical  strain.  Taking  these  factors  into  consideration, 
Lopez  was  convinced  that  the  expedition  would  be 
months  before  arriving  at  its  destination,  but  the  Dictator 
in  his  turn  was  wrong.  To  his  astonishment  he  learned 
at  the  beginning  of  December,  that  the  road  to  Santa 
Helena  was  open.  He  was  informed  also  that  Marshal 
Caxias,  with  2000  men,  was  to  join  Argollo  at  Santa 
Helena,  and  that  General  da  Silva  would  arrive  shortly 
at  that  place  with  8000  troops.  In  the  first  week  in 
December  this  force  of  12,000  men  was  concentrated 
near  San  Antonio  and  ready  to  attack  the  Paraguayans 
at  Villeta. 

The  advance  from  San  Antonio  to  Villeta  necessi- 
tated the  crossing  of  the  river  Itaroro,  and  the  possession 
of  the  bridge  over  this  waterway  was  essential.  Aware 
of  its  importance,  Lopez  detached  fourteen  battalions  of 
infantry  for  its  defence.  On  December  6,  1868,  the 
allies  attacked.  Marshal  Caxias  advanced  towards  the 
bridge,  while  General  Geliy  y Obes  assaulted  the  trenches 
at  Angostura,  and  General  Osorio  led  his  division 
against  the  fortified  lines  near  the  river  Canabe.  The 
attack  by  Marshal  Caxias  was  energetically  carried  out, 
and  the  enemy  compelled  to  retire  before  they  destroyed 
the  bridge,  so  that  the  troops  were  able  to  cross  safely 
after  severe  fighting.  To  the  south  General  Geliy  y Obes 
occupied  the  outer  lines  of  Angostura.  General  Osorio 
met  with  obstinate  resistance  near  the  river  Canabe,  but 
captured  the  outlying  positions  of  the  Paraguayans. 
When  night  fell  the  advantage  to  the  north  and  south 
lay  with  the  allies,  whose  intention  was  to  reopen 
hostilities  next  morning  at  daybreak,  but  heavy  rains 
prevented  fighting  for  several  days. 

Not  until  December  11  did  the  weather  allow  a 
renewal  of  the  operations,  and  then  the  Paraguayans  in 
all  directions  offered  determined  resistance  to  the 
advance  of  the  allies.  Marshal  Caxias  on  the  north, 
and  General  Geliy  y Obes  and  General  Osorio  in  the 
south,  made  every  effort,  and  the  losses  in  killed  and 
wounded  on  both  sides  were  heavy.  But  as  the  day 


1868] 


OPERATIONS  RETARDED 


177 


wore  away  the  attack  from  the  north  gained  ground 
steadily,  and  before  darkness  set  in  Marshal  Caxias  was 
in  possession  of  Villeta,  the  Paraguayans  leaving  twenty- 
three  guns,  eleven  standards,  and  a quantity  of  stores.  In 
spite,  however,  of  repeated  assaults  on  the  positions  at 
the  river  Canabe  and  Angostura,  these  remained  under 
control  of  the  Paraguayans.  As  evidence  of  the  severity 
of  this  action,  the  allies  lost  3000  officers  and  men  killed 
or  wounded.  Amongst  the  injured  were  Marshal  Caxias, 
General  Osorio,  and  General  Argollo.  The  Paraguayan 
loss  was  equally  heavy,  General  Caraballo  being  severely 
wounded.  Next  morning  opened  with  torrential  rains 
which  continued  for  seven  or  eight  days,  and  rendered  it 
impossible  to  resume  hostilities,  so  that  it  was  not  until 
the  20th  that  the  allies  were  able  to  follow  up  the 
advantages  gained  in  the  fighting  on  the  6th  and  lltli. 


M 


CHAPTER  X 


Paraguay — continued. 

Resumption  of  Hostilities  on  December  20.  Work  of  Allied  Cavalry. 
Paraguayan  Camp  in  the  Valentine  Hills.  Action  of  December 
27.  Defeat  of  the  Paraguayans.  Surrender  of  Angostura. 
Occupation  of  Asuncion.  Disorderly  Conduct  of  the  Allied 
Troops.  Delay  in  Operations.  Mission  of  Senhor  Parunhos. 
Provisional  Government  at  Asuncion.  A new  National  Capital. 
Concentration  at  Oscurra.  Engagement  at  the  river  Manduvira. 
Arrival  of  the  Conde  d’Eu.  Military  Reorganisation.  Opera- 
tions against  Lopez  in  July,  1869.  Fight  at  Sapucay.  Attack 
on  Peribebuy.  Lopez  evacuates  Oscurra.  Plan  of  Campaign 
of  Conde  d’Eu.  Retreat  of  Lopez  to  Caraguatay.  Engagement 
at  Yagari.  Action  at  Campo  Grande.  Lopez  seeks  Refuge  in 
the  Forests.  Paraguayan  Encampment  near  the  Aquidaban. 
Colonel  Silva  Tavares  and  Major  Oliveira.  Death  of  Lopez. 
Madame  Lynch.  Treaty  of  Peace.  Withdrawal  of  Argentine 
and  Uruguayan  Troops.  Election  of  President  Rivarola. 
Political  Representation  under  the  Constitution  of  1870.  Diffi- 
culties of  President  Rivarola.  Vice-President  Salvador  Jovellanos. 
Assassination  of  Rivarola.  Election  of  President  Gill.  Brazilian 
Policy  in  Paraguay.  Assassination  of  President  Gill.  Senor 
Uriarte.  Election  of  President  Baredo.  Death  of  the  President. 
Vice-President  Saguier.  Revolution  in  1881.  Saguier  Deposed. 
General  Caballero  named  Provisional  President.  General 
Caballero  elected  President.  Election  of  President  Escobar. 
Condition  of  Country.  Election  of  President  Gonzalez. 
Attempts  at  Reform.  Deposition  of  President  Gonzalez.  Vice- 
President  Morinigo  takes  Office.  Election  of  President  Egusquiza. 
Rupture  with  Uruguay.  Election  of  President  Aceval.  Oligarchy 
in  Control.  Political  Rights.  Economic  Conditions  after  1870. 
Natural  Causes  and  Reaction.  Idleness  of  Male  Population. 
Improvement  in  General  Conditions.  Population  during  Thirty 
Years.  Immigration.  Australian  Socialistic  Colony.  Sicilian 
Colonisation.  Educational  System. 

The  situation  of  the  allied  army  after  the  severe 
fighting  in  December  was  unsatisfactory  because  the 

178 


1868] 


HOSTILITIES  RESUMED 


179 


forces  to  the  north  and  south  of  the  Paraguayan  position 
had  failed  to  effect  a junction,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
lines  of  the  enemy  extended  from  the  river  Paraguay  to 
the  Valentine  ranges,  and  so  divided  the  army  of  invasion 
that  communication  was  difficult.  So  Marshal  Caxias 
again  called  a council  of  war,  which  was  followed  by  an 
order  to  General  Geliy  y Obes  to  despatch  to  the  north 
such  reinforcements  as  could  be  spared,  and  to  draw 
upon  Humaita  for  fresh  troops.  In  the  opinion  of 
Marshal  Caxias,  the  positions  at  Angostura  and  the 
Lomas  Valentinas  were  the  last  entrenchments  Lopez 
had  constructed  to  resist  the  advance.  If  these  were 
captured  the  Paraguayan  Dictator  would  make  terms, 
and  with  this  end  in  view  the  Commander-in-chief 
issued  instructions  for  all  available  forces  to  be  brought 
into  action  when  hostilities  were  resumed. 

They  were  resumed  on  December  20,  when  a move- 
ment from  the  north  was  begun  against  the  positions  in 
the  Lomas  Valentinas,  with  the  object  of  cutting  com- 
munication between  that  point  and  Angostura.  From 
the  south  the  attack  was  on  the  entrenchments  at  the 
river  Canabe  to  break  through  the  line  and  join  Marshal 
Caxias.  The  first  advantages  gained  were  slight,  but 
encouraging,  and  on  the  21st  Marshal  Caxias  pressed 
forward  towards  the  Valentine  range,  General  Menna 
Barreto  attacking  the  trenches  of  Canabe,  where 
important  progress  was  made.  Barreto  ordered  a feint 
against  both  flanks  of  the  Paraguayan  position,  and  the 
enemy  detached  all  available  men  to  strengthen  the 
defence  at  these  points,  leaving  the  centre  of  the  line 
weakly  held.  Barreto  now  ordered  his  main  body  to 
advance,  and  the  Paraguayan  centre  was  stormed  with 
comparatively  small  loss.  Resistance  broke  down  com- 
pletely after  this,  and  Barreto  was  able  to  effect  a 
junction  with  Marshal  Caxias. 

Meanwhile  valuable  work  was  accomplished  by  the 
cavalry  under  the  Marshal.  The  broken  country  to  the 
east  of  Angostura  had  been  thoroughly  reconnoitred, 
and  it  was  discovered  that  the  Paraguayan  position  con- 


180 


PARAGUAY 


sisted  of  an  entrenched  encampment  with  50  guns,  in 
which  the  entire  population  of  Asuncion  was  concen- 
trated. It  was  a formidable  obstacle  to  face,  and  Caxias 
determined  to  delay  the  attack  until  all  available  troops 
could  be  collected.  At  daybreak  on  December  27,  the 
allied  artillery  opened  upon  this  camp,  whose  guns 
replied  energetically,  but  parts  of  it,  where  wooden 
and  straw  buildings  stood,  were  soon  in  flames,  and 
presently  the  ammunition  of  the  Paraguayans  began  to 
run  short.  A general  assault  was  therefore  delivered 
at  midday,  three  columns  attacking  simultaneously.  It 
met  with  stubborn  resistance  at  first,  but  that  did  not 
last,  and  the  Paraguayans  gradually  fell  back  into  the 
forests  at  the  rear,  where  they  disappeared  in  the  thick 
undergrowth.  The  casualties  amongst  the  allied  forces 
were  1000  officers  and  men  killed  or  wounded,  and  the 
Paraguayan  loss  was  heavy,  but  not  accurately  known. 

There  now  remained  only  the  fortifications  at 
Angostura  to  be  reckoned  with  to  leave  the  way  free  to 
Asuncion,  but  before  attempting  their  assault  Marshal 
Caxias  sent  a flag  of  truce  with  terms  for  the  capitula- 
tion of  the  garrison.  These  were  that  the  troops  in 
Angostura  should  surrender  with  all  the  honours  of 
war.  In  case  of  refusal  a threat  was  made  that  the 
place  would  be  assaulted  and  every  officer  shot.  The 
commandant,  Major  Lucas  Carrillo,  asked  for  time  to 
consider  the  proposal,  which  was  granted ; and  the 
Paraguayans  determined  to  accept  the  proffered  terms, 
marching  out  with  flags  flying  and  drums  beating  on 
December  30.  Officers  were  allowed  absolute  liberty 
after  taking  oath  not  to  bear  arms  again  against  the 
allies.  A promise  was  also  made  by  Marshal  Caxias 
to  them  that  they  should  be  given  commissions  in 
the  military  service  of  Paraguay  when  the  army  was 
reorganised  under  the  direction  of  the  allies. 

Next  day  General  Juan  da  Souza  da  Fonseca-Costa 
embarked  with  1700  Brazilian  troops  in  San  Antonio, 
and  arrived  at  Asuncion  the  same  evening,  occupying 
the  city.  The  remainder  of  the  army  marched  north- 


1869]  OCCUPATION  OF  ASUNCION 


181 


wards  under  Marshal  Caxias,  and  reached  the  same 
place  two  days  later ; but  before  adequate  police 
measures  were  adopted  many  outrages  were  committed 
by  the  soldiers.  Houses  were  pillaged  and  stores  looted. 
The  foreign  consuls  were  compelled  to  lodge  a formal 
protest  against  this  lawless  condition  of  affairs,  but 
order  was  at  length  established. 

Further  operations  against  Lopez  were  impracticable 
immediately  after  the  occupation  of  Asuncion.  The 
troops,  greatly  reduced  in  numbers  by  heavy  mortality 
from  wounds  and  sickness,  were  worn  out  with  fatigue ; 
and  Marshal  Caxias,  tired  with  the  long  strain  of  the 
previous  year,  and  not  yet  convalescent  from  the  injury 
received  in  the  attack  upon  Yilleta,  resigned  command 
of  the  army.  Admiral  Ignacio  (Conde  de  Inhauma)  was 
also  prostrated  with  illness,  and  died  on  his  return 
journey  to  Brazil.  General  de  Souza,  who  was  left  in 
command,  after  a careful  consideration  of  the  situation, 
decided  to  make  no  attempt  to  follow  Lopez  pending 
the  arrival  of  the  Conde  d’Eu,  who  had  recently  been 
appointed  to  replace  Marshal  Caxias. 

During  this  cessation  of  hostilities  a special  repre- 
sentative of  Brazil,  Senhor  Parunhos,  arrived  in 
Asuncion,  with  orders  to  inform  his  Government  as  to 
existing  conditions,  and  organise  a Provisional  Adminis- 
tration. The  latter  task  was  difficult,  for  no  civilians 
could  be  induced  to  fill  official  posts.  In  this  dilemma, 
Senhor  Parunhos  decided  to  appoint  officers  from  the 
Paraguayan  Legion.  These  officers  obtained  a certain 
number  of  signatures  to  a petition  praying  for  permis- 
sion to  elect  a Provisional  Government  and  carry  on 
the  war  against  Lopez  under  the  Paraguayan  national 
flag.  The  three  principal  signatories  were  Jose  Diaz 
Bedoya,  Bernardo  Yaliente,  and  D.  F.  Egusquiza.  A 
conference  was  held  and  attended  by  Senhor  Parunhos, 
representing  Brazil,  Senor  Varela  for  Argentina,  and 
Senor  Rodriguez  as  delegate  of  Uruguay.  On  behalf  of 
their  respective  Governments  they  signed  a treaty  giving 
the  right  of  free  election  to  all  Paraguayans  residing 


182 


PARAGUAY 


in  the  liberated  portions  of  the  country,  with  power  to 
constitute  a Provisional  Government.  The  Adminis- 
tration was  to  be  independent  so  far  as  political  and 
administrative  affairs  were  concerned,  but  subject  to  the 
orders  of  the  Commander-in-chief  of  the  allies  in  military 
matters  until  the  death  or  expulsion  of  Lopez  from 
Paraguay.  U nder  these  provisions  a Provisional  Govern- 
ment was  formed. 

The  lull  in  hostilities  gave  Lopez  time  to  reorganise 
his  defence,  and  he  proclaimed  a new  national  capital 
at  Peribebuy.  From  the  war  material  remaining  at 
Cerro-Leon  and  Villa  Rica  all  available  ammunition  and 
stores  were  withdrawn  to  Oscurra,  and  new  guns  were 
cast.  The  position  selected  for  the  next  stand  was 
strengthened  by  carefully  constructed  entrenchments. 
While  this  work  was  proceeding  no  opportunity  was 
lost  to  inflict  damage  upon  the  allies.  Detachments  of 
cavalry  and  infantry  intercepted  convoys  and  recon- 
noitring parties.  General  da  Souza  contented  himself 
with  reinforcing  such  of  the  garrisons  as  were  most 
exposed  to  attack.  He  also  despatched  a squadron  to 
explore  the  river  Manduvira,  as  Paraguayan  vessels 
had  been  reported  lurking  in  that  vicinity.  The  squadron 
ascended  the  river  without  knowledge  of  the  local  con- 
ditions of  navigation,  and  found  that  it  spread  out  into 
a lagoon,  from  all  sides  of  which  fire  was  opened. 
The  ships  attempted  to  retire,  but  the  passage  was 
blocked.  After  a desperate  struggle,  however,  they 
succeeded  in  clearing  away  the  obstruction  and  reached 
the  Paraguay.  By  land  and  sea  Lopez  thus  gave  evi- 
dence of  his  intention  to  continue  the  struggle. 

On  April  16,  1869,  the  Conde  d’Eu  arrived  at 
Asuncion  to  take  command  of  the  army.  The  military 
establishment  needed  reorganisation,  and  the  following 
three  months  were  occupied  in  necessary  preparations 
before  the  troops  could  take  the  field.  At  the  end  of 
July  arrangements  were  so  far  completed  that  the  Conde 
d’Eu  decided  to  begin  another  campaign  against  Lopez. 
The  railway  line  running  from  Asuncion  to  Cerro-Leon 


1869] 


ATTACK  ON  PERIBEBUY 


183 


and  Villa  Rica  was  made  the  base  of  operations  on 
account  of  facilities  for  transport.  On  July  28  the 
vanguard  under  General  Menna  Barreto  set  out  and 
reached  Paraguari,  a town  ten  miles  to  the  south  of 
Oscurra,  without  meeting  resistance ; and  on  August  1 
the  first  and  second  divisions  of  the  army  under 
Generals  Osorio  and  Polidoro  moved  to  the  front.  Two 
days  later  the  main  body  under  the  Conde  d’Eu  followed. 
A long  flanking  movement  was  necessary  to  the  south- 
east to  round  the  ridge  of  hills  protecting  Oscurra  and 
the  new  capital  of  Peribebuy.  The  route  was  first  to 
Sapucay,  thence  to  Costa-Pocu  and  Valenzuela,  and 
from  the  latter  point  to  Peribebuy.  At  Sapucay  a stand 
was  made  by  a few  Paraguayans,  but  they  were  com- 
pelled to  retreat.  Between  August  7 and  10  the  town 
of  Valenzuela  was  occupied,  the  inhabitants  deserting 
the  place,  and  Peribebuy  sighted.  It  was  protected  by 
entrenchments  ; a deep  fosse  ran  round  the  fortifications, 
and  every  sign  was  visible  that  a determined  stand 
would  be  made.  The  defences,  however,  were  badly 
located.  Surrounding  hills  offered  excellent  positions  for 
artillery,  and  the  allies  placed  six  batteries  there  during 
the  night,  intending  to  open  fire  upon  Peribebuy  at 
daybreak  next  morning ; but  a delay  was  caused  by  a 
small  detachment  sent  out  on  reconnaissance  being 
surrounded  and  requiring  the  despatch  of  a body  of 
troops  for  its  relief. 

The  action  began  at  4 a.m.  on  the  12th,  by  a con- 
centration of  artillery  fire  on  the  trenches  and  parapets. 
In  spite  of  heavy  losses  the  Paraguayans  did  not  waver, 
and  their  guns  were  well  served.  For  four  hours  the 
bombardment  continued,  the  fire  of  the  enemy  slacken- 
ing and  finally  dying  away  as  the  superior  artillery  force 
of  the  assailants  told.  At  8 a.m.  the  order  was  given  for 
a general  assault,  and  the  artillery  of  the  allies  continued 
to  play  upon  the  Paraguayan  trenches  until  the  advance 
of  the  infantry  made  further  firing  dangerous.  In  spite 
of  most  determined  resistance  the  fortifications  were 
carried,  and  the  allied  cavalry  thrown  forward  and 


184 


PARAGUAY 


charging  through  the  camp  completed  the  victory.  The 
garrison  made  no  effort  to  escape.  There  were  but  1800 
of  them,  and  of  these  730  were  killed,  600  wounded, 
and  400  taken  prisoners.  Women  and  children  had 
joined  in  the  attempt  to  repel  the  attack,  and  boys  of 
eight  and  ten  years  of  age  were  captured  with  guns  in 
their  hands.  The  casualties  amongst  the  allied  forces 
were  550  officers  and  men  killed  or  wounded,  and 
amongst  the  dead  was  General  Menna  Barreto. 

When  the  news  of  the  capture  of  Peribebuy  reached 
Lopez  he  decided  on  the  evacuation  of  Oscurra  and 
Caacupe.  The  Conde  d’Eu  with  the  main  body  of  the 
army  moved  forward  towards  Oscurra  and  Caacupe 
after  the  victory  at  Peribebuy,  but  the  bad  state  of  the 
roads  delayed  his  arrival  until  August  15,  when  he  found 
both  towns  deserted  except  by  the  wounded  and  some 
women  and  children.  These  people  were  in  a deplorable 
state,  and  had  neither  food  nor  clothing.  In  Caacupe 
some  war  material  was  found,  Lopez  not  having  had 
time  to  arrange  for  its  transport  in  his  hasty  preparations 
for  the  evacuation. 

The  plan  of  operations  for  this  attack  upon  Lopez 
had  been  skilfully  conceived,  and  if  it  had  met  with  no 
contretemps  would  have  concluded  the  war.  Unfortun- 
ately, one  section  of  the  allied  army  failed  in  its  duties. 
The  Conde  d’Eu  had  instructed  General  Jose  da  Silva 
to  march  from  Asuncion  to  the  ranges  of  hills  lying  to 
the  north  of  Oscurra  simultaneously  with  the  advance 
of  the  main  body  from  Sapucay  towards  Peribebuy,  but 
owing  to  a miscalculation  of  distance  and  conditions 
he  did  not  arrive  at  his  destination  until  the  19th.  By 
then  Lopez  had  effected  his  retreat  into  the  mountain 
ranges,  where  he  proposed  making  another  stand, 
choosing  the  neighbourhood  near  Caraguatay. 

The  Conde  d’Eu  lost  no  time  in  pursuing,  and  on 
August  16  came  in  contact  with  the  rearguard  of  the 
enemy  near  the  river  Yagari.  Here  the  Paraguayans, 
to  the  number  of  6000,  attempted  to  stop  the  advance 
of  the  allies.  Lopez  spread  his  forces  to  cover  a long 


1870] 


PURSUIT  OF  LOPEZ 


185 


extension  of  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  and  for  a time 
held  his  own.  At  length  the  Conde  d’Eu  ordered  a 
flanking  movement  on  the  enemy’s  right,  which  was 
successful.  Once  over  the  river  this  division  moved 
down  on  the  Paraguayans  and  opened  a heavy  artillery 
fire,  followed  by  an  infantry  attack,  before  which  the 
foe  retreated,  leaving  1000  men  killed  or  wounded. 
The  allies  captured  700  prisoners  and  21  guns.  In 
the  allied  army  the  losses  were  600  killed  and  wounded. 

But  the  road  to  Caraguatay  was  not  yet  clear,  the 
Paraguayans  taking  up  another  defensive  position  near 
Campo  Grande.  Here  2000  men  with  12  guns  again 
endeavoured  to  stay  the  advance,  but  were  surprised  on 
the  morning  of  the  18th,  and  beaten,  the  allies  capturing 
the  guns  and  many  prisoners.  After  this  defeat  Lopez 
retired  to  the  forest  districts  to  the  north,  from  there 
waging  a guerilla  warfare. 

For  several  months  now  the  work  of  the  allies  was 
to  keep  the  country  patrolled  by  small  detachments 
to  prevent  any  concentration  of  the  enemy,  the  opening 
of  1870  finding  Lopez  still  at  large.  In  February,  in- 
formation was  obtained  that  Lopez  was  encamped  near 
a small  river  called  the  Aquidaban.  With  him  was  his 
mistress,  Madame  Lynch,  his  four  sons,  and  a force 
of  400  men.  In  all  his  misfortunes  Madame  Lynch 
was  his  constant  companion,  and  she  was  faithful  to  him 
in  this  last  phase  of  his  stormy  career.  Troops  were 
despatched  to  attack  the  position  Lopez  now  held,  and 
arrived  near  the  Paraguayan  encampment  at  the  end 
of  February.  To  obtain  accurate  information  as  to  the 
defences,  two  officers,  Colonel  Silva  Tavares  and  Major 
Oliveira,  determined  to  approach  the  lines  without 
escort.  They  set  out  on  the  morning  of  March  1,  1870, 
and  successfully  eluding  the  Paraguayan  outposts, 
reached  the  confines  of  the  camp.  The  enemy  suddenly 
discovered  their  presence,  and  imagining  the  allies  were 
upon  them,  fled,  panic-stricken,  without  attempting  to 
ascertain  the  true  state  of  affairs.  Meanwhile  the 
attacking  force,  becoming  uneasy  at  the  long  absence 


186 


PARAGUAY 


of  the  officers,  had  advanced  and  reached  the  camp 
when  the  panic  was  at  its  height.  In  the  confusion 
Lopez,  his  Minister  Caminos,  and  General  Rasquin 
mounted  their  horses  to  escape  to  the  forest.  The 
broken  ground  prevented  fast  travelling,  and  enabled 
the  assaulting  force  to  make  a dash  to  cut  off  the 
retreat  of  the  three  men.  Caminos  was  killed  by  a bullet, 
and  General  Rasquin  was  surrounded,  and  surrendered 
after  a promise  that  his  life  should  be  spared.  Lopez 
made  a desperate  effort  for  safety  by  forcing  his  horse  into 
the  swamp  formed  by  the  Aquidaban,  but  the  animal 
could  make  no  headway  in  the  soft  mud.  The  Dictator 
was  summoned  to  surrender  by  a corporal.  His  reply 
was  a revolver  shot.  Then  a lance-thrust  caused  him 
to  fall  from  his  horse,  and  he  died  a few  minutes  later. 
The  body  was  given  Christian  burial. 

Madame  Lynch,  the  mistress  of  Lopez,  attempted  to 
escape  with  her  eldest  son  Sancho  in  a carriage,  but  the 
conveyance  was  detained  by  a Brazilian  officer,  whom 
Sancho  shot  at  and  severely  wounded.  Then  a soldie'r 
made  a thrust  at  Sancho  with  a lance  and  mortally 
wounded  him.  Madame  Lynch  was  conducted  to  the 
senior  officer  on  the  field,  General  Jose  da  Camara,  and 
courteously  treated  until  set  at  liberty  a few  weeks  later. 
Shortly  afterwards  she  set  sail  for  Europe,  and  lived  for 
some  years  in  Paris. 

With  the  death  of  Lopez  the  war  was  ended,  and  in 
July,  1870,  a treaty  of  peace  was  signed  with  the 
Provisional  Government.  Argentina  and  Uruguay 
immediately  withdrew  their  troops.  Brazil  largely  re- 
duced the  strength  of  her  forces,  but  retained  an  army 
corps  of  14,000  men  to  ensure  order.  A portion  of  the 
Brazilian  squadron  was  kept  also  on  the  river  Paraguay 
to  facilitate  communication  between  Asuncion  and  Rio 
de  Janeiro.  A law  of  constitution  had  been  drawn  up 
by  the  Provisional  Government  in  1869,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  it  Senor  Rivarola  was  declared  President  of 
the  Republic  in  August,  1870. 

The  struggle  had  lasted  five  years.  On  the  one  side 


1871] 


AFTER  THE  WAR 


187 


was  the  influence  of  Lopez,  with  sufficient  power  to  induce 
the  population  of  Paraguay  to  sacrifice  their  lives  for  his 
cause,  and  on  the  other,  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Uruguay 
faced  terrible  difficulties  to  reduce  to  submission  a man 
regarded  as  a common  enemy.  They  only  accomplished 
their  purpose  after  a conflict  involving  a vast  expenditure 
in  blood  and  treasure.  How  frightful  the  war  was  for 
the  Paraguayans  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  in 
1863  the  population  was  1,337,489.  In  1871  the  returns 
showed  only  221,079  persons  resident  in  the  Republic. 
This  attenuated  population  comprised  28,746  men, 
106,254  women,  and  86,079  children.  The  adult  males 
were  those  who  from  infirmity  or  weight  of  years  had 
been  incapable  of  bearing  arms.  In  other  words,  the 
whole  able-bodied  male  population  had  been  sacrificed. 
In  the  latter  part  of  the  struggle  women  had  been  utilised 
as  beasts  of  burthen,  and  when  no  longer  available  for 
transport  purposes  were  left  to  die  by  the  roadside. 

Cursorily  glancing  back  at  the  conduct  of  the  war,  it 
is  not  difficult  to  name  the  principal  officers  in  the 
operations.  At  the  beginning  of  the  struggle  General 
Flores  (Uruguay)  and  General  Paunero  (Argentina)  were 
especially  prominent.  Subsequently  came  the  advance 
upon  Humaita,  in  which  Marshal  Caxias  (Brazil)  and 
General  Osorio  (Brazil)  played  distinguished  parts.  The 
attack  upon  Angostura  was  directed  by  Marshal  Caxias 
(Brazil),  and  his  victory  was  due  to  the  able  assistance 
of  General  Argollo  (Argentina),  General  Menna  Barreto 
(Brazil),  General  Osorio  (Brazil),  and  General  Geliy  y 
Obes  (Argentina).  In  the  final  phase  of  the  war  the 
success  of  the  operations  was  owing  to  the  skilful  tactics  of 
the  Conde  d’Eu.  The  squadron  did  not  show  to  advan- 
tage during  the  campaign  except  in  the  combat  off  the 
river  Riachuelo,  Admiral  Tamandare  then  commanding. 
About  the  merits  of  General  Mitre  in  connection  with 
the  command  of  the  allied  forces,  there  is  little  to  be 
said.  During  his  presence  in  the  field  little  progress  was 
made,  and  several  serious  disasters  occurred.  On  the 
other  hand,  Mitre  was  the  organiser  of  the  arrangements  to 


188 


PARAGUAY 


keep  the  army  supplied  with  provisions  and  war  material, 
and  it  was  due  to  his  action  in  this  direction  that  Marshal 
Caxias  was  able  to  effect  the  capture  of  Humaita. 

Against  these  many  Generals  and  the  resources  of 
three  Governments,  there  was  only  the  indomitable 
energy  of  one  man.  It  was  not  a war  with  Paraguay, 
but  one  waged  against  the  personality  of  Lopez. 

By  the  constitution  promulgated  in  1870,  the  legis- 
lative authority  in  Paraguay  is  exercised  by  a National 
Congress  of  two  Chambers,  the  Senate  and  the  House 
of  Representatives.  The  Chambers  are  elected  by  the 
people,  the  law  providing  for  one  Senator  for  every 
12,000  inhabitants,  and  one  Representative  for  every  6000 
persons.  The  remuneration  fixed  for  Senators  and 
Representatives  is  $1000  gold  per  annum.  Provision 
is  made  for  a Cabinet  of  five  responsible  Ministers,  the 
departments  being  Interior,  Foreign  Affairs,  Worship 
and  Instruction,  Finance  and  War,  and  Marine. 

The  Administration  of  Cirilo  Rivarola,  the  first 
President  under  the  new  regime,  was  not  without  many 
difficulties.  Independent  in  name,  the  Government  of 
Paraguay  was  subject  to  the  control  of  Brazil  at  the 
cessation  of  hostilities  after  the  death  of  Lopez.  The 
Brazilian  army  corps  left  in  Asuncion  when  the  Argentine 
and  Uruguayan  forces  were  withdrawn  dominated  the 
situation.  President  Rivarola  found  this  at  variance 
with  the  exercise  of  Paraguayan  initiative  in  national 
affairs,  and  he  attempted  to  insist  on  his  right  to  inde- 
pendent action  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  1869. 
He  was  opposed  by  the  Brazilian  military  and  civil 
authorities,  and  finding  his  authority  undermined,  re- 
signed in  1872.  Senor  Salvador  Jovellanos,  the  Vice- 
President,  as  provided  in  the  Constitution,  succeeded. 
Rivarola  had  made  many  personal  enemies  during  the 
two  years  he  was  in  power  by  his  endeavours  to  establish 
order  and  efficiency,  and  in  revenge  for  his  attitude 
towards  certain  politicians  he  was  assassinated  soon  after 
his  resignation. 

Vice-President  Jovellanos  did  little  to  make  his 


1874] 


THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION 


189 


period  of  office  remarkable,  and  matters  drifted  along  for 
the  following  two  years  under  the  guidance  of  Brazilian 
influence.  But  the  Brazilian  army  of  occupation  was 
withdrawn  gradually  in  1873  and  1874,  so  that  when 
President  Gill  was  elected  to  the  Presidency  in  the 
latter  year  no  foreign  troops  remained  in  the  country. 

Ambitious  politicians  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  now  dis- 
turbed the  political  calm  by  advocating  the  annexation 
of  Paraguay,  contending  that  the  river  Paraguay  would 
be  a satisfactory  southern  boundary  line  between  Brazil 
and  Argentina.  Intrigues  were  set  afoot  in  Asuncion 
to  induce  the  Paraguayans  to  petition  for  annexation 
to  Brazil.  President  Gill  would  have  nothing  to  do 
with  these  proposals,  and  gave  offence  by  his  attitude. 
His  expressed  determination  to  eradicate  corruption  in 
the  Administration  increased  his  unpopularity,  and  in 
1875  a conspiracy  resulted  in  his  assassination.  The 
Vice-President,  Seiior  Uriarte,  took  his  place,  and  the 
next  three  years  passed  in  comparative  tranquillity, 
Uriarte  allowing  public  affairs  to  drift,  making  no 
effort  to  introduce  measures  to  improve  the  economic 
or  political  conditions.  In  1875  this  stop-gap  Adminis- 
tration was  ended  by  the  election  of  Seiior  Baredo,  but 
the  new  President  had  been  only  a few  months  in  power 
when  suddenly  he  died.  It  was  asserted  he  was 
poisoned. 

The  death  of  Baredo  brought  into  office  the  Vice- 
President,  Seiior  Saguier.  For  a time  political  condi- 
tions remained  quiet,  but  gradually  a spirit  of  militarism 
crept  into  the  situation.  Against  this  Saguier  set  his 
face,  and  friction  consequently  arose  between  the  officers 
of  the  army  and  the  Executive.  In  1881  this  feeling 
culminated  in  a revolution.  Little  violence  occurred, 
but  the  army  obtained  control  of  affairs  and  immediately 
deposed  the  President.  Pending  a new  election,  General 
Caballero  was  chosen  to  act  provisionally,  and  in  the 
following  year  he  was  proclaimed  President.  The 
support  of  the  army  enabled  him  to  remain  in  office 
until  the  expiration  of  the  presidential  term  in  1886, 


190 


PARAGUAY 


when  Seiior  Escobar  was  elected.  The  succeeding  four 
years  were  uneventful,  but  the  National  Administration 
was  conducted  without  consideration  for  the  general 
welfare,  and  military  influence  dominated  the  political 
situation.  No  attempt  was  made  to  check  corrupt 
practices  in  official  departments. 

In  1890  Senor  Gonzalez  acceded  to  the  Presidency. 
For  a time  all  went  smoothly,  but  presently  the  new 
President  evinced  a desire  to  introduce  reforms,  especially 
in  connection  with  the  spending  of  public  moneys  and 
the  appointment  of  departmental  officials.  This  made 
him  unpopular,  and  matters  were  brought  to  a crisis  in 
1894  by  a conspiracy  to  turn  him  out  of  office.  The 
story  of  his  deposition  is  remarkable. 

One  afternoon  in  May,  1894,  the  principal  members 
of  the  opposition  called  a meeting  to  decide  what  action 
should  be  taken.  Enquiries  elicited  the  fact  that  the 
army  was  prepared  to  throw  in  its  lot  with  the  mal- 
contents. Two  members  of  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives were  then  selected  to  wait  upon  President 
Gonzalez  and  inform  him  that  his  presence  in  Paraguay 
was  not  compatible  with  the  public  interests,  and  that 
he  was  to  be  deported.  The  delegates,  revolver  in  hand, 
walked  to  the  Government  Palace  and  looked  through 
the  rooms  for  the  President.  Entering  his  private 
office,  they  found  him  engrossed  in  business,  and  having 
explained  their  mission,  they  presented  their  revolvers 
at  his  head  and  requested  him  to  accompany  them 
without  noise  or  resistance  on  pain  of  instant  death. 
President  Gonzalez  acceded  to  this  demand.  Marched 
to  the  barracks  and  handed  over  to  the  care  of  the 
troops,  he  was  next  day  embarked  on  a steamer  bound 
for  Buenos  Aires,  and  the  advice  was  tendered  to  him 
not  to  return  to  Paraguay  if  he  had  any  regard  for 
his  personal  safety.  Vice-President  Morinigo  was 
then  installed  in  office  for  the  few  months  necessary 
to  complete  the  presidential  term  for  which  Gonzalez 
had  been  elected. 

In  November,  1894,  Senor  J.  B.  Egusquiza  was 


1894]  THE  URUGUAYAN  INCIDENT 


191 


chosen  President.  Egusquiza  was  tactful  in  dealing 
with  his  opponents,  and  so  far  earned  the  respect  of 
Paraguayans  that  he  was  able  to  introduce  administrative 
reforms  without  creating  marked  hostility  on  the  part 
of  the  officials  most  closely  affected.  During  his  presi- 
dency excitement  occurred  concerning  the  boundary 
question  with  Bolivia,  and  this  led  to  a rupture  of  official 
relations  with  Uruguay  in  consequence  of  the  Uruguayan 
minister  in  Asuncion  stating  to  his  Government  that  he 
considered  the  Bolivian  claims  just.  This  despatch  was 
made  public,  and  on  the  return  of  the  minister  from 
Montevideo  he  was  refused  permission  to  disembark  at 
Asuncion.  The  affair  was  patched  up  subsequently, 
and  relations  re-established.  In  1898  Egusquiza  com- 
pleted his  term,  and  was  succeeded  by  Senor  Emilio 
Aceval,  who  in  turn  gave  place  to  Senor  Juan  B. 
Escurra  in  1902. 

The  Administration  of  President  Aceval  attempted 
no  drastic  reforms.  Occasionally  projects  for  the  better 
dispensation  of  justice,  the  regulation  of  the  national 
finances,  or  the  extension  of  public  education,  were 
introduced.  Such  proposals  gave  rise  to  lengthy  dis- 
cussions in  Congress,  which  resulted  in  a general  expres- 
sion of  approval,  but  seldom  crystallised  into  action. 
Legislation  was  confined  to  ways  and  means  to  pay 
salaries  and  military  expenditure.  Much  more  cannot 
be  expected  from  the  oligarchy  which  controls  Para- 
guayan destinies. 

This  short  sketch  of  political  events  shows  the  con- 
ditions immediately  after  the  dictatorship  of  Lopez. 
The  administration  of  the  country  fell  into  the  hands  of 
a small  group  of  politicians  supported  by  the  army,  and 
whenever  this  support  was  withdrawn  the  Opposition 
ousted  the  Government. 

The  mass  of  the  people  care  little  for  the  political 
liberties  conferred  by  the  Constitution  of  1870.  For 
them  elections,  presidential  and  congressional,  have  no 
significance.  A candidate  supported  by  the  authorities 
is  returned  without  question.  Away  from  the  towns, 


192 


PARAGUAY 


however,  a horror  of  officials  exists,  and  springs  from 
reminiscences  of  former  years  when  official  interference 
meant  cruelty  and  extortion.  The  people  desire  only 
immunity  from  too  heavy  taxation  and  freedom  from 
military  service. 

The  economic  condition  of  Paraguay  after  1870  was 
pitiable.  All  industry  had  been  abandoned,  and  agri- 
culture ceased  as  the  male  population  was  drawn  from 
the  fields  by  Lopez  for  military  purposes.  All  the 
able-bodied  men  perished,  so  that  when  the  war  ended 
there  were  no  husbands,  fathers,  or  brothers  to  cultivate 
the  deserted  homesteads.  The  remnant  of  the  popula- 
tion left  alive  had  neither  strength  nor  inclination  to  till 
the  ground,  and  sustained  life  on  wild  fruits  and  roots 
of  the  forests.  Orange  groves  scattered  over  the 
country  side  proved  a valuable  resource  in  this  crisis, 
the  mandate  by  the  Dictator  some  years  previously  that 
every  inhabitant  should  plant  orange  trees  thus  proving 
a boon  to  these  starving  people.  The  trees  flourished  in 
the  midst  of  desolation,  and  now  yielded  abundant 
harvests.  From  outside  no  help  was  offered,  nor  did 
the  three  governments  at  war  with  Lopez  make  any 
pretence  to  assist  the  economic  situation.  The  cattle 
and  horses  had  nearly  all  been  killed  during  the  war, 
but  Argentina  and  Brazil  took  no  steps  to  supply  this 
deficiency.  Between  1870  and  1873,  therefore,  the 
Paraguayans  existed  more  like  wild  beasts  than  human 
beings,  and  hopeless  despair  was  the  keynote  of  the 
situation.  They  did  not  understand  the  so-called 
liberation  of  their  country,  and  feared  the  army  of 
occupation  more  than  they  had  ever  dreaded  the  tyranny 
of  Lopez. 

When  prospects  seemed  darkest  certain  natural 
forces  saved  the  Paraguayans  from  extinction.  A 
majority  of  the  population  were  women,  many  the 
mothers  of  young  children.  The  instincts  of  maternity 
crushed  all  other  feeling,  and  they  determined  on  a 
supreme  effort  to  alleviate  their  distress.  Rather  than 
see  their  babies  naked  and  hungry,  they  set  to  work  to 


1899]  WOMEN  SAVE  THE  SITUATION  193 

raise  food  stuffs  for  themselves  and  their  families, 
selling  the  surplus  to  purchase  the  scanty  clothing  they 
needed.  No  leaders  suggested  this  course  to  them.  It 
was  due  to  individual  effort  that  they  obtained  a means 
of  livelihood  by  active  labour.  This  action  wrought  a 
rapid  alteration  in  the  economic  conditions.  The  women 
cultivated  such  crops  as  Indian  corn,  mandioca,  and 
similar  products  to  meet  their  own  necessities.  They 
made  long  journeys  afoot  to  market,  and  where  manual 
work  on  the  farms  was  impossible  they  manufactured 
lace  and  other  articles  for  disposal  in  Asuncion.  That 
heroic  conduct,  however,  developed  an  unfortunate  trait 
in  the  few  men  who  survived  the  war.  No  inclination 
was  exhibited  by  them  to  resume  work  when  physically 
fit  to  do  so.  They  were  content  with  a life  of  idleness 
whilst  the  women  laboured,  and  this  condition  has 
altered  but  slightly  to  the  present  day. 

Matters  improved  as  agricultural  industry  revived. 
In  1876  the  crops  were  sufficient  to  meet  local  demands. 
Minor  industries  sprang  up,  and  the  exportation  of 
oranges  to  the  Argentine  markets  brought  some  little 
money  to  the  country.  The  trade  in  Paraguayan  tea 
(yerba  mate)  increased.  Tobacco  cultivation  gave  con- 
siderable employment,  and  as  industrial  life  expanded 
foreign  capital  came  for  investment.  This  alleviated 
poverty  amongst  certain  sections  of  the  population,  and 
a fertile  soil  and  a kindly  climate  greatly  ameliorated 
the  hardships  of  these  miserable  years. 

Notwithstanding  all  adverse  influences,  the  population 
shows  a substantial  increase  in  the  past  thirty  years. 
At  the  end  of  the  war  it  was  returned  as  221,000.  In 
1899  it  was  estimated  at  460,000  souls,  not  including 
some  60,000  or  70,000  Indians  classified  as  uncivilised 
and  dwelling  in  the  unexplored  regions  to  the  north. 
Foreign  immigration  has  been  limited,  and  the  total 
number  of  foreigners  now  resident  in  the  Republic  does 
not  exceed  10,000.  Of  these  300  are  British,  38  Belgian, 
2000  Italian,  6000  classified  as  Argentines,  Brazilians 
or  South  Americans,  the  remainder  comprising  natives 


194 


PARAGUAY 


of  Spain,  France,  Germany,  Switzerland  and  Scandi- 
navia. In  1893  an  experiment  was  attempted  by  a 
group  of  Australians.  A concession  was  obtained  for 
colonisation  purposes,  and  an  expedition  arrived  from 
Australia  to  form  a settlement  under  socialistic  auspices. 
The  basis  of  this  New  Australia  was  that  all  property 
should  be  in  common,  and  work  performed  for  the 
general,  not  individual,  benefit.  The  experiment  was 
not  successful.  Disputes  arose  in  regard  to  the  con- 
ditions the  leader  of  the  movement,  one  Lane,  wished 
to  impose,  and  in  1896  the  colony  was  broken  up,  the 
lands  reverting  to  Paraguay.  Some  of  these  Australians 
were  induced  by  Lane  to  found  another  colony,  this 
latter  called  San  Cosme.  Here  the  settlers  gained  a 
bare  living  by  growing  fruit  and  vegetables,  supple- 
menting their  incomes  by  working  when  opportunity  for 
employment  occurred.  The  terms  upon  which  the  land 
at  San  Cosme  is  held  are,  a free  title  for  80  acres  to 
each  individual  after  compliance  with  certain  conditions 
of  residence  and  area  under  cultivation.  A further 
experiment  in  the  direction  of  colonisation  has  been 
attempted  by  the  introduction  of  150  Sicilian  families, 
the  land  for  their  occupation  being  provided  by  the 
Government.  This  latter  departure  has  not  proved 
satisfactory  either,  and  many  of  the  colonists  deserted. 
There  is  no  great  inducement  for  Europeans  to  come  to 
Paraguay  under  existing  conditions.  The  climate  is 
semi-tropical,  and  the  bulk  of  the  land,  especially  in  the 
more  favoured  localities,  has  been  alienated  already  to 
private  individuals. 

Education  in  Paraguay  has  hitherto  received  little 
attention.  Attendance  at  the  schools  is  compulsory  for 
all  children  between  the  ages  of  eight  and  fourteen 
years,  but  is  not  enforced,  nor  is  it  likely  to  be  in  the 
immediate  future.  The  population  is  scattered  over  the 
country  districts,  and  distance  to  the  nearest  school 
offers  an  insuperable  bar  to  the  peasant  classes.  In  the 
towns  the  attendance  is  fair,  and  the  official  statistics  of 
1898  showed  that  the  number  of  public  and  private 


1899] 


EDUCATION  IN  PARAGUAY 


195 


elementary  schools  was  358  and  the  aggregate  of  pupils 
23,000.  Asuncion  boasts  of  a national  college  with  a 
staff  of  15  professors  and  an  attendance  in  1898  of  205 
students.  Little  attempt,  however,  is  made  to  impart 
sound  mental  or  physical  discipline. 


CHAPTER  XI 


URUGUAY 

Colorados  and  Blancos.  Flores  refuses  Re-election.  Revolt  of  Colonel 
Fortunato  Flores.  Presidency  of  Dr  Pedro  Varela.  Blanco 
Conspiracy.  Assassination  of  General  Flores.  Execution  of 
Rebels.  General  Batlle  becomes  President.  Cholera  Epidemic, 
1868.  Forced  Currency.  Insurrections  under  Maximo  Perez 
and  General  Caraballo.  Blanco  Revolution.  Insurgent  Suc- 
cesses. Engagement  near  Santa  Lucia.  Government  Defeat 
Engagement  near  Corralito.  Retreat  of  General  Caraballo. 
Insurgent  Losses.  Siege  of  Montevideo.  Capture  of  the  Cerro. 
Public  Opinion  in  Montevideo.  Sortie  from  Montevideo.  Siege 
of  Montevideo  Raised.  Operations  near  Puerto  del  Ingles. 
Decisive  Battle.  Government  Victory.  Reorganisation  of  Rebel 
Forces.  Further  Insurgents  Defeat.  Sefior  Gomensoro  accedes 
to  Presidency.  Restoration  of  Peaceful  Conditions.  Congres- 
sional Elections.  Dr  Jose  Ellauri.  Election  of  Dr  Ellauri. 
Complicated  Situation.  Threatening  Attitude  of  Military.  Ad- 
ministration of  Ellauri.  Conspiracy  of  Colorados  netos.  Assassi- 
nation of  Colonel  Castillo.  Revolt  in  Soriano.  Municipal 
Election  in  Montevideo.  Ministers  Resign.  Military  Revolt. 
Deposition  of  Ellauri.  Pi'ovisional  Administration.  Senor  Pedro 
Varela  elected  President.  Unsettled  Conditions.  Political 
Arrests.  Revolution  in  May,  1875.  Revolutionary  Committee 
in  Buenos  Aires.  Military  join  Insurgents.  Fighting  in  Soriano 
and  Paysandu.  Measures  against  the  Rebels.  Defeat  of 
Insurgents.  Financial  Difficulties.  Dictatorship  of  Colonel 
Latorre.  Praetorian  Administration  Established.  Public  Edu- 
cation. Election  of  Latorre.  Latorre  Resigns.  Dr  Vidal  as 
President.  Colonel  Santos.  Attack  on  Independent  News- 
papers. Increase  of  Militarism.  President  Vidal  Resigns. 
Santos  succeeds  to  Presidency.  Discontent  Spreads.  Question 
with  Italy.  Irresponsible  Administration.  Paraguayan  Debt. 
Preparations  for  Revolt  against  Santos.  Dr  Vidal  again  Elected. 

199 


1865]  POLITICAL  PKINCIPLES  197 

Revolt  in  Western  Part  of  Republic.  Defeat  of  Rebels  by 
General  Tajes.  Title  of  Captain-General  granted  to  Santos. 
General  Santos  again  President.  Attempt  to  Assassinate  Santos. 
Ministry  of  Dr  Ramirez.  Santos  resigns  Office.  Suppression 
of  Militarism.  Decree  exiling  Santos.  Election  of  Herrera 
y Obes. 

Uruguay  has  experienced  to  a marked  extent  the  unrest 
customary  in  South  America,  where  armed  revolution 
is  the  climax  of  discontent  with  the  authorities,  or  the 
outcome  of  ambitious  politicians  seeking  office.  The 
Civil  War  of  1863-5  had  overthrown  the  Blancos  and 
brought  in  General  Yenancio  Flores,  a success  due 
to  the  action  of  Brazil  against  the  Uruguayan  Govern- 
ment. With  one  exception,  the  revolutions  since  1865 
have  been  attempts  by  the  Blancos  to  regain  office.  So 
far  as  political  principles  go,  there  is  little  to  choose 
between  Color  ados  and  Blancos.  Uruguayans  profess 
to  be  one  or  the  other  because  their  parents  were  so 
before  them.  The  emoluments  of  office  comprise  every- 
thing the  majority  of  politicians  desire.  Owing  to  the 
fact  that  the  Blancos  have  taken  no  part  in  the  govern- 
ment for  thirty  years,  they  are  regarded  as  advocates  of 
reform,  but  the  methods  they  followed  previous  to  their 
defeat  in  1865  do  not  show  that  a Government  under 
their  auspices  would  differ  greatly  from  one  guided  by 
the  Colorados. 

In  1867,  during  the  war  with  Paraguay,  General 
Flores  returned  to  Montevideo.  The  congressional 
elections  were  fixed  for  the  close  of  that  year.  Under 
the  Law  of  Constitution  the  choice  of  the  President  is 
left  to  the  National  Congress.  General  Flores  informed 
the  Colorados  that  he  was  not  again  a candidate  for  the 
Presidency.  When  the  elections  took  place  only  the 
Colorados  went  to  the  polls,  the  Blancos  making  no 
effort  to  record  their  votes  ; and  the  friends  of  General 
Flores,  finding  that  no  arguments  would  induce  him  to 
again  accept  the  Presidency,  incited  his  son,  Colonel 
Flores,  to  organise  a revolt  to  bring  pressure  to  bear 
upon  him,  the  Colonel’s  regiment  being  the  only  one  in 


198 


URUGUAY 


Montevideo.  By  it  the  Plaza  Constitution  was  seized,  and 
barricades  thrown  up.  The  President  then  appealed  to 
his  son  to  surrender,  which  he  eventually  agreed  to  do, 
and  the  leader  and  others  principally  implicated  were 
sentenced  to  temporary  exile.  Congress  assembled  on 
February  15,  1868,  and  General  Flores  then  vacated  his 
office  in  favour  of  Dr  Pedro  Varela,  the  President  of  the 
Senate,  who  under  the  Law  of  Constitution  was  required 
to  act  as  Chief  Magistrate  pending  a new  election. 

Tempted  by  the  smallness  of  the  garrison,  the  Blanco 
Party  rose  again,  thinking  they  could  seize  the  capital 
and  bring  on  a general  rising  throughout  the  country. 
The  conspirators  proposed  to  seize  the  arms  of  the 
regiment,  acting  as  a guard  of  honour  at  the  opening  of 
Congress  on  February  15,  and  then  make  prisoners  of 
the  Senators,  Deputies,  and  other  authorities,  it  being 
the  custom  of  the  troops  to  pile  their  arms  in  the 
barracks  when  the  official  opening  of  Congress  was  con- 
cluded. The  authorities,  however,  had  received  notice 
of  some  mischief  brewing,  and  the  regiment  on  duty  was 
ordered  to  remain  under  arms ; so  the  revolt  was 
deferred  for  a few  days,  and  other  plans  hatched.  On 
February  19,  a mob,  led  by  Senor  Bernardo  P.  Berro, 
attacked  the  Government  Palace  at  mid-day,  and 
obtained  possession  of  the  building ; and  at  the  same 
time  Colonel  Freire  assaulted  the  barracks  of  the 
“ Libertad  ” Regiment,  effecting  an  entry  after  killing 
the  sentries,  but  the  regimental  commander,  Colonel 
Olave,  rushed  out  sword  in  hand  and  cut  down  Freire, 
whereupon  the  soldiers  rallied  and  regained  control  of 
the  barracks  and  Government  Palace. 

When  General  Flores  was  informed  of  the  revolt  he 
started  for  the  Palace,  but  his  carriage  was  stopped  by 
a group  of  men  in  the  street  of  Juncal,  and  the  coachman 
shot.  Flores  then  attempted  to  alight,  but  was  stabbed 
to  death  by  assassins,  who  at  once  dispersed  and  were 
never  identified.  During  the  attack  on  the  barracks  a 
body  of  armedrebels,  headed  by  Major  Mendoza,  appeared 
in  the  outskirts  of  Montevideo,  but  were  defeated  by  a 


General  Venancio  Flores. 


President  Latorre. 


President  Santos. 


[Face  page  198. 


1868] 


RIOTS  IN  MONTEVIDEO 


199 


detachment  of  troops.  Senor  Berro  was  taken  prisoner 
and  shot,  in  company  with  an  accomplice  by  name  of 
Barbot,  a former  commissary  of  police,  and  several  other 
conspirators.  This  attempt  of  the  Blancos  was  a com- 
plete fiasco. 

Congress  proceeded  on  March  1,  1868,  to  elect  the 
President.  The  three  candidates  were  General  Lorenzo 
Batlle,  a soldier  of  long  and  meritorious  service,  Senor 
Jose  C&ndido  Bustamante,  and  General  Jose  Gregorio 
Sudrez  ; and  General  Batlle  was  chosen.  His  Adminis- 
tration was  confronted  by  numerous  difficulties.  A 
cholera  epidemic  swept  over  the  country  in  1868,  and 
claimed  many  victims,  causing  also  acute  commercial 
and  financial  disturbance.  During  this  crisis  bank  fail- 
ures involved  the  Government  in  serious  financial  straits, 
to  relieve  which  a forced  currency  of  notes  was  instituted. 
The  commercial  community  strongly  opposed  this 
measure,  and  refused  to  accept  the  paper  money  with 
a resolution  so  obstinate  that  the  Government  drew 
back. 

The  first  two  years  of  Bathe’s  Administration  were 
further  complicated  by  an  outbreak  under  Maximo 
Perez,  a man  of  considerable  influence,  and  by  a rising 
headed  by  General  Caraballo,  an  officer  of  high  standing 
in  the  Uruguayan  army.  The  first  of  these  was  easily 
suppressed ; the  second  ended  by  the  surrender  of 
General  Caraballo  at  Mazangano,  a ford  on  the  Rio 
Negro.  Neither  movement  threatened  serious  danger, 
but  both  entailed  expenses  at  a time  when  the  Treasury 
was  empty. 

Meanwhile  the  Blancos , or  Whites,  went  on  plotting 
against  the  Government,  and  perfected  arrangements  in 
Brazilian  territory  or  in  the  Argentine  provinces  of 
Corrientes  and  Entre  Rios  for  a strong  expedition  to  in- 
vade the  Republic.  War  material — small  arms,  artillery, 
and  ammunition — was  accumulated,  and  early  in  1870 
the  leaders  of  the  movement  decided  to  take  the  field. 
Accordingly,  on  March  5,  the  authorities  received  infor- 
mation that  Colonel  Timoteo  Aparicio  had  raised  the 


200 


URUGUAY 


standard  of  revolt  in  the  north-west  of  Uruguay,  and 
was  attracting  volunteers  in  such  numbers  that  in  a 
few  months  he  was  at  the  head  of  5000  men.  The 
prestige  of  the  insurgents  was  increased  so  much  by 
several  small  successes  over  detachments  of  troops  that 
the  Government  became  seriously  alarmed  and  made 
vigorous  efforts  to  raise  and  equip  an  adequate  military 
force.  One  army  corps  was  organised  under  General 
Francisco  Caraballo  to  operate  in  the  north,  and  a 
second  under  General  Suarez  to  protect  the  country 
lying  to  the  south  of  the  Rio  Negro. 

The  rebels  came  in  touch  with  Suarez  in  September 
near  the  river  of  Santa  Lucia  Chico,  and  on  the  12th 
an  action  was  fought  in  which  the  Government  forces 
were  obliged  to  fall  back  towards  Montevideo  closely 
pursued  by  the  enemy.  Near  Maronas,  however,  they 
received  reinforcements,  and  General  Suarez  again  pre- 
pared to  take  the  offensive.  Meanwhile  General 
Caraballo  in  the  north  of  the  Republic  had  come  in 
contact  with  another  section  of  the  revolutionary  forces, 
and  a series  of  indecisive  skirmishes  took  place.  But 
when  Colonel  Aparicio  heard  that  Caraballo  was  pushing 
southwards  to  join  General  Suarez,  he  abandoned  the 
position  he  had  taken  up  in  the  Department  of  Monte- 
video and  marched  to  the  west  to  intercept  him.  The 
two  forces  met  in  the  vicinity  of  Corralito,  and  a fight 
ensued  in  which  heavy  losses  were  sustained  on  both 
sides,  especially  by  the  Government  cavalry.  The  troops 
were  able,  however,  to  hold  the  positions  they  occupied  ; 
yet  Aparicio  now  opened  negotiations  for  the  surrender 
of  General  Caraballo,  who  called  a council  of  war  after 
the  cessation  of  hostilities  on  the  evening  of  September 
29,  at  which  it  was  decided  to  temporise  with  the 
rebel  leader  and,  under  cover  of  night,  evacuate  the 
positions  and  make  towards  the  south.  The  over- 
confidence  of  the  rebels  allowed  this  to  be  done,  and 
a forced  march  of  36  miles  was  accomplished  before 
daylight. 

Colonel  Aparicio  pursued,  and  his  force  came  up 


1870] 


THE  CAPITAL  BESIEGED 


201 


with  Caraballo  as  that  commander’s  troops  were  crossing 
the  Rio  Negro.  Attempting  to  prevent  this,  the  revolu- 
tionists were  met  by  a heavy  fire  from  troops  posted 
in  the  scrub  adjoining  the  river  bank  and  driven  back 
with  serious  loss,  leaving  Caraballo  free  to  cross  and 
embark  his  men  in  steamers  for  Paysandu.  Aparicio 
then  marched  towards  the  centre  of  the  Republic  in 
search  of  General  Suarez,  who,  however,  effected  a 
junction  with  Caraballo  at  Paysandu,  thereby  leaving 
the  entire  country  south  of  the  Rio  Negro  in  the  hands 
of  the  rebels,  who  then  decided  to  march  upon  Monte- 
video and  besiege  it. 

Recruits  joined  the  rebels  near  Montevideo  in  such 
numbers  that  their  strength  rose  to  7000  men,  and  their 
confidence  to  a height  which  made  them  deem  the 
capture  of  the  capital  certain.  The  authorities,  however, 
were  not  idle.  Caraballo  had  been  relieved  of  his  com- 
mand, and  the  charge  of  all  troops  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Paysandu  given  to  Suarez,  who  made  such  preparations 
to  take  the  field  without  delay  as  to  be  able  in  November 
to  inform  the  Government  that  he  was  ready. 

At  Montevideo  meanwhile  the  resistance  encountered 
by  the  insurgents  was  greater  than  Aparicio  anticipated. 
On  November  28  the  fortress  at  the  Cerro  had  been 
taken  by  assault  after  severe  fighting,  and  on  the 
following  day  a number  of  steamboats  were  seized  and 
brought  into  the  wharves  near  the  Cerro  fortress  for 
use  in  a sudden  descent  on  Montevideo,  but  that  plan 
was  frustrated.  President  Batlle  thought  strong  action 
necessary  to  restore  confidence,  and  decided  to  make 
a sortie  from  the  city.  Accordingly,  on  the  29th,  a 
column  led  by  the  President  moved  out  against  the 
insurgent  camp,  which  it  at  first  surprised,  but  a rally 
was  made,  and  severe  fighting  ensued,  ending  in  the  loss 
to  the  revolutionists  of  their  position.  The  troops 
succeeded  in  forcing  the  insurgents  to  abandon  their 
headquarters  at  the  Villa  de  la  Union.  Elsewhere, 
however,  they  held  their  ground,  and  after  some  hours 
President  Batlle  ordered  his  troops  to  retire  to  Monte- 


202 


URUGUAY 


video.  But  the  object  of  the  sortie  had  been  attained, 
in  so  far  as  the  enemy  had  been  driven  out  of  the  Villa 
de  la  Union  and  the  river  steamers  recaptured. 

Suarez  now  left  Paysandu  and  marched  to  the  relief 
of  Montevideo,  a move  of  which  Aparicio  was  ignorant 
until  the  middle  of  December,  when  the  troops  from 
Paysandu  had  already  crossed  the  Rio  Negro,  and  the 
opportunity  for  opposing  the  advance  at  this  strategic 
point  been  lost.  The  insurgent  position  now  became 
untenable,  since  to  continue  the  siege  was  to  invite 
General  Suarez  to  make  an  attack  on  its  rear,  supported 
by  a simultaneous  onslaught  by  the  garrison  in  front, 
when  the  rebel  army  would  be  caught  between  two 
fires.  Aparicio,  therefore,  raised  the  siege  and  moved 
out  to  meet  Suarez,  to  assist  whom  reinforcements  were 
sent  by  sea  to  Puerto  del  Ingles.  The  rebel  leader 
heard  of  these  reinforcements,  and  ordered  a division 
of  the  insurgents  to  occupy  this  place,  which  it  did, 
compelling  the  steamers  to  return  to  Montevideo  with 
the  troops.  General  Suarez,  disappointed  of  this  help, 
was  now  in  a difficult  situation  confronted  by  the 
whole  rebel  army.  If  a defeat  occurred  the  capture  of 
Montevideo  was  certain,  and  the  cause  of  the  Colorados 
lost.  So  he  decided  upon  a bold  move,  and  on  the 
night  of  December  23  led  his  troops  round  the  flank 
of  the  insurgents,  and  by  forced  marches  proceeded 
towards  the  city.  Too  late  Aparicio  ordered  the  rebels 
to  pursue  ; Suarez  reached  the  capital.  A bloody  battle 
was  fought  on  Christmas  Day,  both  sides  aware  that 
the  result  would  decide  the  fate  of  the  revolution.  At 
last  the  repeated  attacks  on  the  insurgents  told  and 
their  line  gave  way,  and  Sudrez  pressing  home  his 
advantage,  retreat  followed,  but  not  until  most  of  the 
rebel  infantry  had  been  killed  or  wounded.  The  retreat 
became  a rout  before  the  day  closed,  Aparacio  abandon- 
ing his  artillery  to  save  the  remnant  of  his  men,  but 
the  pursuit  was  not  energetic.  Had  it  been,  not  a 
rebel  would  have  escaped. 

For  some  months  after  this  little  was  heard  of 


1871] 


REVOLT  UNDER  APARICIO 


203 


revolutionary  movements,  but  the  authorities,  satisfied 
with  their  victory,  took  no  steps  to  prevent  a reorganisa- 
tion of  the  rebel  forces,  and  this  apathy  gave  Aparicio 
opportunity  to  collect  groups  of  insurgents,  so  that  by 
June,  1871,  he  had  again  a force  of  2500  men  under  his 
command.  Some  artillery  had  been  saved  in  serviceable 
condition,  and  small  arms  and  ammunition  were  fairly 
plentiful.  This  reconcentration  of  rebels  was  at  Manan- 
tiales  de  San  Juan,  and,  when  information  of  their 
increasing  strength  reached  the  Government,  a division 
under  General  Enrique  Castro  was  sent  to  attack  and 
disperse  them.  This  he  did  on  July  17,  when,  although 
the  insurgent  position  was  a strong  one,  he  found  the 
rebels  still  so  demoralised  from  their  recent  reverses 
that  no  determined  resistance  was  made.  Their  defeat 
was  complete ; their  guns  were  captured,  most  of  the 
infantry  killed,  and  many  of  the  principal  leaders  as  well. 
A number  of  the  rebel  cavalry  escaped,  however,  and 
with  these  men  Aparicio  continued  a guerilla  warfare, 
but  he  did  not  again  succeed  in  raising  a force  of  suffi- 
cient strength  to  endanger  the  safety  of  the  constituted 
authority. 

President  Batlle,  at  the  end  of  his  term,  was  followed 
by  Sehor  Tomas  Gomensoro,  the  President  of  the 
Senate,  for  no  congressional  elections  could  be  held  in 
1871,  owing  to  the  disturbed  state  of  the  country,  and, 
therefore,  no  presidential  election  was  possible  until  a 
year  later. 

In  the  short  Administration  of  President  Gomensoro 
the  smouldering  revolutionary  trouble  was  settled 
through  the  good  offices  of  Argentina.  An  agreement 
between  the  National  Authorities  and  the  rebel  leaders 
was  signed  on  April  6,  1872.  The  officers  implicated 
in  the  insurrection  were  restored  to  the  grades  they  held 
before  the  outbreak,  and  a sum  of  $500,000  was  distri- 
buted to  the  followers  of  Aparicio.  The  Blancos, 
furthermore,  were  allowed  to  nominate  the  jefes  politicos 
of  Canelones,  San  Jose,  Florida,  and  Cerro  Largo. 
Satisfaction  at  the  establishment  of  peace  was  general, 


204 


URUGUAY 


and  the  elections  held  for  Senators  and  Representatives 
resulted  in  a representation  of  both  political  parties,  but 
with  the  Color  ados  still  in  a substantial  majority.  On 
February  14,  1873,  Dr  Jose  E.  Ellauri  was  chosen 
President  of  the  Senate,  and,  in  virtue  of  this  office, 
succeeded  Gomensoro  as  temporary  President  of  the 
Republic. 

The  situation  in  Congress  now  changed.  The  prin- 
cipal political  parties  still  were  the  Colorados  and  the 
Blancos , but  the  former  split  into  two  factions,  the 
Colorados  principistas  and  the  Colorados  netos,  the  former 
urging  the  introduction  of  certain  reforms  in  the 
Government  and  a participation  of  the  Blancos  in  the 
National  Administration,  and  the  netos  wishing  to 
maintain  the  system  hitherto  in  vogue,  by  which  the 
political  party  in  power  kept  all  offices  and  representation 
in  the  Chambers  for  their  supporters.  It  was  under 
these  circumstances  the  presidential  election  took 
place.  The  Colorados  principistas  nominated  Dr  Jose 
Maria  Munoz ; the  Colorados  netos  supported  ex- 
President  Tom&s  Gomensoro,  but  Munoz  was  the 
popular  candidate. 

The  presidential  election  was  fixed  for  March  1,  and 
the  supporters  of  both  candidates  worked  with  a will. 
Dr  Munoz  was  regarded  as  sure  of  victory,  but  a surprise 
was  in  store.  A third  candidate,  the  acting  President, 
Dr  Jose  Ellauri,  appeared  on  the  scene.  This  gentle- 
man belonged  to  the  same  party  as  Dr  Munoz,  and  his 
chances  of  election  were  deemed  remote,  but  the  voting 
gave  him  a substantial  majority.  This  totally  un- 
expected result  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Colorados 
netos  found  themselves  unable  to  elect  Senor  Gomensoro 
and  unanimously  voted  for  Ellauri,  by  assisting  whom 
they  reckoned  they  could  not  be  excluded  from  a share 
in  the  spoils  of  office.  When  informed  of  his  election, 
Dr  Ellauri  sent  his  resignation  to  Congress,  but,  being 
pressed,  in  the  end  accepted. 

The  new  President  started  amid  difficulties  enough. 
He  imagined  when  he  accepted  the  Presidency  that  he 


1873] 


PRESIDENT  ELLAURI 


205 


would  receive  the  support  of  the  Coloraclos  principistas, 
but  soon  discovered  that  his  former  political  friends 
were  little  inclined  to  assist  him.  Again,  therefore,  he 
announced  his  resignation,  but  no  sooner  was  this 
known  than  the  senior  officers  in  Montevideo  revolted, 
paraded  their  regiments  in  front  of  the  Chambers,  and 
informed  the  Senators  and  Representatives  that  force 
would  be  used  to  ensure  the  rejection  of  the  resignation 
when  presented  to  Congress.  So  Ellauri  had  no  help 
for  it  but  to  remain.  That  satisfied  the  military  and  the 
troops  were  withdrawn,  but  the  incident  left  an  uneasy 
feeling  and  was  the  cause  of  grave  disturbances  in  the 
end.  And  an  unfortunate  act  of  Ellauri’s  helped  to 
strengthen  military  influence  in  politics.  President 
Gomensoro  had  dismissed  the  officer  commanding  the 
1st  Regiment  of  Cazadores  in  consequence  of  interference 
in  elections,  and  the  first  decree  published  by  Ellauri 
restored  this  officer,  Major  Lorenzo  Latorre,  to  his 
command. 

Yet  Ellauri  succeeded  in  establishing  an  Adminis- 
tration generally  beneficial  to  the  Republic,  and  during 
1873  and  1874  the  public  finances  were  honestly  managed 
and  protection  for  life  and  property  strictly  enforced. 
Such  policy  was  not  to  the  taste  of  the  more  reactionary 
section  of  the  Coloraclos  netos,  groups  of  whom  began 
conspiring,  with  the  result  that  at  the  end  of  1874  Colonel 
Romualdo  Castillo  was  assassinated  in  Paysandu.  He 
was  a strong  supporter  of  the  President,  and  had  enforced 
respect  for  law  and  order. 

Other  disturbances  followed.  Colonel  Maximo  Perez 
attempted  an  outbreak  in  the  Department  of  Soriano, 
which  was  suppressed  ; but  in  January,  1875,  affairs  took 
a more  serious  turn,  the  leaders  of  the  Coloraclos  netos 
being  determined  to  embarrass  the  Administration.  The 
election  of  an  Alcalde  for  Montevideo  gave  them  their 
opportunity.  Owing  to  rioting  on  January  1,  the  election 
was  postponed  until  the  10th,  and  this  interval  was  taken 
advantage  of  by  the  conspirators  to  publish  libellous 
statements  about  the  policy  and  administration  of  Ellauri. 


206 


URUGUAY 


The  candidate  of  the  more  respectable  portion  of  the 
community  was  Don  Jose  Varela,  and  the  Color  ados 
netos  decided  to  prevent  his  election.  Accordingly,  when 
the  supporters  of  Varela  proceeded  to  the  voting  stations, 
they  were  met  by  armed  men  who  opened  fire  upon 
them,  killing  and  wounding  a number  of  the  most 
prominent  citizens.  Such  supporters  of  Senor  Varela 
as  had  arms  returned  this  fire,  and  the  shooting  continued 
until  the  arrival  of  a body  of  troops  commanded  by  Major 
Latorre.  In  consequence  of  this  affair,  several  ministers 
resigned  their  portfolios,  accusing  the  President  of  want 
of  energy  for  not  proceeding  more  severely  against  the 
instigators  of  the  outrage.  The  Colorados  netos  insisted 
that  the  vacant  ministerial  posts  should  be  filled  from 
their  ranks.  Ellauri  refused,  and  appointed  Colorados 
principistas.  This  brought  matters  to  a crisis. 

Five  days  after  the  riot  the  troops  were  marched  to 
the  Plaza  Constitution.  The  senior  officers  drew  up  a 
manifesto  in  which  they  declared  the  authority  of  Ellauri 
at  an  end,  and  that  they  had  determined  to  install  a Pro- 
visional Government  under  Senor  Pedro  Varela  pending 
a new  presidential  election.  Dr  Ellauri,  powerless  to 
resist,  sought  asylum  on  a foreign  warship,  and  through- 
out the  country  the  majority  of  the  officials  accepted 
unreservedly  the  Provisional  Government  set  up  in  his 
place.  The  Blancos  concentrated  in  Florida,  placing 
themselves  under  the  orders  of  Colonel  Aparicio,  to 
whom  the  Government  sent  envoys  requesting  his 
adhesion  to  the  new  regime,  he  meanwhile  having  in- 
formed Ellauri  that  the  Blancos  would  lend  him  assist- 
ance to  regain  office.  Ellauri  declined  this  offer,  and 
Aparicio  then  determined  to  recognise  the  Provisional 
Government.  His  reward  was  the  rank  of  General. 

On  January  22  the  Chambers  were  convened  in 
extraordinary  session  to  elect  a President  of  the  Republic, 
but  many  dissentient  members  of  the  Senate  and  House 
of  Representatives  absented  themselves,  leaving  the 
Government  supporters  in  control.  These  duly  elected 
Senor  Pedro  Varela  to  the  Presidency. 


1875]  PRESIDENT  PEDRO  VARELA 


207 


The  new  chief  magistrate’s  first  acts  did  not  inspire 
confidence,  for  the  members  of  the  Legislature  who  had 
not  attended  the  extraordinary  session  were  declared  to 
have  forfeited  their  seats,  and  a number  of  military  officers 
and  civilians  were  arrested  and  sentenced  to  exile  without 
trial.  They  were  placed  on  the  Puig,  an  unseaworthy 
barque,  and  sent  to  sea,  with  instructions  to  the  master 
of  the  vessel  to  proceed  to  Cuba,  and  were  eventually 
disembarked  on  the  coast  of  Florida,  U.S.A.,  after  many 
weeks  of  hardship. 

President  Varela’s  conduct,  and  the  fact  that  the 
influence  of  the  Colorados  netos  became  paramount  in 
public  affairs,  provoked  revolutionary  feeling  so  much, 
that  in  May  the  standard  of  revolt  was  raised  in  the 
Department  of  Maldonado  by  Colonel  Julian  de  la  Liana, 
a man  of  considerable  local  influence  and  a Colorado 
principista.  Senor  Enrique  Yarza  and  Senor  Miguel 
Yarza,  prominent  citizens  of  Rocha,  joined  this  move- 
ment, and  many  other  recruits  came  forward,  by  whose 
leaders  a committee  was  formed  in  Argentina  to  arrange 
for  supplies  of  war  material.  It  also  appointed  Colonel 
Angel  Munis  Commander-in-chief  of  the  rebel  army. 
In  the  Department  of  Salto  the  troops  to  the  number  of 
1000  officers  and  men  under  Colonel  Atanasildo  Saldana 
joined  the  revolutionary  cause,  and  in  Paysandu  Colonel 
Genuardo  Gonzalez  and  other  military  officers  took  the 
same  step.  An  expedition  from  Buenos  Aires  com- 
manded by  Colonel  Julio  Arrue  was  disembarked  in  the 
Department  of  Colonia,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  town 
of  Mercedes  was  occupied  and  the  National  Guard  of 
that  district  called  out  for  service  in  the  insurgent  ranks. 
It  was  a revolution  supported  by  Colorados  and  Blancos, 
without  distinction  of  party.  General  Aparicio,  however, 
remained  loyal  to  the  Government,  and  restrained  many 
Blancos  from  volunteering  their  services  to  the  rebels. 
The  revolt  became  known  as  la  revolucion  tricolor  on 
account  of  the  flag  used. 

In  October  the  rebels  under  Colonel  Arrue  gained  a 
victory  in  the  Department  of  Soriano,  but  this  was 


208 


URUGUAY 


counterbalanced  by  advantages  of  the  Government 
troops  in  Paysandu,  at  Palomas,  and  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Tacuarembo.  General  Aparicio,  whose  experi- 
ence gained  in  the  Blanco  revolution  of  1870-2  was  most 
valuable,  was  given  command  of  an  army  corps,  and 
allowed  the  insurgents  little  rest,  while  Colonel  Latorre, 
now  Minister  of  War,  took  charge  of  the  Government 
forces  in  the  north.  At  the  beginning  of  1875  he 
inflicted  a crushing  defeat  on  the  rebels  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  Minas,  a reverse  that  practically  ended  the 
revolution,  for  the  remnant  of  the  insurgents  scattered 
in  various  directions,  many  seeking  refuge  in  southern 
Brazil. 

The  stability  of  the  Administration,  however,  was 
not  established.  Financial  difficulties  complicated  the 
situation,  and  accusations  of  malversation  of  public 
funds  were  made  against  the  Government.  So  wide- 
spread did  the  general  discontent  become  that  President 
Varela  found  his  position  rapidly  verging  on  the 
impossible,  and  few  prominent  persons  would  accept 
office.  This  unpopularity  was  the  opportunity  Colonel 
Latorre  had  been  waiting  for,  and  considering  the  time 
ripe  for  action,  he  proclaimed  himself  Dictator  of  Uruguay 
on  March  10,  1876.  He  was  supported  by  the  army, 
and  Varela  quietly  submitted. 

Colonel  Latorre’s  Government  was  a dictatorship 
with  the  support  of  the  army.  Civil  rights  were 
suppressed,  liberty  of  the  press  restricted,  political 
opponents  arrested  and  imprisoned  without  trial,  and 
mysterious  assassinations  of  persons  unfriendly  to  the 
authorities  occurred.  It  was  a reign  of  terror  not 
unlike  that  in  Argentina  under  Rosas.  In  some  direc- 
tions, however,  the  influence  of  Latorre  was  exerted  for 
the  benefit  of  Uruguay.  Brigandage,  common  in  many 
districts,  was  suppressed,  and  security  for  the  lives  and 
property  of  the  inhabitants  not  connected  with  political 
affairs  was  established.  Attention  was  also  given  to 
public  education,  and  in  August,  1877,  a decree  was 
published  providing  a national  school  system,  Seiior 


1879] 


LATORRE  AS  DICTATOR 


209 


Jose  Varela,  who  had  been  Director  of  Schools  in 
Montevideo  since  March,  1876,  being  nominated  national 
inspector  of  public  instruction.  Special  taxes  were  set 
apart  to  support  the  new  department.  After  exercising 
dictatorial  powers  for  three  years,  Latorre  determined 
to  be  nominated  Constitutional  President ; so  in 
February,  1879,  a Congress  was  convoked  which  elected 
him  for  a term  of  four  years  from  the  first  day  of  the 
preceding  March. 

As  President,  the  former  Dictator  made  a strong 
effort  to  govern  in  accordance  with  the  Constitution,  but 
found  his  path  beset  by  difficulties.  The  former  political 
parties  had  been  so  crushed  as  to  make  Latorre  dependent 
still  on  the  military  faction  for  any  assistance  he  required, 
and  that  was  poor  material  with  which  to  reorganise 
republican  institutions.  For  a year  he  struggled  on, 
but  lacked  the  ability  to  carry  out  his  projects,  and  on 
March  13,  1880,  to  the  general  surprise,  he  presented 
his  resignation  to  Congress,  declaring  that  he  found  the 
country  ungovernable.  Congress  accepted  the  resigna- 
tion and  elected  Dr  Francisco  A.  Vidal,  a well-known 
physician,  but  a man  of  small  weight  in  political  matters, 
for  the  remainder  of  the  legal  period. 

The  new  President  was  unfitted  to  deal  with  the 
complicated  situation,  and  one  of  his  first  acts  was  to 
nominate  as  his  minister  and  principal  adviser  Colonel 
Maximo  Santos,  an  officer  who  had  been  prominent  in 
the  dictatorship  of  Latorre.  In  a short  time  Colonel 
Santos  obtained  complete  control,  President  Vidal 
being  only  a figurehead.  Under  the  last  year  of  Latorre 
a certain  degree  of  liberty  had  been  accorded  to  the 
press,  and  independent  newspapers  had  criticised  public 
events.  This  independent  criticism  was  now  directed 
against  Vidal  and  Santos,  and  the  latter  determined  to 
suppress  it. 

A mob  in  May,  1880,  instigated  from  high  quarters 
and  led  by  military  officers  and  other  officials,  attacked 
the  offices  of  these  independent  news  sheets  and  wrecked 
them.  There  was  no  redress,  and  all  independent 

o 


210 


URUGUAY 


criticism  of  the  Administration  ceased;  which  was  just 
what  General  Santos  desired.  Thenceforth,  in  the  name 
of  President  Vidal,  he  allotted  all  lucrative  posts  to  his 
friends  and  created  many  new  offices  to  provide  sinecures 
for  a host  of  needy  adventurers.  Militarism  became 
more  rampant  than  ever,  and  in  all  ways  he  did  his  best 
to  prepare  the  way  for  his  accession  to  the  Presidency 
at  the  end  of  Vidal’s  term.  Vidal,  however,  did  not 
wait  for  the  end.  Finding  himself  powerless,  he 
determined  to  retire,  and  presented  his  resignation 
on  March  1,  1882.  It  was  accepted  without  demur, 
and  on  the  same  day  the  Chambers  elected  General 
Santos. 

Santos  was  unpopular  outside  his  own  clique,  and 
discontent  was  so  strong  that  the  probability  of  armed 
revolution  was  widely  discussed.  For  the  moment, 
however,  a scarcity  of  arms  and  ammunition  prevented 
any  rising.  All  departments  were  conducted  on  an 
irresponsible  basis.  The  Treasury  was  mulcted  to 
supply  the  personal  needs  of  high  officials ; the  public 
debt  was  increased  for  the  same  purpose ; the  rights  of 
citizens  were  disregarded  ; no  redress  could  be  obtained 
in  the  courts  for  wrongs  inflicted  under  the  guise  of 
authority,  and  it  needed  an  Italian  squadron  off  Monte- 
video to  insure  the  payment  of  compensation  for  torture 
and  imprisonment  inflicted  on  two  Italians  during  the 
disturbances  under  Vidal.  Santos’s  only  act  to  benefit 
the  people  was  the  introduction  of  the  civil  marriage 
law;  but  in  1884  he  ordered  the  return  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  Paraguay  of  all  trophies  captured  during  the 
war,  and  he  also  cancelled  the  claim  for  the  war 
indemnity,  due  under  the  treaty  of  1865,  between 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Uruguay. 

Towards  the  end  of  1885,  the  discontent  took  definite 
form.  Many  Uruguayans  emigrated  to  Argentina,  and 
there  commenced  military  preparations  for  an  insurrec- 
tion. Battalions  of  volunteers  Tvere  enrolled  and  war 
material  collected,  and  in  view  of  these  hostile  prepara- 
tions President  Santos  increased  the  strength  of  the 


1886] 


GENERAL  SANTOS 


211 


army.  His  term  expired  on  March  1,  1886,  and 
influenced  by  him  the  Chambers  elected  ex- President 
Vidal  as  his  successor.  This  meant  that  Santos  intended 
to  continue  to  be  the  real  ruler  of  the  Republic,  and  it 
is  difficult  to  understand  why  Dr  Vidal  accepted  the 
position  after  his  former  experience,  but  he  was  per- 
suaded to  do  so  by  the  arguments  and  promises  of 
General  Santos.  At  the  same  session  the  Chamber 
appointed  General  Santos  to  be  Commander-in-chief  of 
the  army  with  widely  extended  powers,  and  these  events 
decided  the  revolutionary  leaders  to  make  their  effort 
without  further  delay. 

On  March  28,  accordingly,  an  insurgent  expedition 
disembarked  at  Guaviyu  under  command  of  General 
Enrique  Castro  and  General  Jose  Miguel  Arredondo. 
Recruits  joined  from  various  districts,  and  all  omens 
pointed  to  a determined  attempt  to  oust  Santos  from 
power.  There  was,  however,  a lack  of  organisation 
amongst  the  rebels,  and  when  they  were  attacked  by 
General  Tajes  on  March  30  they  were  forced  to  retreat. 
Tajes  followed  up  his  advantage,  and  next  day  inflicted 
a decisive  defeat,  sending  the  captured  rebels  to  Monte- 
video, where  they  were  released.  The  failure  of  this 
attempt  at  revolution  strengthened  the  position  of 
Santos,  who  was  now  accorded  by  Congress  the  title  of 
Captain- General  of  the  army,  and,  contrary  to  the  Con- 
stitution in  regard  to  military  officers,  returned  as  Senator 
for  the  Department  of  Flores  and  nominated  President 
of  the  Senate.  In  this  post  in  virtue  of  his  office  he 
would  succeed  to  the  Presidency  in  the  event  of  the 
resignation  of  Dr  Vidal.  Pressure  was  accordingly 
exercised  upon  that  puppet,  who  resigned  on  May  24, 
Santos  immediately  assuming  the  duties  of  Chief 
Magistrate. 

In  his  second  Administration,  Santos  made  no 
pretence  of  constitutional  government.  Nominally  the 
various  official  departments  were  in  charge  of  Ministers  ; 
but  the  President  intervened  directly  in  all,  and  dis- 
content grew  apace  when  this  became  fully  understood. 


212 


URUGUAY 


On  the  night  of  August  17,  1886,  as  the  President  was 
alighting  from  his  carriage  in  front  of  the  Cibils  Theatre, 
a man  named  Gregorio  Ortiz  fired  at  him,  the  bullet 
breaking  his  lower  jaw.  This  attempt  at  assassination, 
combined  with  the  resignation  of  his  Ministers  a few 
weeks  later,  and  a revolutionary  movement  on  the 
northern  frontier,  convinced  Santos  that  his  intention  to 
be  Dictator  of  Uruguay  for  life  was  not  feasible,  and  he 
sought  a way  of  escape  by  sending  for  Dr  Jose  Pedro 
Ramirez,  a leader  of  the  Opposition,  and  requesting  him 
to  form  a ministry  on  strictly  constitutional  lines.  At 
first  Ramirez  refused,  and  it  was  only  after  many 
promises  from  General  Santos  that  he  agreed  to  con- 
sider the  matter.  One  condition  imposed  by  Dr  Ramirez 
as  a sine  qua  non  for  his  participation  in  the  Government 
was  that  General  Santos  should  retire  from  the  Presi- 
dency on  February  14,  1887. 

The  new  Ministry  embraced  such  well-known  men 
as  Dr  Aureliano  Rodriguez  Larreta  and  Dr  Juan  Carlos 
Blanco,  and  was  known  as  the  Ministerio  de  la  con- 
ciliacion.  It  came  into  power  on  November  4,  1886. 
General  Santos  now  announced  his  intention  of  making 
a journey  to  Europe,  alleging  ill  health,  and  on  November 
18  he  placed  his  resignation  in  the  hands  of  Congress. 
The  Chambers  nominated  General  Maximo  Tajes  to 
discharge  the  presidential  duties  until  March  1,  1890. 
Tajes  wished  the  Ministry  presided  over  by  Dr  Ramirez 
to  retain  their  portfolios,  but  a difference  of  opinion 
arose  in  regard  to  the  policy  of  the  new  Government, 
and  they  resigned. 

President  Tajes  had  no  desire  to  see  a continuance 
of  militarism,  and  on  December  28  issued  a decree  dis- 
embodying several  regiments  of  the  army,  including 
those  whose  senior  officers  had  been  conspicuous  for 
interference  in  political  affairs.  General  Santos,  on 
receiving  this  news,  immediately  embarked  for  Monte- 
video, but  on  his  arrival  in  the  River  Plate,  he  was 
advised  that  Congress  had  passed  a law  exiling  him 
from  Uruguayan  territory.  Finding  it  impossible  to  land 


1890J  ADMINISTRATION  OF  TAJES 


213 


at  Montevideo,  he  proceeded  to  Buenos  Aires,  where  he 
remained  until  his  death  on  May  10,  1889, 

Under  General  Tajes  the  Republic  made  substantial 
progress.  He  conciliated  the  Opposition,  and  permitted 
no  military  influence  over  the  Executive.  As  a con- 
sequence peace  was  established,  and  opportunity  allowed 
for  the  development  of  the  natural  resources  of  the 
country.  Means  of  communication  were  improved,  and 
the  value  of  property  rose  rapidly.  The  better  security 
for  life  and  property  also  attracted  foreign  capital,  and 
when  Tajes  retired  after  completing  his  term  of  office, 
Uruguay  was  in  more  thriving  circumstances  than  at  any 
previous  time.  As  his  successor,  the  Congress  elected 
Dr  Julio  Herrera  y Obes,  a Colorado  who  had  served 
as  a Minister  under  Tajes. 


CHAPTER  XII 

Uruguay — continued 

Foreign  Capital  in  Uruguay.  Corrupt  Administration.  Revival  of 
Militarism.  Extravagant  Financial  Policy.  Discontented  Feel- 
ing. Economic  and  Financial  Crisis.  Temporary  Administration 
of  Senor  Duncan  Stewart.  Election  of  Seiior  Borda.  The  Borda 
Administration.  Revival  of  Corruption.  Formation  of  Revolu- 
tionary Committee  in  Buenos  Aires.  Depots  of  War  Material. 
Congressional  Elections.  Outbreak  of  Revolt.  Aparicio  Saraiva 
and  Colonel  Diego  Lamas.  Condition  of  Insurgent  Forces. 
Engagement  at  Arbolito.  Government  Forces  Augmented. 
Engagements  at  Tres  Arboles,  Cerro  Colorado,  and  Cerros 
Blancos.  Insurgent  Expedition  in  Venus.  Peace  Negotiations. 
Assassination  of  Borda.  Accession  of  Seiior  Cuestas.  Fresh 
Peace  Negotiations.  Peaceful  Conditions  Re-established. 
Festivities  in  Montevideo.  Death  of  Lamas.  Policy  of  New 
Administration.  Attitude  of  Congress.  Cuestas  dissolves  the 
Chambers.  Congress  elects  Cuestas  to  the  Presidency.  Military 
Revolt.  Blanco  Majority  in  Senate.  Political  Situation.  Cuestas 
and  Economic  Situation.  Climatic  Conditions.  Area  of  Territory. 
Density  of  Population.  Foreign  Residents.  Immigration. 

Apathy  regarding  Education.  Secondary  and  Higher  Education. 
School  of  Arts  and  Trades.  Administration  of  Justice.  Criminal 
Courts.  Uruguayan  National  Character.  Influence  of  the 
Church.  Means  of  Communication  and  Economic  Progress. 
Industrial  Enterprise.  Cattle  Breeding.  Importation  of  Foreign 
Stock.  Sheep  Farming.  Export  of  Sheep.  Agriculture.  Viti- 
culture. Olive  Orchards.  Tobacco  Cultivation.  Industry  and 
Taxation.  Landed  Proprietors.  Values  of  Foreign  Holdings. 
Tendency  of  Foreign  Landowners  to  Decrease. 


President  Herrera  y Obes  assumed  his  duties  at  a 
period  when  the  attention  of  European  capitalists  was 
drawn  towards  South  America  in  connection  with  rail- 

214 


1891] 


PUBLIC  DEBT  AUGMENTED 


215 


way  construction  and  industrial  enterprise.  This  new 
interest  had  centred  chiefly  in  Argentina,  but  Uruguay 
shared  it  to  some  extent,  and  the  Administration  was 
not  slow  to  profit  by  the  ease  with  which  funds  could 
be  acquired,  so  that  the  public  debt  was  soon  largely 
augmented.  But  the  borrowed  money  was  not  applied 
to  useful  purposes,  the  greater  part  of  it  being  absorbed 
by  annual  deficits  caused  by  unnecessary  expenses  for 
political  objects.  The  tendency  of  the  Herrera  Adminis- 
tration was  to  drift  back  to  the  methods  of  Latorre  and 
Santos  rather  than  to  expand  the  reforms  of  President 
Taj  es.  To  ensure  the  support  of'  the  Army  many  con- 
cessions were  made  to  military  officers,  and  gradually 
widespread  corruption  crept  into  the  administrative 
departments,  no  effort  being  make  to  check  abuses. 

The  President  was  clever,  but  perfectly  unscrupulous 
in  politics  and  short-sighted  in  matters  financial. 
Extravagant  expenditure  at  the  beginning  of  his  rule, 
expenditure  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  resources  of  the 
Republic,  therefore  bore  its  natural  fruit,  and  in  1891  the 
service  of  the  external  debt  could  not  be  met.  No 
wonder  that  in  these  circumstances  discontent  gained 
ground,  and  when  the  financial  and  commercial  crisis  of 
1891-2  occurred,  armed  revolt  was  again  rumoured. 
Unsuccessful  efforts  were  actually  made  to  incite  the 
populace  to  strong  measures. 

The  population  sank  into  lethargy  under  the  weight 
of  the  trying  economic  situation  which  followed  the 
collapse  of  financial  and  commercial  business  in  1890. 
After  Herrera  y Obes  vacated  the  Presidency  on 
March  1,  1894,  and  pending  the  new  election,  the  duties 
were  temporarily  discharged  by  Senor  Duncan  Stewart, 
President  of  the  Senate,  and  not  until  March  21  did 
Congress  elect  Senor  Juan  Idiarte  Borda  to  fill  the 
vacancy. 

The  attitude  of  the  new  President  at  first  was  an 
agreeable  surprise.  He  refused  to  tolerate  abuses  per- 
mitted by  his  predecessor,  whose  influence  was  eliminated. 
Reforms  were  introduced  and  corruption  restricted,  but 


216 


URUGUAY 


unfortunately  the  Uruguayans  were  doomed  once  more 
to  disappointment,  for  during  his  second  year  President 
Borda  allowed  matters  to  relapse  into  the  old  rut,  until 
towards  the  end  of  1896  corruption  had  become  as 
common  as  ever.  The  national  resources  were 
squandered,  taxation  was  increased,  jobbery  in  con- 
nection with  public  works  was  condoned,  election  returns 
falsified,  civil  rights  disregarded— in  fact,  no  considera- 
tion was  shown  except  to  the  small  circle  immediately 
in  touch  with  the  Government.  This  could  only  end  in 
revolution.  Once  more  the  Blancos  saw  an  opportunity 
to  regain  the  position  they  lost  in  1865.  The  leaders 
were  encouraged  to  action  by  the  knowledge  that  Presi- 
dent Borda  had  estranged  certain  sections  of  the  Colo- 
rados,  and  that  friction  existed  between  the  Administra- 
tion and  several  influential  military  officials.  Thus  the 
probabilities  were  that  while  the  Blancos  would  form 
the  backbone  of  the  movement,  outside  help  would 
come  from  the  dissentient  Colorados  and  a portion  of 
the  army.  These  calculations  were  not  far  wide  of  the 
mark,  for  although  little  active  support  was  given  to  the 
insurrection  of  1897  by  the  Colorados  or  the  military, 
there  was  a passive  attitude  of  non-resistance  in  various 
directions  that  favoured  the  insurgent  cause.  The  usual 
committee  was  formed  in  Buenos  Aires  to  collect  arms 
and  ammunition  and  arrange  for  supplies  when  hostilities 
commenced.  Recruits  also,  mostly  Uruguayans,  were 
enrolled  in  Argentine  territory,  and  a depot  of  war 
material  was  formed  at  Bage,  a Brazilian  town  near  the 
southern  frontier  of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  in  whose  neigh- 
bourhood men  were  to  concentrate  to  invade  Uruguayan 
territory.  Certain  points  in  Argentina  were  selected  as 
the  base  of  operations. 

The  Congressional  elections  were  held  in  November 
1896,  when,  in  spite  of  solemn  assurances  that  voting 
should  be  free,  the  ballot  was  so  manipulated  that  in 
districts  where  the  Blancos  were  known  to  be  in  a 
majority  the  result  was  returned  in  favour  of  the  Colo- 
rados, fraud  being  resorted  to  wherever  any  doubt 


1897] 


RISING  AGAINST  BORDA 


217 


existed  as  to  the  success  of  the  official  candidate.  The 
Blancos  were  indignant,  and  resentment  against  the 
Administration  became  more  pronounced,  one  group 
going  so  far  as  to  prematurely  raise  the  standard  of 
revolt,  but  dispersing  again  when  ordered  by  the  party 
leaders.  But  in  February,  1897,  the  rebel  forces  entered 
Uruguay  from  the  north  under  command  of  Aparicio 
Saraiva,  other  detachments  from  the  west  and  south 
joining  the  main  body  a few  days  later.  Colonel  Diego 
Lamas,  with  a small  following,  came  from  Buenos  Aires 
shortly  after  the  commencement  of  hostilities,  these  two 
insurgent  leaders  being  the  men  upon  whom  public 
attention  was  centred.  The  former  was  a brother  of 
Gumersindo  Saraiva,  so  prominent  in  revolutionary  out- 
breaks in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  and  had  accompanied  his 
brother  in  the  campaign  against  Marshal  Peixoto.  He, 
therefore,  had  some  experience  of  warfare  and  an  idea 
of  the  requirements  of  military  organisation,  but  his 
knowledge  of  military  tactics  was  confined  to  guerilla 
movements.  Although  a citizen  of  Uruguay,  and  owning 
property  in  the  Republic,  Saraiva  was  always  con- 
sidered a Brazilian,  his  parents  being  natives  of  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul.  He  was  a man  of  little  education,  but 
naturally  shrewd  and  with  considerable  influence  in  the 
northern  districts  of  Uruguay. 

Colonel  Diego  Lamas  was  a man  of  very  different 
type.  His  father  had  been  a prominent  officer  when 
the  Blancos  controlled  Uruguayan  affairs  previous  to 
1865,  and  had  emigrated  to  Argentina  when  the  Color - 
ados  gained  the  day.  Educated  in  Buenos  Aires,  young 
Lamas  had  entered  the  Argentine  army,  in  which  he 
was  a major  when  this  revolution  in  Uruguay  broke  out. 
He  at  once  volunteered  on  the  rebel  side,  and  was  given 
the  rank  of  Colonel,  and  placed  in  command  of  the  head- 
quarter staff.  In  reality  he  directed  all  movements  of 
the  rebel  forces,  although  General  Saraiva  was  the 
nominal  Commander-in-chief.  He  was  considered  ex- 
ceptionally intelligent  in  his  profession,  and  his  conduct 
throughout  this  campaign  proved  him  to  be  so. 


218 


URUGUAY 


Within  a few  weeks  of  the  outbreak  the  rebels 
numbered  3000  men  with  rifles  and  small  arm  ammu- 
nition, but  no  artillery.  Many  of  the  mounted  men  were 
armed  only  with  lances  and  revolvers,  but  these  proved 
useful  weapons.  For  rations  the  insurgents  depended 
on  cattle  and  sheep,  and  they  never  hesitated  to  confis- 
cate such  animals  as  they  needed.  Other  necessities 
were  obtained  from  the  smaller  villages,  or  smuggled 
from  Argentina  and  Brazil.  Horses  for  cavalry  and 
transport  purposes  were  appropriated  wherever  found. 
Firewood  was  often  a difficulty,  but  when  no  timber  was 
available  the  fencing  posts  on  the  grazing  farms  were 
cut  down  and  used  without  compunction,  so  that  the 
damage  to  property  was  heavy  in  all  districts  through 
which  the  insurgents  passed.  As  similar  practices  were 
followed  by  the  Government  troops,  the  losses  to  the 
farmers  often  amounted  to  little  short  of  ruin,  but  the 
sufferers  attributed  all  their  injuries  to  the  Government 
and  laid  small  blame  on  the  insurgents,  an  unreasonable 
attitude  characteristic  of  the  temper  of  the  people. 

The  Government  was  aware  of  the  movements  of 
the  insurgents  before  and  after  the  declaration  of  the 
revolt,  but  there  had  been  so  many  false  alarms  during 
1896  that  it  was  inclined  to  underrate  its  foes.  When, 
however,  President  Borda  became  convinced  that  the 
insurrection  was  serious,  he  lost  no  time  in  concentrat- 
ing all  available  troops,  and  in  March,  1897,  despatched 
an  expedition  to  the  north  to  attack  Aparicio  Saraiva. 
After  long  and  tedious  marches  the  two  forces  met  at 
Arbolito,  where  the  insurgent  leader  had  been  able  to 
select  his  ground.  This  put  the  Government  troops  at 
a disadvantage,  and  their  attack  was  a failure.  They 
then  retired  to  wait  reinforcements,  and  under  cover  of 
night  the  insurgents  slipped  away,  putting  many  leagues 
between  them  and  the  Government  forces  before  the 
following  morning.  All  this  was  so  far  favourable  to 
the  rebels  that  it  encouraged  not  only  those  already  in 
the  ranks,  but  prompted  offers  of  additional  men  and 
supplies. 


President  Bokda. 


President  Cuestas. 


Major  Diego  Lamas. 


Al'ARICIO  Saraiva. 


[ Face  page  21S. 


1897] 


SKIRMISHES  WITH  REBELS 


219 


The  check  at  Arbolito  opened  the  eyes  of  Borda, 
who  forthwith  raised  the  strength  of  his  forces  until  by 
June  their  total  exceeded  10,000  men  placed  under 
General  Villar  as  Commander-in-chief.  The  suppression, 
however,  of  the  insurrectionary  movement  was  no  easy 
task,  for  the  delay  that  occurred  after  Arbolito  had 
given  the  rebels  time  to  establish  friendly  relations  with 
the  inhabitants  of  the  northern  and  western  districts,  by 
whose  help  swift  and  early  information  about  all  move- 
ments of  the  enemy  became  sure. 

Things  dragged  on  through  June  and  July,  the  policy 
of  the  insurgents  being  no  fighting  except  when  able  to 
select  most  advantageous  positions,  or  when  in  greatly 
superior  numbers.  A few  skirmishes  occurred  between 
outposts,  and  at  Cerro  Colorado,  Cerros  Blancos,  and 
Tres  Arboles,  Aparicio  Saraiva  was  forced  into  engage- 
ments to  keep  open  the  road  to  the  frontier  of  Brazil, 
where  the  refuge  of  the  rebels  lay  in  case  of  disaster 
overtaking  them  in  Uruguayan  territory,  but  in  none  of 
these  three  engagements  could  either  side  claim  a victory. 
The  insurgents,  however,  were  able  to  hold  their  own 
for  a time,  and  then  make  good  their  retreat  without 
great  loss  of  life,  while  the  Government  troops  obtained 
small  benefit  from  the  occupation  of  the  positions  the 
rebels  temporarily  defended.  It  was  marching  and 
countermarching,  a kind  of  warfare  where  the  services 
of  Aparicio  Saraiva  were  invaluable.  He  knew  every 
inch  of  the  country,  having  been  engaged  for  several 
years  in  the  business  of  driving  cattle  from  Rio  Grande 
do  Sul  to  the  markets  of  Montevideo. 

But  in  June  the  revolution  suffered  serious  loss  by 
the  capture  of  an  important  expedition.  The  rebel 
plans  were  cleverly  laid.  Some  400  men  embarked  on 
board  the  steamer  Venus  in  Buenos  Aires,  taking  tickets 
as  ordinary  passengers  for  Montevideo.  In  their  luggage 
was  the  equipment  necessary  for  arming  the  force.  No 
suspicions  were  aroused,  and  the  Venus  left  dock  at  the 
usual  hour.  Clear  of  the  harbour  she  was  seized,  and 
the  captain  ordered  to  make  for  a point  on  the  Uruguayan 


220 


UEUGUAY 


coast,  the  leader  of  the  expedition  informing  him  that 
after  landing  the  insurgents  he  would  again  be  given 
possession  of  the  steamer.  The  captain  altered  his 
course  accordingly,  but  a few  miles  from  Buenos  Aires 
an  Argentine  man-of-war  was  encountered,  whose  com- 
mander, seeing  the  Venus  heading  for  Colonia  instead  of 
Montevideo,  ordered  her  to  heave-to  and  sent  to  ascer- 
tain if  anything  was  wrong.  On  learning  the  truth  this 
officer  obliged  the  Venus  to  return  to  Buenos  Aires,  and 
there  handed  her  over  to  the  authorities.  The  insurgents 
were  detained  as  prisoners  for  a few  days  and  then 
released  without  punishment. 

At  the  end  of  July  negotiations  for  peace  were 
initiated  by  President  Borda,  with  the  revolutionary 
committee  in  Buenos  Aires.  No  satisfactory  terms  were 
reached,  the  President  refusing  the  claims  of  the  Blancos 
to  be  allowed  representation  in  Congress  and  the  nomina- 
tion of  political  governors  of  districts  in  which  the 
Blancos  predominated.  Borda  demanded  the  uncon- 
ditional surrender  of  the  rebels,  and  the  confiscation  of 
their  arms  and  ammunition.  To  this  proposal  the 
revolutionary  leaders  would  not  listen.  So  the  armistice 
proclaimed  pending  these  negotiations  was  declared  at 
an  end  in  August,  and  hostilities  recommenced.  The 
President  was  blamed  for  not  offering  more  lenient  terms 
when  this  opportunity  for  restoring  peace  occurred. 

On  August  25  the  Uruguayan  national  holiday  was 
held  in  Montevideo,  a part  of  the  official  ceremony 
connected  with  which  is  a parade  of  troops  and  the 
attendance  of  the  President,  Ministers,  and  all  other 
high  authorities  at  a special  Te  Deum.  President  Borda, 
at  the  head  of  the  procession,  left  the  cathedral  after 
the  service,  and  had  proceeded  only  fifty  yards  when 
a spectator  fired  at  him  from  a distance  of  a dozen 
feet.  The  President  fell  mortally  wounded,  the  bullet 
passing  through  his  heart,  death  being  almost  instan- 
taneous. The  assassin,  who  made  no  attempt  to  escape, 
was  arrested,  and  gave  his  name  as  Avelino  Arredondo. 
He  stated  he  belonged  to  no  political  party,  and  had 


1897]  ASSASSINATION  OF  BORDA  221 

killed  the  President  because  he  considered  the  sufferings 
of  the  country  were  the  direct  outcome  of  the  Borda 
misrule.  Nor  was  any  further  explanation  vouchsafed 
at  the  trial  in  1899,  when  Arredondo  was  sentenced  to 
two  years  imprisonment. 

Senor  Juan  Lindolfo  Cuestas,  President  of  the 
Senate,  now  succeeded  to  the  Presidency,  a man  well 
known  as  a lawyer,  and  although  not  personally  popular 
with  Colorados  or  Blancos,  respected  by  both  as  honest 
and  straightforward.  By  tradition  the  President  was  a 
Colorado,  but  he  had  no  violent  feelings  of  partisanship. 

The  news  of  the  murder  of  Borda  was  received  by 
the  insurgents  with  mixed  feelings.  He  had  been  the 
principal  cause  of  the  revolution,  but  the  rebels  had 
never  advocated  his  assassination,  and  they  feared  his 
death  would  be  attributed  to  their  agency.  Nor  did 
they  view  with  enthusiasm  the  accession  to  power  of 
Senor  Cuestas,  taking  his  temporary  tenure  of  office  to 
infer  a continuance  of  the  obnoxious  regime  of  his  pre- 
decessor. The  rebels  were  mistaken.  President  Cuestas 
saw  that  peace  must  be  re-established  to  avert  ruin,  and 
put  himself  in  communication  with  representatives  of 
the  Blancos  to  ascertain  what  terms  the  insurgents  would 
accept.  In  September  a Commission  consisting  of  Dr 
Ramirez,  Dr  Larreta,  Dr  Berro,  and  other  persons 
friendly  to  the  revolutionary  cause,  visited  the  rebel 
headquarters  and  discussed  with  Aparicio  Saraiva  and 
other  leaders  the  details  of  an  agreement  with  the 
Government.  A general  amnesty  was  proposed  for  all 
persons  concerned  in  the  insurrection  ; political  governors 
selected  from  the  Blancos  were  to  be  nominated  for 
certain  districts ; a fair  representation  in  Congress  was 
guaranteed ; and,  finally,  a sum  of  8200,000  was  to  be 
distributed  to  the  rank  and  file  of  the  insurgent  forces. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  rebels  were  to  surrender  all  arms 
and  ammunition  and  disperse  quietly  to  their  homes. 
Pending  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  these  terms  by 
Congress  an  armistice  was  declared.  No  time  was  lost 
in  bringing  this  arrangement  before  the  Chambers,  both 


222 


URUGUAY 


of  which  unanimously  approved  it,  and  before  the  end 
of  September  the  arms  of  the  insurgents  were  sur- 
rendered and  the  men  disbanded. 

On  the  official  ratification  of  peace  a series  of  fes- 
tivities took  place  in  Montevideo,  and  a great  demonstra- 
tion was  organised  to  welcome  the  revolutionary  leaders, 
together  with  such  citizens  as  had  taken  part  in  the 
campaign.  The  enthusiasm  with  which  the  townspeople 
of  all  social  classes  entered  into  the  preparations  for 
this  reception  proved  how  widespread  was  the  sympathy 
extended  to  the  insurrection.  It  was  the  more  marked 
because  all  exhibition  of  feeling  had  been  restrained  by 
fear  of  unpleasant  consequences  so  long  as  President 
Borda’s  Government  had  lasted.  One  event,  though,  cast 
a gloom  over  the  popular  rejoicings.  A few  weeks  after 
the  peace  Colonel  Lamas  was  riding  through  the  out- 
skirts of  Montevideo  when  his  horse  bolted.  The  Colonel 
was  still  suffering  from  a wound  received  in  his  arm 
during  the  campaign,  and  was  able  to  use  one  hand 
only.  The  horse  threw  his  rider,  who  died  from  his 
injuries. 

Many  difficulties  now  confronted  President  Cuestas  ; 
the  chaotic  financial  condition  required  careful  attention  ; 
corrupt  methods  in  the  administrative  departments  had 
to  be  restrained,  and  military  influence  needed  clipping ; 
and  he  faced  them  all  boldly,  so  that  before  many  months 
had  elapsed  the  worst  abuses  were  eliminated.  In  the 
reforms  necessary  to  counteract  the  results  of  the  Borda 
regime  the  new  Administration  raised  hostile  feeling  in 
various  quarters,  especially  amongst  the  more  violent 
section  of  the  Colorados  and  certain  groups  of  military 
officers,  but  the  Blancos  had  no  cause  for  complaint,  as 
the  President  kept  his  promises  to  them.  They  obtained 
a fair  representation  in  both  Senate  and  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. 

In  February,  1898,  however,  the  dissatisfied  wing  of 
the  Colorados  determined  to  obstruct  the  policy  of  Senor 
Cuestas  until  the  presidential  election.  The  President 
saw  clearly  that  if  they  were  able  to  do  so,  all  his  good 


1898] 


PRESIDENT  CUESTAS 


223 


work  would  be  undone,  and  to  prevent  this  he  dissolved 
the  Chambers  and  suspended  all  constitutional  guarantees 
on  February  10,  1898,  assuming  dictatorial  powers. 
This  bold  stroke  took  his  enemies  by  surprise,  and  they 
made  no  further  attempts  to  interfere.  And  when,  late 
in  February,  1899,  Congress  was  convoked  for  the 
presidential  election  and  Cuestas  resigned  office,  the 
Chamber  stamped  their  approval  of  his  action  by  electing 
him  President  for  the  ensuing  term. 

Installed  anew,  Cuestas  continued  to  devote  himself 
to  the  reform  of  abuses,  and  ordered  a large  reduction 
in  the  military  establishment,  which  met  with  determined 
opposition  from  a number  of  officers  who,  encouraged 
by  the  extreme  wing  of  the  Colorados,  resolved  to 
organise  a military  revolt.  It  took  place  on  July  1, 
when  the  mutinous  portion  of  the  garrison  took  pos- 
session of  a section  of  Montevideo.  The  loyal  troops 
then  attacked  the  mutineers,  and  for  some  hours  shot 
and  shell  screamed  through  the  streets  until  the  rebels 
surrendered.  Some  200  men  were  killed  or  wounded 
before  the  fighting  ceased. 

After  1899  President  Cuestas  did  not  add  to  his 
popularity.  Increased  taxation  created  hostility  towards 
him,  and  his  insistence  that  official  interference  should 
not  take  place  in  regard  to  elections  embroiled  him  with 
the  Colorados.  That  voting,  however,  was  really  free 
was  proved  by  the  fact  that  when,  in  November,  1900, 
six  vacancies  occurred  in  the  Senate,  five  were  captured 
from  the  Colorados  by  the  Blancos,  this  victory  giving 
the  latter  a majority  there. 

On  March  1,  1903,  President  Cuestas  was  succeeded 
by  Senor  Jose  Batlle  y Ordonez,  and  it  was  thought 
that  he  would  hold  the  balance  between  the  two  political 
parties  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  open  friction. 
Unfortunately  this  did  not  prove  to  be  the  case,  and 
discontent  spread  rapidly  amongst  the  Blancos,  who 
complained  that  the  concessions  granted  to  them  in 
1897  were  infringed.  Matters  drifted  from  bad  to  worse 
during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1903,  and  then  the 


224 


URUGUAY 


Blancos  determined  to  resort  to  armed  rebellion  to  enforce 
their  political  rights.  Under  the  leadership  of  General 
Aparicio  Saraiva  they  took  the  field,  plunging  Uruguay 
again  into  that  turmoil  of  civil  war  which  has  checked 
the  development  of  the  republic  ever  since  emancipation 
from  Spanish  dominion  was  secured. 

Uruguay  has  one  asset  which  is  beyond  injury  by 
any  administrative  action — the  climate.  There  are  no 
extremes  of  temperature  in  summer  or  winter,  and 
topographical  features  lend  themselves  to  desirable 
surroundings  for  the  settler  from  northern  countries.  A 
rolling  landscape  rising  to  mountain  ranges  of  2000  to 
3000  feet  effectually  bars  monotony;  and  in  the  valleys 
the  streams,  in  most  districts  fringed  with  timber  enough 
to  provide  fuel  for  domestic  purposes,  afford  abundance 
of  water  for  live  stock. 

In  spite  of  climatic  advantages,  the  population  of 
Uruguay  is  scanty.  In  1823  an  official  estimate  gave  a 
total  of  450,000  persons,  and  in  1897  it  was  estimated  at 
but  827,485.  A census  of  the  republic,  exclusive  of  Monte- 
video, was  taken  in  1899,  and  showed  599,364;  while 
on  January  1,  1900,  that  city  and  district  was  estimated 
to  contain  252,713  inhabitants.  The  total  population  in 
the  Republic  at  the  beginning  of  1900  was  by  this 
reckoning  852,077.  As  Uruguay  covers  an  area  of 
72,110  square  miles,  this  makes  the  density  of  popula- 
tion under  12  to  the  square  mile,  or,  exclusive  of  the  area 
and  population  of  Montevideo,  9 per  mile.  By  the 
census  of  1900  the  foreigners,  apart  from  those  living  in 
the  city  and  department  of  Montevideo,  were  returned  as 
90,199.  Of  these,  only  1383  were  not  of  Latin  origin. 
It  is  therefore  clear  that  immigration  does  not  tend 
much  to  modify  national  characteristics,  and  proof  of  the 
strictly  Latin  character  of  the  population  is  found  in  the 
immigration  returns  from  1867  to  1890.  In  that  period 

54.000  immigrants,  exclusive  of  Brazilians,  landed  in 
Uruguayan  territory,  of  whom  1066  were  British  and 
1353  German,  no  fewer  than  25,000  being  Italians  and 

14.000  Spaniards. 


1900] 


EDUCATIONAL  FACILITIES 


225 


Public  instruction  in  Uruguay  lias  been  neglected, 
partly  in  consequence  of  the  apathetic  attitude  of  the 
people,  and  partly  because  the  National  Treasury  has 
been  persistently  pilfered  to  supply  the  greed  of  Govern- 
ment officials,  leaving  but  little  money  available  to  meet 
the  expenses  incidental  to  an  efficient  educational  system. 
The  teachers  in  the  public  schools  are  underpaid  and 
salaries  usually  months  in  arrear,  although  in  this  latter 
respect  an  improvement  took  place  under  Cuestas. 
Nominally,  the  attendance  of  all  children  between  the  ages 
of  six  and  fourteen  years  is  obligatory  at  the  elementary 
schools,  but  small  effort  is  made  to  enforce  this  law,  and 
in  many  country  districts  the  population  is  so  scattered 
that  distance  makes  a daily  visit  to  a school-house 
impossible.  According  to  official  statistics  for  1898, 
there  were  540  public  and  344  private  elementary  schools, 
the  rolls  of  the  former  showing  an  attendance  of  49,733 
pupils,  and  of  the  latter  22,509,  while  the  numbers  of 
teachers  employed  were  respectively  1069  and  890.  This 
shows  one  teacher  to  every  46  pupils  in  the  public  schools, 
and  one  for  every  26  in  the  private.  The  total  number  of 
children  who  should  have  attended  school  in  1898  was 
estimated  at  138,200,  whereas  the  actual  rolls  of  the 
public  and  private  schools  only  accounted  for  72,242. 
In  1898  the  cost  of  public  elementary  education  was 
$671,633AV,  or  $13XV\>  for  each  pupil.  No  adequate 
system  of  inspection  is  provided. 

For  secondary  and  higher  education  the  University 
at  Montevideo  was  in  1898  equipped  with  a staff  of  91 
professors  and  teachers  for  684  students.  The  training 
at  this  establishment  is  not  satisfactory  on  account  of 
the  superficial  way  all  studies  are  pursued.  Lack  of 
attention  to  detail  is  the  most  defective  point.  In 
Montevideo  there  is  also  a School  of  Arts  and  Trades, 
maintained  by  the  National  Commission  of  Caridad 
y Beneficencia  Piiblica,  at  which  there  were  243 
apprentices  in  1898.  All  trades  are  taught,  and  classes 
are  held  for  instruction  in  telegraphy,  drawing  and 
music.  In  addition  to  the  official  institutions  for  higher 

p 


226 


URUGUAY 


education,  there  are  religious  ones.  Taking  a broad  view 
of  the  educational  question,  it  may  be  said  that  for  the 
richer  classes  there  exist  fair  public  and  private  facilities 
for  instruction,  but  for  the  poorer  people  the  opportunities 
are  restricted  in  all  directions,  and  the  system  of  ele- 
mentary education  especially  calls  for  reforms. 

The  administration  of  justice  is  another  cause  of 
constant  complaints,  procedure  in  both  criminal  and  civil 
courts  being  tedious  and  costly.  The  criminal,  civil,  and 
commercial  laws  are  codified,  and  if  intelligently  and 
honestly  administrated,  would  serve.  No  discretion  is 
used,  however,  in  making  judicial  appointments,  and  the 
result  is  ignorant  judges  and  magistrates.  Necessary 
reform  would  entail  the  elimination  of  the  personal 
influence  candidates  can  bring  to  bear  upon  politicians 
in  power,  and  this  is  unlikely  at  present.  In  the  matter 
of  criminal  justice,  no  better  example  of  the  inadequacy 
of  punishment  for  serious  offences  can  be  quoted  than 
the  sentence  passed  upon  the  murderer  of  President 
Idiarte  Borda.  The  assassination  was  committed  in  cold 
blood,  no  extenuating  circumstances  were  brought  to 
light,  and  the  verdict  was  one  of  two  years  imprisonment 
only.  Nor  is  this  an  isolated  case.  Uruguayans  and 
foreigners  have  been  murdered  on  many  recent  occasions, 
and  no  severe  penalties  were  inflicted  as  a deterrent  to 
such  crimes  in  the  future. 

Uruguayan  character  is  a curious  mixture  of  narrow- 
minded conservatism,  tempered  occasionally  with  ambi- 
tion which  inadequate  mental  training  does  not  allow 
to  crystallise  into  deeds.  Jealousy  of  the  foreigner  and 
foreign  enterprise  is  a marked  trait.  In  the  northern 
districts  are  many  families  of  Brazilian  origin,  and  with 
them  all  evolution  is  slow.  They  consider  that  what 
was  good  enough  for  their  forefathers  will  serve  to-day, 
and  often  a wealthy  landed  proprietor  is  content  to  dwell 
in  a hovel  rather  than  spend  a small  sum  to  obtain  the 
commonest  comforts  of  life.  These  descendants  of 
Brazilians  cling  tenaciously  to  their  landed  property, 
and  are  loath  to  contract  loans  on  their  estates  even  for 


1900] 


URUGUAYAN  CHARACTER 


227 


permanent  improvements.  The  lower  class  Uruguayan 
is  intensely  ignorant,  and  a prey  to  every  description 
of  superstition,  especially  in  regard  to  religion,  although 
generally  apathetic  as  to  the  real  tenets  of  Christianity. 
The  influence  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  is  far- 
reaching  in  Uruguay,  and  although  the  majority  of  the 
male  population  pay  small  attention  to  religion,  they 
never  rid  themselves  of  a sense  of  fear  of  the  conse- 
quences of  direct  disobedience  to  clerical  authority ; 
but  over  the  women  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy  main- 
tain a strong  hold.  In  the  country  districts  the  priest- 
hood can  seldom  claim  a high  standard  of  education, 
being  often  recruited  from  the  small  farmer  class, 
amongst  whom  a knowledge  of  reading  and  writing 
passes  as  a claim  to  scholarship. 

To  turn  to  other  points  of  material  interest  : — Lack 
of  means  of  communication  has  been  one  of  the  principal 
obstacles  to  the  development  of  industrial  enterprise,  but 
in  recent  years  the  construction  of  railways  has  brought 
improvement  in  this  respect.  Much,  however,  remains 
to  be  done.  At  present  there  are  1200  miles  of  standard 
gauge  railway  open,  the  principal  lines  running  from 
Montevideo  to  the  river  Uruguay,  with  the  feeders  north- 
wards to  the  southern  frontier  of  Brazil.  A new  road 
taps  the  agricultural  lands  in  the  western  districts 
towards  Colonia.  The  capital  invested  in  railways  is 
$70,000,000,  and  if  the  various  lines,  already  partly  built, 
are  completed,  this  will  be  increased  to  $97,000,000. 

Aw^ay  from  the  chief  towns  practically  no  attempt 
has  been  made  to  build  roads  for  wheeled  traffic,  and  for 
this  neglect  there  is  no  excuse.  Stone  can  be  obtained 
in  all  districts,  labour  is  not  abnormally  expensive,  and 
the  amount  of  bridge  work  required  does  not  constitute  a 
serious  obstacle.  Many  districts  are  inaccessible  at  the 
present  time  for  any  form  of  transport  except  horses  or 
mules. 

Nature  has  been  beneficent  to  Uruguay  in  regard  to 
waterways,  but  the  rivers  and  streams  have  been 
utilised  only  in  haphazard  fashion.  The  construction 


228 


URUGUAY 


of  a deep-water  port  at  Montevideo  is  necessary  to 
provide  facilities  for  the  transhipment  of  cargo  from 
ocean  steamers  to  river  craft,  and  on  the  initiative  of 
President  Cuestas  this  work  was  begun.  Meanwhile, 
the  greater  attractions  afforded  by  Buenos  Aires  have 
drawn  to  Argentina  a large  proportion  of  the  trade 
which  belonged  formerly  to  Uruguay.  The  river  Plate 
on  the  south  offers  cheap  carriage  for  all  agricultural 
and  pastoral  produce  if  facilities  for  shipping  were 
available.  At  only  one  place,  however,  the  new  port 
of  Sauce,  has  any  attempt  been  made  to  provide  it. 
The  river  Uruguay  on  the  western  boundary  has  all 
the  attributes  for  an  excellent  waterway,  but  want  of 
energy  in  the  Government  has  prevented  any  effort  to 
dredge  a channel  through  the  shoals  near  Paysandu,  so 
that  when  the  river  is  low  it  becomes  navigable  only  for 
craft  of  shallow  draught. 

Hitherto  pastoral  industry  has  been  the  principal 
occupation  of  the  Uruguayans,  and  in  many  respects 
ideal  conditions  exist  for  stock  farming.  The  grasses 
are  good,  running  streams  obviate  the  necessity  of 
expensive  wells,  the  undulating  character  of  the  land  is 
a safeguard  against  excessive  damp,  and  the  temperate 
climate  is  a guarantee  against  disease  and  pests.  The 
northern  half  of  the  country  is  chiefly  devoted  to  cattle, 
the  south  to  large  sheep  farms.  Of  late  years  the  breed 
of  cattle  has  been  improved  by  importation  of  Durham 
and  Hereford  stock,  and  to  such  an  extent  that  strains 
of  foreign  blood  run  through  all  herds.  Cattle  are 
exported  abroad,  but  the  saladero  (jerked  beef) 
establishments  provide  the  main  outlet  for  the  surplus 
stock,  this  term  also  including  the  extract  of  meat 
factory  of  the  Liebig  Company  at  Fray  Bentos.  In 
1896  the  number  of  animals  slaughtered  at  the  saladeros 
was  703,000;  in  1897,  670,000;  and  in  1898,  612,700. 
The  exact  number  of  horned  cattle  in  Uruguay  is 
difficult  to  ascertain.  In  1898,  returns  showed  4,826,675, 
but  a footnote  states  this  to  be  probably  far  short  of  the 
real  total. 


1900] 


INDUSTRIAL  EXPANSION 


229 


Few  countries  possess  greater  natural  facilities  for 
sheep-farming.  The  pasturage  in  the  south  and  west  is 
rich,  the  lands  healthy,  and  Uruguayan  wool  is  clean 
and  preferred  to  Argentine.  In  1898  there  were 
15,586,889  sheep ; the  value  of  wool  exported  to 
European  markets  was  $10,716,158,  and  the  weight 
41,011,562  kilos.  According  to  these  returns,  the 

approximate  weight  of  fleece  was  six  pounds — an 
exceptionally  heavy  average.  Of  late  years  flock- 
masters  have  improved  the  breed  by  the  importation  of 
foreign  blood.  Comparatively  few  live  sheep  are 
exported,  only  114,093  in  the  year  to  which  all  these 
statistics  apply. 

It  is  only  in  the  past  dozen  years  that  agriculture 
has  become  important.  As  better  transport  facilities 
were  established  a marked  development  took  place. 
Maize,  long  cultivated  only  for  local  use,  has  now 
become  an  important  article  of  export.  A few  years 
ago  the  quantity  of  wheat  grown  was  insufficient  to 
supply  home  demand,  and  now  Brazil  draws  a consider- 
able proportion  of  her  breadstuffs  from  Uruguay.  In 
1896  the  shipments  of  maize  were  89,895  tons;  in  1897 
they  were  1377  tons  ; and  in  1898,  12,575  tons.  During 
these  same  years  the  exports  of  wheat  to  foreign  markets 
were  6390  tons,  12,548  tons,  and  77,231  tons.  In  1896, 
17,714  tons  of  flour  were  shipped  abroad;  in  1897, 
11,454  tons ; and  in  1898,  296  tons.  The  area  sown  with 
cereals  was  1,500,000  acres  in  1900.  Of  22,000  farmers, 
about  one-half  are  owners  of  the  soil  they  till. 

Olives  and  vines  are  also  cultivated.  The  first 
vineyard  in  Uruguay  was  planted  in  1874,  since  when 
the  industry  has  grown  apace,  so  that  by  1897  the 
number  had  increased  to  824,  covering  8916  acres,  and 
containing  15,243,268  plants,  whose  total  yield  of  grapes 
in  1898  reached  7388  tons.  Of  this  crop,  2041  tons 
were  sold  as  fresh  fruit,  and  5347  tons  made  into  wine, 
besides  24,149  litres  of  grape  and  9367  litres  of  wine 
alcohol. 

Olive  orchards  have  been  planted  near  Salto  and  at 


230 


URUGUAY 


other  places.  So  far  the  production  is  only  sufficient 
for  the  local  demand,  but  the  supply  is  steadily  increas- 
ing. The  olive  trees  flourish  in  many  districts,  and  are 
a profitable  investment ; but  the  long  wait  before  a return 
is  obtained  has  hindered  extension  in  the  area  planted. 
Recently,  several  farmers  have  grown  tobacco  with  fair 
results,  the  amount  sent  into  Montevideo  in  1897  being 
1G5  tons,  and  260  tons  in  1898. 

The  principal  hindrance  to  development  everywhere 
is  the  exceedingly  heavy  taxation,  which  makes  every- 
thing required  for  the  use  of  producers  abnormally  dear. 
Undertakings  that  in  more  favourable  circumstances 
would  show  a fair  profit,  only  leave  a bare  living  wage. 
National  taxes  alone  amount  to  $18  per  head,  and  in 
addition  there  are  municipal  charges  averaging  less 
than  $5  per  head.  No  wonder,  therefore,  that  industry 
is  throttled,  especially  in  a country  where  little  wealth 
has  been  accumulated. 

In  1898  the  total  number  of  landed  proprietors  was 
returned  as  67,112,  and  the  value  of  real  estate  as 
.$278,704,000.  Of  these  owners  36,579  were  Uruguayans 
with  lands  worth  $143,083,809,  and  30,533  foreigners 
with  estates  valued  at  $135,620,606.  Upon  2634 
properties  mortgages  were  registered  to  the  value  of 
$5,501,610.  The  Italians  are  the  largest  foreign  land 
owners,  with  holdings  worth  $35,000,000.  The  Spaniards 
follow  with  $32,000,000,  then  Brazilians  with  $30,000,000, 
and  French  with  $16,000,000.  The  property  of  British 
subjects  is  valued  at  $10,000,000,  Argentines  account  for 
$5,000,000,  and  Germans  for  $3,000,000,  Portuguese  for 
$1,500,000,  and  Swiss  and  North  Americans  for 
$1,000,000  each.  This  large  proportion  of  foreign  to 
native  holders  has  a tendency  to  decrease,  because  many 
children  of  present  proprietors  are  born  in  the  country, 
and  are,  therefore,  native  citizens.  The  fact  that  there 
are  no  waste  lands  renders  it  unlikely  that  any  rush  of 
settlers  from  abroad  can  occur  to  counterbalance  this 
natural  shrinkage  of  the  foreign  ownership. 


CHAPTER  XIII 


BRAZIL 

Brazil  after  the  Paraguayan  War.  Influence  of  Dom  Pedro  II.  His 
Reputation  in  Europe.  Quick  Recovery  in  Economic  Conditions. 
Dom  Pedro  visits  Europe.  Immigration  Projects.  Personality 
of  Dom  Pedro.  His  wish  to  benefit  Brazil.  His  Admiration 
for  the  United  States.  Princess  Isabel  and  the  Conde  d’Eu. 
Church  Influence  and  the  Princess.  Unpopularity  of  the  CoHde. 
Brazil  and  the  Imperial  Regime.  Political  Situation,  1870-1880. 
Effect  of  August  Comte  on  Brazilian  Character.  Sao  Paulo  and 
Republican  Doctrines.  The  Emperor  and  Republican  Ideas. 
Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  Reason  for  German  Settlements  in  the 
Southern  Provinces.  The  Emperor  and  Railway  Extension. 
Public  Instruction.  The  Emperor  and  Higher  Education.  The 
Clergy  and  Education.  Internal  Development  of  Brazil.  Third 
Visit  of  Dom  Pedro  to  Europe.  Abolition  of  Slavery.  Acts  in 
Relation  to  Emancipation.  Treatment  of  Brazilian  Slaves. 
Troubles  in  Sao  Paulo.  Enmity  of  Plantation  Owners  to 
Emancipation.  Seditious  Feeling  gaining  ground.  Return  of 
Dom  Pedro  to  Rio.  Inconsistencies  in  the  Parliamentary  System. 
The  Ouro  Preto  Ministry.  Unpopularity  of  Cabinet.  Ouro 
Preto  supported  by  Dom  Pedro.  Political  Position  strained. 
Plot  to  overthrow  Ministry.  Younger  Officers  urge  Deposition 
of  Emperor.  Seditious  Feeling  runs  Riot.  Military  Conspirators. 
Generals  da  Fonseca  and  Floriano  Peixoto  Leaders  of  the  Move- 
ment. The  Fete  in  Rio  de  Janeiro.  The  Palace  surrounded. 
Arrest  of  Dom  Pedro.  Public  Buildings  occupied  by  Rebels. 
Barao  de  Ladario  Wounded.  Proclamation  of  General  da  Fonseca. 
Provincial  Governors  support  Republic.  Fonseca  proclaimed 
Provisional  President.  Dom  Pedro  sent  to  Portugal.  Country 
accepts  Change  with  Indifference.  Discontent  in  Sao  Paulo. 
Monarchists  and  Public  Life.  Brazilians  condone  Revolution. 
Praetorian  Administration.  Reaction  in  Sao  Paulo.  Imaginary 
Plot  against  Government.  Arbitrary  Measures.  New  Banking 
Laws.  Misiones  Question.  Congress  summoned.  Law  of  Con- 
stitution. Presidential  Election. 

The  close  of  the  Paraguayan  war  found  Brazil  exhausted. 
The  seven  years’  struggle  in  Paraguay  against  the 

231 


232 


BRAZIL 


Dictator  Lopez  proved  a heavy  drain  in  men  and  money. 
Success  had  cost  50,000  lives,  and  to  maintain  the  army 
Brazilian  credit  had  been  heavily  mortgaged.  Industrial 
progress  was  severely  checked  by  the  long  war,  and  no 
direct  benefit  obtained  to  compensate  for  the  expendi- 
ture of  blood  and  money.  Brazil  had  rid  herself  of  a 
neighbour  occasionally  troublesome,  but  this  was  her 
only  gain  in  joining  forces  with  Argentina  and  Uruguay 
for  bringing  to  an  end  the  piratical  tendencies  of  Lopez. 

The  attention  of  both  Government  and  people  was 
required  to  set  internal  affairs  in  order,  and  the  recovery 
was  rapid.  The  central  figure  at  this  period  was  the 
Emperor,  Dom  Pedro  II.,  and  his  influence  at  home  and 
abroad  was  of  paramount  importance  to  the  Brazilians 
in  this  crisis,  for  Dom  Pedro  inspired  confidence  in 
Europe  and  rendered  foreign  loans  possible.  At  home 
also  conviction  of  his  probity  induced  many  wealthy 
Brazilians  to  come  forward  to  help  the  Government  in 
its  hour  of  need.  A sense  of  security  under  his  future 
guidance  caused  free  investment  of  capital  in  business 
and  industry.  Soon  a marked  improvement  was  visible 
in  the  general  economic  conditions,  so  that  by  1875 
the  worst  effects  of  the  recent  war  were  obliterated, 
and  Brazil  was  again  on  the  high  road  to  substantial 
prosperity. 

Shortly  after  the  war  with  Paraguay  the  Emperor 
decided  on  a journey  to  Europe.  His  object  was  two- 
fold. Dom  Pedro  considered  his  presence  in  London 
would  assist  certain  financial  arrangements  then 
pending ; he  wished  also  to  obtain  rest  after  the  long 
strain  imposed  by  the  events  of  the  preceding  years. 
Europe  received  the  Brazilian  ruler  with  cordial 
sympathy,  and  his  personality  favourably  impressed  all 
who  came  in  contact  with  him.  Facts  concerning  Brazil 
and  her  people  were  explained,  plans  for  European 
immigration  perfected,  and  encouragement  offered  to 
European  settlers  to  make  a home  in  Brazilian 
territory. 

Brazil  owes  much  to  the  personality  of  the  late 


Dom  Pedro  II.,  Emperor  of  Brazil. 


[ Face  page  232. 


1875] 


DOM  PEDKO  II. 


233 


Emperor.  Dom  Pedro  II.  was  dignified  in  public  and 
private  life,  gentle  and  considerate  to  an  unusual  degree 
in  all  his  dealings  with  his  fellow-men.  His  kindness 
of  heart  often,  indeed,  led  him  to  condone  acts  on  the 
part  of  his  subjects  deserving  punishment  and  censure. 
His  dislike  of  autocratic  authority  was  mistaken  by 
many  people  for  weakness,  and  presumed  upon  at  times 
to  an  unwarranted  extent.  The  Emperor’s  customs 
were  simple.  He  had  no  liking  for  ostentatious  luxury. 
His  tastes  lay  in  the  direction  of  literary  pursuits,  and 
he  wished  rather  to  be  known  as  savant  than  to  be 
thought  of  in  the  light  of  his  imperial  dignities.  He 
attempted  to  master  many  subjects,  but  had  insufficient 
leisure  for  constant  study.  Foreign  travel,  making  the 
acquaintance  of  other  nationalities,  delving  into  the 
peculiarities  of  Europeans  and  Americans,  attracted  the 
Emperor’s  most  lively  interest.  Attached  to  the  Koman 
Catholic  faith  by  association  and  education,  Dom  Pedro 
was  yet  broad-minded  and  tolerant  on  all  points  of 
theological  controversy.  In  no  country  in  the  world 
was  there  greater  freedom  for  discussion  of  doctrinal 
subjects  than  in  Brazil  under  his  rule.  The  Emperor 
was  a thoroughly  patriotic  Brazilian,  and  loved  to 
wander  unattended  through  town  and  country,  talking 
to  this  or  that  chance  person  as  man  to  man.  The 
problem  of  how  best  to  further  the  civilisation  and 
progress  of  Brazil  was  the  keynote  of  Dom  Pedro’s 
policy.  He  made  close  and  extended  study  of  economic 
questions,  calling  to  his  assistance  a variety  of  expert 
opinions  abroad  and  at  home.  His  conclusions  were 
conservative,  and  he  regarded  gradual  evolution  as  better 
fitted  to  Brazilian  character  than  the  violent  changes 
that  must  follow  wholesale  adoption  of  American  and 
European  methods  of  thought  and  action.  For  the 
United  States  the  Emperor  had  profound  admiration, 
and  he  spoke  with  enthusiasm  of  his  experiences  in  that 
country ; but  he  quite  realised  that  experiments  so 
successfully  carried  out  in  North  America  were  im- 
possible amongst  his  own  people. 


234 


BRAZIL 


In  sharp  contrast  to  the  personality  of  the  Emperor 
were  those  of  his  daughter  Princess  Isabel  and  her 
husband  the  Conde  d’Eu.  As  heiress  to  the  Imperial 
Throne  public  interest  centred  round  the  Princess  and 
her  consort.  Many  of  the  traits  the  Brazilians  most 
loved  in  the  father  were  lacking  in  the  daughter,  for 
Princess  Isabel  was  autocratic  and  reserved  in  manner, 
and  her  ideas  of  religious  tolerance  were  narrow-minded. 
Church  influence  was  a strong  factor  in  her  life,  and 
was  unpopular  so  far  as  the  more  highly  educated 
classes  were  concerned.  The  Conde  d’Eu  possessed 
few  qualities  acceptable  to  the  people  of  his  adoption. 
His  cold  demeanour  in  public,  accentuated  by  slight 
deafness,  repelled  the  majority  of  those  with  whom  he 
was  brought  into  contact,  and  his  reputation  of  being 
close  fisted  in  money  matters  did  not  add  to  his  attrac- 
tiveness. The  fact  that  he  was  a foreigner  was  a point 
which  the  people  of  Brazil  were  never  quite  able  to 
overlook,  and  it  made  his  position  difficult. 

Possibly,  feeling  in  regard  to  monarchical  institutions 
in  Brazil  might  have  been  modified  if  the  Princess  had 
chosen  some  scion  of  Portuguese  royalty  for  her  mate ; 
but  as  matters  stood  a quarter  of  a century  ago  the 
popular  sentiment  was  decidedly  lukewarm,  if  not 
actually  hostile,  to  the  legal  successor  to  Dom  Pedro. 
This  condition  of  affairs  was  not  of  paramount  import- 
ance whilst  the  Emperor  was  in  the  prime  of  life,  his 
influence  serving  to  counteract  any  decided  discontent 
as  to  future  prospects ; but  the  seeds  of  dissatisfaction 
were  there,  and  they  grew  apace  as  old  age  crept  over 
Dom  Pedro.  It  was  therefore  no  surprise  to  thinking 
people  when  the  eruption  took  place  in  1889,  but  that 
both  Princess  Isabel  and  her  husband  were  misjudged 
in  many  respects  is  scarcely  open  to  doubt.  Both  were 
charitable  and  determined  to  do  their  duty  by  Brazil ; 
but  their  personal  unpopularity  overshadowed  all  other 
considerations. 

Between  1870  and  1880  the  political  situation  practi- 
cally hinged  upon  the  two  factors  of  the  popularity  of 


1880] 


PRINCESS  ISABEL 


235 


the  Emperor  and  the  growing  dislike  to  Princess  Isabel 
and  her  husband,  from  which  came  a development  des- 
tined to  alter  the  course  of  Brazilian  history.  The  theory 
of  positivism  preached  by  Auguste  Comte  and  his  disciple 
Benjamin  Constant  found  ready  acceptance  with  the 
Brazilians.  These  doctrines  as  interpreted  in  South 
America  were  given  a strong  revolutionary  and  re- 
actionary character  at  variance  with  the  distinctly 
conservative  tendency  hitherto  a marked  feature  in 
Brazilian  national  character.  Republican  societies  were 
formed,  and  republican  principles  strongly  advocated  in 
different  quarters.  The  Province  of  Sao  Paulo  was  the 
centre  of  the  movement.  It  was  stated  by  the  sup- 
porters of  this  agitation  that  no  attempt  would  be  made 
to  overthrow  existing  institutions  during  the  lifetime  of 
Dom  Pedro,  and  these  assertions  were  made  in  good 
faith  at  the  time. 

The  Emperor  was  aware  of  this  spread  of  republican 
ideas,  but  took  no  steps  to  check  the  movement.  He 
relied  upon  his  personal  influence  to  counterbalance  the 
effect  of  subversive  doctrines,  and  failed  to  realise  that 
the  object  of  the  campaign  was  not  intended  to  injure 
himself,  but  directed  against  the  Princess.  Thus  he 
completely  underestimated  the  strength  and  significance 
of  the  movement. 

Meanwhile,  in  certain  sections  of  Brazil,  local  affairs 
were  none  too  tranquil,  and  in  the  south  trouble  broke 
out.  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  contained  a turbulent  popula- 
tion, whose  revolt  against  the  Imperial  Authorities  was 
frequent.  The  province  was  difficult  for  troops  to  reach, 
and  the  Uruguayan  frontier  afforded  easy  escape  for 
insurgents  when  hard  pressed  by  Government  forces. 
Desultory  skirmishing  was  checked  only  by  occasional 
concessions,  or  by  the  rebellious  faction  tiring  for  a 
season  of  living  in  perpetual  turmoil.  Foreign  immigra- 
tion to  these  southern  provinces  was  encouraged  by 
Dom  Pedro  as  a check  upon  the  turbulent  spirit  of 
these  people.  German  settlements  were  founded  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Porto  Alegre  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul, 


236 


BRAZIL 


at  Blumenau  in  Santa  Catharina,  and  at  Curit.yba  in 
Paranagua.  In  1878.  a truce  was  patched  up  with  the 
Rio  Grande  insurgents,  and  for  a time  order  was 
restored. 

In  1880  the  Emperor  sought  fresh  means  to  develop 
the  natural  resources  of  Brazil,  and  determined  upon  an 
extension  of  the  railway  system.  It  was  decided  to 
guarantee  the  interest  on  capital  employed  by  foreign 
companies  in  the  construction  of  the  required  works, 
and  also  to  build  certain  lines  at  Government  expense. 
The  inauguration  of  this  policy  was  not  long  delayed, 
and  although  not  carried  out  as  fully  as  originally 
intended,  it  has  proved  a great  help  to  the  producing 
power  of  the  country. 

The  Emperor  took  great  personal  interest  in  higher 
education,  but  the  instruction  of  the  labouring  classes 
was  neglected,  economic  conditions  contributing  to  apathy 
in  this  direction.  Slavery  was  still  a legal  institution, 
and  the  Church  retained  as  far  as  possible  the  direction 
of  educational  progress.  The  priesthood  in  Brazil  was 
bigoted  and  ignorant,  and  made  small  exertion  to  raise 
the  intellectual  level  of  the  people. 

Between  1880  and  1886  the  internal  development  of 
Brazil  steadily  continued,  and  the  national  credit  rose  to 
a high  level  which  conduced  to  social  stability.  The 
main  source  of  wealth  was  coffee-growing,  but  other 
industries  began  to  show  vigorous  signs  of  vitality, 
especially  in  the  direction  of  the  manufacture  of 
textiles. 

Dom  Pedro  determined,  in  1886,  on  another  visit 
to  Europe,  his  third  journey  abroad  since  the  close  of 
the  Paraguayan  War.  He  went  partly  in  connection 
with  public  business,  and  partly  to  recoup  his  health 
and  indulge  his  love  of  travel  and  desire  to  keep  in 
touch  with  foreign  civilisation  and  evolution.  Princess 
Isabel  was  granted  the  powers  of  Regent  during  his 
absence.  It  was  impossible  for  the  Emperor  to 
anticipate  the  momentous  results  arising  from  this 
journey  to  foreign  lands,  and  he  left  Brazil  confident 


1887]  DOM  PEDRO  VISITS  EUROPE 


237 


he  would  find  political  affairs  undisturbed,  and  economic 
prosperity  satisfactorily  assured,  on  his  return. 

After  the  departure  of  Dom  Pedro  in  1887,  the  first 
important  act  of  the  Princess  Regent  related  to  slavery. 
The  Emperor  was  an  abolitionist,  but  he  favoured  the 
gradual  extinction  of  slavery  rather  than  its  sudden 
suppression,  for  he  feared  that  immediate  freedom  of 
the  negroes  without  compensation  to  owners  would 
entail  grave  difficulties.  For  one  thing  the  financial 
situation  did  not  permit  of  adequate  monetary  assistance 
to  producers  for  the  substitution  of  free  for  forced 
labour.  The  Princess  thought  differently.  She  was 
convinced  the  right  policy  to  pursue  was  abolition 
throughout  the  Empire,  leaving  the  labour  question  to 
be  settled  by  demand  and  supply.  Subsequent  events 
proved  her  to  be  not  far  wrong,  but  she  attached  too 
little  weight  to  the  political  aspect  of  the  question. 

A law  known  as  A Liber ta(;.ao  do  ventre  (the  freedom 
of  the  belly)  had  been  enacted  on  September  28,  1871, 
and  provided  freedom  for  children  of  slaves  born  after 
that  date.  This  measure  was  generally  referred  to  as 
the  Rio  Branco  law,  the  Visconde  do  Rio  Branco  being 
President  of  the  Council  when  it  was  enacted.  On 
September  28,  1885,  a further  law  provided  that  all 
slaves  attaining  the  age  of  sixty  years  were  free.  The 
Emperor  intended  to  suppress  slavery,  but  to  allow  the 
change  to  come  gradually,  so  that  slave  owners  could 
make  the  necessary  arrangements  to  secure  free  labour. 
There  was  no  great  complaint  that  Brazilian  slaves 
were  specially  maltreated,  although  cases  of  cruelty 
undoubtedly  occurred  at  intervals,  and  not  infrequently 
neglect  was  apparent  in  the  supply  of  food  and  clothing. 
But  these  faults  were  the  exception  and  not  the  rule. 
A disturbance,  however,  in  1887,  in  the  province  of  Sao 
Paulo,  brought  the  slavery  question  to  the  front.  Many 
Italian  immigrants  had  settled  in  the  province,  and 
these  people  held  that  slave  labour  interfered  with  the 
class  of  work  they  were  fitted  to  undertake.  They 
therefore  encouraged  desertion,  and,  as  the  local 


238 


BRAZIL 


authorities  were  unable  to  enforce  the  return  of  runa- 
ways, an  appeal  was  made  to  Rio  de  Janeiro  for 
assistance.  Troops  were  thereupon  despatched  to  Sao 
Paulo,  but  the  men  in  the  ranks  refused  to  serve  when 
they  understood  the  duty  required.  The  Princess 
Regent  took  advantage  of  the  incident  to  press  for 
immediate  abolition.  In  vain  the  Ministry  warned  her 
of  the  political  danger,  she  turned  a deaf  ear  to  all 
remonstrance ; and  when  it  was  hinted  that  such  action 
would  undermine  the  security  of  the  Throne,  she  said 
that  her  Throne  might  be  lost,  but  the  slaves  should 
be  free.  Senhor  Joao  Alfredo  Correa  de  Oliveira  was 
President  of  the  Council,  and  Senhor  Rodrigo  Augusto 
da  Silva  Minister  of  Agriculture,  when  this  determina- 
tion of  the  Princess  was  taken,  and  upon  them  fell 
the  duty  of  carrying  into  effect  the  royal  wishes  and 
commands. 

On  May  7,  1888,  the  Minister  of  Agriculture 
requested  the  Secretary  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  to 
name  a day  and  hour  for  presentation  to  the  House  of  a 
proposition  from  the  Executive  Power.  Next  day  at 
2 p.m.  Avas  designated,  and  the  Committee  appointed  to 
receive  the  Minister  then  introduced  him  to  the 
Chamber.  After  the  usual  formalities  the  Minister 
stated  : — “ August  and  worthy  Representatives  of  the 
Nation, — I come  by  order  of  Her  Highness  the  Imperial 
Princess  Regent,  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor,  to  present  the  folloAving  project : — 

“Art.  1.  Slavery  in  Brazil  is  declared  extinct. 

“Art,  2.  All  Acts  to  the  contrary  are  revoked. 

“ The  Palace  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  May  8,  1888 — 
Rodrigo  A.  da  Silva” 

For  three  days  the  measure  Avas  debated  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  strenuously  championed  by 
Senhor  Joaquin  Nabuco  and  opposed  by  Senhor 
Andrade  Eigueira  on  the  grounds  of  the  injustice  of 
immediate  emancipation  Avithout  money  compensation 
to  the  owners.  But  on  May  10  the  Act  passed,  and 
next  day  it  Avas  submitted  to  the  Senate  and  sanctioned 


1888] 


ABOLITION  OF  SLAVERY 


239 


after  a discussion  lasting  for  three  sittings.  The  Royal 
Decree  followed  on  the  15th,  emancipating  all  slaves 
within  the  dominions  of  Brazil,  and  an  immense  show  of 
jubilation  followed,  public  holidays  being  proclaimed  for 
a period  of  five  days. 

According  to  the  last  census  compiled  previous  to 
emancipation  the  total  number  of  slaves  in  Brazil  was 

720.000,  and  no  less  than  600,000  of  these  were  said  to 
be  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  sixty  years,  classed 
therefore  as  effective  for  active  work.  The  assertions 
made  by  the  abolitionists  that  the  total  was  only 

500.000,  were  proved  to  be  inaccurate  by  Senhor 
Andrade  Figueira  in  his  speeches  opposing  the 
measure. 

Rejoicings  were  confined  to  the  working  classes  of 
the  population  and  to  those  having  no  direct  interest  in 
the  slave  question.  But  the  great  plantation  owners 
and  many  others  pecuniarily  injured  opposed  emancipa- 
tion bitterly,  and  the  effect  upon  this  influential  body 
of  people  was  to  draw  them  nearer  to  the  republican 
propaganda  which  had  been  gaining  strength  for  some 
time  past.  Wo  may  therefore  say  that  the  final  deter- 
mination to  abolish  monarchy  in  Brazil  dates  from  the 
passage  of  this  Act.  No  violent  display  was  made  by 
the  dissatisfied  portion  of  the  community ; but  sedition 
was  wide  sown  and  encouragement  thenceforth  lent  to 
the  ambitious  group  of  military  officers  who  saw  in  the 
establishment  of  a republican  administration  many  oppor- 
tunities for  advancement.  Sao  Paulo,  the  centre  of 
disaffection,  gave  evidence  from  time  to  time  that  some 
upheaval  might  be  expected,  and  occasionally  rumours 
of  a disquieting  nature  drifted  down  to  the  imperial 
capital.  The  leaders  of  the  republican  group  were  Dr 
Prudente  de  Moraes  Barros  and  Dr  Campos  Salles,  and 
allied  with  them  was  General  Floriano  Peixoto,  an 
officer  in  the  Brazilian  arm)7.  Since  the  overthrow  of 
the  Empire  each  one  of  these  three  men  has  been 
President  of  the  Brazilian  Republic.  It  was  not  this 
republican  caucus,  however,  that  threatened  the  greatest 


240 


BRAZIL 


danger  to  the  imperial  regime,  but  rather  the  subaltern 
officers  of  the  army  and  the  students  at  the  military 
school  at  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Upon  this  element  the 
seditiously  disposed  senior  military  officers  counted  for 
active  support  in  any  outbreak  of  a revolutionary 
character.  The  insubordinate  spirit  amongst  these 
juniors  was  therefore  encouraged,  until  it  soon  became 
a menace  to  public  order  and  military  discipline. 

Only  vague  rumours  of  the  unsatisfactory  political 
situation  reached  the  Emperor.  There  was  no  deliberate 
intention  to  keep  him  uninformed  ; but  he  was  in  ill 
health,  and  his  friends  were  anxious  to  spare  him 
unnecessary  worry,  and,  moreover,  they  failed  to  gauge 
the  position  accurately.  Towards  the  middle  of  1888, 
however,  the  fact  that  seditious  feeling  was  spreading 
rapidly  could  not  be  disguised,  and  the  return  of  the 
Emperor  became  imperative.  How  far  Dom  Pedro 
sanctioned  the  policy  pursued  by  the  Princess  Isabel 
during  his  absence  has  never  been  made  public,  but  he 
gave  no  outward  sign  of  disapproval ; on  the  other 
hand,  he  was  on  no  very  cordial  terms  with  the  Conde 
d’Eu,  the  principal  adviser  of  the  Princess. 

In  August,  1888,  the  Emperor  returned  to  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  where  an  immense  reception  was  organised  to 
greet  him,  sincere  enough  among  the  majority  of 
Brazilians.  Throughout  the  festivities,  however,  there 
was  a note  of  uneasy  feeling,  and  probably  enough  the 
Emperor  was  aware  of  this  discordant  note  in  the  pro- 
ceedings ; but  he  was  surrounded  by  his  family  and 
intimate  personal  friends,  and  neither  the  Princess 
Isabel  nor  the  circle  immediately  about  the  Court 
believed  in  any  movement  portending  immediate  danger. 
Besides,  the  military  were  prominent  in  assisting  at  the 
demonstrations  of  apparent  loyalty  and  affection,  and  so 
little  evidence  was  visible  that  anything  in  the  nature  of 
a conspiracy  was  afoot.  Yet  the  plot  was  then  hatched 
for  the  overthrow  of  monarchical  institutions,  and  the 
conspirators  only  watched  for  a favourable  opportunity. 
They  had  not  long  to  wait. 


1889] 


THE  POLITICAL  SITUATION 


241 


For  years  the  parliamentary  method  of  Government 
under  the  imperial  regime  had  drifted  away  from  the 
sound  principles  originally  incorporated  in  the  system. 
Various  Cabinets  assumed  authority  to  intervene  directly 
in  many  local  affairs  in  a manner  impolitic  and  irritating 
to  the  community.  Both  Liberal  and  Conservative 
Administrations  were  equally  at  fault  in  this  respect. 
As  a result,  log-rolling  and  favouritism  had  crept  into 
the  life  of  both  legislative  chambers  to  an  extent  quite 
at  variance  with  the  best  traditions  of  Brazil.  The 
Ministry  in  power  when  the  Act  of  Emancipation  had 
been  passed  was  popular  with  the  masses,  but  out  of 
favour  with  the  former  slave-owners,  and  it  resigned  in 
May,  1889.  A new  Cabinet  was  formed  on  June  7, 
with  the  Vizconde  de  Ouro  Preto  as  President  of  the 
Council ; but  the  Ministers  were  chosen  from  the  Liberal 
Party,  and  were  not  popular  with  the  powerful  group  of 
plantation  proprietors.  Ouro  Preto  was  an  able  and 
loyal  statesman  ; but  he  was  unable,  or  at  all  events 
made  no  effort,  to  check  the  abuses  which  had  grown 
up  in  the  administration  of  public  affairs.  The  Opposi- 
tion, therefore,  determined  to  oust  this  Cabinet  without 
scruple  as  to  the  means  employed.  Dom  Pedro  liked  and 
respected  the  Vizconde  de  Ouro  Preto,  and  extended 
to  him  all  possible  support  without  direct  intervention 
in  the  political  situation,  but  the  position  he  assumed 
tended  none  the  less  to  weaken  his  influence  with 
certain  sections  of  the  Brazilians.  Still,  the  same  feeling 
which  had  controlled  the  action  of  the  republican 
theorists  in  former  days  animated  the  minds  of  the 
majority  now,  and  no  desire  was  expressed  to  overthrow 
the  imperial  regime  forthwith.  But  the  political 
opponents  of  Ouro  Preto  became  impatient  when  they 
found  that  constitutional  agitation  failed  to  induce  his 
resignation,  and  some  talk  of  a coup  tfetat  was  heard, 
with  the  avowed  object  of  turning  out  the  Ministry. 
Certain  officers  of  the  army  promised  assistance,  and 
the  movement  was  deferred  only  until  circumstances 
were  propitious  for  its  execution. 


Q 


242 


BRAZIL 


The  military  element  generally  in  Rio  de  Janeiro 
were  not  satisfied  with  the  political  plan  as  originally 
proposed.  A majority  of  the  younger  officers  wished 
to  depose  the  Emperor,  and  determined  to  seize  this 
occasion  for  a military  rising,  and  proclaim  a republic. 
Dom  Pedro’s  personal  kindness  towards  individual 
members  of  this  revolutionary  faction  carried  no  weight. 
Past  favours  were  forgotten  in  view  of  alluring  future 
prospects,  and  ambitious  sedition  ran  riot.  These 
military  conspirators,  in  short,  were  clever  enough  to 
see  that  in  the  existing  political  irritation  no  strong 
effort  would  be  made  to  uphold  the  imperial  regime, 
no  matter  how  much  regret  might  be  felt  personally  for 
the  Emperor.  The  idea  of  the  chief  movers  in  the  con- 
spiracy was  to  seize  control  of  public  affairs  in  the  name 
of  a republic,  and  then  dominate  the  country  by  a 
military  administration  under  the  guise  of  republican 
institutions.  General  Deodoro  da  Fonseca  and  General 
Floriano  Peixoto,  two  officers  whose  advancement  in 
the  military  service  was  due  to  favours  extended  by  the 
Emperor,  were  chosen  as  leaders  of  the  military  move- 
ment. For  weeks  before  the  rising  occurred  frequent 
discussions  took  place  at  meetings  held  in  different 
quarters,  and  the  inhabitants  were  prepared  for  an  out- 
break at  any  moment. 

On  the  evening  of  November  14,  1889,  Rio  de  Janeiro 
was  enfcte.  The  Emperor,  then  living  with  his  family 
at  the  royal  palace  in  Petropolis,  was  present  at  a great 
ball,  to  which  all  prominent  residents  of  the  Brazilian 
capital  were  invited,  and  the  festivities  continued  until 
the  early  hours  of  the  following  morning,  Dom  Pedro 
and  his  suite  retiring  to  Petropolis  before  the  close  of 
the  entertainment.  The  military  conspiracy  determined 
to  strike  on  this  night,  and  at  5 a.m.  next  morning  the 
Imperial  Palace  was  surrounded  by  a detachment  of 
soldiers,  the  officer  in  charge  being  instructed  to  permit 
access  or  egress  to  nobody  until  further  orders.  An  escort 
was  detailed  to  enter  the  palace  and  take  possession, 
while  a detachment  despatched  to  Petropolis  arrested  the 


1889] 


THE  EMPIRE  OVERTHROWN 


243 


Emperor  and  brought  him  to  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Mean- 
while the  principal  government  buildings  in  the  city 
had  been  occupied  by  the  rebels.  Practically  only  one 
official,  the  Baron  de  Ladario,  Minister  of  Marine,  raised 
his  voice  in  protest  against  these  revolutionary  proceed- 
ings. He  was  in  his  office  when  the  republican  forces 
arrived,  and  was  called  upon  to  surrender ; but  refusing, 
was  shot  at  and  wounded.  He  subsequently  recovered, 
and  no  other  bloodshed  occurred.  Early  in  the  morning 
a proclamation  was  issued  by  General  Deodoro  da 
Fonseca,  stating  that  the  Emperor  had  been  deposed 
and  that  a republican  form  of  government  would  be 
created  for  Brazil.  The  imperial  crown  was  cut  out  of 
the  badges  on  official  uniforms,  and  the  present  flag 
ordered  to  be  used  in  place  of  the  Royal  Standard. 
Provincial  governors  were  notified  of  the  course  of 
events,  and  without  exception  adhered  to  the  movement. 
General  Deodoro  da  Fonseca  was  then  proclaimed 
provisional  President  of  the  Republic,  and  nominated  a 
Ministry  from  the  circle  of  his  immediate  supporters. 
He  intended  that  the  supreme  power  should  rest  with 
the  military  element,  and  in  all  these  steps  General 
Floriano  Peixoto  was  his  principal  adviser. 

A few  days  after  the  military  revolt,  Dom  Pedro  and 
his  family  were  sent  to  Portugal,  and  with  the  departure 
of  the  Emperor  any  idea  in  the  minds  of  his  friends  of 
an  immediate  effort  to  reverse  the  events  of  November  15 
fell  to  the  ground.  The  country  accepted  the  change  of 
government  with  the  utmost  indifference.  In  Sao  Paulo, 
the  centre  of  the  real  republican  spirit,  prominent 
politicians  were  not  satisfied  with  the  manner  the  change 
had  been  effected,  but  decided  to  await  developments, 
and  endeavour  later  to  obtain  fair  representation  in  the 
Administration  and  Legislature.  The  supporters  of 
monarchist  principles  made  no  sign,  and  practically 
dropped  out  of  sight. 

No  attempt  was  made  to  confiscate  the  property  of 
Dom  Pedro,  and,  subsequently,  a pension  was  offered  to 
him,  but  refused.  Nor  was  there  interference  for  the 


244 


BRAZIL 


moment  with  monarchist  families.  They  were  regarded 
as  a harmless  factor  in  the  situation.  It  must  also  be 
said,  to  the  credit  of  the  military  conspirators,  that  no 
unnecessary  indignities  were  offered  to  the  Emperor  and 
those  who  followed  him  into  exile.  The  circumstances  • 
of  the  revolt  were  unjustified  by  the  causes  for  existing 
discontent ; but  many  intelligent  Brazilians  condoned  it, 
on  the  ground  that  it  would  have  occurred  in  any  case 
upon  the  death  of  Dom  Pedro,  and  that  if  the  change 
had  been  made  after  the  accession  of  Princess  Isabel, 
it  would  have  entailed  violence  and  bloodshed.  As 
matters  stood  in  November  1889,  the  majority  of  the  in- 
habitants were  satisfied  that  the  upheaval  had  happened 
so  quietly,  and  they  were  prepared  to  wait  tranquilly  to 
see  the  course  that  public  affairs  would  take. 

This  comparatively  apathetic  attitude  in  connection 
with  the  deposition  of  Dom  Pedro  received  a severe 
shock  when  the  true  character  of  the  men  at  the  head 
of  affairs  became  understood.  Most  Brazilians  enter- 
tained an  innate  dislike  to  militarism,  and  for  more 
than  half  a century  under  the  kindly  rule  of  Dom  Pedro 
individual  rights  and  civil  liberty  had  been  respected. 
A very  different  state  of  affairs  now  came  to  the  fore. 
General  Deodoro  da  Fonseca  no  sooner  found  himself 
securely  installed  as  chief  of  the  Provisional  Government, 
than  he  instituted  a system  of  praetorian  administration 
at  variance  with  all  Brazilian  traditions.  Unbridled 
military  despotism  was  apparent  in  every  quarter,  and 
officers  of  the  army  were  appointed  to  all  important 
official  posts.  An  ignorant  soldiery  was  permitted 
unwarranted  license  in  cities  and  towns,  but  the 
inhabitants,  galled  and  frightened,  were  too  timid  to 
make  open  protest  against  the  injustice  they  suffered. 
In  the  province  of  Sao  Paulo  the  reaction  against  this 
outburst  of  praetorianism  was  stronger  than  elsewhere  ; 
but  no  open  resistance  was  offered.  But  the  political 
leaders  of  that  province  determined  to  make  every  effort 
to  place  their  candidate  in  power  at  the  first  election  for 
the  Presidency.  It  was  recognised  that  the  outcome  of 


Deodoro  da  Fonseca. 


Prudente  de  Moraes  Barros. 


President  Campos  Salles. 


General  Bittencourt. 


( Face  page  244. 


1890]  CHURCH  AND  STATE  SEPARATION  245 


the  military  plot  had  succeeded  beyond  the  wildest 
dreams  of  the  conspirators,  and  that  the  men  concerned 
had  completely  lost  their  heads  in  consequence.  The 
country  hoped  and  believed  that  this  phase  of  despotism 
was  only  temporary,  and  that  it  would  cease  when  the 
responsibilities  of  government  were  appreciated  by  those 
who  presided  over  the  direction  of  public  affairs. 

On  December  18,  1889,  a drunken  row  occurred 
amongst  a group  of  soldiers.  This  rioting  was  magnified 
into  a seditious  outbreak  against  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, and  a decree  was  issued  on  the  23rd,  imposing 
arbitrary  Press  restrictions,  and  providing  a military 
tribunal  with  powers  to  try  summarily  cases  of  persons 
accused  of  treasonable  conduct.  Some  arrests  were 
made,  but  no  proof  discovered  that  any  conspiracy  was 
afoot.  On  January  7,  1890,  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment published  another  decree,  by  which  the  separation 
of  Church  and  State  was  ordered.  This  measure  created 
lively  dissatisfaction,  the  majority  of  educated  Brazilians 
contending  that  an  Act  so  intimately  connected  with  the 
internal  conditions  of  the  country  should  only  be  enacted 
after  the  consent  and  approval  of  a responsible  Congress. 
Then  followed  measures  in  connection  with  banking 
laws  and  the  emission  of  paper  money,  affecting  seriously 
trade  and  commerce.  Another  unpopular  Act,  in  1890, 
was  the  despatch  of  the  Minister  of  Eoreign  Affairs  to 
Buenos  Aires  to  negotiate  the  settlement  of  the  Misiones 
boundary  question  with  the  Argentine  Government. 
The  treaty  concluded  by  Minister  Bocayuva  conceded 
so  many  advantages  to  Argentina  that  Brazilians  con- 
sidered that  they  had  been  duped. 

General  Deodoro  da  Fonseca  erected  the  former 
provinces  of  Brazil  into  autonomous  states,  and  from 
these  was  summoned  a Congress  of  national  representa- 
tives. This  body  met  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  on  November  15, 
1890,  and  a draft  Law  of  Constitution  was  submitted  by 
the  Provisional  Government  for  approval  and  ratifica- 
tion. After  various  modifications,  this  law  was  passed 
by  Congress  on  February  24,  1891,  one  of  its  provisions 


246 


BRAZIL 


being  that  the  first  President  and  Vice-President  of  the 
republic  should  be  elected  by  the  Congress.  Next  day 
the  voting  for  these  two  offices  took  place.  As  the 
result,  General  da  Fonseca  was  named  President,  and 
General  Floriano  Peixoto,  Vice-President.  The  total 
number  of  votes  cast  was  234,  and  of  these  da  Fonseca 
received  129,  and  Dr  Prudente  de  Moraes  Barros  97. 
The  latter  represented  the  civilian  republican  element 
centred  in  Sao  Paulo,  and  his  defeat  therefore  implied 
the  continuance  of  the  existing  praetorian  system. 

With  the  Law  of  Constitution  and  the  Presidential 
election  the  dictatorial  authority  which  General  da 
Fonseca  had  exercised  unchecked  for  fifteen  months 
nominally  ended,  but  subsequent  events  show  how  little 
he  allowed  his  actions  to  be  controlled  by  the  new  law. 
His  election  was  the  result  of  pressure  upon  the  first 
Brazilian  Congress  by  the  military  party,  and  in  no  sense 
represented  popular  feeling. 

Under  the  Law  of  Constitution,  the  formal  title  of 
The  United  States  of  Brazil  was  adopted.  Each  of  the 
former  provinces  became  a state,  administered  without 
interference  from  the  Federal  Government  save  for 
defence,  for  the  maintenance  of  public  order,  and  for  the 
execution  of  the  Federal  laws.  Fiscal  arrangements  in 
connection  with  import  duties,  stamps,  rates  of  postage, 
and  bank-note  circulation,  belong  to  the  Federal 
authority ; but  export  duties  are  exclusively  the 
property  of  the  various  states.  The  legislative  power 
is  exercised  by  the  National  Congress,  with  the  sanction 
of  the  President  of  the  republic.  Congress  consists  of 
two  Houses,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  and  Senate. 
Provision  is  made  for  the  Chambers  to  meet  annually 
on  May  3,  without  convocation,  unless  another  day  be 
fixed  by  law.  The  ordinary  sessions  last  four  months, 
but  may  be  prorogued  or  convoked  for  extraordinary 
sittings.  No  member  of  Congress  can  contract  with  the 
Executive  Power,  or  accept  any  commission  or  paid 
office,  except  such  as  are  diplomatic,  military,  or  imposed 
by  law.  If,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  the  accept- 


1890]  THE  REPUBLICAN  CONSTITUTION  247 


ance  of  diplomatic  or  military  employment  would  cause 
the  loss  of  the  legislative  services  of  any  member  the 
consent  of  the  Chamber  to  the  appointment  is  required. 
No  member  of  Congress  is  permitted  to  take  part  in  the 
administration  of  any  company  drawing  a subsidy  from 
the  Federal  Government.  Deputies  and  Senators 
receive  a salary,  but  cannot  be  Ministers  of  State  and 
retain  their  seats  in  Congress.  Deputies  must  have 
been  citizens  for  four  years,  and  Senators  must  be  above 
the  age  of  thirty-five  years  and  have  been  Brazilian 
citizens  for  six  years.  The  Chamber  of  Deputies 
consists  of  members  elected  by  direct  vote,  providing 
for  the  representation  of  the  minority  in  proportion  of 
one  for  every  70,000  inhabitants,  as  shown  by  a 
decennial  census,  but  in  such  manner  that  no  State 
shall  have  less  than  four  representatives.  With  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  lies  the  initiative  of  all  taxation. 
The  franchise  extends  to  all  citizens  above  twenty-one 
years  of  age  duly  inscribed  in  the  electoral  registers, 
with  the  exception  of  beggars,  illiterates,  soldiers 
actually  serving,  and  members  of  monastic  orders  under 
vows  of  obedience. 

The  following  table  shows  the  number  of  Deputies 
from  the  various  States  and  the  Federal  district  author- 
ised by  the  Law  of  Constitution  in  1891  : — 


States. 

Deputies. 

States. 

Deputies. 

1. 

Amazones . 

# 

. 4 

12.  Espirito  Santo  . 

4 

2. 

Para . 

# 

. 7 

13.  Rio  de  Janeiro  . 

. 17 

3. 

Maranhao . 

# 

. 7 

14.  Sao  Paulo  . 

22 

4. 

Piauhy 

. 4 

15.  Parana 

. 4 

5. 

Ceara 

. 10 

16.  Santa  Catharina 

. 4 

6. 

Rio  Grande 

do  Norte  4 

17.  Rio  Grande  do  Sul 

. 16 

7. 

Parahyba  . 

. 5 

18.  Minas  Geraes  . 

. 37 

8. 

Pernambuco 

. 17 

19.  Goyaz 

4 

9. 

Alagoas 

. 6 

20.  Matto  Grosso  . 

. 4 

10. 

Sergipe 

. 4 

21.  Federal  District 

. 10 

11. 

Bahia 

22 

Total  . .212 


Senators,  sixty-three  in  number,  are  chosen  by  direct 
vote,  three  for  each  State  and  the  Federal  District,  for 
nine  years.  One-third  of  the  Senate  is  renewed  every 


248 


BRAZIL 


three  years.  The  Vice-President  of  the  Republic  is 
President  of  the  Senate. 

The  Executive  Authority  is  exercised  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic.  He  must  be  a native  of  Brazil, 
and  have  attained  the  age  of  thirty-five  years.  His  term 
of  office  is  four  years,  and  he  is  not  eligible  for  the 
succeeding  term.  The  constitution  provides  that  Presi- 
dent and  Vice-President  are  elected  by  the  people 
directly  by  an  absolute  majority  of  votes.  The  presiden- 
tial election  is  fixed  for  March  1,  in  the  last  year  of  each 
presidential  term.  No  candidate  may  be  related  by 
blood  or  marriage,  in  the  first  or  second  degree,  to  the 
actual  President  or  Vice-President.  The  President  has 
the  nomination  and  dismissal  of  ministers,  the  supreme 
command  of  the  army  and  navy,  and,  within  certain 
defined  limits,  the  power  to  declare  war  and  make  peace. 
With  the  consent  of  Congress  the  President  appoints 
the  members  of  the  Supreme  Federal  Tribunal  and  the 
Diplomatic  Ministers.  No  Minister  can  appear  in  Con- 
gress, but  must  communicate  with  the  Legislature  by 
letter  or  in  conference  with  commissions  nominated  by 
the  Chamber.  Ministers  are  not  responsible  to  Congress 
or  to  the  Tribunals  for  advice  tendered  to  the  President 
of  the  Republic.  The  Constitution  provides  for  six 
Secretaries  of  State  at  the  head  of  the  following  depart- 
ments : — (1)  Finance,  (2)  Justice,  Interior  and  Public 
Instruction,  (3)  War,  (4)  Marine,  (5)  Foreign  Affairs,  (6) 
Industry,  Communications,  and  Public  Works. 

According  to  the  new  law  each  State  must  have  its 
administrative,  legislative,  and  judicial  authorities  dis- 
tinct and  independent.  The  Governors  and  members  of 
the  Legislatures  must  be  elected.  Magistrates  must  not 
be  elected  or  removed  from  office  except  by  judicial  sen- 
tence. The  Federal  Executive  is  not  permitted  to 
intervene  directly  in  the  local  government  of  the  States. 
In  cases  of  infringement  of  the  Federal  constitution  by 
State  authorities  the  resource  of  the  Federal  Government 
is  an  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Tribunal  of  the  Federal 
Districts.  Provision  is  made  for  the  administration  of 


1890]  EXTENDED  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  249 


the  Federal  District  by  an  elected  council,  the  municipal 
authority  being  exercised  by  a Prefect  appointed  by  the 
President  of  the  Republic. 

This  Law  of  Constitution  was  satisfactory  theoreti- 
cally from  a republican  standpoint ; but  in  several  ways 
it  has  proved  impracticable  in  application.  The  country 
was  unprepared  for  the  institution  of  the  local  govern- 
ment conceded  to  it,  independent  authority  in  local 
matters  led  to  corrupt  practices,  and  often  left  the 
Federal  Government  powerless  to  correct  most  flagrant 
abuses.  The  position  accorded  to  the  States  of  being 
under  no  practical  control  by  the  Federal  authorities 
was  an  act  of  too  sudden  transition  from  the  former 
condition  of  dependent  provinces.  But  the  greatest 
error  in  connection  with  the  new  law  in  the  opinion  of 
many  Brazilians  was  the  formation  of  a Federal  in  place 
of  an  Unitarian  system  of  administration.  To  have 
retained  the  new  States  in  the  category  of  Provinces, 
with  Governors  nominated  by  the  Federal  Administra- 
tion, would  have  reduced  local  expenditure  and  been 
equally  effective  for  administrative  purposes. 


CHAPTER  XIV 


brazil — continued 

Autocratic  Administration.  Sao  Paulo  dissatisfied.  Manifesto 
condemning  Federal  Authorities.  Second  Manifesto  accusing 
the  President.  Severity  of  Praetorian  Regime.  Chambers 
Hostile  to  President.  Congress  refuses  Supplies.  Coup  d’etat 
of  da  Fonseca.  The  Chambers  Dissolved.  Martial  Law.  Presi- 
dent da  Fonseca  as  Dictator.  Monarchist  Conspiracies.  The 
Public  and  the  President.  General  Peixoto  becomes  Prominent. 
Sao  Paulo  disappoints  Public  Expectation.  Rio  Grande  against 
the  Dictatorship.  Para  follows  the  lead  of  Rio  Grande.  Naval 
Revolution  in  Rio.  Arrests  of  Prominent  Persons.  President 
Resigns.  Vice-President  Peixoto  succeeds  to  the  Presidency. 
Riots  in  the  Capital.  Congress  Re-assembles.  Death  of  Dom 
Pedro  II.  New  Electoral  Law.  Militarism  Dominant.  Mutiny 
at  Santa  Cruz.  Intervention  in  Local  Affairs.  Question  of  New 
Presidential  Election.  Protest  of  Officers.  President  and  Con- 
gress. Military  Despotism.  Insurrection  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul. 
General  Peixoto  and  Governors  of  States.  Resignation  of  Marine 
and  Finance  Ministers.  Affairs  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  Admiral 
Wandelkolk  and  the  Insurgents.  Naval  Revolt.  Government 
surprised.  Admiral  de  Mello.  Prolonged  Conflict  not  expected. 
Determination  of  Peixoto.  Defence  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  and 
Nictheroy.  Rebel  Squadron  and  Resources.  Bombardment  of 
Rio.  Panic  amongst  Inhabitants.  Italian  Incident.  Indemnity 
Paid.  Rebel  Ships  leave  Rio.  Object  of  sending  Expedition  to 
South.  Formation  of  Provisional  Government.  Situation  in  Rio 
Harbour.  Villegaignon  joins  Revolt.  Explosion  at  Gouvernador 
Island.  The  Aquidaban  and  Esperanqa  leave  Harbour.  Saldanha 
da  Gama  joins  Revolt.  Supporters  of  Peixoto  assert  da  Gama 
attempting  Restoration  of  Monarchy. 


President  Deodoro  da  Fonseca  had  learned  little 
from  his  experience  whilst  holding  dictatorial  power. 
The  Federal  authority  continued  to  intervene  in  local 


Antofagn 


J)F  FORMOSA-' 


La  Sere 


'K1VI.1I 


UTKtroSAIBES1 


TERRITORY  or  THE  FAMlJ 

l«UT..L\,W 


SOUTH  AMERICA 


1FEY  Jv  ri 


London.  John  Murray;  Albemarle  Street 


1891]  FEELING  AGAINST  DA  FONSECA  251 


matters  in  opposition  to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  the 
recently  framed  Law  of  Constitution,  and  the  State  of 
Sao  Paulo  openly  protested  against  this  policy.  On 
March  9, 1891,  a manifesto  was  issued,  calling  attention  to 
the  irregularities  practised  by  the  President.  This  docu- 
ment asserted  that  the  attitude  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment towards  Sao  Paulo  was  caused  by  that  State 
voting  against  Fonseca  for  the  Presidency,  and  it  was 
signed  by  sixteen  prominent  citizens,  including  Prudente 
de  Moraes  Barros,  Campos  Salles,  Bernardino  de  Campos 
Salles,  and  Francisco  Glycerio.  Another  manifesto 
followed  on  March  18,  signed  by  thirty  Senators  and 
Deputies  representing  fourteen  States  and  the  Federal 
District,  and  amongst  its  signatories  were  Aristides 
Lobo,  formerly  adjutant-general  of  the  army,  Jose 
Simeao,  ex-chief  of  police  of  Rio  de  Janiero,  Admiral 
Custodio  de  Mello,  Colonel  Marciano  de  Magalhaes, 
and  Major  Serzedello.  The  accusations  now  brought 
against  the  President  were  : — 

1.  Retaining  ministers  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment in  office  without  re-appointment  after  the  promulga- 
tion of  the  Law  of  Constitution. 

2.  Maintenance  of  honorary  titles  abolished  by  the 
Constitution. 

3.  Intervention  of  the  Federal  authority  in  the  or- 
ganisation of  the  States  to  punish  representatives  voting 
against  the  election  of  General  da  Fonseca. 

4.  The  creation  of  remunerative  offices  without 
authorisation. 

5.  That  by  constant  removal  of  magistrates  from  one 
district  to  another  the  President  maintained  a system 
of  violence  and  corruption  condemned  by  all  true 
republicans.  For  these  acts  the  signatories  held  the 
President  responsible. 

The  immediate  effect  of  these  protestations  was  to 
increase  the  severity  of  the  praetorian  system.  Arrests 
were  made  on  the  grounds  of  implication  in  plots  for 
restoring  the  imperial  regime,  but  no  monarchist  con- 
spiracy was  really  attempted.  Harsh  measures  and  the 


252 


BRAZIL 


short-sighted  policy  of  not  conciliating  the  Opposition 
resulted  in  exasperating  public  feeling  during  the  first 
half  of  1891,  and  when  Congress  met  for  the  annual 
session  in  June,  1891,  it  was  evident  a political  explosion 
could  not  be  long  deferred.  The  situation  was  the 
more  strained  on  account  of  distrust  in  regard  to  the 
Baron  Lucena,  then  Minister  of  Finance. 

In  the  unpopularity  of  President  da  Fonseca  lay  the 
opportunity  of  General  Floriano  Peixoto,  Vice-President 
of  the  Republic.  Peixoto  was  ambitious,  for  in  case  of 
the  resignation  or  decease  of  President  da  Fonseca,  he 
would  accede  to  the  Presidency.  Prominent  in  the 
revolution  against  the  Emperor  he  could  count  on  a 
strong  following  amongst  the  military  element,  and  for 
the  moment  he  attracted  the  support  of  the  civilian 
section  of  Congress  as  the  most  convenient  means  of 
ousting  Fonseca  from  office.  Without  declaring  his 
intentions,  General  Peixoto  became  the  centre  of  the 
intrigue  against  the  President.  The  plan  adopted  to 
force  the  hand  of  Fonseca  was  simple.  Every  measure 
sent  into  Congress  by  the  Administration  was  blocked, 
judicial  and  other  appointments  made  by  the  Provisional 
Government  between  1889  and  1891  were  declared 
illegal  on  the  grounds  they  were  not  sanctioned  by  the 
Legislature,  amendments  to  the  Constitution  were  pro- 
posed to  curtail  the  presidential  powers,  and  the 
Chambers  refused  to  vote  supplies  that  the  President 
considered  necessary. 

In  November,  Congress  was  still  in  session,  and 
the  relations  between  President  and  both  Chambers 
became  so  strained  that  Fonseca  realised  his  position 
was  becoming  untenable,  and  he  determined  upon  a last 
effort  to  make  himself  master  of  the  situation.  So  on 
the  3rd  of  the  month  Brazil  was  startled  by  the 
publication  of  two  decrees.  The  first  was  : — 

The  President  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States  of  Brazil,  in 
view  of  his  explanation  in  a manifesto  to  the  country,  decrees  : — 

1.  The  National  Congress,  elected  on  September  15,  1890,  is 
dissolved. 


1891]  STATE  OF  SIEGE  DECLARED 


253 


2.  The  Nation  is  convoked  to  choose  new  representatives  at  a 
date  hereafter  to  be  designated. 

3.  The  Government  will  for  this  purpose  issue  electoral  regulations, 
ensuring  entire  freedom  to  the  country  in  the  choice  of  members  of 
the  Chambers. 

4.  The  new  Congress  will  revise  the  Constitution  of  February  24, 
of  the  present  year,  in  regard  to  points  to  be  made  known  in  the 
decree  of  convocation. 

5.  The  revision  will  in  no  case  relate  to  the  constitutional 
provisions  establishing  the  Federal  Republican  form  of  Government, 
and  the  inviolability  of  liberty  and  personal  safety. 

Manoel  Deodoro  da  Fonseca. 

Tristao  de  Alencar  Araripe. 


The  second  decree  established  a state  of  siege  and 
martial  law  in  the  Federal  District  and  the  city  of 
Nictheroy,  the  capital  of  the  State  of  Rio.  It  was  : — 


Whereas,  facts  and  circumstances  related  in  the  manifesto  addressed 
to  the  country,  and  from  which  it  is  evident  there  is  imminent  danger 
to  the  preservation  and  stability  of  the  republican  form  of  Government 
adopted  in  the  Constitution  of  February  24  of  the  present  year. 

Whereas,  it  is  most  urgently  necessary  to  check  the  movement  for 
restoration  of  monarchy  and  the  dishonour  and  ruin  of  our  country 
which  has  commenced,  and  is  clearly  perceptible. 

Whereas,  the  safety  and  security  of  the  new  institutions,  which 
are  giving  such  progress  and  prosperity,  demand  prompt  and  extra- 
ordinary measures  to  meet  the  exceeding  grave  danger  now 
threatening. 

The  President  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States  of  Brazil 
decrees : — 

1.  The  Federal  District  and  the  city  of  Nictheroy  are  declared  in 
a state  of  siege,  and  constitutional  guarantees  suspended  for  a space 
of  two  months. 

2.  Any  acts  or  demonstrations  contrary  to  public  security  and 
order  will  be  severely  punished. 

3.  The  Government  will  appoint  a commission  to  try  summarily 
the  enemies  of  the  Republic  and  those  persons  who  in  any  way 
contribute  to  the  disturbance  of  public  order. 

4.  Citizens  who  may  be  deported  for  the  sake  of  public  safety  and 
the  stability  of  the  republican  form  of  Government,  shall  be  sent 
without  delay  or  trial  to  such  place  as  may  be  hereafter  determined. 

5.  The  Government  in  due  course  will  render  Congress  an 
account  of  the  exceptional  measures  adopted. 

Federal  Capital,  November  3,  1891,  third  year  of  the  Republic. 

Manoel  Deodoro  da  Fonseca. 

Antonio  Luiz  Affonso  de  Carvalho. 


254 


BRAZIL 


By  these  two  decrees  General  Fonseca  arrogated  to 
himself  dictatorial  rights.  He  was  again  in  the  position 
he  seized  when,  as  leader  of  the  military  revolt  on 
November  15,  1889,  he  deposed  Dom  Pedro  II.  The 
manifesto  to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  decree  was 
a long  document  of  5000  words,  in  which  the  President 
recounted  the  attitude  of  Congress  towards  himself  and 
the  impossibility  of  administering  public  affairs.  He 
endeavoured  to  justify  his  action  by  declaring  that  the 
Government  had  clear  proof  of  monarchist  plots,  and 
that  the  conspirators  had  determined  to  take  advantage 
of  the  restless  feeling  produced  by  economic  and 
financial  causes  to  raise  the  standard  of  armed  revolution. 
In  reality,  the  President  had  very  little  to  say  in  defence 
of  his  coup  d’etat.  His  assertions  of  monarchist 
conspiracies  deceived  nobody,  and  the  population 
extended  neither  sympathy  or  support  to  the  course  he 
had  taken.  The  President  and  General  Floriano  Peixoto 
were  now  the  two  central  figures  in  the  Brazilian 
political  world,  and  each  was  playing  for  his  own  hand. 
The  President  hoped  by  his  coup  d’etat  to  overwhelm 
his  adversary,  but  General  Peixoto  had  succeeded  in 
splitting  up  the  military  following  upon  which  da  Fonseca 
mainly  relied  for  support,  and  was  in  touch  also  with 
the  Opposition  in  Congress. 

Sao  Paulo  was  where  the  principal  opposition  to 
Fonseca  was  anticipated  ; but  all  hopes  in  this  direction 
were  disappointed.  On  the  return  of  the  State  repre- 
sentatives an  attempt  was  made  to  influence  public 
opinion  against  the  dictatorial  policy  of  the  Federal 
authorities ; but  the  people  were  cowed  by  a show  of 
force.  Yet  in  the  lower  Chamber  of  the  local  legislature 
a vote  of  censure  was  carried  by  16  votes  to  11.  In  the 
Senate  a similar  motion  was  proposed,  but  the  arrival 
of  a detachment  of  soldiery  induced  the  Senators  to 
change  their  proposition  to  a vote  of  confidence  in  the 
President.  Although  martial  law  had  not  been  pro- 
claimed in  the  State  or  city  of  Sao  Paulo,  the  Governor, 
a nominee  of  Fonseca,  exercised  autocratic  authority. 


1891]  rising  AGAINST  GOVERNMENT  255 


From  the  south  came  the  real  resistance.  On 
November  9,  the  garrisons  at  Rio  Grande,  Bage,  Pelotas, 
and  other  points  in  the  State  of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul 
declared  against  the  action  of  the  Federal  Government. 
On  the  10th,  the  regiment  stationed  at  Santa  Anna  de 
Livramento  revolted,  and  the  troops  at  Jaguarao,  Caqa- 
pava,  Alegrete,  and  Uruguayana  followed.  Generals 
Osorio,  Tavares,  and  Astrogildo  assumed  command  of 
these  opposition  forces  and  occupied  all  important  points, 
and  two  days  later,  Governor  Julho  de  Castilhos  was 
forced  to  resign  office.  A committee  consisting  of  Dr 
Assis  Brazil,  Dr  Barros  Casal,  and  General  Rocha 
Osorio  was  then  appointed  to  administer  the  State,  the 
National  Guard  was  called  out,  and  by  November  23 
the  number  of  men  under  arms  prepared  to  dispute  the 
authority  of  Fonseca  was  50,000.  A flotilla  of  five  small 
vessels  was  also  organised  and  the  entrance  to  Rio 
Grande  harbour  closed. 

In  Para  armed  resistance  against  the  President  was 
determined  upon,  but  in  the  remaining  States  no  active 
opposition  was  made,  although  his  course  in  regard  to 
Congress  was  generally  disapproved. 

In  Rio  de  Janeiro  the  navy  took  up  the  defence  of 
the  Chambers.  Admiral  Wandenkolk  and  Admiral 
Custodio  de  Mello  were  both  National  Deputies.  They 
decided  to  resort  to  armed  force  to  counteract  the 
Government  decrees  of  November  3,  and  the  naval 
officers  of  the  squadron  joined  the  movement.  A 
raid  was  made  on  the  21st  upon  one  of  the  stations 
of  the  Central  Railway,  and  a quantity  of  material 
and  stores  seized  by  the  insurgents.  The  Govern- 
ment, becoming  seriously  alarmed,  ordered  the  arrest 
of  several  prominent  naval  officers,  amongst  these 
Admirals  Wandelkolk  and  Guimaraes ; but  that  did 
not  stop  the  rising,  and  next  day  Admiral  Custodio 
de  Mello  boarded  the  cruiser  Riadiuelo  and  assumed 
command  of  the  war  vessels.  On  the  morning  of  the 
23rd  the  squadron  steamed  into  position  before  the 
city.  A rumour  of  bombardment  caused  a panic,  but 


256  BRAZIL 

only  a few  shots  were  fired,  one  of  which  struck  the 
Candelaria  Church. 

The  fact  that  the  navy  was  in  opposition  was  re- 
garded by  the  President  as  proof  that  the  game  was  lost, 
so  he  held  a hasty  consultation  with  his  ministers,  and 
determined  to  resign.  This  resolution  come  to,  he  sent 
for  Vice-President  Floriano  Peixoto  and  gave  orders  for 
the  release  of  Admiral  Wandenkolk,  at  the  same  time 
issuing  a manifesto  announcing  his  resignation,  together 
with  the  following  decree  : — 


General-in-Chief  Manoel  Deodoro  da  Fonseca,  President  of  the  Re- 
public of  the  United  States  of  Brazil : — 

In  the  interests  of  the  Nation,  resolves  to  resign  into  the  hands  of 
his  legal  substitute  the  charge  of  President  of  the  Republic. 

Manoel  Deodoro  da  Fonseca. 

T.  de  Alencar  Araripe. 

Some  riotous  scenes  followed,  and  two  newspaper 
offices,  the  Diario  de  Commercio  and  Novidades,  were 
wrecked.  The  municipal  building  was  raided  in  search 
of  the  Prefect,  Senhor  Jose  Felix,  who  had  made  himself 
specially  obnoxious  by  strict  enforcement  of  recent 
arbitrary  orders,  and  outbursts  of  minor  importance 
occurred  in  the  city.  These  conditions,  however,  were 
of  short  duration,  and  normal  quiet  was  restored  in  a few 
hours.  General  Floriano  Peixoto,  in  virtue  of  his  office 
as  Vice-President  of  the  Republic,  assumed  the  Presi- 
dency, and  Fonseca  retired  into  private  life  for  good  and 
all,  forgotten  until  his  death  in  August  1892. 

Peixoto’s  accession  gave  promise  of  better  things. 
Brazilians  were  aware  of  the  part  he  had  taken  in  the 
overthrow  of  his  predecessor,  and  quite  understood  that 
his  action  was  dictated  by  personal  motives,  and  did  not 
forget  that  the  Vice-President  was  connected  with  the 
military  element,  which  had  caused  much  misery  in  the 
past  two  years.  The  experiences,  however,  the  country 
had  passed  through  since  the  deposition  of  Dom  Pedro 
II.  inclined  people  to  anticipate  that  the  new  Administra- 
tion would  be  conducted  on  constitutional  lines,  and 


1892] 


INCREASE  OF  MILITARISM 


257 


militarism  restrained.  President  Peixoto’s  first  steps  in 
forming  his  ministry,  and  the  abrogation  of  the  decree 
of  November  3,  dissolving  the  Chambers,  helped  to 
strengthen  this  hopeful  feeling,  and  the  reassembling  of 
Congress  on  December  18,  1891,  further  assisted  to  re- 
store confidence.  On  December  5 had  come  news  of  the 
death  of  Dom  Pedro  II.  It  evoked  such  expressions  of 
regret  in  Eio  de  Janeiro  and  other  prominent  cities,  as 
served  to  reveal  the  small  part  that  the  general  public 
had  taken  in  his  deposition  in  1889. 

Political  interest  was  now  concentrated  upon 
Congress,  and  the  relations  between  the  Legislature  and 
President  Peixoto.  Matters  went  smoothly  at  first, 
the  President  bringing  no  undue  pressure  to  bear  upon 
the  Chambers.  A new  electoral  law  was  passed  to 
provide  for  an  election  in  case  of  the  death  or  resignation 
of  the  President  within  two  years  of  assuming  office. 
This  point  (Article  42  of  the  Constitution)  is  important, 
for  the  reason  that  round  it  centred  a bitter  dispute  at  a 
later  period.  Congress  rose  on  the  21st  of  January  1892, 
after  passing  a vote  of  confidence  in  the  Administration, 
and  recommending  that  stringent  measures  be  taken  to 

I avoid  a recurrence  of  internal  political  disturbances. 

Peixoto,  now  free  from  the  control  of  Congress, 
soon  showed  signs  of  perpetuating  many  of  the  worst 
abuses  of  his  predecessor.  Militarism  became  more 
marked  than  at  any  previous  period,  and  unmitigated 
hostility  was  shown  towards  the  Governors  of  States 
who  had  not  openly  pronounced  against  General  da 
Fonseca  when  he  made  his  coup  (Tdtat  on  November  3 
preceding.  Towards  the  close  of  January  a mutiny 
occurred  at  the  fortress  of  Santa  Cruz,  situated  near  the 
entrance  to  the  harbour  of  Eio  de  Janeiro  ; but  the 
outbreak  was  suppressed  by  two  battalions  of  infantry, 
this  force  assaulting  the  fort  and  sustaining  heavy  loss 
in  the  attack.  The  President  believed  that  the  rebellious 
act  was  promoted  by  his  enemies,  and  cherished  bitter 
feeling  towards  all  opposed  to  him,  which  led  him  into  a 
course  of  action  carrying  in  its  train  many  tragic  results. 

K 


258 


BRAZIL 


He  surrounded  himself  with  a clique,  and  to  ensure  the 
adherence  of  these  supporters,  corrupt  practices  were 
condoned  and  public  monies  inadvisedly  expended. 
Absolute  obedience  to  his  will  was  demanded,  both 
from  his  immediate  following  and  from  the  Governors 
of  the  States,  and  he  intervened  persistently  in  State 
Government  afiairs,  going  so  far  in  February,  1892,  as  to 
depose  the  Governors  of  Ceara,  Amazonas  and  Matto 
Grosso. 

As  the  severity  of  this  praetorian  system  became 
more  unbending,  popular  feeling  against  Peixoto 
developed,  and  that  same  month  the  Jornal  do  Comercio, 
the  leading  newspaper  of  Brazil,  expressed  the  general 
sentiment  by  calling  attention  to  Article  42  of  the 
Constitution.  The  President  ignored  this  attack,  on  the 
grounds  that  the  election  of  General  da  Fonseca  and 
himself  to  the  offices  of  President  and  Vice-President 
had  been  effected  by  Congress  under  special  circum- 
stances, and  that  ordinary  law  did  not  apply.  But  next 
April  his  answer  to  a protest  made  by  13  officers  of  high 
rank,  who  appealed  to  him  for  a fresh  presidential 
election  as  the  only  adequate  means  of  restoring 
confidence,  was  their  dismissal  from  the  public  service, 
and  the  arrest  of  others  suspected  of  sympathy  with 
them. 

Congress  assembled  again  in  May,  and  to  it  the 
President  explained  his  reasons  for  the  arrests  and 
deportations  he  had  made,  asserting  that  he  had  only 
taken  such  steps  as  were  necessary  to  preserve  order. 
Dissatisfaction  was  on  the  increase  in  both  Chambers, 
but  Peixoto  could  have  secured  a majority  to  confirm 
his  determination  to  hold  no  fresh  presidential  election. 
He  did  not  attempt,  however,  to  obtain  the  legal 
sanction  of  Congress  to  his  conduct.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Chambers  took  no  steps  to  express  disapproval 
of  his  attitude,  or  to  prevent  the  intervention  of  the 
Federal  Government  in  the  States.  For  the  remainder 
of  1892  matters  drifted  in  an  unsatisfactory  manner,  and 
the  Administration  gradually  developed  into  despotism. 


1893]  RISING  IN  RIO  GRANDE  DO  SUL  259 


Dr  Julho  de  Castilhos  regained  control  in  Rio  Grande 
do  Sul,  a position  he  had  been  forced  to  resign  in 
November  1891,  and  the  inhabitants,  incensed  at  his 
return  to  power,  revolted  under  the  leadership  of 
Gumercindo  Saraiva.  In  other  directions  revolutionary 
outbreaks  were  threatened. 

The  year  1893  opened  with  ominous  murmurings  of 
discontent  and  frequent  rumours  of  revolutionary  con- 
spiracies. The  President  was  aware  of  the  popular 
sentiment,  but  only  became  the  more  severe  in  his 
treatment  of  persons  suspected  of  political  intrigue  and 
consolidated  his  military  resources  for  a determined 
resistance  if  armed  revolt  broke  out.  In  April,  Admiral 
Custodio  de  Mello  resigned  his  portfolio  as  Minister 
of  Marine,  and  in  a letter  severely  criticising  the  Presi- 
dent complained  that  the  Ministry  was  ignored  by  the 
Executive.  The  Finance  Minister,  Dr  Serzedello  Correa, 
went  out  with  him. 

In  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  the  spirit  of  revolt  spread 
rapidly,  the  insurgent  leader  Gumercindo  Saraiva  being 
a man  with  a genius  for  organisation  and  guerilla 
warfare.  A small  store  of  munitions  of  war  was 
obtained  through  agents  in  Uruguay,  a larger  amount 
was  captured  from  the  Government  troops,  and  the 
President  was  compelled  to  despatch  strong  reinforce- 
ments for  the  southern  garrisons,  these  and  other 
military  operations  involving  a heavy  drain  upon  the 
national  exchequer.  A rising  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  was 
talked  of  in  June,  but  no  movement  was  attempted.  In 
the  following  month,  however,  Admiral  Wandenkolk, 
with  a handful  of  men,  seized  the  Brazilian  coasting 
steamer  Jupiter',  and  entered  Rio  Grande  to  aid  the 
insurrection  there ; but  the  move  proved  abortive,  for 
the  city  did  not  respond,  and  Government  reinforcements 
were  promptly  brought  from  the  interior.  Admiral 
Wandenkolk,  finding  himself  powerless  against  superior 
forces,  then  left  Rio  Grande  for  the  north  ; but  when  off 
Santa  Catharina,  his  vessel  was  captured,  and  all  the 
conspirators  brought  to  Rio  de  Janeiro  as  prisoners. 


260 


BRAZIL 


At  length,  on  September  6,  the  standard  of  revolt 
was  raised  in  the  harbour  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  by  Admiral 
Custodio  de  Mello  on  board  the  armoured  cruiser 
Aquidaban.  The  plans  of  the  conspiracy  had  been  care- 
fully matured,  but  an  inkling  of  them  had  reached  the 
Government,  which  strove  to  discover  the  nature  of  the 
plot  and  the  persons  implicated.  These  efforts  were 
unavailing,  and  it  was  a surprise  to  both  the  authorities 
and  the  public  when  the  entire  squadron  in  the  harbour 
broke  into  open  insurrection.  In  explanation  of  his 
conduct,  and  in  justification  to  the  officers  and  men 
supporting  the  movement,  de  Mello  issued  the  following 
manifesto  : — - 


Fellow  Citizens  : 

The  revolutionary  movement  of  November  23  had  no  object  but 
the  restoration  of  a constitutional  regime  which,  to  the  amazement 
of  the  whole  nation,  and  especially  of  all  who  were  responsible  for  the 
establishment  of  Republican  Government,  had  been  annihilated  by 
the  coup  d’ctal  of  November  3. 

The  sole  purpose  of  the  dictatorship  of  November  3 was  to  create 
administrative  irresponsibility  and  spread  the  belief  that  the  people, 
unable  to  establish  and  maintain  free  institutions,  had  submissively 
bowed  to  the  yoke  of  an  autocracy. 

You  know  the  part  which,  through  force  of  circumstances,  it  was 
my  lot  to  take  in  that  memorable  period  of  revolutionary  action.  I 
served  the  interests  of  the  people  on  November  23,  which,  in  virtue 
of  my  honour  as  a sailor  and  my  duties  of  a citizen,  my  country  had  a 
right  to  demand  1 should  defend. 

And  if  after  that  day  to  my  humble  home  there  came  a share  of 
public  authority,  it  was  not  due  to  suggestions  of  vanity,  but  to  political 
responsibility  resulting  from  the  revolution,  which  had  created  a new 
state  of  affairs. 

In  the  Government  I sought  to  maintain  my  patriotic  aspirations, 
contending  for  the  supremacy  of  the  Constitution  and  submission  to 
the  law. 

While  I was  a Minister  not  a single  day  passed  over  my  head  that 
did  not  find  me  engaged  in  the  defence  of  popular  rights  and  liberties 
against  the  encroaching  and  absorbing  action  of  an  Administration 
which,  concentrating  in  its  grasp  all  the  political  functions  of  the 
nation,  tended,  by  usurpation  after  usurpation,  outrage  after  outrage, 
to  scale  the  ramparts  of  political  power  and  annul  all  constitutional 
privileges. 

Against  the  Constitution  and  against  the  integrity  of  the  nation, 
the  head  of  the  Executive  has  mobilised  the  national  army,  placed  it 


261 


1893]  THE  NAVY  REVOLTS 

on  a war  footing,  and  utilised  it  to  terrorise  Santa  Catharina  and  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul. 

And  against  whom  ? Against  foreigners  and  alien  enemies  ? No ! 
The  President  of  the  Republic  has  armed  Brazilians  against  Brazilians; 
he  has  raised  legions  of  so-called  patriots,  spreading  mourning,  want, 
and  desolation  in  every  nook  and  corner  of  the  Republic,  for  the  sole 
object  of  gratifying  his  personal  caprices  and  strengthening  and  per- 
petuating the  supremacy  of  his  tyrannical  dictatorship. 

Promising  to  be  the  sentinel  of  the  Treasury,  the  President  has 
perjured  himself  and  deceived  the  nation,  opening  with  sacrilegious 
hand  the  public  exchequer  to  a policy  of  bribery  and  corruption,  thus 
abusing  the  authority  which,  in  an  evil  hour,  the  revolution  of 
November  23,  1891,  placed  in  his  hands. 

Bankruptcy  is  knocking  at  our  doors,  followed  by  a long  train  of 
misfortunes  and  disasters. 

Fellow  citizens  ! The  Republican  Administration  has  descended  to 
all  kinds  of  abuses. 

Mutilated  and  violated,  the  Constitution  is  no  longer  recognised  as 
the  supreme  law  of  public  liberty. 

In  this  wretched  situation  I can  no  longer  remain  inactive.  The 
nation  longs  to  be  free  from  a Government  that  humiliates  it.  The 
time  has  arrived  for  regaining  rights  and  liberties  repressed  and 
trodden  under  foot. 

In  the  life  of  a nation,  as  in  that  of  an  individual,  there  are 
moments  of  decisive  action. 

To  preserve  our  country  from  humiliation  ; to  uphold  the 
principles  of  liberty  which  human  honour  consecrates ; to  transmit 
unstained  to  our  children  a free  government  in  Brazil — this  is  our 
present  situation. 

Events  have  so  ordained. 

An  officer  in  the  navy,  a Brazilian,  and  a citizen  of  a free  country, 
I once  more  take  the  field  of  revolutionary  action,  to  give  battle  to 
the  destroyers  of  the  Constitution,  and  to  restore  the  sway  of  law,  of 
order,  and  of  peace. 

No  longing  for  power,  no  selfish  aspirations  for  control  by  violence, 
leads  me  into  this  revolution. 

That  the  nation  may  prove  its  ability  for  sovereignty  under 
Republican  Government,  is  my  desire,  the  supreme  ambition  ot  my 
mind,  and  my  purpose  at  the  present  time. 

Long  live  the  Brazilian  nation. 

Long  live  the  Republic. 

Long  live  the  Constitution. 

Custodio  Jose  de  Memo. 

Federal  Capital,  September  6,  1893. 


This  pronunciamiento  of  Admiral  Mello  embodied 
the  feeling  of  most  naval  officers,  for  the  navy  was  on 


262 


BRAZIL 


unfriendly  terms  with  the  army,  and  had  been  persist- 
ently ignored  and  slighted  since  the  establishment  of  the 
Republic  in  1889.  When  Admiral  de  Mello,  therefore, 
determined  to  head  the  revolt,  he  relied  upon  this  hos- 
tility to  draw  to  his  aid  nearly  all  the  officers  of  his  own 
branch  of  the  service,  and  the  fact  that  he  had  been  one 
of  the  prominent  leaders  in  the  successful  revolt  against 
General  da  Fonseca  was  also  important,  and  undoubtedly 
attracted  many  Brazilians  to  his  side. 

The  civilians  actively  participating  in  the  revolt  were 
a group  of  members  of  Congress  and  others,  who  joined 
Admiral  de  Mello  on  board  the  Aquidaban  on  the  morn- 
ing of  September  6.  That  any  prolonged  conflict  should 
occur,  was  not  expected.  The  revolutionary  movements 
in  1889  and  1891  had  been  of  short  duration,  and  similar 
brevity  was  anticipated  now.  It  was  thought  President 
Peixoto  would  tender  his  resignation,  or  that  a modus 
vivendi  would  be  reached  in  a few  days  at  furthest. 
But  the  sympathisers  with  the  revolt  and  the  peaceable 
section  of  the  inhabitants  were  mistaken.  Whatever 
faults  Peixoto  may  have  had,  they  did  not  include  a lack 
of  energy  and  determination,  and  a wish  to  resist  the 
uprising  was  the  dominant  feeling  amongst  his  sup- 
porters. But  his  decision  to  defend  his  position  at  all 
costs  resulted  in  a prolonged  and  bloody  struggle 
between  the  two  factions. 

The  defences  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Nictheroy  were 
strengthened.  Sangbag  breastworks  were  thrown  up 
along  the  water-front  in  all  positions  where  a landing 
was  likely,  and  cavalry  patrolled  the  streets.  Batteries 
of  artillery  were  mounted  on  the  hills  commanding  the 
bay  ; martial  law  was  proclaimed  in  the  Federal  District, 
and  in  the  States  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Sao  Paulo,  Parana, 
Santa  Catherina,  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  The 
President  personally  inspected  the  defensive  measures. 
Orders  for  war  material  were  sent  to  Europe  and  the 
United  States,  and  negotiations  were  opened  for  the 
purchase  of  war-vessels  to  take  the  offensive  against 
the  ships  under  command  of  Admiral  de  Mello.  The 


President  Peixoto. 


Admiral  Saldanha  da  Gama. 


Admiral  Custodio  de  Mello. 


Gumercindo  Saraiva. 


[Face  page  262. 


1893] 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  REBELS 


263 


military  element  rallied  round  the  Government  with  few 
exceptions. 

In  possession  of  the  insurgents  were  the  warships 
Aquidaban,  Republica , Trajano,  Orion , J at  ary,  Mar  a jo, 
Marcilio  Dias,  Guanabara , Amazonas,  Madeira,  Sete  de 
Septembre,  Iguatemy,  Araguary,  the  cruiser  Almirante 
Tamandare,  and  five  torpedo-boats  ; also  the  Brazilian 
merchant  steamers  Uranus,  Venus,  Marte,  and  Jupiter. 
Government  steam-launches  were  captured,  and  utilised 
for  warlike  purposes.  The  rebels  occupied  the  naval 
depot  at  the  Armacao,  near  Nictheroy,  but,  after  remov- 
ing all  stores  and  ammunition  needed  for  immediate  use, 
abandoned  the  position.  In  the  first  few  days,  the  fleet 
was  busy  laying  in  coal  and  supplies ; the  former  was 
taken  from  deposits  in  the  bay,  the  latter  from  ware- 
houses near  the  water-front,  and  consisting  for  the  most 
part  of  dried  beef  and  recently  imported  stores.  Occa- 
sional skirmishes  took  place,  but  no  serious  fighting.  At 
the  Armaqao,  however,  matters  bore  a different  aspect, 
for  Peixoto  had  reinforced  the  garrison  of  Nictheroy, 
and  every  attempt  of  the  rebels  to  land  in  the  vicinity  of 
that  city  was  disputed.  Fort  Villegaignon  remained 
neutral  at  the  opening  of  the  struggle,  and  was  watched 
anxiously  by  both  factions.  It  was  the  headquarters  of 
the  marine  infantry  and  heavily  armed  with  guns  of 
large  calibre,  and  its  proximity  to  Rio  de  Janeiro  gave 
it  great  strategical  importance.  Cobras  Island  was  held 
by  a garrison  that  also  stood  aloof  from  any  active 
participation  in  the  revolt.  The  naval  school  at 
Enxadas  Island,  in  charge  of  Admiral  Saldanha  da 
Gama,  followed  the  example  of  Villegaignon,  while  the 
forts  of  Santa  Cruz,  Sao  Joao  Baptista,  and  Lage 
remained  faithful  to  Peixoto. 

Civilians  were  apathetic,  few  thinking  that  there 
would  be  serious  fighting,  even  after  the  suspension  of 
all  traffic  in  the  harbour  had  brought  home  to  people’s 
minds  the  fact  that  something  of  the  nature  of  civil  war 
had  broken  out.  But,  on  September  12,  this  apathy 
was  abruptly  disturbed  when  Admiral  de  Mello  ordered 


264 


BRAZIL 


all  merchant  vessels  and  foreign  warships  to  leave  the 
usual  anchorage  and  move  further  up  the  bay,  and  next 
morning  took  up  a position  commanding  the  city. 
When,  about  9 a.m.,  the  guns  of  the  forts  at  Santa 
Cruz  and  Sao  Joao  opened  an  ineffective  fire  upon  the 
rebel  ships,  and  an  hour  later  the  fleet  began  to  bombard 
the  Government  forts  and  certain  points  in  the  city, 
all  was  immediately  confusion.  The  population,  panic- 
stricken  by  the  shot  and  shell  thrown  at  the  town,  fled 
en  masse  to  the  suburbs,  never  pausing  to  note  that  the 
naval  guns  were  directed  chiefly  against  the  war  arsenal, 
the  city  being  spared  as  much  as  possible.  All  day  the 
fight  went  on,  and  the  squadron  then  withdrew  out  of 
range  of  the  guns  of  the  forts.  The  Aquidaban  had 
been  struck  several  times  by  shells  from  Santa  Cruz, 
but  no  serious  damage  occasioned  to  hull  or  machinery. 

On  the  night  of'  September  18  heavy  firing  was 
heard  from  Santa  Cruz,  Lage,  and  Sao  J oao.  This  was 
occasioned  by  the  warships  Republica,  Marcilio  Diaz, 
and  the  armed  merchantmen  Uranus  and  Pallas  passing 
the  forts  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour.  Three  of  these 
vessels  ran  out  unharmed,  but  the  Pallas  was  struck 
and  her  machinery  badly  injured  when  abreast  of  the 
military  school,  where  for  eight  hours  she  lay  crippled 
and  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  forts,  with  a number  of 
civilian  sympathisers  aboard,  all  of  whom  considered 
themselves  lost.  A few  threw  themselves  into  the  sea 
and  swam  to  shore,  there  to  be  captured  and  shot  down 
by  troops.  The  engineers  of  the  Pallas,  however,  did 
not  lose  heart.  Unable  to  repair  the  damage  to  the 
principal  machinery,  they  got  the  ship  under  weigh  with 
an  auxiliary  engine.  Before  this  was  accomplished, 
some  twenty  men  were  killed  or  wounded,  but  at  length 
the  Pallas  steamed  away  at  a speed  of  three  miles  an 
hour  to  the  southward. 

The  object  of  sending  the  Republica  and  her  con- 
sorts to  southern  waters  was  to  establish  a Provisional 
Government,  thus  giving  a rallying  point  to  Brazilians 
who  wished  to  join  the  revolt.  Direct  communication 


1893]  PROVISIONAL  GOVERNMENT 


265 


was  established  also  with  the  rebels  in  Rio  Grande  do 
Sul.  The  plan  was  for  the  fleet  in  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
and  the  people  of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  to  make  common 
cause  against  Peixoto,  and  the  island  of  Desterro,  in 
Santa  Catharina,  was  selected  as  a convenient  place  to 
establish  the  Government.  The  city  of  Desterro,  the 
State  capital,  being  weakly  garrisoned,  surrendered  in 
October,  and  a Provisional  Government  was  immediately 
formed,  Captain  Lorena  being  proclaimed  President  and 
furnished  with  a ministry  to  carry  on  the  adminis- 
tration. 

Little  change  occurred  in  the  harbour  of  Rio  de 
Janeiro  during  the  remainder  of  September.  At  the 
instigation  of  the  foreign  diplomatic  corps  a com- 
promise was  arranged,  by  which  the  squadron  refrained 
from  firing  upon  the  city,  provided  no  artillery  was 
mounted  within  the  town  limits.  Foreign  vessels  were 
allowed  to  load  and  discharge  in  the  harbour  so  long  as 
no  war  material  was  landed.  Constant  skirmishing 
took  place  near  Nictheroy,  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Armaqao ; and  on  October  9 the  white  flag,  which  the 
insurgents  had  taken  as  their  distinguishing  emblem,  was 
seen  flying  from  the  flagstaff  of  Fort  Villegaignon,  proof 
sufficient  that  the  garrison  had  thrown  in  their  lot  with 
the  revolt.  It  was  impelled  to  do  so  by  the  action 
of  the  Government  in  cutting  off  the  water  supply  and 
refusing  further  issue  of  rations. 

During  November  the  progress  of  the  revolution 
was  marked  by  a daily  exchange  of  artillery  fire 
between  the  Government  forts  of  Santa  Cruz  and  Sao 
Joao,  and  the  insurgent  stronghold  Villegaignon  and  the 
warships.  Admiral  de  Mello  now  determined  to  go 
south  to  Desterro  to  confer  with  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment, and  Admiral  Saldanha  da  Gama  agreed  to  take 
over  command  of  the  rebel  forces  in  the  harbour.  An 
incident  occurred  at  this  time,  resulting  in  the  death  of 
two  officers,  a boatswain,  and  an  ordinary  seaman  of 
the  British  squadron.  A party  from  H.M.S.  Sirius 
and  H.M.S.  Racer  landed  close  to  the  powder  magazine 


266 


BRAZIL 


on  Ilha  do  Gouvernador,  then  in  possession  of  the 
insurgents.  About  3.40  p.m.  on  November  3,  the 
Mattoso  powder  deposit,  containing  seventy  tons  of 
powder,  blew  up  with  a terrific  explosion,  killing  a 
number  of  Brazilians  in  the  vicinity,  and,  it  was  supposed, 
injuring  some  British  sailors.  Search  parties  from  the 
British  squadron  found  that  Lieutenant  Beauchamp 
Mowbray,  of  the  Sirius,  Lieutenant  0.  G.  Tupper,  of 
the  Racer,  and  Boatswain  Harris,  of  the  Sirius , were 
dead,  and  seaman  Lynch  so  severely  injured  that  he 
succumbed  shortly  afterwards.  The  only  trace  of  the 
two  officers  was  some  uniform  buttons.  The  explosion 
was  expected  ashore,  and  was  probably  the  work  of  a 
Government  agent,  but  the  facts  were  never  disclosed. 

On  November  30  Admiral  de  Mello  determined  to 
carry  out  his  intention  of  visiting  Desterro.  At  mid- 
night, the  Aquidaban,  accompanied  by  the  steamer 
Esperanga,  got  under  weigh.  The  Esperanga  escaped 
unscathed.  The  Aquidaban  was  struck  in  several 
places,  but  not  seriously  damaged. 

When  de  Mello  left  at  the  end  of  the  month  for 
Desterro,  Admiral  Saldanha  da  Gama,  a man  of  great 
influence,  published  a manifesto  to  explain  his  posi- 
tion, in  which  he  declared  his  wish  to  see  affairs  in 
Brazil  on  the  same  footing  as  existed  previous  to  the 
revolution  of  November  15,  1889,  and  the  people  free  to 
choose  the  form  of  government  that  they  desired.  This 
was  twisted  by  the  friends  of  President  Peixoto  to 
mean  that  Admiral  da  Gama  was  fighting  to  re-establish 
the  imperial  regime.  That  the  Admiral  preferred 
Monarchy  to  Republicanism  there  was  no  doubt ; but 
he  most  emphatically  and  repeatedly  reiterated  that  he 
had  no  intention  of  forcing  any  particular  form  of 
Government  upon  Brazilians.  What  he  always  said 
was,  “ Let  them  choose  for  themselves.”  Notwithstand- 
ing these  denials,  the  effect  of  his  manifesto  was  to 
weaken  sympathy  from  a section  of  the  population, 
who,  whilst  holding  President  Peixoto  in  detestation, 
were  strong  believers  in  the  ethics  of  Republicanism. 


CHAPTER  XV 

brazil — continued 

Position  in  December  1893.  Many  Persons  Emigrate.  Precautions 
to  stop  Rebel  Supplies.  Peixoto  orders  Daily  Firing  against 
Rebel  Ships.  Troops  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Nictheroy.  The 
Government  Flotilla.  Admiral  da  Gama.  Strain  of  Continuous 
Fighting.  Ilha  Gouvernador.  General  Telles  killed.  Capture 
of  Ilha  Mocangue.  Personality  of  da  Gama.  Question  of 
Belligerent  Rights.  Journey  of  Mello  to  the  South.  Saraiva 
marches  Northwards.  Personality  of  Saraiva.  Rebel  Plan  of 
Campaign.  Saraiva  reaches  Parana.  Mello  captures  Para- 
nagua.  Successes  raise  Revolutionary  Prestige.  Lapa  Sur- 
renders. War  Material  captured  at  Curityba.  Scarcity  of 
Ammunition.  Rebel  Casualties.  Artillery  Fire  more  effective. 
Government  Flotilla  sails  from  Europe.  Foreign  Trade  Suffers. 
Insurgent  Hospital  Bombarded.  Admiral  Da  Gama  urges 
Mello  to  send  Reinforcements.  The  Aquidaban  reaches  Harbour. 
Rebels  attack  the  Arma§ao.  Incident  of  U.S.  Admiral  Staunton. 
Arrival  of  U.S.  Admiral  Benham.  Threat  if  United  States 
Merchantmen  Molested.  Situation  of  Rebels.  Council  of  War. 
Cruiser  Republica  Appears.  Aquidaban  and  Republica  sail  North- 
wards. Government  Flotilla  Arrives.  Population  advised  to 
leave  City.  Rebel  Situation  Desperate.  Captain  Castilhos 
grants  asylum  on  Portuguese  Men-of-War.  Rebel  Positions 
Abandoned.  Peixoto  demands  Surrender  of  Refugees  from 
Castilhos.  Portuguese  Vessels  convey  Rebels  to  Montevideo. 
Diplomatic  Relations  interrupted  with  Portugal.  Incident  of 
H.M.S.  Sirius.  Brutal  Treatment  of  Insurgent  Wounded. 

In  December,  1893,  civil  war  appeared  inevitable.  The 
people  wanted  peace,  but  they  were  too  supine  to  take 
up  arms  to  end  the  contlict.  While  the  insurgents  had 
many  sympathisers,  Peixoto  was  upheld  by  the  military 
and  a numerous  political  following,  and  he  now  allowed 

2C7 


268 


BRAZIL 


his  vindictive  passions  to  overcome  all  caution.  Legal 
guarantees  were  suspended  under  martial  law,  and  no 
act  of  the  authorities  towards  citizens  could  be  criticised 
by  the  courts.  Suspicion  surrounded  every  person  who 
was  not  an  ardent  supporter  of  the  Peixoto  Adminis- 
tration, and  arrests  were  the  order  of  the  day  amongst 
all  classes  of  society.  The  prisons  were  filled  with 
insurgent  sympathisers,  opportunity  being  taken  to 
gratify  personal  spite  by  denouncing  private  enemies 
as  being  implicated  in  seditious  plots  against  the  Govern- 
ment, and  thousands  of  peaceful  people  fled  the  country. 
Prominent  persons,  unable  to  escape  on  account  of  the 
strict  supervision  over  transport  from  Rio  de  Janeiro,  to 
avoid  arrest  lay  hidden  whilst  this  reign  of  terror  lasted. 

The  President  understood  that  if  he  could  stop 
supplies  reaching  the  rebel  squadron,  the  insurgents  must 
abandon  the  harbour  or  surrender.  For  the  rebels  to 
take  the  warships  away,  meant  the  continuance  of  the 
fight  elsewhere  in  Brazil,  and  this  was  not  to  the  liking 
of  Peixoto.  His  object  was  to  prevent  the  squadron 
running  the  gauntlet  of  the  forts  and  batteries.  At  the 
same  time,  he  redoubled  the  precautions  to  hinder  the 
insurgents  receiving  provisions.  Whilst  knowing  that 
the  squadron  had  a fair  stock  of  ammunition,  the  Presi- 
dent argued  that  with  sufficient  provocation  for  fre- 
quent artillery  and  rifle  fire,  the  supply  would  soon 
be  exhausted.  To  draw  the  rebel  fire,  artillery  was 
mounted  on  both  sides  of  the  harbour,  and  a daily  duel 
between  the  Government  batteries  and  Villegaignon, 
assisted  by  the  naval  vessels,  took  place.  The  National 
Guard  was  called  out,  and  volunteer  regiments  raised, 
until,  at  the  end  of  1893,  the  troops  in  Rio  de  Janeiro 
and  Nictheroy  exceeded  20,000,  well  armed  with 
repeating  Mannlicher  rifles,  and  amply  provided  with 
ammunition.  The  vessels  Peixoto  had  ordered  in 
Europe  and  the  United  States  were  now  reported  ready, 
and  consisted  of  the  converted  steamer  Cid,  re-named 
the  Nictheroy , and  armed  with  a Zalinski  dynamite  gun, 
several  6-inch  quick  firers,  and  a number  of  machine 


1894]  POSITION  OF  THE  INSURGENTS  269 


guns  ; the  torpedo-catcher  Aurora , re-named  the  Gustavo 
Sampaio ; and  six  sea-going  torpedo  boats.  Peixoto’s 
design  was  to  attack  the  rebel  squadron  under  the 
protection  of  the  fire  from  the  forts  and  batteries. 

The  position  of  Admiral  Saldanha  da  Gama  in  the 
harbour  was  a difficult  one.  His  object  was  to  keep 
the  attention  of  the  army  concentrated  upon  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  to  allow  more  freedom  for  the  revolutionary 
movement  in  the  South  ; but  the  rebel  squadron  was  in 
an  ineffective  condition,  and  was  not  capable  of  taking 
the  offensive.  The  monitor  Jar  ary  had  been  sunk  by 
a 9-inch  shell,  and  the  Aquidaban  and  the  Republica, 
the  two  most  serviceable  vessels  in  the  navy,  were  at 
Desterro.  Yillegaignon  fortress,  moreover,  had  suffered 
severely  from  the  converging  fire  of  Sao  Joao,  Santa 
Cruz,  and  Cragosta.  Its  casualties  in  men  had  been 
heavy,  and  rations  were  getting  difficult  to  obtain.  For 
the  moment  there  was  ammunition,  but  the  Admiral 
knew  the  stock  would  be  exhausted  if  a general  action 
occurred,  and  the  strain  was  beginning  to  tell  on  officers 
and  men.  The  Government  troops  now  became  more 
aggressive,  and  forced  da  Gama  to  active  measures  to 
denude  his  ships  of  their  crews  to  obtain  men  for 
landing-parties.  In  December,  for  instance,  Peixoto 
ordered  General  Telles  with  a strong  body  of  men  to 
occupy  the  Ilha  do  Gouvernador,  hitherto  in  undisputed 
possession  of  the  insurgents.  This  entailed  a force 
being  landed  from  the  squadron,  and  in  the  sharp  fight 
that  followed  (the  rebels  commanded  by  Admiral  da 
Gama  in  person),  the  Government  troops  were  routed 
and  General  Telles  and  a number  of  officers  and  men 
killed.  The  area  of  the  island  was  of  too  great  extent, 
however,  to  permit  of  permanent  occupation  by  the 
rebels,  so  the  position  was  evacuated  and  immediately 
occupied  by  Government  troops. 

Sharp  fighting  also  occurred  on  the  island  of 
Mocangue,  which  afforded  excellent  positions  for 
artillery  to  annoy  the  rebel  squadron.  Peixoto  ordered 
a battery  of  Krupp  guns  to  be  mounted  there,  and  so 


270 


BRAZIL 


effective  was  its  fire  that  Admiral  da  Gama  resolved  to 
silence  it.  His  attack  was  made  with  excellent  judg- 
ment. Early  one  morning  several  ships  were  moved 
into  position  to  bring  a cross-fire  to  bear  upon  the 
trenches,  and  half  an  hour  before  daybreak  300  officers 
and  men  were  landed,  taking  the  Government  troops  by 
surprise.  In  less  than  an  hour,  the  Krupp  battery,  a 
machine  gun,  and  some  eighty  prisoners  were  captured, 
wdth  a loss  on  the  Government  side  of  35  killed  and 
wounded,  against  3 killed  and  9 wounded  among  the 
insurgents. 

The  personality  of  the  Admiral  alone  kept  the  revolt 
alive.  Luiz  Felipe  Saldanha  da  Gama  was  a man  of 
exceptional  ability,  who  had  become  Rear-Admiral  in 
the  Brazilian  navy  after  long  service.  A descendant  of 
Vasco  da  Gama,  he  had  the  pride  of  family  tradition 
deep-rooted  in  his  heart.  The  subservience  of  political 
principles  to  personal  motives  had  no  place  in  his  life. 
He  had  travelled  extensively,  and  his  knowledge  of 
English,  French,  Italian,  Spanish  and  German  enabled 
him  to  profit  from  his  journeys.  Whilst  holding  aloof 
from  political  affairs  in  Brazil,  he  frequently  expressed 
to  his  more  intimate  friends  his  contempt  for  the 
politicians  who  had  dragged  his  country  down  since  the 
abolition  of  the  imperial  regime.  He  condemned  the 
dictatorial  methods  of  Peixoto,  and  at  heart  was  a 
devoted  servant  of  the  exiled  royal  family.  His 
personal  inclination  was  for  its  restoration,  but  he  never 
proposed  to  re-establish  monarchy  by  force.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  revolt  he  was  in  charge  of  the  Naval 
School,  and  it  was  in  part  due  to  this  fact  that  he  got 
drawn  into  the  revolutionary  movement.  The  cadets, 
in  age  ranging  from  16  to  21,  were  determined  to  join 
their  comrades  on  the  squadron,  and  Admiral  da  Gama 
could  not  reconcile  his  mind  to  take  the  offensive  against 
the  officers,  and  more  especially  the  cadets,  with  whom 
he  had  been  so  long  associated.  Towards  President 
Peixoto  and  his  Administration  he  was  bound  by  no 
ties,  and  naturally  he  decided  to  support  his  friends. 


1894] 


SALDANHA  DA  GAMA 


271 


His  energy  was  stupendous.  Day  and  night  he  worked 
at  details  in  connection  with  the  insurgent  vessels, 
inspecting  every  post,  looking  after  the  supply  and 
purchase  of  rations,  visiting  hospitals,  and  personally 
superintending  every  warlike  operation  in  the  bay.  His 
personal  bravery  gave  those  under  him  confidence  in  the 
presence  of  the  gravest  danger.  No  wonder,  then,  that 
with  da  Gama  at  the  head  of  the  revolt  in  the  harbour, 
Peixoto  should  feel  anxious. 

In  the  beginning  of  1894,  the  question  of  the  recog- 
nition of  the  insurgents  as  belligerents  arose.  The  Pro- 
visional Government  in  Desterro  instructed  its  agents 
abroad  to  press  for  recognition,  on  the  grounds  that  the 
insurgents  practically  controlled  the  southern  section  of 
Brazil ; that  they  had  established  a government ; that 
this  government  was  equipped  with  machinery  of  office, 
and  that  it  maintained  both  military  and  naval  forces  to 
support  its  authority.  To  the  squadron  this  recognition 
was  of  the  highest  importance,  because  it  would  have 
given  the  right  to  establish  a blockade  and  cut  off  food 
supplies,  and  it  was  failure  to  obtain  the  belligerent 
rights  that  ultimately  led  to  the  collapse  of  the  revolt. 
Without  them  the  power  of  the  rebel  squadron  was 
greatly  restricted,  inasmuch  as  it  could  not  deter 
foreign  merchantmen  from  entering  the  harbour. 

Admiral  Mello,  after  leaving  Pio  de  Janeiro  in  the 
Aquidaban,  proceeded  to  Ilha  Grande,  the  national 
quarantine  station,  and  occupied  the  Government 
buildings  without  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  detach- 
ment of  troops  forming  the  island  garrison.  Two  days 
later  the  Admiral  sailed  for  Desterro  to  confer  with  the 
rebel  government.  It  was  determined  to  send  for 
Gumercindo  Saraiva,  who,  with  4000  men,  was  on  the 
northern  frontier  of  the  State  of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul, 
where  he  had  fought  a series  of  victorious  engagements 
with  the  Government  forces,  capturing  much  additional 
war  material.  In  place  of  lances  and  other  obsolete 
weapons,  with  which  his  men  were  armed  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  revolt,  they  had  now  modern  rifles.  Ammunition 


272 


BRAZIL 


was  difficult  to  obtain  ; but  supplies  for  Government 
troops  were  seized,  and  a small  quantity  purchased  in 
Uruguay.  The  Rio  Grande  insurgents  were  without 
much  military  discipline,  but  obedient  to  their  chiefs, 
and,  being  well  mounted  and  accustomed  to  country  life, 
were  a mobile  force.  On  receiving  this  message  from 
the  Provisional  Government  at  Desterro,  the  rebel  leader 
decided  to  move  northwards  with  the  majority  of  his 
army,  leaving  the  command  of  the  insurgent  operations  in 
Rio  Grande  in  the  hands  of  General  Tavares,  a man  of 
wide  experience  in  guerilla  warfare.  His  instructions 
were  to  harass  the  Government  troops,  but  avoid  serious 
engagements.  Early  in  January  Saraiva  arrived  at 
Desterro,  the  mainland  not  far  from  the  German  settle- 
ment, bringing  with  him  Colonel  Salgado,  a former  officer 
in  the  Brazilian  artillery. 

Saraiva  was  an  interesting  personality.  One  of  a 
family  of  nine  brothers,  he  was  born  near  the  Uruguayan 
frontier,  where  his  parents  were  landed  proprietors  and 
cattle  owners.  He  thus  belonged  to  the  class  most 
injured  by  misrule  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  and  his  dislike 
to  governmental  officials  had  caused  trouble  on  various 
occasions ; so  that,  when  the  revolutionary  movements 
broke  out,  he  was  a ready  recruit.  Knowing  the  country 
intimately  from  experience  gained  in  driving  cattle 
through  Rio  Grande  and  Uruguay,  he  was  invaluable  for 
guerilla  tactics,  and  his  natural  talent  for  organisation 
soon  brought  him  into  prominence.  His  command  over 
men  was  remarkable.  Pie  assumed  the  position  of  a 
semi-feudal  chieftain,  and  demanded  absolute  obedience. 
He  was  now  46  years  of  age,  could  boast  little  education, 
but  possessed  a quiet  dignity  of  manner  and  a fund  of 
sound  common  sense  in  everyday  affairs.  His  habits  of 
living  were  simple  ; the  open  air,  with  the  earth  for  a bed 
and  his  saddle  for  a pillow,  pleased  him  as  well  as  a 
comfortably  furnished  house,  and  he  was  devoid  of 
fear. 

The  plan  of  campaign  proposed  by  the  Provisional 
Government  was  for  the  Rio  Grande  forces  to  march 


1894]  REBELS  ADVANCE  FROM  SOUTH  273 


through  the  central  districts  of  Santa  Catharina,  cross 
into  Parana,  and  advance  on  the  city  of  Curityba  by  way 
of  Lapa.  Simultaneously,  Admiral  de  Mello  was  to 
proceed  with  the  cruiser  Republica  and  the  armed  trans- 
ports Uranus  and  Pallas  to  Paranagua.  A railway 
connects  Curityba  with  the  seaport,  and  the  possession 
of  the  two  points  meant  control  of  the  State  of  Parana. 
The  armed  transports  were  to  be  utilised  to  convey 
troops  locally  recruited  in  Santa  Catharina  to  occupy 
Paranagua  and  the  adjacent  country.  This  plan  was 
accepted  by  Saraiva,  and  by  the  middle  of  January, 
1894,  word  was  received  from  him  that  his  march 
northwards  had  met  little  opposition.  Where  fighting 
had  occurred,  he  had  been  successful.  He  added  that 
the  garrison  of  Lapa  was  surrounded  and  its  capitulation 
daily  expected,  and  that  he  would  be  at  Curityba  by  the 
end  of  the  month.  Admiral  da  Mello  now  started  with 
his  expedition,  and  the  Republica  with  two  armed 
transports  entered  Paranagua.  Landing  parties  seized 
the  port.  The  city  made  a show  of  resistance,  but  after 
20  of  the  garrison  had  been  killed  or  wounded  the  force 
of  350  officers  and  men  surrendered,  and  a considerable 
amount  of  war  material  was  captured.  Many  of  the 
prisoners  enlisted  in  the  rebel  ranks.  This  success  was 
important  for  the  insurrection,  because  it  gave  the 
Provisional  Government  a port  from  which  revenue 
could  be  collected  to  defray  expenses.  Order  was 
quickly  established  in  Paranagua  and  the  vicinity. 

Mello’s  victory  added  prestige  to  the  revolutionary 
cause,  and  enabled  the  insurgents  to  occupy  Curityba 
and  other  important  points  without  further  resistance. 
The  town  of  Lapa  surrendered,  the  garrison  being 
allowed  transport  out  of  the  rebel  zone.  Situated  on  a 
hill  rising  from  rolling  plains,  Lapa  was  considered  to  be 
impregnable.  The  surrounding  slopes  were  strongly 
defended  by  trenches,  and  Saraiva  feared  the  losses  he 
might  sustain  in  any  attempt  to  carry  the  place  by 
assault ; but  a small  naval  brigade  of  150  officers  and 
men  obtained  permission  to  rush  the  position,  and 

s 


274  BRAZIL 

carried  the  two  outer  lines  of  entrenchments.  The 
place  then  capitulated. 

On  the  occupation  of  Curityba,  the  warlike  stores 
captured  included  two  Krupp  batteries  of  6 guns  each, 
3 Nordenfelt  machine  guns,  a supply  of  artillery  ammuni- 
tion, and  150,000  rounds  of  Mannlicher  rifle  ball  cartridge. 
Two  Italian  regiments  were  now  recruited  from  colonists 
settled  in  Parana,  and  the  total  available  insurgent 
forces  in  February  raised  to  more  than  6000  men,  fairly 
well  ecjuipped.  It  was  proposed  to  advance  to  Sao 
Paulo,  but  Saraiva  decided  that  his  men  and  horses 
needed  rest  after  their  long  marches  from  the  south, 
influenced  in  this  decision  by  the  knowledge  that  to  the 
northward  lay  the  yellow  fever  region. 

Saldanha  da  Gama  heard  of  these  victories  in  the 
south,  and  he  redoubled  his  attempts  to  prevent  troops 
being  despatched  from  the  Brazilian  capital  to  check 
the  advance  to  Sao  Paulo.  Feints  of  landings  were 
made  daily,  and  the  waste  of  ball  cartridge  was  heavy. 
Casualties  also  augmented  steadily,  and  at  the  end  of 
January,  the  Admiral  send  word  to  Mello  that  he 
required  reinforcements  of  men,  ammunition,  and  food 
to  maintain  his  position. 

Peixoto,  likewise,  was  untiring  in  his  efforts,  and  the 
artillery  fire  from  Santa  Cruz,  Sao  Joao,  Gragoata,  and 
the  batteries  mounted  at  the  Arma<jao  improved.  In 
spite  of  reverses  in  the  south,  the  President  never 
wavered  in  his  determination  to  subdue  the  revolt.  In 
January,  the  vessels  purchased  in  Europe  and  the  United 
States  were  ordered  to  rendezvous  at  Pernambuco.  The 
plan  was  to  station  them  off  the  entrance  of  Rio  de 
Janeiro  to  prevent  the  ingress  or  egress  of  insurgent 
vessels,  and  to  cut  off  rebel  supplies.  If  this  was  in- 
sufficient to  induce  the  surrender  of  the  insurgents, 
Peixoto  proposed  to  open  fire  from  every  gun  near 
the  bay,  and  simultaneously  to  attack  the  insurgent 
squadron  with  his  ships. 

During  the  revolt  commerce  and  shipping  suffered 
severely.  Passenger  and  cargo  traffic  was  not  altogether 


1S94]  SITUATION  AT  RIO  DE  JANEIRO  *275 


suspended  on  account  of  the  protection  extended  by  the 
foreign  men-of-war,  but  restriction  as  to  working  hours 
and  the  danger  to  the  crews  from  stray  bullets  was  so 
great,  that  the  port  was  practically  closed  for  ordinary 
business.  Admiral  da  Gama  realised  that  the  more 
impediments  he  could  throw  in  the  way  of  foreign  ship- 
ping entering  the  harbour  the  more  difficult  would  the 
situation  be  for  the  Government,  for  less  trade  entailed 
less  revenue.  With  the  exception  of  the  Custom-house 
duties  the  Government  practically  had  no  income,  and 
thus  was  forced  to  resort  to  emissions  of  inconvertible 
paper  money.  Feeling  on  both  sides  became  more  em- 
bittered as  the  conflict  was  prolonged,  and  absolute 
military  despotism  prevailed  in  Rio  de  Janeiro.  So 
intense  had  vindictive  feeling  become  that  the  insurgent 
hospital  on  Enxadas  Island  was  bombarded,  although  a 
Red  Cross  flag  floated  over  the  buildings,  and  on  one  occa- 
sion six  shells  were  thrown  into  the  hospital,  killing  two 
patients.  Another  day  two  projectiles  struck  the  prin- 
cipal ward  in  the  main  building.  A remonstrance  to 
Peixoto  elicited  the  reply  that  the  firing  was  not  intended 
for  the  hospital,  but  directed  at  an  armed  launch  crossing 
the  bay.  A second  protest  was  submitted,  pointing  out 
that  a number  of  wounded  prisoners  were  under  treat- 
ment at  Enxadas,  and  after  this  the  hospital  was  not 
molested.  Admiral  da  Gama  treated  his  prisoners  most 
humanely.  They  were  placed  on  a transport,  regular 
rations  issued,  and  the  wounded  cared  for  in  the  insurgent 
hospitals. 

By  F ebruary  da  Gama  found  his  position  so  critical 
that  he  sent  another  urgent  request  to  Mcllo  for  rein- 
forcements and  supplies.  The  Aquidaban  arrived,  but 
brought  neither  men  nor  provisions,  and  the  accounts 
given  by  her  commander  in  regard  to  hesitation  on  the 
part  of  the  insurgent  leaders  to  move  on  Rio  de  Janeiro 
were  not  satisfactory.  The  artillery  fire  from  the 
Armacao  now  became  so  aggressive  that  da  Gama 
decided  to  assault  the  position  and  endeavour  to  occupy 
it  permanently.  On  the  evening  of  February  7 a force 


276 


BRAZIL 


of  35  officers  and  600  men  were  landed  on  the  island 
of  Concecao,  with  the  intention  of  attacking  next  morn- 
ing ; but  transport  arrangements  went  amiss,  and  the 
men  remained  under  cover  all  day.  At  1 a.m.  next 
morning  the  force  was  embarked  in  barges,  and  con- 
veyed by  steam  launches  to  the  spots  selected  for  landing. 
Shortly  after  3 a.m.  the  first  shot  was  fired,  and  after 
some  hard  fighting  the  insurgents  obtained  possession  of 
the  naval  arsenal  and  advanced  towards  Nictheroy, 
hoisting  the  rebel  flag  at  daybreak  over  the  Armacao. 
Heavy  firing  continued  in  the  vicinity  of  Nictheroy,  and 
here  a serious  check  occurred.  The  Government  troops 
were  retiring  when  strong  reinforcements  opportunely 
arrived,  obliging  Admiral  da  Gama  to  retreat  to  the 
barges,  himself  wounded  in  the  neck,  and  many  of  his 
force  dead  or  disabled.  The  troops  endeavoured  to 
prevent  the  re-embarkation  of  the  rebels,  and  a desperate 
conflict  ensued ; but,  aided  by  the  machine  guns  of  the 
cruiser  Liberdacle  and  several  armed  launches,  the  naval 
force  finally  succeeded  in  reaching  their  boats.  This 
was  not  accomplished  until  the  Admiral  had  been  again 
wounded  in  four  places.  The  insurgent  loss  altogether 
was  22  officers  and  156  men  killed  and  wounded. 
This  attempt  to  capture  the  Armacao  further  crippled 
the  rebel  resources.  The  casualties  amongst  the 
Government  troops  reached  700  officers  and  men,  but 
could  be  better  borne. 

In  October,  1893,  Rear-Admiral  Staunton  of  the 
United  States  navy  was  in  command  of  the  U.S.  squadron 
in  Brazilian  waters.  Admiral  de  Mello,  then  at  the 
head  of  the  naval  revolt,  paid  a formal  visit  to  the  United 
States  Admiral,  and  was  received  on  board  the  flagship 
with  the  usual  courtesies.  Admiral  Staunton  returned 
the  visit,  and  was  given  the  customary  salute.  President 
Peixoto  notified  Washington  of  this  interchange  of  visits, 
and  asserted  that  such  action  was  tantamount  to  recog- 
nising the  rebels  as  belligerents.  Washington  cabled 
the  recall  of  Admiral  Staunton,  and  in  January  Admiral 
Benham  arrived.  He  reached  Rio  de  Janeiro  with  no 


1894]  ATTITUDE  OF  U.S.  ADMIRAL 


277 


very  friendly  feelings  towards  the  insurgents,  and  had 
no  intention  of  allowing  the  rebels  to  interfere  with 
United  States  merchant  shipping,  or  of  recognising  rules 
tacitly  admitted  hitherto  by  foreign  vessels.  In  the  third 
week  in  February  two  United  States  merchantmen 
entered  the  harbour  and  proposed  to  draw  up  to  the 
quays  to  discharge.  Admiral  da  Gama  notified  the 
masters  of  these  vessels  that  they  could  not  moor  to 
the  wharves,  as  the  district  was  within  the  field  of  fire 
between  the  ships  and  the  shore,  and  no  vessels  were 
allowed  in  that  zone.  The  shipmasters  appealed  to  the 
United  States  Admiral.  Benham  ordered  the  merchant- 
men to  go  up  to  the  wharves,  and  notified  da  Gama  that 
he  would  open  fire  upon  the  insurgent  squadron  if  any 
interference  was  attempted.  The  United  States  warships 
in  harbour  were  the  New  York , Charleston , San  Francisco , 
Detroit,  and  Newark.  Admiral  da  Gama  could  make 
no  effective  resistance  in  the  face  of  this  superior  force. 
The  merchantmen  were  ordered  to  heave-to  when  abreast 
of  the  cruiser  Trajano,  and  the  Detroit  immediately 
fired  two  shots  at  the  rebel  vessel.  The  merchantmen 
then  were  allowed  to  pass  unmolested.  This  blow  to 
the  prestige  of  the  rebel  cause  was  great,  because  it 
showed  clearly  that  the  insurgents  woidd  no  longer  be 
permitted  to  interfere  with  shipping  and  commerce. 

The  combined  effects  of  the  repulse  at  the  Arma^ao 
and  the  action  of  the  United  States  Admiral  led  da 
Gama  to  the  conclusion  that  his  situation  was  desperate, 
lie  had  recovered  from  the  wounds  he  received  on 
February  9 with  the  exception  of  the  injury  to  his  left 
arm,  the  upper  tendons  of  which  had  been  severed  by 
a fragment  of  shell,  and  on  February  19  summoned  a 
council  of  officers,  to  which  he  explained  the  position  and 
asked  the  members  to  decide  whether  they  wished  to  con- 
tinue the  fight,  or  would  authorise  him  as  their  leader  to 
make  terms  with  Peixoto.  He  pointed  out  that  no 
supplies  or  reinforcements  had  come  from  the  south,  in 
spite  of  repeated  and  urgent  requests ; but  the  officers 
unanimously  decided  to  prolong  the  struggle.  The 


278 


BRAZIL 


Admiral  then  said  he  would  again  appeal  to  Mello  for 
reinforcements  before  discussing  a change  of  policy,  and 
once  more  a message  was  sent  to  Desterro.  To  this  the 
reply  was  that  Mello  had  left  for  the  north  in  the  cruiser 
Republica,  which  appeared  on  the  23rd  off  Rio.  The 
rebels  imagined  that  the  reinforcements  so  sorely  needed 
had  come,  and  it  was  decided  that  the  Aquidaban  should 
communicate  with  de  Mello.  After  consultation  with 
the  senior  officers  of  the  squadron,  da  Gama  determined 
that  it  would  be  useless  for  Mello  to  enter  the  harbour 
unless  his  force  was  sufficient  for  a landing  at  Nictheroy. 
If  the  reinforcements  were  not  strong  enough  for  this, 
the  suggestion  was  that  the  two  vessels  should  proceed 
to  Bahia  and  demand  the  surrender  of  that  city.  At 
4 a.m.  on  the  morning  of  February  24,  the  Aquidaban 
was  under  weigh.  Search-lights  on  various  heights 
showed  her  movements,  and  as  she  steamed  down  the 
bay,  firing  from  the  forts  and  batteries  was  fast  and 
furious.  Taking  his  ships  within  fifty  yards  of  the 
walls  of  Santa  Cruz,  the  commander,  Alexandrino  de 
Alencar,  fired  a broadside  when  abreast,  and  then 
steamed  out  to  sea  without  discharging  another  shot. 
The  gunnery  at  the  forts  was  better  than  on  former  occa- 
sions, and  one  shell  passed  through  the  funnel  and 
another  completely  wrecked  the  lower  bridge ; no 
other  serious  damage  occurred. 

Clear  of  the  fire  of  the  forts,  Captain  Alencar  made 
for  the  Republica  to  confer  with  Mello.  The  views  of 
Saldanha  da  Gama  were  explained,  and  Mello  said  that 
an  accident  to  the  machinery  of  the  transport  accom- 
panying him  from  Desterro  necessitated  the  return  of 
the  vessel  to  port.  In  these  circumstances  the  Admiral 
considered  it  useless  to  enter  Rio,  and  decided  to  steam 
northwards  to  Bahia  in  company  with  the  Aquidaban. 

In  the  harbour  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  comparative  quiet 
ensued.  Admiral  da  Gama  waited  for  news  from  the 
north,  expecting  daily  to  hear  of  the  success  or  failure 
of  the  expedition.  On  shore  President  Peixoto  made  a 
final  disposition  of  the  troops  pending  the  arrival  of 


1894]  PREPARATIONS  TO  ABANDON  RIO  279 


the  Government  warships.  The  artillery  duel  between 
the  forts  on  the  mainland  and  Villegaignon  and  the 
rebel  ships  continued,  but  no  other  aggressive  measures 
were  attempted  ; but  the  constant  shelling  of  Villegaignon 
for  four  months  by  Santa  Cruz  and  Sao  Joao  has 
reduced  the  fortifications  to  a shapeless  mass  of  ruins, 
and  although  the  guns  were  intact  it  was  evident  the 
position  must  soon  be  untenable.  The  bomb-proof 
casemates  no  longer  afforded  protection  to  the  garrison. 
In  February  a 9-inch  shell  from  Sao  Joao  penetrated 
during  the  dinner  hour,  killing  7 and  wounding  35  men. 

Admiral  da  Gama  determined  to  evacuate  the  harbour 
of  Rio  de  Janeiro  as  soon  as  he  received  information  of 
the  fate  of  Mello.  If  the  expedition  proved  a success, 
the  insurgents  were  to  be  transported  to  Bahia ; if  a 
failure,  to  the  south.  Orders  were  given  to  provision 
and  coal  the  insurgent  vessels.  The  remaining  warlike 
stores  were  distributed  amongst  the  vessels,  and  arrange- 
ments made  to  disable  such  launches  and  ships  as  were 
not  considered  in  a fit  state  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  the 
batteries  and  forts.  Whilst  the  vessels  were  preparing 
for  sea,  the  armed  transport  Venus  was  struck  by  a 
shell  and  foundered,  and  a valuable  stock  of  provisions 
and  ammunition  was  lost  in  her. 

Whilst  da  Gama  was  waiting  for  news  from  Mello, 
the  vessels  Peixoto  had  purchased  in  Europe  and  the 
United  States  arrived  off  the  entrance  to  the  harbour 
on  March  7.  Peixoto  then  issued  notice  to  the  inhabi- 
tants that  on  the  1 3th  all  forts  and  batteries  would  open 
fire  upon  the  insurgents,  and  that  the  new  vessels  would 
also  attack.  It  was  added  that  batteries  posted  in  the 
city  would  join  in  the  action,  and  that  a bombardment 
by  the  rebel  squadron  might  be  anticipated.  The 
population  was  therefore  advised  to  leave  the  town,  and 
certain  localities  were  specified  as  free  from  danger. 
Panic  followed ; men,  women,  and  children  fled  to 
escape  the  threatened  danger,  and  business  was  at  a 
standstill. 

Next  day  da  Gama  learned  that  the  Aquidaban  was 


280 


BRAZIL 


at  Desterro  and  the  Republics  at  Parangua,  and  that 
no  attempt  had  been  made  either  to  capture  Bahia  or 
to  send  reinforcements  to  Rio  de  Janeiro.  He  naturally 
regarded  this  news  as  proof  that  Mello  had  played  him 
false,  and  a council  of  war  was  called  at  which  da  Gama 
explained  the  desperate  situation,  pointing  out,  however, 
that  it  might  be  possible  to  run  the  ships  out  of  the 
harbour  and  proceed  to  the  south,  although  the  operation 
would  be  attended  by  extreme  danger.  The  Admiral 
offered  to  treat  with  Peixoto,  surrendering  his  own 
person  if  the  safety  of  the  officers  and  men  under  his 
command  was  assured.  This  proposal  the  council 
rejected,  and  finally  it  was  decided  to  leave  da  Gama 
to  act  as  he  deemed  fit. 

The  Admiral  determined  not  to  risk  sacrifice  of  life 
by  attempting  to  run  past  the  batteries  and  ships,  and 
to  appeal  to  the  senior  naval  officer  of  the  Portuguese 
squadron  then  in  the  port  for  asylum.  Captain  Castilhos 
acceded  at  once  to  the  request,  promising  to  receive 
the  insurgents  on  board  the  Portuguese  men-of-war  Min- 
dello  and  Alfonso  Alberquerque  and  land  them  in  neutral 
territory.  Arrangements  were  commenced  immediately 
for  abandoning  the  ships  and  Fort  Villegaignon,  and  on 
the  night  of  March  12  the  rebels  left  their  stations  and 
embarked  on  the  Portuguese  vessels. 

On  the  following  day  the  programme  announced  by 
Peixoto  was  executed.  As  there  was  no  response  from 
the  rebels,  the  order  was  given  to  cease  firing,  and  the 
news  rapidly  spread  that  the  insurgents  had  given  up 
the  fight.  Detachments  of  troops  were  sent  to  occupy 
Villegaignon  and  the  islands  of  Cobras  and  Enxadas, 
and  arrangements  made  to  take  charge  of  the  deserted 
ships.  Peixoto  was  furious  that  da  Gama  and  his 
officers  had  escaped  him,  and  sent  a peremptory  demand 
to  Captain  Castilhos  for  the  surrender  of  the  insurgents. 
This  was  curtly  refused,  in  spite  of  a threat  that  the 
Portuguese  ships  would  not  be  permitted  to  leave  the 
harbour  with  the  rebels  on  board.  Captain  Castilhos 
informed  his  Government  of  his  action,  pointing  out 


1894]  INCIDENT  OF  H.M.S.  SIRIUS 


281 


that  the  surrender  of  the  insurgents  to  the  authorities 
meant  the  summary  execution  of  the  greater  number  of 
officers  and  men.  In  reply  the  Portuguese  Government 
ordered  Captain  Castilhos  to  proceed  to  Montevideo  with 
the  rebels,  but  not  to  allow  them  to  land  until  further 
instructions.  He  sailed  unmolested  for  the  south  three 
days  later,  and  diplomatic  relations  between  Portugal 
and  Brazil  were  forthwith  broken  off. 

A few  days  after  the  close  of  the  revolt  in  Rio  an 
incident  nearly  brought  about  complications  with  the 
British  Government.  Lieutenant  Hotham,  navigating 
officer  of  H.M.S.  Sirius,  landed  from  a launch  on  Enxadas 
Island  to  take  sights  and  correct  chronometers.  The 
military  officers  in  charge  of  the  island  ordered  his 
arrest,  refusing  to  listen  to  explanations,  and  seizing  the 
launch.  After  some  hours  had  elapsed,  another  launch 
was  sent  to  enquire  the  reason  for  Lieutenant  Hotham’s 
delay.  On  learning  the  facts,  Captain  Pipon  demanded 
the  instant  release  of  his  officer,  and  pending  a reply 
moved  the  Sirius  into  a position  to  open  fire  on  the 
Nictheroy  and  others  of  the  new  vessels  belonging  to  the 
Government.  Dismayed  at  this  determined  attitude,  the 
authorities  at  once  released  Lieutenant  Hotham.  The 
commander  of  the  Sirius  further  demanded  the  British 
flag  to  be  hoisted  on  board  the  senior  Brazilian  naval 
officer’s  ship  then  in  port,  and  duly  saluted.  Peixoto 
acceded. 

The  wildest  excesses  took  place  after  the  collapse  of 
the  rebels.  The  insurgent  wounded  left  in  hospital  at 
Enxadas  were  neglected  and  abused,  and  such  civilian 
attendants  as  had  remained  on  the  island  for  hospital 
duties  were  imprisoned  and  flogged. 


CHAPTER  XVI 


brazil — continued 

The  Voyage  of  the  Aquidaban  and  the  Republica.  Saraiva  deceived  as 
to  the  Position.  Mello  and  Saraiva.  Discontent  with  Provisional 
Government.  Presidential  Election.  Dr  Prudente  Moraes. 
News  reaches  Saraiva.  Parana  evacuated.  Mello  organises 
Expedition  to  Rio  Grande.  Curityba  occupied  without  Resistance. 
Rebel  Cause  collapses.  Nava!  Expedition  against  Desterro. 
Rebel  Expedition  enters  Rio  Grande.  Threatened  Bombardment 
of  Rio  Grande.  Attack  on  Rio  Grande.  Insurgent  Troops 
landed  in  Uruguay.  Mello  delivers  Rebel  Ships  to  Argentine 
Authorities.  Argentine  Government  returns  Vessels  to  Brazil. 
Naval  Expedition  at  Desterro.  Aquidaban  sunk.  Desterro 
Occupied.  Insui'gents  shot  by  Military  Authorities.  Frenchmen 
executed.  Indemnity  demanded  by  French  Government.  Fate 
of  Saraiva.  Revolution  crushed.  President  Moraes  accedes  to 
Office.  Policy  of  new  President.  Militarism  decreases.  Opposi- 
tion to  Moraes.  Amnesty  for  Rebels.  Law  of  Constitution  strictly 
observed.  Misiones  Boundary  settled.  Outbreak  at  Military 
School.  Firm  Attitude  of  President.  Diplomatic  Relations 
with  Portugal  resumed.  Disturbances  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul. 
Admiral  da  Gama  joins  Insurgents.  Atrocities  by  Troops  and 
Rebels  in  Rio  Grande.  Battle  at  Campo  Osorio.  Death  of  da 
Gama.  Suspension  of  Hostilities.  The  Trinidade  Question. 
Peace  arranged  with  Insurgents.  Amnesty  for  Officers.  Sup- 
pression of  Praetorian  Methods.  Italian  Claims.  Financial 
Legislation.  President  Moraes  temporarily  vacates  Office. 


Admiral  de  Mello’s  two  ships  parted  company  two 
days  after  leaving  Rio  owing  to  a defect  in  the  machinery 
of  the  Republica,  so  the  ships  instead  of  going  to  Bahia 
turned  south,  and  while  the  Aquidaban  went  to  Desterro 
to  await  further  instructions  the  Republica  steamed  to 
Paranagua,  and  on  March  3 reached  port.  Three  days 


1894]  INSURGENTS  OCCUPY  CURITYBA  283 


later  Admiral  de  Mello  arrived  at  Curityba.  The 
majority  of  the  insurgent  forces  were  in  the  vicinity 
of  Punto  Grosso,  some  seventy  miles  distant  from 
Curityba,  but  connected  with  that  city  by  railway,  and 
it  was  from  this  point  General  Saraiva  journeyed  to 
meet  the  Admiral. 

At  the  council  of  war  held  on  Saraiva’s  arrival  the 
Admiral  did  not  represent  the  position  of  da  Gama  as 
critical.  A forward  movement  would  be  politic,  he  said, 
but  was  not  a necessity  to  save  the  situation,  and  possibly 
Mello  did  not  himself  believe  in  the  desperate  nature  of 
the  insurgent  position  in  Rio.  Nothing  definite 
resulted ; but  some  dissatisfaction  was  expressed  at  the 
attitude  of  the  Provisional  Government,  and  Saraiva 
resented  the  attempt  of  the  Desterro  authorities  to 
control  his  movements.  He  was  willing,  he  said,  to 
co-operate  with  them  under  certain  conditions,  but 
would  not  recognise  their  right  to  issue  orders  in 
connection  with  his  forces.  A Governor  was  then 
elected  for  the  State  of  Parana,  civil  authorities 
nominated  for  the  districts  held  by  the  insurgents,  and 
thanksgiving  masses  celebrated  in  the  principal  churches 
for  the  deliverance  of  this  section  of  the  country  from 
the  domination  of  Peixoto. 

March  1 was  the  date  of  the  presidential  election, 
and  Dr  Prudente  de  Moraes  Barros  was  declared 
elected  ; but  the  insurgents  insisted  that  the  proceedings 
were  invalid,  on  the  ground  that  no  voting  had  taken 
place  in  the  States  of  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  Santa 
Catharina,  and  Parana.  That  these  three  States  did 
not  participate  in  the  election  was  due  to  the  disturbed 
conditions  in  southern  Brazil.  To  Dr  Prudente  de 
Moraes  Barros  personally  the  rebels  had  no  cause  for 
objection. 

It  was  not  until  March  15  that  news  of  the 
collapse  of  the  revolt  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  reached 
Curityba.  Mello  and  Saraiva  were  in  the  city  when  the 
telegram  announcing  the  surrender  of  Saldanha  da 
Gama  was  received.  To  Mello  the  disaster  could  not 


284 


BRAZIL 


have  been  unexpected,  to  Saraiva  it  was  an  absolute 
surprise,  and  in  Curityba,  Paranagua,  and  Desterro  the 
effect  was  consternation  and  panic.  Civilians  who  had 
lent  active  assistance  to  the  insurgents  made  arrange- 
ments to  leave  the  country,  and  on  all  sides  the  situation 
was  regarded  with  most  gloomy  forebodings.  General 
Saraiva  called  a meeting  of  his  senior  officers  to  discuss 
the  situation,  and  all  expressed  the  wish  to  return  to 
Rio  Grande  do  Sul.  They  resolved  to  evacuate  Curityba 
at  an  early  date,  and  Saraiva  communicated  this  decision 
to  Mello.  A new  plan  of  campaign  was  then  drawn  up. 
Saraiva  with  his  forces  was  to  march  towards  the  north- 
western districts  of  Rio  Grande,  and  Mello  was  to 
proceed  to  Desterro,  there  to  organise  a squadron  and 
embark  a body  of  troops  from  Santa  Catharina  and 
attempt  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Rio  Grande.  Early 
in  April  Saraiva  evacuated  Curityba,  leaving  only  the 
local  levies  recruited  after  the  capture  of  the  district  in 
January,  but  these  rapidly  melted  away,  and  by  the 
middle  of  April  there  was  no  insurgent  organisation  to 
check  the  advance  of  troops  from  Sao  Paulo. 

The  Federal  capital  being  now  in  no  further  danger, 
President  Peixoto  prepared  an  army  to  restore  the 
representatives  of  his  Administration  to  office  in  the 
southern  States.  A division  of  5000  troops  was  concen- 
trated at  Sao  Paulo,  but  the  march  to  Curityba  was 
long  and  tedious,  and  it  was  not  until  the  end  of  April 
that  the  army  approached  the  city,  where  no  resistance 
was  offered.  The  officials  nominated  by  the  insurgents 
fled  or  secreted  themselves  as  best  they  could,  and  in 
the  course  of  a few  days  the  Government  was  in  full 
possession  of  the  whole  State.  Thus  the  collapse  of  the 
rebel  cause  was  complete,  and  it  only  remained  to  assert 
the  Federal  authority  in  Santa  Catharina,  for  which 
purpose  a naval  force  was  organised. 

The  expedition  under  Admiral  de  Mello,  consisting 
of  the  cruiser  Republic, a and  three  armed  transports,  the 
latter  conveying  1400  men  commanded  by  Colonel 
Salgado,  left  Desterro  early  in  April,  and  reached  the 


1894]  ATTACK  ON  RIO  GRANDE  DO  SUL  285 


harbour  of  Rio  Grande  safely  on  April  10,  when  a 
demand  was  sent  to  the  authorities  for  the  surrender  of 
the  garrison.  The  city  was  threatened  with  immediate 
bombardment  unless  it  capitulated.  Only  a weak 
garrison  was  available  for  its  defence,  the  majority  of 
the  troops  having  been  sent  into  the  interior  of  the 
country  to  attack  scattered  groups  of  insurgents.  The 
commander,  General  Argollo,  asked  for  time  to  consider 
the  proposal  of  Admiral  de  Mello,  and  sent  for  rein- 
forcements. Meanwhile  the  foreign  consuls  met  and 
decided  to  represent  the  necessity  of  allowing  time  for 
the  foreign  residents  to  remove  to  a place  of  safety 
before  a bombardment  took  place.  Mello  granted  24 
hours  to  allow  non-combatants  to  evacuate  the  town, 
and  that  delay  proved  fatal,  permitting  reinforcements 
to  reach  the  city.  At  the  expiration  of  24  hours  the 
Republica  opened  fire  on  the  town,  and  the  rebel  troops 
were  landed  between  the  city  and  the  coast  - line. 
Trenches  had  been  constructed  in  this  zone,  and  were  so 
strongly  held,  that  in  the  severe  fighting  which  ensued 
the  casualties  amongst  the  invaders  numbered  150  killed 
and  wounded.  Repeated  attempts  were  made  to  carry 
the  trenches,  but  without  success,  and  after  the  struggle 
had  continued  for  eight  hours  Colonel  Salgado  decided 
to  retire.  This  brought  the  attack  on  Rio  Grande  to  an 
end,  although  the  Republica  still  continued  to  throw 
occasional  shells  into  the  town  with  little  effect.  A few 
buildings  were  damaged,  but  the  loss  of  life  was  trifling. 
Mello  was  now  convinced  of  the  abortive  nature  of  the 
expedition,  and  decided  to  make  no  further  attempt  of 
an  offensive  character  against  Rio  Grande.  After 
lingering  in  the  vicinity  for  a day  longer,  the  insurgent 
vessels  put  to  sea,  and  two  days  later  were  sighted  off 
Uruguay.  There  Colonel  Salgado  and  his  men  dis- 
embarked, and  were  immediately  disarmed  by  the 
Uruguayan  authorities.  Mello  took  the  ships  to  the 
River  Plate,  and  anchored  off  the  port  of  Ensenada, 
whence  he  sent  a despatch  stating  that  he  wished  to 
surrender  to  the  Argentine  Government.  The  crews 


286 


BRAZIL 


were  then  landed,  and  Argentine  officials  took  charge  of 
the  cruiser  and  transports,  which  were  at  once  put  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Brazilian  Government  and  in  due  course 
handed  over. 

This  fiasco  removed  another  difficulty  from  the  path 
of  President  Peixoto,  but  there  was  still  the  problem  of 
Desterro  to  be  solved.  The  Aquidaban  and  several 
small  vessels  were  at  that  port,  and  would  have  to  be 
reckoned  with,  so  in  April  the  flotilla  of  torpedo  boats 
was  despatched  to  the  coast  of  Santa  Catliarina  with 
instructions  to  find  the  Aquidaban  and  sink  her.  On 
the  morning  of  April  16,  in  a dense  fog,  the  Gustavo 
Sampaio  was  cruising  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Desterro 
when  she  was  discovered  by  the  look-out  on  the 
Aquidaban,  which  at  once  opened  fire  with  her  machine 
guns.  The  Gustavo  Sampaio  discharged  two  torpedoes 
and  steamed  away.  Later  on  in  the  day  the  German 
cruiser  Ancon  sighted  the  Aquidaban,  and  noticed  she 
was  partially  submerged.  On  closer  examination  it  was 
discovered  that  the  vessel  was  aground  and  abandoned, 
with  a gaping  hole  in  her  side.  Notification  was  sent 
to  Rio  de  Janeiro,  and  Peixoto  ordered  the  flotilla  to 
advance  and  take  possession  of  the  insurgent  head- 
quarters at  Desterro. 

No  resistance  was  offered.  Colonel  Moreira  Csesar 
was  appointed  military  commandant,  and  by  orders  of 
the  President  the  members  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment were  arrested  on  a charge  of  sedition.  A similar 
fate  overtook  all  naval  and  military  officers  and  civilians 
who  had  participated  directly  or  indirectly  in  the 
insurrection,  and  no  time  was  lost  in  bringing  the 
prisoners  before  a specially  appointed  military  tribunal. 
In  nearly  every  instance  death  sentences  were  passed, 
approved  by  Peixoto,  and  executed  forthwith.  Captain 
Lorena,  the  President  of  the  Provisional  Government, 
and  his  fellow-prisoners  were  shot.  It  was  a scene  of 
wholesale  slaughter  carried  out  under  direction  of  the 
military.  Rebellion  is  a serious  offence,  and  merits 
severe  punishment ; but  adequate  castigation  and  the 


1894]  COLLAPSE  OF  INSURRECTION 


287 


execution  of  the  rank  and  file  of  a body  of  men  who  had 
surrendered  after  a long  struggle  entered  into  from 
political  motives,  are  two  different  things.  Nor  was  this 
scene  of  revenge  confined  to  Desterro.  Throughout  the 
States  of  Santa  Catharina  and  Parana  persons  impli- 
cated in  the  insurrection  were  seized  and  shot  down. 
These  events  were  ample  justification  for  the  action  of 
the  Portuguese  senior  naval  officer  in  the  harbour  of  Rio 
for  the  protection  he  accorded  Admiral  da  Gama  and 
his  companions. 

Amongst  the  victims  were  three  French  citizens, 
Buette,  Etienne,  and  Muller,  engineers  practising  their 
calling  in  Desterro.  After  the  city  came  under  the 
domination  of  the  insurgents  they  were  employed  on 
work  connected  with  repairs  to  rebel  ships,  but  took  no 
part  in  the  warlike  operations.  Yet  they  were  charged 
with  aiding  and  abetting  the  revolt.  The  French 
Government  took  up  the  matter  energetically  when  the 
facts  were  made  plain,  and  after  a searching  investiga- 
tion demanded  a heavy  indemnity.  The  affair  was 
settled  by  the  payment  of  900,000  francs. 

Little  was  heard  of  Gumercindo  Saraiva  and  his  army 
of  4000  men,  and  no  wonder,  for  after  leaving  Curityba 
early  in  April  continuous  bad  weather  was  encountered, 
transport  animals  failed,  and  war  material  was  aban- 
doned. Food  too  became  scarce,  so  that  before  the 
frontier  of  Rio  Grande  was  reached  half  the  force  was 
on  foot.  Malarial  fever  then  decimated  the  ranks,  and 
worst  of  all  the  frontier  of  Rio  Grande  was  occupied  by 
Government  forces.  Constant  skirmishes  took  place, 
and  in  May,  Saraiva  was  shot  through  the  heart  by  a 
spent  bullet  while  returning  with  his  staff  from  a recon- 
naissance of  the  enemy’s  position.  His  loss  was  a death- 
blow to  the  cause  of  his  followers,  and  the  remnant  of 
these  formerly  victorious  insurgents  determined  to  march 
into  Argentine  territory  and  lay  down  their  arms.  One 
column  crossed  the  river  Uruguay  into  Misiones,  another 
made  for  a point  further  south  and  reached  the  Argen- 
tine province  of  Corrientes.  In  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  a 


288 


BRAZIL 


guerilla  warfare  was  maintained  by  scattered  groups, 
but  the  backbone  of  the  movement  was  broken. 

The  revolution  was  crushed  after  eight  months  of  a 
civil  war  in  which  thousands  of  lives  had  been  sacrificed, 
the  public  exchequer  loaded  with  additional  indebted- 
ness, and  social  and  economic  unity  thoroughly  dis- 
ordered. No  wonder  that  the  majority  of  educated 
Brazilians  did  not  believe  that  the  election  of  Dr 
Prudente  de  Moraes  Barros  would  be  verified  by  his 
accession  to  office,  and  looked  forward  to  a period  of 
military  despotism,  with  General  Peixoto  as  Dictator. 

Happily  these  gloomy  forebodings  were  not  fulfilled. 
On  November  15,  1894,  Peixoto  surrendered  the  presi- 
dential office,  anti  although  in  military  circles  mutterings 
of  discontent  were  heard,  no  outbreak  occurred.  With 
the  accession  to  power  of  Dr  Prudente  de  Moraes  Barros, 
the  personal  influence  of  Peixoto  as  a factor  in  Brazilian 
political  life  disappeared.  He  died  on  June  29,  1895. 

The  new  President  was  of  different  calibre  to  his 
predecessor.  Dr  Prudente  de  Moraes  Barros  belonged 
to  the  political  group  in  Sao  Paulo  which  had  led  the 
republican  propaganda  for  some  years  before  the  deposi- 
tion of  Dom  Pedro  II.,  was  a republican  from  conviction, 
and  had  been  the  presidential  candidate  of  the  civilian 
element  in  the  Constituent  Congress  which  elected 
General  Deodoro  da  Fonseca  in  February,  1891. 

It  was  supposed  that  the  choice  of  the  representative 
of  Sao  Paulo  was  the  consideration  offered  by  Peixoto 
for  that  State  not  joining  the  revolutionary  movement. 
The  Paulistas  were  opposed  to  the  Peixoto  Administra- 
tion, and  they  needed  small  encouragement  to  have 
thrown  in  their  lot  with  the  insurgent  cause  when 
Saraiva  was  at  Curityba.  When  animosity  against 
President  Peixoto  was  highest,  Dr  Moraes  was  an- 
nounced as  the  official  candidate  for  the  Presidency, 
and  the  selection  implied  his  success.  Peixoto  could 
unquestionably  have  declared  himself  Dictator  in  1894, 
and  that  he  did  not  is  to  his  credit.  Guilty  of  inhuman 
cruelties  to  his  fellow-countrymen,  holding  in  his  hands 


1895]  PRESIDENT  MORAES  ACCEDES 


289 


the  power  to  proclaim  himself  Supreme  Chief,  he  yet 
refrained. 

Dr  Moraes  was  a lawyer  by  profession,  and  opposed 
to  the  use  of  armed  force  in  connection  with  public 
administration.  His  career  had  shown  him  to  be 
possessed  of  an  impartial  judgment  in  political  affairs, 
and  that  he  had  no  vindictive  feelings  towards  his 
opponents.  Leading  a life  simple  and  free  from  any 
suspicion  of  ostentatious  display,  his  quiet  determination 
in  public  affairs  had  gained  him  the  respect  of  the  more 
intelligent  Brazilians,  and  his  integrity  and  straight- 
forwardness were  beyond  question.  A marked  alteration 
was  accordingly  apparent  at  once  in  the  methods  of 
public  administration.  Praetorian  government  dis- 
appeared, and  military  habits  no  longer  dominated 
national  politics.  Legal  rights  were  respected,  and 
protection  for  life  and  property  assured  under  the  new 
ruler.  Naturally  there  was  strong  opposition  in  some 
quarters,  and  the  supporters  of  the  policy  of  the  late 
administration  promoted  intrigues  and  fomented  diffi- 
culties. But  this  discontented  faction  was  powerless  in 
the  face  of  the  unanimous  approval  accorded  to  the 
altered  manner  of  conducting  the  national  affairs.  The 
people  had  tasted  freedom,  and  were  not  willing  to 
submit  again  to  dictatorial  tyranny. 

On  January  3,  1895,  the  President  further  consoli- 
dated his  position  by  granting  an  amnesty  to  all  enlisted 
men  of  the  army,  navy,  and  police  who  had  taken  part 
in  the  revolution.  The  commissioned  officers  were  not 
included,  but  it  was  made  to  cover  the  cadets  of  the 
naval  school.  This  action  and  other  measures  showed 
that  the  public  administration  was  to  be  carried  on  in 
strict  compliance  with  the  terms  of  the  Law  of  Consti- 
tution, and  satisfied  all  reasonable  expectations. 

About  the  same  time  (January  6)  the  dispute  between 
Brazil  and  Argentina  in  connection  with  the  Misiones 
territory  was  settled  in  favour  of  the  Brazilian  claims. 

The  discontent  in  the  army  at  the  firm  determination 
of  President  Moraes  to  eliminate  military  influence  from 

T 


•290 


BRAZIL 


national  politics  took  active  form  in  March.  General 
Jacques  had  been  appointed  Commandant  of  the  Military 
School,  and  was  most  unpopular  with  the  students. 
Instigated  by  outside  intrigues,  the  390  officers  and 
400  cadets  undergoing  instruction  decided  to  make  a 
demonstration  hostile  to  the  Moraes  Administration. 
So,  on  reaching  the  establishment  at  10  a.m.  on  the 
morning  of  March  15,  General  Jacques  was  saluted 
with  insulting  remarks  concerning  President  Moraes, 
and  cheers  for  Peixoto.  The  General  at  once  reported 
the  affair,  and  instructions  were  issued  to  close  the 
school.  The  officers  on  the  rolls  were  ordered  to  report 
for  duty,  and  the  400  cadets  were  dismissed.  A brigade 
of  troops  was  marched  to  the  school  at  3 p.m.,  and  the 
order  concerning  the  students  was  read  to  them  on 
parade,  the  cadets  being  informed  they  must  resume 
civilian  clothing  and  leave  the  premises.  Officers  and 
students  together  then  attempted  to  create  a riot  in  the 
streets.  Many  were  arrested,  and  32  officers  were  sent 
as  prisoners  to  the  forts  of  Santa  Cruz  and  Lage. 
Forty  more  were  confined  at  army  headquarters.  The 
attitude  of  President  Moraes  in  regard  to  this  outburst 
was  proof  that  he  was  free  from  any  leaning  towards 
militarism. 

Diplomatic  relations  were  now  resumed  with  Portugal 
through  the  good  offices  of  the  British  Government. 
The  Portuguese  Government  stated  that  the  protection 
granted  to  the  insurgents  had  not  been  intended  as  an 
affront  to  Brazil,  an  explanation  that  the  President 
accepted. 

Rio  Grande  do  Sul  was  now  again  in  a disturbed 
condition.  Aparicio  Saraiva,  a brother  of  Gumercindo 
Saraiva,  had  collected  the  remnant  of  the  insurgent 
forces  which  had  invaded  Parana  and  Santa  Catharina 
the  previous  year,  and  with  these  defied  the  authorities. 
The  movement  was  not  against  the  National  Govern- 
ment, but  undertaken  to  oust  Governor  Castilhos  from 
office.  Admiral  da  Gama  and  some  400  officers  and 
men  from  the  naval  revolt  were  in  Buenos  Aires,  and 


1895]  FRESH  OUTBREAK  IN  RIO  GRANDE  *291 


they  decided  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  the  Rio  Grande 
rebels.  Some  successes  were  obtained  at  first  over  the 
Government  troops,  but  the  country  was  tired  of  the 
constant  turmoil  in  the  south  ; yet,  though  the  removal 
of  Governor  Castilhos  would  doubtless  have  induced  the 
insurgents  to  lay  down  their  arms,  his  supporters  were 
numerous  and  influential,  and  could  easily  have  changed 
front  and  made  trouble  in  their  turn.  President  Moraes 
did  not  feel  justified  in  deposing  Castilhos — an  act,  in 
his  opinion,  savouring  of  the  methods  of  the  former 
regime — so  negotiations  with  the  rebel  leaders  were 
attempted  without  satisfactory  results.  At  this  juncture 
Admiral  da  Gama  took  the  field.  Up  to  the  time  of  his 
arrival  on  the  scene  the  conflict  had  been  carried  on 
with  the  greatest  barbarity,  quarter  on  neither  side 
being  expected.  An  eye-witness  described  what  occurred 
when  400  Government  troops  fell  into  the  hands  of  a 
strong  party  of  insurgents,  in  these  terms  : — 


The  prisoners  were  penned  into  a cattle  corral,  a guard  surround- 
ing the  spot  to  prevent  any  attempt  at  escape.  A man  would  ride 
into  the  yard  and  lasso  a prisoner  as  though  he  were  a bullock. 
Dragging  his  victim  a few  yards  away,  he  would  dismount,  draw  his 
long  knife,  and  deliberately  cut  the  prisoner’s  throat.  This  operation 
was  repeated  until  half  of  the  men  in  the  corral  were  killed.  The 
remainder  were  reserved  for  similar  treatment  the  following  day. 


This  is  horrible  enough,  but  on  June  24,  the  outbreak 
met  with  a reverse  that  destroyed  any  hopes  of  success 
its  partisans  may  have  entertained.  At  Campo  Osorio, 
Admiral  da  Gama  and  374  officers  and  men  were 
surrounded  by  Government  troops,  commanded  by 
Colonel  Joao  Francisco.  A desperate  struggle  ensued. 
Five  times  the  troops  assaulted  the  rebel  trenches,  and 
were  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Then,  the  ammunition 
of  the  insurgents  becoming  exhausted,  they  endeavoured 
to  break  through  the  enemy’s  lines,  and  some  succeeded. 
Many  others  were  killed  or  captured,  and  Admiral  da 
Gama  was  wounded  and  his  retreat  cut  off.  To  avoid 
being  taken  prisoner,  he  committed  suicide,  and  his  body 


•292 


BRAZIL 


was  found  some  days  later  horribly  mutilated.  The 
circumstances  of  his  death  decided  public  opinion 
that  this  warfare  in  Rio  Grande  must  be  ended,  and 
negotiations  were  again  opened  with  the  insurgent 
leaders,  a suspension  of  hostilities  being  declared 
meanwhile. 

It  is  difficult  to  understand  the  motive  of  Saldanha 
da  Gama  in  joining  the  revolutionary  movement  in  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul.  He  explained  his  action  to  his  friends 
by  stating  that  he  believed  Moraes  would  be  simply  a 
nominee  of  Peixoto,  and  that  when  he  understood  the 
policy  of  the  President  he  was  too  far  committed  to 
withdraw  from  the  movement  in  Rio  Grande.  Pie 
preferred  to  sacrifice  himself  rather  than  appear  to  act 
treacherously  towards  the  rebel  leaders. 

An  unexpected  excitement  arose  in  July,  when 
H.M.S.  Barracouta,  acting  under  instructions  from  Her 
Majesty’s  Government,  proceeded  to  Trinidade,  a 
deserted  island  lying  about  651  miles  to  the  eastward 
of  the  Brazilian  coast,  and  there  hoisted  the  British 
flag.  The  object  was  to  facilitate  the  laying  of  a direct 
cable  from  England  to  Argentina,  and  the  British 
claimed  that  the  island  had  been  occupied  in  1700,  and 
a British  colony  established  in  1781,  adding  that  the 
island  was  barren  and  possessed  little  fresh  water. 
The  Brazilian  Government  asserted  that  Portugal  had 
possession  in  1795,  and,  with  the  independence  of 
Brazil,  Trinidade  became  Brazilian.  Public  feeling  ran 
high,  and  anti-British  demonstrations  were  held  in  Rio 
and  elsewhere.  The  matter  was  carefully  investigated 
bv  the  British  Government,  and  the  claim  to  the  island 
withdrawn. 

Negotiations  for  the  pacification  of  Rio  Grande  do 
Sul  now  approached  a climax.  General  Innocencio 
Galvao  de  Queiros,  commanding  the  troops  in  Rio 
Grande,  represented  the  Federal  authority;  General 
Jose  da  Silva  Tavares  acted  on  behalf  of  the  insurgents. 
The  conditions  submitted  to  President  Moraes  were  : — 

1.  Unrestricted  enjoyment  of  the  rights  and  privi- 


1895] 


PEACE  IN  RIO  GRANDE 


293 


leges  appertaining  to  Brazilian  citizens  under  the 
Federal  Constitution. 

2.  The  political  reorganisation  of  the  State  of  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul. 

3.  The  right  to  claim  compensation  for  losses 
sustained. 

The  President  acceded  to  the  first  and  third  of  these 
conditions,  but  refused  the  second  on  the  ground  that  he 
had  no  power  to  act  under  the  Law  of  Constitution. 
General  Tavares,  in  reply,  stated  that  the  revision  of 
the  State  Constitution  demanded  by  the  insurgents  was 
not  expected  from  the  Executive,  but  that  Congress 
should  take  such  action  as  would  ensure  lasting  peace. 
On  August  23  a formal  agreement  of  peace  was  signed, 
the  second  condition  being  left  to  Congress,  whereupon 
the  President  immediately  ordered  a reduction  of  the 
army  in  the  south.  Arrangements  were  made  for  the 
insurgents  to  deliver  up  their  arms,  and  on  October  21, 
1895,  an  amnesty  was  sanctioned  for  all  offences  in 
connection  with  revolutionary  practices  previous  to 
August  23,  1895,  but  providing  that  officers  in  the 
army  and  navy  should  not  be  permitted  to  return  to 
duty  for  a period  of  two  years. 

The  remainder  of  1895  passed  without  sensational 
events.  President  Moraes  steadily  adhered  to  the  policy 
he  had  initiated  on  accession  to  office,  and  the  change  the 
new  regime  had  affected  in  a single  year  was  remark- 
able. Civil  rights  had  been  upheld.  Dictatorial  inter- 
ference by  the  Central  Government  in  local  affairs  had 
been  suppressed.  The  pacification  of  Rio  Grande  do 
Sul  had  been  achieved.  An  amnesty  had  been  granted 
to  the  participators  in  the  outbreaks  of  1893  and  1894. 

In  1896  some  excitement  was  caused  by  the  insist- 
ence of  Italy  that  claims  of  Italian  residents  for  damages 
to  property  and  persons  during  the  revolutionary  period 
of  1893-4  should  be  promptly  settled,  but  the  dispute 
was  arranged  by  the  payment  of  cash  indemnities  in 
certain  cases,  referring  others  to  arbitration.  The 
Legislature  took  up  the  question  of  fiscal  taxation, 


294 


BRAZIL 


tlie  Chamber  of  Deputies  being  decidedly  in  favour  of 
a heavy  protectionist  tariff.  Many  new  internal  taxes 
were  imposed,  and  the  scale  of  duties  on  imported 
merchant]  ise  augmented.  The  condition  of  the  national 
finances  caused  serious  apprehension,  for  the  effects  of 
the  disastrous  occurrences  from  1889  to  1894  were 
now  felt,  and  the  Government  was  unable  to  devise 
a remedy.  In  November,  1896,  President  Moraes,  on 
the  advice  of  his  physicians,  obtained  leave  from  Con- 
gress to  vacate,  temporarily,  his  office,  and  confided  his 
presidential  duties  to  Dr  Victorino  Pereira,  the  Vice- 
President,  retiring  to  the  country  to  rest. 


CHAPTER  XVII 


brazil  — continued 

Sudden  return  of  President  Moraes  to  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Plot  against 
the  President.  Story  of  Antonio  Maciel.  The  Canudos  Settle- 
ment. The  Jugungos  and  the  Bahia  Police.  Bahia  Government 
ask  help  against  Conselheiro.  Troops  sent  to  Canudos  and 
defeated  by  Jagungos.  Another  Expedition  to  Canudos  under 
Colonel  Moreira  Caesar.  Riots  in  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Murder  of 
Colonel  Gentil  de  Castro.  Strong  force  organised  against 
Canudos.  General  Oscar  in  charge  of  Military  Operations. 
Situation  of  Expedition  unsatisfactory.  Heavy  Casualties 
amongst  Troops.  Followers  of  Conselheiro  attack  Troops  under 
General  Oscar.  Situation  saved  by  General  Savaget.  Minister 
of  War  at  the  front.  Power  of  Religious  Fanaticism.  Failure  to 
storm  Canudos.  Siege  of  the  Stronghold.  Canudos  captured, 
October  3.  Atrocities  at  Canudos.  Withdrawal  of  Troops. 
Final  Report  of  Operations.  Accusations  of  Military  Clique  in 
Rio  against  Moraes.  Plot  to  Assassinate  President  Moraes. 
Murder  of  Minister  of  War.  Arrests  made.  Public  Opinion  and 
Attempt  upon  Life  of  President.  Presidential  Candidates. 
Campos  Salles  supported  by  President.  Dr  Campos  Salles  elected. 
Personality  of  President  - elect.  Critical  financial  situation. 
Mission  of  Campos  Salles  to  London.  Funding  Loan  Agree- 
ment. Campos  Salles  accedes.  Contrast  between  1894  and 
1898.  The  Amapa  Question.  Nabuco  represents  Brazil.  Policy 
of  President  Campos  Salles.  Brazilians  satisfied.  President  of 
Argentina  visits  Brazil.  Fiscal  Legislation.  Lack  of  strong 
Political  Parties.  Bubonic  Plague  in  Santos  and  Rio.  Economic 
Development  and  Political  Disturbances.  State  Governments. 
Illegitimate  Taxation.  Federal  Courts.  States  and  Railways. 
Distribution  of  Population.  Italians.  State-aided  Immigration. 
Sao  Paulo  and  the  Italian  Colony.  German  Settlements  in 
Brazil.  German  Colonists  during  Revolution.  Portuguese 
Immigrants.  Brazilian  national  character.  Positivist  Tend- 
encies. Public  Instruction.  Number  of  “ Illiterates.”  Apathy 


296 


BRAZIL 


concerning  Education.  Administration  of  Justice.  Condition  of 
Prisons.  Capital  of  Minas  Geraes.  Depreciation  of  Currency. 
Means  of  Communication.  Inadequate  Railway  System.  State 
Control  of  Railways.  Central  Railway  a Political  Machine.  Tele- 
graphs and  Cables.  Inefficiency  of  the  State  Lines.  Brazilian 
Waterways. 


President  Moraes  unexpectedly  returned  in  March, 
1897.  His  reason  for  doing  so  was  a plot  against 
liis  administration,  the  discontented  military  element 
having  taken  advantage  of  the  President’s  absence  to 
stir  up  seditious  feeling,  aided  by  certain  deputies, 
formerly  ardent  supporters  of  Peixoto.  Suspicion  fell 
on  the  Vice-President,  and  his  arrest  was  ordered.  A 
coup  detat  was  intended,  and  of  this  the  President  had 
been  warned,  but  his  prompt  action  disconcerted  his 
enemies  and  prevented  the  conspiracy  from  coming  to  a 
head. 

Another  cloud  now  appeared  on  the  horizon,  with 
momentous  results,  for  it  entailed  a war  in  the  interior 
of  Brazil  against  a force  that  had  never  been  known 
to  exist.  The  antecedents  are  curious. 

In  1861  a man  named  Antonio  Maciel  lived  in 
Pernambuco  with  his  mother.  He  possessed  fair 
education  and  moderate  fortune,  but  had  married 
against  his  mother’s  wishes.  Jealousy  sprang  up 
between  parent  and  wife.  Maciel’s  mind  was  poisoned 
by  his  mother’s  constant  insinuations  that  she  had  proof 
of  the  wife’s  infidelity.  She  told  her  son  to  secrete 
himself  in  the  bushes  at  the  foot  of  the  garden,  and  that 
shortly  after  nightfall  he  would  see  his  wife  meet  her 
lover.  To  the  wife  a similar  story  was  told,  and  in  the 
evening  the  mother  donned  male  costume  and  approached 
the  trysting-place  she  had  indicated  to  husband  and 
wife.  In  the  darkness  Maciel  saw,  as  he  thought,  his 
wife  and  her  lover,  and  fired  first  at  the  one  and  then  at 
the  other,  killing  both.  Overcome  by  remorse,  he 
apprised  the  authorities  of  his  crime,  and  was  con- 
demned to  a long  term  of  imprisonment,  but  at  the 
end  of  a year  was  pardoned.  He  then  determined  to 


1897] 


ANTONIO  CON SELHEIRO 


297 


devote  the  remainder  of  his  life  to  missionary  work  in 
the  interior  of  Brazil,  selecting  what  is  known  as  the 
sertao  for  his  field,  a district  inhabited  by  people 
descended  from  Indians  mingled  with  Portuguese  blood, 
who  have  little  in  common  with  the  Brazilian  of  to-day. 
Known  as  Jagungos,  they  live  on  the  products  of  the 
chase.  Although  provided  only  with  antiquated 
weapons,  every  man  is  armed,  and  their  wants  are 
few ; only  a little  Indian  corn  to  add  to  their  diet  of 
fish  and  game,  a small  supply  of  cloth  for  the  rough 
garments  they  wear,  and  a stock  of  powder  and  lead 
for  their  firearms.  It  was  to  these  savages  Maciel  set 
out,  and  in  the  course  of  thirty-five  years  he  came  to  be 
regarded  by  them  as  a prophet. 

Antonio  Conselheiro,  as  this  man  was  called  by  his 
followers,  preached  no  recognised  form  of  religion.  He 
merely  taught  the  Jagungos  that  there  was  a life  here- 
after they  could  attain  under  certain  conditions  of 
living  on  earth,  inculcating,  however,  many  fundamental 
principles  of  Christianity,  civilisation,  and  a belief  in  a 
Supreme  God.  From  time  to  time  chapels  were  built 
in  different  districts,  and  round  these  settlements  sprang 
up.  One  such  place  was  Canudos,  some  300  miles  from 
Bahia,  and  there  the  authorities  of  Bahia  thought  it 
necessary  to  nominate  a magistrate.  This  official 
became  involved  in  an  intrigue  with  a Jagungo  woman, 
and  becoming  afraid  of  remaining  at  Canudos  he  obtained 
an  appointment  in  a neighbouring  district,  taking  the 
girl  with  him.  Antonio  Conselheiro,  in  1896,  sent  out 
men  to  cut  wood  for  building  purposes,  and  these  people 
came  to  the  vicinity  where  the  former  Canudos 
magistrate  was.  Thinking  they  were  searching  for 
him,  he  sent  police  to  drive  them  from  the  district.  A 
fight  ensued,  and  the  police  were  worsted.  Bahia  was 
asked  for  assistance,  and  200  men  arrived,  but  proved 
unable  to  cope  with  the  Jagungos,  who,  believing  the 
Government  wished  to  turn  them  out  of  their  settle- 
ments, determined  to  resist. 

The  Governor  of  Bahia  then  appealed  to  the  Federal 


BRAZIL 


Government  for  aid,  and  an  expedition  under  command 
of  Major  Febronio  was  organised,  to  which  was  added  a 
number  of  police  from  Bahia.  In  January  the  march  to 
Canudos  began,  and  the  camp  of  Antonio  Conselheiro 
was  reached  at  the  end  of  the  month.  Ordered  to 
surrender,  the  Jagungos  refused,  and  Febronio  determined 
to  take  the  place  by  assault.  But  the  troops  were 
repulsed,  50  officers  and  men  killed  or  wounded,  and 
the  expedition  forced  to  retire  towards  Queimadas, 
suffering  severely  during  the  retreat.  Quantities  of 
arms  and  ammunition  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

The  Federal  Government  now  decided  to  send  a 
strong  force  against  Canudos,  and  a column  of  1500 
men  was  organised,  including  a battery  of  field  artillery, 
and  strengthened  by  400  armed  police.  The  command 
was  given  to  Colonel  Moreira  Caesar,  and  in  February 
1897  the  advance  began.  Queimadas,  180  miles  to  the 
north-east  of  Bahia,  was  the  base  of  operations,  and  for 
the  greater  part  of  the  distance  railroad  communication 
was  available.  Thence  the  country  was  rugged  and 
broken,  and  heavy  undergrowth  afforded  excellent  cover 
for  the  enemy.  Colonel  Moreira  Caesar,  however,  was 
confident  of  success.  Underestimating  the  strength  of 
the  enemy,  the  expedition  was  pushed  forward  rapidly, 
and  small  precautions  taken  to  avoid  surprise.  The 
inevitable  followed  ; on  March  2,  the  column  was  ambus- 
caded, the  troops  thrown  into  confusion,  and  Colonel 
Moreira  with  many  officers  and  men  killed.  Panic 
ensued ; the  guns  were  abandoned,  rifles  and  ammuni- 
tion thrown  away,  and  stores  of  all  kinds  left  lying  by 
the  roadside.  News  of  this  disaster  reached  the 
Government  three  days  later,  the  telegram  from  Bahia 
stating  that  fugitives  arriving  at  Queimadas  reported 
the  annihilation  of  the  expeditionary  force,  but  after 
three  or  four  days  further  particulars  showed  that  the 
loss  of  life  was  not  so  great  as  at  first  supposed. 
Stragglers  drifted  back,  and  when  the  final  muster  of 
the  survivors  was  made,  some  1100  men  were  present. 

Colonel  Moreira  Caesar  had  been  one  of  the  prominent 


1897]  EXPEDITIONS  TO  CANUDOS  299 

members  of  the  military  regime  under  Peixoto.  So  it 
was  now  asserted  by  his  former  followers  that  the 
Canudos  movement  was  the  outcome  of  monarchist 
intrigues,  and  that  the  fault  of  the  disaster  lay  with  the 
Administration  for  not  dealing  more  harshly  with  all 
persons  of  monarchist  tendencies.  Serious  rioting 
ensued  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Sao  Paulo.  The  offices 
of  the  newspapers  Apostolo,  Liberdade,  and  Gazeta  da 
Tarde  in  the  former  city,  and  that  of  0 Commercio  in 
the  latter,  were  sacked,  and  other  buildings  were  damaged, 
on  March  7.  Next  day  the  mob  again  assembled,  and 
Colonel  Gentil  de  Castro,  the  editor  of  the  Jornal  do 
Brazil , a newspaper  professing  monarchist  leanings,  was 
assassinated  at  the  Sao  Francisco  Xavier  station. 
Attempts  were  also  made  to  murder  the  Visconde  de 
Ouro  Preto  and  Senhor  Affonso  Celso,  but  a powerful 
police  force  brought  into  the  city  restrained  the  mob 
from  further  violence. 

A strong  army  corps  was  forthwith  organised,  for  it 
had  become  evident  that  another  repulse  would  bring 
serious  complications.  For  one  thing,  a victory  for 
Antonio  Conselheiro  would  draw  to  his  standard 
thousands  of  Jagungos  and  give  additional  incentive  to 
repeat  the  disgraceful  scenes  of  March  7 and  8 in  Rio. 
Orders  were  issued  for  the  regulars  at  all  stations  to 
concentrate  at  Bahia,  and  several  States  aided  by  sending 
local  regiments,  so  that  by  May  the  force  consisted  of 
10,500  troops.  General  Cantuaria  was  given  charge  of 
the  Bahia  military  district,  General  Arturo  Oscar 
directed  the  field  operations,  with  General  Savaget  as 
second  in  command.  Oscar  pushed  on  towards  Canudos 
in  June,  but  was  greatly  hampered  by  want  of  transport, 
and  had  much  difficulty  in  provisioning  the  troops. 
The  Jagunpos  gave  the  expedition  no  rest,  laying 
ambuscades  in  all  directions. 

As  Oscar  approached  Canudos  the  tactics  of  Antonio 
Conselheiro  became  bolder,  and  his  persistent  attacks 
had  already  cost  the  troops  1000  casualties.  The  men 
were  wearied  by  long  marches  over  barren  stretches  of 


300 


BRAZIL 


country,  and  were  poorly  supplied  with  provisions  and 
ammunition.  It  therefore  became  necessary  to  suspend 
the  advance,  and  Colonel  Madeiros  with  a strong  brigade 
was  detached,  to  convoy  the  wounded  to  Monte  Santo 
and  bring  back  supplies.  This  was  understood  by 
Conselheiro  to  mean  that  the  troops  were  afraid  to 
approach  nearer  to  Canudos,  so  the  Jaguncos  assembled 
in  force  and  surrounded  Oscar’s  camp,  which  was  located 
in  a position  commanded  by  abrupt  hills,  from  which 
a continuous  fire  was  maintained.  Soon  the  situation 
became  critical,  but  relief  was  afforded  by  Savaget  in 
command  of  a column  2000  men,  which  had  marched 
through  Sergipe  to  effect  a junction  with  General  Oscar 
near  Canudos.  At  the  beginning  of  July  he  arrived  at 
Cocorobo,  six  miles  to  the  north  of  Canudos,  and  fought 
a severe  action,  in  which  the  general  and  6 officers  were 
wounded,  the  casualties  amongst  the  rank  and  file 
exceeding  200  men.  In  spite  of  this  loss  General 
Savaget  continued  his  advance,  and  reached  Oscar  just 
when  matters  looked  most  gloomy.  There  the  com- 
bined forces  remained  on  the  defensive  awaiting  the 
return  of  Colonel  Madeiros  with  supplies. 

When  the  Government  understood  the  difficulties 
confronting  General  Oscar,  further  reinforcements  of 
3500  men  were  ordered  to  Bahia.  Additional  artillery 
was  also  sent  to  the  front,  and  heavy  siege  guns 
were  despatched  to  reduce  the  fortified  positions  in 
the  neighbourhood.  This  brought  the  total  number  of 
troops  employed  in  the  operations  up  to  14,000,  and  no 
more  could  be  furnished  without  calling  out  the  National 
Guard.  The  Minister  of  War,  General  Bittencourt, 
proceeded  to  Bahia  to  superintend  the  arrangements  for 
the  campaign.  Public  interest  was  centred  upon  the 
movements  of  the  troops.  No  attention  was  paid  to 
repeated  assertions  in  certain  quarters  that  the  main 
source  of  strength  for  the  Jaguncos  was  the  support 
they  obtained  from  monarchist  centres,  for  they  were 
false.  The  Jaguncos  were  religious  fanatics  with  a blind 
faith  in  the  personality  of  Conselheiro,  and  their  ability 


1897] 


CANUDOS  BESIEGED 


301 


to  resist  troops  lay  in  the  fact  that  every  inch  of  the 
country  was  familiar  to  them,  enabling  them  to  move 
quickly  from  one  position  to  another  whenever  the 
expedition  advanced.  Being  also  skilled  marksmen, 
they  made  the  best  use  of  the  ammunition  at  their 
disposal,  and  the  arms  and  other  war  materials  captured 
from  Colonel  Moreira  Caesar  and  other  expeditions  gave 
them  means  of  defence.  Their  successes  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  struggle  tended  to  convince  them  that 
they  were  in  the  right  in  a conflict  regarded  by  them  as 
an  attack  upon  their  religious  practices. 

While  waiting  for  the  reinforcements  and  supplies, 
General  Oscar  moved  to  a hill  two  miles  from  Canudos, 
known  as  Favella.  The  position  was  undesirable  owing 
to  scarcity  of  water,  but  it  was  possible  to  use  artillery 
fire  from  this  point  against  the  headquarters  of  the 
fanatics.  On  July  18  Oscar  attempted  to  storm 
Canudos,  and  the  troops  succeeded  in  capturing  a portion 
of  the  town,  but  were  ultimately  driven  back  with  the 
loss  of  800  killed  and  wounded.  Oscar  then  determined 
to  remain  entrenched  on  the  Favella  hill  until  the  arrival 
of  the  reinforcements  from  Bahia. 

A long  siege  now  ensued,  varied  by  attempts  to 
assault  the  outlying  portions  of  the  settlement  and  by 
sallies  of  the  fanatics  to  dislodge  their  enemies  from 
the  positions  from  time  to  time  captured.  During 
August  and  September  the  bombardment  continued, 
but  a stone  church  building  in  the  centre  of  the  town 
was  still  intact  at  the  commencement  of  October,  and 
this  formed  the  rallying  point  for  the  Jagunpos  when 
their  trenches  became  untenable  from  shell  fire.  General 
Oscar  had  intended  forcing  the  surrender  of  Canudos 
by  shutting  off  supplies,  and  becoming  impatient  at  the 
determined  resistance  offered,  decided  to  order  a general 
assault.  When  October  came  and  the  besieged  town 
showed  no  signs  of  capitulating,  the  troops  available  for 
the  attack  numbered  5500,  and  with  these  the  advance 
was  made  on  October  3.  A desperate  encounter  followed, 
but  the  defence  was  unable  to  resist  superior  force,  and 


302 


BRAZIL 


finally  succumbed.  The  church  was  only  carried  after 
a fierce  fight,  in  which  the  remnant  of  the  fanatics  shel- 
tered by  its  stone  walls  were  killed.  Terrible  scenes 
ensued.  All  discipline  was  lost ; many  of  the  houses 
and  huts  in  which  women  and  children  had  taken  refuge 
were  set  on  fire,  the  occupants  perishing  in  the  flames 
or  deliberately  shot  down  when  endeavouring  to  escape, 
no  mercy  being  shown.  How  many  were  killed  is  not 
known,  but  the  bodies  of  450  fighting  men  were  counted. 
A few  prisoners,  however,  were  saved  from  the  general 
massacre,  and  brought,  some  to  Bahia,  some  to  Rio,  but 
they  refused  to  speak  of  their  life  at  Canudos.  A body, 
reported  to  be  that  of  Antonio  Conselheiro,  was  found 
buried  under  the  church.  It  was  asserted  he  had  been 
killed  several  days  before  the  final  battle. 

With  the  fall  of  Canudos  the  war  ended,  although 
bands  of  Jagunpos  were  still  reported  in  different  districts, 
and  information  reached  General  Oscar  that  they  were 
concentrating  in  force  at  Caypam.  At  the  approach  of 
troops,  however,  they  dispersed,  and  nothing  more  serious 
than  the  interchange  of  a few  shots  occurred,  so  at  the 
end  of  October  the  evacuation  of  the  district  was  ordered. 
The  total  losses  in  this  campaign  were  placed  at  from 
5000  to  6000  officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded. 

Just  when  the  situation  of  the  troops  in  the  Canudos 
campaign  was  causing  President  Moraes  keenest  anxiety, 
his  political  enemies  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  were  endeavour- 
ing to  throw  discredit  upon  the  Administration.  The 
military,  or  jacobino,  element  persistently  asserted  that 
the  cause  of  the  non-success  of  General  Oscar  at  the 
beginning  of  the  campaign  was  due  entirely  to  the 
President  refusing  adequate  supplies.  Rioting  incited 
by  these  malcontents  occurred  in  the  streets  of  Rio  on 
the  publication  of  any  unfavourable  news,  and  in  Con- 
gress attempts  were  made  by  Deputy  Francisco  Glycerio 
and  others  of  the  former  Peixoto  clique  to  embarrass  the 
action  of  the  President.  In  spite  of  these  intrigues, 
President  Moraes  fulfilled  his  duties  with  a dignity 
and  quiet  determination  worthy  of  all  praise. 


1897]  MINISTER  OF  WAR  ASSASSINATED  303 

The  Minister  of  War  remained  in  Bahia  to  super- 
intend the  withdrawal  of  the  troops.  Necessary  details 
being  settled,  General  Bittencourt  returned  to  Rio  to 
make  his  final  report  to  the  President.  A week  later 
a tragedy  occurred.  The  jacobinos,  unable  to  create 
serious  embarrassments  for  the  Administration  during 
the  Canudos  campaign,  determined  on  other  means  to 
attain  their  ends.  Intimidation  of  prominent  officials 
was  attempted  by  anonymous  letters,  in  which  the 
assassination  of  public  men  was  hinted  at.  No  notice 
being  taken  of  these  communications,  the  desperadoes 
plunged  into  crime. 

On  November  4,  1897,  President  Moraes,  accom- 
panied by  the  Minister  of  War  and  his  staff,  boarded  the 
steamer  Espirito- Santo  to  welcome  General  Ruy  Barbosa, 
and  at  1 p.m.  landed  at  the  arsenal.  A cry  was  heard 
of  “ Long  live  the  memory  of  Floriano  Peixoto,”  followed 
by  shouts  of  “Long  live  the  President  of  the  Republic,” 
and  amid  the  noise  a soldier  forced  his  way  through  the 
crowd  and  levelled  a pistol  at  the  President,  but  it  missed 
fire.  A blow  from  Colonel  Mendes  de  Moraes  felled 
the  would-be  assassin,  and  cries  of  “Kill  him,  kill  him,” 
rose  from  various  quarters.  The  President  and  Minister 
of  War  protested  against  the  slaughter  of  the  criminal. 
A struggle  ensued  in  the  attempt  to  disarm  the  soldier, 
who  in  the  course  of  it  drew  a long  knife  and  wounded 
Colonel  Mendes  de  Moraes,  and  slightly  injured  other 
bystanders.  The  Minister  of  War  rushed  forward  to 
assist,  and  was  stabbed  thrice,  dying  in  a few  moments. 
Examination  of  the  pistol  with  which  the  murder  of  the 
President  was  attempted,  showed  the  weapon  to  be 
loaded  in  both  barrels  with  Comblain  bullets.  The 
assassin  was  Marcellino  Bispo  de  Mello,  a native  of 
Alagoas,  and  a private  in  the  33rd  Regiment. 

Investigation  revealed  a political  conspiracy  to 
assassinate  Dr  Moraes,  in  which  certain  of  the  jacobinos 
were  directly  concerned.  Martial  law  was  proclaimed  in 
the  Federal  District  to  allow  the  police  authorities  a 
free  hand  in  making  arrests  of  suspected  persons. 


304 


BRAZIL 


Various  people  whose  complicity  in  the  conspiracy  was 
undoubted  were  arrested,  amongst  whom  was  Major 
Diocletiano  Martyr,  accused  of  being  the  intermediary 
who  arranged  the  crime.  The  details  as  they  were 
unfolded  showed  the  conspiracy  to  be  widespread. 

For  the  first  time  since  the  institution  of  republican 
government  in  Brazil,  public  opinion  made  itself  heard, 
and  most  emphatically  condemned  the  attempt  upon 
the  life  of  Dr  Moraes,  and  it  made  him  secure  of  approval 
for  his  methods  of  administration.  He  felt  he  would 
be  supported  in  measures  he  took  to  prevent  any  relapse 
to  a praetorian  system.  Therefore  no  clemency  was 
extended  to  the  jacobinos,  who  were  made  to  comprehend 
that  any  further  attempt  to  disturb  public  order  would 
be  punished  with  a heavy  hand.  Thus  cowed,  they  made 
no  effort  at  further  opposition. 

The  presidential  election  for  the  period  beginning 
November  15,  1898,  now  began  to  occupy  public  atten- 
tion, and  the  candidates  supported  by  President  Moraes 
and  his  administration  were  Dr  Manuel  Campos  Salles 
for  President,  and  Dr  Rosa  E.  Silva  for  Vice-President ; 
the  former  had  been  Governor  of  the  State  of  Sao  Paulo, 
the  latter  was  a prominent  citizen  from  Pernambuco.  The 
opposition  candidates  were  Senhor  Lauro  Sodre,  formerly 
Governor  of  Para,  and  now  a member  of  the  Senate, 
and  Dr  Fernando  Lobo  from  Minas  Geraes,  and  also 
a Senator.  Senhor  Sodre  was  a young  army  officer  of 
considerable  ability.  Dr  Lobo  could  lay  claim  to  small 
qualification  for  office,  for  he  had  been  one  of  the  most 
subservient  members  of  the  Peixoto  Administration. 

Official  influence  is  the  main  factor  in  all  South 
American  electoral  contests,  and  the  fact  that  Dr  Campos 
Salles  could  count  upon  President  Moraes  and  his  friends 
was  ample  assurance  that  he  would  be  elected.  The 
President  had  chosen  wisely,  for  Dr  Campos  Salles  was 
experienced  in  public  affairs  and  commanded  the  respect 
of  the  Conservatives.  Under  his  rule  Sao  Paulo  had 
prospered.  Moreover,  that  State  was  the  centre  of 
sounder  republican  ideas  than  any  other  section  of 


1898]  ELECTION  OF  CAMPOS  SALLES  305 


Brazil.  Campos  Salles  had  sufficient  private  fortune 
to  place  him  above  the  suspicion  of  seeking  office  for 
personal  gain. 

The  opposition  candidate  represented  the  methods 
of  Fonseca  and  Peixoto,  favouring  intervention  in  the 
local  affairs  of  states  and  the  use  of  armed  force  to 
carry  out  any  policy  the  Administration  desired.  His 
supporters  comprised  professional  politicians,  needy 
adventurers,  ambitious  military  officers — -all  the  elements 
which  had  caused  disaster  and  suffering  during  the 
previous  decade.  President  Moraes  realised  the  danger 
to  Brazil  if  the  opposition  should  win,  and  determined 
that  official  influence  should  be  used  unsparingly  in 
favour  of  Campos  Salles. 

The  election  was  held  on  March  1,  and  Dr  Campos 
Salles  was  declared  successful.  Some  clamour  was 
raised  by  the  opposition  on  the  ground  of  unfair  treat- 
ment by  the  Government,  but  the  majority  of  intelligent 
people  listened  with  scant  courtesy  to  this  tirade  of 
abuse  directed  against  the  President  and  the  supporters 
of  his  policy.  They  did  well,  for  in  the  President-elect 
the  Brazilians  had  a man  whose  political  ideas  were  in 
accordance  with  the  changes  wrought  by  President 
Moraes  in  the  administration  of  public  affairs.  Dr 
Campos  Salles  was  a republican  from  conviction,  who 
for  several  years  before  the  deposition  of  Dom  Pedro  II. 
had  assisted  in  spreading  the  republican  propaganda. 
An  able  lawyer,  whose  ambition  was  to  govern  Brazil 
by  the  terms  of  the  Law  of  Constitution,  he  accepted 
the  responsibilities  laid  upon  him  with  the  full  deter- 
mination to  do  his  duty  at  all  costs. 

In  the  early  part  of  1898,  the  full  effects  of  the 
financial  mismanagement,  coincident  with  the  disturbed 
internal  conditions  of  the  country  since  1889,  became 
apparent,  and  rendered  some  arrangement  necessary 
with  the  national  creditors  to  save  Brazil  from  default. 
The  President  determined  to  open  negotiations  with  the 
holders  of  the  foreign  debt,  and  to  Dr  Campos  Salles 
was  confided  the  mission  of  visiting  Europe  and  devising 

u 


BRAZIL 


306 

a plan  to  give  time  for  the  Brazilian  Treasury  to  recover. 
The  President-elect  was  courteously  received  in  London 
and  elsewhere,  and  after  hearing  his  explanations,  an 
agreement  was  made  with  the  Rothschilds.  Cash 
interest  payments  were  suspended  for  three  years  dating 
from  July  1,  1898,  and  bonds  issued  instead  for  the 
amount  due.  Sinking  funds  were  suspended  for  twenty 
years,  but  Campos  Salles  promised  he  would  use  every 
effort  to  ensure  a resumption  of  interest  payments  in 
cash  in  1901.  The  success  of  this  mission  added  greatly 
to  the  prestige  of  the  President-elect. 

President  Moraes  completed  his  tenure  of  office  on 
November  15,  1898,  and  the  contrast  between  the 
conditions  at  this  date  and  when  he  acceded  to  power 
calls  for  more  than  passing  mention.  At  the  earlier 
date  the  dictatorial  regime  of  Peixoto  held  Brazil  in  an 
iron  grip,  and  personal  liberty  was  at  the  mercy  of  a 
tyrannical  Administration.  In  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  the 
revolutionary  movement  threatened  again  to  plunge  the 
Republic  into  civil  war;  intervention  in  the  local  affairs  of 
the  different  States  had  bred  discontent ; corruption  was 
rampant  in  the  administrative  departments ; the  Press 
was  muzzled,  and  the  right  of  public  meeting  denied. 
Everywhere  public  welfare  was  absolutely  uncared  for 
by  the  Government.  In  the  teeth  of  determined 
opposition  President  Moraes  established  order  in  public 
affairs.  Undeterred  by  threats  of  assassination,  he  broke 
the  vicious  influence  of  the  jacobinos,  and  pacified  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul.  His  administration  was  conducted 
according  to  the  Law  of  Constitution,  civilians’  rights 
respected,  and  the  Press  allowed  full  license.  The 
heavy  expenditure  in  connection  with  the  warlike 
operations  against  Canudos  had  prevented  the  rehabili- 
tation of  financial  credit,  but  the  arrangements  made  by 
Dr  Campos  Salles  were  such  as  to  give  ample  oppor- 
tunity for  recovering  stability. 

A misunderstanding  had  arisen  in  1897,  on  the 
frontier  of  French  Guiana,  threatening  to  bring  compli- 
cations between  the  two  Governments.  To  avoid  these, 


1899] 


FISCAL  LEGISLATION 


307 


President  Campos  Salles  determined  to  submit  the 
question  to  the  arbitration  of  the  President  of  the 
Swiss  Republic,  and  in  April,  1899,  Dr  Nabuco  went 
to  Switzerland  as  the  Brazilian  representative.  His 
nomination  was  of  some  significance,  for  he  belonged  to 
the  Monarchist  Party,  and  had  refused  hitherto  to  serve 
the  Republican  Administration  in  any  capacity,  and  his 
acceptance  of  this  mission  meant  that  the  hostile  feeling 
which  monarchists  professed  towards  the  republic  had 
disappeared.  The  policy  of  the  new  Administration  was 
a continuation  of  the  methods  established  by  President 
Moraes,  and  that  fact  alone  caused  most  Brazilians  to 
rally  round  the  Government. 

The  President  of  Argentina  visited  Brazil  in  August, 
1899,  the  first  instance  of  the  President  of  one  South 
American  Republic  officially  visiting  another.  President 
Roca  was  escorted  by  a squadron  of  the  Argentine  navy, 
and  accompanied  by  a large  staff  of  naval  and  military 
officers,  and  his  visit  was  not  without  some  result,  for 
a commercial  treaty  between  Argentina  and  Brazil  was 
signed,  and  shortly  afterwards  ratified. 

The  first  and  second  sessions  of  Congress  in  the 
presidential  term  of  Campos  Salles  were  occupied  with 
fiscal  legislation.  The  chief  source  of  revenue  to  the 
Central  Government  came  from  duties  levied  on  imported 
merchandise,  and  this  was  found  to  be  inadequate  to 
cover  the  national  expenditure.  To  provide  additional 
income  the  amount  of  the  duties  was  increased,  and 
new  taxes  were  levied  by  excise  stamps  for  all  articles 
in  everyday  use.  Personal  motives  occasionally  led  to 
opposition  to  the  fiscal  Acts  that  Congress  was  asked 
to  sanction,  but  the  subject  was  not  made  a party  ques- 
tion, and  members  of  Congress  were  opportunists  for 
the  most  part.  Nominally  the  political  parties  were  the 
republicanos,  the  federalistas  7'epublicanos,  and  an  insig- 
nificant group  professing  to  hold  monarchist  opinions. 
No  strong  party  organisation  existed,  the  members  of  the 
different  political  sections  voting  from  personal  motives 
without  regard  to  party  principles.  An  alleged  mon- 


308 


BKAZII 


arcliist  conspiracy  was  discovered  in  February,  1900, 
and  a number  of  arrests  made ; but  the  majority  of  the 
prisoners  were  released  after  a detention  of  a few  days, 
and  the  movement  met  with  no  general  support  from 
the  people.  The  appearance  of  bubonic  plague  in 
Santos  in  1899,  and  Rio  in  1900,  marked  the  end  of  the 
century.  In  Santos  the  epidemic  has  been  stamped  out 
by  the  energetic  action  of  the  authorities,  but  in  Rio  the 
disease  threatens  to  become  endemic. 

The  last  two  years  of  the  Campos  Salles  Administra- 
tion calls  for  no  special  mention  except  in  connection 
with  the  dispute  over  the  Acre  territory  with  Bolivia. 
The  negotiations  were  conducted  on  both  sides  in  a 
moderate  spirit,  with  the  result  that  the  way  was 
paved  for  a treaty  between  the  two  Governments,  which 
was  signed  in  1903,  and  subsequently  ratified.  On 
November  15,  1902,  Dr  Rodriguez  Alves,  a former 
Governor  of  Sao  Paulo,  was  installed  as  Chief  Magistrate, 
and  his  term  does  not  expire  until  1907.  Since  his 
accession  to  power  there  has  been  no  disturbance  of 
public  order. 

Economic  development  in  Brazil  has  been  retarded 
by  disturbed  politics,  and  the  unwieldy  character  of  the 
existing  constitution  of  the  Republic.  The  semi-inde- 
pendence of  the  States  in  the  Federal  Union  renders 
local  administration  cumbrous  and  costly,  and  opens  the 
door  to  corruption.  In  rich  and  populous  districts  the 
necessary  revenue  may  be  forthcoming  to  sustain  a host 
of  local  officials,  but  in  the  poorer  sections  the  demands 
made  on  the  inhabitants  are  so  exhausting  that  develop- 
ment is  strangled.  Promising  industries  are  crushed 
by  taxation,  often  of  an  illegal  character.  Nominally 
there  is  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  Federal  Courts  against 
unjust  impositions  of  State  authorities,  but  this  right 
avails  little,  on  account  of  the  heavy  cost  entailed. 
Another  disadvantage  arising  from  the  sovereign  rights 
of  the  States  is  the  hindrance  they  cause  to  railway 
extension,  as  from  each  State  through  which  a new 
railway  passes  a concession  must  be  obtained.  Onerous 


1903] 


ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS 


309 


conditions  are  accordingly  imposed  by  the  local  govern- 
ments at  the  time  of  construction,  and  also  after  the 
railway  is  open  to  the  public  service.  The  Law  of 
Constitution  of  1891  was  on  lines  that  presupposed 
the  population  of  Brazil  to  equal  that  of  the  United 
States  in  capacity  for  self-government,  and  in  the  recog- 
nition of  sparsely  populated  districts  as  semi-independent 
communities  an  even  greater  license  is  conceded  than 
in  North  America.  The  broad  result  is  that  local 
administrations  abuse  their  power,  partly  through  ignor- 
ance, partly  from  corrupt  motives. 

Brazil,  with  an  area  of  3,209,878  square  miles,  was 
credited  by  the  census  of  1890  with  a total  population 
of  14,333,015;  classified  as  whites,  5,000,000;  half-breeds 
of  Indian,  negro,  and  white  blood,  6,500,000;  negroes, 
3,500,000;  and  Indians,  400,000.  The  whites  comprise 
descendants  of  Portuguese  settlers,  foreign  immigrants 
from  Portugal,  Italy,  and  Germany,  and  a few  South 
Americans  from  other  parts  of  the  Continent ; but  the 
colour  line  between  them  and  negroes  is  only  slightly 
observed,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  slavery  existed  until 
1887.  This  enumeration  gave  a density  of  4 \ persons 
to  the  square  mile.  From  Italy  has  come  a steady  flow 
of  immigration  for  the  past  fifteen  years.  Previous  to 
the  abolition  of  slavery,  the  coffee  planters  and  other 
employers  of  labour  realised  that  immigration  must  be 
encouraged  to  maintain  the  great  producing  industries, 
and  the  result  of  representations  to  the  Imperial 
authorities  was  a propaganda  in  Europe  to  show  the 
advantages  that  Brazil  offered  for  settlement.  After  the 
suppression  of  slavery  in  1887,  the  demand  for  labourers 
rapidly  increased,  and  both  Italians  and  Portuguese 
came  in  large  numbers.  Good  wages  were  earned,  and 
the  heavily  taxed  lower  classes  of  Italy  were  eager  to 
travel  to  the  coffee  plantations  of  Sao  Paulo  and  Minas 
Geraes.  The  Portuguese  prefer  the  cities,  and  gain  a 
living  as  servants,  in  shops,  as  boatmen,  and  at  small 
trades.  State-aided  immigration  was  undertaken  by 
the  Government,  and  Italians  principally  benefited  by 


310 


BRAZIL 


the  free  passages  to  Brazil,  so  that  by  1802,  the  number 
in  the  country  was  reported  by  the  Italian  legation  to 
exceed  1,000,000.  Sao  Paulo  is  the  centre  for  these 
immigrants  from  Italy.  Its  climate  appeals  to  them,  and 
the  work  on  the  plantations  and  in  the  city  of  Sao  Paulo  is 
congenial.  How  far  these  incomers  will  become  assimi- 
lated to  the  Brazilian  it  is  not  yet  possible  to  say.  At 
present  the  majority  remit  their  wages  to  their  homes 
in  Italy,  do  not  intermarry  largely  with  Brazilians,  and 
seldom  form  binding  social  ties.  Occasionally,  however, 
they  buy  plots  of  land,  and  when  this  occurs  they  become 
lixed  residents  of  Brazil,  but  such  instances  are  not 
common.  Hitherto  these  people  from  Southern  Europe 
have  been  inclined  rather  to  adopt  Brazilian  habits  and 
customs  than  to  impart  those  of  their  own  nationality. 

The  German  settlements  in  the  South  are  destined 
in  the  future  to  play  an  important  part  in  Brazilian 
national  life.  At  Porto  Alegre  and  elsewhere  in  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul  the  number  of  German  residents  exceeds 
50,000,  and  Santa  Catharina  and  Parana  contain  other 
colonies  all  sufficiently  strong  to  retain  their  own 
manners  and  traditions,  and  hitherto  showing  small 
inclination  anywhere  to  lose  them.  In  the  revolutionary 
period,  1893-5,  these  settlers  held  aloof  from  the  struggle 
and  maintained  the  strictest  neutrality,  indifferent  to 
local  politics.  So  strong  was  this  apathy  that  in  the 
larger  settlements  armed  guards  were  established  by  the 
residents  for  their  protection  against  marauding  attempts 
on  their  property,  and  neither  Government  nor  revolu- 
tionary troops  were  permitted  to  enter  their  territory. 
The  Germans  are  agriculturists  and  cattle  owners,  and 
although  few  among  them  have  acquired  wealth,  they 
are  in  a fairly  prosperous  condition.  Those  German 
colonies,  however,  formed  by  Dom  Pedro  II.  at  Petro- 
polis,  Novo  Friburgo,  and  the  neighbouring  districts 
occupy  land  which  is  poor  and  broken  by  rugged 
mountain  ranges.  So  they  only  make  a bare  living  by 
growing  vegetables,  fruit,  and  minor  agricultural  products, 
and  their  progress  is  slow  compared  to  that  of  their 


1903]  THE  FOREIGN  RESIDENTS  311 

fellow-countrymen  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  and  Santa 
Catharina. 

The  Portuguese  become  so  intimately  associated 
with  Brazilians  that  they  practically  lose  their  national 
identity.  They  intermarry  with  their  Brazilian 

neighbours,  and  express  no  intention  of  returning  to 
Europe  except  for  an  occasional  visit.  Brazil  becomes 
their  home,  and  their  children  grow  up  with  Brazilian 
ideas  of  life.  The  number  of  Portuguese  who  take  out 
naturalisation  papers  is  not  great,  but  this  is  due  largely 
to  apathy.  Moreover,  by  retaining  their  nationality 
they  are  exempt  from  military  service,  and  this  is  a 
privilege  they  do  not  care  to  forego,  unless  for  direct 
compensation  in  the  shape  of  official  employment.  As 
a rule,  they  are  thrifty  and  industrious,  and  form  a 
valuable  addition  to  the  labour  supply. 

The  dominant  note  of  Brazilian  character  comes 
from  the  Latin  stock  which  colonised  this  section  of 
South  America.  Circumstances  have  modified  ideas  in 
many  respects,  but  not  to  an  extent  to  alter  the  funda- 
mental principles  underlying  and  governing  action  and 
line  of  thought.  Into  the  solemn  mystery  surrounding 
the  traditions  of  the  Catholic  Church  have  crept  super- 
stitious African  legends,  and  intermingled  with  these 
are  traces  of  Indian  folk-lore.  The  product  is  an 
imagination  ready  to  receive  without  reasoning  passing 
impressions,  and  in  this  soil  the  doctrines  of  Auguste 
Comte  took  ready  root  on  minds  lacking  in  mental 
balance,  producing  many  evil  fruits.  Mental  perspective 
is  contracted,  and  lacks  energy  to  strike  boldly  in  new 
directions.  Examples  of  the  want  of  sound  judgment 
on  the  part  of  prominent  Brazilians  in  recent  years  are 
found  in  Admiral  de  Mello  during  the  revolt  of  1893-4, 
in  General  Saraiva’s  hesitation  to  march  northwards 
after  his  victories  in  Parana,  and  in  Admiral  Saldanha 
da  Gama’s  resolve  to  join  the  hopeless  cause  of  the  Rio 
Grande  insurgents.  General  da  F onseca  when  President, 
General  Floriano  Peixoto,  President  Moraes,  when  he 
allowed  the  country  to  be  dragged  into  a war  entailing 


312 


BRAZIL 


the  sacrifice  of  the  lives  of  5000  soldiers  without  an 
effort  to  negotiate  with  Antonio  Conselheiro,  all  behaved 
like  men  swayed  by  fixed  ideas.  Added  to  the  tropical 
conditions  in  which  life  is  passed,  there  is  an  absence  of 
mental  training  in  youth,  and  a social  system  extremely 
lax  in  regard  to  a moral  standard  of  everyday  conduct. 
Belief  in  spiritualism  is  widespread,  and  at  times 
inspires  these  naturally  timid  people  with  a fanaticism 
that  carries  them  blindly  into  peril.  The  average 
Brazilian  is  not  lacking  in  intelligence,  but  his  mind 
fails  to  stand  the  strain  of  mastering  intricate  detail. 
This  want  of  thoroughness  has  caused  Brazil  many 
troubles  in  the  past,  and  is  a standing  menace  to  the 
country  in  the  future. 

To  permit  satisfactory  evolution  of  Brazilian 
character,  education  must  be  placed  on  a different 
footing  from  the  present.  Under  the  existing  system 
it  is  not  compulsory.  Public  instruction,  in  so  far  as 
the  primary  and  secondary  stages  are  concerned,  is  under 
the  control  of  State  and  Municipal  authorities,  over 
whom  the  Federal  Administration  exercises  no  jurisdic- 
tion. Higher  education,  however,  is  in  the  hands  of 
the  Central  Government.  The  establishments  comprise 
two  medical  schools,  four  law  colleges,  four  military 
schools,  one  naval  school,  and  a school  of  mines.  The 
number  of  students  is  3000.  In  addition,  there  is  the 
Lyceum  of  Arts  and  Trades,  with  accommodation  for 
2500  pupils,  and  five  special  schools  with  facilities  for 
600  students  ; while  the  Gymnasio  National,  a secondary 
school,  is  maintained  by  the  Federal  Government,  the 
States  having  the  right  to  found  similar  institutions. 
All  other  secondary  schools  are  private  concerns,  and 
the  result  of  this  inadequate  system  was  clearly  demon- 
strated in  1889,  when  the  official  returns  showed  7500 
public  and  private  primary  schools,  attended  by  300,000 
pupils.  The  following  year  no  fewer  than  8,365,997 
persons  were  returned  as  “illiterates,”  unable  to  read  or 
write,  and  since  then  the  number  of  illiterate  persons 
has  increased.  The  States  render  no  educational  returns 


1903] 


DEFECTIVE  EDUCATION 


313 


to  the  Federal  Government,  and  only  Sao  Paulo  makes 
a real  effort  to  grapple  with  this  grave  problem.  Even 
there  the  measures  taken  are  efficient  only  in  cities  and 
towns. 

The  importance  of  this  vital  national  question  does 
not  appeal  to  the  majority  of  Brazilians.  They  were 
indifferent  to  it  under  the  Empire,  and  remain  so  at  the 
beginning  of  the  new  century.  Dom  Pedro  took 
personal  interest  in  higher  education,  and  was  never 
slow  to  suggest  improvements,  but  gave  little  heed  to 
primary  education,  and  the  Republican  authorities  have 
allowed  matters  to  run  on  in  the  old  grooves,  attempt- 
ing no  reforms.  Indeed,  the  standard  of  higher  educa- 
tion has  suffered  from  the  withdrawal  of  the  protection 
afforded  it  by  Dom  Pedro ; and  where  other  nations 
have  increased  facilities  for  educating  the  lower  classes, 
Brazil  has  retrograded.  No  wonder  if  in  these  circum- 
stances  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  are  wrapped  in 
ignorant  superstition  and  make  no  advance  towards  a 
higher  civilisation. 

With  a defective  educational  system,  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  administration  of  justice  is  on  an 
unsatisfactory  footing.  Brazilian  law  is  codified,  and 
in  the  hands  of  impartial  and  intelligent  judges  would 
meet  the  necessities  of  criminal  and  civil  proceedings ; 
but  corruption  is  common  in  all  branches  of  the  judiciary, 
and  the  cost  of  litigation  is  abnormally  high.  Delay  of 
decisions  in  contested  cases  is  one  serious  complaint; 
and  an  investigation  into  the  condition  of  the  principal 
prison  in  1899  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  (Casa  da  Detencao) 
brought  to  light  grave  abuses.  Prisoners  arrested  for 
trivial  offences  were  kept  in  confinement  without  trial 
for  months,  in  some  instances  for  years.  Ten  and 
twelve  prisoners  were  crowded  into  cells  intended  to 
hold  four  only,  with  the  excuse  of  “no  room.”  No 
discrimination  of  class  was  made,  hardened  criminals 
and  offenders  for  petty  illegal  acts  being  herded  together. 
The  prison  was  condemned  as  insanitary  by  medical 
experts,  and  no  discipline  was  observed.  The  scandal 


314 


BRAZIL 


led  to  some  reforms  in  this  particular  establishment, 
but  nothing  was  done  towards  reform  all  round. 

An  extraordinary  experiment  deserves  mention  in 
the  State  of  Minas  Geraes.  Ouro  Preto  was  formerly 
its  capital,  but  in  1891  it  was  decided  to  remove  head- 
quarters to  a more  suitable  spot,  and  the  authorities 
selected  the  valley  of  Bello  Horizonte,  fifty  miles  distant 
from  Ouro  Preto.  There  was  no  sign  of  town  or 
hamlet  in  the  vicinity,  nor  was  it  the  centre  of  any  agri- 
cultural or  pastoral  industry  ; but  it  was  picturesque,  and 
struck  the  fancy  of  the  officials,  and  straightway  they 
ordered  a city  to  be  built — no  light  task,  as  the  State 
Government  soon  found  to  its  cost.  A railway  was 
laid  to  give  access  to  the  valley,  but  as  the  plans  of 
construction  were  presented  the  heavy  expenditure  for 
the  project  became  obvious.  Government  buildings, 
theatres,  municipal  offices,  barracks,  and  other  costly 
edifices  were  required,  and  all  planned  on  royal  scale. 
A water-supply  too  was  provided,  the  streets  paved, 
electric  light  and  gas  installed,  and  other  expenses 
incurred,  so  that  votes  were  always  exceeded,  and  in 
1892  the  works  were  perforce  suspended  for  want  of 
money.  All  revenue  was  then  mortgaged  to  permit  a 
resumption  of  construction,  and  at  length  the  new  city 
was  sufficiently  advanced  for  habitation.  Bello 
Horizonte  was  declared  the  local  capital  in  1898,  and 
the  Government  transferred  to  it. 

Economic  progress  in  Brazil  has  also  been  retarded 
by  the  financial  difficulties  of  the  Federal  Government, 
resulting  from  reckless  expenditure  of  the  national 
resources  to  combat  revolutionary  outbreaks  and  satisfy 
the  demands  of  the  corrupt  circle  surrounding  the 
Presidency  from  1890  to  1894.  The  depreciation  of 
the  currency  was  due  to  the  mismanagement  of  the 
national  finances,  and  occasioned  the  ruin  of  many 
families  who  possessed  fixed  sources  of  income.  It 
also  disturbed  the  wages  of  employes  and  labourers, 
reducing  their  earnings.  To  the  effects  of  the  reduced 
purchasing  power  of  the  inconvertible  notes  was  added 


1903]  MEANS  OF  COMMUNICATION  315 

the  burthen  of  heavy  extra  taxation,  rendered  necessary 
by  obligations  contracted  in  former  Administrations. 
These  two  influences  caused  widespread  poverty  amongst 
all  classes  of  Brazilians,  and  paralysed  economic  progress. 
Reaction  has  begun,  but  has  not  yet  overcome  the  results 
of  former  errors. 

Lack  of  more  adequate  means  of  communication  is 
still  felt  severely  in  Brazil,  for  the  length  of  railways 
open  for  public  service  is  only  9000  miles,  in  a country 
only  300,000  square  miles  smaller  than  the  United 
States.  This  limited  facility  for  transport  hinders 
development  in  every  direction,  and  it  is  due  to  it  that 
the  interior  of  the  country  remains  unknown  and  un- 
populated. Under  the  Empire  many  railway  lines  were 
projected,  and  a few  constructed,  partly  by  the  Central 
Government,  partly  by  private  enterprise,  under  a 
guarantee  of  a fixed  rate  of  interest  on  capital  invested. 
Under  the  Republic  the  nation  attempted  to  obtain 
control  of  all  railways  where  the  right  of  purchase  was 
recognised  by  the  concession,  and  it  was  then  the  system, 
now  controlled  by  the  Leopoldina  Company,  passed 
under  State  management.  The  Government  found 
itself  unable  successfully  to  direct  the  system  acquired, 
and  to  earn  the  money  due  for  interest  on  the  bonds 
issued  to  cover  the  cost  of  purchase.  As  national 
property,  the  railway  became  the  refuge  of  political 
adventurers,  all  posts  being  given  away  as  recompense 
for  political  service  rendered  or  promised.  No  wonder 
that  the  line  could  not  earn  enough  to  cover  the  cost  of 
maintenance ; so  after  long  litigation  the  bondholders 
regained  possession  of  their  property,  and  enough  was 
earned  within  two  years  to  pay  a dividend.  The  Central 
Railway  of  Brazil,  which  has  remained  under  State 
control,  is  a parallel  instance,  doing  duty  as  a pension 
list.  Political  patronage  secures  a favourable  response 
to  applications  for  employment.  No  attempt  is  made 
to  manage  the  State  railways  on  a commercial  basis,  and 
the  result  of  the  ignorance  of  the  employes  is  that  a 
valuable  property  is  a constant  drag  upon  the  national 


316 


BRAZIL 


resources  instead  of  yielding  a handsome  profit.  The 
desire  for  State  control  of  the  railway  systems  is  found 
everywhere  in  South  America,  and  for  a reason  not 
fill'  to  seek.  A railway  organisation  becomes  one  of 
the  most  powerful  of  political  machines  when  run  under 
State  auspices,  the  employes  being  dependent  for  their 
positions  on  the  Government.  Presidential  or  congres- 
sional elections  are  more  easily  manipulated  when  the 
railway  employe  is  aware  that  the  penalty  for  voting 
against  the  Government  is  instant  dismissal.  The  result 
in  Brazil  has  been  that  the  projected  lines  to  unite 
Pernambuco  and  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  with  Rio  de  Janeiro 
have  not  been  built,  the  loss  through  systematic  State 
mismanagement  having  left  each  Administration  with 
only  limited  funds  for  railway  extension.  Notwith- 
standing, the  Government  has  remained  unwilling  to 
give  private  companies  the  right  to  provide  means  of 
transport. 

The  same  jealously  of  private  enterprise  has  been 
shown  in  connection  with  the  telegraph  service.  If  the 
Government  could  maintain  efficient  telegraphic  com- 
munication there  could  be  no  cause  for  complaint,  but 
this  is  not  the  case.  In  Brazil  it  is  no  infrequent  occur- 
rence to  send  a message  to  some  interior  town  the  day 
before  starting  for  it,  and  to  arrive  twenty-four  hours 
ahead  of  the  despatch  announcing  the  intended  visit. 
So  far,  however,  as  submarine  cables  are  concerned,  the 
Government  has  no  control  beyond  a heavy  tax  levied 
on  the  receipts  of  the  companies,  and  the  right  to  place 
irritating  restrictions  on  the  despatch  of  all  messages, 
even  ordinary  business  communications,  in  time  of 
revolutionary  trouble.  Recently  the  cable  service  has 
been  extended,  additional  communication  to  Europe 
being  established  via  Senegal  in  1801,  thus  giving  an 
alternate  route.  Cable  connection  between  Pard  and 
Manaos,  a distance  of  nearly  1000  miles,  has  also 
been  recently  opened. 

In  the  matter  of  utilising  her  waterways  to  best 
advantage,  Brazil  is  behind  the  times.  The  Amazon, 


1903] 


BRAZILIAN  WATERWAYS 


317 


with  its  many  tributaries,  presents  possibilities  for 
development  that  have  been  allowed  to  rest  in  the 
background.  Steamer  accommodation  provided  by  ships 
flying  the  Brazilian  flag  is  totally  inadequate  to  fulfil 
the  wants  of  the  travelling  public,  or  to  carry  freight 
at  reasonable  rates. 


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BRAZIL 


CHAPTER  XVIII 


CHILE 

Law  of  Constitution.  Congress.  The  Executive.  State  Council. 
Administration  from  1833  to  1861.  President  Bulnes.  President 
Montt.  President  Perez.  Liberal  Administration.  Disaster  to 
the  Compania  Church.  War  with  Spain.  Blockade  of  Valparaiso. 
Capture  of  the  Covadonga.  Bombardment  of  Valparaiso.  Truce 
with  Spain.  Foundation  of  Chilian  Navy.  Re-election  of 
President  Perez.  Economic  Progress.  President  Errazuriz. 
Construction  of  the  Cochrane  and  Blanco  Encalada.  Railway 
Expansion.  Presidential  Candidates  in  1876.  President  Pinto. 
Relations  between  Chile  and  Bolivia.  Economic  Crisis.  Incon- 
vertible Currency.  Relations  with  Argentina.  Quarrel  with 
Bolivia  and  Peru.  President  Pinto  and  the  War.  Presidential 
Contest  in  1881.  Election  of  Santa  Maria.  Congressional 
Elections.  Treaty  with  Peru.  Truce  with  Bolivia.  Laws  of 
Civil  Registry  and  Marriage.  The  Cemeteries.  Presidential 
Election  in  1886.  Origin  of  Parliamentary  System.  Early  Days 
of  Balmaceda.  Special  Mission  to  Lima.  His  connection  with 
Politics.  Election  to  Congress.  Programme  of  Reformistas. 
Opposition  to  new  Political  Movement.  Balmaceda  appointed 
Minister  in  Buenos  Aires.  Balmaceda  in  1882  and  1885. 
Election  to  Presidency.  Political  Intrigues.  Ministry  of  Senor 
Carlos  Antuiiez.  Zanartu  Cabinet.  Congressional  Elections, 
1888.  Resignation  of  Zanartu.  Ministerial  changes.  Policy  con- 
cerning Church  and  Education.  Conflict  between  Congress  and 
Executive.  Political  situation  in  1890.  Dictatorial  attitude  of 
Balmaceda.  Senor  Vicuna  proclaimed  Presidential  Candidate. 
Resolutions  by  Mass  Meetings.  The  Comision  Conservadora. 
Pretext  for  Revolt. 

The  Law  of  Constitution,  under  which  Chile  is 
governed,  was  voted  by  the  representatives  of  the  nation 
in  1833.  Although  it  has  been  modified  from  time  to 

321 


322 


CHILE 


time  to  meet  the  developments  of  unforeseen  conditions, 
in  its  fundamental  points  it  remains  unaltered  to  the 
present  day.  Administration  is  vested  in  three  branches 
— legislative,  executive,  and  judicial.  The  legislative 
power  consists  of  the  National  Congress,  comprising 
two  assemblies,  a Senate  and  a Chamber  of  Deputies. 
The  Senate  is  composed  of  members  returned  by  the 
direct  vote  of  the  provinces  for  a term  of  six  years  in 
the  proportion  of  one  Senator  for  every  three  Deputies, 
and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  comprises  representatives 
chosen  by  the  direct  vote  of  the  departments  for  a term 
of  three  years,  in  ratio  of  one  Deputy  for  every  30,000 
inhabitants  or  any  fraction  of  not  less  than  15,000. 
Voting  is  cumulative,  and  the  franchise  is  extended  to 
all  male  citizens  of  twenty -one  years  of  age  who  can 
read  and  write.  The  Executive  is  exercised  by  the 
President  of  the  Republic,  elected  by  indirect  vote  for  a 
term  of  five  years,  in  the  month  of  June  preceding  the 
expiration  of  the  existing  presidency,  the  new  chief 
magistrate  taking  his  seat  on  the  18th  of  the  September 
following.  By  an  amendment  to  the  Law  of  Constitu- 
tion enacted  in  1871,  the  President  is  not  eligible  for 
re-election  at  the  close  of  his  term.  In  questions  of 
legislation  the  President  has  a modified  right  of  veto, 
but  a Bill  returned  to  the  Chambers  may  become  law  if 
a majority  of  the  members  are  present  and  a two-thirds 
vote  is  obtained.  The  President  is  assisted  by  a 
Cabinet  of  seven  ministers,  namely  : — Interior  ; Foreign 
Affairs;  Worship  and  Colonisation  ; Justice  and  Public 
Instruction  ; Finance  ; War  and  Marine  ; and  Industry 
and  Public  Works  ; and  the  Constitution  further  provides 
for  a Council  of  State,  consisting  of  the  ministers  holding 
portfolios ; five  members  nominated  by  the  President, 
these  to  include  a member  of  the  Courts  of  Justice,  an 
ecclesiastical  dignitary,  a general  or  admiral,  an  official 
of  the  Finance  Department,  one  ex-minister  or  diplo- 
matic agent ; and  six  members  chosen  by  Congress.  It 
is  the  Council’s  duty  to  advise  the  President,  and  to  act 
as  a check  upon  him  in  his  conduct  of  public  affairs. 


Chilian  Celebrities. 


[Face  page  322. 


1841] 


AUTOCRATIC  PRESIDENTS 


323 


From  the  date  of  the  Law  of  Constitution  in  1833 
until  1861,  the  Government  was  conducted  more  on  the 
lines  of  a Dictatorship  than  a Republic.  It  was  not 
designed  in  the  Constitution  that  this  dictatorial 
tendency  should  exist ; but  in  view  of  subversive  out- 
breaks and  the  turbulent  character  of  the  Chilians, 
extraordinary  powers  were  granted  from  time  to  time, 
principally  for  the  suppression  of  revolutionary  risings, 
and  these  included  power  to  suspend  constitutional 
guarantees,  muzzle  the  expression  of  public  opinion, 
imprison  and  exile  political  suspects  without  trial,  and, 
in  fact,  to  adopt  any  arbitrary  measures  that  the  Presi- 
dent might  consider  necessary  to  secure  his  absolute 
authority.  Moreover,  the  Law  of  Constitution  permitted 
the  re-election  of  a President  at  the  expiration  of  his 
term  of  office ; and  this  led  to  the  custom  of  extend- 
ing the  presidential  period  to  ten  years,  a prolongation 
conducive  to  autocracy.  It  was  in  such  circumstances 
that  President  Prieto  developed  dictatorial  tendencies 
previous  to  1841,  and  the  system  showed  no  signs  of 
modification  under  President  Bulnes  between  1841  and 
1851.  Bulnes  was  a soldier,  and  had  small  idea  of  an  v 
method  of  administration  other  than  by  force,  and  all 
attempts  to  dispute  his  authority  were  crushed  with  an 
iron  hand. 

In  1851  Manuel  Montt  acceded  to  the  Presidency, 
and  public  opinion  confidently  looked  for  a decisive 
change  in  the  Government.  Montt  was  a civilian  and  a 
judge  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  he  was  regarded  as  a 
man  who  would  insist  upon  personal  liberties  being 
respected  ; but  unfortunately  a revolution  occurred  a few 
days  after  his  installation,  and  stern  measures  were 
adopted  to  quell  the  outbreak.  It  may  have  been  that 
this  subversive  movement  exerted  a direct  influence  on 
his  attitude,  or  possibly  the  fact  that  ex-President 
Bulnes  was  a power  in  the  presidential  councils  was 
responsible  for  his  policy  ; but  in  any  case  the  first  five 
years  of  Montt’s  Administration  showed  no  improvement 
in  the  position  of  the  Chilians  in  regard  to  civil  and  politi- 


324 


CHILE 


cal  liberty.  It  was  not  that  Montt  was  an  unjust  man 
in  the  literal  sense  of  the  word,  indeed  his  reputation  is 
rather  the  reverse  ; but  he  was  impatient  of  the  slightest 
wish  to  dispute  his  authority  ; and  although  during  the 
latter  five  years  of  his  Administration,  from  1856  to 
1861,  a greater  degree  of  political  and  civil  liberty  was 
apparent,  this  satisfactory  development  was  crushed  by 
the  occurrence  of  another  insurrection  in  the  provinces 
Atacama,  Aconcagua,  Talca,  and  Concepcion,  an  out- 
break which  led  to  a renewal  of  the  drastic  measures  of 
former  years,  persons  suspected  of  sedition  being  treated 
with  the  utmost  severity.  Practically  from  1833  to 
1861  the  administration  of  the  country  was  so  conducted 
that  the  people  were  excluded  from  all  participation  in 
the  affairs  of  the  Government,  and  it  was  due  to  this 
fact  that  the  country  was  so  constantly  a prey  to  those 
internal  dissensions  which  served  to  hinder  ali  economic 
progress  and  substantial  prosperity. 

The  year  1861  marked  a new  departure.  Senor 
Jose  Joaquin  Perez  succeeded  President  Montt  on 
September  18,  and  it  was  evident  from  the  commence- 
ment of  his  Administration  that  Chile  was  about  to 
enjoy  a freedom  unknown  in  the  past.  One  of  Perez’s 
first  acts  was  to  annul  the  decrees  of  expatriation 
against  persons  who  had  taken  part  in  former  subversive 
plots,  and  throughout  the  country  this  action  was 
warmly  applauded  by  all  classes.  Nor  were  the  Chilians 
disappointed  in  their  expectations,  for  the  expression  of 
public  opinion  was  encouraged  and  criticism  of  the 
Government  invited  instead  of  being  treated  as  a crime, 
as  had  previously  been  the  case.  The  extraordinary 
powers  conceded  heretofore  to  dictatorial  presidents 
were  neither  asked  for  nor  required  by  Perez,  and  the 
people  recognised  that  the  oppression  which  had  weighed 
so  heavily  upon  them  since  their  independence  from 
Spanish  dominion  was  eliminated.  They  felt  that  it 
was  no  longer  an  autocratic  President,  but  the  Legisla- 
ture which  ruled  Chile. 

Two  years  after  Perez  assumed  office  a disaster,  of  a 


1863]  BURNING  OF  COMPANIA  CHURCH  325 


magnitude  unparalleled  in  Chile,  occurred  in  Santiago. 
On  the  afternoon  of  December  8,  1863,  a special  service 
was  celebrated  in  the  old  Jesuit  church  of  the  Compania. 
The  interior  of  the  building  was  decorated  profusely 
with  tapestries  and  hangings  in  honour  of  the  occasion, 
and  a profusion  of  candles  and  lamps  gave  added  effect 
to  the  scene.  Towards  the  end  of  the  afternoon  the 
church  was  densely  crowded  with  women  and  children 
of  all  ranks  of  society,  when  suddenly  a current  of  air 
caught  one  of  the  high  hanging  draperies,  bringing  it  in 
contact  with  a lighted  candle,  and  in  a moment  this  dry 
curtain  was  on  fire.  The  wind  caused  the  flames  to 
spread  with  utmost  rapidity,  and  before  any  effort  could 
be  made  to  check  the  fire  the  interior  of  the  church 
was  a mass  of  burning  hangings  and  woodwork.  A 
panic  ensued,  and  all  present  made  a rush  for  the  doors, 
with  the  result  that  every  exit  became  jammed.  Women 
and  children  were  trodden  under  foot  and  crushed  to 
death  in  their  frantic  attempts  to  escape.  Soon  the 
doorways  were  heaped  with  the  bodies  of  the  dead  and 
dying,  impeding  all  outlets.  In  the  interior  of  the  church 
the  conflagration  raged,  and  the  shrieks  rose  high  above 
the  din  of  falling  timbers  as  beam  after  beam  crashed 
down  on  the  heads  of  the  unfortunate  victims.  The 
news  of  the  catastrophe  spread  quickly  through  the 
city,  and  fathers,  husbands,  and  brothers  rushed  to  the 
scene,  only  to  find  themselves  helpless  to  give  aid  to 
their  dear  ones  imprisoned  within  the  walls.  For  two 
hours  the  flames  continued,  in  spite  of  all  efforts  to 
subdue  them ; but  at  9 a.m.  the  roof  of  the  burning 
building  fell  in,  and  the  holocaust  was  complete.  Two 
thousand  persons  had  perished  in  the  course  of  less 
than  a couple  of  hours,  and  there  were  few  families  in 
Santiago  but  mourned  some  relative  amongst  the  dead. 
A few  bodies  were  recognised  and  claimed  by  relations 
for  burial,  but  the  vast  majority  were  past  all  identifica- 
tion, and  the  corpses  were  carted  to  the  cemetery  and 
there  interred  in  a common  tomb,  over  which  a 
monument  was  subsequently  raised. 


326 


CHTLE 


While  the  Perez  Administration  proved  so  satis- 
factory for  the  Chilians  at  home,  it  was  during  this  term 
that  the  country  became  involved  in  war  with  Spain. 
The  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Spain  and  Peru 
in  connection  with  the  quarrel  concerning  the  Chincha 
Islands,  caused  the  President  and  his  advisers  to  imagine 
that  if  Spain  was  victorious  the  Spaniards  would 
endeavour  to  regain  control  over  South  America. 
Regarding  the  Spanish  attitude  as  distinctly  menacing, 
the  Chilian  Government  proposed  that,  in  company 
with  Bolivia  and  Ecuador,  common  cause  should  be 
made  with  Peru,  and  in  1S65  these  four  South  American 
republics  were  united  against  such  power  as  Spain 
could  send  across  the  seas  to  attack  them.  The  policy 
of  Perez  was  supported  enthusiastically  in  Chile ; but 
the  country  was  unprepared  for  war,  and  towards  the 
latter  part  of  1865  a Spanish  squadron  blockaded 
Valparaiso,  and  considerable  damage  was  inflicted  upon 
the  trade  of  that  city.  Chile  possessed  only  one  warship, 
the  Esmeralda , commanded  by  Captain  Juan  Williams 
Rebolledo,  and  in  January  1865,  when  this  vessel  was 
cruising  to  the  north  of  Valparaiso,  she  captured  the 
Spanish  gunboat  Covadonga  and  took  her  prize  into 
Coquimbo.  The  incident  so  affected  Admiral  Pareja, 
the  Spanish  officer  in  charge  of  the  blockading  squadron, 
that  he  committed  suicide  on  his  flagship,  the  Villa  de 
Madrid.  Irritated  by  the  loss  of  the  Covadonga  and 
the  death  of  Admiral  Pareja,  the  Spanish  Government 
sent  out  the  Nmnancia,  commanded  by  Captain  Mendez 
Nunez,  and  other  vessels,  with  orders  to  exact  reparation 
from  the  Chilians.  Captain  Nunez  assumed  charge  of 
the  Spanish  fleet  on  his  arrival  in  Chilian  waters,  and 
decided  that  the  shortest  way  to  accomplish  his  mission 
was  to  bombard  Valparaiso,  although  that  seaport  was 
undefended.  On  March  31,  1866,  at  9.30  a.m.,  four 
Spanish  ships  fired  on  the  town  for  three  hours,  aiming 
chiefly  at  the  custom-house  sheds,  because  they  were 
filled  with  valuable  merchandise.  When  it  was  seen 
that  these  buildings  were  in  flames  and  other  sections  of 


1866] 


VALPARAISO  BOMBARDED 


327 


the  city  were  burning,  the  order  to  cease  firing  was 
given,  but  not  until  damage  to  the  estimated  value  of 
$14,000,000  was  done. 

After  the  bombardment,  the  Spanish  squadron  left 
Valparaiso  and  did  not  attempt  to  interfere  again  with 
the  Chilians.  In  1867  a truce  was  made  between  Spain 
and  Chile,  and  twelve  years  later,  in  1879,  a treaty  of 
peace  and  friendship  was  signed  ; but  even  after  a lapse 
of  thirty-five  years  bitter  feelings  exist  against  the 
Spaniards  on  account  of  that  bombardment.  One  re- 
sult of  the  war  was  that  the  Chilians  realised  that  they 
required  ships  and  forts  to  defend  themselves  in  future 
against  foreign  aggression,  and  the  foundation  of  the 
navy,  which  rendered  such  signal  service  a few  years 
later,  was  laid  by  President  Perez,  when  he  gave  instruc- 
tions for  building  the  O'  Higgins  and  Chacabuco.  Forts 
were  also  constructed  for  the  defence  of  Valparaiso,  and 
attention  generally  was  given  to  the  question  of  military 
and  naval  armaments. 

As  had  been  the  custom,  Perez  was  re-elected  for 
another  presidential  term.  In  some  quarters  exception 
was  taken  to  this  proceeding,  on  the  grounds  that  the 
time  had  arrived  to  amend  the  Law  of  Constitution 
where  it  concerned  the  re-election  of  the  President. 
Perez  informed  the  deputations  waiting  upon  him  in 
connection  with  this  matter  that  they  had  full  liberty  of 
public  meeting  to  discuss  such  questions,  and  a free 
Press  to  circulate  their  ideas.  This  attitude  conciliated 
the  Opposition  in  regard  to  his  election,  but  on  the  other 
hand  a legitimate  agitation  was  set  afoot  to  amend  the 
law  in  respect  to  the  eligibility  of  Presidents  for  a 
second  consecutive  term,  and  in  1871  a reform  was 
sanctioned  which  precluded  re-election  at  the  expiry  of 
the  regular  presidential  period.  As  this  was  the  first 
time  any  such  action  had  been  attempted  by  consti- 
tutional means,  it  marks  an  important  step  in  Chilian 
political  evolution. 

In  addition  to  the  satisfactory  political  conditions 
established  by  Perez,  his  Administration  was  noteworthy 


328 


CHILE 


for  economic  progress.  Railways  projected  by  President 
Montt  were  finished  and  opened  for  traffic,  and  tele- 
graphic communication  was  established  throughout  the 
central  districts.  Public  instruction  was  encouraged, 
and  schools  and  colleges  founded  by  aid  of  the  Govern- 
ment at  the  initiative  of  Senor  Barros  Arana,  who 
represented  to  Congress  the  necessity  of  a more  ex- 
tended system  of  education.  Measures  were  taken  to 
provide  more  adequate  means  of  protection  for  life  and 
property  than  had  formerly  existed,  and  the  efforts 
in  this  direction  encouraged  the  establishment  of  new 
industries  in  country  districts  where  settlers  had  pre- 
viously been  afraid  to  reside  because  of  the  prevailing 
lawlessness. 

Senor  Federico  Errazuriz  was  elected  to  succeed 
Perez,  and  he  assumed  office  on  September  18,  1871. 
The  new  Chief  Magistrate  entered  upon  his  presidential 
duties  under  different  auspices  to  his  predecessors.  In 
the  Senate  he  had  supported  the  amendment  of  the 
Constitution  regarding  the  ineligibility  of  Presidents  for 
re-election,  and  through  his  influence  Congress  had 
approved  the  measure.  During  his  Administration  the 
country  enjoyed  exceptional  peace  at  home  and  abroad, 
and  the  political  and  civil  liberties  permitted  under 
Perez  were  strictly  respected  and  in  some  directions 
amplified.  In  one  matter  Errazuriz  rendered  his  country 
a service  which  proved  of  the  utmost  importance  at  a 
slightly  later  stage.  In  1871  Peru  possessed  a navy 
consisting  of  several  modern  ships,  and  this  gave  her  a 
preponderating  power  in  her  dealings  with  her  neigh- 
bours. Errazuriz  recognised  that  Chile  was  at  a serious 
disadvantage,  in  consequence  of  her  naval  inferiority, 
whenever  complications  arose  with  the  Peruvian 
Government,  and  to  remedy  this  drawback  the 
President  in  1873  ordered  the  construction  in  British 
shipyards  of  the  ironclads  Almirante  Cochrane , Almirante 
Blanco  Encalada,  and  the  gunboat  Magallanes.  It  was 
not  until  after  his  death  that  occasion  occurred  to  use 
these  men-of-war  for  fighting  purposes,  but  when  the 


329 


1873]  THE  CHILIAN  NAVY 

time  did  come  his  forethought  proved  the  salvation  of 
the  Chilians. 

The  policy  of  Errazuriz  in  regard  to  public  works 
was  especially  beneficial.  Loans  were  raised  in  London, 
and  the  money  expended  on  extending  the  railway 
system ; the  Valparaiso  custom-house  sheds  destroyed 
during  the  Spanish  bombardment  were  remodelled  and 
rebuilt ; the  Congress  Hall  in  Santiago  was  erected,  and 
other  improvements  initiated.  Perhaps  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  features  of  his  Administration  was  that 
throughout  his  term  the  same  Minister  of  the  Interior 
held  office  without  interruption,  and  this  permitted  a 
continuity  of  policy  that  would  have  been  impossible  if 
he  had  been  hampered  by  ministerial  changes. 

The  question  of  the  presidential  election  created 
general  interest  in  1876.  In  former  years  the  retiring 
President  had  nominated  his  successor;  but  in  1876 
more  liberal  ideas  prevailed,  and  the  Chilians  were 
called  upon  to  decide  for  themselves  to  whom  the 
Government  should  be  entrusted.  The  candidates  were 
Senor  Ben  jamen  Vicuna  Mackenna,  Senor  Miguel  Luis 
Amunategui,  and  Senor  Anibal  Pinto.  Mackenna  was 
a distinguished  historian,  and  had  served  his  country  in 
different  public  capacities ; Amunategui  had  been  a 
professor  of  the  National  Institute,  was  a well-known 
writer,  and  had  been  Minister  of  the  Interior  under 
Perez  ; while  Pinto  was  a man  of  good  standing,  who 
had  held  the  portfolio  of  War  under  Errazuriz.  Senor 
Pinto  won,  and  on  September  18,  1876,  assumed  his 
presidential  responsibilities. 

Pinto  was  destined  to  rule  Chile  during  a most 
critical  period.  The  war  with  Bolivia  and  Peru  altered 
the  course  of  Chilian  history  and  character,  and 
President  Pinto  was  far  from  the  generally  accepted 
ideal  type  of  citizen  to  face  the  great  national  crisis 
which  confronted  the  country  in  1879.  He  was  quiet, 
inclined  to  studious  habits,  and  a strong  advocate  for 
peaceful  measures,  and  yet  he  showed  no  sign  of 
faltering  when  his  Administration  became  involved  in  a 


330 


CHILE 


bloody  and  costly  war  in  which  the  lives  of  20,000  of 
his  countrymen  were  sacrificed. 

Before  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  while  relations  with 
Bolivia  caused  constant  anxiety,  President  Pinto  had  to 
deal  with  a difficult  and  unforeseen  situation.  The 
country  was  plunged  into  a severe  economic  crisis  due 
to  depression  in  the  mining  industry,  and  the  revenue 
shrank  to  such  an  extent  that  the  available  funds  were 
barely  sufficient  to  meet  the  ordinary  expenses.  Gold 
and  silver  coin  was  shipped  abroad  by  the  commercial 
community  in  payment  of  liabilities,  and  this  brought 
a monetary  crisis.  The  Administration  suggested  a law 
to  relieve  the  banks  from  specie  payments,  which  was 
sanctioned,  and  an  inconvertible  note  issue  established. 
The  currency  complications  date  from  this  period,  and 
they  have  proved  ever  since  a constant  obstacle  to  com- 
mercial prosperity  and  economic  development.  To  add 
to  the  trouble,  the  dispute  with  Argentina  concerning 
the  boundary  line  gave  cause  for  serious  alarm,  and  it 
became  so  acute  in  1878  that  hostilities  between  the  two 
countries  appeared  likely  to  occur ; but,  happily,  the 
tact  shown  by  the  President  conciliated  the  angry 
passions  on  both  sides  of  the  Andes,  and  a treaty  was 
signed  which  removed  for  the  time  any  danger  of  a 
rupture. 

The  question  of  relations  with  Bolivia  has  been 
dealt  with  under  the  description  of  the  war  of  1879  ; it 
is  unnecessary  here  to  enter  into  the  details  of  that 
controversy  beyond  noting  the  fact  that  the  President 
never  wavered  in  his  determination  to  protect  Chilian 
rights  in  Bolivia,  even  when  his  policy  in  this  respect 
entailed  an  appeal  to  arms  to  support  his  convictions. 
Pinto  considered  the  rupture  with  Peru  inevitable,  and 
he  accepted  the  situation  as  the  only  possible  one  for 
the  general  welfare  of  Chile.  From  the  moment  of  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  he  was  untiring  in  his  efforts  to 
furnish  the  army  in  the  field  with  supplies  of  men  and 
equipment,  and  he  personally  supervised  the  details  of 
the  various  expeditions,  besides  devising  expedients  to 


1881] 


PRESIDENT  PINTO 


331 


obtain  the  funds  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  the 
campaign.  Throughout  the  period  when  the  success  or 
failure  of  the  Chilian  cause  hung  in  the  balance,  Pinto 
kept  a cool  head  and  clear  judgment  in  regard  to  the 
operations  by  land  and  sea,  and  his  confident  atti- 
tude materially  assisted  in  bringing  about  the  final 
victory. 

In  1881  came  the  question  of  the  election  of  a 
successor  to  Pinto.  A number  of  prominent  politicians 
requested  the  President  to  advise  in  the  selection  of  a 
candidate ; but  to  this  appeal  he  replied  that  he  had 
nothing  to  do  with  the  election  of  his  successor,  and  no 
arguments  could  induce  him  to  depart  from  his  deter- 
mination to  refrain  from  exerting  his  official  influence. 
The  candidate  upon  whom  the  choice  fell  was  Senor 
Domingo  Santa  Maria,  who  assumed  office  at  the  usual 
date  in  1881.  Senor  Pinto  survived  his  term  of  office 
for  three  years,  dying  in  Valparaiso  in  1884. 

President  Santa  Maria  had  passed  through  many 
vicissitudes  in  his  political  career.  In  1848  he  had 
been  in  the  public  service  as  Intendente  of  Colchagua, 
and  afterwards  held  other  posts ; but  during  the  Presi- 
dency of  Senor  Manuel  Montt  he  was  implicated  in 
revolutionary  outbreaks  and  condemned  to  banishment. 
On  his  return  to  Chile  in  1864  he  was  named  Minister 
of  Finance  by  President  Perez  ; later  he  was  the  repre- 
sentative of  Chile  to  the  Government  of  Peru ; subse- 
quently he  was  appointed  a judge  of  the  Court  of 
Appeal ; and  under  President  Pinto  he  had  held  the 
portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  Interior.  The  new 
President,  as  a Liberal,  opposed  the  introduction  of 
clerical  influence  into  political  affairs,  and  this  led  to 
bitter  opposition  to  his  Administration  on  the  part  of 
the  Conservatives,  who  represented  the  Church  Party. 
It  was  in  consequence  of  this  opposition,  which  was 
subsequently  strengthened  by  different  groups  of 
Liberals,  that  he  brought  official  influence  to  bear  in 
the  Congressional  elections  of  1882,  his  object  being  to 
create  an  absolute  majority  in  his  favour  in  the 


332 


CHILE 


Chambers ; but  his  action  was  severely  criticised,  and 
led  to  violent  obstruction  to  all  legislative  measures 
brought  forward  by  his  Administration,  and  when  in 
1885  he  adopted  a similar  policy  in  the  elections,  he 
again  brought  upon  himself  an  avalanche  of  abuse. 

In  spite  of  this  opposition  to  his  Administration,  the 
President  succeeded  in  carrying  through  some  important 
measures.  The  treaty  of  peace  with  Peru  was  signed  and 
ratified,  and  a truce  was  celebrated  witli  Bolivia;  and  two 
measures  were  passed,  most  directly  affecting  internal 
affairs  in  connection  with  the  laws  relating  to  civil 
registry  and  marriage.  Until  these  laws  were  enacted 
the  priests  alone  controlled  the  registers  for  the  inscrip- 
tion of  births,  deaths,  and  marriages,  but  the  new  laws 
provided  special  officials  for  the  purpose,  and  the 
registration  of  all  marriages,  births,  and  deaths  was 
made  compulsory.  Another  reform  was  the  freeing  of 
the  cemeteries  for  the  burial  of  all  persons,  whereas 
formerly  only  those  belonging  to  the  Roman  Catholic 
religion  were  permitted  interment  in  consecrated 
ground.  These  reforms  were  carried  in  the  teeth  of 
the  most  violent  resistance  from  the  Church  Party. 

When  the  term  of  Santa  Maria  approached  comple- 
tion he  selected  Senor  Jose  Manuel  Balmaceda  as  his 
successor,  and  threw  all  the  weight  of  his  official 
influence  in  favour  of  his  choice.  The  Conservatives 
and  those  Liberals  who  were  in  opposition  made  a 
determined  fight  against  Balmaceda,  but  the  official 
support  accorded  to  him  finally  secured  his  return. 

The  action  of  Santa  Maria  in  using  official  influence 
in  the  Congressional  election  of  1882,  and  again  in  1885, 
was  due  to  the  curious  phase  into  which  political  pro- 
cedure in  the  Chambers  had  drifted.  Ideas  of  Liberal 
Government  had  gradually  evolved  the  unwritten  law 
that  the  resignation  of  the  ministry  should  follow  an 
adverse  vote  on  any  administrative  measure ; in  other 
words,  the  ministry  was  only  justified  in  holding  office 
when  it  represented  a majority  in  Congress.  This 
development  was  the  result  of  the  agitation  by  the 


1885]  PARLIAMENTARY  PROCEDURE  333 


Liberals  to  secure  a parliamentary  system  of  govern- 
ment ; but  there  was  one  important  defect  in  the 
adoption  of  this  procedure  which  then,  and  since,  caused 
unexpected  complications.  No  power  is  given  to  the 
President  to  dissolve  the  Chambers  when  an  adverse 
majority  exists,  and  it  was  the  effort  to  secure  a 
substantial  majority  in  the  Legislature  that  induced 
Santa  Maria  to  act  as  he  did  in  1882  and  1885.  The 
so-called  parliamentary  procedure  has  been  productive 
of  similar  practices  in  succeeding  Administrations,  and 
must  continue  to  do  this  until  the  power  of  ordering  a 
dissolution  of  the  Chambers  is  vested  in  the  President. 
The  alternative  can  only  be  the  introduction  of  a system 
making  the  Ministry  practically  independent  of  Con- 
gress, as  is  the  case  in  the  United  States. 

Sehor  Balmaceda  acceded  to  the  Presidency  on 
September  18,  1886,  and  his  term  was  destined  to  be 
marked  by  stirring  events,  covering  a notable  period  in 
Chilian  history.  A brief  description  of  himself  and  his 
policy  will  therefore  help  towards  a better  understanding 
of  the  situation  from  1886  to  1891. 

Jose  Manuel  Balmaceda  was  born  in  1838,  and  in 
his  childhood  autocratic  government  was  the  keystone 
of  Chilian  politics.  His  father  had  been  an  intimate 
councillor  and  supporter  of  President  Manuel  Montt, 
and  throughout  the  revolutionary  risings  of  1851  and 
1859  he  enthusiastically  espoused  the  cause  of  his  friend. 
Young  Balmaceda  was  educated  under  clerical  influence, 
and  an  inclination  to  asceticism  was  ingrained  in  his 
nature.  After  completing  his  studies  he  wished  to  take 
priestly  orders,  but  his  father  strongly  opposed  the 
Church  as  a career,  and  in  1864  he  obtained  an  appoint- 
ment for  his  son  as  a member  of  a special  mission  to 
Lima,  to  attend  a South  American  Congress  called  to 
discuss  the  attitude  of  Spain  towards  Peru  in  connection 
with  the  question  of  the  Chincha  Islands.  When,  a 
year  later,  J ose  Balmaceda  returned,  he  no  longer  thought 
of  devoting  his  life  to  the  priesthood,  but  rather  to 
politics  or  diplomacy.  Finding  for  the  moment  no 


334 


CHILE 


opening  in  these  directions,  he  occupied  himself  with 
the  management  of  his  father’s  country  estates,  and 
shortly  afterwards  married  the  Seilorita  Emilia  Toro 
Herrera,  a member  of  one  of  the  most  prominent 
families  of  Santiago. 

During  his  life  in  the  country,  Balmaceda  did  not 
allow  himself  to  lose  touch  with  political  developments. 
The  closing  years  of  the  Perez  Administration  saw  the 
change  from  dictatorial  rule  to  Constitutional  Govern- 
ment, and  the  more  advanced  thinkers  of  the  younger 
generation  then  established  the  Reform  Party,  taking  for 
their  motto  the  word  “Libertad,”  and  giving  expression 
to  their  views  at  meetings  and  through  the  newspaper 
La  Libertad,  a journal  founded  in  1866  by  the 
brothers  Arteaga  Alemparte  to  disseminate  through  the 
country  a creed  for  the  advancement  of  political  liberty. 
Among  these  reformers  Balmaceda  took  his  place,  and 
soon  became  one  of  the  most  prominent  advocates  of 
the  new  doctrines.  At  the  elections  for  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  in  1870,  Balmaceda  was  a candidate  for  the 
Department  of  Carelmapu,  and  after  a hard  contest  was 
victorious.  From  that  date  until  his  death,  he  was 
constantly  before  the  people  of  Chile  as  a participator 
in  political  developments. 

On  September  26,  1875,  the  reformistas  convened  a 
meeting,  and  adopted  the  following  programme  as  the 
political  basis  of  their  party  : — 


1.  Equality  and  independence  of  the  different  public  administrative 
departments.  To  guarantee  this,  the  establishment  of  the  following 
principles : — 

(a)  Independence  and  responsibility  of  the  judicial  power. 

(bS  Organisation  of  the  franchise  on  the  popular  lines  of  liberty 
of  suffrage  and  non-intervention  of  official  influence  in 
electoral  matters. 

(c)  Reform  of  the  municipal  power,  and  independence  in  local 

affairs.  The  limit  to  such  power  being  that  municipal  acts 
must  harmonise  with  the  general  welfare. 

(d)  Separation  of  Church  and  State  upon  the  following  principles : 

(1)  Subjection  of  all  religious  communities  to  common  law; 

(2)  Suppression  of  special  laws  and  privileges;  (3)  Freedom 


President  Balmaceda. 


[ Face  page  334. 


1875] 


POLITICAL  REFORM 


335 


of  the  cemeteries  to  all  religious  sects  ; (4)  Establishment  of 
civil  registry  and  civil  marriage. 

(e)  Encouragement  of  public  education  by  State  and  Municipality. 
Liberty  of  instruction  and  profession,  the  latter  qualified  by 
the  necessity  to  prove  competence. 

(J")  Equal  distribution  of  the  charges  levied  by  State  or  Munici- 
pality. 

(g)  Reform  of  the  Law  of  Constitution  to  make  practicable  these 
ideas,  and  where  necessary  a modification  of  civil  and 
administrative  laws. 


These  political  ideals  emanated  from  Balmaceda,  and 
explain  his  later  career.  That  some  of  them  were 
impracticable,  was  shown  subsequently,  but  this  does 
not  minimise  the  historical  importance  of  the  action  of 
the  reformistas.  It  marked  an  upheaval  in  Chilian 
political  life,  and  the  new  doctrine  was  vigorously 
preached  by  Balmaceda  and  his  colleagues  in  and  out 
of  Congress.  The  effect  was  to  create  a more  general 
interest  in  political  affairs,  for  the  new  principles  gained 
ground  steadily  in  spite  of  bitter  opposition  by  the  Con- 
servatives and  the  supporters  of  the  Clerical  Party. 

When  war  with  Bolivia  and  Peru  broke  out  in  1879, 
the  attitude  of  Argentina  was  most  important  to  Chile. 
The  boundary  question  required  careful  diplomatic 
treatment  to  ensure  Argentine  neutrality,  and  an  able 
representative  in  Buenos  Aires  was  indispensable. 
Balmaceda  was  selected  for  this  post  by  President 
Pinto,  and  his  mission  was  successfully  fu  I Idled.  For 
a year  Balmaceda  remained  in  Argentina,  and  then  he  re- 
turned with  the  assurance  that  Argentina  would  neither 
press  her  claims  in  respect  to  the  disputed  territory  or 
lend  active  assistance  to  the  enemies  of  Chile.  Soon 
after  this  the  question  of  the  presidential  election  came 
up,  and  efforts  were  made  to  bring  him  forward,  but 
Balmaceda  decided  not  to  enter  the  electoral  campaign 
on  his  own  behalf,  preferring  to  act  as  a leader  of  the 
party  in  favour  of  Senor  Santa  Maria,  who,  in  due 
course,  was  elected,  and  it  was  only  natural  a portfolio 
in  the  Cabinet  should  be  offered  to  Balmaceda.  He 
accordingly  became  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Santa 


336 


CHILE 


Maria’s  first  Cabinet.  In  view  of  the  existing  inter- 
national  complications  this  was  a most  important  post, 
and  it  afforded  him  a wide  scope  for  his  abilities. 

The  policy  of  Santa  Maria  in  connection  with  the 
Congressional  elections  led  to  a Cabinet  crisis  in  1882, 
entailing  the  resignation  of  the  Prime  Minister,  Senor 
Jose  Francisco  Vergara,  and  this  portfolio  was  accepted 
by  Balmaceda.  It  is  not  easy  to  reconcile  his  retention 
of  office  with  the  political  principles  he  enunciated 
between  1870  and  1879,  for  then  one  of  the  factors 
upon  which  greatest  stress  was  laid  was  the  non-inter- 
vention of  the  Government  in  elections.  On  the  other 
hand,  three  of  the  principal  objects  for  which  the 
reformistas  had  contended— the  freeing  of  the  cemeteries, 
the  establishment  of  civil  registry,  and  the  civil  marriage 
law — were  now  brought  forward.  Apparently  Balmaceda 
considered  himself  justified  in  remaining  in  office  to 
assist  the  passage  of  these  reforms,  which  were  presented 
to  Congress  in  1882  and  1883,  and  duly  approved. 
When  the  question  of  the  separation  of  Church  and 
State  came  before  the  Chambers  a year  later,  Balmaceda 
again  fell  away  from  the  programme  of  1875,  supporting 
the  union  of  Church  and  State,  with  the  modification  of 
liberty  of  worship  rather  than  absolute  separation.  In 
defending  his  conduct  in  the  Senate,  he  stated  that  he 
considered  too  rapid  a change  from  existing  conditions 
was  injurious  to  the  true  welfare  of  the  country. 

When  the  Congressional  elections  took  place  in 
1885,  official  influence  was  again  utilised  to  obtain 
majorities.  Nor  did  Balmaceda,  then  Minister  of 
Interior,  raise  any  protest  against  a practice  he  had 
condemned  so  frequently  in  public  and  private,  and  for 
his  attitude  he  was  attacked  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
and  the  Senate.  His  conduct  was  placed  in  a worse 
light  by  the  publicity  given  to  a telegram  despatched  by 
him,  and  referring  to  preparations  then  being  made  for 
the  proclamation  of  a presidential  candidate  to  succeed 
Santa  Maria.  It  was  urged  that  this  telegram  demon- 
strated the  intention  of  the  Administration  to  interfere, 


1885]  BALMACEDA  AND  THE  ELECTION  337 


and  the  incident  attracted  unusual  attention,  as  it  was 
known  that  the  presidential  candidate  of  the  Liberals 
was  no  other  than  Balmaceda.  In  consequence  of 
these  attacks  and  of  the  fact  that  he  was  the  presi- 
dential candidate,  Balmaceda  resigned  in  January  of 
1886. 

Opposed  to  Balmaceda  for  the  Presidency  was  Seiior 
Jose  Francisco  Vergara;  but  it  was  soon  clear  that  he 
had  no  chance  of  success,  and  he  withdrew  from  the 
contest.  The  Conservatives  refused  to  take  part  in  the 
election,  allesnn'j  that  the  influence  of  the  Government 
was  exercised  on  behalf  of  Balmaceda,  and  that,  con- 
sequently, they  had  no  chance  of  fair  treatment  at  the 
polls.  In  these  circumstances  Balmaceda  was  unopposed, 
and  on  June  25,  1886,  was  declared  elected,  his  election 
being  ratified  by  Congress  on  August  30.  Preparations 
were  made  by  his  friends  to  celebrate  his  success  by  a 
banquet  in  his  honour ; but  he  declined  any  such  mani- 
festation, and  this  refusal,  although  applauded  by  the 
Press,  offended  a section  of  the  Liberals,  and  developed 
serious  consequences  at  a later  period. 

The  majority  in  Congress  were  Liberals  when 
Balmaceda  assumed  the  Presidency  in  the  middle  of 
September,  but  the  party  had  split  into  factions,  called 
respectively  Liberals,  Nationals,  Dissentient-Liberals, 
and  Radicals,  although  so  far  as  political  doctrine  was 
concerned  small  difference  existed.  During  the  violent 
debates  in  1884  in  connection  with  the  separation  of 
Church  and  State,  all  Liberals  approved  the  theory  of 
the  measure ; but  they  were  at  variance  on  the  method 
and  the  time.  It  was  anticipated  that  Balmaceda  would 
receive  general  support  in  the  Chambers  ; and  that  he 
did  not  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  various  groups 
posing  as  Liberals  were  more  swayed  by  personal  motives 
than  by  strict  adherence  to  political  principles,  and  this 
led  them  often  to  oppose  the  Administration  without 
just  cause.  It  was  the  ambition  of  Balmaceda  to  reunite 
the  Liberals  into  one  strong  party,  and  to  this  end  his 
first  ministry  was  composed  rather  of  representatives 

Y 


338 


CHILE 


from  the  groups  likely  to  oppose  his  policy  than  of  men 
who  could  be  relied  upon  for  support  in  an  emergency. 
His  first  Cabinet  consisted  of  Senor  Eusebio  Lillo, 
Interior;  Senor  Joaquin  Godoy,  Foreign  Affairs;  Senor 
Pedro  Montt,  Justice,  Worship,  and  Public  Instruction  ; 
Senor  Augustin  Edwards,  Finance  ; and  Senor  Evaristo 
Sanchez,  War  and  Marine.  Apparently  these  appoint- 
ments gave  satisfaction  at  first  to  the  majority  in 
Congress,  but  in  a very  few  weeks  political  intrigues 
brought  about  complications. 

The  result  of  these  intrigues  was  in  evidence  when 
the  Chambers  met  in  October,  six  weeks  after  the 
presidential  inauguration.  At  the  preliminary  session 
to  elect  officers  the  Deputies  chosen  were  in  political 
unison  with  the  Cabinet,  but  at  the  next  meeting  the 
Conservatives  allied  themselves  with  the  various  groups 
opposed  to  the  Administration,  refused  to  ratify  the 
elections,  chose  officers  of  their  own  political  colour,  and 
formed  a strong  majority  against  the  Ministry.  As  the 
estimates  for  the  ensuing  year  had  not  yet  been  sanc- 
tioned, a deadlock  was  certain  unless  another  Cabinet 
was  appointed,  and  the  Ministry  resigned  on  November 
25.  A new  Cabinet  was  formed  on  the  last  day  of  the 
month,  and  in  its  composition  Balmaceda  again  showed 
his  wish  to  unite  the  different  Liberals  into  one  party. 
The  Ministers  were  Carlos  Antunez  (Liberal),  Interior ; 
Francisco  Freire  (Liberal),  Foreign  Affairs;  Adolfo 
Yalderrama  (National),  Instruction  ; Augustin  Edwards 
(National),  Finance  ; and  Nicolas  Pena  Vicuna  (Liberal), 
War  and  Marine.  This  gave  a preponderance  of  port- 
folios to  the  Liberals,  whereas  that  advantage  had  been 
with  the  Nationals  in  the  former  Ministry.  The  spirit 
of  opposition  to  the  President  when  he  had  been  only 
a few  weeks  in  office  was  a foretaste  of  after  events ; 
but  he  failed  to  grasp  the  fact  that  in  his  efforts  for 
uniting  the  Liberals  he  was  laying  the  foundation  of 
troubles  that  would  render  his  own  position  untenable 
in  the  end. 

The  situation  at  the  beginning  of  1887  was  unpleasant 


1887]  CONGRESS  AND  BALMACEDA 


339 


to  contemplate.  There  was  no  doubt  that  the  tactics 
of  the  Opposition  which  had  brought  about  the  resigna- 
tion of  the  Ministry  under  Sehor  Lillo  would  be  repeated 
after  the  Chambers  reassembled  for  ordinary  sessions, 
and  the  President  was  powerless  to  remedy  this  state 
of  affairs.  The  apparent  solution  lay  in  a real  unification 
of  the  Liberals,  and  Balmaceda  determined  on  another 
attempt  in  this  direction.  In  June,  1887,  the  Ministry 
under  Senor  Antunez  resigned  office.  A new  portfolio 
— that  of  Industry  and  Public  Works — had  meantime 
been  created,  and  this  gave  six,  instead  of  five,  appoint- 
ments to  the  Cabinet.  Balmaceda  now  nominated  two 
Liberals,  two  Nationals,  and  two  Dissident-Liberals  : — 
Anibal  Zanartu  (Liberal),  Interior ; Miguel  Luis  Amuna- 
tegui  (Dissident),  Foreign  Affairs;  Pedro  Lucio  Cuadra 
(Liberal),  Justice ; Augustin  Edwards  (National), 
Finance ; Manuel  Garcia  de  la  Huerta  (Dissident),  War 
and  Marine  ; and  Pedro  Montt  (National),  Industry  and 
Public  Works.  This  Ministry  was  the  longest  lived 
of  any  under  his  Administration,  remaining  in  office 
until  April,  1888,  the  only  modification  during  that 
period  being  the  appointment  of  Senor  Augusto  Matte 
to  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs,  rendered  vacant  by 
the  sudden  death  of  Senor  Amunategui. 

Congressional  elections  were  held  in  March,  1888, 
and,  although  everything  passed  off  quietly,  the  occasion 
gave  rise  to  many  new  developments.  The  Opposition 
accused  Balmaceda  of  using  official  influence  to  secure 
the  return  of  candidates  favourable  to  himself,  and  the 
President  denied  that  the  elections  had  been  other  than 
perfectly  free.  In  one  sense,  possibly,  this  assertion  was 
made  in  good  faith,  for  no  open  corruption  was  apparent 
and  no  disturbance  of  public  order  occurred ; but  there 
was  no  doubt  that  indirectly  the  President  did  bring 
pressure  to  bear,  following  in  this  respect  the  example 
of  Santa  Maria  in  1882  and  1885.  Subsequent  events 
demonstrated  the  truth  of  this  statement.  Many 
members  of  Congress  who  owed  their  seats  to  the 
protection  extended  by  the  President  were  no  sooner 


340 


CHILE 


in  office  than  they  opposed  the  Administration,  and  the 
immediate  outcome  of  these  elections  was  the  resignation 
of  the  Ministry  in  consequence  of  serious  disagreement 
between  Senor  Zanartu  and  Balmaceda.  This  resigna- 
tion marks  an  important  epoch,  because  from  that  date 
the  tone  of  Congress  was  invariably  hostile  to  Balmaceda, 
and,  as  a consequence,  between  April,  1888,  and  October, 
1890,  no  fewer  than  ten  Cabinets  were  appointed.  The 
leaders  of  these  various  Ministries  were  : — Senor  Cuadra, 
April  12,  1888 ; Barros  Luco,  November  2,  1888 ; 
Lastarria,  June  11,  1889;  Ramon  Donoso  Vergara, 
October  23,  1889  ; Manuel  Sanchez  Fontecilla,  November 
7,  1889 ; Adolfo  Ibanez,  January  1,  1890 ; Sanfuentes, 
May  30,  1890;  Belisario  Prats,  August  11,  1890;  and 
Claudio  Vicuna,  October  15,  1890. 

Political  turmoil  such  as  these  changes  implied  was 
galling  to  a man  of  the  ambitious  character  of  Balmaceda. 
To  reform  the  intellectual  and  economic  state  of  the 
Chilian  people  was  his  aim,  and  in  many  ways  he  found 
his  projects  impracticable,  but  he  grasped  the  fact  that 
if  he  controlled  Congress  he  could  settle  many  vexed 
questions  retarding  the  material  development  of  the 
country.  The  status  of  the  Church  in  Chile  was  regarded 
by  him  as  requiring  clear  definition,  the  footing  on  which 
clerical  influence  stood  being  incompatible  with  existing 
circumstances.  Public  education  was  a subject  to  which 
he  devoted  careful  study,  but  here  his  efforts  at  advance- 
ment were  blocked  by  the  hostility  of  the  Chambers. 
Public  works  were  needed  and  persistently  advocated 
by  him ; but  the  antagonistic  attitude  of  Congress 
interfered  with  his  plans  in  this  direction  also,  and  the 
continuous  friction  between  the  Executive  and  the  Legis- 
lature altered  the  character  of  Balmaceda  until  he  felt 
he  stood  alone.  Gradually  in  the  struggle  he  developed 
dictatorial  tendencies,  which  became  more  pronounced 
when  he  realised  that  his  efforts  to  unite  the  Liberals 
were  doomed  to  failure.  In  some  respects  he  owed 
his  disappointment  to  the  fact  that  he  was  in  advance 
of  his  time,  and  before  his  death  he  realised  he  had 


1889]  DISTURBED  POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  341 


gone  too  fast  for  the  people  he  wished  to  aid  and 
regenerate. 

The  conflict  between  the  President  and  Congress 
reached  an  acute  stage  in  1889.  An  accusation  was 
made  to  the  effect  that  the  President  was  preparing  the 
way  for  a nominee  of  his  own  to  succeed  him,  and  he 
was  requested  to  declare  categorically  that  he  would 
make  no  use  of  his  influence  in  the  presidential  election 
of  1891.  This  met  with  a curt  refusal,  and  everywhere 
the  Chilians  realised  that  the  strained  relations  existing 
between  the  Chambers  and  the  Executive  might  lead  to 
serious  consequences.  As  the  hostility  in  Congress 
became  more  marked  the  autocratic  tendencies  of 
Balmaceda  were  accentuated,  and  finding  that  the 
parliamentary  system  hampered  his  Administration,  he 
insisted  on  his  right  to  name  his  ministers  and  keep 
them  in  office  in  spite  of  an  adverse  majority  in  the 
Chambers.  This  called  forth  a clamour  of  indignation, 
and  Congress  determined  to  refuse  supplies  until  the 
President  modified  his  attitude.  In  the  end  Balmaceda 
was  obliged  to  give  way  : he  nominated  a Cabinet  in 
accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Chambers.  Not 
until  this  was  done  was  the  budget  for  1890  sanctioned. 

In  1890  it  became  evident  that  a definite  rupture 
between  the  Executive  and  Congress  was  inevitable, 
and  the  two  questions  which  had  created  difficulties 
in  1889  recurred  with  increased  vigour.  The  first 
was  that  of  a representative  as  opposed  to  a parlia- 
mentary system  of  government.  Balmaceda  had  again 
changed  his  Cabinet,  and  the  Chambers  refused  support 
to  the  new  ministers ; but  the  President  stubbornly 
held  his  ground  until  matters  reached  a deadlock.  He 
then  temporised  with  Congress,  but  the  breach  had 
become  so  wide  that  no  permanent  solution  of  the 
quarrel  was  possible,  and  all  attempts  to  conciliate  the 
conflicting  interests  were  unavailing.  On  October  15, 
when  Congress  was  not  in  session,  Balmaceda  appointed 
a Ministry  under  the  leadership  of  Senor  Claudio  Vicuna, 
which  was  at  variance  with  the  ideas  of  the  majority  of 


342  CHILE 

Senators  and  Deputies,  and  the  effect  was  to  further 
embitter  the  Opposition. 

It  was  thought  that  the  impossible  situation  into 
which  the  Administration  had  drifted  would  lead  to  the 
resignation  of  Balmaceda ; but  he  showed  no  inclination 
to  take  this  way  out  of  the  difficulty,  and  he  let  it  be 
understood  that  he  was  determined  to  govern  the 
country  irrespective  of  the  opinion  in  the  Chambers. 
From  October,  1890,  he  assumed  almost  dictatorial 
powers,  surrounding  himself  with  men  whom  he  could 
depend  upon  to  do  his  bidding,  and  assuming  an  attitude 
directly  opposed  to  the  doctrines  he  had  preached  at 
the  commencement  of  his  political  career.  By  his 
action  he  alienated  the  sympathy  of  many  people  who 
had  watched  with  interest  the  widening  of  the  breach 
between  himself  and  Congress ; moreover,  there  was  no 
longer  any  doubt  that  he  would  use  his  influence  un- 
sparingly to  ensure  the  election  of  his  successor,  and  on 
March  8,  1891,  his  nominee,  Sehor  Claudio  Vicuna,  then 
Minister  of  Interior,  was  proclaimed  the  presidential 
candidate  by  a convention  assembled  in  Santiago. 

How  great  the  tension  between  the  President  and 
the  Opposition  had  become  in  October,  1890,  is  seen  by 
a resolution  passed  at  a mass  meeting  held  in  Santiago 
on  the  15th  of  that  month.  This  was  : — 


1.  That  the  President  has  broken  his  word  of  honour  as  both  man 
and  governor,  in  organising  a ministry  not  supported  by  Congress. 
That  he  is  unworthy  of  confidence,  and  has  shown  from  the  first  his 
intention  to  intervene  in  electoral  questions. 

2.  That  the  Comixion  Conservadora  merits  a vote  of  thanks  for 
having  assumed  its  constitutional  role  in  defence  of  the  prerogatives 
of  Congress. 

3.  That  all  citizens,  without  distinction  of  political  colour,  should 
unite  to  offer  resistance  by  legal  means  so  long  as  the  Government 
acts  according  to  the  Constitution,  and  by  all  possible  means  when 
the  Government  oversteps  that  Constitution. 


The  Comixion  Conservadora  referred  to  at  this 
meeting  is  a body  of  six  Senators  and  eight  Deputies 
appointed  by  the  Chambers  to  safeguard  the  interests  of 


1890]  THE  COMISION  CONSERVADORA  343 


Congress  when  that  body  is  not  in  session.  On  October 
16,  1890,  this  committee  sent  a note  to  the  President 
requesting  that  Congress  be  convoked,  and  in  reply 
received  only  an  acknowledgment  of  the  communica- 
tion. On  November  21  following,  the  committee  again 
demanded  that  the  Chambers  be  summoned,  and  five 
days  later  it  was  advised  by  Balmaceda that  “the  causes 
which  determined  the  closing  of  the  extraordinary 
sessions  of  the  National  Congress  on  October  15  last 
are  still  existing,  and  the  time  has  not  yet  arrived  for 
the  Chambers  to  be  convoked.”  The  Comision  Conservci- 
dora  continued  to  protest  against  various  acts  of  the 
Administration,  and  on  December  10  advised  the 
Executive  that  after  December  31  there  would  be  no 
authorisation  for  maintaining  the  army  and  navy  unless 
such  expenditure  was  sanctioned  by  the  Legislature. 

All  these  indications  showed  that  the  breaking  point 
was  near.  The  Executive  was  acting  within  the  letter 
of  the  Law  of  Constitution,  but  it  was  abundantly  clear 
that  the  attitude  of  Balmaceda  would  lead  to  some 
illegality  which  would  give  the  Opposition  an  opportunity 
of  revolting  against  his  authority,  and  early  in  January, 
1891,  a decree  issued  by  Balmaceda  afforded  this 
pretext.  This  decree  was  : — 

No.  40 — . Santiago,  5 of  January,  1891. 

His  Excellency  decrees  : — 

That  Congress  has  not  despatched  the  Law  of  Estimates  for  the 
present  year. 

That  it  is  impossible,  pending  the  promulgation  of  the  said  law, 
to  suspend  the  public  services  without  endangering  internal  order 
and  external  security.  It  is  therefore  decreed  : 

Pending  the  sanction  of  the  Law  of  Estimates  for  1891,  those 
approved  by  the  law  of  December  31,  1889,  shall  remain  in  force. 

Let  this  be  registered,  communicated,  published,  and  inserted  in 
the  Gazette  of  Laws. 

Balmaceda. 

Claudio  Vicuna. 

Domingo  Godov. 

Ismael  Perez  Montt. 

J.  M.  Valdes  Cuevas, 

J.  F.  Gana. 

G.  Mackenna, 


344 


CHILE 


This  act  was  illegal,  and  was  issued  in  the  face  of  the 
communication  of  December  20, 1890,  from  the  Comision 
Conservadora  to  the  Executive,  and  it  proved  to  be  the 
signal  for  the  outbreak  of  a civil  war  which  devastated 
the  country  for  a period  of  eight  months. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


c hile — continued 

Preparations  for  Rebellion.  The  Navy  Revolts.  Capture  of  War 
Material.  Skirmish  in  Valparaiso.  Occupation  ot  Coquimbo. 
Engagement  at  Pisagua.  Attitude  of  Balmaceda.  Measures 
against  Revolution.  Position  in  January,  1891.  Public  Opinion. 
Capture  of  Pisagua.  Revolutionary  Troops.  Fight  near  Dolores. 
Congressionalists  Defeated  at  Huara.  Occupation  of  Iquique. 
Attempt  to  Recapture  Iquique.  Intervention  of  Admiral  Hotham. 
Congressionalists  at  Iquique.  Defeat  of  Robles  at  Pozo  Almonte. 
Capture  of  Arica.  Reinforcements  for  Tarapaca.  Antofagasta 
Blockaded.  Evacuation  of  Antofagasta.  Colonel  Camus  Retires 
into  Bo'ivia.  Occupation  of  Caldera.  The  Blanco  Encalada. 
Lull  in  Hostilities.  Treatment  of  Suspected  Persons.  Financial 
Difficulties.  The  Junta  de  Gobierno.  Revolutionary  Agents. 
The  Itata  Incident.  Peace  Negotiations.  Meeting  of  Commis- 
sioners in  Santiago.  Attempt  to  Assassinate  Balmaceda. 
Optimistic  Feeling.  The  Condell  and  Lynch.  Dictatorial 

Tendencies  of  Balmaceda.  Election  of  Senor  Claudio  Vicuna. 
Richard  Cumming.  Revolutionary  Propaganda  in  Europe. 
Sympathy  with  Revolutionary  Cause.  Armaments  reach 
Iquique.  Congressionalist  Army.  Revolutionary  Committee  in 
Santiago  and  Valparaiso.  Embarkation  of  Revolutionary  Army. 
Balmaceda  and  the  Invasion.  Insurgents  near  Santiago. 
Execution  of  Prisoners.  Massacre  of  Lo  Canas.  Tyrannical 
Conduct  of  Balmaceda.  The  Esmeralda  off  Valparaiso.  Landing 
of  Congressionalists.  The  Central  and  Southern  Districts. 

Previous  to  the  decree  of  January  5,  1891,  which 
set  moving  active  revolutionary  measures,  extensive  pre- 
parations had  been  made  for  armed  revolt : many  of  the 
principal  naval  officers  had  been  sounded,  and  found 
willing  to  lend  assistance  in  the  movement  against 
Balmaceda.  Interviews  took  place  on  January  3,  1891, 

345 


346 


CHILE 


and  on  the  two  subsequent  days  between  Captain  Jorje 
Montt,  the  senior  naval  officer  at  Valparaiso,  and  Senor 
Waldo  Silva  and  Senor  Ramdn  Barros  Luco,  and 
arrangements  were  made  for  the  squadron  to  be  ready 
on  the  night  of  January  6 ; the  former  as  Vice-President 
of  the  Senate,  and  the  latter  as  President  of  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  were  to  board  the  ships  as  the  representa- 
tives of  Congress  in  the  movement.  On  the  evening  of 
January  6,  Senor  Silva  and  Senor  Barros  Luco,  with 
several  deputies  and  friends,  embarked  on  the  Blanco 
Encalada,  and  at  midnight  that  vessel,  accompanied  by 
the  Esmeralda  and  the  O' Higgins,  left  Valparaiso 
harbour  for  Quinteros,  where  the  Cochrane  and  Magal- 
lanes  were  lying.  Next  morning  the  commanders 
assembled  on  the  Blanco  Encalada , when  the  communi- 
cations exchanged  between  the  Vice-President  of  the 
Senate,  the  President  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and 
Captain  Montt,  were  read,  and  the  object  of  the 
rebellion  against  Balmaceda  was  explained,  the  com- 
manders expressing  approval,  and  announcing  their 
adhesion  to  the  revolution.  The  position  was  then 
explained  to  the  junior  officers  and  crews,  after  which 
the  ships  returned  to  Valparaiso. 

The  remainder  of  January  7 was  occupied  by  the 
squadron  in  taking  possession  of  the  Huascar , some 
steam  launches,  anti  the  vessels  of  the  Chilian  South 
American  Steamship  Company,  these  latter  being 
required  as  transports,  and  on  January  8 the  Cochrane 
and  Magallanes  sailed  north  to  establish  the  blockade  of 
Iquique.  On  the  same  day  the  Congressionalists  seized 
a valuable  cargo  of  war  material  recently  arrived  for  the 
Chilian  Government  in  the  German  steamer  Cleopatra , 
consisting  of  4500  Mannlicher  rifles,  and  the  Esmeralda 
went  south  to  Talcahuana  and  captured  all  stores  at 
that  naval  station.  On  January  10  a skirmish  occurred 
in  the  harbour  of  Valparaiso  between  boats  belonging 
to  the  squadron  and  the  shore  batteries,  in  which 
several  men  were  killed  and  wounded.  Next  day  a 
party  disembarked  from  the  Esmeralda  at  Lebu,  and  an 


1891] 


OUTBREAK  OF  CIVIL  WAR 


347 


expedition  from  the  transport  Angamos  captured  a 
detachment  of  rural  police  at  Quillota.  The  O'  Higgins 
and  the  transport  Amazonas  arrived  off  Coquimbo  on 
the  12th,  and  after  some  skirmishing  that  place  was 
occupied.  The  town  of  Serena  was  entered  without 
resistance,  and  Ovalle  was  visited  on  the  same  day,  the 
result  of  the  expedition  being  the  capture  of  400  rifles, 
a considerable  quantity  of  ammunition,  and  a large 
amount  of  coal  and  other  necessaries. 

Four  days  later,  the  Magallanes  appeared  off  Pisagua, 
in  the  Province  of  Tarapaca,  and  landed  a party  to  take 
possession  of  the  town,  the  garrison  joining  the  rebel 
cause.  In  the  next  few  days  the  squadron  visited 
various  ports,  and  occasional  skirmishes  occurred  when 
resistance  was  offered ; but  no  serious  fighting  took 
place  until  January  21,  when  an  attack  was  made  by 
the  Government  troops  upon  Pisagua,  to  endeavour  to 
regain  possession  of  that  town.  A sharp  engagement 
ensued,  in  which  the  Congressionalists  lost  5 killed  and 
1 officer,  and  13  men  wounded ; and  on  January  23 
another  engagement  occurred  in  this  vicinity  without 
decisive  result.  A third  action  took  place  on  January 
26 ; the  attacking  force  consisted  of  400  men  commanded 
by  Major  Marco  Aurelio  Valenzuela,  and  in  this  fight 
the  Congressionalists  were  worsted  and  obliged  to 
re-embark  their  men,  leaving  8 officers  prisoners  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

On  the  morning  of  January  7 the  Intendente  of 
Valparaiso  had  advised  Balmaceda  of  the  revolt  of 
the  squadron,  and  a meeting  of  the  Cabinet  was  called 
to  discuss  the  situation.  An  outbreak  had  been 
expected ; but  the  fact  that  the  whole  of  the  navy  had 
joined  the  movement  came  as  a surprise  to  the  President 
and  his  Ministers,  and  the  question  of  a compromise 
with  the  Congressionalists  was  considered,  but  dismissed 
as  impracticable.  The  President  explained  the  measures 
to  be  taken,  and  a decree  was  issued  under  which  he 
assumed  absolute  powers.  Under  this  authority  he 
became  Dictator,  and  all  constitutional  guarantees  were 


348 


CHILE 


suspended.  Orders  were  issued  for  the  suppression  of 
newspapers  in  sympathy  with  the  rebellion,  directions 
were  given  for  the  augmentation  of  the  army  to  40,000 
men,  and  the  military  forces  were  declared  to  be  on  a 
war  basis,  the  pay  of  officers  and  men  being  raised  fifty 
per  cent.  Preparations  were  made  for  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  army  at  various  points,  and  an  order  was 
published  prohibiting  the  sale  of  arms  and  ammunition. 
The  officers  and  men  of  the  navy  were  proclaimed 
rebels,  but  a reward  of  two  years’  pay  was  offered  to  the 
crews  of  any  men-of-war  if  the  vessel  in  which  they 
were  serving  deserted  the  revolutionary  cause  to  support 
the  Government. 

On  January  29  the  towns  of  Serena  and  Coquimbo 
were  reoccupied  by  Government  troops,  the  Congres- 
sionalist  garrison  having  been  withdrawn  two  days 
previously  and  sent  north  to  Tarapacd,  and  on  the  last 
day  of  the  month  Balmaceda  ordered  reinforcements  of 
300  men  under  command  of  Colonel  Eulojio  Robles  to 
proceed  to  Patillos  in  Tarapaca,  and  march  thence  to 
support  Iquique.  The  command  of  the  army  was 
entrusted  to  General  Jose  Francisco  Gana,  General 
Jose  Velasquez  was  appointed  Chief  of  Staff,  and 
Colonel  Julio  Banados  Espinosa  named  Military 
Secretary.  It  was  evident  that  Balmaceda  was  deter- 
mined to  make  every  effort  to  maintain  his  position,  and 
his  resolution  was  not  shaken  by  the  discovery  of  a 
military  conspiracy  in  Santiago.  This  attempt  against 
the  Government  was  frustrated  by  the  vigilance  of 
General  Barbosa,  the  result  being  the  arrest  and 
imprisonment  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Gabriel  Alamos, 
Major  Gatica,  and  other  officers. 

The  position  at  the  close  of  January,  1891,  showed 
every  prospect  of  a long  struggle.  The  revolution  con- 
trolled the  sea,  but  had  established  no  permanent  footing 
on  shore ; and  Balmaceda  had  a formidable  army  with 
which  to  dispute  all  attempts  of  the  Congressionalists  to 
gain  possession  of  any  large  section  of  territory,  although 
lack  of  transport  prevented  him  throwing  a strong  force 


1891] 


PUBLIC  OPINION 


349 


into  Tarapaca,  the  locality  where  the  rebels  intended  to 
concentrate  before  attempting  an  advance  on  Santiago 
or  Valparaiso.  During  the  first  three  weeks  of  the 
revolt  the  people  of  Chile  had  time  to  consider  the 
situation,  and  broadly  speaking  the  balance  of  opinion 
was  in  favour  of  the  Congressional  Party.  There  was 
no  spontaneous  uprising  in  aid  of  the  rebellion,  but 
sympathy  was  demonstrated  in  indirect  ways  by  all 
classes.  The  majority  of  the  Chilian  aristocracy  had 
openly  joined  the  revolt,  and  expressed  their  willingness 
to  contribute  their  money  and  personal  services  in  the 
fight  against  Balmaceda,  and  this  action  of  the  more 
wealthy  section  of  the  community  naturally  influenced 
the  views  of  a large  portion  of  the  population. 

An  interesting  decision  as  to  the  legality  of  the  Acts 
of  Balmaceda  was  given  in  the  Supreme  Court  on 
January  10,  1891,  and  was  representative  of  the  drift 
of  public  sentiment.  Six  judges  were  called  upon  to 
decide  whether  two  men  of  the  army  should  be  tried  by 
military  or  civil  process,  and  by  a majority  of  two  votes 
the  Court  ordered  the  men  to  be  delivered  to  the  civil 
tribunal,  on  the  ground  that  Congress  had  made  no 
provision  for  military  forces  and  that  the  army  had  no 
legal  standing.  This  verdict  served  to  support  the  Act  of 
Deposition,  signed  by  eighty-nine  members  of  Congress, 
in  which  the  signatories  declared  that  Balmaceda  was 
no  longer  recognised  as  President.  The  document  was 
published  in  the  Heraldo  newspaper  on  January  7,  and 
by  that  means  circulated  through  the  country.  On  the 
other  hand,  Balmaceda  had  a large  circle  of  friends  who 
stood  firmly  by  him,  and  this,  in  conjunction  with  the 
fact  that  the  resources  of  the  Government  at  the  out- 
break of  the  revolution  were  infinitely  greater  than  those 
of  the  Congressionalists,  drew  many  supporters  to  his 
side. 

In  the  beginning  of  February  the  warlike  operations 
assumed  a more  serious  character,  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  6th,  the  Cochrane,  O' Higgins,  Amazonas,  and 
Cachapoal  appeared  off  Pisagua,  where  the  Magallanes 


350 


CHILE 


was  lying.  The  garrison  of  that  town  consisted  of  300 
men  under  Major  Valenzuela,  the  officer  who  had 
effected  its  recapture  on  January  26.  A detachment  of 
300  men  was  landed  from  the  ships  to  the  north  of  the 
town,  and  a similar  force  on  the  south,  these  troops 
being  instructed  to  converge  towards  the  heights  of  “ El 
Hospicio  ” and  assault  the  position  and  guns  at  that 
point,  and  as  soon  as  they  were  well  advanced  the  ships 
opened  a heavy  fire  on  the  fortifications  of  the  town. 
The  position  at  “ El  Hospicio  ” was  captured  with  little 
difficulty,  and  the  Congressional  forces  then  descended 
to  attack  Pisagua,  the  garrison  surrendering  after  resist- 
ing for  a couple  of  hours.  The  casualties  on  the  side  of 
the  defence  were  2 officers  and  10  men  killed,  1 officer 
and  28  men  wounded,  and  Major  Valenzuela  and  250 
officers  and  men  were  taken  prisoners ; and  the  loss  on 
the  side  of  the  revolution  was  8 killed,  and  1 officer  and 
10  men  wounded.  Four  guns,  160  rifles,  101 
Winchester  carbines,  and  a quantity  of  ammunition 
and  stores  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victors ; and  from 
this  date  Pisagua  remained  in  the  possession  of  the 
Congressionalists.  After  this  success  the  revolutionary 
leaders  set  to  work  to  organise  an  effective  land  force, 
and  men  were  brought  from  various  points  on  the  coast 
and  drilled  and  disciplined.  Recruits  were  also 
obtained  from  the  mining  districts  in  the  vicinity  of 
Pisagua,  and  in  less  than  a fortnight  2000  men  were 
under  arms. 

General  Robles,  who  had  arrived  at  Patillos  on 
February  2,  and  reached  Iquique  next  day,  now  marched 
with  a force  of  339  officers  and  men  in  the  direction  of 
Pisagua.  He  intended  to  attack  that  place  after  making 
a junction  with  a detachment  sent  to  meet  him  from 
Tacna ; but  when  nearing  the  station  of  Dolores  on 
February  15,  he  found  that  a strong  revolutionary  force 
had  come  from  Pisagua  to  intercept  his  advance.  So  he 
took  up  a position  on  the  hill  of  San  Francisco,  the  site 
of  a memorable  battle  in  1879,  and  there  awaited 
developments.  At  3 p.m.  the  Congressionalists  opened 


Admiral  Jorje  Montt. 


General  Canto. 


Ramon  Barros  Luco. 


General  Korner. 


[Face  page  350 


1891]  REBELS  VICTORIOUS  IN  TARAPACA  351 


fire  with  their  artillery,  and  under  protection  of  the  guns 
the  infantry  was  pushed  forward ; in  a couple  of  hours 
it  was  evident  that  Robles  could  not  hold  his  ground, 
and  he  retired  towards  the  railway  to  await  reinforce- 
ments from  Iquique.  In  the  fighting  on  the  hill  and 
during  the  retirement  the  casualties  were  heavy,  only 
108  men  escaping,  amongst  the  officers  killed  being 
Colonel  Villagras  and  Lieutenant- Colonel  Riquelme, 
while  6 others  were  taken  prisoners ; the  revolutionary 
loss  was  1 officer  and  15  men  killed,  and  54  officers  and 
men  wounded.  This  defeat  of  Robles  led  to  unexpected 
events. 

The  news  of  the  disaster  at  Dolores  and  the  request 
for  assistance  by  Robles  caused  consternation  in  Iquique. 
Colonel  Soto,  in  command  of  the  garrison,  determined  to 
take  the  majority  of  his  troops  to  where  the  survivors  of 
the  recent  fight  were  encamped,  and  he  joined  Robles  on 
February  16,  the  combined  force  numbering  800  men. 
On  the  following  day  Robles  decided  to  march  to  Huara, 
and  intercept  the  advance  of  the  enemy  towards  Iquique, 
and  he  arrived  at  that  place  at  noon.  At  3 p.m.  notice 
was  brought  in  that  the  enemy  was  in  sight,  the  Con- 
gressionalists’  strength  being  estimated  at  1200  men, 
and  a few  minutes  later  the  struggle  began.  The  positions 
selected  by  Robles  were  exceptionally  well  adapted  for 
defence ; in  spite  of  repeated  assaults  by  the  rebels,  the 
Government  troops  held  their  ground,  and  at  5 p.m.  a 
cavalry  charge  threw  the  attacking  forces  into  disorder. 
General  Urrutia,  fearing  a disaster,  decided  to  retreat, 
and  it  was  only  the  lack  of  mounted  men  on  the  part  of 
the  Government  forces  that  prevented  this  retreat 
becoming  a rout.  The  Congressionalists  were  obliged 
to  leave  their  dead  and  wounded  on  the  field,  and  1 


field  gun,  4 machine  guns,  and  200  rifles  were  aban- 
doned, besides  the  loss  of  10  officers  and  240  men 
killed  and  wounded,  and  1 officer  and  78  men  taken 

(prisoners.  The  Government  casualties  were  1 officer  and 
35  men  killed,  and  12  officers  and  120  men  wounded. 
The  departure  of  Colonel  Soto  from  Iquique  was 


352 


CHILE 


unavoidable  in  view  of  the  situation  of  Robles ; but  it 
left  the  town  without  an  adequate  garrison  for  defensive 
purposes,  and  the  commander  of  the  Blanco  Encalada 
was  quick  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunity  afforded 
to  obtain  possession  of  the  city.  On  February  16,  1891, 
he  demanded  its  surrender ; the  Intendente  replied  that 
he  had  no  forces  to  resist,  but  stipulated  that  private 
property  should  not  be  injured,  or  personal  violence 
offered,  and  at  10.30  a.m.  the  town  was  occupied  by  a 
detachment  from  the  squadron. 

Three  days  later,  Colonel  Soto  with  a small  force 
arrived  early  outside  the  city,  and  penetrated  into  the 
streets  without  being  discovered.  The  garrison  from  the 
squadron  only  consisted  of  40  men,  these  being  quartered 
in  the  Custom-house ; but  before  Colonel  Soto  could 
reach  this  building  the  alarm  was  given,  and  the  defenders 
opened  fire.  Reinforcements  were  now  sent  ashore  from 
the  Blanco  Encalada , and  a brisk  musketry  action  was 
maintained  for  an  hour.  At  8 a.m.  the  guns  of  the 
Blanco  Encalada  and  the  Esmeralda  began  firing,  and 
soon  afterwards  a large  portion  of  the  town  was  in 
flames.  The  danger  of  the  total  destruction  of  Iquique 
was  so  apparent,  that  Admiral  Hotham,  who  was  in  the 
roadstead  on  his  flagship,  sent  Captain  Lambton  to 
arrange  an  armistice  between  the  combatants,  and 
invited  Colonel  Soto  to  meet  the  Congressional  repre- 
sentatives on  the  War  spite,  in  order  that  some  under- 
standing might  be  reached  and  further  injury  to  property 
prevented.  At  this  conference  it  was  decided  that 
Colonel  Soto  should  retire  his  force  to  the  suburb  of 
Cavancha  and  there  deliver  all  his  arms,  both  officers 
and  men  being  free  afterwards  to  remain  in  Iquique,  or 
proceed  in  a revolutionary  transport  to  any  Chilian  port 
they  selected.  By  this  arrangement  the  Congression- 
alists  were  left  in  quiet  possession  of  Iquique,  and  the 
stores  and  war  material  accumulated  at  that  place,  these 
including  half  a million  rounds  of  rifle  ammunition  and 
a considerable  sum  of  public  money. 

The  Congressionalists  now  made  Iquique  their  head- 


1891]  BATTLE  OF  POZO  ALMONTE 


353 


quarters,  and  immediately  proceeded  with  the  organisa- 
tion of  military  forces  in  order  to  establish  control  over 
the  Province  of  Tarapaca.  Meanwhile  the  possible  loss 
of  Tarapaca  spurred  Balmaceda  to  further  exertions,  and 
reinforcements  were  sent  to  Robles  to  enable  him  to 
regain  his  lost  ground.  Expeditions  were  despatched  to 
Arica,  and  in  all  1000  men  were  landed  to  join  Robles 
in  the  Pampa  of  Tamarugal.  But  by  now  the  leaders 
of  the  revolution  had  also  organised  a division  ready  to 
take  the  field,  and  on  March  6,  1891,  these  troops,  under 
command  of  General  Holley,  were  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Pozo  Almonte,  where  Robles  was  encamped,  the 
Government  forces  numbering  1300  and  the  Congres- 
sionalists  1600.  At  7 a.m.  on  the  7th  the  action  com- 
menced with  artillery  fire  at  a range  of  5000  yards,  from 
rising  ground  which  had  been  selected  on  the  preceding 
day,  and  General  Robles,  holding  a strong  position,  felt 
confident  he  could  repel  the  rebel  attack. 

On  the  advance  of  the  Congressional  infantry  against 
his  left  wing,  Robles  ordered  the  troops  on  the  right  to 
be  thrown  forward  to  attack  the  revolutionary  flank. 
This  movement  was  cleverly  executed,  and  the  advancing 
enemy  was  practically  surrounded ; but  the  revolutionary 
leader  saw  the  danger,  and  hurrying  up  all  available 
reserves  saved  the  situation,  after  a desperate  struggle 
which  at  times  developed  into  a hand-to-hand  conflict. 
F or  the  next  two  hours  a stubborn  resistance  was  offered 
by  the  Government  troops,  but  they  were  gradually 
forced  back,  and  to  make  matters  worse  their  ammuni- 
tion ran  short,  so  that  before  noon  the  battle  was  over 
and  the  Congressionalists  absolute  masters  of  the  field. 
Few  of  the  Government  force  escaped,  and  their  artillery 
was  abandoned  in  the  railway  station  of  Pozo  Almonte. 
Robles  had  been  shot  in  the  left  ankle  about  9 a.m.,  and 
at  11.30  a.m.  was  mortally  wounded;  it  was  stated  that 
he  was  subsequently  bayonetted  as  he  lay  in  a dying 
state  on  a hospital  stretcher,  although  proof  of  this 
atrocity  is  lacking. 

So  far  as  accounts  made  public  by  officials  of  both 

z 


354 


CHILE 


sides  can  be  believed,  the  loss  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment troops  was  11  officers,  including  General  Robles, 
killed,  and  12  wounded,  besides  23  taken  prisoners.  Of 
the  remainder  of  the  force,  400  were  reported  as  killed 
or  wounded,  although  this  was  probably  below  the  actual 
figure,  and  380  captured.  The  casualties  of  the  Con- 
gressionalists  were  7 officers  and  76  men  killed,  and  4 
officers  and  156  men  wounded,  while  165  men  were 
returned  as  “ missing,”  these  latter  probably  having  died 
of  wounds  through  being  overlooked  by  the  ambulance 
parties  sent  out  after  the  fighting  ceased.  This  gave  a 
total  of  killed  and  wounded  in  this  engagement  of  831 
officers  and  men  out  of  a total  force  of  2900  engaged. 
In  this  encounter  the  war  material  captured  by  the 
Congressionalists  included  11  guns,  4 machine  guns,  and 
800  rifles. 

The  victory  at  Pozo  Almonte  gave  the  rebels  control 
of  Tarapaca,  and  the  defeat  and  death  of  Robles  left  the 
Government  no  rallying-point  for  reinforcements.  Any 
attempts  to  reconquer  the  province  inferred  an  invasion 
by  long  and  tedious  marches  from  the  south,  for  by  sea 
the  transport  of  troops  had  become  impossible.  The 
refugees  from  Pozo  Almonte  made  the  best  of  their  way 
to  Arica,  but  the  two  or  three  hundred  survivors  were 
no  longer  a fighting  force.  In  the  beginning  of  April, 
the  Cochrane , O'  Higgins,  Abtao,  Aconcagua,  and  Maipu 
arrived  off  Arica  and  demanded  the  surrender  of  the 
garrison,  but  this  was  refused  by  Colonel  Arrate,  the 
officer  in  command.  A force  of  1500  men  was  dis- 
embarked from  the  ships  to  attack  the  town,  and  then 
Colonel  Arrate  ordered  the  evacuation  of  the  city,  retiring 
in  the  direction  of  the  river  Sama,  and  reaching  Peruvian 
territory  on  April  7.  The  armament  of  the  troops  was 
delivered  to  the  Peruvian  authorities,  and  the  force  of 
84  officers  and  569  men  was  sent  to  Arequipa,  where 
it  remained  until  peace  was  restored.  Tacna  and  Arica, 
as  well  as  Tarapaca,  were  now  in  undisputed  possession 
of  the  revolution. 

To  attempt  the  relief  of  General  Robles,  a column 


1891]  REBELS  OCCUPY  ANTOFAGASTA  355 


2000  strong,  commanded  by  Colonel  Hermogenes  Camus, 
had  been  landed  at  Antofagasta  at  the  end  of  February. 
The  plan  was  to  march  across  the  Atacama  deserts  and 
enter  the  Pampa  of  Tamarugal  to  reach  the  district 
where  Robles  was  encamped,  and  this  journey  was  a 
matter  of  weeks  if  all  went  well  with  the  expedition. 
Colonel  Camus  had  proceeded  as  far  as  Quilloga  when 
news  arrived  of  the  annihilation  of  the  Government 
troops  at  Pozo  Almonte,  and  he  decided  it  was  useless 
to  continue  the  march  in  the  face  of  this  disaster.  The 
order  was  given  to  return  to  Calama,  a station  of  the 
Antofagasta  railway  close  to  the  Bolivian  frontier,  and 
this  place  was  reached  at  the  end  of  the  third  week  in 
March.  One  reason  that  decided  Colonel  Camus  to  adopt 
this  course  was  the  insubordinate  conduct  of  the  men 
under  his  command,  and  this  became  so  serious  that  he 
was  obliged  to  disarm  a portion  of  his  force.  Arriving 
at  Calama,  the  information  received  was  unsatisfactory, 
and  Camus  determined  to  delay  any  further  movement 
until  he  was  joined  by  Senor  Villegas  y Silva,  the  Inten- 
dente  of  Antofagasta. 

Since  March  16  Antofagasta  had  been  blockaded, 
and  on  the  17th  the  officer  in  command  of  the  Blanco 
Encalada  had  notified  the  Intendente  that  measures 
would  be  taken  to  suspend  the  railway  service  and  cut 
off  the  water  supply  of  the  town,  both  railway  and  water 
distillery  being  commanded  by  the  guns  of  the  war- 
ships. On  March  18  a detachment  of  35  men  of  the 
garrison  mutinied,  joined  the  revolution,  and  were  taken 
on  board  the  Blanca  Encalada.  On  the  19th  a division 
of  Congressional  troops  under  General  Holley  landed  at 
Celoso,  close  to  Antofagasta,  and  Senor  Villegas,  the 
Intendente,  decided  to  retire  with  the  garrison  to  the 
interior  and  join  Camus  at  Calama.  This  he  did,  the 
garrison  of  514  officers  and  men  proceeding  by  train  to 
Calama,  and  reaching  that  place  early  the  following  day. 
The  town  of  Antofagasta  was  thus  left  free  for  the 
occupation  of  the  revolutionary  forces,  and  it  was  taken 
possession  of  by  General  Ilolley  without  resistance. 


356 


CHILE 


A reconnaissance  was  made  from  Antofagasta  towards 
Calama  to  ascertain  the  position  and  strength  of  the 
division  under  Camus,  and  some  skirmishing  occurred, 
but  no  serious  fighting.  Holley  considered  it  advisable 
to  send  north  for  reinforcements,  and  the  advance  to 
Calama  was  postponed  until  the  ‘29th.  Meanwhile, 
Camus,  who  had  decided  to  enter  Bolivian  territory, 
travelled  by  rail  with  his  division  to  Huanchaca,  and 
there  all  armament  was  surrendered  to  the  Bolivian 
authorities,  an  encampment  being  formed  at  Uyuni 
preparatory  to  the  journey  over  the  Andes  into  Argentina, 
thence  by  way  of  Mendoza  and  the  Uspallata  pass  to 
Santiago.  On  April  5,  1891,  this  force  set  out,  and  after 
marching  660  miles  on  foot  throughout  the  wild,  moun- 
tainous regions  of  the  Cordillera,  and  travelling  1200 
miles  by  rail  from  Jujuy  to  Uspallata,  finally  reached 
Santiago  on  May  17,  a performance  which  showed 
wonderful  poAver  of  resistance  to  hardship  and  fatigue. 
Thus,  on  March  29,  Calama  was  occupied  by  Congression- 
alists,  and  the  whole  province  of  Atacama  fell  under 
their  control. 

The  Congressionalist  leaders  now  determined  to  take 
possession  of  the  port  and  district  of  Caldera,  and  this 
was  accomplished  on  April  22  without  resistance  from 
the  small  garrison.  The  detachment  of  troops  at  Caldera 
and  the  surrounding  district  consisted  of  600  men  of 
the  Hitsares  de  Santiago , commanded  by  Colonel  Stephan, 
and  this  officer  finding  all  other  means  of  retreat  cut  off, 
decided  to  follow  the  example  of  Colonel  Camus  and 
march  over  the  mountains  into  Argentine  territory  and 
thence  to  Chile.  This  was  another  remarkable  under- 
taking, as  deep  snow  was  met  in  the  pass  of  Uspallata 
and  elsewhere,  but  it  was  successfully  accomplished, 
and  Colonel  Stephan  and  his  men  reached  Santiago  in 
the  middle  of  July,  1891. 

The  ease  with  which  the  towns  on  the  coast  had 
been  occupied  tended  to  make  the  rebel  officers  over- 
confident, and  this  led  to  a serious  misfortune  after  the 
occupation  of  Caldera,  when  the  Blanco  Encalada  was 


1891 J SINKING  OF  BLANCO  ENCALADA  357 


left  to  guard  that  port.  In  the  possession  of  the  Govern- 
ment were  two  torpedo-boats,  the  Lynch  and  Condell , 
and  President  Balmaceda  ordered  these  vessels  to  cruise 
northwards  towards  Caldera,  to  see  if  an  opportunity 
offered  for  the  destruction  of  the  revolutionary  squadron. 
On  the  morning  of  April  23,  at  4 a.m.,  these  two  boats 
crept  into  the  harbour  where  the  Blanco  Encalada  was 
anchored,  and  approached  within  a hundred  yards  with- 
out being  discovered,  and  the  Condell  discharged  three 
torpedoes  in  rapid  succession,  but  without  effect.  The 
Lynch  was  more  fortunate,  and  her  second  torpedo  struck 
the  Blanco  Encalada  amidships,  causing  her  to  founder 
in  five  minutes,  drowning  12  officers  and  207  men. 
Both  the  Condell  and  Lynch  escaped  without  serious 
damage,  although  exposed  to  a hot  fire  from  the  Blanco 
Encalada  and  the  shore.  When  outside  Caldera  Bay, 
they  fell  in  with  the  revolutionary  armed  transport 
Angamos,  and  nearly  succeeded  in  capturing  her,  but 
were  prevented  by  the  appearance  of  another  vessel, 
supposed  to  be  the  Esmeralda. 

After  the  sinking  of  the  Blanco  Encalada , a lull 
occurred.  The  Congressionalists  were  awaiting  arms 
and  ammunition  from  Europe  and  the  United  States 
before  attempting  an  attack  on  the  main  positions  of 
Balmaceda  at  Santiago  and  Valparaiso,  and  meanwhile 
the  organisation  of  additional  troops  was  carried  on  at 
Iquique  and  other  centres.  In  this  preparatory  work 
the  Congressionalists  were  aided  by  Colonel  Korner,  a 
German  officer  who  had  been  attached  to  the  Chilian 
army  before  the  revolt. 

The  escape  of  Colonel  Korner  from  Valparaiso,  when 
he  started  for  the  north  to  join  the  insurgents  is  an 
example  of  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  Congressional 
sympathisers  who  wished  to  take  active  part  in  the 
revolt.  Every  steamer  was  watched,  and  no  opportunity 
occurred  for  Korner  to  embark.  At  last,  with  the 
connivance  of  some  friends,  he  was  coopered  up  in  a 
barrel  and  shipped  as  cargo,  not  being  released  from  his 
voluntary  confinement  until  the  ship  was  well  out  at  sea. 


358 


CHILE 


Balmaceda  was  still  confident  he  could  hold  his  own 
in  spite  of  the  reverses  he  had  suffered.  An  army  of 
40,000  men  was  concentrated  in  the  central  and 
southern  districts  of  Chile ; two  men-of-war,  the  Presi- 
dents Pinto  and  Presidents  Errazuriz,  were  expected 
shortly  from  Europe,  and  several  torpedo-boats,  in 
addition  to  the  Lynch  and  Condell , were  prepared  for 
service.  Unfortunately  for  himself,  Balmaceda  now 
adopted  a more  severe  policy  against  all  persons 
suspected  of  complicity  in  the  revolution,  and  his 
conduct  alienated  much  sympathy.  On  May  15,  two 
sergeants  of  the  7th  Regiment,  Benigno  Pena  and  Pedro 
Pablo  Meza,  were  condemned  to  death  on  a charge  of 
treason,  and  shot ; on  May  23,  similar  treatment  was 
accorded  to  Gregorio  Vera,  Juan  Ovalle,  Ramon  Santi- 
banez,  and  Juan  Grammer,  in  consequence  of  an  attempt 
to  seize  the  torpedo-boat  Guale,  and  other  executions 
followed.  Balmaceda  now  found  that  he  was  short  of 
funds  to  meet  the  heavy  expenses  entailed  by  the  war,  as 
a large  proportion  of  the  Chilian  revenues  were  derived 
from  export  duties  on  nitrate  of  soda,  and  this  source  of 
income  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Congres- 
sionalists  when  they  obtained  control  of  Tarapaca.  In 
these  circumstances  he  issued  Treasury  notes,  and 
utilised  the  specie  reserve  which  had  been  accumulated 
for  the  conversion  of  the  paper  money  emitted  during 
the  Chilian-Peruvian  war,  both  these  measures  entailing 
a serious  disturbance  of  economic  and  financial  condi- 
tions. 

In  April  the  Congressionalists  organised  a Provi- 
sional Government  at  Iquique  with  Captain  Jorje  Montt 
at  the  head  of  the  Administration.  The  arrangements 
for  military  and  naval  operations  devolved  upon  this 
Junta  de  Gobierno,  as  the  Administration  was  officially 
styled  in  public  documents,  and  it  was  responsible  for 
all  appointments,  and  for  the  necessary  supplies  of  war 
material  for  the  campaign. 

General  Estanislao  Canto,  who  had  been  nominated 
Commander-in-chief  of  the  Congressional  army,  was  an 


1891] 


THE  IT  AT  A INCIDENT 


359 


energetic  organiser,  and  lie  was  fortunate  in  having 
Colonel  Korner  as  his  right-hand  man ; but  regiments 
of  soldiers  without  arms  and  ammunition  were  of  little 
avail,  and  it  was  to  the  provision  of  an  adequate  supply 
of  war  material  that  the  attention  of  the  Provisional 
Government  was  principally  devoted.  Agents  were 
employed  in  England,  on  the  Continent  of  Europe,  and 
in  the  United  States,  to  purchase  the  required  equip- 
ment, and  money  for  this  purpose  was  plentiful  from 
the  duties  on  the  export  of  nitrate  of  soda  from 
Tarapaca  and  the  assistance  of  wealthy  supporters. 
The  principal  difficulty  lay  in  the  shipment  of  warlike 
material  from  foreign  ports,  for  the  agents  of 
Balmaceda  were  active  in  denouncing  the  embarka- 
tion of  arms  and  ammunition.  For  the  purpose  of 
evading  these  restrictions,  the  transport  Itata  was 
despatched  to  a point  near  San  Diego  in  California  to 
bring  supplies  ordered  by  the  Junta , the  cargo  consist- 
ing of  5000  rides  and  2,500,000  cartridges.  This  was  to 
be  transferred  from  a sailing  ship  off'  the  island  of  San 
Clemento,  and  the  Itata  left  Iquique  in  April  on  this 
important  mission. 

In  due  course  the  Itata  received  her  cargo,  and 
apparently  everything  was  ready  for  the  homeward 
journey,  when  an  unexpected  difficulty  arose.  The 
representative  of  Balmaceda  in  the  United  States 
notified  the  authorities  of  the  ltata's  presence  in 
United  States  waters,  and  gave  particulars  of  her 
mission.  Orders  were  issued  to  prevent  the  steamer 
leaving  the  port,  and  a marshal  was  placed  on  board, 
the  officer  in  command,  Captain  M.  Tejeda,  being- 
advised  that  he  could  not  sail  pending  a decision  as  to 
the  action  to  be  taken.  Captain  Tejeda,  well  aware  of 
the  anxiety  with  which  his  cargo  was  expected  at 
Iquique,  slipped  out  of  San  Diego'carrying  the  United 
States  marshal  with  him,  and  a man-of-war  was  sent  in 
pursuit,  but  was  unable  to  overtake  him.  Knowing 
some  United  States  naval  vessels  were  off  Iquique, 
Tejeda  took  his  ship  into  Tocopilla,  reaching  that  port 


360 


CHILE 


on  June  3,  1891,  and  there  he  received  telegraphic  in- 
structions to  proceed  to  Iquique  without  disembarking 
any  portion  of  the  cargo.  The  Itata  entered  the  harbour 
of  the  latter  port  a little  before  midnight  on  June  3,  and 
was  directed  by  the  revolutionary  authorities  to  anchor 
near  the  United  States  warships. 

The  Junta  cle  Gobierno  was  unable  to  refuse  the 
demand  of  Admiral  MacCann  that  the  Itata  should  be 
sent  back  to  San  Diego,  and  there  submitted  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  courts,  although  this 
entailed  a long  delay  in  the  delivery  of  the  arms  and 
ammunition,  and  possibly  even  the  confiscation  of  the 
cargo.  No  argument  would  induce  the  American 
Admiral  to  modify  his  attitude,  and  the  Congression- 
alists  were  forced  to  order  the  vessel  north.  On 
June  13,  a guard  from  the  United  States  cruiser 
Charleston  arrived  on  board  the  Itata,  and  at  8 p.m. 
she  left  for  San  Diego  with  the  Charleston  as  a con- 
voy. It  was  a bitter  disappointment  to  the  rebels  and 
a triumph  for  Balmaceda  that  this  cargo  was  not  dis- 
embarked, and  as  events  turned  out  the  vessel  was 
detained  in  San  Diego  until  the  following  October. 

On  April  19  the  Junta  received  a communication 
from  Rear-Admiral  Hotham  to  the  effect  that  he  had 
been  requested  by  the  British  Minister  in  Santiago,  Mr 
John  Gordon  Kennedy,  to  inform  the  Congressionalists 
that  in  his  opinion  and  that  of  the  German  Minister, 
Baron  Gutschmid,  Balmaceda  would  open  peace  negotia- 
tions, and  he  desired  to  know  if  the  Junta  would  be 
willing  to  discuss  the  subject.  Admiral  Hotham  further 
stated  that  he  was  prepared  to  give  passage  to  Valparaiso 
in  the  Warspite  to  the  commissioners  appointed  to 
represent  the  Congressionalists.  The  Junta  agreed  to 
follow  the  suggestion  of  the  British  and  German 
Ministers,  and  nominated  a commission  to  discuss  terms 
for  a cessation  of  hostilities,  the  commissioners  being 
M.  Concha  y Toro,  E.  Altimirano,  C.  Walker  Martinez, 
Gregorio  Donoso,  B.  Prado,  Pedro  Montt,  and  Eduardo 
Matte.  A safe  conduct  was  issued  by  Balmaceda  for 


1891] 


A PEACE  CONFERENCE 


361 


these  representatives  to  proceed  to  Santiago  and  be  free 
from  molestation  until  May  15,  and  on  May  3 they  held 
a preliminary  meeting.  It  was  then  found  that  it  was 
not  the  good  offices  of  the  British  and  German  Ministers 
that  had  been  accepted  by  Balmaceda,  but  those  tendered 
by  the  representatives  of  the  United  States,  France,  and 
Brazil ; but  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  continue  the 
negotiations  in  spite  of  this  change.  A second  meeting 
was  held,  at  8 p.m.,  in  the  house  of  the  United  States 
Minister,  Mr  Patrick  Egan,  and  a third  conference  took 
place  on  the  following  day.  On  May  5 the  com- 
missioners placed  in  the  hands  of  the  mediators  the  con- 
ditions upon  which  they  were  willing  to  make  peace,  and 
this  document  stated  : — “ In  the  name  of  our  colleagues, 
we  offer  to  lay  down  our  arms  if  the  Constitution  and 
Laws  of  the  Republic  be  re-established  in  full  vigour, 
with  the  declaration  and  acknowledgment  of  nullity  of 
all  acts  executed  in  open  violation  of  the  Constitution 
and  Laws.  The  constitutional  and  legal  situation  must 
revert  to  where  it  was  on  December  31,  1890,  for  the 
purpose  of  eliminating  from  the  Boletines  decrees  which 
have  exceeded  the  faculties  of  the  Executive.  As  an 
example  of  our  meaning,  we  cite  the  decree  ordering  the 
elections  of  senators,  deputies,  and  municipal  authorities 
in  March  last.  The  citizens  deriving  offices  from  those 
illegal  elections  cannot  be  recognised  as  representatives 
of  the  people.  We  would  point  out  that  the  Courts  of 
Justice  ought  to  sit  with  all  the  attributes  of  jurisdiction 
provided  by  our  laws,  and  that  the  numerous  decrees 
dismissing  public  employes  must  be  revoked  where  such 
officials  are  protected  by  public  guarantees.  The 
legitimate  Congress,  whose  power  still  subsists,  should 
be  immediately  convened,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging 
future  elections  and  providing  for  the  expense  of  main- 
taining the  public  Administration.  In  other  words,  we 
ask  for  the  re-establishment  of  the  Government  on  a 
constitutional  basis.  In  the  second  place,  we  ask  for 
substantial  guarantees  that  any  agreement  will  be  loyally 
executed.”  This  document  was  signed  by  the  seven 


362 


CHILE 


commissioners,  although  not  without  objection  on  the 
part  of  Senores  Prado,  Concha,  Matte,  and  Altimirano, 
who  desired  to  insert  a clause  providing  for  the  resigna- 
tion of  Balmaceda.  It  was  pointed  out,  however,  that 
this  would  be  the  certain  consequence  of  the  abrogation 
of  all  decrees  since  the  end  of  1890,  and  that  the 
demands  were  less  personal  if  Balmaceda  were  not 
directly  mentioned. 

Next  day  the  mediators,  Mr  Egan  for  the  United 
States,  M.  A.  Defrance,  the  French  charge  d’affaires, 
and  Senlior  E.  de  B.  Cavalcanti  de  Lacerda  for  Brazil, 
communicated  the  general  tenor  of  these  terms  to 
Balmaceda  through  his  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
On  learning  the  proposed  conditions  Balmaceda  expressed 
surprise  that  the  revolutionary  representatives  should 
have  asked  so  much,  but  consented  to  give  further 
consideration  to  the  proposals  before  sending  a reply ; 
meanwhile,  unfortunately,  an  incident  occurred  that 
caused  negotiations  to  be  broken  off.  About  4.30  p.m. 
on  the  same  day  that  the  terms  of  the  Congressionalist 
commissioners  were  communicated,  Balmaceda  with  the 
members  of  his  Cabinet  left  the  Congress  Hall  and  had 
no  sooner  reached  the  street  than  they  were  approached 
by  two  men  on  horseback,  who  threw  a bomb  on  either 
side  of  the  President  and  galloped  away.  One  of  these 
bombs  exploded,  but  caused  no  injury,  and  the  other 
failed  to  burst.  The  general  idea  in  Santiago  was  that 
the  affair  was  a farce,  and  was  not  intended  to  do  any 
harm ; but  this  was  not  the  opinion  of  the  Cabinet, 
and  Minister  Godoy  insisted  that  it  was  the  work  of 
sympathisers  with  the  revolution.  It  was  then  decided 
to  cancel  the  safe  conducts  issued  to  the  commissioners, 
and  order  their  arrest  and  imprisonment,  and  it  was 
only  the  firm  attitude  of  the  representatives  of  the 
United  States,  France,  and  Brazil  that  prevented  this 
being  done.  Balmaceda  refused  to  continue  the  negotia- 
tions, and  the  commissioners,  whose  safety  was  carefully 
provided  for  by  the  three  foreign  ministers,  proceeded  to 
Valparaiso  and  embarked  for  the  north. 


1891]  FAILURE  OF  PEACE  PROPOSALS  363 


An  attempt  was  made  at  the  end  of  May,  by  the 
United  States  Minister,  to  renew  these  negotiations,  and 
a communication  to  that  effect  was  made  by  Admiral 
MacCann  to  the  Junta  de  Gobierno.  At  the  same  time 
a suggestion  was  put  forward  for  a cessation  of 
hostilities  until  September  18,  the  date  when  the  new 
presidential  term  would  commence ; but  to  this  latter 
proposal  Balmaceda  refused  to  listen,  and  in  consequence 
notliing  was  accomplished. 

On  May  27  the  Government  of  Bolivia  issued  a 
decree  recognising  the  belligerency  of  the  Junta  de 
Gobierno,  and  that  a state  of  civil  war  existed  in  Chile ; 
but  this  was  the  only  Government  to  adopt  this  attitude 
in  spite  of  every  endeavour  to  induce  other  South 
American  Administrations  to  take  a similar  step.  The 
desire  for  this  recognition  was  to  prevent  Balmaceda 
obtaining  supplies  of  war  material,  as  he  had  done  in 
the  case  of  the  transport  Aquila  purchased  in  Buenos 
Aires  in  July ; another  important  reason  was  that  the 
two  new  cruisers  Preside nte  Errazuriz  and  Presidente 
Pinto  were  now  ready  to  leave  France,  and  substantial 
delay  in  the  departure  of  these  vessels  could  only  be 
effected  by  the  revolutionary  agents  if  the  belligerent 
status  of  the  Congressionalists  was  recognised. 

In  June  the  supporters  of  Balmaceda  were  opti- 
mistic. The  sinking  of  the  Blanco  Encalada  and  the 
incident  of  the  Itata  raised  hopes  of  ultimate  victory, 
and  the  fact  that  the  two  cruisers  constructed  in  France 
were  reported  ready  increased  their  confidence.  It  was 
proposed  to  organise  a squadron  comprising  these  two 
new  cruisers,  the  torpedo-boats  Condell  and  Lynch, 
some  smaller  vessels  of  the  same  class,  and  the  armed 
transports  Imperial  and  Aquila,  arrangements  for  the 
purchase  of  the  latter  steamer  from  the  Veloce  Company 
being  well  advanced. 

Pending  the  arrival  of  the  cruisers  and  the  Aquila, 
the  Condell  and  Lynch  were  sent  on  predatory  excur- 
sions to  the  section  of  the  seaboard  controlled  by  the 
Congressionalists  ; to  a certain  extent  these  tactics  were 


364 


CHILE 


successful,  the  superior  speed  of  the  two  torpedo-boats 
rendering  them  immune  from  capture.  They  made 
their  appearance  at  Pisagua,  Iquique,  Chanaral,  Taltal, 
and  Antofagasta  while  the  Junta  de  Gobierno  was 
waiting  for  war  material  to  equip  the  army  for  the 
invasion  of  the  central  districts.  Throughout  June  and 
July,  Balmaceda  showed  the  greatest  energy  in  augment- 
ing the  strength  of  his  army,  and  at  the  beginning  of 
August  the  number  of  men  under  arms  from  Coquimbo 
to  Valdivia  was  50,000,  the  bulk  of  these  being  con- 
centrated for  the  defence  of  the  National  Capital, 
Valparaiso,  and  Coquimbo. 

As  Balmaceda  became  more  confident  of  success 
he  developed  marked  dictatorial  tendencies.  In  June 
he  made  preparations  for  the  election  of  his  successor, 
although  at  the  time  he  did  not  control  one-half  of 
Chile.  The  candidate  supported  by  the  Government, 
Senor  Claudio  Vicuna,  was  unopposed,  and  was  declared 
elected.  In  many  other  ways  Balmaceda  developed 
despotic  attributes ; every  day  suspected  persons  were 
arrested,  the  case  of  Mr  Richard  Cumming  raising  strong 
feelings  against  the  Administration.  This  man  was 
born  in  Chile  of  British  parents,  but  the  fact  of  his  birth 
in  Chilian  territory  subjected  him  to  Chilian  laws.  The 
charge  against  him  was  complicity  in  a plot  to  seize  the 
torpedo-boats  Condell  and  Lynch : and  doubtless  he  had 
knowledge  of  this  conspiracy,  for  in  common  with  the 
majority  of  men  of  his  class  he  was  in  sympathy  with 
the  Coimressionalists.  He  was  tortured  into  an  admis- 

o 

sion  of  being  cognisant  of  the  plot,  and  a court  martial 
condemned  him  to  death.  His  execution  took  place  on 
July  12,  and  created  a profound  sensation. 

Abroad  the  Congressionalist  agents  worked  hard 
for  the  revolutionary  cause.  The  conditions  leading  up 
to  the  revolt  were  explained  in  the  United  States, 
Europe,  and  in  South  America.  In  North  America 
the  representatives  of  the  Junta  de  Gobierno  were  Senor 
Pedro  Montt  and  Senor  Trumbull ; in  Europe  the  task 
was  confided  to  Senor  Augusto  Matte  and  Senor 


1891]  CONGRESSIONAL  MISSIONS  ABROAD  365 


Augustin  Ross ; in  Bolivia  to  Senor  J uan  Gonzalo 
Matta;  in  Argentina  to  Senor  Adolfo  Guerrero  and 
Senor  Alvaro  Bianchi  Tupper ; and  in  Peru  to  Senor 
Javier  Vial  Solar.  The  mission  to  the  United  States 
was  unfortunate  in  regard  to  the  Itata,  but  Matte  and 
Ross  in  Europe  materially  helped  the  rebels ; not  only 
was  war  material  obtained  and  shipped  to  Chile,  but  in 
May  and  June  the  departure  of  the  two  cruisers  so 
anxiously  expected  by  President  Balmaceda  was  kept 
back  until  the  revolutionary  leaders  had  time  to  organise 
the  invasion  of  the  central  districts.  In  Argentina, 
Guerrero  and  Tupper  raised  obstacles  to  the  sailing  of 
the  transport  Aquila,  and  they  also  supplied  the  Junta 
with  information  of  all  movements  of  Balmaceda’s 
forces.  In  Peru,  the  task  of  Senor  Solar  was  to  delay 
the  steamer  Mapocho,  induce  the  autliorites  not  to  allow 
the  return  to  Chile  of  the  troops  who  had  entered 
Peruvian  territory  after  the  conquest  of  Tarapaca  and 
Tacna  by  the  Congressionalists,  and  to  secure  supplies 
for  the  revolutionary  forces,  these  three  objects  being 
successfully  attained. 

In  Santiago  and  Valparaiso  revolutionary  committees 
worked  unceasingly  against  Balmaceda.  It  was  a most 
dangerous  position  for  sympathisers  with  the  Congres- 
sionalists ; but  they  did  not  flinch,  and  the  progress  of 
the  revolution  and  the  disasters  to  the  Government 
troops  were  made  known,  and  the  effect  of  these 
successes  counteracted  the  influence  of  Balmaceda  in 
many  districts  where  his  authority  was  still  recognised, 
and,  furthermore,  means  were  found  to  smuggle  many 
recruits  to  the  north  for  the  revolutionary  army. 
General  Baquedano,  the  Commander-in-chief  of  the 
Chilian  army  previous  to  the  outbreak  of  the  revolt,  was 
favourably  disposed  towards  the  Congressionalists,  as 
were  many  prominent  people  in  high  places,  who, 
without  open  adhesion  to  the  revolt,  did  much  to  alienate 
sympathy  from  Balmaceda. 

On  July  3,  1891,  the  transport  Maipo  arrived  at 
Iquique  with  a cargo  of  arms  and  ammunition.  This 


366 


CHILE 


war  material  was  purchased  by  Senor  Ross  in  Europe, 
and  despatched  on  the  steamer  Waudle  to  San  Sebastian 
Bay  in  Tierra  del  Fuego,  and  there  the  Maipo  had 
taken  over  the  cargo.  The  shipment  comprised  a 
battery  of  6 Krupp  mountain  guns,  with  1700  shells 
and  1000  shrapnels ; 5000  Gras  rifles,  with  2,000,000 
cartridges ; 1,970,000  Mannlicher  cartridges ; and  a 
supply  of  ammunition  for  the  squadron. 

Now  that  arms  and  ammunition  were  available,  no 
time  was  lost.  The  regiments  recruited  at  Iquique, 
undergoing  military  instruction,  were  equipped  and 
drafted  to  points  in  the  south  and  new  regiments  raised, 
principally  from  the  miners  working  in  the  nitrate  of 
soda  districts.  At  the  end  of  July  a notification  was 
sent  to  the  revolutionary  committees  in  Santiago  and 
Valparaiso  that  the  advance  of  the  Congressional  army 
might  be  expected  in  August,  and  that  the  date  would 
be  signalised  by  the  appearance  of  the  Esmeralda  off 
Valparaiso.  The  total  strength  of  the  proposed  expedi- 
tion was  9300  men,  and  the  force  was  divided  into 
three  brigades,  the  first  being  concentrated  at  Huasco, 
the  second  and  third  at  Caldera.  Here  transports  were 
in  readiness,  and,  on  August  16,  the  order  was  given  to 
start  the  expedition ; and  the  vessels,  convoyed  by  the 
squadron,  set  out  for  the  south.  This  was  the  crisis  of 
the  revolutionary  movement,  for  less  than  10,000  men 
were  to  attack  an  army  of  40,000  strong.  Failure 
meant  the  collapse  of  the  revolutionary  cause ; but  the 
leaders  were  confident  of  success ; the  troops  were 
thoroughly  well  armed  and  equipped,  they  were  the 
best  fighting  material  in  Chile,  and  they  had  enlisted  in 
the  revolutionary  ranks  of  their  own  free  will.  More- 
over, the  Junta  had  information  from  Santiago  and 
Valparaiso  that  desertions  from  the  army  of  Balmaceda 
would  be  numerous  when  the  expedition  landed,  and 
this  proved  to  be  the  case. 

Balmaceda  received  notice  of  the  preparations  of  the 
Congressionalists,  and  made  plans  to  repel  the  invasion. 
Strong  positions  were  selected  in  the  neighbourhood  of 


1891]  the  ADVANCE  TO  THE  SOUTH  367 


Concon  and  Placilla,  to  check  an  advance  upon  Valparaiso, 
for  it  was  known  that  the  landing  would  be  near 
Quinteros,  and  it  was  for  the  object  of  bringing 
the  invaders  immediately  face  to  face  with  a difficult 
situation  that  Concon  was  chosen  as  a first  line  of 
defence,  while  Placilla,  a few  miles  to  the  south,  served 
admirably  as  a second  line.  The  Government  was  con- 
fronted by  unexpected  difficulties  when  it  was  known 
that  the  invasion  was  close  at  hand.  Armed  groups 
made  their  appearance  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Santiago 
and  caused  serious  embarrassment  to  the  authorities  by 
destroying  railway  bridges  and  generally  interrupting 
communication  between  Santiago  and  Valparaiso,  and 
on  August  14  one  of  these  groups  attempting  to  destroy 
the  bridge  near  Quilipue  was  surprised  by  a patrol 
detached  for  the  protection  of  the  line,  and  a skirmish 
ensued,  in  which  the  corporal  of  the  patrol  was  killed. 
On  the  same  afternoon,  four  men  were  arrested  on  a 
charge  of  being  implicated  in  the  revolution,  and  were 
tried  by  summary  court  martial,  condemned  to  death, 
and  executed  on  August  20. 

Balmaceda  now  adopted  measures  of  the  utmost 
severity.  Orders  were  given  to  show  no  mercy  to  any 
insurgents  captured,  and  it  was  under  these  instructions 
that  the  massacre  of  “ Lo  Canas  ” took  place.  Fifty 
young  men,  all  members  of  well-known  families  in 
Santiago,  assembled  at  “Lo  Canas,”  probably  with  the 
intention  of  forming  a party  in  connection  with  the 
revolution,  and  on  the  morning  of  August  19  they  were 
surrounded  by  Government  troops.  No  attempt  was 
made  at  defence,  for  few  of  the  young  men  were  armed, 
but  the  troops  fired  into  the  house  and  killed  twenty-one 
of  the  occupants.  Fifteen  escaped,  although  several 
subsequently  died  of  wounds,  and  fourteen  were  captured 
and  imprisoned  until  the  fall  of  Balmaceda.  On  August 
18  another  group  of  seven  young  men  were  arrested  in 
Santiago. 

It  was  these  occurrences  towards  the  close  of  his 
Administration  that  caused  Balmaceda  to  be  characterised 


368 


CHILE 


as  tyrannical  and  cruel.  When  the  end  of  the  contest 
approached,  the  strain  affected  his  mind  to  such  a degree 
that  the  value  of  human  life  sank  into  insignificance 
when  compared  to  any  question  of  his  own  supremacy. 
Political  suspects  were  flogged  and  tortured  in  the 
prisons  to  make  them  reveal  the  names  of  sympathisers 
with  the  rebellion.  That  these  practices  were  directly 
ordered  by  Balmaceda  is  improbable,  but  that  he  was 
ignorant  of  them  is  impossible.  The  latter  part  of  the 
revolutionary  period  was  a reign  of  terror,  and  it  was 
this  fact  that  contributed  to  the  downfall  of  the  man 
in  whom  centred  the  moving  spirit  of  the  resistance  to 
the  Oongressionalists.  With  the  sympathy  of  the 
majority  of  the  inhabitants  on  his  side,  Balmaceda  could 
have  defied  the  power  and  wealth  arrayed  against  him 
in  the  ranks  of  the  revolution,  and  this  sympathy  he 
had  to  a large  extent  at  the  commencement  of  the 
movement ; but  he  lost  it  entirely  through  the  attitude 
he  subsequently  adopted. 

On  August  18  the  Esmeralda  appeared  off  Valparaiso 
and  fired  three  guns.  This  was  the  signal  agreed  upon 
by  the  Junta  to  notify  the  friends  of  the  Congressionalists 
that  the  disembarkation  of  the  revolutionary  army  would 
take  place  within  forty-eight  hours,  and  it  proved  to  be 
the  death-knell  of  all  hopes  that  Balmaceda  may  have 
had  for  the  re-establishment  of  his  authority.  On  the 
following  day  sixteen  vessels  assembled  fifty  miles  to 
the  south  of  Valparaiso  with  the  army  under  the 
orders  of  General  Estanislao  Canto,  the  revolutionary 
Commander-in-chief,  accompanied  by  General  Holley, 
Minister  of  War  in  the  Junta.  In  the  evening  a pro- 
clamation was  read  to  the  troops  on  the  transports, 
giving  a general  explanation  of  the  object  of  the  expe- 
dition, and  a distribution  of  two  days’  rations  and  a 
supply  of  ammunition  was  then  made. 

At  six  o’clock  next  morning,  the  Condor  and  Huemul, 
accompanied  by  the  transport  Bio-Bio , entered  the  bay 
of  Quinteros  and  made  a careful  search  for  submarine 
mines.  On  reporting  the  bay  clear,  the  Pisagua 


1891]  THE  LANDING  AT  QUINTEROS  369 

Regiment  was  landed  from  the  Bio-Bio  to  occupy  the 
village  of  Quinteros,  and  the  remaining  transports  came 
up,  the  disembarkation  of  the  troops  being  effected  in 
sixteen  barges  towed  by  steam  launches,  each  barge 
carrying  110  men,  and  by  10  p.m.  the  army  was  ashore. 
Notice  of  the  disembarkation  was  despatched  to 
Balmaceda  by  Major  Athas,  who  was  stationed  at 
Quinteros  to  observe  any  approach  of  the  enemy,  and 
after  advising  the  appearance  of  the  fleet  the  telegraphic 
apparatus  was  destroyed  and  the  wires  cut. 

The  news  of  the  landing  at  Quinteros  spread  rapidly 
through  Valparaiso  and  Santiago.  It  was  evident  from 
the  temper  of  the  people  that  any  decided  revolutionary 
success  would  make  the  position  of  Balmaceda  untenable, 
and  that  if  the  Government  forces  were  defeated  in  the 
central  districts,  no  attempt  could  be  made  in  the  south 
to  prolong  the  struggle. 


CHAPTER  XX 
chile — continued, 


Country  round  Quinteros.  Congressionalist  Array  Tactics  of 
Defence.  Battle  of  Concdn.  Congressionalist  Victory.  Heavy 
Casualties.  Reorganisation  of  Government  Troops.  Reinforce- 
ments from  Santiago.  Defence  of  Vina  del  Mar.  Faulty 
Information  Concerning  Valparaiso.  Advance  on  Vina  del  Mar. 
Concentration  at  Quilpue.  Preparations  for  Attacking  Val- 
paraiso. March  to  Placilla.  Defence  of  Placilla.  Strength  o' 
the  Armies.  Battle  of  Placilla.  Severe  Losses.  Occupation  ol 
Valparaiso.  Riotous  Scenes.  Message  to  Balmaceda.  The 
President  Resigns  his  Powers.  Decree  of  General  Baquedano. 
Political  Prisoners.  Unprotected  state  of  Santiago.  Arrival  of 
the  Junta  de  Gobierno.  Disarmament  of  Troops. 


Between  Quinteros  and  Concon  is  the  river  Aconcagua, 
a deep  stream  with  steep  hills  rising  on  either  side,  but 
which  can  be  forded  at  the  village  of  Colmo  and  also  at 
Concon  bajo.  The  advance  of  the  Congressionalist  army 
was  confided  to  Colonel  Korner,  chief  of  staff  to  General 
Canto,  who  was  acquainted  with  the  country  near  the 
Aconcagua  and  with  the  Concon  district  to  the  south, 
and  he  realised  the  importance  of  occupying  the  valley 
of  the  river  before  the  enemy  could  concentrate  in  force 
to  obstruct  the  passage  of  the  fords. 

No  time  was  lost  after  the  disembarkation.  The  1st 
Brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Anibal  Frias,  was  sent 
on  as  the  different  regiments  reached  the  shore,  and  was 
ordered  to  concentrate  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Aconcagua  in  the  direction  of  Concon  bajo,  six  miles 

370 


1891] 


BATTLE  OF  CONCON 


371 


distant  from  Quinteros,  but  it  was  not  until  10  p.m. 
that  they  were  assembled  at  this  point.  The  2nd 
Brigade  was  ordered  to  the  village  of  Colmo,  but  did 
not  reach  its  destination  until  7.30  a.m.  on  the  following 
day  ; and  the  3rd  Brigade,  the  last  to  disembark,  camped 
for  the  night  four  miles  to  the  north  of  Concon  bajo. 
The  total  strength  of  the  revolutionary  army  was  9284 
officers  and  men.  Scouting  parties  were  thrown  out, 
and  reported  that  the  enemy  had  taken  up  positions 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  extending  from  Colmo  to 
Concon  bajo. 

Xo  small  confusion  arose  amongst  the  Balmacedists 
when  the  news  of  the  landing  and  advance  of  the  Con- 
gressionalists  was  received.  Only  the  Valparaiso  and 
Santiago  Divisions  were  ready  to  take  the  field,  the 
former  commanded  by  General  Alcerrica,  and  the  latter 
by  General  Barbosa.  The  effective  strength  of  these 
two  divisions  was  8500  men,  but  owing  to  detachments 
detailed  for  various  purposes  the  number  of  the  troops 
at  Concon  on  August  21  only  reached  6322.  The 
Coquimbo  Division  had  not  come  in,  and  the  Concepcion 
forces  only  marched  for  Santiago  on  the  day  of  the 
disembarkation  of  the  Congressional  army,  so  that  the 
superiority  of  numbers  lay  with  the  attacking  force. 
With  this  knowledge  before  them,  the  senior  officers 
of  the  defence  were  divided  in  opinions  as  to  the  tactics 
to  be  followed,  General  Alcerrica  advising  a retirement 
to  Vina  del  Mar  and  the  occupation  of  the  heights  near 
Miramar ; but  to  this  General  Barbosa  objected  on  the 
ground  that  any  retrograde  movement  would  be  disastrous 
in  its  effects  upon  the  discipline  of  the  troops,  and  this 
argument  eventually  decided  the  point. 

The  battle  was  begun  at  7.30  a.m.  on  August  21  by 
the  Congressional  artillery  of  the  1st  Brigade  opening 
fire  upon  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  with  a view  to 
discover  the  position  of  the  guns  of  the  defence.  To 
this  cannonade  there  was  no  response,  and  rifle  fire  was 
then  directed  against  the  huts  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river,  which  were  forthwith  evacuated.  The  2nd  Brigade 


372 


CHILE 


had  now  reached  Colmo,  and  the  Armstrong  battery 
opened  on  the  enemy,  the  guns  of  the  Government 
forces  replying.  A brisk  artillery  duel  was  maintained 
for  an  hour,  and  meanwhile  a reconnaissance  of  the  two 
fords  was  made  by  the  J unta’s  troops.  The  one  opposite 
Colmo  was  found  practicable  so  far  as  the  depth  of 
water  was  concerned,  but  the  ground  to  the  left  of  the 
river  was  broken  and  afforded  admirable  cover  for 
defence.  At  Concon  bajo  the  conditions  were  more 
favourable,  the  ford  being  only  three  feet  deep,  the 
ascent  to  the  heights  on  the  south  side  of  the  river 
comparatively  easy,  and  the  position  only  weakly  held, 
so  it  was  decided  to  take  the  1st  Brigade  over  the  river 
at  Conc6n  bajo  while  the  2nd  Brigade  engaged  the 
enemy  at  Colmo,  where  the  main  body  of  the  Govern- 
ment troops  were  concentrated.  The  1st  Brigade  of 
the  Congressionalists  crossed  the  river  without  serious 
losses,  occupying  the  heights  on  the  left  bank  near 
Concon  bajo  shortly  before  noon,  and,  once  well  across, 
the  brigade  swung  round  and  attacked  the  left  flank  of 
the  enemy,  while  the  guns  of  the  squadron  seconded  the 
movement  by  shelling  the  plateau  on  which  the  main 
body  lay. 

The  supporters  of  Balmaceda  made  a stubborn  stand 
and  disputed  every  inch  of  ground,  but  at  2.30  p.m. 
reinforcements  were  brought  up  to  the  assistance  of  the 
1st  Brigade,  and  a portion  of  the  2nd  Brigade  was  thrown 
over  the  river  to  push  home  the  assault  on  the  right,  and 
half  an  hour  later  the  Government  forces  began  to  run 
short  of  ammunition.  Thereupon  the  Congressionalist 
troops  perceptibly  gained  ground,  and  shortly  before 
4 p.m.  the  Government  forces  were  driven  from  their 
positions  and  the  victory  of  the  revolutionary  army  was 
complete.  Pursued  by  the  Congressionalist  cavalry,  the 
retreat  quickly  developed  into  a rout ; the  men  threw 
down  their  arms  and  scattered  in  all  directions,  a large 
number  being  taken  prisoners,  while  others  reached 
villages  in  the  neighbourhood  and  discarded  their 
uniforms. 


[Face  page  372. 


1891] 


HEAVY  CASUALTIES 


373 


That  night  the  Congressionalist  army  encamped  on 
the  heights  occupied  by  the  supporters  of  Balmaceda  the 
previous  day.  The  casualties  on  both  sides  had  been 
heavy,  and  the  victors  reported  19  officers  and  197  men 
killed  and  49  officers  and  482  men  wounded,  besides  122 
missing,  probably  drowned  during  the  passage  of  the 
river.  The  loss  on  the  part  of  the  Government  troops 
was  1700  officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded  and 
1500  officers  and  men  taken  prisoners,  while  the  whole 
of  their  artillery,  consisting  of  18  pieces  and  4 
machine  guns,  was  captured.  Amongst  the  wounded 
was  Colonel  Hermogenes  Camus,  the  officer  who  had 
directed  the  march  through  Bolivia  and  across  the 
Andes  after  the  evacuation  of  Antofagasta  by  the 
Government  authorities. 

The  survivors  of  the  army  of  Balmaceda  straggled 
along  the  road  to  Quilpue  and  were  collected  and  re- 
organised by  General  Barbosa,  but  when  mustered  this 
remnant  only  reached  2000.  General  Alcerrica  pro- 
ceeded to  Vina  del  Mar  to  make  preparations  for  the 
defence  of  that  locality  and  Valparaiso,  the  garrison, 
including  the  police,  at  the  latter  place  comprising  1300 
men,  it  having  been  reinforced  on  the  22nd  by  the 
advanced  guard  of  the  Concepcion  Division,  which  had 
reached  Santiago  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th  and  been 
sent  forward  to  endeavour  to  reach  General  Barbosa 
before  the  battle  of  Concon.  The  Congressionalists 
neglected  to  seize  the  railway  between  Santiago  and 
Concbn  after  their  victory,  and  this  negligence  resulted 
in  8000  Government  troops  being  transferred  from 
Santiago  to  Valparaiso  during  the  day  and  night  of  the 
22nd.  In  view  of  these  reinforcements  the  capture  of 
Valparaiso  was  not  easy,  and  General  Alcerrica,  in 
spite  of  the  recent  reverse,  waited  confidently  in  Vina 
del  Mar  for  the  attack. 

On  the  morning  of  August  22  the  revolutionary  army 
was  still  resting  from  the  fatigues  of  the  previous  forty- 
eight  hours,  when  information  reached  General  Canto 
that  both  Vina  del  Mar  and  Valparaiso  were  denuded 


374 


CHILE 


of  troops  and  would  be  an  easy  prey  to  the  Congression- 
alists  if  an  immediate  advance  was  made.  Probably 
this  information  was  correct  in  substance  when  des- 
patched to  the  Commander-in-chief,  for  it  was  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  railway  communication  with  Santiago 
had  been  cut,  as  was  intended  by  General  Canto  after 
the  victory  at  Concon,  but  the  troops  detailed  to  destroy 
the  line  had  failed  to  carry  out  their  instructions,  and 
this  enabled  the  reinforcements  to  reach  Valparaiso. 
Of  the  strength  of  the  garrison  in  Valparaiso  and  Vina 
del  Mar  the  information  was  quite  inaccurate,  but  acting 
on  the  supposition  that  the  place  was  weakly  held,  an 
advance  on  Vina  del  Mar  was  ordered.  For  this 
operation  the  ’2nd  and  3rd  Brigades  were  directed  to 
move  forward  on  the  night  of  the  22nd  until  close  to 
Vina  del  Mar,  then  take  up  positions  on  the  heights 
for  a sudden  attack  on  the  town,  the  assault  being  fixed 
for  daybreak  on  August  23.  It  was  intended  that  the 
place  should  be  carried  by  a bayonet  charge,  and  the 
revolutionary  artillery  was  so  placed  as  to  command 
the  town  and  the  fort  of  Callao  in  order  to  protect  the 
infantry  advance  and  silence  the  guns,  while  the  1st 
Brigade  was  to  cover  the  retirement  of  the  attacking 
force  if  the  movement  was  unsuccessful.  In  accordance 
with  these  dispositions  the  advance  began  during  the 
night. 

Unexpected  difficulties  were  encountered,  and  the 
2nd  and  3rd  Brigades  did  not  reach  their  positions  until 
6 a.m.  in  daylight  and  all  chance  of  surprising  the 
garrison  lost.  Under  the  altered  conditions  the  com- 
manders of  the  2nd  and  3rd  Brigades  requested  further 
instructions  from  the  Commander-in-chief,  and  pending 
his  decision  the  Congressional  artillery  opened  fire  on 
the  fortress  of  Callao,  while  the  Cochrane  and  Esmeralda 
also  bombarded  this  fort  from  seawards,  but  little 
damage  was  done  by  the  artillery  fire  on  either  side.  At 
10  a.m.  orders  were  received  to  withdraw  the  2nd  and 
3rd  Brigades,  and  later  all  the  troops  were  retired 
beyond  reach  of  the  artillery  at  Vina  del  Mar  to  a 


1891]  CONCENTRATION  AT  QUILPUE  375 

position  on  the  heights  of  Las  Cruces.  The  casualties 
during  the  day  were  insignificant,  only  1 officer  and  2 
men  being  wounded. 

The  fact  that  Valparaiso  and  Vina  del  Mar  were 
strongly  held  led  the  Congressionalists  to  reconsider 
their  position.  The  mistake  of  not  cutting  the  railway 
communication  between  Santiago  and  Valparaiso  after 
Concdn  was  clearly  recognised  and  it  was  too  late  to 
repair  the  error,  but  it  was  obvious  that  immediate 
action  must  be  taken  to  deprive  Balmaceda  of  easy 
transportation  from  Santiago  to  the  seaboard.  For  this 
purpose  it  was  determined  to  concentrate  the  army  at 
Quilpue  and  block  the  passage  of  trains  at  that  point. 
In  accordance  with  this  plan  the  2nd  Brigade  marched 
on  the  night  of  August  23,  reaching  Quilpue  early  on 
August  24  without  encountering  resistance,  while  the 
3rd  Brigade  destroyed  the  line  at  Salto  before  retiring  to 
Quilpue.  From  information  gleaned  at  this  point  it  was 
ascertained  that  during  the  previous  twenty-four  hours 
thirteen  trains  conveying  8000  troops  had  passed  through 
the  station  en  route  to  Valparaiso,  and  also  that  Generals 
Barbosa  and  Alcerrica  were  in  Valparaiso,  and  that 
Balmaceda  had  been  in  Quillota  and  Quilpue  that 
morning.  The  1st  Brigade  was  ordered  to  make  a feint 
of  attacking,  and  then  retire  on  the  evening  of  August  24 
towards  Quilpue,  bringing  the  guns  and  stores  disem- 
barked by  the  squadron  at  Concon  bajo ; to  further 
deceive  the  enemy,  orders  were  issued  for  camp  fires  to 
be  lighted  on  the  evening  of  the  24th,  and  replenished 
before  the  position  was  evacuated.  The  distance  from 
the  encampment  of  the  revolutionary  army  to  Quilpue 
was  only  six  miles,  but  the  mountainous  nature  of  the 
country  and  bad  condition  of  the  roads  from  the  heavy 
rainfall  prevented  the  rearguard  of  the  1st  Brigade 
reaching  that  place  until  after  daybreak  on  August  25. 
With  the  exception  of  a small  force  sent  on  reconnais- 
sance duty  towards  Pena  Blanca,  the  troops  were  per- 
mitted to  rest  on  August  25. 

The  object  of  General  Canto  now  was  to  attack 


376 


CHILE 


Valparaiso  from  the  south-east.  In  order  to  do  this  it 
was  necessary  to  obtain  possession  of  the  heights  near 
Placilla  and  Las  Zorras,  and  it  was  decided  to  advance 
from  Quilpue  to  Las  Cadenas,  a hamlet  on  the  Placilla 
road,  ten  miles  in  a direct  line  from  Quilpue.  It  was 
thought  inadvisable  to  march  out  of  Quilpue  by  daylight, 
as  the  movement  could  be  seen  by  the  enemy’s  outposts 
on  the  heights  near  Salto,  and  orders  were  given  to  start 
at  1.30  a.m.  on  August  26 ; but  a delay  occurred,  and  it 
was  6.30  a.m.  before  the  1st  Brigade,  forming  the 
rearguard,  left  Quilpue',  and,  consequently,  news  of  the 
movement  reached  the  authorities  in  Valparaiso.  The 
heavy  state  of  the  roads  made  the  march  to  Las  Cadenas 
a long  affair,  and  the  circuitous  route  followed  increased 
the  distance  to  25  miles.  The  troops  were  wearied  from 
want  of  sleep,  lost  their  formation  and  straggled  out,  and 
it  was  not  until  daybreak  on  August  27  that  the  army 
reached  its  destination.  Soon  after  leaving  Quilpue  a 
squadron  of  the  Husares  de  Colipulli,  commanded  by 
Major  Julio  Padilla,  joined  the  Congressionalists  and  was 
incorporated  under  the  title  of  Husares  Constitutionales. 
The  intention  of  General  Canto  had  been  to  occupy  the 
heights  of  Placilla  at  daybreak  on  August  27 ; but  the 
disorganised  condition  of  the  men  made  this  impossible, 
and  the  attack  was  postponed  until  8 a.m.  on  the  28th, 
to  allow  the  troops  rest  and  food  before  going  into 
action. 

The  retirement  from  Vina  del  Mar  on  August  24 
surprised  Balmaceda’s  generals,  and  they  imagined  that 
the  enemy  had  returned  to  Concon  bajo  to  re-embark,  or 
had  marched  inland  to  attack  Santiago.  A reconnais- 
sance on  the  25th  discovered  the  Congressionalists  at 
Quilpue.  General  Barbosa  insisted  that  the  revolutionary 
forces  intended  to  re-embark ; but  General  Alcerrica 
maintained  that  an  attack  would  be  made  on  Valparaiso 
from  Placilla,  and  events  proved  this  conclusion  to  be 
correct,  for  on  the  26th  a telegram  from  Colonel  Juan 
de  Dios  Leon,  who  was  reconnoitring  between  Salto  and 
Quilpue,  informed  the  authorities  that  the  Co'  gression- 


1891] 


BATTLE  OF  PLACILLA 


377 


alists  had  followed  the  direction  of  the  Casablanca 
cartroad  towards  Placilla. 

From  this  it  was  evident  that  the  enemy  intended  to 
converge  upon  Placilla,  and  preparations  were  com- 
menced by  Barbosa  and  Alcerrica  to  occupy  the  heights 
of  Alto  del  Puerto  with  the  main  body  of  the  Govern- 
ment troops.  At  half-past  three  in  the  afternoon  the 
division  near  Vina  del  Mar  was  advanced  to  Las  Zorras 
and  Alto  del  Puerto,  the  vanguard  reaching  this  position 
at  ten  o’clock  next  morning,  the  27th.  As  had  happened 
with  the  Congressionalists,  the  heavy  state  of  the  roads 
made  marching  difficult,  and  the  men  were  worn  out 
with  fatigue  when  they  arrived  at  their  destination.  A 
reconnaissance  in  the  direction  of  Las  Cadenas  reported 
the  enemy  in  full  strength  five  miles  distant.  The 
Government  troops  concentrated  on  the  heights  at 
Placilla  numbered  9200  officers  and  men,  and  the 
strength  of  the  revolutionary  forces  was  almost  the 
same,  the  gaps  in  the  ranks  from  the  fighting  at  Concon 
having  been  filled  by  volunteers  from  the  prisoners  taken 
on  that  occasion  and  by  deserters  from  the  Government 
army.  The  defence  had  40  guns  and  4 machine  guns, 
while  the  revolutionary  army  was  equipped  with  50 
guns  and  10  machine  guns ; but  this  preponderance  of 
artillery  was  counterbalanced  by  the  more  advantageous 
position  held  by  their  opponents. 

The  plan  of  the  revolutionary  leaders  for  the  attack 
upon  Placilla  on  August  28  was  simple.  The  artillery 
was  directed  to  take  up  positions  on  the  high  ground 
near  Las  Cadenas  fronting  the  Alto  del  Puerto  and  to 
the  east  of  the  road  to  Placilla,  with  orders  to  concen- 
trate all  fire  on  the  enemy’s  guns,  and  was  protected  by 
the  3rd  Brigade.  The  1st  and  2nd  Brigades  were  to 
advance  to  positions  on  both  sides  of  the  Placilla  road, 
and  to  press  forward  gradually  for  a frontal  attack  on 
the  Alto  del  Puerto,  but  inclining  to  the  left  to  outflank 
the  right  wing  of  the  defence.  Part  of  the  cavalry  was 
in  rear  of  the  2nd  Brigade  to  protect  the  left,  and  the 
remainder  was  in  rear  of  the  3rd  Brigade  ready  for  any 


378 


CHILE 


emergencies,  and,  if  necessary,  to  support  the  right 
wing.  The  Commander-in-chief  remained  with  the  3rd 
Brigade. 

The  position  of  the  Government  troops  was  ex- 
ceptionally strong,  and  extended  on  both  sides  of  the 
Placilla  road,  with  the  right  and  left  flanks  resting 
on  deep  ravines.  From  Placilla  to  the  Alto  del  Puerto 
the  ground  rose  gradually,  and  afforded  excellent  cover 
and  a clear  field  of  fire.  The  cavalry  was  posted  in 
rear  of  the  line  in  a dip  in  the  Valparaiso  road,  the 
bulk  of  the  artillery  being  massed  in  the  centre,  but 
a few  guns  were  detached  towards  the  right.  The 
reserves  were  kept  close  to  the  cavalry  in  rear  of  the 
centre. 

At  7 a.m.  on  August  28,  the  Congressionalist  advance 
began.  The  1st  Brigade  led  the  attack,  and  crept  up 
within  half  a mile  of  the  enemy’s  lines  before  fire  opened, 
but  at  7.30  a.m.  the  artillery  on  both  sides  commenced 
a heavy  cannonade  which  lasted  for  an  hour.  Shortly 
before  9 a.m.  General  Canto  saw  that  the  2nd  Brigade, 
which  should  have  supported  the  1st  Brigade,  had 
drifted  to  the  left  to  obtain  the  protection  of  some 
broken  ground  and  was  not  able  to  reinforce  the  leading 
troops,  rendering  the  position  of  this  section  extremely 
critical.  Reserves  from  the  3rd  Brigade  were  immedi- 
ately thrown  forward,  and  at  10  a.m.  all  available  troops 
of  the  revolutionary  force  were  engaged  in  the  first  line. 
The  advance  was  disputed  at  every  step,  the  defence 
maintaining  a heavy  rifle  and  artillery  fire,  and  the 
Congressionalists  being  checked  for  some  time  by  the 
ravines  and  wire  fences ; but  a bayonet  charge  by  the 
Esmeralda  Regiment  against  the  left  flank  of  the  defence 
at  half-past  ten  carried  that  section  of  the  position,  and 
immediately  afterwards  the  Congressional  cavalry  charged 
the  line  and  captured  several  guns.  The  infantry  now 
broke  through  the  defence  at  all  points  and  a hand-to- 
hand  fight  ensued ; but  it  lasted  only  a few  moments, 
and  then  the  defenders  threw  down  their  arms,  some 
surrendering,  others  taking  to  flight.  By  eleven  o’clock 


1891] 


CONGRESSIONAL  VICTORY 


379 


the  battle  was  over,  and  the  last  hopes  of  Balmaceda 
were  shattered. 

When  defeat  was  certain,  General  Alcerrica  attempted 
to  escape  on  horseback,  but  was  pursued  by  some 
cavalry-men,  against  whom  he  fired  several  shots  from 
his  revolver.  His  horse  fell  dead,  and  the  General 
attempted  to  proceed  on  foot,  but  realised  this  was 
impossible.  Near  by  was  a house,  and  rushing  into  this 
shelter  he  expired  a few  moments  afterwards  from  his 
wounds.  The  death  of  General  Barbosa  was  more 
tragic.  The  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Government 
troops  took  refuge  in  the  residence  of  Sehor  Soto  on 
the  Alto  del  Puerto,  and  was  followed  by  half-a-dozen 
troopers,  against  whom  he  attempted  to  defend  himself, 
shutting  himself  into  a dark  room  and  wounding  three 
soldiers  as  they  tried  to  enter  the  doorway.  Then 
Ensign  Fuenzalida  appeared  with  his  revolver  in  hand 
and  forced  his  way  into  the  room,  a duel  ensuing  in 
which  the  General  was  twice  wounded  without  injuring 
his  adversary.  When  his  ammunition  was  exhausted, 
Barbosa  drew  his  sword  to  attack  his  opponent ; but  he 
was  overpowered  by  the  troopers,  dragged  outside,  and 
there  killed  in  cold  blood,  his  body  being  pierced  with 
lance  thrusts  and  hacked  by  sabre  cuts. 

The  casualties  on  both  sides  were  heavy.  The  action 
had  lasted  scarcely  four  hours,  but  when  the  rolls  were 
called  the  losses  of  the  victors  were  found  to  be  22 
officers  and  463  men  killed  and  83  officers  and  1041 
men  wounded,  besides  199  missing — a total  of  1800; 
and  on  the  part  of  the  defence,  the  returns  were  941 
killed  and  2422  wounded — a total  of  3363. 

At  12.30  p.m.,  an  hour  after  the  firing  ceased  at 
Placilla,  Valparaiso  was  occupied  ^by  a detachment  of 
Congressional  troops,  the  garrison  offering  no  resistance  ; 
but  the  torpedo-boat  Lynch  opened  fire,  although  she 
was  soon  overpowered.  At  3 p.m.  General  Canto 
arrived,  and  two  hours  later  the  squadron  under  Admiral 
Montt  anchored  in  the  bay.  The  friends  of  Balmaceda 
were  given  asylum  on  the  German  man-of-war  Leipzig , 


380 


CHILE 


and  the  United  States  cruisers  San  Francisco  and 
Baltimore , but  the  majority  of  the  population  were 
satisfied  at  the  turn  affairs  had  taken,  and  readily 
accepted  the  change  of  authority.  Unfortunately  no 
efficient  measures  were  taken  during  the  first  night  for 
policing  the  city,  and  many  of  the  victorious  troops 
became  drunk,  with  the  result  that  scenes  of  rioting  and 
disastrous  incendiary  fires  occurred.  Patrols  were  forced 
to  shoot  down  300  persons  before  order  was  established, 
and  the  actual  monetary  loss  from  damage  done  to 
property  was  estimated  at  $3,000,000. 

It  was  from  the  officer  in  command  of  the  Govern- 
ment troops  at  Limache  that  Balmaceda  first  received 
information  of  the  defeat  at  Placilla.  On  August  28 
constant  telegraphic  messages  were  exchanged  between 
Limache  and  Santiago,  but  it  was  not  until  7.30  p.m. 
that  a telegram  from  Quillota,  sent  by  Colonel  Vargas, 
definitely  conveyed  news  of  the  disaster.  The  message 
read  : — “ Arrived  here,  several  officers  of  defeated  army. 
They  say  defeat  is  complete.  Our  men  fought  without 
bravery  or  enthusiasm,  and  in  crisis  of  struggle  laid 
down  arms  and  passed  over  to  enemy.  Generals  Barbosa 
and  Alcerrica  dead.  Senor  Claudio  Vicuna  and  Senor 
Banados  shut  up  in  Municipal  Building,  Valparaiso,  and 
that  city  in  power  of  Opposition.  Nothing  more  for 
me  to  do  here.  I march  with  my  men  to  Santiago — 
Vargas.”  Balmaceda  was  in  consultation  with  his 
ministers  when  this  despatch  reached  him,  and  he  at 
once  proposed  to  take  measures  for  the  defence  of 
Santiago,  pointing  out  that  in  and  near  the  national 
capital  was  a force  of  7000  men,  and  with  these  a strong 
resistance  could  be  made ; but  when  the  full  nature  of 
the  disaster  was  known,  and  the  fact  appreciated  that 
the  loyalty  of  the  troops  could  not  be  depended  upon, 
Balmaceda  realised  it  was  useless  to  continue  the  struggle. 
He  decided  to  resign  office  and  transfer  his  presidential 
powers  to  General  Baquedano,  who  was  known  to  be 
in  sympathy  with  the  revolutionary  movement,  under 
the  condition  of  protection  for  the  persons  and  property 


1891]  RESIGNATION  OF  BALMACEDA  381 


of  all  those  who  had  supported  his  Administration,  and 
this  General  Baquedano  promised.  The  last  official  act 
of  Balmaceda  was  the  following  document,  issued  next 
morning : — 


Santiago,  August  29,  1891. — Gregorio  Cerda  y Ossa,  Intendente 
of  the  Province.  Whereas  : 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  the  Republic  has  decreed  as 
follows : — 

Considering  that  in  resisting  the  armed  revolution  begun  on 
January  7 by  the  squadron  I have  complied  with  my  simple  duty  ot 
maintaining  the  principle  of  authority,  without  which  Government  is 
impossible. 

That  my  patriotism  and  duties  as  a Chilian  have  placed  a limit  to 
my  efforts.  It  does  not  become  an  honest  Governor  to  prolong  a 
struggle  that  cannot  be  maintained  with  reasonable  prospects  of 
success. 

That  the  result  of  the  last  battle  near  Valparaiso  has  been 
unfavourable  to  the  cause  I sustain.  I have  therefore  resolved  to 
end  a conflict  that  reflects  little  credit  to  the  Republic  and  the 
common  welfare. 

Decree  : 

That  citizen  General  of  Division  Senor  Don  Manuel  Baquedano 
remains  at  the  head  of  the  Government.  I therefore  charge  all 
chiefs,  officers,  soldiers,  Intendentes,  governors,  and  other  officials  to 
render  him  proper  respect  and  obedience. 

Let  this  be  published  and  communicated  by  telegraph. 

Balmaceda. 

Manuel  A.  Zanartu. 


General  Baquedano  immediately  issued  the  follow- 
ing short  decree : — 

I provisionally  accept  the  charge  confided  to  me,  in  order  to 
preserve  public  order. 


Two  reasons  prompted  Balmaceda  to  select  General 
Baquedano.  In  the  first  place,  he  was  popular  in  con- 
sequence of  the  prestige  he  had  gained  as  the  victorious 
leader  of  the  Chilians  in  the  war  against  Peru,  and  in 
his  capacity  as  a soldier  he  would  be  fitted  to  deal  with 
the  present  situation ; and,  secondly,  Baquedano  was 
known  to  be  on  friendly  terms  with  the  Congressionalist 
leaders,  although  taking  no  active  part  in  the  conflict. 


382 


CHILE 


Practically,  therefore,  the  resignation  of  Balniaceda  in 
his  favour  was  equivalent  to  a surrender  to  the  Junta  de 
Gobierno,  and  in  these  circumstances  Balniaceda  con- 
sidered that  the  promise  of  protection  in  regard  to  his 
supporters  would  be  respected. 

The  abdication  of  Balmaceda  was  soon  known.  It 
caused  consternation  on  the  part  of  his  followers  and 
exultation  to  his  enemies.  Official  returns  show  that 
448  persons  had  been  incarcerated  in  the  prisons  of 
Santiago  as  political  offenders  during  the  latter  months 
of  the  civil  war ; as  the  majority  of  these  belonged  to 
families  of  high  social  position  in  Santiago,  it  is  easy  to 
imagine  the  bitter  hostility  existing,  and  that  these 
people  and  their  friends  determined  to  be  revenged  for 
their  injuries.  On  the  morning  of  August  29,  the  police 
in  Santiago  ceased  to  resist,  the  men  deserting  to  the 
country  districts  and  carrying  their  arms  with  them. 
The  military  forces  refused  to  perform  duty,  and  the 
town  was  absolutely  unprotected.  Sufferers  under  the 
late  Administration  saw  their  opportunity,  and  they 
organised  bodies  of  men  to  wreck  the  properties  of  the 
most  prominent  supporters  of  Balmaceda.  Lists  of 
houses  to  be  sacked  were  made  out  and  handed  to  the 
leaders  of  different  gangs,  and  two  hundred  residences 
were  completely  gutted ; but  no  personal  violence  was 
offered,  nor  was  riotous  behaviour  in  evidence.  It  was 
not  until  the  afternoon  of  August  29  that  General 
Baquedano  was  able  to  organise  an  adequate  police 
force,  and  by  then  the  destruction  had  ceased. 

On  August  30  Colonel  Emilio  Kdrner  reached 
Santiago  to  arrange  for  barrack  accommodation  for  a 
part  of  the  Congressionalist  army,  and  the  day  following 
the  Junta  de  Gobierno  arrived,  and  became  the  de  facto 
Government  of  Chile.  It  only  remained  now  to  disarm 
the  troops  stationed  at  Coquimbo  and  in  the  south,  and 
this  was  accomplished  without  difficulty  within  fifteen 
days. 


CHAPTER  XXI 


c hile — continued 


General  Baquedano  Surrenders  Powers.  Proclamation  by  Admiral 
Montt.  Work  of  Reconstruction.  Unsettled  Conditions.  Dis- 
appearance of  Balmaceda.  Suicide  of  Balmaceda.  Political 
Testament  of  Balmaceda.  Explanation  of  Suicide.  New  Con 
gress.  Junta  de  Gobierno  Resigns.  Admiral  Montt  as  Presi- 
dential Candidate.  Cost  of  the  Revolution.  Election  of  Montt. 
Promotions  for  Services.  Actions  concerning  Supporters  of 
Balmaceda.  Law  of  Amnesty.  Chile  and  the  United  States. 
The  Baltimore  Incident.  Message  of  President  Harrison  to  the 
U.S.  Congress.  Telegram  from  Santiago  to  Chilian  Minister  in 
Washington.  United  States  Ultimatum.  Excitement  in  Chile. 
Apology  to  U.S.  Government. 


On  the  arrival  at  Santiago  of  the  Junta  de  Gobierno , 
General  Baquedano  immediately  surrendered  the  powers 
with  which  he  had  been  invested  by  the  decree  of 
Balmaceda  on  August  29.  In  a communication  to  the 
Junta,  dated  August  31,  he  gave  an  account  of  his 
actions  during  the  three  days  that  he  was  in  charge  of 
public  affairs. 

Baquedano  described  the  absolute  confusion  follow- 
ing the  abdication  of  Balmaceda.  All  prominent  officials 
under  the  recent  Administration  had  left  their  posts, 
and  many  of  the  senior  officers  of  the  army  had  fled  the 
country.  Telegrams  from  all  districts  revealed  dis- 
organisation in  the  provinces,  and  that  with  the  dis- 
appearance of  Balmaceda  the  machinery  of  government 
had  been  temporarily  suspended.  Baquedano  accom- 
plished as  much  as  was  possible  in  the  circumstances  to 

383 


384- 


CHILE 


resolve  order  out  of  chaos,  and  officers  in  whom  he  felt 
confidence  were  placed  in  command  of  the  regiments 
forming  the  garrison  of  Santiago.  Governors  of  Provinces 
and  Intendentes  of  Departments  were  nominated,  and 
prominent  citizens  of  the  National  Capital  were  called 
upon  for  their  advice  in  connection  with  the  situation. 
The  result  of  these  measures  was  that  comparative 
tranquillity  had  been  restored  before  the  appearance  in 
Santiago  of  the  Junta,  and  the  task  now  before  the 
Provisional  Government  was  to  continue  the  work  of 
reconstruction  that  Baquedano  had  begun. 

After  the  Provisional  Government  assumed  charge, 
Admiral  Montt  issued  the  following  proclamation  : — 


Fellow  Citizens  : 

After  eight  long  months  of  bloody  combats  I arrive  at  the 
National  Capital,  having  accomplished  the  task  entrusted  to  me  by 
the  delegation  of  the  National  Congress  in  the  roadstead  of 
Valparaiso. 

I heartily  congratulate  the  country,  the  navy,  and  the  army,  that 
have  so  bravely  contributed  to  the  most  noble  and  holy  cause  that  has 
ever  convulsed  this  Republic. 

The  Empire  of  the  Constitution  and  Laws  is  assured  throughout 
the  Republic. 

I now  call  on  all  Chilians,  without  distinction  of  political  colour,  to 
co-operate  in  the  re-establishment  of  public  order,  and  the  realisation 
of  that  great  work  of  peace  that  the  Nation  has  confided  to  us. 

Fellow  countrymen  : 

In  action  and  in  work  look  for  the  remedy  from  the  evils  created 
by  the  dictatorship,  with  the  confidence  that  you  will  be  protected 
and  sheltered  by  the  forces  that  from  to-day  are  the  zealous 
guardians  of  public  order. 

Jorje  Montt. 

Santiago,  September,  1891. 


The  work  of  reconstruction  proceeded  rapidly. 
Elections  were  ordered  for  Senators  and  DejDuties,  and 
for  the  presidential  electors,  and  the  Appeal  Courts 
reopened  after  having  been  suspended  since  March  2, 
1891,  by  order  of  Balmaceda.  A large  proportion  of 
the  army  was  disbanded.  The  Executive  decreed  that 
all  members  of  the  judiciary  dismissed  by  Balmaceda 
shouldbe  reinstated,  and  all  appointments  made  after 


General  Baquedano. 


Pedro  Montt. 


President  Errazuriz. 


President  Riesco. 


[ Face  page  3S4. 


1891] 


AFTER  THE  REVOLUTION 


3S5 


January  1,  1891,  cancelled.  Practically  the  first  fifteen 
days  of  the  Provisional  Government  was  occupied  in 
undoing  the  acts  of  Balmaceda  during  the  previous  eight 
months. 

In  the  towns  matters  soon  settled  down,  but  in  the 
country  districts  affairs  were  not  so  satisfactory. 
Deserters  from  the  army  and  police  had  taken  to  the 
hills  after  Concon  and  Placilla ; most  of  these  men  had 
arms  and  ammunition,  and  they  developed  into  bandits. 
The  south  and  centre  became  infested  with  groups  of 
these  robbers,  and  life  and  property  in  outlying  districts 
was  continually  menaced.  To  such  an  extent  did  these 
marauders  strike  terror  that  prosperous  farming  districts 
were  abandoned,  and  the  authorities  have  not  been  able 
to  eradicate  this  pest  in  the  twelve  years  that  have  passed 
since  the  revolution,  its  suppression  to-day  having 
become  a most  serious  problem. 

Much  interest  was  aroused  concerning  Balmaceda 
after  his  abdication.  He  had  disappeared  absolutely, 
mysteriously,  and  neither  friend  nor  foe  knew  where  to 
look  for  him.  After  signing  the  decree  transferring  his 
powers  to  Baquedano,  the  late  President  passed  from 
the  public  rooms  of  the  Casa  de  Moneda  to  his  private 
apartments,  there  meeting  his  wife  and  a group  of 
intimate  friends.  A few  minutes  later  he  left  the 
building  accompanied  by  Senor  Manuel  Zanartu,  the 
Minister  of  the  Interior,  Senor  Cerda  y Ossa,  Intendente 
of  Santiago,  and  Senor  Luis  Vergara.  After  driving  for 
a short  distance,  he  and  his  friends  descended  from  the 
carriage,  dismissed  the  coachman,  and  proceeded  on  foot 
to  the  Argentine  Legation.  They  knocked,  and  the 
door  was  opened  by  the  Argentine  Minister,  Senor 
Uriburu,  Balmaceda  entering  the  house  after  taking 
leave  of  his  companions.  It  had  been  arranged  that 
Senor  Uriburu  should  give  the  President  shelter  if 
necessity  arose,  and  a room  at  the  top  of  the  building 
had  been  prepared  for  his  reception.  Here  Balmaceda 
lay  concealed  for  twenty  days,  his  wife  and  family  being 
transferred  to  the  protection  of  the  United  States 


386  CHILE 

Legation,  where  they  remained  until  all  danger  had 
disappeared. 

The  intention  of  Balmaceda  had  been  to  surrender 
to  the  Congressionalist  leaders,  but  this  course  was 
abandoned  when  he  understood  the  intense  hostility 
against  himself.  The  alternative  to  his  first  idea  was 
escape  from  the  country  under  protection  of  the  diplo- 
matic corps ; this  was  feasible,  but  was  rejected  by  him 
as  too  undignified  a proceeding.  It  was  impossible  to 
prolong  indefinitely  his  stay  in  the  Argentine  Legation, 
and  in  the  middle  of  September  Senor  Uriburu  and  his 
guest  discussed  the  best  plan  to  follow.  It  was  arranged 
that  Senor  Uriburu  should  inform  the  Provisional 
Government  of  Balmaceda’s  presence  in  his  house  and 
request  advice,  and  then  the  minister  was  to  take 
Balmaceda,  accompanied  by  Senor  Concha  y Toro  and 
Senor  Carlos  Walker  Martinez,  to  any  locality  indicated 
by  the  authorities.  In  this  manner  no  attention  would 
be  called  to  him  in  his  passage  through  the  streets.  On 
September  10,  Senor  Uriburu  was  to  have  carried  out 
this  programme,  but  on  the  morning  of  that  day 
Balmaceda  ended  his  troubles  by  taking  his  own  life. 
Torn  by  doubts  as  to  the  fairness  of  any  trial  if  he 
placed  his  fate  in  the  hands  of  his  enemies,  and  dis- 
tracted by  fear  that  his  hiding-place  would  be  discovered 
by  the  mob,  he  resolved  to  commit  suicide  rather  than 
face  the  results  of  the  storm  he  had  raised. 

The  death  of  Balmaceda  is  described  by  his  friend 
Senor  Julio  Banados  Espinosa  as  having  taken  place  in 
the  following  manner.  He  rose  early  on  the  morning 
of  September  19,  attired  himself  in  black  clothes,  and 
then  opened  a door  leading  from  his  bedroom  to  a 
balcony.  There  he  stood  for  some  moments  looking  at 
the  great  snow-covered  ranges  of  the  Andes  glowing  in 
the  sunlight.  He  closed  the  door,  carefully  arranged 
the  furniture,  and  lay  down  on  his  bed  at  8 a.m.  A few 
moments  later  a pistol  shot  was  heard  by  Senor  Uriburu 
and  Ms  wife,  and  they  sent  a servant  upstairs  to  ascertain 
what  had  occurred.  The  messenger  returned  with  the 


1891] 


SUICIDE  OF  BALMACEDA 


387 


information  that  Balmaceda  was  dead,  and  Senor 
Uriburu,  calling  on  Senor  Carlos  Walker  Martinez  to 
accompany  him,  ascended  to  the  apartment.  The  body 
was  lying  on  the  bed  with  a wound  in  the  right  breast, 
and  it  was  evident  that  death  had  been  instantaneous. 
On  the  pillow  was  a letter  addressed  to  Senor  Uriburu, 
in  which  Balmaceda  declared  his  intention  of  committing 
suicide  as  the  only  means  of  escape  from  his  difficulties. 

The  authorities  were  at  once  notified  of  the  tragedy 
in  the  Argentine  Legation,  and  at  noon  a committee 
assembled  to  verify  the  cause  of  death.  It  consisted  of 
the  following  members: — Jose  Uriburu  (Argentine 
Minister) ; J.  Arrieta  (Uruguayan  Minister) ; Baron 
Gutschmid  (German  Minister) ; E.  de  B.  Cavalcanti  de 
Lacerda  (Brazilian  Minister) ; Jose  Barcelo ; Carlos 
Lira ; J.  J.  Aguirre ; M.  Concha  y Toro ; Domingo 
Toro  y Herrera  ; C.  Walker  Martinez.  The  burial  took 
place  at  7.30  in  the  evening,  and  the  body  was  carried 
to  the  cemetery  in  a public  conveyance  of  the  commonest 
kind,  the  ceremony  being  unattended  by  mourners.  A 
picquet  of  cavalry  was  detailed  to  accompany  the  corpse 
from  the  Argentine  Legation  to  the  cemetery,  but  no 
hostile  manifestation  was  attempted. 

Among  the  letters  written  by  Balmaceda  on  the  day 
before  his  death  was  one  jointly  directed  to  Senor 
Claudio  Vicuna  and  Senor  Julio  Banados  Espinosa,  and 
this  document  is  designated  by  his  friends  as  his  political 
testament.  In  this  letter  Balmaceda  pleads  justification 
for  his  actions  during  the  civil  war  and  for  the  general 
drift  of  his  policy.  In  regard  to  existing  principles  of 
Government  in  Chile,  a clear  opinion  is  expressed  that 
they  must  inevitably  bring  a deadlock  between  the 
Chambers  and  the  Executive,  and  he  says : — “ The 
parliamentary  system  has  triumphed  on  the  field  of 
battle,  but  this  victory  will  not  prevail.  Either  investi- 
gation, convenience,  or  patriotism  will  open  a reasonable 
way  to  reform  and  the  organisation  of  a representative 
government,  or  fresh  disturbances  and  painful  occurrences 
will  happen  among  the  same  people  who  united  for  the 


388 


CHILE 


revolution,  and  who  remained  united  to  assure  the 
result,  but  who  will  end  by  divisions  and  conflicts.” 
He  sets  forth  his  idea  of  a satisfactory  government  for 
Chile  in  these  terms  : — “ Only  in  the  organisation  of  a 
popular  representative  government  with  independent 
and  responsible  powers  and  easy  means  to  make  that 
responsibility  effective  will  there  be  parties  of  a national 
character,  derived  from  the  will  of  the  people  and  ensuring 
harmony  between  the  different  powers  of  the  State.” 
This  latter  criticism  shows  that  Balmaceda  understood 
the  defects  of  the  existing  constitution  of  Chile.  His 
prediction  as  to  disturbed  political  conditions  has  been 
justified  since  by  the  confusion  in  Congress  during  the 
presidency  of  Errazuriz,  and  later  under  Riesco,  and 
which  has  made  useful  legislation  almost  impossible. 
The  contrast  between  the  ideas  of  Balmaceda  in  1891 
and  the  convictions  he  expressed  at  the  beginning  of  his 
political  career  are  interesting,  for  from  1870  to  1880 
he  was  the  apostle  of  a political  movement  for  the  free 
exercise  of  a parliamentary  system.  When  holding 
ministerial  office  after  1881  under  President  Santa 
Maria,  he  found  that  the  existing  Constitution  was  incom- 
patible with  this  doctrine,  and  from  1886  until  1889  he 
believed  the  key  to  the  situation  was  the  unification  of 
the  Liberals  and  a solid  majority  to  support  a Liberal 
Cabinet.  For  this  end  he  laboured  unceasingly,  but  in 
1890  he  was  convinced  that  this  was  impossible,  princi- 
pally owing  to  the  personality  of  the  members  of 
Congress,  and  then  he  advocated  a representative 
Government  on  the  model  of  the  United  States  rather 
than  that  any  attempt  should  be  made  to  perfect  a 
parliamentary  system. 

In  a letter  to  his  brothers,  written  on  the  eve  of  his 
death,  Balmaceda  says  : — “ I could  escape  ; but  I would 
never  run  the  risk  of  the  ridicule  any  disaster  to  such  an 
attempt  would  entail,  and  which  would  be  the  beginning 
of  vexatious  humiliation  which  I could  not  endure  for 
myself  or  for  my  family  ” ; and  this  is  probably  the  true 
explanation  of  his  action  in  taking  his  own  life.  He  was 


1891]  THE  PROVISIONAL  GOVERNMENT  389 


a proud  man,  who  could  not  bear  the  thought  of  the 
insults  he  anticipated  if  he  was  arrested  and  brought  to 
his  trial,  and  to  fall  from  the  possession  of  absolute 
power  and  be  treated  as  a criminal  was  more  than  he 
could  endure.  He  thought  of  suicide,  and  his  imagin- 
ative temperament  was  fascinated  by  the  idea  of  death. 
One  sharp  pang  rather  than  a period  of  lingering  torture 
at  the  hands  of  his  enemies  was  his  dominant  impression. 
To  assert  that  he  was  insane  when  he  killed  himself 
would  be  quite  erroneous,  as  his  letters  of  September  18 
and  the  morning  of  his  death  show  that  his  mind  was 
perfectly  clear.  He  had  become  morose  by  constant 
brooding  over  his  misfortunes ; to  die  as  he  did  was  in 
some  sense  to  pose  as  a martyr  for  his  faults,  and  to  him 
the  fascination  of  that  idea  was  irresistible.  By  his 
death  Chile  lost  one  of  the  most  remarkable  men  she 
ever  produced. 

On  November  10,  1891,  the  newly  elected  Congress 
met,  and  the  Junta  de  Gobierno,  consisting  of  Admiral 
Montt,  Sehor  Waldo  Silva,  and  Sehor  Ramon  Barros 
Luco,  resigned  the  powers  they  had  held  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  revolution.  In  reply  to  their  communi- 
cation to  this  effect,  the  Chambers  stated  that  it  was  the 
unanimous  desire  of  Congress  that  Admiral  Montt  should 
continue  to  discharge  the  presidential  duties  until  such 
time  as  a Chief  Magistrate  was  elected,  and  under  these 
circumstances  he  remained  in  office.  The  question  of 
the  presidential  election  now  occupied  public  attention, 
and  the  convention  called  to  select  a candidate  decided 
on  Admiral  Montt  by  a large  majority,  and  finally  he 
accepted  the  nomination,  although  he  had  made  no 
effort  to  influence  people  in  his  favour  and  showed  no 
strong  desire  to  become  a politician. 

The  Provisional  Government  abolished  the  “ Tesorerfa 
General  de  la  Escuadra”  on  November  21,  an  office 
created  during  the  revolution  to  account  for  official 
expenditure,  and  some  interesting  details  of  the  expenses 
of  the  late  Administration  and  the  cost  of  the  revolution 
were  made  public.  Between  January  7 and  August  21, 


390 


CHILE 


1891,  Balmaceda  had  devoted  $73,446,104  towards 
defraying  expenses  in  connection  with  warlike  opera- 
tions, and  during  the  same  period  the  Congressionalists 
had  expended  $11,794,654.  The  contrast  is  evidence  of 
the  better  management  of  the  Opposition,  and  it  shows 
that  Balmaceda  would  soon  have  exhausted  his  avail- 
able funds  even  if  the  decisive  defeats  at  Concon  and 
Placilla  had  not  occurred.  The  amount  of  arms  and 
ammunition  that  reached  Chile  after  peace  was  re- 
established, and  which  had  been  despatched  from 
Europe  in  July  and  August,  proved  that  the  Congres- 
sionalists possessed  ample  means  to  continue  the 
struggle  for  a more  lengthy  period  than  was  required. 

On  December  18  the  election  for  the  presidential 
electors  took  place,  and  there  was  at  once  small  doubt 
that  the  feeling  of  the  country  was  in  favour  of  a con- 
tinuance in  power  of  Admiral  Montt,  for  when  two  days 
later  the  Chambers  met  to  scrutinise  the  presidential 
votes,  the  result  showed  that  Montt  had  been  unani- 
mously elected.  He  assumed  the  Presidency  on 
the  26th. 

During  November  the  Chambers  agreed  to  various 
promotions  and  rewards  for  services  rendered  during  the 
war.  Jorje  Montt,  who  held  the  rank  of  a Post-Captain, 
was  made  Vice-Admiral;  Captain  Francisco  Molina  was 
promoted  Rear-Admiral ; and  many  other  steps  were 
given  to  naval  officers.  Generals  Estanislas  del  Canto 
and  Adolfo  Holley  were  gazetted  Generals  of  Division, 
and  Colonel  Emilio  Kbrner  was  promoted  to  General  of 
Brigade  and  granted  a gratuity  of  $20,000.  The  part 
Senor  Waldo  Silva  and  Senor  Barros  Luco  had  taken 
was  not  forgotten,  and  to  each  was  accorded  the 
honorary  rank  of  Vice-Admiral,  entitling  them  to 
receive  the  customary  salutes  and  honours  of  that 
grade  when  visiting  Chilian  men-of-war;  furthermore, 
the  right  of  free  carriage  for  their  personal  correspond- 
ence, and  also  the  privilege  for  themselves  and  their 
friends  of  travelling  on  State  railways  without  payment. 
Senor  Waldo  Silva  was  allotted  a pension  of  $9000 


1391]  HONOURS  AWARDED  BY  CONGRESS  391 


annually ; on  his  death,  shortly  afterwards,  his  family 
was  conceded  a yearly  subvention  of  $5250,  and 
Congress  also  ordered  a monument  to  his  memory  at 
a cost  of  $12,000.  In  addition  to  other  honours 
conceded  to  Senor  Ramon  Barros  Luco,  he  was  pre- 
sented with  a library  valued  at  $10,000. 

The  question  of  the  persons  who  had  supported 
Balmaceda  came  before  the  Chambers  in  December,  and 
it  was  held  that  the  higher  officials  of  the  late  Adminis- 
tration were  guilty  of  high  treason  and  could  not  be 
included  in  a general  amnesty.  The  law  passed  on 
December  25  extended  free  pardon  to  all  partisans  of 
Balmaceda  except  members  of  the  Cabinet  between 
January  1 and  August  29,  1891,  and  those  who  had 
served  during  that  period  as  members  of  Congress, 
judges,  members  of  the  Council  of  State,  diplomats, 
persons  signing  the  bank-note  emissions,  legal  advisers 
to  the  military  tribunals,  and  senior  military  and  naval 
officers,  yet  only  some  400  persons  in  all  were  excluded. 
Subsequently  the  law  was  modified,  and  on  August  28, 
1893,  amnesty  was  extended  to  all  persons  except  those 
responsible  for  the  events  at  “Lo  Canas,”  and  the 
Ministers  of  State  who  had  signed  the  decree  for 
dictatorial  powers  to  maintain  military  and  naval  forces 
without  the  consent  of  Congress.  Two  years  later  even 
this  restriction  was  withdrawn,  and  Senor  Claudio 
Vicuna  and  his  friends  were  relieved  of  all  impediments 
to  their  return  to  Chile. 

At  the  end  of  1891  and  the  beginning  of  1892 
relations  between  Chile  and  the  United  States  became 
strained.  The  question  of  the  transport  Itata  and  the 
attitude  assumed  by  the  United  States  had  aroused 
hostile  feeling,  and  this  had  become  accentuated  by  the 
presence  of  the  IJ.S.  warship  San  Francisco  in  Quinteros 
Bay  on  the  morning  of  August  20,  when  the  Congres- 
sionalist  army  disembarked.  The  San  Francisco  reached 
Quinteros  at  2.30  p.m.  on  that  day  and  immediately 
returned  to  Valparaiso,  arriving  at  the  latter  place  at 
5 p.m.,  when  Admiral  Brown  at  once  sent  an  officer 


392 


CHILE 


ashore  with  a cable  despatch  in  cypher  to  advise  the 
authorities  in  Washington  of  the  progress  of  events. 
The  Congressionalists  interpreted  this  as  a device  for 
providing  information  of  their  movements  to  Balmaceda, 
moved  to  take  that  view  by  the  fact  that  the  United 
States  had  not  been  favourable  to  the  Congressionalist 
cause.  In  a letter  dated  September  8,  1891,  being  then 
awrare  of  the  erroneous  conclusions  formed  as  to  the 
reason  of  his  visit  to  Quinteros,  Admiral  Brown  explained 
matters  to  Mr  Egan,  and  stated  that  he  had  received 
information  early  on  August  20  that  the  Congres- 
sionalists were  disembarking,  that  the  Government 
authorities  anticipated  an  important  engagement  at 
Quinteros,  and  that  he  then  decided  to  steam  down  to 
the  scene  of  the  expected  fighting.  He  proceeds  : — “ I 
arrived  at  Quinteros  Bay  at  2.30  p.m.  Seeing  no  signs 
of  a battle,  I returned  to  this  port.  Dropping  anchor 
at  5 a.m.,  I sent  an  officer  ashore  with  a cablegram  that 
had  to  be  submitted  to  the  Intendente  to  allow  its 
transmission.  My  message  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
of  the  United  States  was  in  cypher,  and  nobody  could 
become  possessed  of  its  substance.”  The  Congres- 
sionalists were  convinced  that  he  was  acting  in  the 
interests  of  Balmaceda,  and  this  engendered  a spirit  of 
hostility,  the  unfriendly  feeling  being  augmented  by  the 
fact  that  after  the  battle  of  Placilla  asylum  was  given 
on  the  San  Francisco  and  the  Baltimore  to  Ministers 
Domingo  Godoy,  Ismael  Perez  Montt,  Julio  Banados 
Espinosa,  and  other  refugees.  Friction  was  increased 
by  a protest  from  the  United  States  Minister,  Mr 
Egan,  complaining  to  the  Provisional  Government  that 
“the  Legation  is  constantly  surrounded  by  secret  police 
without  any  justifiable  motive,  persons  are  arrested  and 
sent  to  prison  simply  because  they  have  been  seen  to 
enter  the  Legation,  and  some  of  my  employes  and  servants 
are  actually  prisoners.”  Communications  on  this  subject 
were  exchanged  between  Mr  Egan  and  Senor  Matte, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  on  September  26,  the 
former  submitted  a document  containing  a deposition 


1891]  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CHILE  393 


made  by  a Mr  Raycraft  concerning  his  arrest  and 
imprisonment  after  leaving  the  Legation,  details  descrip- 
tive of  nineteen  other  such  arrests  having  been  previously 
forwarded.  Senor  Matte  stated  that  the  Legation  was 
extra-territorial  and  had  the  right  to  grant  asylum,  but 
the  streets  in  the  vicinity  could  claim  no  such  privilege, 
and  that  if  it  was  in  the  interests  of  public  order  any 
persons  found  in  those  streets  would  be  apprehended  by 
the  police.  It  was  natural  that  Chilians  who  had  sup- 
ported the  Congressionalist  cause  regarded  United  States 
citizens  with  some  animosity,  and  on  October  16,  when 
this  unfriendly  feeling  was  running  high,  Captain  Schley 
of  the  U.S.S.  Baltimore  gave  116  petty  officers  and  men 
shore  liberty.  This  was  unwise  of  Captain  Schley  in 
view  of  existing  sentiments,  and  also  because  the  sailors 
who  had  been  long  confined  on  board  ship,  as  might 
have  been  anticipated,  took  advantage  of  their  freedom 
to  drink  freely.  A dispute  arose  between  a group  from 
the  Baltimore  and  some  Chilian  sailors,  and  friends  on 
both  sides  joined  in  the  quarrel  until  some  hundreds 
were  engaged  in  the  melee.  Knives  and  revolvers  were 
freely  used,  with  the  result  that  Quartermaster  Riggin 
of  the  Baltimore  was  killed  and  several  of  his  shipmates 
wounded,  one  of  these  so  severely  that  he  shortly  after- 
wards died. 

This  affair  was  reported  to  Washington,  Captain 
Schley  stating  that  the  police  of  Valparaiso  encouraged 
the  disturbance,  and  on  October  26,  under  instructions 
from  his  Government,  Mr  Egan  demanded  satisfaction. 
In  reply  Senor  Matte  stated  that  as  legal  proceedings 
had  been  instituted  to  bring  the  culprits  to  justice,  no 
further  steps  could  then  be  taken,  and  on  October  30 
he  forwarded  to  Mr  Egan  the  report  of  the  Intendente 
of  Valparaiso  demonstrating  the  good  conduct  of  the 
police  in  the  riot.  Affairs  were  at  this  pass  when 
President  Harrison  sent  his  annual  message  to  Congress 
on  December  9,  1891,  accompanied  by  the  report  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  one  from  Mr  Egan,  and  one  from 
Captain  Schley.  Reference  was  made  to  the  right  of 


394 


CHILE 


asylum,  and  regret  was  expressed  that  the  Chilian 
Administration  showed  so  little  inclination  to  treat 
courteously  with  a friendly  nation.  The  remarks  of 
President  Harrison,  cabled  to  Santiago,  caused  an  out- 
burst of  indignation,  and  on  December  11  Senor  Matte 
explained  in  the  Senate  the  relations  existing  between 
Chile  and  the  United  States,  denying  the  accusations 
formulated  by  President  Harrison,  and  reading  a telegram 
to  Senor  Pedro  Montt,  the  Chilian  representative  in 
Washington. 

This  telegraphic  despatch  brought  matters  to  a crisis. 
The  text  was  : — 


Santiago,  December  11,  1891. 

Senor  Pedro  Montt,  Washington. 

Referring  to  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  the 
message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  I think  it  opportune 
to  say  that  the  data  on  which  the  report  and  the  message  is  based 
are  erroneous  or  deliberately  inexact. 

In  regard  to  refugees.  No  threats  of  cruel  treatment  have  been 
emitted,  no  attempts  have  been  made  to  take  such  persons  from 
the  Legation,  nor  has  any  request  been  preferred  that  they  should 
be  handed  over 

The  house  and  person  of  the  Minister,  in  spite  of  indiscretions  and 
meditated  provocations,  has  not  been  molested,  as  is  evidenced  by 
eleven  communications  in  September,  October,  and  November. 

In  respect  to  the  sailors  of  the  Baltimore,  there  is  neither  accuracy 
or  truth  in  what  is  said  in  Washington. 

The  affair  took  place  in  the  worst  quarter  of  the  city — the 
“main-top”  of  Valparaiso — and  between  people  who  are  not  models 
of  discretion  or  temperance.  When  the  police  interfered  and  quelled 
the  riot  there  were  some  hundreds  of  men  in  the  locality,  the  police 
force  being  more  than  half  a mile  distant  when  the  disturbance 
commenced. 

On  October  26  Mr  Egan  sent  a communication  couched  in  pur- 
posely aggressive  and  irritating  language,  as  is  seen  by  the  copy  and 
reply  despatched  October  27.  On  October  18  investigation  into  the 
affair  was  begun,  but  delayed  by  the  non-attendance  of  the  men  from 
the  Baltimore,  and  by  pretensions  and  unnecessary  denials  on  the 
part  of  Mr  Egan. 

This  Department  has  never  initiated  any  provocation,  maintaining 
an  attitude  which,  if  prudent  and  firm,  has  never  been  aggressive, 
nor  will  it  be  one  of  humiliation  whatever  interested  persons  may  say 
to  the  contrary  in  Washington. 

The  telegrams,  communications,  and  letters  forwarded  to  your 
Excellency  contain  the  truth,  the  whole  truth  of  what  has  happened 


1891] 


THE  BALTIMORE  INCIDENT 


395 


in  these  questions,  in  which  bad  faith  has  not  been  shown  by  this 
Department.  Mr  Tracy  and  Mr  Harrison  have  been  led  into  error 
concerning  us,  the  people  and  the  Government.  Their  instructions 
in  regard  to  impartiality  and  friendship  have  not  been  attended  to 
either  at  the  present  time  or  previously.  If  there  have  been  no 
complaints  against  the  Minister  and  the  naval  officers,  it  is  because 
the  facts,  public  and  notorious  in  both  Chile  and  the  United  States, 
have  not  been  allowed  to  carry  weight,  however  strong  the  proofs. 
The  appeals  put  forward  by  Balmaeeda  and  the  concessions  made  in 
June  and  July,  the  affair  of  the  Itata,  the  San  Francisco  in  Quinteros 
Bay,  and  the  conduct  of  the  cable  companies,  are  proofs  of  this 
assertion. 

It  is  absolutely  inexact  that  the  North  American  sailors  were 
attacked  in  different  localities  at  the  same  time.  The  investigation 
being  not  finished,  it  is  unknown  whom  or  how  many  the  culprits  may 
be.  Your  Excellency  must  have  the  communication  of  November  9, 
replying  to  Mr  Egan,  as  well  as  that  in  which  he  is  asked  for  evidence 
which  he  has  not  desired  to  give,  notwithstanding  he  stated  he  had 
proofs  to  indicate  the  homicide  and  other  culprits  in  the  affair  of 
October  16.  This  and  all  other  communications  will  be  published 
here.  Your  Excellency  should  have  them  translated  and  published 
also  in  Washington. 

Meanwhile,  deny  everything  that  may  be  contrary  to  these  advices, 
and  feel  confident  in  the  exactness  of  your  position,  as  we  are,  in  the 
certainty  of  the  right  of  our  cause,  and  the  final  result  for  Chile  in 
spite  of  intrigues  from  below  and  threats  from  above  now  confronting 
us.  Matte. 


Senor  Montt,  the  Chilian  Minister  in  Washington, 
communicated  this  telegram  verbatim  to  the  United 
States  Government.  The  result  was  an  ultimatum  on 
January  22,  1892,  through  Mr  Egan  to  the  Chilian 
authorities,  to  the  effect  that  an  indemnity  must  be  paid 
for  the  injury  to  the  men  of  the  Baltimore,  and  that 
the  amount  be  left  to  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States.  Excitement  amongst 
Chilians  ran  high  when  affairs  reached  this  stage,  and 
the  question  of  war  was  freely  discussed.  A certain 
section  of  the  population  clamoured  for  an  appeal  to 
arms,  but  President  Montt  took  a more  calm  view  of 
the  situation.  The  telegram  sent  to  Senor  Pedro  Montt 
had  been  a mistake,  and  the  only  sensible  course  was 
to  withdraw  it  to  avoid  the  disastrous  consequences  of 
a rupture  with  the  United  States.  A new  Ministry  was 


396 


CHILE 


formed,  in  which  Sehor  Luis  Pereira  assumed  the 
portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  on  January  25,  1892, 
a despatch  was  sent  to  the  Chilian  minister  in  Wash- 
ington instructing  him  to  withdraw  the  note  presented 
on  December  11,  and  inform  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment that  no  insult  had  been  intended  : furthermore, 
that  an  indemnity  on  account  of  the  Baltimore  incident 
would  be  paid.  On  the  28th  a telegram  was  received 
from  Washington  to  the  effect  that  the  United  States 
Government  considered  the  question  ended,  and  on  the 
30th  a communication  from  Mr  Egan  to  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  definitely  confirmed  this  information. 
On  July  13  following,  Mr  Egan  was  notified  that  the 
sum  of  $75,000  was  at  the  disposal  of  the  United 
States  Government  for  distribution  amongst  the  families 
of  the  men  killed  or  injured  on  October  16  in  Valparaiso, 
and  the  U.S.  Minister  promptly  accepted  this  offer. 


CHAPTER  XXTT 

chile — continued 

Heal  Issues  of  the  Civil  War.  Political  Situation  in  1892.  Comisidn 
Conservadora.  Increase  of  Naval  Strength.  Military  Reorganisa- 
tion. Congressional  Elections  in  1894.  Political  Situation. 
Domestic  Legislation.  Municipal  Law.  Conversion  of  the 
Currency.  Political  Parties  in  Congress.  Coalition  Cabinet. 
Complications  with  Argentina.  Sale  of  the  Esmeralda  to  Japan. 
Understanding  with  Peru  re  Tacna  and  Arica.  Treaty  with 
Bolivia.  A Diplomatic  Blunder.  Presidential  Contest  in  1896. 
Election  of  Senor  Federico  Errazuriz.  Congressional  Elections 
in  1897.  The  Boundary  Question  with  Argentina.  War 
Imminent.  Attitude  of  Errazuriz.  Arbitration  re  Tacna  and 
Arica.  The  Bolivian  Question.  The  Kbnig  Note.  Presidential 
Contest  in  1901. 


President  Montt  had  been  elected  by  the  supporters 
of  a parliamentary  system  as  opposed  to  a representative 
regime,  for  in  the  recent  struggle  the  real  point  at  issue 
was  whether  Congress  should  conduct  the  national 
business  through  a Cabinet  chosen  with  the  consent  and 
support  of  the  Chambers,  or  if  the  Executive  in  the 
shape  of  the  President  and  his  nominees  should  alone 
govern. 

The  advocates  of  the  parliamentary  system  had  wTon 
the  day,  and  the  principles  they  preached  became  firmly 
established  for  better  or  worse  with  the  downfall  of 
Balmaceda.  Montt  accepted  the  presidency  under 
these  conditions,  and  showed  that  he  intended  to 
abide  by  the  responsibilities  they  entailed.  In  one 
respect  he  was  well  adapted  to  deal  with  the  political 

397 


398 


CHILE 


position ; he  had  been  a naval  officer  all  his  life,  and 
had  taken  no  part  in  politics,  and  it  was  immaterial  to 
him  whether  his  Cabinet  represented  a Conservative 
or  Liberal  majority  in  the  Chambers.  As  was  to  be 
expected  after  the  desperate  struggle  in  1891,  the 
Congress  was  composed  of  members  with  a common 
political  platform  who  were  not  inclined  to  differ 
immediately  on  legislative  questions,  and  in  these 
circumstances  political  reconstruction  after  the  recent 
upheaval  went  on  so  rapidly  that  by  the  middle  of  1892 
a normal  situation  was  established. 

Previous  to  1892  the  rights  and  interests  of  Con- 
gress when  not  in  session  were  safeguarded  by  a com- 
mittee of  six  Senators  and  eight  Deputies  elected  for 
that  purpose.  The  duty  of  this  committee  was  to 
notify  the  President  when  privileges  of  the  Chambers 
were  endangered,  and  to  suggest  the  convocation  of 
Congress  whenever  such  a course  appeared  desirable. 
In  1890  this  committee,  known  as  the  Coniision 
Conservadora,  had  so  notified  the  President,  but  had 
only  obtained  a reply  that  he  considered  the  time 
inopportune  for  extraordinary  sessions.  It  was  the 
action  taken  in  regard  to  Balmaceda  which  led  to  a 
reform  in  the  Law  of  Constitution,  and  the  proposal 
which  was  approved  by  the  Chambers  in  1892  delegated 
to  the  Coniision  Conservadora  the  power  to  convene 
Congress  in  extraordinary  session  without  reference  to 
the  President,  thus  securing  a permanent  check  on  the 
Executive.  The  Coniision  Conservadora  represents  the 
majority  in  the  Chambers,  and  in  the  event  of  the 
President  retaining  a Ministry  not  representative  of  this 
majority,  the  Coniision  Conservadora  can  force  a crisis. 
The  first  time  this  right  was  exercised  was  in  March, 
1901,  when  Congress  was  convoked  to  oust  a Coalition 
Cabinet  and  replace  it  by  Liberals. 

President  Montt  had  taken  to  heart  the  lessons  of 
the  war  with  Peru  and  the  later  experience  of  the 
revolution  against  Balmaceda  in  regard  to  the  effect  of 
naval  power,  and  naturally  his  attention  was  turned  to 


1892]  INCREASE  OF  NAVAL  ARMAMENT  399 


the  efficiency  of  the  Chilian  navy.  As  a sailor  he 
knew  what  he  wanted,  and  as  President  he  was  able  to 
put  before  Congress  the  information  necessary  to  secure 
the  credits  required  for  the  purchase  of  ships  and  war 
material,  with  the  result  that  orders  were  given  for  the 
construction  of  the  new  Blanco  Encalada,  the  O' Higgins, 
and  the  Esmeralda.  Congress  showed  no  reluctance  to 
vote  this  expenditure,  for  the  question  with  Argentina 
was  pending  in  1893  and  1894  when  the  heaviest  of 
these  liabilities  were  contracted,  and  the  Chambers  were 
content  to  accept  the  suggestion  of  the  President  that 
Chile  to  be  safe  must  be  strong  for  defensive  and 
offensive  purposes.  Nor  was  the  army  neglected,  and 
under  the  direction  of  General  Korner  many  reforms 
were  introduced.  German  officers  were  brought  to 
Chile ; the  equipment  of  the  cavalry  and  infantry  was 
improved  ; the  artillery  was  made  the  subject  of  special 
attention  ; and  in  an  unostentatious  manner  Montt  so 
managed  that  whilst  political  and  economic  reconstruc- 
tion was  proceeding  in  1892  and  1893,  the  naval  and 
military  forces  were  raised  to  a high  state  of  proficiency. 

In  1894  the  political  situation  became  more  compli- 
cated. The  Congressional  elections  were  free  from 
interference  by  the  Executive,  President  Montt  not 
being  a politician,  and  showing  no  desire  to  be  involved 
in  electoral  questions.  His  advent  to  the  Presidency 
had  been  due  in  great  part  to  such  intervention  by 
Balmaceda,  and  his  honest  nature  would  not  allow  him 
to  throw  his  convictions  to  the  wind  and  use  his 
influence  to  secure  the  return  of  men  on  whom  he  could 
depend  for  political  support  in  an  emergency.  As  a 
result,  a number  of  representatives  who  had  admired 
Balmaceda  were  elected  to  the  new  Congress,  and  at 
once  the  division  of  parties  in  the  Chambers  rendered 
legislation  difficult.  The  newcomers  were  principally 
Liberals,  but  they  formed  a compact  party,  known  as 
Balmacedistas,  and  were  ever  ready  to  unite  with  other 
dissentient  sections  to  throw  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
domestic  legislative  measures.  It  was  in  consequence 


400 


CHILE 


of  this  subdivision  of  parties  that  frequent  ministerial 
changes  occurred  in  the  latter  half  of  Montt’s  term.  In 
the  first  tAvo  years  of  his  Presidency  four  Cabinets  had 
been  nominated ; but  special  circumstances  occurred  in 
1892  and  1893,  and  the  first  Ministry,  under  Senor 
Irarrazavnl  was  forced  to  resign  in  consequence  of  the 
Baltimore  incident,  after  only  holding  office  for  a month. 
The  second,  under  Senor  Barros  Luco,  remained  in 
power  for  eighteen  months,  and  it  was  then  reorganised 
for  personal  reasons  ; Senor  Edwardo  Matte  became  the 
leader  of  the  Cabinet,  but  Senor  Barros  Luco  again  took 
office  after  a few  months.  Then  came  a Ministry  under 
Senor  Pedro  Montt  in  1894,  and  it  tvas  in  this  latter 
year  that  the  political  complications  caused  by  the 
division  of  parties  became  really  troublesome,  no 
Ministry  since  having  been  strong  enough  to  hold  office 
for  more  than  a few  months  at  a time. 

The  domestic  legislation  to  which  President  Montt 
gave  most  attention  was  a law  for  the  local  government 
of  the  municipalities,  and  the  means  to  establish  a 
sound  currency.  Hitherto  the  various  townships  had 
been  dependent  on  the  National  Government  for  all 
public  works,  no  expenditure  being  permitted  without 
the  sanction  of  the  Executive  and  no  appointments 
made  except  through  the  Administration,  this  system 
resulting  in  the  neglect  of  local  needs.  Montt  wished 
to  decentralise  the  municipalities  and  allow  municipal 
corporations  to  raise  revenue  from  local  sources,  and  to 
make  them  responsible  for  the  administration  of  their 
oavii  districts.  The  theory  was  sound,  the  more  so  as 
there  is  a weakness  in  Chile,  as  in  most  Latin  countries, 
to  rely  solely  for  initiative  and  financial  aid  on  the 
Central  Government.  After  much  discussion  a measure 
creating  municipal  corporations  was  sanctioned,  although 
not  without  a strong  opposition,  owing  to  the  fact  that 
local  government  restricted  political  influence  and  patron- 
age. By  the  Hav  of  1891,  the  only  check  the  National 
Government  retained  over  the  municipalities  was  that 
the  intendentes,  governors,  or  sub-delegates  should 


1^94: j CONVERSION  OF  THE  CURRENCY  401 


preside  over  meetings  of  the  municipal  councillors  and 
suspend  any  action  they  considered  prejudicial  to  public 
order. 

The  question  of  the  establishment  of  a gold  standard 
currency  raised  stormy  debates  in  Congress,  and  personal 
motives  caused  many  members  of  both  Chambers  to 
oppose  the  Government  policy.  Many  Senators  and 
Deputies  were  landed  proprietors  and  employers  of 
labour,  others  were  interested  in  mining  enterprises  or 
the  production  of  nitrate  of  soda ; and  to  these  the 
conversion  of  the  notes  at  a fixed  rate  inferred  a loss, 
in  so  far  as  wages  would  be  paid  in  same  number  of 
dollars  although  the  intrinsic  value  would  be  greater. 
The  benefit  to  the  general  credit  of  the  Republic  from  a 
sound  monetary  system  was  not  considered  by  the 
individuals  adversely  affected  by  the  measure.  The 
value  of  the  dollar  had  been  forced  down  to  the 
equivalent  of  a franc,  and  the  Government  proposed  to 
convert  at  the  rate  of  eighteen  pence.  The  first  intention 
had  been  to  establish  a rate  of  twenty-four  pence ; but 
this  was  abandoned  in  view  of  the  violent  opposition 
aroused,  and  in  the  end  the  compromise  of  an  eighteen- 
penny  rate  was  made  and  the  law  approved  and  pro- 
mulgated in  1895. 

It  was  during  the  discussions  on  the  conversion 
question  that  the  unwieldy  composition  of  Congress 
was  clearly  seen.  Liberals  were  split  into  three  groups, 
any  one  of  which  in  conjunction  with  the  Conservatives 
could  force  the  Cabinet  to  resign.  The  friends  of  the 
late  President  after  the  elections  of  March,  1894,  made 
any  unification  of  the  Liberals  impossible ; they  would 
only  agree  to  join  with  the  other  groups  as  the  dominant 
factor  of  the  party,  and  to  this  the  Liberals  as  a whole 
would  not  consent.  The  Conservatives  alone  were  not 
strong  enough  to  command  a majority,  so  the  only 
possible  combination  was  a coalition  of  Conservatives 
and  some  one  group  of  Liberals.  Further  instability 
was  introduced  by  the  occasional  efforts  made  to  unify 
the  Liberals,  which,  although  never  permanently  success- 

*2  c 


402 


CHILE 


fill,  tended  to  unsettle  political  stability  and  cause 
frequent  changes  in  the  Ministry.  In  these  circum- 
stances it  was  not  surprising  that  little  useful  legislation 
was  enacted  between  1894  and  the  termination  of 
Montt’s  presidential  term. 

In  1895  the  Argentine  Government  became  aware 
of  the  largely  increased  expenditure  by  Chile  for  naval 
and  military  purposes,  and  this  was  interpreted  as  a 
menace  in  connection  with  the  boundary  dispute.  It 
was  answered  by  a credit  of  850,000,000  for  the  purchase 
of  ships  and  other  war  material  to  counterbalance  the 
Chilian  preparations,  and  this  was  the  beginning  of  the 
ruinous  policy  which  dominated  the  two  countries 
between  1895  and  1901.  Any  acquirement  of  war 
material  on  the  one  side  of  the  Andes  was  met  by 
corresponding  purchases  on  the  other,  irrespective  of 
cost.  Of  the  two,  Chile  was  better  able  to  stand  this 
constant  call  for  money,  the  export  duties  on  nitrate  of 
soda  providing  a large  and  easily  collected  revenue, 
whereas  Argentina  was  hampered  by  financial  difficulties, 
a legacy  from  the  Celman  Administration ; but  Chile 
found  that  her  rival  was  determined  to  keep  pace  with 
her  at  any  cost. 

Montt  consented  in  1894  to  a transaction  reflecting 
little  credit  upon  his  judgment.  That  was  the  year  of 
the  Chino-Japanese  war,  and  Japan  was  in  need  of 
additional  cruisers.  A proposition  was  made  to 
purchase  the  Chilian  warship  Esmeralda,  but  a direct 
sale  of  this  vessel  to  the  Japanese  Government  consti- 
tuted so  flagrant  a breach  of  neutrality  that  it  was 
considered  inadvisable,  so  a nominal  disposal  of  the 
Esmeralda  to  the  Government  of  Ecuador  and  her 
subsequent  transfer  to  Japan  was  suggested,  and  to  this 
the  Chilian  authorities  assented.  No  doubt  the  price 
was  high  and  the  bargain  a good  one  in  the  sense  that 
enough  money  was  obtained  by  Chile  to  purchase  a 
more  modern  vessel,  but  it  provoked  much  adverse 
criticism  on  the  policy  of  the  Administration. 

It  was  during  the  Presidency  of  Admiral  Montt  that 


1895]  INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  403 

the  period  fixed  under  the  Treaty  of  Ancon  for  the 
Chilian  occupation  of  the  provinces  of  Tacna  and  Arica 
expired.  The  plebiscite  to  decide  the  permanent 
ownership  of  that  territory  should  have  taken  place  in 
May,  1894,  but  the  internal  conditions  of  Peru  were 
complicated  by  an  outbreak  of  revolution  against  Presi- 
dent Caceres,  and  for  the  moment  the  Peruvian  Govern- 
ment was  unable  to  negotiate  on  the  subject  of  the  form 
in  which  the  vote  should  be  taken.  Moreover,  the 
resources  of  Peru  were  at  such  low  ebb  that  she  was  in 
no  position  to  make  payment  to  Chile  of  the  indemnity 
of  $10,000,000  stipulated  by  the  treaty  of  1883,  and  an 
understanding  was  reached  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments to  take  no  action  until  a more  opportune  occasion 
arose. 

Some  attention  was  devoted  to  the  Bolivian  question 
by  the  Montt  Administration  with  the  view  to  a definite 
treaty  of  peace  between  the  two  countries,  and  the 
recognition  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  Chile  over  territory 
occupied  after  the  war  of  1879,  and  in  May,  1895,  a 
treaty  was  signed  by  which  Bolivia  agreed  to  transfer 
the  territory  in  question,  but  with  the  condition  that  the 
Chilian  Government  ceded  a port  to  her  on  the  Pacific 
seaboard.  The  districts  of  Tacna  and  Arica  were  to  be 
handed  over  to  Bolivia  to  satisfy  this  desire  for  an  outlet 
to  the  coast,  provided  that  the  settlement  with  Peru  re- 
sulted in  favour  of  Chile,  and  in  event  of  Tacna  and  Arica 
not  passing  to  Chilian  ownership,  another  port  was  to  be 
given.  This  treaty  was  rejected  by  the  Chilian  Congress, 
and  it  was  an  error  of  the  Administration  to  have 
negotiated  on  any  basis  which  presupposed  the  right  of 
Bolivia  to  a seaport.  The  mention  of  Tacna  and  Arica 
as  territories  to  be  transferred  to  Bolivia  was  also  a 
! diplomatic  blunder,  for  the  Chilian  authorities  were 
perfectly  cognisant  of  Peruvian  feeling  about  them  and 
j the  anxiety  invariably  demonstrated  to  recover  their 
possession.  For  Bolivia  to  obtain  control  of  Tacna  and 
Arica  was  especially  galling,  because  it  was  the  treaty  of 
alliance  with  Bolivia  that  involved  Peru  in  the  war  with 


404 


CHILE 


Chile,  and  the  idea  that  Bolivia  should  benefit  by  her 
misfortunes  and  become  the  owner  of  her  lost  provinces 
naturally  hurt  Peruvian  pride.  Peru  has  since  raised 
many  difficulties  in  negotiating  with  Chile  in  connection 
with  Tacna  and  Arica,  all  in  great  measure  due  to  the 
proposals  made  by  Chile  to  Bolivia ; but  on  the  other 
hand  the  problem  was  not  easy  for  Chile.  Hostile 
feeling  against  Argentina  was  strong ; in  event  of  war, 
Bolivia  as  a friend  was  valuable,  and  as  an  enemy  to  be 
feared,  and  it  was  this  consideration  that  inspired  the 
negotiations  in  1895. 

At  the  beginning  of  1896  the  question  of  the  Presi- 
dency came  before  the  country.  The  field  was  open  to 
any  candidates  the  various  political  parties  desired  to 
bring  forward,  President  Montt  declining  to  take  any 
part  in  the  electoral  contest  and  all  the  members  of  his 
Administration  being  neutral  spectators.  Only  two 
candidates,  however,  came  forward,  Senor  Federico 
Errazuriz  and  Senor  Vicente  Reyes ; the  former 
supported  by  the  Conservatives  and  a section  of  the 
Liberals,  the  latter  by  Liberals  and  Radicals.  Senor 
Errazuriz  was  the  son  of  a former  President,  was 
wealthy,  and  had  social  and  political  influence.  Senor 
Reyes  had  been  a member  of  Congress,  had  held 
ministerial  office  and  other  public  posts,  and  was 
respected  for  his  statesmanlike  qualities  and  general 
ability  in  dealing  with  public  questions.  Both  candi- 
dates worked  hard,  and  when  the  decision  of  the 
electors  was  given  there  was  only  a majority  of  one 
vote  in  favour  of  Errazuriz,  who  assumed  office  on 
September  18,  1896.  Admiral  Montt  returned  to  his 
naval  duties,  and  was  shortly  afterwards  appointed 
Director-General  of  the  Navy. 

On  the  whole  Montt’ s Administration  was  satisfactory, 
in  view  of  the  difficulties  created  by  the  conduct  and 
downhill  of  Balmaceda.  Moderation  in  the  treatment 
of  opponents  was  necessary  when  the  Congressionalists 
came  into  power  after  a bloody  and  hard-fought  cam- 
paign, and  moderation  was  the  keynote  of  Montt’s 


1896]  PRESIDENT  ERRAZURIZ  ELECTED  405 


policy.  His  Government  accomplished  more  in  the 
direction  of  reconstructing  political  and  economic  life 
than  could  have  been  achieved  by  brilliant  statesmanship 
unrestrained  by  a desire  to  restore  domestic  harmony. 
Immediately  after  the  success  of  the  Congressionalists  at 
Placilla  instances  of  personal  violence  to  some  of  the 
supporters  of  Balmaceda  did  occur,  but  once  Montt  was 
in  control  of  affairs  after  August  31,  1891,  all  outrages 
of  this  nature  ceased.  In  one  respect  the  period  between 
1891  and  1896  was  hampered  by  unexpected  difficulties, 
for  an  economic  and  commercial  crisis  made  the  adminis- 
tration of  public  affairs  more  complicated  than  would 
otherwise  have  been  the  case  ; but  for  the  causes  of  that 
crisis  the  Government  cannot  be  held  responsible.  They 
were  due  to  agricultural  depression  from  a series  of  poor 
crops,  the  low  price  of  silver  and  copper,  the  result  of 
the  excessive  issue  of  inconvertible  paper  currency  by 
Balmaceda,  and  the  overtrading  which  occurred  at  the 
end  of  1891  and  the  beginning  of  1892 ; but  in  spite  of 
those  difficulties,  when  Montt  left  the  Government 
confidence  in  Chile  and  her  institutions  was  firmly 
re-established. 

Within  six  months  of  the  accession  of  President 
Errazuriz  the  Congressional  elections  took  place,  and 
the  result  accentuated  the  political  confusion  in  the 
Chambers.  The  Liberals  became  more  divided  than 
formerly,  and,  although  able  to  claim  a majority 
whenever  they  united,  they  could  never  agree  amongst 
themselves  to  sink  their  differences  and  form  a strong 
combination  to  support  a Cabinet  of  their  own  political 
colour.  Crisis  followed  crisis  in  rapid  succession,  and  it 
was  only  when  Congress  was  not  in  session  that  a 
Ministry  could  expect  to  remain  in  power.  The  outcome 
was  an  absolute  lack  of  continuity  of  policy  in  all 
matters  connected  with  domestic  legislation,  for  before 
any  Ministry  could  formulate  ideas  of  what  action  should 
be  taken  in  regard  to  any  question  it  was  succeeded  by 
a new  Cabinet  imbued  with  different  opinions.  There 
is  a touch  of  comedy  in  the  manner  President  Errazuriz 


406 


CHILE 


treated  this  political  confusion,  and  especially  the  crisis 
in  April  of  1901.  When  excitement  was  running  high 
at  the  deadlock  in  the  formation  of  a Ministry  he  sailed 
away  to  Robinson  Crusoe’s  island  to  spend  a week  there, 
out  of  reach  of  the  telegraph  and  other  worries  of  modern 
civilisation. 

But  the  most  serious  question  which  confronted 
Errazuriz  was  the  dispute  with  Argentina.  Grave 
differences  of  opinion  arose  in  connection  with  the 
delimitation  of  the  frontier,  the  principal  cause  of  the 
inability  of  the  representatives  of  the  two  Governments 
to  agree  being  the  interpretation  of  the  wording  of  the 
treaty.  The  Chilian  authorities  claimed  that  it  was 
intended  that  the  divisional  line  should  be  the  highest 
peaks  of  the  Andes  where  these  divide  the  watershed ; 
the  Argentines  insisted  that  this  clause  meant  only  the 
highest  peaks  of  the  Cordillera  of  the  Andes.  Con- 
stant friction  had  complicated  the  question  to  an 
alarming  extent  between  1890  and  1898,  and  in  the 
latter  year  an  impasse  occurred  through  the  insistence  of 
both  parties  on  their  respective  claims.  Congress  took 
up  the  question,  warlike  speeches  were  made,  and  the 
public  mind  unduly  excited.  Not  content  to  leave  the 
affair  in  the  hands  of  the  Executive,  both  Senators  and 
Deputies  created  embarrassments  by  demanding  to 
know  the  exact  stage  of  the  negotiations,  at  times 
even  publicly  advocating  an  appeal  to  arms,  and  so 
excited  the  Chilian  people  that  crowds  shouting  for 
war  paraded  the  streets  of  Santiago.  Preparations 
were  pushed  forward  for  the  mobilisation  of  an  army 
of  50,000  men,  and  matters  had  gone  so  far  in  August 
of  1898  that  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  appeared  inevit- 
able. What  further  complicated  the  situation  was  the 
fact  that  in  Congress  a numerous  group  of  politicians 
wished  to  overthrow  the  sound  currency  standard  estab- 
lished under  Montt,  and  looked  upon  a war  as  offering 
an  admirable  opportunity  for  their  purpose.  The  war 
scare  became  so  intense  in  the  third  week  in  August 
that  the  banking  institutions  of  Chile  were  threatened 


1898] 


AEGENTINA  AND  CHILE 


407 


with  a severe  financial  crisis,  and  Congress  insisted  on  a 
suspension  of  the  conversion  until  such  time  as  calm 
was  restored,  a proceeding  that  reflected  small  credit  on 
the  Chambers. 

When  war  was  expected  almost  daily,  Errazuriz 
took  upon  himself  the  direction  of  the  question  with 
Argentina,  demanding  that  the  dispute  be  submitted  to 
arbitration,  the  northern  section  to  be  decided  by  the 
representative  of  the  United  States  Government  in 
Argentina  assisted  by  a Chilian  and  an  Argentine  com- 
missioner, and  the  southern  by  Her  Majesty  Queen 
Victoria.  At  first  Argentina  was  inclined  to  resist 
these  terms ; but  it  was  peace  or  war,  and  in  the  end 
she  chose  peace.  It  was  largely  due  to  the  attitude  of 
President  Errazuriz  at  this  extremely  critical  period  that 
war  was  averted. 

During  the  Errazuriz  Administration  lengthy  negoti- 
ations took  place  with  Peru  for  a settlement  of  the  Tacna 
and  Arica  question.  The  difficulty  of  establishing  any 
mutual  understanding  between  the  two  Governments 
arose  from  a divergence  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  Treaty  of  Ancon  in  respect  to  the 
voting  qualification  of  the  residents  in  Tacna  and  Arica. 
That  treaty  says  : — “ A plebiscite  shall  decide  by  popular 
votation  if  the  territory  of  these  provinces  shall  remain 
definitely  under  the  dominion  and  sovereignty  of  Chile, 
or  if  they  shall  continue  to  form  part  of  the  territory  of 
Peru.”  The  Chilian  representatives  in  the  negotiations 
maintained  that  in  a plebiscite  of  this  nature  all  residents 
within  the  territories  in  question  were  entitled  to  vote, 
but  Peru  contended  that  the  right  was  restricted  to 
Peruvian  citizens.  By  an  agreement  in  April,  1898, 
known  as  the  Billinghurst  - Latorre  Protocol,  it  was 
proposed  to  submit  the  disputed  points  to  the  arbitra- 
tion of  the  Queen-Eegent  of  Spain,  but  the  Chilian 
Congress  refusing  this  proposition,  a deadlock  in  the 
negotiations  occurred  and  no  solution  of  the  question 
has  yet  been  reached. 

The  efforts  of  Errazuriz  to  settle  the  Bolivian  ques- 


408 


CHILE 


tion  also  proved  abortive.  In  September,  1900,  a note 
was  presented  by  Senor  Ivonig,  the  Chilian  Minister  in 
Bolivia,  to  the  Government,  offering  a basis  for  a treaty 
of  peace  between  Chile  and  Bolivia,  but  in  which  the 
cession  of  any  seaport  in  Chilian  territory  was  expressly 
excluded.  This  communication  conveyed  the  additional 
information  that  if  Bolivia  refused  a settlement  the 
Chilian  Government  would  feel  constrained  to  denounce 
the  agreement  of  truce  executed  in  1884.  This  note 
practically  amounted  to  an  ultimatum,  and  provoked 
such  adverse  expressions  of  opinion  in  the  majority  of 
the  South  American  Republics  that  the  Chilian  Govern- 
ment considered  it  politic  to  deny  that  it  was  authorised. 
Viewed  from  a neutral  standpoint,  there  is  small  reason 
why  Chile  should  be  exceptionally  magnanimous  in  her 
treatment  of  Bolivia.  The  treaty  signed  in  1895,  but 
subsequently  rejected  by  the  Chilian  Congress,  accorded 
valuable  concessions  to  Bolivia,  and  while  that  treaty  was 
pending  ratification  Bolivia  ceded  to  Argentina  the 
territory  of  the  Puno  de  Atacama,  which  Chile  con- 
sidered as  belonging  to  the  districts  occupied  by  her  in 
accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  truce  with  Bolivia  in 
1884.  In  this  matter  Bolivia  acted  in  bad  faith,  and 
after  such  conduct  it  is  unreasonable  to  suppose  that 
Chile  would  make  unnecessary  concessions  to  her. 

Once  more,  early  in  1901,  a presidential  election 
came  up.  In  February,  Senor  Pedro  Montt  was  pro- 
claimed a candidate  in  Valparaiso,  supported  by  the 
Conservatives  and  the  Liberal  - Democractic  Party. 
Senor  Montt  had  a long  record  of  public  service  to 
recommend  him  to  the  electors  of  Chile,  having  been  a 
prominent  member  of  several  Ministries  and  a member 
of  Congress  for  a quarter  of  a century.  In  certain 
quarters  hostility  was  shown  to  his  candidature  for  the 
personal  reason  that  in  the  two  revolutions  occurring 
during  his  father’s  presidential  term  many  families  had 
been  harshly  treated,  and  their  descendants  entertained 
bitter  feelings  against  the  son  of  the  man  who  had 
successfully  maintained  his  position.  Montt’s  opponent 


1901]  PRESIDENTIAL  CANDIDATES 


409 


was  Senor  Jerman  Riesco,  whose  candidature  was  pro- 
claimed by  a convention  of  Liberal  Senators,  Deputies, 
and  ex-Congressmen  held  in  Santiago  in  March.  Senor 
Riesco  was  a member  of  the  Senate,  but  had  taken 
little  part  in  political  life,  and  in  the  voting  for  several 
days  the  nomination  hovered  between  Senor  Ramon 
Barros  Luco,  one  of  the  principal  leaders  of  the  revolt 
against  Balmaceda,  and  Senor  Claudio  Vicuna,  the 
President-elect  in  1891 ; but  neither  of  these  could 
obtain  the  required  majority,  and  they  withdrew  their 
names. 

For  once  the  majority  of  the  Liberals  sank  their 
differences  and  combined  to  defeat  Senor  Montt,  and 
Senor  Riesco  was  elected  in  June,  1901.  His  Adminis- 
tration has  been  chiefly  remarkable  for  the  final  settle- 
ment of  the  dispute  with  Argentina  in  1902.  A few 
weeks  after  the  presidential  election,  the  condition  of 
Senor  Errazuriz,  who  had  never  enjoyed  robust  health, 
developed  alarming  symptoms,  and  these  finally  caused 
his  death.  For  some  time  previously  his  duties  had 
been  discharged  by  the  Prime  Minister,  Senor  Zanartu, 
who  now  continued  at  the  head  of  the  Administration 
until  the  inauguration  of  President  Riesco  on  September 
18,  1901. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

chile — continued 

Effect  of  Foreign  Wars  and  Internal  Disturbances.  Movement  of 
Population.  Infantile  Mortality.  Immigration.  Araucanian 

Indians.  Physical  Qualities.  Tendency  to  Drift  to  the  Cities. 
Spread  of  Alcoholism.  Drunkenness  in  Valparaiso  and  London. 
Regulation  of  Liquor  Traffic.  Chilians  and  the  Government. 
Educational  Facilities.  Primary  Instruction.  Educational 

Statistics.  German  Schools.  Secondary  and  Higher  Education. 
Religious  Liberty.  Church  Influence.  Administration  of  Justice. 
Brigandage.  National  Character.  Aggressive  Nature  of  Chilians. 
Means  of  Communication.  State  and  Private  Railways.  Pata- 
gonia and  Tierra  del  Fuego.  Industrial  Zones.  Mining  Industry. 
Nitrate  of  Soda.  Development  of  Tarapaca.  Copper  Mining. 
Want  of  Transport  Facilities.  Silver  Mining.  Gold  and 
Manganese.  Specimens  of  Minerals  at  Santiago.  Coal  and 
Iron.  Borax.  Proportion  of  Minerals  to  remainder  of  Exports. 
Agricultural  Enterprise.  Rapid  Decadence  after  1893.  Pro- 
duction of  Wheat.  The  Government  and  Agricultural  Industry. 
Viticulture.  Pastoral  Industry.  Sheep-breeding  in  Patagonia. 
The  Lumber  Trade.  The  Fishing  Industry.  Manufactures. 
Lack  of  Skilled  Labour.  Cloth  and  Cotton  Factories.  Sugar 
Refineries.  Protection  for  Manufacturing  Interests. 

Economic  development  in  Chile  has  been  checked  for 
the  past  twenty-five  years  by  international  complications 
and  internal  disturbances.  The  war  with  Spain  in  1865 
occasioned  heavy  monetary  losses  to  the  community, 
especially  in  the  trade  centre  of  Valparaiso,  and  after 
the  country  had  recovered  from  its  effects  it  was  plunged 
into  a crisis  by  the  quarrel  with  Bolivia  and  Peru. 

This  second  war  was  a heavy  drain  on  the  country 
owing  to  the  necessity  of  sending  an  army  to  the  front. 

410 


1903]  FOREIGN  AND  CIVIL  WARS 


411 


The  able-bodied  men  engaged  in  industrial  pursuits 
were  required  for  military  service  in  such  large  numbers 
that  between  the  years  1879  and  1882  the  remainder 
of  the  population  consisted  in  great  part  only  of  old 
men,  women  and  children,  and  in  such  circumstances 
rapid  economic  progress  could  not  be  expected.  A few 
years  of  peace  followed  the  victory  of  the  Chilians,  and 
then  came  the  events  of  1891  to  throw  the  coimtry  once 
more  into  confusion.  After  the  downfall  of  Balmaceda 
economic  conditions  were  unsatisfactory,  for  the  struggle 
had  shaken  the  Republic  to  its  foundations,  and  from  the 
evil  effects  Chile  is  still  suffering,  her  troubles  having 
been  aggravated  during  the  last  decade  by  constant 
alarms  of  a possible  outbreak  of  hostilities  with  Argentina 
and  by  unstable  domestic  politics.  Constant  wrangling 
in  Congress  has  so  engrossed  the  attention  of  the 
Chambers  that  no  time  has  been  available  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  true  interests  of  the  country,  and  the 
largely  increased  naval  and  military  expenditure  has  left 
no  revenue  to  aid  in  the  development  of  the  country’s 
resources. 

In  the  economic  evolution  of  Chile  the  movement  of 
population  is  an  important  factor,  and  the  small  rate  of 
its  increase  a serious  drawback.  In  the  ten  years 
between  1885  and  1895  the  population  has  increased  by 
only  184,825  to  a total  of  2,712,145,  of  whom  1,240,353 
were  urban  and  1,471,792  rural.  As  Chilian  territory 
comprises  290,000  square  miles,  the  average  is  but  nine 
inhabitants  to  the  mile.  In  1895  the  average  death-rate 
was  34  per  thousand,  and  very  much  higher  in  the  cities. 
Santiago  being  credited  with  72  and  Valparaiso  67  per 
thousand ; in  the  former  city  12,057  deaths  were 
registered  in  1899  and  only  10,379  births,  while  in 
Valparaiso  the  figures  were  6256  deaths  and  6408  births. 
The  high  death-rate  in  Chile  is  accounted  for  by  the 
heavy  infantile  mortality  from  contagious  diseases, 
inadequate  attention,  hereditary  alcoholism,  and  a 
general  absence  of  hygienic  precautions. 

Immigration  is  small,  and  the  number  of  foreigners 


412 


CHILE 


in  the  Republic  in  1895  was  placed  at  72,812.  Of  these, 
42,105  were  Europeans,  701  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  28,986  natives  of  other  South  American  countries, 
and  1020  other  nationalities ; the  total  increase  in  the 
foreign  population  between  1885  and  1895  being  only 
7812  persons.  The  European  residents  include  8296 
Spaniards,  7809  French,  7049  Germans,  7587  Italians, 
and  6241  British.  In  the  southern  districts  near  Valdivia 
are  many  Germans,  whilst  in  Valparaiso  and  Iquique 
the  British  community  is  largely  represented,  the 
remainder  of  the  foreign  population  being  scattered  over 
the  country,  with,  however,  one-third  of  the  French 
residents  in  Santiago.  A comparison  of  immigration  to 
Chile  with  that  to  Argentina  and  Brazil  is  much  to  the 
advantage  of  the  latter  countries ; and  this  is  an  im- 
portant fact  in  view  of  the  low  rate  of  increase  amongst 
the  natives,  since  it  means  that  in  a few  years  Chile  must 
be  overshadowed  by  the  numerical  superiority  of  her  sister 
republics,  unless  means  can  be  found  to  bring  about  an 
improvement.  Undoubtedly  Santiago  could  be  improved 
to  the  benefit  of  public  health ; but  effective  action  in 
this  or  any  useful  direction  requires  men  at  the  head  of 
affairs  who  will  work  wisely  and  patiently  for  the  wel- 
fare of  the  community,  and  such  men  are  not  prominent 
in  Chile  to-day. 

The  Indian  population  of  Araucania  is  rapidly  dis- 
appearing, becoming  merged  with  the  mixed  race  of 
Spanish  and  Indian  blood  forming  the  majority  of  the 
Chilians,  or  dying  out,  as  such  Indian  races  do  when 
brought  into  contact  with  modern  civilisation.  With 
the  elimination  of  the  Araucanians  Chile  loses  a 
picturesque  element  in  her  civic  life.  In  the  past  they 
were  regarded  as  dangerous  to  the  community,  anti 
hunted  down  unmercifully,  they  in  turn  raiding  settle- 
ments and  committing  outrages  whenever  opportunity 
offered ; but  for  the  last  twenty  years  they  have  steadily 
shrank  in  numbers  and  gradually  drifted  out  of  the 
more  central  districts  to  the  forest  country  of  the 
south.  They  seldom  care  for  steady  work,  and,  as  a 


1903] 


ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS 


413 


rule,  live  in  abject  poverty,  subsisting  on  the  produce  of 
small  patches  of  cultivated  ground  and  such  wild  food 
and  game  as  they  can  find  in  the  woods. 

In  physique  the  Chilians  are  a more  hardy  race  than 
is  generally  found  in  South  America.  They  are  moun- 
taineers or  live  by  the  seashore,  where  they  grow  to  man- 
hood, always  fighting  the  forces  of  nature.  Thus  they 
have  developed  in  all  classes  a sturdy  quality  in  the  strain 
of  Spanish  blood  which  showed  its  value  when  they 
measured  strength  with  the  Bolivians  and  Peruvians, 
and  was  proved  again  in  the  desperate  struggle  which 
took  place  in  1891,  but  to  some  extent  this  hardiness 
has  been  undermined  in  recent  years  by  a marked 
tendency  of  the  rural  population  to  drift  into  the  towns 
and  by  the  steady  spread  of  alcoholism.  Town-crowd- 
ing is  due  to  the  decline  of  the  agricultural  industry,  owing 
to  poor  harvests  and  the  absence  of  adequate  security  for 
life  and  property  in  the  country  districts,  but  the 
excessive  consumption  of  strong  liquors  dates  many 
years  back.  The  Chilians  were  addicted  to  drink  before 
the  war  with  Bolivia  and  Peru ; but  it  expanded  the 
habit,  for  the  soldiers  found  liquor  plentiful  during  the 
campaigns,  and  after  the  war  ended  and  the  troops 
returned  home  the  increase  of  drunkenness  became  most 
noticeable.  To  such  a height  has  the  abuse  of  alcohol 
now  grown  in  Chile  that  official  statistics  show  the 
consumption  to  be  nearly  four  gallons  of  raw  spirit 
annually  per  head  of  population,  liquor  mostly  of  the 
worst  quality.  Spirit  distilled  from  rotten  wheat, 
potatoes,  maize,  and  the  refuse  from  the  wine-making 
establishments,  is  the  poison  eating  into  the  life  of  the 
Chilian  nation,  and  the  Government  is  supine  in  the 
matter,  while  private  crusades  attempted  by  a few  clear 
sighted  individuals  have  been  powerless  as  yet  to  check 
the  evil.  As  an  example,  compare  Valparaiso  in  1898 
with  London.  Valparaiso  has  a population  of  140,000 
inhabitants,  London  one  of  5,000,000 ; in  Valparaiso 
there  were  six  hundred  more  cases  of  drunkenness  dealt 
with  by  the  police  authorities  than  came  before  the 


414 


CHILE 


London  magistrates  in  the  same  year ; probably  the 
disparity  would  be  even  greater,  but  in  Chile  arrests  for 
intoxication  are  seldom  made  unless  individuals  are 
unable  to  walk  or  dangerous  to  their  neighbours. 

It  is  in  the  regulation  of  the  liquor  traffic  and  the 
alleviation  of  the  conditions  of  the  agricultural  com- 
munity that  the  Government  has  failed  in  its  duty  dur- 
ing the  last  few  years,  and  this  inaction  has  helped 
to  intensify  the  economic  depression  from  which  the 
country  is  now  suffering.  Primarily  the  fault  lies  with 
Congress,  where  Senators  and  Deputies  are  too  busy 
attending  to  their  own  small  political  interests  to  pay 
any  attention  to  the  public  welfare,  but  the  Executive 
must  also  bear  a portion  of  the  blame.  If  the  President 
was  determined  to  prevent  the  Chilians  from  dropping 
into  the  threatened  abyss,  he  would  find  strong  support 
for  his  policy  ; but  no  such  energetic  movement  has 
been  hinted  at,  and  matters  drift  from  bad  to  worse 
with  hardly  a protest.  It  is  clear  that  unless  the  liquor 
traffic  is  controlled  and  agricultural  industry  revived,  the 
prosperity  which  Chile  enjoyed  in  former  years  will  be 
greatly  curtailed. 

There  is  another  serious  peril.  A quarter  of  a 
century  ago  the  Chilians  were  self-reliant  and  cared 
little  for  official  assistance,  and  it  is  only  necessary  to 
compare  the  national  feeling  in  1875  with  that  in  1904 
to  recognise  the  change  that  has  occurred  in  this  respect. 
Before  the  war  with  Peru  the  Government  was  poor 
and  had  a hard  struggle  to  pay  its  way,  but  the  capture 
of  Tarapaca  suddenly  made  Chile  wealthy  to  an  extent 
never  previously  contemplated.  The  duties  levied  on 
exported  nitrate  of  soda  brought  into  the  exchequer  a 
large  and  constantly  increasing  revenue,  and  gradually 
the  Chilians  realised  that  with  these  abundant  resources 
official  positions  could  be  created  and  life  made  easy  in 
various  ways.  In  the  past  twenty  years  people  of  all 
classes  have  therefore  come  to  look  on  the  Government 
as  a milch  cow,  and  succeeding  Administrations  have 
not  possessed  sufficient  determination  to  resist  this 


1903] 


EDUCATIONAL  STATISTICS 


415 


popular  inclination.  This  is  a fast  growing  evil  to-day 
in  Chile,  and  one  every  year  more  difficult  to  abate. 
Chilians  of  twenty- five  years  ago  only  insisted  on  liberty 
to  work  for  themselves  : Chilians  of  the  present  time 
want  no  work  as  long  as  funds  are  forthcoming  from 
official  sources  for  their  support. 

Education  has  received  considerable  attention  from 
the  Government  at  various  periods,  but  there  is  still 
much  room  for  improvement.  Primary  education  has 
been  sacrificed  to  permit  greater  support  to  be  extended 
to  higher  education,  with  the  result  that  the  class  of 
inhabitants  which  benefits  most  by  the  bounty  of  the 
State  is  the  one  best  able  to  defray  the  cost  for  itself. 
This  tendency  of  the  influential  classes  to  monopolise 
the  State  revenues  has  led  the  authorities  to  neglect  the 
general  progress  of  the  population  and  pander  to  a 
comparatively  limited  circle. 

How  matters  stand  in  regard  to  elementary  educa- 
tion may  be  judged  by  the  official  returns  published  for 
1895,  the  most  recent  available.  The  census  showed  that 
out  of  a total  population  of  2,712,145  only  756,893 
persons,  or  28  per  cent.,  were  able  to  read  and  write. 
The  number  of  children  between  the  ages  of  five  and 
fifteen  was  given  as  674,955,  of  whom  141,829  were 
enrolled  on  the  registers  of  public  and  private  schools ; 
but  the  actual  attendance  at  public  schools  for  the  year 
was  33,746  boys  and  36,861  girls,  and  15,885  boys  and 
10,409  girls  more  went  to  private  schools,  these  figures 
showing  that  only  96,901  children  were  receiving 
instruction  out  of  the  total  of  674,955  who  should 
have  been  at  school.  Nor  is  the  condition  of  affairs  in 
Santiago  at  all  satisfactory,  for  out  of  a population  of 
256,413  only  116,556  could  read  and  write,  while  the 
number  of  children  between  the  ages  of  five  and  fifteen 
was  47,025,  of  whom  only  13,066  attended  school. 

Public  instruction  is  gratuitous  but  not  obligatory. 
This  freedom  and  the  apathetic  indifference  of  the 
public  combine  to  ensure  the  scanty  attendance  of  the 
children.  In  1899  the  number  of  public  schools  was 


410 


CHILE 


1403,  and  of  private  445,  the  latter  including  148  schools 
for  boys,  50  for  girls,  and  247  for  both  sexes  ; the  public 
and  private  schools  combined  numbering  1848,  equal  to 
one  school  for  365  children,  so  it  is  clear  that  the  facili- 
ties for  primary  education  are  inadequate,  and  would  be 
shockingly  so  did  thirst  for  knowledge  replace  indiffer- 
ence among  the  masses.  Instruction  in  the  1403  public 
schools  in  1895  was  conducted  by  452  masters  and  296 
assistants,  and  by  978  mistresses  with  573  assistants — a 
total  staff  of  2299  ; but  the  payment  of  these  teachers  is 
at  a very  low  rate,  often  barely  sufficient  to  provide 
actual  necessities  of  life,  and  never  inviting  enough  to 
secure  the  services  of  highly-trained  professionals. 

In  the  south,  where  the  Germans  are  numerous, 
elementary  education  is  on  a much  better  basis.  The 
schools  at  Valdivia,  Llanquihue,  Osorno,  and  other 
places  are  under  German  preceptors,  and  the  contrast 
between  these  establishments  and  those  left  to  Chilian 
direction  is  most  marked.  The  Government  recognises 
the  benefit  these  German  schools  confer  upon  the 
community,  and  encourages  their  existence  by  an 
annual  subvention.  In  many  of  them  the  language  used 
is  German,  Spanish  being  taught  only  on  certain  days 
in  the  week,  but  all  the  formalities  required  by  Chilian 
law  are  duly  fulfilled. 

The  supervision  of  education  in  Chile  is  delegated  to 
a Council  of  Public  Instruction,  comprising  the  Minister 
of  Public  Instruction,  the  Rector  and  the  Secretary- 
General  of  the  University,  the  five  senior  members  of 
the  Faculties,  the  Rector  of  the  National  Institute, 
three  members  nominated  by  the  President,  and  two 
delegates  elected  by  the  University — in  all  fourteen 
members.  This  council  has  the  right  to  decide  what 
qualifications  are  necessary  for  teachers,  and  also  to 
maintain  a general  check  on  the  educational  courses  and 
the  standard  required  for  periodical  examinations. 

For  secondary  and  higher  education,  colleges  and 
lyceums  have  been  established  in  Santiago  and  the 
provinces,  and  thirty  are  open,  the  principal  being  the 


An  Araucanian  Type. 


I 


[Face  page  412. 


1903] 


THE  CHURCH  IN  CHILE 


417 


National  Institute  at  Santiago,  where  1168  pupils 
attended  in  1899.  Scholarships  are  given  there,  and  in 
1899  the  number  of  students  obtaining  money  premiums 
was  104.  Instruction  is  free,  but  the  cost  of  individual 
maintenance  must  be  defrayed  from  private  funds,  the 
average  expense  to  the  State  in  1899  for  each  student 
under  instruction  being  $218tw.  The  number  of 
students  attending  the  thirty  colleges  in  the  Republic  in 
1899  was  4996,  and  the  professors  employed  419.  There 
are  eight  colleges  for  girls,  at  which  the  average  attend- 
ance in  1899  was  896  pupils,  whose  studies  were 
superintended  by  8 male  and  87  female  professors.  In 
addition  to  the  colleges  and  lyceums  directly  administered 
by  the  State,  there  are  Church  seminaries  to  which 
annual  subventions  are  paid  by  the  Government,  and 
others  under  control  of  the  clergy,  which  are  without 
public  assistance. 

At  Santiago  is  the  State  University,  where  degrees 
in  law,  mathematical  sciences,  medicine,  and  fine  arts 
are  granted,  and  some  1700  students  were  inscribed  on 
the  rolls  in  1899,  573  degrees  being  conferred  in  that 
year.  In  addition  to  the  State  University  there  is  the 
Catholic  University  conducted  strictly  under  the  auspices 
of  the  Church,  and  this  institution  also  confers  degrees 
which  are  recognised  by  the  State  for  legal  and  other 
professions.  At  both  universities  the  instruction  im- 
parted is  sound,  and  in  many  cases  it  is  directed  by 
specialists  of  Chilian  or  foreign  nationality.  In  all 
phases  of  secondary  and  higher  education  the  careful 
supervision  of  the  authorities  is  noticeable,  the  more  so 
when  the  neglect  of  primary  instruction  is  considered. 

In  Chile  there  is  religious  liberty  for  all  creeds,  but 
the  Roman  Catholic  faith  is  protected  by  the  State  and 
forms  an  important  factor  in  the  national  life.  In  1899 
the  funds  devoted  by  the  Government  in  aid  of  the 
Church  and  the  various  religious  institutions  was 
$942,508.  Both  politically  and  socially,  the  Catholic 
Church  has  a widely  extended  influence,  and  is 
extremely  wealthy  apart  from  the  assistance  it  receives 

2 D 


418 


CHILE 


from  the  State.  Practicaliy  all  Chilians  are  Roman 
Catholics,  but  of  the  foreigners  some  16,000,  chiefly 
Germans,  British,  Scandinavians,  North  Americans  and 
Austrians,  out  of  a total  foreign  population  of  72,000, 

are  Protestants. 

The  administration  of  justice  in  Chile  leaves  much 
to  be  desired.  Complaints  are  frequent  that  the 
formalities  of  the  courts  are  often  so  unwieldy  as  to 
render  equitable  dispensation  of  the  laws  a practical 
impossibility.  The  sum  allotted  from  the  national 
revenues  in  1899  for  the  maintenance  of  the  judiciary 
was  $1,881,360,  which  is  more  than  adequate  payment 
for  the  duties  entailed.  The  laws  are  codified,  and 
would  meet  the  public  needs  if  reforms  were  introduced 
to  expedite  civil  and  criminal  procedure,  and,  as 
elsewhere  in  South  America,  the  system  is  based  on 
the  Spanish  laws  in  force  when  these  countries  were 
colonies  of  Spain.  While  the  courts  are  unsatisfactory 
the  condition  of  the  police  is  infinitely  worse,  and  pro- 
tection for  life  and  property  can  hardly  be  said  to  exist 
in  any  outlying  districts,  and  even  near  Santiago  and 
Valparaiso  cases  of  assault  and  highway  robbery  in 
broad  daylight  daily  occur.  An  organised  system  of 
brigandage  has  developed  of  late  years,  and  although 
the  authorities  are  perfectly  cognisant  of  this  condition 
of  affairs,  no  steps  are  taken  to  clear  the  country  of  a 
pest  which  retards  progress  and  threatens  ruin  to  many 
branches  of  industrial  enterprise. 

The  Chilian  national  character  has  undergone  a 
marked  change  in  recent  years.  Previous  to  the  war 
with  Peru  the  dominant  note  was  a desire  for  peace 
and  ample  opportunity  for  industrial  pursuits.  The 
people  were  ready  to  fight  if  forced  into  a corner,  though 
never  anxious  for  an  appeal  to  arms.  But  the  victories 
over  the  Bolivians  and  Peruvians  convinced  the  Chilians 
that  they  were  superior  to  their  neighbours  as  a fighting 
race,  and  pride  buried  the  former  wish  to  avert  any 
serious  conflict.  Aggressiveness  became  dominant  both 
in  public  and  private  life,  but  would  have  done  little 


1903]  NATIONAL  CHARACTERISTICS 


419 


harm  had  it  not  been  accompanied  by  those  other 
influences  already  mentioned  which  modified  the  qualities 
that  had  enabled  Chile  to  defeat  her  adversaries,  the 
debasing  influences  of  sudden  wealth.  Thus  the  evolution 
of  the  last  twenty  years  has  been  productive  of  arrogance 
of  bearing,  and  the  old  self-reliant  spirit  has  given  place 
to  bluster  and  an  inclination  to  make  the  Government 
the  universal  provider.  The  more  wealthy  section  of 
the  population  still  retains  its  shrewdness,  but  warped 
by  aggressive  tendencies,  and  the  lower  class  imitate 
their  betters.  It  is  hence  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  ’ 
the  dominant  traits  of  the  national  character  to-day  are 
brusqueness,  aggressiveness,  and  a tendency  to  domineer, 
arising  from  the  belief  that  prestige  as  a fighting  people 
and  the  financial  resources  of  the  Government  will  carry 
Chile  successfully  through  all  international  difficulties. 
In  one  respect  the  Chilians  have  an  advantage  over  other 
South  American  countries,  they  are  patriotic  because 
they  are  still  one  people  without  any  constant  influx  of 
foreign  blood  to  lessen  or  alloy  their  ideals  as  Chilians 
of  the  cause  for  which  they  must  fight  and,  if  necessary, 
give  their  lives. 

Economic  development  has  been  se’verely  checked 
by  inadequate  means  of  communication  and  transport. 
For  years  railway  extension  has  been  contemplated,  but 
through  lack  of  funds  or  political  disturbances  the  work 
has  made  slow  progress,  and  there  is  a decided  disinclina- 
: tion  to  permit  private  enterprise  to  provide  the  additional 
means  of  communication  so  urgently  needed.  The  out- 
come is  that  the  railways  at  the  commencement  of  1901 
were  only  2890  miles  in  length,  of  which  the  State  owns 
1460  and  private  enterprise  1430  miles.  In  the  central 
centre  and  south  the  greater  part  of  the  system  is 
controlled  by  the  Government  and  in  the  north  chiefly 
by  private  owners.  The  management  on  the  State 
! owned  lines  is  the  cause  of  constant  complaint — service 
irregular,  rolling  stock  deficient,  accidents  and  loss  of 
life  frequent — while  on  the  railways  belonging  to  private 
enterprise  few  of  these  defects  are  found.  But  the 


420 


CHILE 


lesson  carries  no  weight  with  the  Government,  for  State 
lines  are  an  admirable  political  machine,  to  alienate  which 
would  raise  the  most  violent  opposition  amongst  poli- 
ticians. 

In  a mountainous  country  such  as  Chile  roads  as 
well  as  railways  are  necessary  to  allow  the  natural 
resources  to  be  developed.  Money  is  regularly  voted 
for  repairs  to  existing  highways  and  the  construction  ot 
new  ones,  but  only  a small  proportion  of  the  funds  so 
provided  is  legitimately  expended.  Dishonest  contractors 
benefit  to  a large  extent  by  the  appropriations,  so  the 
agricultural  and  mining  industries  struggle  along  as  best 
they  can,  and  must  be  content  with  mule  tracks  because 
the  authorities  will  make  no  effort  at  improvements. 
The  sea  affords  a means  of  easy  transport ; but  roads 
and  railways  are  needed  to  reach  the  coast,  and  shipping 
facilities  required  to  enable  the  produce  to  be  handled. 

In  one  district,  however,  economic  progress  during 
the  past  decade  has  been  exceptionally  rapid.  The 
Straits  of  Magellan  have  undergone  a development 
which  has  converted  barren  wastes  into  wealth -producing 
properties,  and  the  sheep  farming  industry  has  been 
the  backbone  of  this  movement.  The  town  of  Punta 
Arenas,  in  the  centre  of  these  districts,  from  an  insignifi- 
cant village  has  become  a thriving  city  of  10,000 
inhabitants,  and  streets  lighted  by  electricity  have  taken 
the  place  of  the  mud  tracks  of  ten  years  ago.  Hovels 
have  been  replaced  by  comfortable  houses,  and  on  all 
sides  are  signs  of  vigorous  prosperity  in  this  southern 
corner  of  Patagonia,  Tierra  del  Fuego  also  sharing  in 
this  development. 

For  convenience  in  reviewing  industrial  enterprise 
in  Chile,  the  country  may  be  roughly  divided  into  four 
zones.  The  most  northern  of  these  sections  lies  between 
the  parallels  of  latitudes  18°  to  27°,  and  includes  the 
provinces  of  Tacna,  Tarapaca,  Antofagasta,  and  a part 
of  Atacama.  In  these  districts  are  narrow  valleys,  a 
limited  water  supply,  no  rainfall,  sparse  vegetation,  and 
a comparatively  healthy  climate.  On  the  coast  are 


1903] 


INDUSTRIAL  ENTERPRISE 


421 


depositions  of  guano  ; a few  miles  inland  is  found  nitrate 
of  soda  and  borax;  and  further  in  the  interior  are 
mines  of  copper,  silver,  gold,  sulphur,  and  other  minerals, 
this  section  being  devoted  to  mining  enterprise. 

The  zone  lying  between  latitude  27  and  32’,  and 
comprising  part  of  Atacama  and  the  provinces  of 
Coquimbo  and  Aconcagua,  contains  deposits  of  copper, 
silver,  iron,  manganese,  lead,  cinnabar,  and  other  metals, 
and  fertile  valleys  watered  by  streams  from  the  Andine 
ranges  permit  extensive  agriculture.  The  third  section 
is  between  latitude  32°  and  43  , and  contains  the 
Provinces  of  Valparaiso,  Santiago,  O’Higgins,  Colchagua, 
Curico,  Talca,  Linnares,  Maule,  Nuble,  Concepcion, 
Bio -Bio,  Arauco,  Malleco  Cautin,  Valdivia,  Llanquiliue, 
and  the  northern  part  of  the  island  of  Chilbe,  and  is 
chiefly  agricultural,  especially  in  the  great  central  valley 
extending  from  Santiago  to  Valdivia.  In  this  zone  are 
the  coal-mining  districts  near  Concepcion  and  Arauco. 
The  fourth  section  is  the  country  lying  between  latitude 
43°  and  57°,  and  here  the  mainland  is  rugged  and 
mountainous,  while  an  archipelago  is  formed  by  the 
islands  of  Cliiloe,  Guaitecas,  Guayaneco,  the  Magallanes, 
and  Tierra  del  Fuego.  The  characteristic  features  are 
heavy  forests,  valleys  suitable  for  grazing  cattle  and 
sheep,  and  an  abundance  of  fish  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
islands,  industrial  enterprise  consisting  principally  of 
cutting  lumber,  breeding  sheep  and  cattle,  and  fishing. 

It  is  from  the  mining  industry  that  Chile  draws  her 
principal  wealth.  The  chief  branch  is  the  extraction 
and  preparation  of  nitrate  of  soda  for  exportation,  and 
the  development  of  this  enterprise  during  the  past  quarter 
of  a century  has  been  large.  In  1878,  when  the  nitrate 
districts  were  under  Peruvian  and  Bolivian  control,  the 
total  amount  shipped  was  only  7,023,000  Spanish  quintals 
of  102  pounds  weight,  and  in  the  two  succeeding  years 
the  production  fell  away  during  the  war.  By  1881, 
Tarapaca,  the  centre  of  the  nitrate  industry,  was  under 
Chilian  administration,  and  a revival  of  the  industry  took 
place,  the  exportation  reaching  7,734,000  Spanish  quintals, 


422 


CHILE 


a steady  increase  occurring  until,  in  1884,  no  less  than 
12,152,000  quintals  were  sent  abroad.  A crisis  in  the 
nitrate  market  then  resulted  from  over-production,  and 
in  1885-0  the  shipments  decreased  twenty-five  per  cent., 
but  this  check  was  only  temporary,  and  in  1889  the 
exportation  rose  to  20,182,000  quintals,  and  in  the 
following  twelvemonth  further  increased  to  23,373,000 
quintals.  Again  the  markets  were  flooded,  and  for 
three  years  smaller  shipments  were  made,  a widespread 
opinion  existing  that  an  annual  output  of  20,000,000 
quintals  was  the  largest  amount  the  world  could  absorb. 
The  propaganda  to  demonstrate  the  value  of  nitrate  as 
a fertiliser  altered  previously  existing  conditions,  and 
once  more  the  exportation  increased,  the  amount  shipped 
in  1895  being  27,285,205  quintals,  rising  in  1898  to 
28,408,110  quintals,  and  in  1899  to  30,209,192  quintals. 
In  1900  it  increased  to  31,549,653  quintals,  valued  at 
eight  millions  sterling— equal  to  two-thirds  of  the  total 
value  of  Chilian  products  exported  to  foreign  countries. 
It  is  evident  from  these  figures  that  the  acquisition  of 
the  nitrate  districts  of  Tarapaca  from  Peru  entirely 
revolutionised  the  industrial  enterprise  of  Chile,  the 
production  of  nitrate  becoming  the  factor  of  most  im- 
portance. 

How  important  the  industry  has  become,  apart  from 
the  value  of  the  product,  can  be  judged  from  the  fact 
that  in  fifty-eight  establishments  for  the  extraction  and 
preparation  of  nitrate  18,914  persons  were  employed 
in  1900,  and  no  fewer  than  seven  seaports  are  now 
dependent  for  their  existence  on  the  traffic  shipments. 
Through  these  seven  ports  the  export  in  1899  was — 
Pisagua,  77,465  tons;  Junin,  112,243  tons;  Caleta 
Buena,  262,136  tons;  Iquique,  674,397  tons;  Tocopilla, 
150,505  tons;  Taltal,  90,546;  and  Antofagasta,  22,328 
tons. 

The  danger  that  the  nitrate  deposits  may  be  shortly 
exhausted  and  leave  Chile  bereft  of  this  great  source  of 
wealth  is  not  one  to  be  seriously  contemplated  at  present, 
for  careful  surveys  show  that  in  1899  there  still  remained 


1903]  PRODUCTION  OF  NITRATE  OF  SODA  4*23 

the  following  quantities  of  raw  material— Tarapaca, 
private  property  407,160,000  quintals,  and  owned  by 
the  Government  165,888,513  quintals;  Toco,  private 
138,112,000  quintals,  and  Government  87,726,769 
quintals;  Aguas  Blancas  and  Antofagasta,  153,000,000 
quintals  in  private  hands;  and  at  Taltal,  151,984,500 
quintals  privately  owned — -giving  a total  of  1,103,871,782 
quintals  still  to  be  extracted.  Allowing  for  a large 
annual  increase  in  production,  the  life  of  these  grounds 
is  not  less  than  twenty-five  years,  and  in  all  probability 
other  deposits  will  be  discovered  before  the  present 
ones  are  exhausted.  The  capital  invested  in  the  nitrate 
industry  and  the  railways  to  transport  the  output  to  the 
ports  is  estimated  at  £12,000,000,  the  greater  portion 
belonging  to  foreigners,  principally  British. 

Next  in  importance  to  nitrate  in  Chilian  mining 
industry  is  copper.  In  former  years  Chile  held  second 
place  in  the  world’s  production  of  this  metal,  but  low 
prices  prevailing  for  a lengthy  period  so  injuriously 
affected  the  Chilian  mines  that  the  output  sank  until 
the  average  annual  exportation  was  only  20,000  tons. 
Better  values  for  the  last  three  years  have  brightened 
prospects ; many  new  ventures  have  been  started,  and 
when  these  reach  the  producing  stage,  shipments  will 
show  a decided  increase.  Of  low-grade  ores  Chile  has 
an  unlimited  supply,  but  lack  of  adequate  means  of 
communication  has  rendered  impossible  any  systematic 
attempt  to  work  the  deposits,  and  it  has  only  been  when 
they  are  exceptionally  rich  that  successful  ventures  have 
been  made.  Transport  in  the  copper  districts  is  by 
mules,  no  roads  being  available  for  wheeled  traffic. 
The  condition  of  the  copper  industry  is  one  urgently 
requiring  energetic  action  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment, for  with  an  adequate  system  of  roads  and  railways 
to  cheapen  the  cost  of  working  and  admit  of  low-grade 
ores  being  mined  at  a profit,  the  output  could  be  increased 
threefold,  and  long  before  t he  nitrate  grounds  of  Tarapaca 
are  exhausted,  copper  mining  would  be  ready  to  fill  the 
void  in  industrial  life  that  must  occur  if  the  exportation 


424 


CHILE 


of  nitrate  of  soda  declines.  The  authorities  are  aware 
of  the  enormous  wealth  contained  in  the  copper  deposits, 
and  they  know  that  difficulty  of  transport  is  the  principal 
cause  of  the  unsatisfactory  condition  into  which  the 
industry  has  fallen ; but  no  steps  are  taken  to  remedy 
the  evil,  and  this  supine  policy  has  prevented  Chile  from 
reaping  any  great  benefit  through  the  recent  high  prices 
for  the  metal.  It  is  not  that  the  Government  is  without 
funds  for  the  work  necessary  to  place  the  copper  industry 
on  a satisfactory  basis,  for  the  revenues  derived  from 
the  export  of  nitrate  are  sufficient  to  establish  means  of 
communication  throughout  the  copper  districts ; but 
these  resources  annually  disappear  in  unnecessarily 
heavy  naval  and  military  expenditure,  or  are  utilised  to 
maintain  employes  whose  services  could  be  dispensed 
with,  and  the  country  be  the  better  administered. 

Silver  mining  has  suffered  from  the  prevalence  of 
low  prices.  The  same  difficulties  which  have  prevented 
the  development  of  the  copper  industry  have  caused  the 
abandonment  of  a large  proportion  of  the  silver  enter- 
prises, and  mines  that  were  profitable  when  prices  were 
higher  can  only  be  worked  at  a loss  with  silver  at  its 
present  value,  not  on  account  of  any  lack  of  moderately 
rich  ore,  but  because  the  cost  of  carriage  renders  expenses 
abnormally  high.  The  average  annual  export  of  silver 
for  the  last  few  years  has  been  5,000,000  ounces,  and 
under  improved  conditions  this  amount  might  be  doubled 
or  trebled.  Gold  mining  is  only  attempted  to  a small 
extent,  and  the  total  amount  of  this  metal  exported  in 
1898  was  valued  at  only  £183,621.  Of  manganese 
21,000  tons  are  annually  shipped  abroad,  and  the  quantity 
could  be  largely  augmented.  Other  metals  and  minerals 
are  exported  in  small  parcels.  In  no  way  can  an  idea 
of  the  mineral  wealth  of  Chile  be  better  obtained  than 
by  an  inspection  of  specimens  in  the  museum  at  Santiago, 
and  a glance  at  this  collection  shows  how  widely 
extended  is  the  mineral  area,  every  specimen  being 
tabulated  with  data  indicating  in  what  district  it  was 
found. 


1903J 


THE  MINING  INDUSTRY 


4*25 


Coal  mining  is  another  most  important  branch  of 
Chilian  industry.  At  present  it  is  confined  to  the  mines 
of  Concepcion  and  Arauco,  but  deposits  exist  further 
to  the  south  on  the  Pacific  coast,  near  Punta  Arenas  in 
the  Straits  of  Magellan,  and  in  Tierra  del  Fuego.  One 
million  tons  are  mined  annually  in  the  Concepcion  and 
Arauco  districts,  and  while  the  coal  is  described  as 
“dirty,”  and  not  equal  to  English  or  Australian,  it  is 
the  custom  of  steamers  homeward  bound  to  Europe  to 
take  supplies  at  Coronel  or  Lota,  and  vessels  on  the 
Chilian  coast  use  it,  as  also  the  Chilian  fleet  and  rail- 
ways. For  gas-making  this  coal  is  stated  to  be  excep- 
tionally good.  So  far,  the  production  from  the  mines  in 
Concepcion  and  Arauco  has  been  restricted  by  the 
scanty  labour  supply,  and  the  quantity  mined  has  been 
insufficient  for  the  local  demand,  importation  from  Europe 
and  Australia  consequently  taking  place  to  a considerable 
extent ; but  the  future  development  of  this  industry  is 
assured,  all  that  is  needed  being  additional  capital  to 
increase  the  output  and  so  permanently  exclude  foreign 
coal  from  the  Chilian  markets. 

The  existence  of  coal  over  widely  distributed  areas 
is  especially  valuable  in  view  of  the  fact  that  iron  ores 
are  abundant  in  the  central  and  southern  districts,  and 
with  coal  and  iron  in  close  proximity  there  should  be 
no  doubt  of  industrial  expansion  in  the  future.  Hitherto 
the  price  of  Chilian  coal  has  prohibited  undertakings  for 
the  manufacture  of  iron  and  steel ; but  such  conditions 
cannot  last,  and  signs  are  not  lacking  that  a change  is 
coming.  The  deposits  are  so  extensive,  that  instead  of 
a million  tons,  four  times  that  amount  should  be  available, 
and  competition  will  lower  existing  prices  to  European 
and  United  States  rates.  The  establishment  of  smelting 
works  and  factories  to  supply  local  demand  for  iron  and 
steel  must  follow. 

One  other  mineral  product  must  be  mentioned,  viz., 
borax,  the  export  of  which  has  assumed  large  proportions 
of  recent  years.  The  annual  output  is  estimated  at 
3*200  tons,  shipped  principally  from  Antofagasta,  but  in 


426 


CHILE 


Tarapaca  large  deposits  exist,  although  few  attempts 
have  been  made  to  turn  them  to  account.  But  the 
industry  is  destined  to  grow. 

To  understand  the  paramount  importance  of  mining 
in  the  industrial  life  of  Chile,  it  is  only  necessary  to 
glance  at  the  exports  in  1899,  and  the  proportion  of  the 
different  products  in  the  list.  The  following  table 
shows  : — 


National  Exportation,  1899. 

Dollars  of 
18  pence. 

Per  cent, 
of  total. 

1. 

Products  of  mining  enterprise 

137,637,603 

84-39 

2. 

,,  agricultural  enterprise  . 

10,597,870 

6-50 

3. 

„ manufacturing  enterprise 

3,862,117 

2-36 

4. 

„ viticultural  enterprise  . 

328,615 

0-20 

5. 

„ pastoral  enterprise 

5,050,108 

3-09 

G. 

„ various  enterprises 

1,460,424 

0-89 

7. 

Gold  and  silver  coin  exported  . 

2,595,577 

1-59 

8. 

Merchandise  nationalised 

1,172,164 

0-73 

9. 

Coin  re-exported  ..... 

401,655 

0-25 

Total  of  exports 

163,106,133 

100-00 

With  84’39  per  cent,  of  the  total  value  of  products 
shipped  abroad,  it  is  clear  that  the  mineral  industry  is 
the  backbone  of  Chilian  prosperity. 

Agricultural  enterprise  in  Chile  has  shown  most 
unmistakable  decadence  in  recent  times.  Twenty-five 
years  ago  the  farming  industry  was  the  real  mainstay 
of  the  country  ; it  afforded  means  of  livelihood  to  more 
than  two-thirds  of  the  population,  and  landed  pro- 
prietors resided  on  their  estates  and  superintended  their 
properties.  Wheat  was  a principal  article  of  export  to 
Europe,  and  between  1880  and  1890  Chilian  grain  was 
a factor  of  some  importance  in  the  Liverpool  market. 
The  production  of  barley,  although  not  so  great  as 
wheat,  was  also  large.  To  achieve  this  result  necessi- 
tated steady  and  laborious  application  by  the  majority 
of  the  inhabitants,  and  this  gave  a sturdy  tone  to  the 


1903] 


AGRICULTURE 


427 


national  character  at  the  critical  period  when  Chile  was 
confronted  with  difficult  problems,  the  solution  of  which 
depended  in  great  measure  on  ability  to  face  physical 
hardships  of  unusual  severity.  After  1880  the  condition 
of  agricultural  industry  changed,  and  a tendency  arose 
for  the  owners  of  properties  to  congregate  in  the  cities, 
the  administration  of  the  farms  being  deputed  to  agents 
and  managers.  At  first  this  altered  state  of  affairs  made 
small  difference  in  the  output  of  farm  products,  because 
the  men  left  in  charge  were,  as  a rule,  old  servants  who 
faithfully  executed  the  duties  entrusted  to  their  care. 
Other  causes,  however,  were  at  work  to  undermine  the 
supremacy  of  agriculture  in  Chile.  The  development  of 
the  nitrate  industry  in  Tarapaca  called  for  able-bodied 
men  from  the  central  and  southern  districts,  and  the 
attraction  of  high  wages  drew  many  thousand  agricultural 
labourers  to  the  north. 

When  the  civil  war  of  1891  occurred  agriculture  was 
drifting  to  a critical  stage,  and  the  effects  of  the  struggle 
between  Balmaceda  and  Congress  was  to  accelerate  its 
decline,  the  thousands  of  men  killed  and  wounded 
creating  a shortage  of  labour  in  the  central  districts. 
The  military  regime  during  the  greater  part  of  1891 
unsettled  the  entire  population,  and  produced  a constant 
stream  of  immigration  from  the  rural  districts  to  the 
towns.  Then  came  the  disbandment  of  the  troops 
when  peace  was  re-established,  and  the  alarming  increase 
in  brigandage.  These  untoward  changes  were  not  at 
first  noted  owing  to  the  extensive  areas  of  new  agri- 
cultural lands  opened  in  the  south  during  the  years 
immediately  preceding  1891.  Cultivation  of  the  virgin 
soil  of  these  new  districts  gave  heavy  yields  of  grain, 
and  counterbalanced  the  decreasing  production  of  the 
older  agricultural  areas.  But  it  was  not  long  before  the 
newer  districts  also  began  to  suffer,  and  the  harvest  of 
1892-3  was  the  last  which  left  any  large  surplus  of  grain 
for  export,  and  the  decadence  of  agricultural  enterprise 
became  rapid  after  1893.  Inclement  seasons  accentuated 
the  depression,  and  lack  of  protection  for  life  and  property 


428 


CHILE 


made  residence  a practical  impossibility  in  many  of  the 
rural  districts.  Therefore  the  habit  of  landed  proprietors 
to  leave  everything  in  connection  with  their  estates  in 
the  hands  of  agents  became  general,  and  led  to  the 
neglect  of  farming,  each  year  witnessing  a decrease  in 
production.  To  such  an  extent  has  the  mischief  now 
spread,  that  in  place  of  an  annual  exportation  of  200,000 
tons  of  grain,  the  present  supply  is  insufficient  to  meet 
home  demands,  and  in  1901  cargoes  of  wheat  were 
brought  from  Australia  and  the  United  States  to  make 
good  the  local  deficiency.  In  1899  the  value  of  all 
agricultural  products  shipped  abroad  only  represented 
per  cent,  of  the  total  export  trade,  and  even  this  small 
proportion  has  been  reduced  in  the  last  three  years. 

The  decay  of  agriculture  explains  to  a great  extent 
the  extreme  poverty  among  the  mass  of  the  Chilians,  for 
in  the  central  districts,  where  the  country  is  most 
densely  inhabited,  nothing  has  taken  its  place.  How 
great  the  shrinkage  has  been  may  be  judged  from  the 
value  of  the  surplus  products  derived  from  agricultural 
pursuits,  which  is  now  estimated  to  be  worth  £400,000 
as  against  £3,000,000  a few  years  ago ; in  other  words, 
the  average  gain  for  each  of  the  2,000,000  persons 
directly  or  indirectly  dependent  upon  agriculture  has 
been  reduced  from  thirty  shillings  per  head  to  four 
shillings.  Nor  are  any  adequate  steps  attempted  by  the 
Government  to  remedy  this  condition  of  affairs.  While 
money  is  lavished  on  the  naval  and  military  forces,  no 
effort  is  made  to  establish  an  efficient  constabulary  to 
protect  farmers  from  the  depredations  of  the  hordes  of 
robbers  infesting  with  impunity  the  rural  districts.  The 
construction  of  roads  and  railways  to  aid  in  cheapening 
the  cost  of  farming  is  sometimes  discussed  by  the 
Executive  and  Congress,  but  nothing  practical  has  been 
initiated  in  recent  years,  and  on  all  sides  Chilian  agri- 
cultural prospects  are  gloomy  in  the  extreme. 

That  the  Government  could  accomplish  much  towards 
the  salvation  of  the  country’s  agriculture,  is  evident  to 
the  most  unpractical  eye.  Water  is  the  one  essential 


1903]  NECESSITY  OF  IRRIGATION  WORKS  429 


thing  in  the  central  and  northern  districts,  for  irrigation 
is  the  keynote  to  agricultural  enterprise  in  Chile,  and  a 
cheap  water  supply  would  immensely  benefit  the  farmers. 
It  is  for  the  Government  to  elaborate  a practical  plan  for 
storing  the  abundant  supplies  in  the  mountain  ranges, 
and  to  regulate  this  distribution  to  districts  at  present 
under  cultivation,  and  also  over  the  large  areas  of  desert, 
as  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  pampa  of  Tamarugal, 
which  only  require  moisture  to  develop  amazing  fertility. 
That  any  obstacle  exists  to  prevent  adequate  protection 
for  life  and  property  is  not  even  suggested  ; the  Govern- 
ment is  simply  lacking  in  energy  and  initiative.  Roads 
and  railways  are  a question  of  the  necessary  money  to 
defray  the  cost  of  construction,  and  the  selection  of 
competent  and  honest  contractors  to  execute  the  work 
required.  Money  the  Government  would  have  in  plenty 
if  a more  economical  system  guided  the  general  adminis- 
tration of  the  revenues,  and  honest  contractors  can  be 
found  quickly  enough  if  no  favouritism  is  shown  in  the 
choice.  Such  improvements  need  a policy  of  progress, 
and  that  of  the  Chilian  Government  during  the  last  few 
years  has  been  one  of  drift. 

Viticulture  is  another  industry  of  considerable 
importance,  the  climate  being  exceptionally  favourable 
for  vineyards,  especially  in  the  central  districts,  where 
they  chiefly  are.  Of  late  years,  the  area  planted  had 
increased  substantially,  and  the  quantity  of  wine  now 
made  is  sufficient  to  meet  the  home  demand.  While, 
however,  improvements  have  been  introduced  in  the 
process  of  the  manufacture  of  both  red  and  white  wines, 
there  is  still  room  for  progress,  for  the  product  now 
placed  on  the  market  has  certain  acid  qualities  that 
militate  against  its  sale  in  foreign  countries,  and 
effectually  prevent  its  introduction  abroad  in  spite  of 
many  trials.  By  some  people  this  acidity  is  attributed 
to  the  excessive  amount  of  copper  in  the  soil,  by  others 
to  a faulty  process  in  the  manufacture,  but  an  investiga- 
tion by  experts  would  probably  solve  the  doubt  and 
find  the  remedy.  Meanwhile,  vine  growers  and  Govern- 


430 


CHILE 


ment  alike  do  little  or  nothing.  A species  of  brandy 
known  as  “pisco”  is  also  largely  manufactured,  and 
finds  a ready  local  sale,  while  another  produce  is 
“chicha,”  a liquid  made  from  fresh  fruit,  and  not 
unlike  cider. 

Pastoral  industry  shows  a tendency  to  increase  ; but 
the  live  stock  is  insufficient  to  meet  home  requirements, 
and  the  custom  has  been  to  import  annually  herds  of 
cattle  from  Argentina  to  supply  the  Chilian  markets. 
Lately,  a heavy  tax  has  been  imposed  on  imported 
animals  to  encourage  local  industry,  and  the  higher 
prices  now  ruling  should  be  an  inducement  to  stock 
breeding  on  a more  extended  scale.  In  the  central 
districts,  cattle  and  sheep  are  raised  to  a large  extent 
on  lucerne,  and  the  quality  of  the  meat  is  excellent,  but 
it  is  in  the  south  that  the  development  of  the  industry 
may  be  expected  to  make  most  progress,  for  there 
millions  of  acres  at  present  lie  waste  which  might  pro- 
fitably be  stocked.  Gradually  these  districts  are  being 
utilised ; but  here  again  comes  the  necessity  for  pro- 
tection against  the  gangs  of  bandits,  and  until  measures 
are  taken  to  suppress  them,  the  development  of  this 
branch  of  industrial  enterprise  must  be  restricted.  In 
Patagonia  and  Tierra  del  Fuego  sheep  breeding  has 
been  successful,  and  the  sheep  thrive  in  spite  of  severe 
winter  seasons,  although  in  years  of  exceptional  snowfall 
heavy  mortality  occurs  amongst  them.  It  is  the  sheep 
farming  near  Punta  Arenas  which  has  caused  that 
locality  to  develop  from  a convict  settlement  into  a busy 
trading  centre  within  the  last  twenty  years. 

Of  the  less  important  rural  industries,  the  principal 
are  apiculture,  in  the  province  of  Llanquihue,  whence 
some  70,000  barrels  of  honey  are  annually  exported  to 
Europe ; the  lumber  trade  in  the  south ; and  fishing. 
The  southern  districts  of  Chile  are  rich  in  valuable 
timber,  but  difficulty  of  access  to  the  forest  regions  from 
the  seaboard  has  hindered  development  of  the  lumber 
trade,  and  timber  is  imported  from  abroad  in  large 
quantities  instead  of  utilising  the  native  resources. 


[ Face  page  430. 


Natives  of  Tierra  del  Fijego. 


1903] 


MANUFACTURES 


431 


This  anomaly  is  unlikely  to  last  long  now,  and  once  the 
natural  wealth  of  the  forest  area  is  understood  and 
appreciated,  and  means  of  transport  provided,  it  will 
supply  all  home  wants  and  leave  an  ample  surplus  for 
export. 

No  systematic  efforts  have  been  made  to  develop 
the  fisheries,  which  in  the  southern  waters  contain  a 
vast  variety  of  fish.  Fishing  merely  provides  desultory 
occupation  for  a small  proportion  of  the  inhabitants  on 
the  coast,  and  an  irregular  supply  to  the  towns.  The 
oyster  beds  of  Chilbe  are  worked  to  some  extent,  but 
never  sufficiently  to  meet  the  demand  of  the  northern 
markets.  Recently,  cod-curing  and  lobster-canning 
works  have  been  started  on  the  island  of  Juan  Fernandez, 
Robinson  Crusoe’s  Island,  the  centre  of  one  of  the 
richest  fishing  grounds  in  the  world,  and  some  400  miles 
from  Valparaiso. 

Manufacturing  industry  has  not  made  great  progress 
in  Chile  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  raw  material  and  fuel 
are  abundant,  and  labour  cheap.  The  reason  for  this 
backwardness  is  to  be  found  to  some  extent  in  the 
absence  of  skilled  labour  to  direct  the  working  of 
factories,  and  the  lack  of  capital  to  initiate  new  under- 
takings. Breweries,  however,  have  been  erected  at 
Valdivia,  Valparaiso,  Santiago,  Concepcion,  Limache, 
and  other  places,  and  the  beer  consumed  in  the  country 
is  almost  exclusively  of  local  manufacture.  Tanneries 
also  are  established  on  a comparatively  extensive  scale, 
especially  in  the  vicinity  of  Valdivia,  while  at  Concep- 
cion cloth  and  cotton  factories  on  a limited  scale  are 
now  producing  textiles  of  fair  quality,  and  flour  mills 
have  been  built  in  different  districts.  The  manufacture 
of  biscuits,  too,  is  a thriving  industry,  rapidly  ousting 
the  foreign  article.  Sugar  refineries  import  the  raw 
material  and  supply  local  demand,  and  iron  foundries 
have  proved  a profitable  enterprise,  important  works  of 
this  description  existing  at  Valparaiso  and  elsewhere, 
but  the  raw  material  is  foreign.  Recently,  the  duties 
on  many  articles  of  imported  merchandise  have  been 


432 


CHILE 


increased  in  the  hope  that  the  higher  tariff  would  induce 
an  extension  of  domestic  manufactures,  an  expectation 
to  some  extent  realised,  factories  for  the  production  of 
soap,  candles,  matches,  cigarettes,  and  many  other  such 
articles  having  been  established.  Circumstances  in 
Chile  are  so  favourable  that  the  existing  apathy  in 
regard  to  the  production  of  home-made  goods  cannot 
possibly  continue  much  longer.  Both  on  the  score  of 
economy  and  because  such  enterprises  can  be  made 
profitable,  there  is  every  reason  for  the  Chilians  to 
extend  manufacturing  enterprise  in  all  its  branches. 
Energetic  action  and  the  introduction  of  skilled 
mechanics  to  superintend  the  work,  is  all  that  is  neces- 
sary to  ensure  a satisfactory  result  for  such  undertakings. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


THE  CHILI AN-PERUVI AN  WAR 

Position  of  Atacama.  Chile  and  Bolivia.  The  Guano  Deposits. 
Bolivian  Claims.  Dispute  in  1861.  Situation  in  1864.  War 
between  Peru  and  Spain.  Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Chile. 
Bad  Faith  of  Bolivia.  Intrigues  by  Peru.  Treaty  between 
Bolivia  and  Peru.  Relations  between  Bolivia  and  Chile.  Chilian 
Capital  in  Atacama.  Violation  of  Treaty  of  1874.  Peruvian 
Intrigues  in  Bolivia.  Duty  on  Nitrate  of  Soda.  Ultimatum  of 
Chile  to  Bolivia.  Occupation  of  Antofagasta  by  Chilians. 
Declaration  of  War  by  Bolivia.  Peru  proposes  Arbitration. 
Chile  declares  War  on  Peru.  Relations  between  Argentina  and 
Chile.  Illusions  of  Bolivia  and  Peru.  Naval  Armaments. 
Equipment  of  Chilian  and  Peruvian  Vessels.  Military  Forces  of 
the  Three  Countries.  Chilian  Preparations.  Inaction  of  Bolivia 
and  Peru.  Embarkation  of  Chilian  Troops.  Occupation  of 
Antofagasta.  Attack  on  Calama.  Occupation  of  Tocopilla  and 
Cobija.  Blockade  of  Iquique.  Peruvian  Seaboard  Harried  by 
Chilians.  Bombardment  of  Pisagua.  Reconnaissance  to  Callao. 
Peruvians  attempt  to  raise  Blockade  of  Iquique.  Attack  of  the 
Huascar  and  Indcpendencia  on  the  Esmeralda  and  Covadonga. 
Loss  of  the  Esmeralda  and  the  Independencia.  Preponderance  of 
Chilian  Sea-power.  Peruvian  Reprisals.  Chilian  Discontent. 
Capture  of  the  Huascar  and  Pilcomayo. 

The  dispute  in  regard  to  territorial  rights  over  the 
seaboard  of  Atacama  leading  to  the  conflict  between 
Chile  and  Bolivia  in  1879,  and  involving  war  with  Peru, 
was  of  long  standing,  and  requires  explanation  to  make 
clear  the  cause  of  a struggle  which  forms  a landmark  in 
South  American  history.  After  Bolivia,  Chile,  and  Peru 
secured  independence  from  Spanish  domination,  little 
attention  was  paid  to  Atacama.  This  section  of  country 

2 E 


432 


CHILE 


increased  in  the  hope  that  the  higher  tariff  would  induce 
an  extension  of  domestic  manufactures,  an  expectation 
to  some  extent  realised,  factories  for  the  production  of 
soap,  candles,  matches,  cigarettes,  and  many  other  such 
articles  having  been  established.  Circumstances  in 
Chile  are  so  favourable  that  the  existing  apathy  in 
regard  to  the  production  of  home-made  goods  cannot 
possibly  continue  much  longer.  Both  on  the  score  of 
economy  and  because  such  enterprises  can  be  made 
profitable,  there  is  every  reason  for  the  Chilians  to 
extend  manufacturing  enterprise  in  all  its  branches. 
Energetic  action  and  the  introduction  of  skilled 
mechanics  to  superintend  the  work,  is  all  that  is  neces- 
sary to  ensure  a satisfactory  result  for  such  undertakings. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 


THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 

Position  of  Atacama.  Chile  and  Bolivia.  The  Guano  Deposits. 
Bolivian  Claims.  Dispute  in  1861.  Situation  in  1864.  War 
between  Peru  and  Spain.  Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Chile. 
Bad  Faith  of  Bolivia.  Intrigues  by  Peru.  Treaty  between 
Bolivia  and  Peru.  Relations  between  Bolivia  and  Chile.  Chilian 
Capital  in  Atacama.  Violation  of  Treaty  of  1874.  Peruvian 
Intrigues  in  Bolivia.  Duty  on  Nitrate  of  Soda.  Ultimatum  of 
Chile  to  Bolivia.  Occupation  of  Antofagasta  by  Chilians. 
Declaration  of  War  by  Bolivia.  Peru  proposes  Arbitration. 
Chile  declares  War  on  Peru.  Relations  between  Argentina  and 
Chile.  Illusions  of  Bolivia  and  Peru.  Naval  Armaments. 
Equipment  of  Chilian  and  Peruvian  Vessels.  Military  Forces  of 
the  Three  Countries.  Chilian  Preparations.  Inaction  of  Bolivia 
and  Peru.  Embarkation  of  Chilian  Troops.  Occupation  of 
Antofagasta.  Attack  on  Calama.  Occupation  of  Tocopilla  and 
Cobija.  Blockade  of  Iquique.  Peruvian  Seaboard  Harried  by 
Chilians.  Bombardment  of  Pisagua.  Reconnaissance  to  Callao. 
Peruvians  attempt  to  raise  Blockade  of  Iquique.  Attack  of  the 
Huascar  and  Independencia  on  the  Esmeralda  and  Covadonga. 
Loss  of  the  Esmeralda  and  the  Independencia.  Preponderance  of 
Chilian  Sea-power.  Peruvian  Reprisals.  Chilian  Discontent. 
Capture  of  the  Huascar  and  Pilcomayo. 

The  dispute  in  regard  to  territorial  rights  over  the 
seaboard  of  Atacama  leading  to  the  conflict  between 
Chile  and  Bolivia  in  1879,  and  involving  war  with  Peru, 
was  of  long  standing,  and  requires  explanation  to  make 
clear  the  cause  of  a struggle  which  forms  a landmark  in 
South  American  history.  After  Bolivia,  Chile,  and  Peru 
secured  independence  from  Spanish  domination,  little 
attention  was  paid  to  Atacama.  This  section  of  country 
433  2 E 


434  THE  CHILIAN -PERUVIAN  WAR 


was  regarded  as  worthless  for  colonisation ; but  so  far  as 
any  authority  was  concerned,  Chilian  jurisdiction  was 
generally  recognised.  Chile  claimed  sovereignty  over 
these  districts  by  virtue  of  the  title  derived  from  the 
provisions  made  for  the  Chilian  vice-royalty  by  the 
Spanish  authorities  in  laws  and  ordinances  relating  to 
the  Indies.  But  1840  brought  a change,  for  at  that 
date  the  value  of  guano  as  a fertiliser  became  better 
understood  in  Europe,  and  the  demand  for  it  led  to 
inquiries  as  to  the  supply  from  the  west  coast  of  South 
America.  An  expedition  despatched  by  the  Chilian 
Government  in  1841,  discovered  guano  deposits  at 
various  points  on  the  seaboard  of  Atacama,  and  this 
led  to  a law  to  regulate  exportation,  sanctioned  by  the 
Chilian  Congress  on  October  31,  1842.  It  was  in 
reference  more  particularly  to  the  district  between 
south  latitude  29  and  23  that  the  Chilian  authorities 
took  action,  and  it  was  a complete  surprise  when,  in 
1843,  the  Bolivian  charge  d’affaires,  Sen  or  Olaneto,  on 
behalf  of  his  Government,  claimed  recognition  of 
Bolivian  jurisdiction  as  far  south  as  latitude  26°  to  a 
point  where  the  river  Salado  discharges  into  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  A revision  of  the  Chilian  titles  was  made  and 
published  in  1845,  the  result  being  favourable  to  Chilian 
pretentions ; and  to  the  memorandum  containing  the 
Chilian  argument  no  answer  was  given  by  Bolivia,  and 
for  a time  the  matter  dropped.  In  1847  Bolivia  again 
demanded,  and  was  refused  by  Chile,  the  recognition 
of  rights  in  Atacama ; but  war  now  broke  out  between 
Bolivia  and  Peru,  and  the  dispute  was  laid  on  one  side 
for  the  moment. 

In  1858  the  question  of  Atacama  was  again  raised 
by  Bolivia.  Chilian  rights  were  energetically  defended 
by  Senor  Geronimo  Urmeneta  in  a note  dated  July  11, 
1859,  and  the  discussion  was  continued  in  1861  by  Senor 
Jose  Maria  Santibanez,  in  charge  of  the  Bolivian  Legation 
at  Santiago,  and  Senor  Manuel  Alcalde,  the  Chilian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Senor  Alcalde  pointed 
out  that  the  Bolivian  claims  were  inconsistent : that 


1863]  EVENTS  PRECEDING  THE  WAR  435 


in  1843  Bolivia  had  demanded  that  the  river  Salado,  at 
the  26tli  parallel,  should  be  recognised  as  the  boundary ; 
that  in  1861  the  24th  parallel  was  mentioned  as  the 
frontier ; that  acts  had  been  committed  by  Bolivian 
authorities  derogatory  to  the  persons  and  property  of 
Chilian  citizens,  and  that  it  had  been  necessary  to 
station  the  Chilian  warships  Esmeralda  and  Chile  on 
the  Atacama  coast  as  a protection  for  Chilian  interests. 
Sharp  notes  were  exchanged  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments during  the  following  three  years,  relations  gradually 
becoming  more  strained,  until  in  March,  1863,  the  quarrel 
was  aggravated  by  the  Bolivian  Congress  at  Oruro 
authorising  the  Administration  to  declare  war  against 
Chile  if  no  other  solution  of  the  dispute  appeared  possible. 
In  October,  1864,  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two 
Governments  Avere  suspended,  and  an  appeal  to  arms  to 
decide  the  question  seemed  inevitable. 

At  this  juncture  events  were  influenced  by  the  un- 
expected outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Spain  and  Peru. 
The  South  American  Republics  regarded  the  action  of 
Spain  as  evidence  of  her  desire  to  attempt  to  recover 
possession  of  her  former  colonies,  and  they  determined 
to  prevent  this.  Bolivia  and  Chile  decided  to  sink  their 
differences  and  make  common  cause  with  Peru,  and 
nothing  more  was  heard  of  war  between  Chile  and  her 
neighbour.  In  place  of  hostile  action  the  claimants  to 
Atacama  signed  a treaty  on  August  16,  1866,  providing 
for  the  boundary  between  Bolivia  and  Chile  at  the  24th 
parallel  of  south  latitude,  and  further  that  the  zone 
lying  between  the  23rd  and  the  25th  parallel  should  be 
subject  to  the  common  jurisdiction  of  both  Governments 
for  the  exploitation  of  the  guano  deposits  and  mineral 
products,  the  revenue  from  these  two  sources  to  be 
equally  divided.  Bolivia  agreed  to  make  the  Bay  of 
Mejillones  the  only  port  through  which  traffic  in  guano 
should  be  permitted,  with  the  condition  that  Chile 
should  nominate  an  official  to  intervene  in  any  matters 
concerning  Chilian  interests.  It  was  provided  also  that 
neither  of  the  contracting  parties  could  alienate  their 


436  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


rights  to  any  foreign  Government  or  private  enterprise, 
but  in  event  of  a desire  to  dispose  of  them  they  could 
only  do  so  to  one  or  other  of  the  parties  to  the  treaty. 
Private  interests  in  Mejillones  affected  by  this  arrange- 
ment were  to  be  compensated  by  a payment  of  $80,000 
by  each  Government.  This  last  clause  was  fulfilled  by 
Chile,  but  not  by  Bolivia. 

Chile  regarded  this  settlement  as  a final  solution 
of  the  long-standing  dispute,  and  it  would  have  been 
had  Bolivia  kept  faith,  but,  unfortunately,  her  Adminis- 
tration acted  contrary  to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the 
compact.  In  1871  a liquidation  of  the  revenue  account 
for  the  guano  deposits  and  duties  on  mineral  products 
in  the  common  zone  requested  by  the  Chilian  authorities 
resulted  in  the  refusal  of  the  Bolivian  Government  to 
make  the  payments  required  by  the  agreement  of  1866, 
and  this  attitude  excited  unusual  indignation  in  Chile, 
as  the  work  in  the  zone  between  the  parallels  23°  and 
25°  was  conducted  chiefly  by  Chilian  capital  and 
labourers.  Explanation  of  the  Bolivian  action  was 
found  in  the  intrigues  set  afoot  by  Peru  to  hinder 
friendly  relations  between  Bolivia  and  Chile,  and  the 
motive  was  the  desire  to  establish  a monopoly  for  the 
exportation  of  nitrate  of  soda.  The  agreement  of  1866 
stood  in  the  way,  as  by  it  Chilian  enterprise  could  work 
freely,  and  to  ensure  resistance  to  the  Chilian  demand 
for  the  observance  of  the  treaty,  Peru  made  a secret 
compact  with  Bolivia  in  1873. 

The  feeling  between  Chile  and  Bolivia  now  became 
so  strained  that  war  was  again  threatened.  Chile, 
however,  had  no  desire  for  an  outbreak  of  hostilities, 
owing  to  the  inadequate  footing  upon  which  her  military 
and  naval  forces  had  been  maintained  for  some  years 
past.  So  after  a long  diplomatic  controversy  matters 
were  arranged  by  a treaty  dated  August  6,  1874,  by 
which  Chile  agreed  to  renounce  the  zone  between  the 
23rd  and  25th  parallels  of  latit  ude  and  to  resign  her  claim 
to  a share  of  the  duties  collected  under  the  treaty  of  1866. 
On  the  other  hand,  Bolivia  accepted  the  proposal  that 


1874]  BOLIVIAN  AND  CHILIAN  TREATY  437 


export  duties  on  mineral  products  from  this  zone  should 
not  be  increased,  and  that  Chilian  capital,  industries,  and 
persons  should  not  be  subjected  to  higher  taxation  than 
was  in  force  at  the  date  of  the  treaty.  These  conditions 
were  to  remain  unaltered  for  twenty-five  years ; but  it 
was  this  question  of  taxation  that  brought  the  final 
rupture  five  years  later. 

The  treaty  of  1874  afforded  protection  for  Chilian 
industry  in  Atacama,  and  considerable  capital  was 
invested  in  mines  and  the  exploitation  of  nitrate  of  soda, 
the  labourers  employed  being  chiefly  of  Chilian  nation- 
ality and  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  Chilians, 
Bolivians  showing  no  tendency  to  become  more  numerous. 
Bolivia,  however,  regarded  with  little  favour  the  flourish- 
ing condition  of  affairs  resulting  from  the  introduction 
of  money  and  labour  from  Chile,  because  the  treaty  of 
1874  prevented  additional  taxation,  and  it  was  not  long 
before  complaints  were  heard  of  the  attitude  of  the 
Bolivian  authorities  towards  Chilian  citizens  and  of 
attempts  to  levy  higher  duties.  Moreover,  Peruvian 
intrigue  was  again  busy  because  competition,  resulting 
from  the  development  of  the  nitrate  of  soda  industry  in 
Atacama,  threatened  to  interfere  with  the  monopoly 
established  in  the  Peruvian  province  of  Tarapaca,  and 
the  object  of  Lima  was  to  induce  Bolivia  to  place  a 
heavy  duty  on  the  exportation  of  nitrate  of  soda  from 
Atacama  to  check  production  and  maintain  better  prices 
in  Europe.  The  fact  that  such  action  inferred  a breach 
of  faith  with  Chile  created  no  scruples  in  the  minds  of 
Peruvian  diplomatists,  and  their  councils  so  far  prevailed 
that  in  1875  an  attempt  was  made  by  the  authorities 
at  Antofagasta  to  impose  a tax  of  three  cents  per 
quintal  on  all  shipments,  but  this  was  abandoned  after 
protest  by  the  Chilian  Government. 

At  this  period  Peru  was  considered  the  superior  of 
Chile  in  both  naval  and  military  strength.  It  was  due 
to  this  fact  that  Peruvian  influence  was  so  strong  in 
moulding  the  attitude  of  Bolivia,  for  the  understanding 
between  Peru  and  Bolivia  in  1873  was  an  alliance  for 


438  THE  CHILIAN -PERUVIAN  WAR 


mutual  defence  against  Chile,  and  it  was  this  supposed 
source  of  strength  that  induced  Bolivia  to  act  in  defiance 
of  her  treaty  obligations.  In  1877  strained  relations 
arose  between  Chile  and  Argentina  about  the  boundary 
between  the  two  countries,  and  Peru  thought  this 
dispute  gave  a favourable  opportunity  to  urge  Bolivia 
to  impose  once  more  a heavy  duty  on  the  export  of 
nitrate  of  soda.  Peru  was  convinced  that  the  strength 
of  her  army  and  navy,  combined  with  the  hostility  of 
Argentina,  would  prevent  Chile  from  making  any  attempt 
to  compel  Bolivia  to  respect  Chilian  rights.  Bolivia, 
under  the  advice  of  President  Hilarion  Daza,  listened 
to  Peruvian  counsels,  and  on  February  14,  1878,  the 
Congress  resolved  that  all  nitrate  of  soda  exported 
should  be  subject  to  a duty  of  ten  cents  the  quintal. 
This  was  done  in  the  face  of  the  revocation  of  the  duty 
imposed  by  the  municipality  of  Antofagasta  in  1875, 
because  “there  exists  the  treaty  of  limits  with  Chile, 
by  which  no  new  taxes  can  be  collected.”  The  bad 
faith  of  Bolivia  caused  earnest  remonstrance  from  Chile, 
but  to  no  effect,  and  demands  were  made  on  the  principal 
nitrate  company  in  Antofagasta.  On  the  refusal  of  the 
manager  to  pay  $90,000  on  account  of  the  new  tax,  he 
was  imprisoned  and  the  property  confiscated. 

In  view  of  these  developments  it  was  imperative  for 
Chile  to  act.  Diplomatic  representations  met  with  no 
satisfactory  response,  and  on  January  3,  1879,  the  Chilian 
charge  d’affaires  in  La  Paz  notified  the  Bolivian  Govern- 
ment that  if  the  law  of  February  14,  1878,  was  enforced, 
he  was  instructed  to  ask  for  his  passports.  The  Chilian 
representative  added : — “ The  Government  of  Chile 
considers  it  also  convenient  to  inform  you  that  the  con- 
tinued refusal  to  suspend  the  law  in  question  renders 
null  and  void  the  treaty  of  1874,  and  consequently  Chile 
considers  as  resumed  all  rights  she  had  legitimately 
over  the  territory  that  treaty  refers  to  prior  to  1866. 
For  this  reason  Chile,  in  the  present  unfortunate 
emergency,  which  she  has  not  provoked,  nor  been  able 
to  avoid,  will  take  such  measures  as  she  deems  necessary 


1879] 


CHILIAN  ULTIMATUM 


439 


to  defend  her  rights.”  On  January  20,  1879,  the  Chilian 
Government  instructed  its  representative  to  press  for 
an  immediate  answer  to  the  ultimatum  of  January  3. 
The  Bolivian  Government  refused  to  consider  the 
suspension  of  the  export  duties,  and  diplomatic  relations 
were  broken  off  on  February  10.  Four  days  later, 
Chilian  troops  landed  at  Antofagasta  and  took  possession 
of  the  city  and  adjoining  district  without  any  formal 
declaration  of  war.  It  was  only  when  news  of  the 
occupation  of  Antofagasta  reached  the  Bolivian  Govern- 
ment that  the  conviction  was  brought  home  to  the 
authorities  that  Chile  intended  to  fight,  and  even  then 
the  Chilian  strength  was  underestimated  by  both  Bolivia 
and  Peru.  After  the  landing  of  the  Chilian  troops  at 
Antofagasta,  the  Bolivian  Government  declared  war, 
and  a proclamation  to  that  effect  was  issued  on  March 
1,  1879. 

During  the  perpetration  of  these  hostile  acts  near 
Antofagasta,  the  Peruvian  special  envoy  at  Santiago, 
Senor  Jose  Antonio  Lavalle,  proposed  that  Peru  should 
arbitrate  between  Chile  and  Bolivia.  In  answer  to  this 
offer  Senor  Lavalle  was  reminded  of  the  alliance  of  Peru 
with  Bolivia  in  1873,  and  he  expressed  ignorance  of  any 
such  compact.  It  has  never  been  quite  clear  whether 
this  assertion  was  made  in  good  faith,  but  the  Chilian 
Government  had  possessed  a copy  of  the  treaty  since 
1874,  and  it  was  only  natural  to  suppose  that  the  head 
of  such  an  important  mission  as  that  entrusted  to  Senor 
Lavalle  had  been  informed  of  a factor  vitally  affecting 
his  negotiations.  The  propositions  submitted  by  Senor 
Lavalle  were  : — (1)  That  Chile  should  evacuate  Anto- 
fagasta pending  the  decision  of  the  dispute  by  arbitra- 
tion ; (2)  that  a neutral  administration  should  be 
established  in  the  territory  evacuated,  this  to  be 
maintained  under  the  guarantee  of  Chile,  Bolivia,  and 
Peru ; (3)  that  all  revenues  from  these  territories  should 
be  equally  divided  between  Chile  and  Bolivia  after 
payment  of  the  local  administration.  These  proposals 
were  not  to  the  liking  of  the  Chilians,  who  saw  in  them 


440  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


a repetition  of  the  bad  faith  already  shown  by  Bolivia, 
with  the  further  complication  of  Peru  as  a party  to  any 
fresh  dispute.  Under  these  circumstances  Senor 
Lavalle  was  informed  that  Peruvian  mediation  was 
unacceptable,  and  this  notification  was  followed  by  the 
Peruvian  envoy  being  handed  his  passports. 

The  temper  of  the  Chilians  was  now  thoroughly 
aroused.  Peruvian  intrigues  had  resulted  in  a dispute 
between  Chile  and  Bolivia,  involving  an  armed  conflict, 
and  the  offer  of  mediation  on  the  part  of  Peru  was 
regarded  as  only  a diplomatic  move  to  further  injure 
Chilian  interests.  The  existence  of  the  secret  treaty 
between  Peru  and  Bolivia  was  considered  a directly 
hostile  act ; in  these  circumstances  the  Chilians  deter- 
mined to  strike  home  at  Peru  and  endeavour  to  make 
that  country  pay  dearly  for  the  part  she  had  played, 
and  for  this  reason,  on  April  5,  1879,  war  against  Peru 
was  declared. 

In  the  published  accounts  of  the  attitude  of  Chile  at 
this  crisis  there  is  a tendency  of  most  writers  to  throw 
the  whole  blame  of  the  war  upon  the  Chilians,  on  the 
ground  they  acted  in  a purposely  aggressive  manner  to 
enable  them  to  carry  out  a plan  of  conquest  and 
territorial  aggrandisement ; but  the  facts  of  the  case  do 
not  justify  such  assertions.  In  the  long-standing 
dispute  in  connection  with  Atacama  Chile  had  ceded 
rights  to  which  she  considered  herself  justly  entitled 
rather  than  push  matters  to  extremes,  and  in  1865,  when 
she  might  have  deprived  Bolivia  of  all  participation  in 
dominion  over  Antofagasta,  she  held  her  hand  and 
elected  to  make  considerable  sacrifices  to  assist  the 
Peruvians  in  the  Spanish  conflict.  It  is  true  that  this 
policy  was  dictated  by  the  idea  that  the  action  of  Spain 
towards  Peru  portended  common  danger  to  South 
America,  but  it  did  not  necessarily  entail  the  surrender 
to  Bolivia  of  the  substantial  advantages  that  country 
gained  by  the  treaty  of  1866.  Again,  in  1874,  Chile  met 
the  Bolivian  demands  in  a conciliatory  spirit,  and  in 
consideration  of  a solemn  covenant  by  Bolivia  she 


1879]  CHILE  DECLARES  WAR  ON  PERU  441 

renounced  all  sovereignty  over  the  zone  between  the 
23rd  and  25th  parallels  of  latitude  on  condition  that 
certain  protection  was  extended  to  Chilian  citizens  and 
industries.  It  has  been  explained  how  lack  of  good 
faith  by  Bolivia  rendered  this  treaty  a dead  letter,  but 
there  is  also  another  aspect  of  the  case  to  which  little 
attention  has  been  devoted.  Chilian  energy  and  Chilian 
capital  converted  Atacama  from  a worthless  desert  into 
a flourishing  industrial  centre  ; and  yet  this  important 
fact  carried  no  weight  with  the  Bolivian  authorities. 

Nor  can  any  great  blame  be  attached  to  Chile  for 
declaring  war  against  Peru.  The  secret  treaty  of  1873 
was  proof  of  the  part  Peru  had  played  in  the  policy  of 
Bolivia,  and  the  fact  that  Peru  was  bound  to  come  to 
the  assistance  of  Bolivia  to  repel  the  Chilian  invasion  of 
Atacama  showed  that  the  action  taken  by  Chile  was  the 
only  wise  course  she  could  adopt  under  the  circum- 
stances. 

The  outbreak  of  hostilities  found  matters  far  less 
favourable  than  the  Bolivian  Government  had  anticipated 
when  the  determination  had  been  reached  twelve 
months  previously  to  force  the  Chilian  question  to  a 
crisis.  The  dispute  between  Argentina  and  Chile  had 
assumed  a more  conciliatory  aspect,  all  prospect  of 
armed  conflict  between  those  two  countries  having 
disappeared  for  the  moment,  and  no  active  assistance 
could  be  expected  from  that  quarter.  This  attitude  of 
Argentina  enabled  Chile  to  concentrate  her  whole 
available  strength  in  the  north,  and  so  unexpected  a 
change  in  the  relations  between  Argentina  and  Chile 
was  the  first  serious  disappointment  Bolivia  experienced 
in  the  conflict,  a feeling  accentuated  by  the  fact  that  the 
policy  of  Peru  was  by  no  means  as  magnanimous  as 
Bolivia  desired.  When  war  with  Chile  was  inevitable, 
Bolivia  claimed  fulfilment  of  the  treaty  obligations 
secretly  contracted  with  Peru  in  1873  ; but  the  Peruvian 
Government  vacillated  for  some  time,  then  only  agreed 
on  condition  that  Bolivia  undertook  to  indemnify  it  for 
all  expenses  incurred. 


442  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


For  many  years  popular  belief  in  South  America 
had  been  that  in  naval  and  military  equipment  Peru 
was  more  than  a match  for  Chile,  and  that  Bolivia 
could  place  an  army  in  the  field  fully  capable  of  defend- 
ing her  territory  against  Chilian  aggression,  and  it  was 
the  general  opinion  that  Chile  would  be  overpowered  by 
the  combined  strength  of  the  Bolivians  and  Peruvians  ; 
but  estimates  of  the  relative  fighting  capacities  had  been 
formed  without  close  attention  to  the  preparations  the 
Chilians  had  made  in  event  of  an  emergency.  Chile 
recognised  that  in  any  war  with  Peru  and  Bolivia  the 
control  of  the  seaboard  would  be  of  paramount  value,  for 
the  railways  of  Peru  which  supplied  Bolivia  ran  at  right 
angles  to  the  coast,  and  the  possession  of  their  outlets 
was  of  the  utmost  importance.  With  this  object  in 
view,  the  Chilian  Government  since  1870  had  steadily 
increased  the  naval  forces.  Peru,  on  the  other  hand, 
had  allowed  matters  to  drift,  and  little  attention  had 
been  given  to  possible  future  developments.  The 
country  was  embarrassed  by  careless  and  corrupt 
Administrations,  which  left  no  funds  available  for  the 
purchase  of  ships  and  war  material,  and  a complete 
reversal  of  former  conditions  was  found  when  the  war- 
cloud  burst  in  1879.  Chile  possessed  two  powerful 
ironclads  of  modern  construction,  designed  by  Read,  and 
built  at  Hull  in  1874-5 ; these  were  the  sister  ships 
Almirante  Cochrane  and  Blanco  Encalada , of  3560  tons, 
2920  horse-power,  and  each  carried  six  9-inch  M.L. 
Armstrong  guns  of  12  tons,  a number  of  light  guns,  and 
two  Nordenfelt  machine  guns.  They  had  armour  nine 
inches  thick  at  the  water-line  and  six  to  eight  inches 
round  the  battery,  and  both  were  fitted  with  twin  screws. 
In  addition  to  these  two  formidable  vessels  there  were 
two  sister  corvettes,  the  Chacahuco  and  the  O' Higgins, 
of  1670  tons  and  800  horse-power,  armed  with  three 
150-pounder  7-ton  Armstrong  guns,  and  four  40- 
pounders  ; the  Magallanes,  armed  with  one  150-pounder 
and  two  small  guns  ; the  Ahtao,  with  three  150-pounders  ; 
the  Covadonga,  a wooden  screw  gunboat,  captured  from 


1879]  NAVIES  OF  CHILE  AND  PERU  443 

the  Spaniards  in  1866,  of  600  tons,  and  armed  with 
two  70-pounders  and  three  small  guns  ; the  Esmeralda , 
a wooden  corvette  built  in  1854,  of  850  tons,  carrying 
twelve  40-pounders  on  the  upper  deck ; and  ten  steam 
transports. 

The  Peruvian  navy  consisted  of  the  Huascar,  built 
at  Birkenhead  by  Messrs  Laird  in  1866,  of  1130  tons, 
300  horse-power,  and  armed  with  two  10-inch  Arm- 
strong 300-pounders  and  two  40-pounder  Whitworths. 
The  armour  round  her  revolving  turret  was  five  and  a 
half  inches  thick,  and  she  had  a belt  of  four  and  a half 
inches,  but  such  protection  was  useless  against  the  guns 
on  the  Cochrane  or  the  Blanco  Encalada.  The  next 
ship  was  a broadside  ironclad,  built  in  London  in  1865, 
called  the  Independencia,  of  2004  tons,  550  horse-power, 
protected  by  four  and  a half  inches  of  armour,  and 
equipped  with  twelve  70-pounders  on  the  main  deck, 
two  150-pounders,  four  32-pounders,  and  four  9-pounders 
on  the  upper  deck.  In  addition  to  these  vessels,  there 
were  the  wooden  corvettes  Union  of  1150  tons,  400 
horse-power,  and  armed  with  twelve  70-pounders  and 
one  9-pounder ; and  the  Pilcomayo,  of  600  tons,  180 
horse-power,  and  armed  with  two  70-pounders,  four 
40-pounders,  and  four  12-pounders.  There  were  also 
the  monitors  Atahualpa  and  Manco  Capac , purchased 
from  the  United  States  in  1869,  each  of  2100  tons,  with 
ten  inches  of  armour  on  the  turrets,  and  carrying  two 
15-inch  smooth-bore  Rodman  guns ; but  these  vessels 
were  little  more  than  floating  forts  for  coast  defence, 
the  Atahualpa  being  stationed  permanently  at  Callao 
and  the  Manco  Capac  at  Arica. 

A comparison  of  naval  forces  shows  that  Chile  had 
twice  the  number  of  sea-going  vessels,  double  the 
aggregate  tonnage,  and  a hundred  per  cent,  greater 
weight  of  metal.  Moreover,  the  complement  of  both 
officers  and  men  in  the  Chilian  fleet  was  superior  in 
seamanship  and  fighting  qualities  to  that  on  the 
Peruvian  warships,  several  of  the  officers  having  served 
in  the  British  navy,  and  the  majority  of  the  men  being 


444  THE  CHILI  AN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


recruited  from  the  hardy  fisherman  class  living  on  the 
southern  coast.  Amongst  the  Chilian  officers  were  many 
whose  names  indicated  British  extraction,  these  includ- 
ing Condell,  Cox,  Christie,  Edwards,  Leighton,  Lynch, 
Macpherson,  Pratt,  Rogers,  Smith,  Simpson,  Souper, 
Stephens,  Thomson,  Walker,  Warner,  Williams,  Wilson, 
and  Wood.  It  was  a complete  revelation  to  South 
America  when  the  strength  of  the  Chilian  navy  was 
understood  and  appreciated,  and  it  was  not  until  the 
war  began  that  Peru  realised  how  entirely  she  had 
underestimated  the  fighting  capabilities  of  the  fleet  with 
which  she  was  confronted. 

With  regard  to  the  military  forces  the  balance  was 
also  in  favour  of  Chile,  if  not  so  much  in  numbers,  most 
assuredly  in  equipment  and  physique.  On  a peace 
footing,  the  army  comprised  2500  infantry,  800  artillery, 
and  700  cavalry,  and  a force  of  25,000  national  guards, 
this  latter  being  raised  to  55,000  on  the  declaration  of 
war.  The  men  were  clothed  in  a thoroughly  workman- 
like outfit  of  tunic  and  trousers  of  brown  liolland,  a cap 
of  the  same  material,  and  a pair  of  untanned  brown 
leather  boots,  and  the  rifle  used  was  the  Gras  or  Com- 
blain.  The  artillery  was  provided  with  Krupp  and 
Armstrong  field  guns,  and  some  Gatlings  and  Norden- 
felts,  and  the  cavalry  was  well  mounted,  and  armed  with 
sabres  and  Winchester  rifles.  Officers  and  men  had 
received  practical  instruction  as  a result  of  the  constant 
raids  they  had  undertaken  against  the  Araucanian 
Indians  in  the  south.  As  a whole,  the  Chilian  army 
was  a fairly  compact  fighting  machine  and  by  no  means 
badly  disciplined. 

At  the  time  of  the  declaration  of  war,  the  Peruvian 
military  forces  comprised  five  battalions  of  infantry,  each 
containing  500  officers  and  men ; three  regiments  of 
artillery,  with  a total  strength  of  1000  officers  and  men ; 
and  two  brigades  of  cavalry,  these  numbering  780  officers 
and  men ; and  there  was  the  constabulary,  with  an 
effective  total  of  5400  of  all  ranks.  This  gave  a fighting 
force  of  9680  officers  and  men  ; but  a decree  shortly 


1879] 


ARMIES 


445 


after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  authorised  the  increase 
of  the  national  army  to  40,000,  and  a subsequent  order 
on  December  26,  1879,  called  to  the  ranks  the  entire 
male  population  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and 
thirty,  the  remainder  between  thirty  and  sixty  being 
embodied  in  the  reserve.  The  regular  army  was  clothed 
in  uniforms  of  white  cotton  cloth,  and  the  infantry  armed 
with  the  Martini-Peabody  rifle.  The  cavalry  was  pro- 
vided with  Winchester  repeating  rifles,  but  was  so 
poorly  mounted  as  to  be  incapable  of  effective  service, 
and  the  artillery  equipment  was  indifferent,  the  majority 
of  the  guns  being  of  local  manufacture,  and  inadequate 
to  cope  with  the  modern  weapons  of  the  Chilians.  The 
bulk  of  the  army  consisted  of  Indians  only  understanding 
Quichua,  who  had  small  stomach  for  fighting  for  the 
Spanish-speaking  people  by  whom  they  were  ruled  ; but 
when  kindly  treated  they  proved  patient  and  obedient, 
and  capable  of  sustaining  great  fatigue  when  required 
to  make  forced  marches  over  long  stretches  of  desert 
country,  where  only  most  scanty  rations  of  food  and 
water  were  available. 

The  Bolivian  army  was  composed  chiefly  of  Aymara 
Indians.  On  paper,  a large  number  were  liable  for 
service,  but  the  Bolivian  authorities  had  been  so 
totally  unprepared  for  an  outbreak  of  war  that  when 
hostilities  commenced  the  only  available  arms  were 
1500  Remington  rifles,  and  even  for  these  the  stock 
of  ammunition  was  very  limited. 

It  was  clear  that  by  land  and  sea  Chile  was  more 
ready  for  action  than  her  adversaries  when  the  crucial 
moment  arrived,  and  it  was  not  long  before  the  superiority 
of  her  preparations  told  its  tale  in  an  unbroken  list  of 
successful  engagements. 

In  view  of  a probable  refusal  by  Bolivia  to  rescind 
the  tax  on  the  exportation  of  nitrate  of  soda,  military 
preparations  had  been  pushed  forward  by  Chile,  so  that 
by  February  an  army  corps  of  6000  men  was  ready  to 
embark,  fully  equipped  with  artillery  and  reserves  of  all 
necessary  war  material.  Transports  were  waiting  at 


446  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


Valparaiso  to  take  the  troops  on  board  whenever  orders 
were  issued  to  that  effect. 

The  Chilian  Government  was  determined  that  if 
warlike  operations  were  necessary  an  expedition  should 
take  the  field  immediately,  and  not  waste  valuable  time 
which  the  enemy  might  employ  to  arrange  defensive 
measures  for  the  protection  of  Antofagasta  and  other 
points,  and  this  energy  was  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
attitude  of  Bolivia  and  Peru.  These  States  left  the 
three  important  seaports  of  Antofagasta,  Cobija,  and 
Tocopilla  undefended,  or  held  by  small  garrisons  and  a 
scanty  police  force  inadequate  to  repel  any  organised 
attack.  No  effort  was  made  to  fortify  the  landing-places 
in  the  possession  of  Bolivia,  nor  did  the  Peruvian 
Government  send  naval  aid,  in  spite  of  its  fancied 
superiority  at  sea — a supineness  totally  without  excuse  ; 
for  although  the  Chilian  preparations  were  effected 
quietly,  no  great  degree  of  secrecy  was  observed,  and 
the  representatives  of  Bolivia  and  Peru  had  ample 
opportunity  to  inform  their  respective  Governments  of 
the  trend  of  events.  The  only  feasible  explanation  is 
that  both  Bolivia  and  Peru  were  convinced  that  the  long 
period  of  peace  which  Chile  had  enjoyed  when  this 
crisis  arose  would  render  rapid  and  effective  warlike 
preparations  impossible.  Moreover,  the  concessions 
made  by  Chile  on  former  occasions  when  hostilities 
with  Bolivia  appeared  probable,  deluded  her  adversaries 
into  the  belief  that  she  would  not  fight ; but  all  such 
illusions  were  soon  destroyed. 

On  February  8,  1879,  the  embarkation  of  the  Chilians 
began,  and  by  the  14th  the  transports  convoyed  by 
Chilian  warships  appeared  off  Antofagasta.  Five 
hundred  men  were  immediately  landed  under  command 
of  Colonel  Sotomayor,  and  took  possession  of  the  town 
without  resistance,  the  Bolivian  authorities  retreating  to 
the  village  of  Calama,  a distance  of  eighty  miles  from  the 
coast-line.  Any  attempt  at  opposing  the  invasion  would 
have  been  futile,  for  the  majority  of  the  population  of 
Antofagasta  were  Chilians,  and  the  small  garrison  was 


1879]  OCCUPATION  OF  ANTOFAGASTA  447 


quite  incapable  of  coping  with  the  invaders.  The 
occupation  of  Antofagasta  was  the  first  act  of  hostility 
in  the  war,  and  the  prompt  manner  in  which  it  was 
executed  boded  well  for  the  subsequent  success  of  the 
Chilian  arms. 

Colonel  Sotomayor  immediately  seized  Caracoles,  the 
centre  of  a rich  mining  district  about  thirty  miles  in- 
land from  Antofagasta,  and  here  also  no  resistance  was 
attempted,  the  authorities  evacuating  the  place  on  the 
approach  of  the  Chilians.  For  the  next  few  weeks 
little  was  done,  the  time  being  occupied  in  concentrating 
troops  at  Antofagasta,  enrolling  local  forces  recruited 
from  the  Chilian  residents  in  Atacama,  and  establishing 
local  administration  under  Chilian  authority.  In  March 
it  was  decided  to  despatch  an  expedition  to  Calama  to 
capture  that  place  and  completely  shut  off  the  Bolivians 
from  access  to  the  seaboard  through  Atacama,  and 
orders  for  an  expedition  were  issued ; and  on  March 
21  st  Colonel  Sotomayor  left  Caracoles  to  occupy  the 
place,  which  lay  to  the  north  on  the  main  road  from  the 
seaport  of  Cobija.  The  expedition  numbered  600  men, 
and  to  oppose  it  at  Calama  was  a small  garrison  of 
refugees  from  Antofagasta  and  Caracoles  under  the 
leadership  of  Dr  Zapata,  the  Prefect  of  Antofagasta. 
Next  evening  the  Chilians  reached  the  vicinity  of  the 
town,  and  found  the  bridge  over  the  river  Loa  destroyed  ; 
but  access  was  possible  by  two  fords,  the  lower  one 
known  as  Topater,  and  the  upper  as  Huaita.  At 
daybreak  on  the  23rd,  the  attack  was  begun  by  the 
cavalry,  which  was  divided  into  two  detachments,  one 
going  towards  the  Huaita  ford  and  the  other  towards 
Topater.  Infantry  in  two  columns  supported  the  advance 
which  the  artillery  planted  on  high  ground  covered. 

The  Bolivian  position  was  admirably  adapted  for 
defence,  and  in  the  face  of  any  determined  opposition 
would  have  presented  many  difficulties,  but  the  tactics 
of  the  Chilians  proved  thoroughly  successful.  Both 
columns  crossed  the  stream,  and  converging  on  the 
village  soon  made  short  work  of  the  defence.  The 


448  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


garrison  evacuated  the  neighbourhood,  retiring  by  the 
Potosi  road  across  the  Andes.  They  left  20  men 
dead  on  the  field,  and  carried  off  such  of  the  wounded  as 
were  able  to  bear  transportation  ; and  as  the  total  force 
of  the  Bolivian  garrison  was  only  140  officers  and  men, 
this  meant  that  one-third  were  killed  or  wounded  before 
the  evacuation  took  place,  while  the  Chilian  troops  had 
only  to  record  20  casualties. 

In  itself  of  no  great  military  importance,  this  affair 
at  Calama  none  the  less  gave  the  Chilians  undisputed 
control  of  Atacama,  and  it  was  also  the  only  occasion 
when  the  Bolivians  attempted  to  check  the  advance  of 
the  enemy  into  their  territory.  Furthermore,  the  success 
raised  Chilian  prestige,  and  greatly  encouraged  all  ranks 
of  the  invading  army.  After  the  capture  of  Calama, 
Sotomayor  proceeded  with  a small  detachment  down 
the  valley  of  the  river  Loa  to  Tocapilla,  but  found  the 
squadron  under  Rear-Admiral  Williams  Rebolledo 
already  in  possession,  as  also  of  Cobija.  So,  on  the 
29th,  Sotomayor  returned  to  Antofagasta,  leaving 
Colonel  Ramirez,  who  had  commanded  the  infantry  in 
the  attack  on  March  23rd,  at  Calama. 

The  short  period  between  the  successful  expedition 
to  Calama  and  the  declaration  of  war  by  the  Chilian 
Government  against  Peru  was  occupied  in  accumulating 
men  and  warlike  stores  at  Antofagasta  to  make  this 
town  a base  for  future  operations.  The  squadron  was 
ready  to  steam  northwards  to  harry  the  Peruvian  sea- 
board when  instructions  arrived  from  headquarters,  and 
on  April  5,  when  the  declaration  of  war  against  Peru 
was  issued,  the  vessels  under  command  of  Rear-Admiral 
Rebolledo  sailed  to  establish  the  blockade  of  Iquique, 
and  inflict  all  possible  damage  on  Peruvian  commerce. 

For  the  next  few  months  the  war  was  confined  to 
naval  operations.  The  object  of  Admiral  Rebolledo 
was  the  capture  or  disablement  of  the  Peruvian  war- 
ships, in  order  that  the  Chilian  army  might  be  thrown 
forward  without  fear  of  interruption  of  communication 
with  the  base  of  supplies.  To  embarrass  the  Peruvian 


1879]  CHILIAN  SQUADRON  OPERATIONS  449 

Government,  the  Chilian  admiral  was  instructed  to 
destory  all  facilities  on  the  Peruvian  coast-line  for  the 
shipment  of  guano  and  nitrate  of  soda,  thus  suspending 
the  chief  source  of  the  national  revenue.  Piers  and 
wharves  were  demolished,  and  lighters  wrecked  at 
different  ports  visited  by  the  Chilian  ships,  and  when 
resistance  was  attempted,  as  at  Mollendo  on  April  17, 
the  towns  were  shelled,  and  in  some  cases  serious 
damage  was  inflicted  on  defenceless  places,  a bombard- 
ment of  this  nature  occurring  at  Pisagua  on  April  18. 
This  town  was  one  of  the  principal  ports  of  shipment 
for  nitrate  of  soda,  and  contained  4000  persons,  of  whom 
many  were  foreigners.  The  garrison  consisted  of  a 
detachment  of  Peruvian  infantry,  so  that  the  town  was 
not  entirely  without  protection,  although  unprovided 
with  artillery.  Without  communicating  with  the 
municipal  authorities,  the  Blanco  Encalada  and  the 
O'Higgins  despatched  their  boats  inshore  to  destroy 
the  lighters  moored  near  the  Custom-house.  These 
were  private  property,  and  when  the  owners  understood 
the  intention  of  the  Chilians  they  opened  fire  on  the 
boats,  and  the  Peruvian  soldiers  also  began  firing  from 
the  shelter  of  rocks  near  the  seashore.  An  attempt  was 
made  to  land,  but  frustrated  by  the  garrison,  and  the 
Chilian  ships  then  bombarded  the  town  for  two  hours, 
setting  many  of  the  principal  buildings  in  flames,  amongst 
the  houses  destroyed  being  that  of  the  British  Vice- 
Consul,  and  those  of  many  other  foreign  residents. 
This  done,  the  Chilian  vessels  steamed  away. 

The  Chilians  have  been  severely  criticised  for  this 
systematic  destruction  of  property,  and  for  the  bombard- 
ment of  towns  which  were  practically  defenceless.  It 
must  be  remembered,  however,  that  it  was  important 
for  their  cause  that  the  Peruvian  Government  should 
be  deprived  of  revenue,  and  this  must  be  accepted  as 
partial  justification  for  the  policy  followed.  In  regard 
to  Mollendo  and  Pisagua,  the  excuse  was  made  that 
resistance  was  attempted  by  the  occupants  of  those 
towns,  and  that  consequently  they  were  liable  to  attack. 

2 F 


450  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVTAN  WAR 

Iquique,  the  principal  seaport  of  the  province  of 
Tarapaca,  was  blockaded  immediately  after  the 
declaration  of  war,  and  this  point  formed  the  rendezvous 
of  the  Chilian  vessels  whilst  harrying  the  coast-line. 
The  Peruvians  showing  no  inclination  to  come 
southwards  to  attack  the  blockading  squadron,  Admiral 
Rebolledo  decided  to  make  a reconnaissance  to  Callao, 
and  started  from  Iquique  with  the  Blanco  Encalada  and 
the  O' Higgins  on  May  16,  1879,  leaving  the  Esmeralda 
and  the  Covadonga  to  maintain  the  blockade.  On  the 
same  day,  General  Prado,  the  President  of  Peru,  set 
out  from  Callao  to  take  command  of  the  Peruvian  Army 
concentrated  at  Tacna.  The  squadron  accompanying 
the  President  consisted  of  the  Huascar , commanded  by 
Captain  Miguel  Grau ; the  Independencia,  in  charge  of 
Captain  Moore ; and  three  transports.  The  Chilian 
vessels  kept  well  out  to  sea  to  conceal  their  movements, 
while  the  Peruvian  squadron  steamed  as  close  inshore 
as  safety  permitted,  so  the  ships  passed  without  sighting 
each  other.  On  arriving  at  Arica  and  disembarking 
General  Prado  and  his  staff,  Captain  Grau  received 
information  of  the  departure  of  Admiral  Rebolledo  from 
Iquique,  and  the  fact  that  only  two  vessels  were  left  to 
maintain  the  blockade.  As  Arica  is  only  sixty  miles 
from  Iquique,  here  was  an  opportunity  thrown  in  the 
way  of  the  Peruvians  to  capture  the  Chilian  vessels  and 
raise  the  blockade,  and  Captain  Grau  determined  to 
proceed  to  Iquique  with  the  Huascar , and  ordered  the 
Independencia  to  keep  him  company.  The  two  ships 
left  Arica  on  the  night  of  May  20,  and  at  daybreak  next 
morning  they  were  close  to  Iquique. 

Early  next  morning  Captain  Prat,  in  command  of 
the  Esmeralda,  saw  the  Peruvian  vessels  approaching, 
and  signalled  to  the  Covadonga  to  prepare  for  action. 
Captain  Prat  found  time  for  a short  conversation  with 
Captain  Condell  of  the  Covadonga  before  the  engagement 
began,  and  it  was  decided  that  in  spite  of  the  over- 
powering strength  of  the  Peruvian  vessels  the  fight 
should  be  continued  as  long  as  either  ship  could  keep 


1879]  NAVAL  ACTION  OFF  IQUIQUE  451 

afloat.  At  8 a.m.  the  action  commenced  by  the  Huascar 
opening  fire  on  the  Covadonga,  but  almost  immediately 
the  Independencia  passed  directly  towards  the  Covadonga, 
apparently  with  the  intention  of  ramming  the  Chilian 
ship,  and  the  Huascar  turned  her  attention  to  the 
Esmeralda.  Captain  Prat  had  endeavoured  to  take  the 
latter  vessel  into  shoal  water  near  the  shore  when  the 
enemy  approached  ; but  a boiler  burst,  and  the  Esmeralda 
was  almost  helpless  with  a steaming  capacity  of  only 
three  miles  an  hour. 

As  the  Huascar  drew  near,  the  Esmeralda  gave  her 
a broadside,  but  without  inflicting  serious  damage, 
owing  to  her  guns  not  being  heavy  enough  to  penetrate 
the  armour  of  her  opponent.  A continuous  cannonade 
was  then  maintained  between  the  two  vessels  at  a 
distance  of  1000  yards,  the  Huascar  not  being  able  to 
approach  nearer  to  her  adversary  in  consequence  of  the 
shoal  water.  Meanwhile  the  Covadonga,  keeping  close 
into  the  shore,  had  drawn  away  to  the  southward  closely 
pursued  by  the  Independencia.  After  the  fight  between 
the  Esmeralda  and  the  Huascar  had  been  some  time  in 
progress,  the  fire  from  a shore  battery  obliged  the 
former  vessel  to  move  further  out  to  sea,  and  soon 
afterwards  a shell  from  the  Peruvian  ship  struck  her 
close  to  the  water-line,  exploding  and  killing  several 
men  and  setting  fire  to  the  vessel.  The  flames  were 
soon  extinguished,  but  the  corvette  was  in  sorry  plight, 
unable  to  move  on  account  of  her  damaged  machinery 
and  at  the  mercy  of  her  antagonist,  but  showed  no  signs 
of  surrender.  Captain  Grau  now  determined  to  end 
the  struggle,  and  rammed  the  Chilian  ship  on  the  port 
side,  abreast  of  the  mizen  mast.  As  the  Esmeralda  and 
the  Huascar  came  together,  Captain  Prat,  sword  in  one 
hand  and  revolver  in  the  other,  sprang  on  board  the 
Peruvian  ship,  calling  upon  officers  and  men  to  follow 
him,  but  the  vessels  parted  so  quickly  that  only  one 
man,  Serjeant  Aldea,  was  able  to  join  his  commanding 
officer.  Captain  Prat  rushed  along  the  deck  of  the 
Huascar  unheeding  the  demands  to  surrender,  and  after 


452 


THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


killing  a signal-officer,  Lieutenant  Velarde,  was  himself 
shot  down,  Serjeant  Aldea  sharing  his  fate.  The  com- 
mand of  the  Esmeralda  now  devolved  upon  Lieutenant 
Luis  Uribe,  and  he,  like  his  predecessor,  showed  no 
indication  of  striking  his  flag. 

Captain  Grau  now  made  a second  attempt  to  ram  at 
11.30  a.m.,  and  on  this  occasion  the  Huascar  struck  the 
Esmeralda  on  the  starboard  bow  at  an  angle  of  45°. 
The  water  rushed  in  through  the  aperture,  filling  the 
engine-room,  extinguishing  the  fires,  and  flooding  the 
magazine,  the  men  serving  in  this  section  of  the  ship 
perishing,  as  time  did  not  permit  their  escape.  As  the 
ships  came  in  contact  for  the  second  time,  Lieutenant 
Ignacio  Serrano  and  a dozen  sailors  repeated  the  action 
of  Captain  Prat,  leaping  on  to  the  deck  of  the  Huascar 
and  attacking  the  crew,  but  both  officer  and  men  were 
shot  before  they  could  inflict  any  injury  upon  the 
Peruvians.  The  Esmeralda  was  now  a wreck,  the  guns 
and  engines  useless,  half  the  crew  killed  or  wounded, 
and  the  ship  settling  down,  but  still  the  Chilians  would 
not  surrender.  Captain  Grau  decided  to  ram  a third 
time,  and  the  Huascar  struck  her  adversary  full  on  the 
starboard  side  abreast  the  main  chains,  and  at  the  same 
moment  discharging  her  guns  into  the  doomed  vessel, 
which  two  minutes  later  sank.  Out  of  a crew  of  200 
officers  and  men  only  50  were  saved,  clinging  to  pieces 
of  wreckage,  and  picked  up  by  the  boats  of  the  Huascar. 
Half  an  hour  after  the  Chilian  ship  went  down  Lieutenant 
Uribe  was  rescued,  having  kept  himself  afloat  by  means 
of  a hammock  under  each  arm,  and  being  completely 
exhausted  when  taken  out  of  the  water.  The  engage- 
ment had  lasted  four  hours,  the  casualties  on  board  the 
Huascar  being  comparatively  few  owing  to  the  protection 
afforded  by  the  turrets,  and  the  ship  herself  was  practi- 
cally uninjured,  the  guns  of  the  Esmeralda  being  too 
light  to  inflict  serious  damage. 

To  turn  to  the  fortunes  of  the  gunboat  Covadonga  in 
her  efforts  to  escape  from  the  Peruvian  ironclad  Inde- 
pendencia.  Captain  Condell  took  his  ship  as  close  into 


1879]  WRECK  OF  THE  INDEPENDENCE  453 


the  land  as  he  dared,  to  entice  his  pursuer  into  shoal 
water,  and  although  a desultory  fire  was  maintained 
from  the  ironclad,  no  serious  injury  was  done  to  the 
gunboat.  When  nearing  Punta  Gruesa,  ten  miles  south 
of  Iquique,  Captain  Condell,  finding  that  the  Independencia 
was  rapidly  overhauling  him,  tried  a cunning  movement. 
Near  Punta  Gruesa  is  a patch  of  rocky  ground  with 
only  enough  water  for  a small  vessel  to  pass  safely,  and 
the  Comdonga  steamed  over  this  shoal.  Captain  Moore, 
excited  by  his  chase  of  the  Chilian  vessel,  followed  at 
full  speed,  and  in  a few  minutes  the  Independencia  was 
a total  wreck  on  the  rocks.  Captain  Condel  now 
manoeuvred  his  ship  into  a position  out  of  reach  of  the 
enemy’s  guns,  and  opened  a cannonade  on  the  stranded 
vessel,  which  he  continued  until  the  approach  of  the 
Huascar  obliged  him  to  seek  safety  in  flight.  The 
Huascar  was  forced  to  remain  by  the  Independencia  to 
rescue  her  crew,  and  the  Covadonga  reached  Antofagasta 
without  mishap. 

The  loss  of  the  Independencia  was  a heavy  blow  to 
the  Peruvians.  It  left  the  Chilians  an  overwhelming 
predominance  of  sea  power,  for,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Huascar,  the  Chilian  squadron  had  now  nothing  to 
fear,  and  it  was  only  a question  of  time  when  that  ship 
should  be  captured.  That  the  Huascar  gave  serious 
trouble  to  the  Chilians  before  her  capture  was  due  to 
the  able  and  energetic  manner  in  which  she  was  handled 
by  Captain  Grau.  After  the  disaster  of  the  Independencia 
Captain  Grau  took  the  Huascar  to  Callao,  and  on  this 
voyage  the  Blanco  Encalada  was  encountered  on  June  3, 
but  Grau  out-manoeuvred  her  after  exchanging  a few 
shots,  and  reached  his  destination  on  June  7. 

During  the  next  few  months  Grau  in  the  Huascar 
rendered  invaluable  services  to  Peru.  The  presence  of 
this  warship  paralysed  the  advance  of  the  Chilian  army 
of  invasion.  Cruising  up  and  down  the  coast,  she 
evaded  the  enemy’s  squadron,  and  kept  the  Chilian 
authorities  in  a constant  state  of  alarm  by  making  sudden 
anti  unexpected  appearances  and  destroying  property  at 


454  THE  CHILIAN -PERUVIAN  WAR 


Carrizal,  Chanaral,  Huasco,  Antofagasta,  Tocopilla, 
Taltal,  and  Caldera,  the  destruction  she  caused  being 
in  the  nature  of  reprisals  for  the  damage  inflicted  by  the 
Chilians  at  Peruvian  ports.  On  July  23  she  captured 
the  Chilian  transport  Rimac  carrying  a regiment  of 
cavalry  and  300  horses,  and  on  August  17  she  entered 
Antofagasta  and  engaged  the  Chilian  men-of-war  Magal- 
lanes  and  Abtao,  these  vessels  being  only  saved  through 
the  protection  afforded  by  the  heavy  guns  mounted  on 
shore.  In  this  action  the  first  torpedo  was  used  during 
the  war.  It  was  a “ Lay,”  and  launched  from  the 
Huascar  against  the  Abtao , but  through  faulty  mechanism 
it  turned  in  the  water  and  came  straight  back  towards 
the  Peruvian  ship,  which  was  only  saved  from  disaster 
by  the  presence  of  mind  of  Lieutenant  Diaz  Canseco, 
who  jumped  overboard  and  deflected  its  course.  This 
was  one  of  the  acts  of  heroism  during  the  war,  of  which 
there  were  many  examples  on  both  sides. 

Discontent  in  Chile  grew  apace,  in  consequence  of 
the  inability  of  the  squadron  to  prevent  the  Huascar 
from  paralysing  military  operations,  and  finally  became 
so  strong  that  it  was  decided  to  overhaul  thoroughly 
the  various  men-of-war  and  supersede  Admiral  Rebolledo 
as  Admiral-in-cliief;  but  this  latter  step  was  rendered 
unnecessary  by  his  resignation  on  account  of  ill-health, 
and  Rear-Admiral  Galvarino  Riveros  took  his  place, 
hoisting  his  flag  on  the  Blanco  Encalada.  On  October  1, 
the  Chilian  squadron,  ready  for  sea,  sailed  northwards 
to  hunt  down  the  Peruvian  cruiser.  Arica  was  first 
visited,  and  there  information  was  obtained  that  the 
Huascar  and  the  Union  were  cruising  to  the  southward. 
Admiral  Riveros  now  ordered  the  Cochrane  commanded 
by  Captain  Latorre,  and  accompanied  by  the  Loa  and 
the  O' Higgins,  to  cruise  off  Mejillones  Bay,  whilst  he  in 
the  Blanco  Encalada  and  attended  by  the  Covadonga 
and  Matias  Cousiho,  the  latter  an  armed  transport,  kept 
a look-out  for  the  enemy  further  to  the  south. 

By  this  time  the  rank  of  admiral  had  been  conferred 
on  Captain  Grau  by  the  Peruvian  Government  as  a 


1879]  CAPTURE  OF  THE  HUASCAR 


455 


recognition  of  his  energy  and  gallantry.  On  the  morning 
of  October  8,  the  Huascar  with  the  Union  was  near 
Antofagasta  steaming  quietly  to  the  northward,  when 
the  smoke  of  three  steamers  was  descried  near  Point 
Angamos.  They  proved  to  be  the  Chilian  squadron 
under  Riveros,  anti  Admiral  Grau  steamed  away  to 
avoid  a fight.  His  ships  seemed  to  have  every  chance 
of  avoiding  the  enemy,  when  suddenly  the  Cochrane , 
Loa,  and  O' Higgins  appeared  on  the  horizon.  Escape 
was  now  impossible,  and  Grau  determined  to  fight  the 
matter  out  to  a finish.  The  Union  was  ordered  to 
make  the  best  of  her  way  out  of  the  course  of  the 
Chilian  vessels,  and  this,  owing  to  her  high  speed,  she 
successfully  did,  while  the  Huascar  prepared  for  the 
unequal  combat  she  was  obliged  to  face. 

The  fight  was  interesting  apart  from  the  fact  that 
it  was  one  of  the  decisive  incidents  in  the  war.  It  was 
the  first  action  that  had  occurred  between  modern 
ironclads,  and  for  that  reason  alone  the  result  claimed 
world-wide  attention.  The  first  shot  was  fired  from  the 
turret  of  the  Huascar  when  the  ships  were  3000  yards 
apart,  and  it  fell  short.  The  second  and  third  rounds 
were  equally  ineffective,  but  the  fourth  struck  the  water, 
ricoclietted,  and  pierced  the  armour-plating  of  the 
Cochrane,  although  doing  no  serious  damage.  The  two 
vessels  were  gradually  closing  whilst  the  engagement 
progressed,  but  hitherto  the  Cochrane  had  been  silent. 
At  2000  yards  distance  Captain  Latorre  gave  the  order 
to  fire,  and  the  two  heavy  guns  opened,  the  projectiles 
damaging  the  hull  of  the  Peruvian  ship,  the  fourth  shot 
striking  the  turret  of  the  Huascar,  and  temporarily 
disabled  the  revolving  gear.  The  two  vessels  were  now 
at  close  range,  and  an  attempt  was  made  by  Admiral 
Grau  to  ram  his  opponent,  but  the  twin-screws  of  the 
Cochrane  enabled  Captain  Latorre  to  manoeuvre  so 
quickly  as  to  render  this  effort  abortive,  and  subsequent 
attempts  of  the  Huascar  to  ram  were  equally 
unsuccessful,  owing  to  the  good  judgment  and  clever 
manner  in  which  Latorre  handled  his  ship. 


456  THE  CHILI  AN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


Shortly  before  10  a.m.,  thirty- five  minutes  after  the 
first  shot  had  been  fired,  a shell  from  the  Cochrane 
struck  the  conning  tower  of  the  Huascar,  in  which  were 
Admiral  Grau  and  his  flag-lieutenant,  and  the  projectile 
exploded  inside  the  structure,  killing  both  occupants,  the 
Admiral  being  mutilated  to  such  an  extent  that  only  his 
right  foot  and  leg  were  identified  as  part  of  the  man 
who  had  been  the  foremost  figure  in  the  Peruvian  navy. 
Soon  after  this  catastrophe  the  Blanco  Encalado  reached 
the  scene  of  action,  and  when  within  600  yards  of  the 
Huascar  opened  fire.  A series  of  misfortunes  now 
overtook  the  Peruvians.  After  the  death  of  Grau  his 
place  was  taken  by  Captain  Elias  Aguirre,  the  next 
senior  officer,  but  he  was  decapitated  by  a shell  a few 
minutes  after  assuming  command,  and  Captain  Manuel 
Carbajal,  who  then  took  charge,  was  severely  wounded. 
Lieutenant  Rodriguez  was  next  in  seniority,  but  had 
hardly  time  to  realise  his  responsibilities  before  he  was 
killed  ; and  Lieutenant  Enrique  Palacios  who  was  left  in 
command  was  so  badly  injured  before  the  close  of  the 
action  that  he  was  forced  to  relinquish  his  post  to 
Lieutenant  Pedro  Garezon.  One  hour  after  the  fight 
began  the  dead  and  dying  were  littered  in  all  directions 
over  the  deck,  and  the  number  of  casualties  rapidly 
increased. 

At  half-past  ten,  an  hour  and  twenty  minutes  after 
the  first  shot  had  been  fired,  the  Huascar  was  com- 
pletely disabled.  The  explosion  of  a shell  in  the  turret 
had  put  one  of  the  heavy  guns  out  of  action,  the  steam 
steering-gear  was  injured,  and  both  the  hull  and  upper 
work  of  the  vessel  were  seriously  damaged.  At  one 
time  the  Chilians  imagined  the  Huascar  had  surrendered, 
owing  to  the  colours  being  shot  away,  and  there  was  a 
lull  in  the  firing,  but  the  flag  was  run  up  again  and  the 
fight  recommenced.  Further  resistance  on  the  part  of 
the  Peruvians  was  now  useless,  and  one  hour  and  forty 
minutes  from  the  beginning  of  the  engagement  the 
Peruvian  flag  was  hauled  down.  Lieutenants  Simpson 
and  Rogers,  and  an  engineer,  with  half  a dozen  sailors 


1879]  CHILIAN  CONTROL  AT  SEA 


457 


and  four  marines,  were  sent  from  the  Cochrane  to  take 
possession  of  the  prize.  Lieutenant  Simpson  was 
received  by  Lieutenant  Garezon,  and  a formal  surrender 
of  the  vessel  was  made.  The  scene  on  the  decks  was 
evidence  of  the  severity  of  the  punishment  the  Peruvian 
cruiser  had  sustained.  Mutilated  corpses  lay  in  every 
corner,  and  of  a total  complement  of  193  officers  and 
men  when  the  Huascar  went  into  action,  64  had  been 
killed  or  wounded.  The  ship  was  burning  near  the 
conning  tower,  and  had  three  feet  of  water  in  the  hold, 
and  the  survivors  of  the  crew  were  ordered  to  help  to 
extinguish  the  fire,  and  were  kept  at  the  pumps  until 
the  water-tight  compartments  were  closed  and  all 
danger  past ; they  were  then  treated  as  prisoners  of 
war.  Of  the  crew  on  the  Huascar,  thirty  were 
Englishmen,  twelve  of  other  foreign  nationalities,  and 
the  remainder  Peruvians. 

The  Chilian  squadron  with  their  prize  proceeded  to 
Mejillones  Bay,  and  there  the  interment  of  the  remains 
of  Admiral  Grau  and  his  companions  was  attended  with 
all  due  honours.  The  Huascar  was  then  taken  to 
Valparaiso  and,  after  undergoing  the  necessary  repairs, 
incorporated  into  the  Chilian  navy.  After  this  action 
the  only  warships  remaining  to  the  Peruvians  were  the 
Pilcomayo  and  the  Union ; the  former  was  captured  on 
November  17,  1879,  but  the  latter  evaded  seizure  to  the 
end  of  the  war.  The  result  of  the  capture  of  the 
Huascar  was  to  leave  the  Chilians  masters  of  the  sea  on 
the  Pacific  coast  of  South  America,  and  to  remove  all 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  advance  of  the  invading 
army  into  Peruvian  territory. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

the  chili  an- Peru  vi  an  war — continued 


Third  Phase  of  the  War.  Chilians  at  Antofagasta.  Embarkation  of 
Expeditionary  Forces.  Peruvians  defend  Tarapaea.  Attack 
on  Pisagua.  Retreat  to  San  Roberto.  Occupation  of  Junin. 
Skirmish  near  Agua  Santa.  Attack  on  Chilians  near  Dolores. 
Chilian  Victory.  Retreat  to  Tarapaea.  Occupation  of  Iquique. 
Stand  at  Tarapaea.  Expedition  under  Colonel  Arteaga.  Battle 
of  Tarapaea.  Peruvian  Victory.  Peruvians  fall  back  on  Arica. 
Defence  of  Arica.  The  Chilian  Advance.  Engagement  at  Torata. 
Tacna  and  Arica  Isolated.  Skirmish  near  the  River  Sama. 
Battle  of  Tacna.  Rout  of  Defenders.  Heavy  Casualties.  Battle 
of  Arica.  Sinking  of  the  Manco  Capac. 


The  first  phase  of  the  war  ended  with  the  occupation 
of  Antofagasta,  Calama,  and  other  districts  of  Atacama. 
The  second  was  concluded  by  the  fight  in  which  the 
Huascar  was  taken  by  the  Blanco  Encalada  and  the 
Cochrane , and  which  signalised  the  elimination  of  Peru- 
vian naval  power ; and  the  third  covers  the  advance  of 
the  Chilian  forces  into  Peruvian  territory. 

In  the  beginning  of  October,  1879,  the  army  of 
invasion  concentrated  at  Antofagasta  numbered  7000 
men,  and  other  troops  were  in  readiness  at  Valparaiso 
to  be  pushed  forward  as  opportunity  arose.  On  October 
9,  the  day  after  the  capture  of  the  Huascar,  orders  were 
issued  for  the  embarkation  of  the  forces  assembled  at 
Antofagasta,  and  active  preparations  were  immediately 
commenced,  the  command  of  the  expedition  being  con- 
fided to  General  Escala,  Senor  Rafael  Sotomayor,  the 
War  Minister,  accompanying  the  army.  The  loading  of 

458 


1879] 


INVASION  OF  TARAPACA 


459 


the  transports  were  carelessly  and  hurriedly  effected, 
and  in  the  anxiety  to  have  all  ready  to  sail  as  soon  as 
possible  the  bulk  of  the  hospital  appliances,  ambulances, 
and  medical  stores  were  left  behind.  The  actual  destina- 
tion was  kept  a profound  secret,  and  beyond  a general 
idea  of  a landing  in  Tarapaca  nothing  was  known.  By 
the  28th  preparations  were  complete,  and  the  expedition, 
now  swelled  to  10,000  officers  and  men,  set  sail  for  the 
north.  The  force  consisted  principally  of  infantry,  but 
included  850  cavalry  well  mounted  and  equipped,  and 
30  long-range  field  guns  of  modern  type.  The  fleet 
comprised  15  transports  under  convoy  of  4 men-of- 
war — the  Cochrane , the  O' Higgins,  and  two  other  vessels. 
Not  until  after  leaving  Antofagasta  was  it  announced 
that  the  objective  point  was  Pisagua  on  the  Tarapaca 
coast. 

It  was  no  easy  matter  for  the  Peruvians  to  organise 
adequate  defensive  measures  to  repel  the  invasion.  The 
long  coast-line  of  1400  miles  was  an  insuperable  source 
of  weakness,  more  especially  on  account  of  the  barren 
and  mountainous  character  of  the  land,  which  prevented 
the  rapid  movement  of  troops  from  one  point  to  another, 
a difficulty  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  the  Chilians  now 
controlled  the  sea  and  could  concentrate  on  any  part  of 
the  seaboard  at  short  notice.  It  was  supposed  naturally 
that  the  Province  of  Tarapaca,  with  its  great  wealth, 
would  be  first  attacked  by  the  invaders,  and  efforts  were 
made  by  the  Peruvians  to  strengthen  the  defences  there. 
In  October  the  troops  in  Tarapaca  numbered  9000 
officers  and  men,  commanded  by  General  Juan  Buendia, 
with  Colonel  Belisario  Suarez  as  chief  of  staff,  and 
supported  by  many  prominent  officers,  amongst  whom 
were  Colonel  Manuel  Velarde,  Colonel  Justo  Pastor 
Davila,,  Colonel  Andres  Avelino  Caceres,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Lubiaga,  Colonel  Villamil,  the  latter  in  com- 
mand of  the  Bolivian  detachment  stationed  at  Pisagua, 
and  Colonel  Isaac  Recarbarren,  military  Governor  of 
Pisagua.  General  Daza,  the  President  of  Bolivia,  who 
had  reached  Tacna  in  April,  was  ordered  to  march  to 


460  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


Tarapaca  and  reinforce  the  division  under  General 
Buendia ; but  he  delayed  his  departure,  from  motives 
of  cowardice  it  was  said,  and  did  not  arrive  before 
disaster  had  overtaken  the  Peruvians,  nor  did  he  at  any 
time  render  assistance  of  value.  The  artillery  consisted 
of  16  old-fashioned  bronze  guns,  so  antiquated  as  to  be 
powerless  against  the  modern  weapons  of  the  Chilians. 

Pisagua  now  became  the  centre  of  operations.  It 
is  an  open  roadstead,  the  shore  slightly  curving  inwards 
where  the  town  is  situated,  and  cliffs  of  an  altitude  of 
over  a thousand  feet  rise  abruptly  behind  the  buildings 
of  the  settlement,  leaving  only  a narrow  strip  of  level 
ground  for  the  dwellings  of  the  residents.  On  either  side 
of  the  town  a small  fort  had  been  constructed,  with  one 
gun  in  each.  The  railway  from  the  town  to  the  nitrate 
districts  zigzagged  up  the  face  of  the  cliffs  until  reaching 
the  summit  station  known  as  El  Hospicio,  thence  running 
over  the  level  pampa  of  Tamarugal.  Six  miles  to  the 
south  is  the  open  roadstead  of  Junin,  also  a port  of 
shipment  for  nitrate  of  soda.  On  November  1,  1879, 
General  Buendia  arrived  at  Pisagua  on  a tour  of  inspec- 
tion and  found  that  the  garrison  consisted  of  600  Boli- 
vians commanded  by  Colonel  Villamil,  and,  in  addition,  a 
corps  of  300  men  recruited  from  boatmen  and  labourers 
in  the  harbour,  in  charge  of  Colonel  Recabarren. 

At  daybreak  on  November  2,  steamers  were  reported 
rapidly  approaching  the  Pisagua  roadstead,  and  shortly 
afterwards  the  15  transports  and  4 men -of- war  forming 
the  Chilian  expedition  were  abreast  of  the  town.  The 
garrison  was  then  posted  to  resist  the  landing  of  the 
army  of  invasion,  the  Bolivian  troops  under  Villamil 
being  stationed  along  the  zigzag  of  the  railway  to  “El 
Hospicio,”  and  the  battalion  commanded  by  Recabarren 
placed  near  the  railway  station  and  wherever  the  houses 
offorded  cover  and  allowed  a clear  range  of  fire,  while 
the  two  forts  were  manned  by  detachments  of  Peruvian 
artillery.  Hostilities  commenced  by  the  bombardment 
of  the  forts  by  the  Cochrane  and  O' Higgins,  and  the  fire 
was  so  accurate  that  the  gun  in  the  southern  fort  was 


1879] 


BATTLE  OF  PISAGUA 


461 


soon  disabled  and  the  northern  fort  abandoned.  The 
necessity  of  putting  these  two  guns  out  of  action  caused 
delay,  and  it  was  not  until  9.30  a.m.  that  the  boats  with 
the  first  detachment  of  the  Chilian  troops  left  the 
transports,  the  landing  being  protected  by  the  squadron, 
whose  fire  was  principally  directed  against  the  Bolivians 
holding  the  railway  line.  Colonel  Recabarren  was 
severely  wounded  early  in  the  engagement,  but  Colonel 
Villamil  from  half-way  up  the  cliff  actively  encouraged 
his  men  to  repel  the  invaders,  and  General  Buendia  from 
the  summit  near  “ El  Hospicio  ” watched  the  development 
of  the  fight.  The  garrison  of  Pisagua  was  powerless  to 
impede  the  disembarkation  of  the  Chilians,  and  although 
a sharp  rifle  fire  was  maintained  when  the  landing  was 
effected,  it  was  soon  silenced  by  the  heavy  guns  and 
musketry  from  the  ships.  General  Buendia  had  sent 
for  reinforcements  early  in  the  day,  but  these  did  not 
arrive  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  action,  and  at  10.30 
a.m.  the  Chilians  had  possession  of  the  town  and 
advanced  to  clear  the  face  of  the  cliff.  By  eleven  o’clock 
the  position  of  the  defenders  had  become  untenable,  and 
Buendia  ordered  a retreat,  the  remnant  of  the  garrison 
assembling  at  San  Roberto,  ten  miles  from  Pisagua,  and 
marching  to  Agua  Santa  on  the  following  day,  a troop 
of  cavalry  of  94  sabres  commanded  by  Captain  Sepulveda 
forming  the  rearguard.  In  this  action  the  defence  lost 
500  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  Chilian  casualties 
were  returned  as  235,  many  of  the  wounded  dying  through 
want  of  proper  attention,  owing  to  the  ambulances  and 
medical  stores  having  been  left  at  Antofagasta. 

While  the  action  at  Pisagua  was  proceeding,  General 
Escala,  the  Chilian  Commander-in-chief,  had  landed  at 
Junin,  six  miles  to  the  south,  and  occupied  that 
neighbourhood.  The  Chilian  troops  were  now  pushed 
forward  from  Pisagua  to  obtain  possession  of  the  rail- 
way line  to  Agua  Santa,  a distance  of  fifty  miles,  and 
on  November  4 a reconnaissance  was  made  by  Colonel 
Jose  Vergara  with  175  troopers.  He  encountered  the 
Peruvian  rearguard  under  Captain  Sepulveda  on  the 


462  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


6th,  close  to  Agua  Santa,  and  a fight  ensued,  in  which 
the  Peruvians  were  cut  to  pieces,  70  of  them  being 
killed ; the  Chilian  loss  was  only  trifling,  owing  to  the 
fact  that  they  were  better  armed  and  mounted  than  their 
opponents.  After  this  skirmish  the  Chilians  occupied 
the  line  of  railway  between  Pisagua  and  Agua  Santa, 
the  main  body  being  camped  near  Dolores  on  the  road 
from  Iquique  to  Arica,  where  there  was  an  abundant 
supply  of  fresh  water,  and  which  was  near  the  hill  of 
San  Francisco,  a naturally  strong  position.  With  the 
railway  to  connect  with  the  base  of  Pisagua  and  to 
carry  water  from  Dolores  to  the  detachments  on  the 
lines  of  communication,  the  Chilian  position  was  excep- 
tionally strong.  By  November  19,  1879,  a force  of  6000 
men  with  32  guns  had  been  concentrated  at  San 
Francisco,  and  reinforcements  were  close  at  hand  if 
the  Peruvians  attacked  in  superior  numbers. 

General  Buendia  determined  to  attempt  to  dislodge 
the  Chilians  from  Dolores  and  San  Francisco.  His  idea 
was  that  if  he  could  seize  the  water  supply  at  Dolores, 
the  enemy  would  lie  forced  to  fall  back  on  Pisagua,  and 
even  that  place  might  become  untenable.  Throughout 
the  pampa  of  Tamarugal  the  lack  of  fresh  water  is  a 
serious  obstacle,  and  the  distances  between  sources  of 
supply  are  usually  great ; and,  moreover,  the  Peruvian 
troops  were  short  of  provisions,  and  immediate  action 
was  a necessity  unless  the  whole  province  was  to  be 
evacuated.  Nominally,  the  Peruvian  army  in  Tarapaca 
amounted  to  10,000  men,  but  when  concentrated  at 
Pozo  Almonte  the  number  had  dwindled  to  between 
6000  and  7000.  Hopes  were  entertained  that  the 
Bolivians  under  President  Daza  would  arrive,  but  on 
November  18  news  was  received  that  he  had  turned 
back  to  Arica.  Notwithstanding  this  disappointment, 
General  Buendia  decided  to  carry  out  his  plans  for 
attacking  the  Chilian  position  near  Dolores,  and  on 
November  16  he  started  from  Pozo  Almonte  for  that 
purpose. 

It  was  a long  and  tedious  march  over  a barren, 


1879]  PERUVIAN  DEFEAT  AT  DOLORES  463 

alkaline  desert,  and  not  until  the  morning  of  the  19th 
did  the  Peruvians  come  within  striking  distance  of  the 
Chilians.  They  were  able  to  occupy  the  establishment 
of  “ Porvenir  ” before  the  action  commenced,  so  obtain- 
ing fresh  water,  and  the  buildings  serving  as  the  head- 
quarters for  General  Buendia.  The  attack  was  deferred 
until  the  afternoon,  to  enable  the  men  to  rest  after  a 
fourteen-mile  march  since  daybreak,  but  meanwhile  a 
reconnaissance  was  made  by  Colonel  Espinar,  who 
reported  that  conditions  were  favourable  for  a flanking 
movement  on  the  San  Francisco  position  at  a point 
where  the  Chilian  artillery  was  much  exposed. 

At  3 p.m.  the  Peruvian  division,  commanded  by 
General  Lavadenz  and  guided  by  Colonel  Espinar,  was 
ordered  to  attack  the  Chilian  flank  and  attempt  to 
capture  the  artillery,  while  another  column  under  General 
Villegas  advanced  to  the  foot  of  the  San  Francisco  Hill ; 
but  the  enemy  was  not  taken  by  surprise,  and  a heavy 
artillery  fire  met  the  advance.  In  spite  of  this,  the 
Peruvians  gained  ground  and  the  Chilian  gunners 
wavered,  but  at  this  critical  moment  Colonel  Espinar 
was  shot  through  the  forehead  and  killed.  Immediately 
following  this  disaster  a body  of  Chilian  infantry  came 
up  and  delivered  an  effective  bayonet  charge  which 
saved  the  Chilians’  gims,  and  support  now  arriving,  the 
Peruvians  were  driven  back  towards  the  “Porvenir.” 
The  frontal  attack  by  General  Villegas  proved  equally 
unsuccessful,  the  General  being  severely  wounded  early 
in  the  action,  and  the  Chilians  working  round  the 
Peruvian  flanks  forced  their  assailants  to  retreat  with 
heavy  loss.  At  5 p.m.  the  battle  was  over,  and  a decisive 
victory  had  been  won  by  the  Chilians.  No  attempt 
was  made  to  follow  the  defeated  Peruvians  beyond 
“Porvenir,”  although  it  was  evident  that  an  energetic 
pursuit  would  have  converted  the  defeat  into  a rout  and 
prevented  the  enemy  from  rallying  again  in  this  district. 
The  casualties  on  the  Chilian  side  were  208  killed  and 
wounded,  the  Peruvian  loss  being  220  dead,  76  wounded, 
and  100  men  taken  prisoners. 


464  THE  CHILIAN -PERUVIAN  WAR 


General  Buendia  retreated  across  the  pampa  of 
Tamarugal  to  the  village  of  Tarapaca.  He  began  this 
toilsome  march  of  thirty  miles  across  the  desert  shortly 
before  midnight  on  the  clay  of  the  battle,  Colonel  Suarez 
being  sent  ahead  to  arrange  for  rations.  Tarapaca  was 
reached  on  November  22,  the  guns  having  been  abandoned 
en  route  owing  to  the  great  difficulty  of  transporting 
them  over  the  sandy  ground.  The  army  was  joined  on 
the  26th  by  Colonel  Rios  and  the  garrison  of  Iquique, 
this  town  having  been  evacuated  when  news  of  the 
defeat  at  Dolores  was  received.  This  disaster  to  the 
Peruvians  was  far-reaching  in  effect,  for  when  the 
garrison  evacuated  Iquique,  the  Prefect  of  the  town, 
Senor  Lopez  Lavalle,  took  refuge  on  board  the  British 
warship  Shannon , and  on  November  20  the  city  was 
given  up  to  the  Chilian  squadron.  The  practical  out- 
come of  the  action  at  Dolores  was  to  place  the  Chilians 
in  absolute  control  of  the  nitrate  of  soda  districts,  the 
source  from  which  the  Peruvian  Government  had  derived 
the  larger  portion  of  the  national  revenues. 

The  town  of  Tarapaca  to  which  the  Peruvians 
retreated  is  situated  at  an  elevation  of  3800  feet  above 
sea  level.  It  lies  in  a fertile  valley  watered  by  a stream 
from  the  Andine  ranges,  but  which  is  narrow  and  not 
capable  of  supporting  a large  population.  It  was 
impossible  to  keep  the  whole  force  concentrated  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  town,  and  General  Buendia 
decided  to  send  the  vanguard  up  the  valley  to  the 
village  of  Pichica,  distant  fifteen  miles.  The  force 
remaining  at  Tarapaca  to  bear  the  brunt  of  any  sudden 
attack  from  the  Chilians  consisted  of  the  Commander- 
in-chief  and  his  staff  and  2500  infantry,  but  this  portion 
of  the  army  was  without  artillery  or  cavalry,  and  had 
suffered  greatly  from  the  privations  endured  in  the  long 
marches  and  hard  fighting  which  had  taken  place  since 
the  invasion  commenced.  Food  was  scarce,  ammunition 
running  short,  and  they  were  generally  in  no  condition 
to  cope  with  the  Chilians,  now  elated  with  victory ; 
nevertheless  General  Buendia  determined  to  make  one 


1879] 


ADVANCE  TO  TARAPACA 


465 


more  stand,  if  the  enemy  followed  him  across  the  pampa 
of  Tamarugal. 

Buendia  was  not  long  kept  in  suspense.  General 
Escala,  in  command  of  the  Chilian  army,  shortly  after 
the  victory  at  Dolores  and  the  surrender  of  Iquique, 
detached  2000  infantry,  150  cavalry,  and  10  guns,  under 
Colonel  Luis  Arteaga  to  proceed  to  Tarapaca  and  attack 
the  Peruvians.  This  expedition  left  the  railway  station 
of  Dibujo  on  November  26,  marched  half-way  across 
the  pampa  that  day,  encamped  for  the  night  at  Lluga, 
and  continued  the  advance  at  daybreak.  At  10  a.m. 
on  the  27th,  the  force,  marching  in  three  columns,  was 
close  to  Tarapaca,  and  its  approach  not  discovered  until 
within  half  a mile  of  the  Peruvian  lines. 

The  hills  on  both  sides  of  Tarapaca  rise  abruptly  to 
a height  of  1200  feet,  and  from  the  slopes  the  valley  can 
be  dominated  by  rifle  fire.  The  object  of  the  Chilians  was 
to  seize  these  ridges  and  compel  the  surrender  of  General 
Buendia  and  his  force.  One  of  the  Chilian  columns 
was  directed  to  march  to  the  point  where  the  valley 
debouches  into  the  plain,  and  to  advance  up  the  slope  to 
the  village,  in  order  to  prevent  all  possibility  of  the 
Peruvians  breaking  away  in  that  direction.  When  the 
alarm  was  given,  the  Peruvians  were  forced  to  fight  and 
endeavour  to  hold  the  ground  they  occupied,  or  to 
retreat  towards  Pichica,  where  lay  the  remainder  of 
their  army,  for  in  front  and  on  both  flanks  they  were 
hemmed  in  by  the  Chilians. 

General  Buendia  lost  no  time  in  making  his  disposi- 
tion for  the  defence.  A division  commanded  by  Colonel 
Andres  Caceres  was  ordered  to  the  ridge  to  the  right  of 
Tarapaca  to  meet  the  enemy  advancing  on  that  flank, 
and  a second  division  was  sent  to  the  right,  the 
Commander-in-chief  with  a small  force  remaining  to 
protect  the  village  from  a frontal  attack.  A messenger 
was  despatched  to  the  officer  commanding  at  Pachica, 
summoning  him  to  bring  up  all  available  troops  in 
support  of  the  defence.  At  10.30  a.m.,  the  division 
under  Colonel  Caceres  gained  the  crest  on  the  right,  and 

2 G 


466  THE  C HIL  IAN  - P EH  U VI  AN  WAR 


at  once  became  heavily  engaged  with  the  Chilian 
column  commanded  by  Colonel  Santa  Cruz.  At  first 
the  advantage  appeared  to  be  with  the  Chilians,  but  the 
Peruvians  were  reinforced  by  the  arrival  of  the  Iquique 
detachment  under  Colonel  Rios  and  slowly  gained 
ground.  Both  Colonel  Zubiaga  and  Lieut. -Colonel 
Manuel  Suarez,  commandant  of  the  20  de  Mayo 
Regiment,  two  of  the  ablest  Peruvian  officers,  were 
killed  in  the  first  quarter  of  an  hour ; but  still  the 
Peruvians  pressed  forward  against  their  enemies,  and  a 
charge  forced  the  Chilians  to  fall  back  and  abandon  two  of 
their  Krupp  field  guns.  The  Peruvians  again  charged, 
and  the  Chilian  infantry  was  obliged  to  retreat,  in  spite 
of  supports  under  Colonel  Arteaga,  the  commander  of 
the  expedition,  having  hurried  up  to  assist  Colonel 
Santa  Cruz.  By  noon  the  Peruvians  had  further 
advanced  and  captured  another  section  of  the  Krupp 
field  battery,  and  this  artillery  was  now  utilised  against 
the  Chilian  infantry.  Finally  the  Chilians  fell  back  from 
the  heights  and  took  up  a position  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Tarapaca  valley,  the  cavalry  under  Colonel  Villagran 
forming  an  efficient  check  to  any  attempt  of  the 
Peruvians  to  follow  up  the  success  they  had  gained  on 
the  right  of  the  valley. 

While  this  fighting  took  place  on  the  right,  an  attack 
had  been  made  on  the  town  of  Tarapaca  by  a detach- 
ment of  Chilian  infantry  advancing  up  the  valley.  To 
repel  this,  the  Peruvian  troops  on  the  heights  on  the 
left  were  brought  down  to  the  valley,  and  these  with 
the  force  remaining  in  the  village  with  General  Buendia 
resisted  so  effectually  that  the  detachment  under  Colonel 
Ramirez  was  obliged  to  seek  shelter  at  the  place  to 
where  the  column  under  Colonel  Santa  Cruz  had 
retreated.  Colonel  Ramirez  was  so  severely  wounded 
during  the  fighting,  that  he  was  left  on  the  field  and 
taken  prisoner  by  the  Peruvians.  It  was  now  3 p.m., 
and  five  hours’  hard  fighting  had  taken  place,  and  while 
the  Peruvians  were  exultant  with  the  success  they  had 
attained,  they  were  exhausted.  The  Chilians  were  also 


1879] 


PERUVIAN  VICTORY 


467 


discouraged,  and  were  with  difficulty  rallied  and  again 
led  to  the  attack.  Reinforcements  from  Pachica  began 
to  arrive  about  3.30  p.m.,  and  when  information  of  this 
fact  reached  Colonel  Arteaga,  he  ordered  a general 
retreat  across  the  pampa  of  Tamarugal,  considering  that 
further  attack  on  the  Peruvians  would  be  useless.  It 
was  carried  out  immediately,  unmolested  by  the  Peruvians 
owing  to  lack  of  cavalry,  but  the  Chilians  left  with  the 
enemy  8 guns  and  1 standard.  This  was  the  one 
substantial  Peruvian  victory  during  the  war.  The 
Chilian  loss  was  687  officers  and  men  killed  and 
wounded  and  52  prisoners,  the  Peruvian  casualties 
being  19  officers  killed,  16  wounded,  and  236  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men  killed  and  262  wounded 
— giving  a total,  exclusive  of  the  men  captured,  of  1220 
casualties  during  an  engagement  of  five  hours.  The 
Chilian  attacking  force  engaged  consisted  of  2000  officers 
and  men,  with  10  guns,  and  the  Peruvians  numbered 
2500  at  the  commencement  of  the  fight,  and  1000 
officers  and  men  arrived  from  Pichica  towards  the  close 
of  the  action  in  response  to  the  summons  of  General 
Buendia  when  the  advance  of  the  Chilians  was  first 
known.  During  the  early  part  of  the  action  the 
superiority  in  the  numbers  of  the  Peruvians  was 
counterbalanced  by  the  fact  that  they  were  without 
artillery  ; towards  the  end  they  were  not  only  in  greater 
force,  but  also  had  the  use  of  the  guns  captured  from 
the  Chilians,  and  it  was  in  view  of  these  circumstances 
that  Colonel  Arteaga  ordered  the  retreat. 

After  the  battle  of  Tarapaca  the  Peruvians  continued 
preparations  for  retreating  to  Arica.  The  route  taken 
was  along  the  foot  of  the  great  mountain  ranges  of  the 
Andes,  and  necessitated  the  crossing  of  long  stretches  of 
barren  desert  where  water  and  food  supplies  were 
always  difficult,  and  often  impossible,  to  obtain.  Arica 
was  reached  finally  on  December  18,  with  the  troops  in 
sorry  condition  from  the  many  hardships  that  they  had 
undergone.  Both  General  Buendia  and  Colonel  Suarez, 
the  chief  of  staff,  were  placed  under  arrest  and  charged 


468  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


with  the  loss  of  Tarapaca,  but  were  subsequently  released 
without  trial  and  appointed  to  important  commands. 
Three  days  after  the  departure  of  the  Peruvians  from 
Tarapaca  an  expedition  was  sent  from  Dibujo,  under 
charge  of  Colonel  Urriola,  to  bury  the  Chilian  dead  and 
bring  in  any  wounded  who  might  be  found  near  where 
the  action  of  November  27  had  been  fought. 

Tarapaca  now  securely  occupied,  the  Chilian  authori- 
ties turned  their  attention  to  the  Peruvian  army  concen- 
trated at  Arica  and  Tacna.  Arica  was  the  principal 
seaport  of  southern  Peru,  and  was  closely  blockaded  by 
the  Chilian  squadron.  It  was  defended  by  20  rifled 
guns,  10  of  them  mounted  on  the  Morro,  a high  table- 
like cape  to  the  south  of  the  town,  and  the  remainder 
distributed  over  the  forts  of  2°  de  Mayo,  Santa  Rosa, 
and  San  Jose  on  the  north  beach,  and  under  the 
protection  of  these  forts  was  anchored  the  monitor 
Manco  Capac,  supported  by  a small  torpedo  brigade 
organised  by  Lieutenant  Prado.  Diming  December,  1879, 
and  the  opening  months  of  1880,  the  Chilian  squadron 
kept  the  garrison  and  inhabitants  in  a state  of  constant 
alarm  by  occasional  bombardments  of  the  fortifications. 
The  command  of  the  troops  at  Tacna  and  Arica  devolved 
on  Admiral  Montero,  President  Daza  having  been  re- 
placed by  Colonel  Eleodoro  Camacho  as  the  senior 
officer  of  the  Bolivian  contingent.  The  Peruvian  army 
numbered  6000  officers  and  men  and  the  Bolivians 
4000,  making  a total  defensive  force  of  10,000  to  resist 
the  Chilian  invasion.  In  April,  General  Campero  arrived 
from  Bolivia  and  assumed  the  chief  command,  Admiral 
Montero  remaining  under  his  orders  in  charge  of  the 
Peruvians,  and  Colonel  Camacho  in  a similar  position 
with  the  Bolivians. 

General  Manuel  Baquedano  had  succeeded  General 
Escala  in  command  of  the  Chilian  army,  and  on 
February  24,  1880,  he  ordered  the  advance  on  Tacna 
and  Arica  to  begin.  A force  of  10,000  men  was 
embarked  at  Iquique  and  Pisagua,  and  on  February  26 
a landing  was  effected  at  Ylo  and  Pacocha,  further 


1880] 


INVASION  OF  TACNA 


469 


reinforcements  of  4000  men  being  disembarked  on 
February  28.  The  port  of  Ylo  was  eighty  miles  to  the 
north-west  of  Arica,  and  Pacocha  only  five  miles  from 
Ylo.  The  object  of  General  Baquedano  was  to  isolate 
the  Peruvian  and  Bolivian  forces  at  Tacna  and  Arica, 
and  cut  off  communication  between  those  places  and  the 
fertile  district  of  Moquegua,  of  which  Ylo  is  the  seaport. 
Moquegua  was  thus  an  important  point  for  the  Peruvians, 
as  from  it  supplies  could  be  drawn  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  army.  An  expedition  was  landed  also  at  Islay  on 
March  8,  to  occupy  Mollendo,  the  port  for  Arequipa, 
under  Colonel  Orozimbo  Barbosa.  Ylo  is  connected 
with  Moquegua  by  railway,  and  no  opposition  was 
encountered  by  the  Chilians  on  the  advance  to  that 
place  on  March  20,  but  at  Torata,  ten  miles  beyond 
Moquegua,  a Peruvian  force  under  Colonel  Gamarra  was 
entrenched  in  a strong  position,  and  it  was  necessary  to 
dislodge  the  enemy  from  this  stronghold.  On  March 
22  General  Baquedano  attacked,  preparing  the  way 
for  the  assault  by  heavy  artillery  fire,  and  detaching  a 
column  to  make  a detour  and  surprise  the  garrison  by 
a flank  attack.  For  an  hour  the  defenders  held  their 
ground ; but  finally  they  were  driven  from  their 
entrenchments,  leaving  28  killed  and  many  wounded  on 
the  field.  The  capture  of  Torata  effectually  closed  all 
communication  between  Tacna  and  the  north  of  Peru, 
and  the  Peruvian  army  at  Tacna  and  Arica  was  now 
surrounded.  On  the  north  was  the  Chilian  force  of 
14,000  men  under  Baquedano,  and  on  the  south  was  the 
province  of  Tarapaca  in  Chilian  occupation.  The  Chilian 
squadron  held  possession  of  the  sea  to  the  west,  and  at 
the  back  of  Tacna  rose  the  vast  mountain  ranges  of  the 
Andes,  preventing  any  rapid  movement  to  the  east. 

IThe  eighty  miles  which  separated  the  Chilian  position 
at  Ylo  from  Tacna  is  traversed  by  two  fertile  valleys, 
through  which  flow  the  rivers  Locumba  and  Sama. 
Preparations  were  begun  for  the  march  to  Tacna,  and  a 
reconnaissance  of  the  intervening  ground  was  made  by 
Colonel  Vergara,  and  on  April  17  an  engagement  took 


470  THE  CHILI  AN-PERUVI  AN  WAR 


place  between  the  mounted  troops  with  Vergara  and  a 
force  of  Peruvian  cavalry  under  Colonel  Albarracain,  in 
which  the  latter  was  cut  to  pieces,  leaving  150  dead 
bodies  on  the  field.  On  April  27  a general  advance 
upon  Tacna  was  ordered,  the  troops  marching  by  easy 
stages  until  reaching  the  vicinity  of  Buenavista  in  the 
valley  of  the  river  Sama  on  May  20,  1880,  and  it  was 
here  that  Senor  Sotomayor,  the  Chilian  Minister  of  War, 
was  taken  suddenly  ill  and  died.  He  was  the  man  who 
had  originated  the  plan  of  campaign  in  Tarapaca  and 
Tacna,  and  his  loss  was  severely  felt.  The  Chilian 
advance  was  continued,  and  on  the  night  of  the  25th  the 
army  encamped  within  six  miles  of  Tacna,  near  which 
place  the  bulk  of  the  Peruvian  and  Bolivian  forces 
were  concentrated. 

To  check  the  Chilian  attack,  General  Campero  had 
selected  a position  on  the  summit  of  some  barren  hills  to 
the  north-west  of  Tacna,  with  deep  ravines  on  either 
side,  while  the  front  sloped  away  at  a sharp  angle. 
Here  entrenchments  were  thrown  up  and  the  troops 
enjoined  to  remain  under  cover  as  much  as  possible. 
The  centre  of  the  defence  was  entrusted  to  Colonel 
Pinto,  and  the  left  wing  was  commanded  by  Colonel 
Camacho.  On  the  right  were  the  Peruvian  troops  in 
charge  of  Admiral  Montero,  with  Colonel  Velarde 
acting  as  chief  of  staff,  and  here  also  was  Colonel 
Belisario  Suarez,  already  well  known  in  connection  with 
the  Tarapaca  campaign.  General  Perez,  a Bolivian 
officer,  was  chief  of  the  staff  of  the  whole  army. 

The  action  was  commenced  at  10  a.m.  on  May  26, 
by  heavy  artillery  fire  from  the  Chilian  long-range 
Krupp  guns,  and  continued  for  an  hour,  and  then 
General  Baquedano  ordered  a general  assault.  The 
Chilian  infantry  advanced  in  four  columns,  each  2400 
strong ; the  first  under  Colonel  Amengual  attacked 
the  left  of  the  Peruvian  position,  while  the  second  and 
third  columns,  led  by  Colonels  Amunategui  and  Barcelo, 
were  directed  against  the  enemy’s  centre,  and  the  fourth, 
commanded  by  Colonel  Barbosa,  assaulted  the  right 


1880] 


BATTLE  OF  TACNA 


471 


flank,  where  Admiral  Montero  was  stationed.  At  noon 
the  battle  was  at  its  height,  when  suddenly  the  left 
wing  of  the  defenders  gave  way.  General  Campero 
immediately  sent  reinforcements  to  support  Colonel 
Camacho,  and  the  Chilians  were  forced  back  down 
the  hill ; but  at  this  critical  moment  a cavalry  charge 
enabled  them  to  rally.  With  the  assistance  of  a con- 
centration of  artillery  fire  on  the  defenders’  left,  the 
attack  was  again  pressed  home,  and  this  second  assault 
was  too  much  for  the  men  under  Camacho.  At  2 p.m. 
the  left  of  the  position  was  carried,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  right  wing  gave  way  and  the  centre  was  overpowered, 
the  defeat  of  the  Peruvians  and  Bolivians  being  complete. 
General  Campero  with  the  remnant  of  the  army  retreated 
through  the  Tacna  valley  towards  Bolivia,  reaching  La 
Paz  without  interference  from  the  Chilians.  The  casual- 
ties on  both  sides  were  exceptionally  heavy,  the  Chilians 
losing  2128  officers  and  men  killed  and  wounded,  and 
the  Peruvians  147  officers  and  1500  men  killed,  and 
1500  officers  and  men  wounded.  The  forces  engaged 
numbered  14,000  Chilians  and  8000  Peruvians  and 
Bolivians,  and  the  severity  of  the  fighting  may  be  gauged 
by  the  fact  that  one-quarter  of  the  combatants  were 
killed  or  wounded  in  an  action  of  only  four  hours’ 
duration. 

After  the  victory  at  Tacna  preparations  were  made 
to  capture  Arica,  where  a Peruvian  garrison  of  2000 
strong  under  command  of  Colonel  Francisco  Bolognesi 
still  held  out.  On  June  2,  1880,  General  Baquedano 
ordered  a force  of  4000  men  in  charge  of  Colonel  Lagos 
to  proceed  to  Chacalluta,  a short  distance  from  Arica. 
The  fortifications  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Arica  had 
been  strengthened,  and  additional  sand-bag  defences 
constructed  on  the  Morro  Hill  to  render  it  more  formid- 
able from  the  land  side.  Towards  the  sea  the  face  of 
this  hill  is  a perpendicular  cliff,  700  feet  high.  The 
artillery  at  Arica  has  already  been  mentioned  ; but  extra 
guns  had  been  mounted  on  the  Morro,  bringing  the  total 
number  to  nine,  and  a few  Gatling  guns  had  also  been 


472  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


placed  on  the  summit,  so  that  it  was  one  of  the  most 
formidable  obstacles  the  Chilians  had  met. 

On  June  5,  1880,  General  Baquedano  sent  a flag  of 
truce  to  the  town  with  a summons  to  surrender,  which 
was  refused.  The  Chilian  Commander-in-chief  then 
gave  orders  to  begin  the  bombardment  of  the  place,  and 
next  day  the  squadron  opened  fire,  and  was  answered 
by  the  forts  and  the  guns  of  the  Manco  Gapac.  Some 
damage  was  done  to  the  Covadonga  during  the  day, 
while  28  men  were  killed  and  wounded  on  the  Cochrane. 
General  Baquedano  now  determined  to  assault  the  forts 
and  defences  at  the  Morro  Hill  on  June  7,  and  all 
preparations  were  made  accordingly  by  Colonel  Lagos. 
Of  the  Chilian  force,  1000  men  were  detailed  to  attack 
the  forts  on  the  beach,  2000  were  to  storm  the  Morro 
where  the  sand-bag  defences  had  been  constructed,  and 
1000  men  were  held  in  reserve  for  emergency. 

The  Chilian  arrangements  were  conducted  with  the 
utmost  secrecy.  Through  the  night  camp  fires  were 
kept  burning  by  cavalry  patrols  to  delude  the  enemy, 
and  meanwhile  the  troops  crept  up  to  the  positions 
assigned  to  them,  in  readiness  to  assault  at  the  first 
glimpse  of  daylight.  So  effectually  was  the  operation 
executed,  that  at  dawn  the  Chilians  were  within  a few 
yards  of  the  outer  works  protecting  the  Morro  without 
having  been  discovered,  and  a rush  was  made,  the  newly 
constructed  forts  carried,  and  the  defenders  bayoneted. 
Simultaneously  the  redoubts  on  the  beach  were  seized 
and  the  Morro  Hill  captured,  in  spite  of  a heavy  fire 
from  the  garrison,  but  only  after  desperate  hand-to-hand 
fighting,  in  which  600  Peruvians  were  killed.  By  8 a.m. 
the  Chilians  were  in  complete  possession  of  Arica  and 
all  the  defences  in  the  neighbourhood.  When  Captain 
Lagomarsino  of  the  Manco  Capac  saw  all  was  lost,  he 
ordered  the  crew  into  the  boats  and  opened  the  valves 
of  the  monitor,  and  in  a few  minutes  the  vessel  sank, 
thus  preventing  her  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  The  total  Peruvian  casualties  were  returned  as 
700  officers  and  men  killed  and  100  wounded.  Permis- 


1880] 


CAPTURE  OF  ARICA 


473 


sion  was  granted  by  the  Chilian  authorities  for  the 
Peruvian  steamer  Limena  to  proceed  to  Arica  and 
remove  the  wounded  to  Callao,  this  being  the  more 
necessary  as  Arica  was  crowded  with  the  Avounded  of 
the  battle  at  Tacna  on  May  26.  The  Chilian  loss  in 
the  storming  of  the  forts  and  the  Morro  Hill  Avas  com- 
paratively trifling,  owing  to  the  defence  being  taken  by 
surprise. 

The  third  phase  of  the  war  was  concluded  with  the 
occupation  of  Tacna  and  Arica.  The  in\’asion  of  Peru- 
vian territory  had  been  accomplished,  the  Chilians  being 
noAv  in  complete  possession  of  the  southern  section  and 
controlling  the  nitrate  of  soda  industry  and  the  shipment 
of  guano,  the  two  principal  sources  of  revenue  upon 
which  Peru  had  relied. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 


the  chiltan-peruvian  war — continued 


Internal  Dissensions.  President  Prado  leaves  Peru.  Senor  Pierola 
heads  a Revolt.  Blockade  of  Callao.  Bombardment  of  Callao. 
Sinking  of  the  Janequeo.  Loss  of  the  Loa.  Sinking  of  the 
Covadonga.  Bombardment  of  Chancay,  Ancon,  and  Chorillos. 
Expedition  to  the  Northern  Coast.  Protests  from  Foreign 
Representatives.  Efforts  of  United  States  for  Peace.  Confer- 
ence on  U.S.  warship  Lackawana.  Conditions  of  Chile.  Chilian 
Preparations  for  Advance  on  Lima.  Army  of  Invasion.  Occupa- 
tion of  Pisco  and  Yea.  Landing  at  Curayaco.  Naval  Opera- 
tions off  Callao.  Defences  of  Lima.  Fourth  Phase  of  War. 
Advance  on  Peruvian  Positions.  Battle  of  Chorillos.  Fighting 
on  Morro  Solar.  Armistice  arranged  by  Foreign  Diplomats. 
Battle  of  Miraflores.  Lima  Surrenders.  Occupation  of  the 
Peruvian  Capital. 


While  Peru  was  suffering  many  misfortunes  in  the 
south  the  situation  was  further  complicated  by  the 
outbreak  of  internal  dissensions  at  the  National  Capital. 
The  President,  General  Mariano  Prado,  in  view  of  these 
unsettled  political  conditions,  had  resigned  command  of 
the  army  at  Tacna  to  Admiral  Montero  on  November 
26,  1879,  and  returned  to  Lima  to  resume  his  presi- 
dential functions. 

In  the  absence  of  the  President  his  duties  had  been 
discharged  by  the  Vice-President,  General  La  Puerta, 
and  on  his  return  to  Lima  he  published  a manifesto 
announcing  his  resumption  of  office  and  stating  that  he 
would  use  every  effort  in  his  power  to  retrieve  the 
recent  national  disasters.  This  document  was  dated 
December  2,  1879,  and  the  astonishment  of  the  public 


1880] 


DISTURBANCES  IN  LIMA 


475 


can  be  imagined  when,  sixteen  days  later,  the  President 
issued  a decree  to  the  effect  that  under  powers  granted 
to  him  on  May  2,  1878,  he  was  proceeding  abroad  on 
urgent  public  business,  and  that  the  Vice-President 
would  fill  his  post  during  his  absence.  Prado  had  no 
sooner  left  than  indignation  became  general,  and  roused 
the  populace  to  armed  revolt  against  the  constituted 
authorities,  the  insurrection  being  headed  by  Senor 
Nicolas  Pierola.  Fighting  took  place  in  the  streets  of 
Lima,  and  on  December  22nd  the  insurgents  obtained 
possession  of  Callao.  The  Vice-President  then  resigned 
office,  and  on  December  23  Senor  Pierola  entered 
Lima,  and  was  proclaimed  the  Supreme  Chief  of  the 
Republic.  While  the  army  at  Tacna  was  making  a 
last  effort  to  check  the  Chilian  invasion  these  turbulent 
events  in  the  National  Capital  effectually  prevented  any 
assistance  in  the  quarter  from  which  aid  was  naturally 
expected. 

The  position  of  Peru  was  desperate  when  Senor 
Pierola  assumed  control  of  the  Administration.  It  was 
too  late  to  avert  disaster  in  Arica,  for  that  port  was 
blockaded  by  the  Chilian  squadron,  and  this  prevented 
the  despatch  of  reinforcements  for  the  garrison. 
Nothing  could  be  done  except  to  strengthen  the 
defences  of  Callao  and  Lima  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
Chile,  flushed  with  her  success  in  Tarapaca,  had  already 
made  her  preparations  for  the  invasion  of  Tacna  and 
Arica,  and  was  evidently  determined  to  carry  the 
campaign  still  further  into  Peruvian  territory  when  she 
had  disposed  of  the  troops  under  Admiral  Montero  and 
General  Campero,  and  established  an  unbroken  line  of 
communication  between  Arica  and  Valparaiso. 

If  any  doubt  existed  in  regard  to  the  intention  of 
Chile  to  prolong  the  war  beyond  the  southern  districts, 
it  was  dispelled  on  April  10,  1880,  for  on  that  date  a 
Chilian  squadron  commanded  by  Rear-Admiral  Riveros 
appeared  off  Callao,  and  notified  the  authorities  and 
foreign  representatives  that  the  blockade  of  the  port 
was  established.  Neutral  merchant  vessels  were  allowed 


476  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


eight  days  to  leave  the  roadstead,  the  Chilian  admiral 
declaring  that  he  would  feel  at  liberty  to  bombard  the 
town  at  the  expiration  of  that  period.  It  was  not  until 
nine  months  later  that  this  blockade  was  raised. 

Callao  is  built  on  a spit  of  land  in  a bay  facing 
northwards,  eight  miles  from  Lima,  and  connected  with 
that  city  by  two  lines  of  railway.  Separated  from 
Callao  by  the  Boqueron  Channel  is  the  island  of  San 
Lorenzo,  and  for  some  unexplained  reason  this  was  not 
fortified  by  the  Peruvians.  This  island  became  the 
headquarters  of  the  blockading  squadron,  and  proved 
of  great  value  to  the  Chilians  during  the  operations. 
The  defences  of  Callao  consisted  of  two  round  towers, 
one  armed  with  two  500-pounder  Blakeley  guns,  the 
other  with  four  300-pounder  Vavasseurs,  and  protected 
by  earthworks  were  two  1000-pounder  smooth-bore 
Rodman  guns.  On  the  beach  were  two  revolving 
armoured  turrets  called  “Junin”  and  “ Mercedes,”  the 
former  to  the  north,  the  latter  to  the  south  of  the  town, 
and  each  equipped  with  two  500-pounder  Armstrong 
guns.  Between  these  two  turrets  were  the  forts 
“ Ayacucho”  and  “Santa  Rosa,”  in  both  of  which  two 
500-pounder  Blakeley  guns  were  mounted.  In  various 
positions  were  the  batteries  “Maypu,”  “Provisional,” 
“Zepita,”  “Abtao,”  “ Pichincha,”  and  “ Independence,” 
with  two,  five,  eight,  six,  four,  and  six  32-pounders 
respectively.  The  harbour  defence  monitor  Atahualpa, 
the  cruiser  Union , three  school  ships,  a Herreschoff 
torpedo-boat,  and  several  steam  launches  were  moored 
inside  the  basin  of  the  port- works.  A torpedo  brigade 
was  formed  to  aid  in  the  defence  of  the  harbour,  and 
submarine  mines  were  laid  in  the  Boqueron  Channel 
and  elsewhere. 

The  blockading  squadron  consisted  of  the  Blanco 
Encalada  (flagship),  the  Huascar,  Angamos,  Pilcomayo, 
and  Matias  Cousino,  and  in  May  it  was  rendered  more 
effective  by  the  addition  of  a number  of  fast  torpedo- 
boats,  two  of  which,  the  Fresia  and  Janequeo,  were 
built  by  Yarrow.  These  two  vessels  were  seventy  feet 


Nicolas  de  Pierola. 


[Face  page  476. 


1880] 


CALLAO  BLOCKADED 


477 


in  length,  with  a speed  of  eighteen  knots,  and  both 
carried  a Hotchkiss  machine  gun,  and  the  Janequeo  was 
fitted  with  three  McEvoy  "patent  duplex  outrigger 
torpedoes.  A third  torpedo-boat  was  the  Guacoldo, 
built  in  the  United  States  for  the  Peruvian  Government, 
and  captured  by  the  Chilian  transport  Amazones  when 
making  the  voyage  from  Panama  to  Callao.  The  two 
other  torpedo-boats  were  the  Colo-colo  and  Tucapel, 
built  by  Thorneycroft,  and  armed  with  machine  guns 
and  outrigger  torpedoes. 

On  April  22  and  23, 1880,  the  fleet  bombarded  Callao 
at  ranges  of  from  5000  to  7000  yards,  and  the  attack 
was  answered  by  the  forts,  little  damage  being  done  on 
either  side.  On  May  10  another  bombardment  took 
place,  the  forts  and  batteries  again  replying,  and  a 
school  ship  and  several  barges  were  sunk  and  some 
injury  inflicted  upon  the  dock  works.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Huascar  was  struck  three  times  during  the 
engagement,  one  shot  rendering  her  steering-gear 
unserviceable,  and  another  penetrating  her  side  and 
flooding  one  of  her  compartments.  On  May  25,  the 
Chilians  sustained  a serious  reverse  by  the  loss  of  the 
torpedo-boat  Janequeo.  In  company  with  the  Guacoldo 
this  vessel  was  cruising  near  the  entrance  to  the  docks 
before  daybreak,  and  suddenly  found  herself  close  to 
the  Peruvian  armed  steam  launch  Independencia  com- 
manded by  Lieutenant  Galvez.  Chase  was  given,  and 
on  closing  with  his  adversary  Lieutenant  Senoret  of  the 
Janequeo  endeavoured  to  destroy  the  launch  with  his 
port  torpedo ; but  as  the  projectile  was  discharged 
Lieutenant  Galvez  heaved  a 100  1b.  case  of  powder  on 
the  deck  of  the  Janequeo  and  exploded  it  with  a pistol 
; shot.  The  torpedo-boat  sank  at  once,  her  commander 
and  crew  escaping  in  a boat,  and  the  Independmcia 
foundered  immediately  afterwards  from  the  effect  of  the 
. torpedo  explosion,  by  which  eight  of  her  crew  also  were 
killed,  Lieutenant  Galvez  and  seven  of  his  men  being 
1 rescued  by  the  Guacoldo.  The  result  of  the  loss  of  the 
Janequeo  was  greatly  increased  vigilance  by  the  Chilians, 


478  THE  CHILIAN -PERUVIAN  WAR 


and  the  utmost  care  was  taken  to  prevent  the  recurrence 
of  a similar  disaster. 

The  Chilians,  however,  were  destined  to  suffer  other 
mishaps  during  the  blockade.  On  July  3 a vessel  was 
seen  in  the  direction  of  Ancon,  a port  sixteen  miles  to 
the  north  of  Callao,  and  the  armed  transport  Loa  was 
despatched  to  overhaul  this  craft.  On  nearing  her  the 
captain  sent  an  officer  on  board  to  examine  the  ship, 
and  he  found  the  vessel  at  anchor,  but  abandoned. 
The  cargo  consisted  of  fresh  provisions,  and  on  this  fact 
being  reported  to  Captain  Pena  of  the  Loa,  orders  were 
given  to  tow  the  prize  alongside  and  tranship  the 
contents  to  the  transport.  As  the  last  of  this  cargo 
was  being  hoisted  on  board  a violent  explosion  occurred, 
making  a gap  of  15  feet  in  length  in  the  side  of  the 
Loa  at  the  water-line,  and  in  five  minutes  the  Chilian 
vessel  sank,  with  her  perishing  Captain  Pena,  three 
officers,  and  fifty  men.  Thirty-eight  of  the  crew  were 
saved  by  the  boats  of  the  foreign  men- of- war  which  were 
lying  four  miles  away  at  the  time.  The  cause  of  the 
explosion  was  never  explained,  but  was  attributed  to  an 
infernal  machine  placed  at  the  bottom  of  the  cargo  of 
the  prize,  and  so  arranged  as  to  go  off  when  relieved 
from  the  pressure  of  the  freight  in  the  hold. 

Another  disaster  was  the  loss  of  the  Covadonga. 
The  Chilian  Admiral  had  detached  this  ship  from  the 
squadron  to  blockade  the  port  of  Chancay,  a little  to 
the  north  of  Ancon,  and  in  charge  was  Commander 
Pablo  Ferrari.  In  the  bay  of  Chancay  a launch  with 
a smart  gig  astern  was  observed  anchored  near  the 
shore,  and  the  launch  was  fired  upon  and  destroyed,  a 
boat  being  then  sent  from  the  Covadonga  to  bring  the 
gig  alongside.  The  boat  proved  uninjured  and  service- 
able in  appearance,  and  orders  were  given  to  hoist  her 
on  board  the  Covadonga,  but  while  she  was  being  hauled 
up  to  the  davits  an  explosion  occurred  of  such  force 
that  the  starboard  side  of  the  Covadonga  was  crushed, 
and  she  sank.  Captain  Ferrari  and  a number  of  the 
crew  were  drowned,  but  fifteen  men  escaped  in  a boat 


1880] 


LOSS  OF  THE  COVADONGA 


479 


and  reached  the  Chilian  sloop  Pilcomayo,  and  forty-nine 
were  saved  by  clinging  to  the  upper  rigging,  and  being 
subsequently  rescued  by  Peruvian  shore  boats.  It  was 
supposed  that  an  infernal  machine  had  been  placed  in 
the  double  bottom  of  the  boat,  and  exploded  under  the 
strain  of  lifting  her  out  of  the  water.  The  loss  of  this 
vessel  was  a source  of  the  greatest  annoyance  to  the 
Chilians,  for  the  Covadonga  had  been  captured  from  the 
Spaniards  in  the  war  of  1866  and  was  a valued  trophy, 
and  she  had  been  instrumental  in  the  destruction  of  the 
Peruvian  ironclad  Independencia , and  was  for  that 
reason  highly  prized  ; moreover,  she  had  only  recently 
been  refitted  and  equipped  with  modern  armament. 
In  retaliation  for  the  destruction  of  the  Loa  and  Cova- 
donga the  bombardment  of  the  undefended  towns  of 
Chancay,  Ancon,  and  Chorillos  was  ordered  by  Admiral 
Riveros,  but  little  serious  damage  was  done. 

The  Chilian  Government  now  determined  further  to 
embarrass  the  Peruvians  by  sending  an  expedition  north- 
wards to  lay  waste  the  country  between  Callao  and 
Payta,  and  for  this  service  Captain  Patricio  Lynch  of 
the  Chilian  navy  was  selected.  Captain  Lynch  was 
born  in  Chile  of  Irish  descent,  and  had  served  eight 
years  in  the  British  navy  ; he  was  an  able  and  energetic 
officer,  and  at  this  time  sixty  years  of  age.  The  purpose 
of  the  expedition  was  to  paralyse  all  trade  and  commerce 
on  the  northern  coast  of  Peru,  and  to  destroy  any 
property  providing  supplies  to  enable  the  Peruvian 
Government  to  carry  on  the  war.  A force  of  3000  men 
was  organised,  and  in  September,  1880,  Captain  Lynch 
proceeded  to  carry  out  his  instructions.  The  coast 
towns  of  Huacho,  Supe,  Chimbote,  Salaverry,  Truxillo, 
Pacasmayo,  Eten,  Chiclayo,  Lambayeque,  and  Payta 
were  visited,  all  Government  property  in  the  shape  of 
railways  and  wharves  were  rendered  useless,  and  all 
villages  and  farms  within  easy  reach  of  the  seaboard 
wrecked.  In  some  cases  this  brought  strong  protests 
from  representatives  of  foreign  governments  when 
residents  of  foreign  nationality  were  the  sufferers,  but 


480  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


such  expostulations  did  not  alter  the  Chilian  policy. 
After  laying  waste  the  northern  section  of  Peru,  Captain 
Lynch  returned  to  Arica. 

An  effort  was  made  by  the  United  States  to  end  the 
struggle  in  October  1880.  On  the  6th.  Mr  Osborn,  United 
States  Minister  at  Santiago,  addressed  a communication 
to  the  Chilian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  suggesting  a 
conference  to  discuss  terms  for  peace,  and  offering  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States.  It  was  further  pro- 
posed that  in  event  of  the  Chilian  Government  accepting 
this  suggestion,  the  meeting  of  the  delegates  from  Chile, 
Peru,  and  Bolivia  should  be  held  on  an  United  States  war- 
ship off  Arica,  and  that  the  representatives  of  the  United 
States  at  Santiago,  Lima,  and  in  Bolivia  should  be  present. 
The  Chilian  Government  was  willing  a meeting  should 
take  place,  and  a conference  was  arranged  for  October 
22,  on  board  the  United  States  corvette  Lackawana,  then 
lying  at  Arica.  The  delegates  from  Chile  were  Colonel 
Vergara,  the  Minister  of  War,  Senor  Eulogio  Altamirano, 
and  Senor  Eusebio  Lillo.  Peru  was  represented  by 
Captain  Aureteo  Garcia  y Garcia,  and  Senor  Antonio 
Arenas,  and  Bolivia  sent  Senor  Mariano  Baptista  and 
Senor  Juan  Carillo.  The  three  United  States  repre- 
sentatives present  were  Mr  Osborn,  Minister  to  Chile, 
Mr  Christiancy,  Minister  to  Peru,  and  Mr  Adams, 
Minister  to  Bolivia.  At  the  opening  of  the  conference 
Mr  Adams  stated  that  the  United  States  representatives 
would  take  no  part  in  the  discussion,  although  they 
would  render  any  assistance  possible  by  friendly  co- 
operation and  through  the  good  offices  of  his  Govern- 
ment. 

The  business  of  the  conference  now  commenced. 
A memorandum  of  the  terms  on  which  the  Chilian 
Government  was  willing  to  make  peace  was  submitted, 
the  conditions  including  the  absolute  cession  by  •Peru  of 
the  Province  of  Tarapaca  to  the  south  of  the  valley  of 
Camarones  ; the  relinquishment  by  Bolivia  of  her  coast 
province  to  Chile,  the  payment  of  $20,000,000,  of  which 
$4,000,000  was  to  be  in  cash ; the  return  to  Chilian 


18S0] 


CHILIAN  TERMS  REJECTED 


481 


citizens  of  all  private  property  seized  during  the  war ; 
the  surrender  of  the  transport  Rimac ; the  abrogation  of 
the  treaty  of  alliance  between  Peru  and  Bolivia ; the 
retention  by  Chile  of  the  Peruvian  provinces  of  Moquegua, 
Tacna,  and  Arica  until  peace  was  established ; and, 
finally,  an  obligation  on  the  part  of  Peru  that  Arica 
should  remain  unfortified.  With  the  submission  of  this 
memorandum,  the  first  meeting  concluded  and  the 
conference  adjourned.  At  the  second  meeting,  Senor 
Arenas  (Peru)  stated  that  the  Chilian  demands  were 
based  on  the  right  of  conquest  without  regard  to  equity, 
and  that  if  they  were  not  modified  all  hope  of  an 
agreement  must  be  abandoned.  To  this  Senor  Alta- 
mirano  replied,  that  Chile  must  be  compensated  for  the 
sacrifices  she  had  made,  and  that  the  conquered  province 
of  Atacama  owed  its  prosperity  and  development  to 
Chilian  capital,  energy,  and  labour.  Senor  Baptista 
(Bolivia)  admitted  that  Chile  by  reason  of  her  success 
might  rightly  claim  an  indemnity,  and  he  proposed  that 
she  should  remain  in  occupation  of  the  territory  which 
she  now  held  until  that  indemnity  had  been  received  out 
of  the  revenues  of  those  districts,  but  he  could  not  accept 
the  idea  of  a permanent  alienation  of  the  area  in  question. 
Captain  Garcia  y Garcia  proposed  that  the  matter 
should  be  referred  to  the  arbitration  of  the  United 
States  Government,  but  this  was  promptly  rejected  by 
the  Chilian  representatives,  and  they  also  refused  to 
consider  the  payment  of  an  indemnity  as  suggested  by 
Senor  Baptista.  With  this  the  futile  conference  ended. 

Immediately  after  preparations  were  begun  by  the 
Chilians  for  an  advance  from  Tacna  towards  Lima.  The 
expeditionary  force  organised  to  attack  Lima  consisted 
of  30,000  men,  in  three  divisions.  The  first  comprised 
9000  officers  and  men,  and  was  commanded  by  Captain 
Patricio  Lynch ; the  second,  under  General  Sotomayor, 
numbered  9500 ; the  third  was  6560  strong,  and  was  in 
charge  of  Colonel  Lagos ; and  in  addition  to  these  three 
divisions,  a reserve  of  1250  officers  and  men  was  held  in 
readiness  to  follow  the  main  body  when  all  preparations 

2 H 


482  THE  CHILIAN -PERUVIAN  WAR 

were  completed.  With  the  army  were  77  guns,  8 
Gatlings  and  2 Nordenfelts.  The  composition  of  the 
force  was: — Infantry,  1008  officers  and  22,169  men; 
cavalry,  91  officers  and  1301  men  ; artillery,  103  officers 
and  1486  men — a total  of  1202  officers  and  24,956  men. 
In  addition  to  this  combative  force,  there  was  the 
commissariat,  ambulance  corps,  teamsters,  and  camp 
followers,  which  raised  the  total  of  the  army  to  more 
than  30,000.  General  Baquedano  was  Commander-in- 
chief,  General  Maturana  the  chief  of  staff,  Colonel 
Velasquez  in  charge  of  the  artillery,  and  Colonel  Letelier 
commanded  the  cavalry.  The  Chilian  authorities  fully 
understood  that  the  object  they  had  in  view  would  not 
be  attained  without  desperate  fighting,  and  they  took  all 
precautions  to  avoid  possible  disaster ; the  army  con- 
tained the  best  of  the  fighting  forces  of  Chile,  and  no 
expense  was  spared  in  the  matter  of  equipment.  On 
November  19,  the  first  division  under  Captain  Lynch 
disembarked  at  Pisco,  which  was  occupied  with  practi- 
cally no  resistance  from  the  small  Peruvian  garrison ; 
and  then  the  valley  and  town  of  Yea  were  seized. 
Captain  Lynch  had  instructions  to  march  to  the  north 
from  Pisco  to  Curayaco  Bay,  107  miles  distant,  where 
the  remainder  of  the  expeditionary  forces  would  be 
landed,  and  which  was  the  base  for  the  final  advance  on 
Lima.  Captain  Lynch  remained  at  Pisco  until  the  11th 
of  December  before  attempting  to  move  northwards  to 
Curayaco. 

The  landing  of  the  main  body  of  the  Chilian  army  at 
Curayaco  began  on  December  22,  1880,  and  was  com- 
pleted in  two  days,  when  a force  of  cavalry  was  immedi- 
ately pushed  forward  to  occupy  the  valley  of  the  river 
Lurin,  twelve  miles  from  Curayaco,  the  district  being  held 
by  a weak  Peruvian  garrison  quite  incapable  of  effec- 
tual resistance.  On  the  27th  a detachment  of  Peruvian 
cavalry  was  surprised  by  Colonel  Barbosa  and  captured, 
leaving  the  valley  clear  of  the  enemy  and  free  for  the 
advance  of  General  Baquedano,  and  on  the  25th  the 
division  under  Captain  Lynch  which  had  marched  from 


1880] 


THE  ADVANCE  TO  LIMA 


483 


Pisco  formed  a junction  with  the  main  body.  On 
December  28  the  expedition  moved  forward  to  the 
river  Lurin  and  encamped  in  a position  ten  miles  from 
the  first  line  of  the  Peruvian  defences  of  Lima,  and  in 
the  valley  of  the  Lurin  a halt  was  made  for  fifteen  days 
while  the  country  round  Lima  was  thoroughly  recon- 
noitred and  final  preparations  made  for  the  attack. 

While  the  Chilian  army  was  gradually  approaching 
Lima  the  blockade  of  Callao  was  closely  maintained  by 
the  Chilian  squadron,  and  on  December  6 the  last 
action  of  the  war  in  which  the  navy  was  engaged  took 
place.  A Peruvian  launch  with  a lighter  in  tow  was 
observed  outside  the  Callao  docks,  and  the  torpedo- 
boats  Fresia,  Tucapel , and  Guacoldo  steamed  in  to 
intercept  her.  The  launch  opened  fire  from  two  40- 
pounder  Armstrong  guns  on  her  pursuers,  and  the  shore 
batteries  joined  in  the  cannonade.  This  brought  up  the 
squadron,  and  a bombardment  of  the  forts  began,  the 
firing  lasting  for  an  hour  and  a half.  The  Fresia  was 
struck  by  a shell  and  foundered,  but  was  subsequently 
raised  and  repaired ; and  a shell  from  the  Angamos  hit 
the  Peruvian  cruiser  Union  lying  in  the  dock  basin,  and 
caused  considerable  damage,  but  no  other  serious  injury 
was  done. 

The  futility  of  the  peace  conference  on  the  U.S. 
warship  Lackawana  in  October,  1880,  brought  home  to 
the  Peruvian  authorities  the  fact  that  they  must  prepare 
to  meet  the  Chilians  in  the  vicinity  of  the  National 
Capital.  There  remained  no  doubt  now  that  the 
invasion  had  Lima  as  its  objective  point,  and  prepara- 
tions for  resistance  were  begun  with  feverish  haste.  By 
a decree  of  the  Government  all  able-bodied  men  between 
the  ages  of  sixteen  and  sixty  were  enrolled  in  the  army 
for  defensive  purposes,  and  after  the  landing  of  the 
Chilian  expedition  at  Curayaco  all  public  offices  and 
commercial  establishments  were  closed  between  the 
hours  of  3 and  6 p.m.  by  official  orders,  to  allow  the 
army  of  defence  to  be  drilled  and  disciplined,  the  tolling 
of  the  Cathedral  bell  notifying  the  men  when  their 


484  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


attendance  was  required.  These  measures  were  directed 
by  Seiior  Nicolas  Pierola,  and  resulted  in  the  organisa- 
tion of  26,000  men  in  the  fighting  ranks  and  a reserve 
numbering  18,000,  although  a large  proportion  of  this 
latter  body  was  unfit  for  active  service.  The  vast 
majority  of  the  men  in  this  army  were  recruits,  and  the 
time  for  imparting  military  training  was  so  short  that 
the  bulk  of  the  troops  could  only  be  regarded  in  the 
light  of  raw  levies  when  the  final  struggle  occurred. 
The  army  was  organised  in  four  divisions,  commanded 
respectively  by  Colonel  Suarez,  Caceres,  Davila,  and 
Iglesias.  In  the  matter  of  artillery  the  Peruvians  were 
very  deficient,  the  total  number  of  field  guns  only 
reaching  100,  most  of  these  being  of  local  manufacture, 
and  of  such  poor  quality  as  to  be  of  little  use  against 
the  modern  equipment  of  the  Chilians. 

When  information  of  the  Chilian  landing  at  Curayaco 
was  received  in  Lima,  Senor  Pierola  determined  to  form 
a first  line  of  defence  on  the  range  of  low  hills  situated 
immediately  to  the  south  of  the  town  of  Chorillos. 
Close  to  the  sea  at  this  point  rises  the  high  bluff  known 
as  the  Morro  Solar,  and  this  was  selected  as  the 
extreme  right  of  the  Peruvian  position.  The  top  of 
Morro  Solar  is  2000  feet  above  sea  level,  and  from 
there  to  the  eastward  is  a chain  of  hills,  of  which  the 
most  prominent  are  Santa  Teresa  and  San  Juan.  The 
length  of  this  defensive  line  was  eight  miles,  and  it  was 
intersected  by  three  roads  connecting  Lima  with  the 
Lurin  valley,  by  which  route  the  Chilians  were  expected 
to  advance.  Trenches  were  thrown  up  and  guns 
posted  in  all  commanding  positions  so  effectively  that 
in  the  hands  of  trained  troops  the  line  would  undoubtedly 
have  been  a most  formidable  obstacle  to  overcome,  but 
the  natural  strength  of  the  position  was  counteracted  by 
the  lack  of  military  experience  of  the  rank  and  file  of 
the  men.  This  first  line  of  defence  was  ten  miles  from 
Lima,  and  a second  line  was  formed  six  miles  from  the 
city,  the  right  flank  resting  upon  the  village  of  Miraflores, 
thence  extending  in  a north-easterly  direction  for  four 


1881] 


THE  PERUVIAN  DEFENCE 


485 


miles  until  reaching  the  hill  of  San  Bartolome,  which 
rises  to  a height  of  1476  feet  above  sea  level.  This 
second  line  was  over  farm  lands,  where  fields  were  separ- 
ated by  mud  walls  which  were  loopholed  and  transformed 
into  efficient  cover  for  infantry,  and  they  constituted  a 
serious  impediment  to  the  manoeuvring  of  any  cavalry 
the  attacking  force  might  throw  forward.  The  positions 
selected  were  regarded  as  impregnable  by  Senor  Pierola 
and  his  staff,  and  they  looked  forward  with  confidence 
to  the  result  of  the  battle. 

The  fourth  phase  of  the  war  was  now  at  hand. 
From  his  encampment  near  the  river  Lurin  the  Chilian 
Commander-in-chief  sent  out  a strong  force  on  January  9, 
1881,  under  Colonel  Barbosa,  to  make  a reconnaissance 
on  the  left  of  the  Peruvian  position,  and  a slight 
skirmish  took  place.  Senor  Pierola,  anticipating  a 
general  attack  in  this  quarter,  immediately  reinforced 
the  position  by  detailing  the  division  under  Colonel 
Davila  to  assist  the  defence  of  this  part  of  the  line. 
The  project  of  moving  the  whole  Chilian  army  to  the 
north-east  of  Lima  and  so  outflanking  the  Peruvian 
position  had  been  carefully  considered  by  General 
Baquedano,  but  the  idea  was  abandoned  in  view  of 
the  information  brought  in  by  Colonel  Barbosa,  and 
also  because  it  necessitated  a march  of  fifteen  miles 
over  waterless  desert  with  the  probability  of  a hard 
fight  when  the  troops  were  tired ; moreover,  this 
flanking  movement  entailed  the  army  losing  touch  with 
the  ships.  In  these  circumstances  General  Baquedano 
decided  to  advance  with  his  left  wing  resting  on  the  sea 
shore,  and  to  make  a frontal  attack  on  the  first  line  of 
the  Peruvian  defence. 

On  the  evening  of  January  12  orders  were  issued 
for  the  advance,  the  plan  being  to  deliver  the  attack  at 
daybreak  on  January  13,  and  if  possible  take  the  enemy 
by  surprise.  The  First  Division,  under  Captain  Lynch, 
formed  the  left  wing,  and  marched  parallel  to  the 
seashore,  with  instructions  to  assault  the  Peruvian 
positions  between  the  Morro  Solar  and  Santa  Teresa, 


486  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


then  to  occupy  Ohorillos.  The  Second  Division,  com- 
manded by  General  Sotomayor,  was  in  the  centre,  and 
was  ordered  to  force  the  Peruvian  line  near  San  Juan, 
and  form  a junction  with  the  First  Division  at  Chorillos. 
The  Third  Division  in  charge  of  Colonel  Lagos  was  on 
the  right,  and  to  it  was  assigned  the  duty  of  holding  the 
enemy’s  left  in  check  and  supporting  General  Sotomayor 
if  necessary.  The  reserves  under  Colonel  Martinez 
were  in  the  rear  between  the  left  and  centre,  with 
instructions  to  support  Captain  Lynch  or  General 
Sotomayor  as  occasion  required.  The  details  of  the 
march  were  carried  out  successfully,  the  army  arriving 
in  front  of  the  Peruvian  position  shortly  before  midnight, 
and  there  resting  until  daylight. 

The  Peruvian  right  on  the  Morro  Solar  was  in  charge 
of  Colonel  Iglesias  with  a force  of  6000  men  ; the  centre, 
in  which  were  the  hills  of  Santa  Teresa  and  San  Juan, 
was  commanded  by  Colonel  Andres  Caceres ; on  the 
left  was  Colonel  Davila ; the  strength  of  the  centre  and 
left  was  each  about  6000  men.  The  Fourth  Division 
of  the  Peruvian  army  under  Colonel  Suarez  formed  the 
reserve.  Sehor  Pierola,  acting  as  Commander-in-chief 
of  the  Peruvians,  had  his  headquarters  at  Chorillos,  and 
with  him  were  General  Buendia,  Admiral  Montero, 
General  Silva,  the  chief  of  staff,  Captain  Garcia  y Garcia, 
and  a number  of  other  officers. 

At  dawn  on  January  13  the  Chilians  attacked,  and 
the  division  on  the  left  under  Captain  Lynch  first 
became  engaged,  but  the  action  was  soon  general  along 
the  line.  For  the  first  hour  the  defenders  at  the  base 
of  the  Morro  Solar  held  their  ground  tenaciously, 
although  subjected  to  a heavy  fire  from  the  Chilian 
squadron  in  addition  to  that  of  the  division  led  by 
Captain  Lynch.  In  view  of  this  obstinate  resistance, 
General  Baquedano  ordered  the  reserves  under  Colonel 
Martinez  to  attack  the  Peruvian  right  wing  on  the 
flank  extended  towards  Santa  Teresa,  and  the  enemy 
gave  way  at  this  point,  retreating  up  the  hill  of  Morro 
Solar.  Meanwhile,  at  6 a.m.,  the  centre  under  General 


1881] 


BATTLE  OF  CHORILLOS 


487 


Sotomayor  had  carried  the  defences  in  front  of  San 
Juan  by  a brilliant  and  daring  bayonet  charge.  At 
7.30  a.m.,  two  and  a half  hours  after  the  commencement 
of  the  battle,  the  defending  army  was  in  full  retreat, 
and  this  was  soon  converted  into  a rout  by  the  Chilian 
cavalry  charging  the  fugitives  again  and  again.  The 
Peruvian  centre  under  Colonel  Caceres  maintained  a 
show  of  order  in  the  retirement,  and  fell  back  upon 
Chorillos,  but  with  this  exception,  and  the  troops  under 
Colonel  Iglesias  concentrated  on  the  hill  of  Morro 
Solar,  the  army  of  the  first  line  of  defence  was  dispersed. 

The  Morro  Solar  was  surrounded,  but  the  position 
was  admirably  adapted  for  defensive  tactics,  and 
Captain  Lynch  found  the  task  before  him  no  easy 
matter.  After  three  hours’  heavy  fighting,  the  Peruvians 
were  driven  to  exposed  ground,  where  a steady  artillery 
fire  was  brought  to  bear  upon  them ; and  seeing  that 
their  case  was  hopeless,  Colonel  Iglesias  surrendered  to 
save  further  sacrifice  of  life.  The  combat  was  now 
transferred  to  Chorillos,  where  Colonel  Caceres  with 
2000  and  Colonel  Recabarren  with  1000  men  were 
making  a last  stand ; but  the  Second  Chilian  Division 
under  General  Sotomayor  finally  carried  the  town  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet,  losses  on  both  sides  being 
heavy.  After  the  capture  of  Chorillos,  the  army  was 
halted  preparatory  to  attacking  the  second  line  near 
Miraflores,  and  to  this  place  Senor  Pierola,  who  had 
escaped  from  Chorillos  when  he  saw  the  day  was  lost, 
had  proceeded  to  direct  the  defence.  In  this  engage- 
ment the  Chilian  losses  were  800  officers  and  men 
killed  and  2500  wounded,  and  the  Peruvian  casualties 
amounted  to  5000  officers  and  men  killed,  4000 
wounded,  and  2000  officers  and  men  taken  prisoners. 
This  was  a total  loss  of  12,300  officers  and  men  killed 
and  wounded  out  of  42,000  engaged. 

The  14th  of  January  was  spent  by  the  Chilians  in 
attending  to  the  wounded  and  burying  the  dead,  and  in 
making  a reconnaissance  of  the  second  line  of  the 
Peruvian  defence.  Plans  were  drawn  up  for  attacking 


488 


THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR, 


this  last  obstacle  to  the  entry  into  Lima,  and  General 
Baquedano  decided  to  assault  the  position  on  January 
15,  but  was  deterred  from  doing  so  by  representations 
from  the  foreign  diplomatic  corps  in  Lima,  who 
requested  an  armistice  to  allow  time  for  Senor  Pierola 
to  consider  if  further  bloodshed  could  be  avoided.  It 
was  at  the  suggestion  of  Senor  Pierola  that  this 
diplomatic  intervention  took  place,  and  the  representa- 
tions were  made  to  General  Baquedano  by  Sir  Spencer 
St  John,  Minister  for  Great  Britain,  M.  de  Vosges, 
Minister  of  France,  and  Senor  Pinto,  Minister  for 
Salvador.  The  Chilian  Commander-in-chief  agreed  to 
suspend  hostilities  until  midnight  on  January  15,  but 
only  on  condition  that  certain  movements  of  troops  then 
in  course  of  execution  should  be  concluded.  To  this  the 
foreign  diplomatists  assented,  but  added  a rider  to  the 
effect  that  the  main  body  of  the  Chilian  army  should  not 
advance  from  the  position  it  then  held.  The  Ministers 
returned  to  Miraflores  and  communicated  the  terms  of 
the  armistice  to  Pierola ; but  hardly  an  hour  had  elapsed 
before  heavy  firing  was  heard,  and  it  was  found  that 
General  Baquedano  had  himself  unwittingly  broken  the 
terms  of  the  armistice  by  riding  out  with  his  staff  in 
front  of  the  Chilian  line.  Some  Peruvian  artillery,  mis- 
taking this  for  an  advance  of  the  Chilians,  had  opened 
fire,  and  at  2 p.m.  the  action  became  general. 

Twelve  thousand  Peruvian  troops  were  concentrated 
on  this  second  line,  partly  the  survivors  of  the  battle  of 
Chorillos,  and  partly  men  from  the  reserves  who  had 
not  been  engaged  in  the  former  action.  After  a 
bombardment  of  the  position  by  the  Chilian  artillery 
and  the  squadron  consisting  of  the  Blanco  Encalada, 
the  Haas  car,  Pilcomayo , O' Higgins,  and  Toro,  the  Third 
Division  of  the  Chilian  army,  led  by  Colonel  Lagos, 
advanced  in  skirmishing  order  under  the  protection  of 
the  field  guns.  A desperate  charge  on  the  Peruvian 
right  at  4.30  p.m.  carried  that  part  of  the  defence  after 
a severe  struggle.  On  the  left,  the  defenders,  supported 
by  five  redoubts  and  the  artillery  mounted  on  the 


1881] 


BATTLE  OF  MIRAFLORES 


489 


heights  of  San  Bartolome  and  San  Cristoval,  made  a 
stubborn  resistance ; but  they  were  forced  back  when 
the  Chilian  line  Avas  reinforced  and  additional  batteries 
brought  into  action,  and  at  5 p.m.  only  the  Permian 
centre  remained  to  be  taken.  Half  an  hour  later,  this 
section  of  the  defence  was  overcome  by  another  bayonet 
charge ; and  at  6 p.m.  all  firing  ceased,  the  Peruvians 
taking  refuge  in  flight.  Seiior  Pierola,  when  he  saw 
that  the  victory  of  the  Chilians  Avas  inevitable,  rode  off 
accompanied  by  General  Buendia,  Colonel  Suarez,  and 
Captain  Garcia  y Garcia,  and  reached  the  town  of 
Cauta  situated  in  the  mountains  and  at  some  distance 
from  the  seaboard,  and  many  other  Peruvian  officers 
escaped  from  the  field  and  found  asylum  in  the 
mountainous  regions  of  the  interior.  In  this  engage- 
ment the  Chilians  lost  500  officers  and  men  killed  and 
1625  wounded,  and  the  Peruvian  casualties  were  3000 
killed  and  Avounded.  At  Miraflores,  the  number  of 
Chilians  in  the  fighting  line  was  13,000,  and  out  of  a 
total  of  25,000  officers  and  men  engaged  on  both  sides, 
the  casualties  were  5125,  a clear  proof  of  the  severe 
nature  of  the  combat.  The  total  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  in  the  two  fights  Avas  17,425  of  all  ranks — of 
these,  5425  Avere  Chilians,  and  12,000  Peruvians. 

The  result  of  the  battle  of  Miraflores  left  Lima  at 
the  mercy  of  the  in  Abiding  army.  Early  on  January  16, 
Senor  Rufino  Torico,  the  Municipal  Alcalde,  tendered 
the  formal  surrender  of  the  National  Capital  to  the 
Chilian  Commander-in-chief,  and  on  the  following  day 
General  Cornelio  Saavedra,  with  a division  of  4000 
troops,  took  possession  of  the  city. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

THE  CHILIAN- PERUVIAN  WAR — continued 


Panic  in  Lima.  Asylum  given  by  the  Legations.  Action  of  British 
and  French  Admirals.  Urban  Guard.  General  Saavedra 
re-establishes  Order.  Conduct  of  Chilians.  Entry  of  General 
Baquedano  into  Lima.  Vessels  Destroyed  at  Callao.  Admiral 
Lynch  Commands  in  Peru.  Government  of  Dr  Calderon. 
Recognition  of  Calderon  Administration  by  United  States. 
Admiral  Lynch  overturns  Calderon.  The  Montero  Government. 
Situation  in  1882.  Caceres  and  Guerilla  Warfare.  Peruvian 
Army  at  Arequipa.  Expedition  against  Arequipa.  Peruvians 
Defeated.  Government  of  General  Iglesias.  Conditions  of 
Peace.  Treaty  between  Chile  and  Peru.  Evacuation  of  Lima. 
Ratification  of  Treaty.  Negotiations  between  Chile  and  Bolivia. 
Text  of  Agreement  between  Chile  and  Bolivia.  Result  of  the 
War. 

The  approach  of  the  invading  army  towards  Lima  had 
created  panic  amongst  the  peaceable  inhabitants  of  the 
city.  Stories  had  been  set  afloat  of  the  atrocities  com- 
mitted by  the  Chilians  in  the  south  of  Peru,  and 
although  obviously  exaggerated,  they  found  credence  in 
the  ears  of  a section  of  the  population  only  too  willing 
to  believe  accounts  of  outrages  committed  by  the 
victorious  troops. 

When  all  able-bodied  men  were  withdrawn  from  the 
city  to  swell  the  fighting  ranks  for  the  defence,  affairs  at 
Lima  were  in  bad  plight.  No  police  were  left  to 
preserve  order  amongst  a numerous  class  of  vicious 
characters  who  avoided  military  service  by  skulking  in 
the  slums,  and  robbery  and  murder  were  committed 

490 


1881 J 


OCCUPATION  OF  LIMA 


491 


almost  with  impunity,  adding  terror  to  the  situation. 
The  foreign  legations  were  crowded  with  refugees  of  all 
ranks  of  society,  and  the  British  Legation  became  an 
asylum  for  hundreds  of  people,  Peruvians  and  foreigners 
alike  begging  a resting-place  within  its  friendly  doors. 
The  crowd  of  persons  asking  admittance  was  so  great 
that  additional  buildings  were  annexed,  and  even  then 
many  of  the  refugees  were  forced  to  live  and  sleep  in 
corridors,  passages,  and  outhouses  for  lack  of  better 
accommodation.  Other  foreign  representatives  followed 
the  example  of  Sir  Spencer  St  John,  and  provided  pro- 
tection for  the  rush  of  panic-stricken  applicants. 
Imbued  with  the  idea  that  Lima  would  be  looted  by 
the  Chilians,  the  Peruvian  families  buried  or  hid  away 
all  valuables  in  the  shape  of  plate,  jewellery,  and 
pictures — in  fact  everything  not  too  bulky  to  be  stowed 
into  a small  compass.  Luckily  for  the  townspeople,  the 
British  and  French  Admirals  assisted  in  the  prevention 
of  undue  excesses,  and  detachments  of  bluejackets  and 
marines  were  landed  from  the  foreign  warships  to  guard 
the  Legations  and  suppress  serious  rioting.  An  Urban 
Guard  was  recruited  from  the  foreign  residents,  and 
armed  for  patrol  duty  in  the  streets  and  suburbs.  Nor 
were  these  precautions  unnecessary,  for  after  the 
Chilian  victories  at  Chorillos  and  Miraflores  fugitives 
from  the  Peruvian  army  poured  into  the  city,  and  were 
only  checked  from  committing  excesses  by  the  steps 
that  had  been  taken  to  maintain  order.  In  some  cases 
the  authority  assumed  by  the  detachments  from  the 
men-of-war  and  the  Urban  Guard  required  to  be 
enforced  by  strong  measures,  but  the  determined  atti- 
tude of  the  men  who  had  taken  control  saved  Lima 
from  any  outrage  by  an  unprincipled  rabble. 

The  action  of  the  foreign  representatives  and  the 
British  and  French  Admirals  in  regard  to  the  entry  of 
the  Chilian  forces  into  Lima  after  the  battle  of  Mira- 
tlores was  deserving  of  the  highest  commendation. 
They  insisted  that  it  would  be  inadvisable  to  allow  the 
troops,  flushed  with  victory,  to  take  possession  of  the 


492  THE  CHILIAN  PERUVIAN  WAR 


city  immediately  after  the  rout  of  the  Peruvian  army, 
and  they  were  so  firm  in  their  attitude  that  the  Chilian 
Commander-in-chief  deferred  to  their  request  for  a short 
delay  before  the  army  assumed  possession  of  the 
Peruvian  capital,  and  it  was  for  this  reason  that  the 
Chilian  troops  did  not  arrive  in  Lima  until  January 
17,  1881.  Immediately  the  Chilians  were  in  possession 
measures  were  taken  by  General  Saavedra  to  guard 
against  disturbances,  and  in  twenty-four  hours  order 
was  re-established  and  quiet  ensured  by  peremptory 
punishment  when  necessary. 

Unfortunately  the  accusations  levelled  against  the 
Chilians  of  acts  of  vandalism  during  the  military  occupa- 
tion of  Lima  have  some  foundation  in  fact.  The 
property  of  the  Peruvian  Government  was  confiscated 
to  an  unnecessary  extent,  an  instance  in  point  being  the 
seizure  of  scientific  instruments  intended  for  the  Lima 
Observatory  and  their  transmission  to  Santiago,  and 
little  effort  was  made  to  safeguard  certain  national 
property  deserving  of  careful  consideration.  A battalion 
of  infantry  was  quartered  in  the  national  library,  where 
a collection  of  most  valuable  books  and  manuscripts 
had  been  accumulated,  and  numbers  of  the  volumes 
disappeared,  priceless  manuscripts  were  taken  from  the 
cases  and  thrown  away  or  sold  for  a few  dollars  by  a 
soldiery  ignorant  of  their  worth.  Many  artistic  trea- 
sures were  appropriated  by  unscrupulous  Chilians 
without  the  knowledge  of  their  superior  officers,  and 
the  owners  were  too  terrified  to  make  complaint  in  the 
proper  quarter ; but  innumerable  thefts  were  committed 
by  persons  entirely  unconnected  with  the  army  of 
occupation,  and  such  robberies  were  invariably  attri- 
buted to  the  Chilian  troops.  Away  from  Lima  the 
Chilian  soldiers  undoubtedly  did  treat  the  Peruvians 
with  unnecessary  harshness  in  districts  to  which 
expeditions  were  despatched,  but  such  conduct  could 
only  be  expected  when  due  appreciation  is  given  to  the 
material  of  the  Chilian  forces ; moreover,  Peru  was  a 
conquered  country,  and  the  inhabitants  could  not 


General  Caceres. 


[Face  page  496. 


1881] 


ACTS  OF  VANDALISM 


493 


expect  any  kid-glove  courtesy.  In  the  towns  per- 
manently garrisoned  by  Chilian  troops  all  depredations 
were  quickly  suppressed  by  the  military  authorities,  and 
hostile  feeling  between  natives  and  soldiers  was  allowed 
small  scope  for  the  disturbance  of  public  order. 

On  January  18,  1881,  the  Commander-in-chief  of 
the  Chilian  army  with  his  staff  made  a formal  entry 
into  Lima  and  occupied  the  presidential  palace. 
Arrangements  were  commenced  for  the  establishment 
of  a temporary  administration  for  the  city  and  surround- 
ing districts,  and  officials  were  appointed  to  take  charge 
of  the  municipal  revenues  and  attend  to  the  distribution 
and  disbursement  of  the  funds  collected.  The  blockade 
of  Callao  was  raised  and  the  port  opened  to  international 
trade,  and  the  reconstruction  of  the  economic  life  of  the 
occupied  districts,  which  had  been  thoroughly  dis- 
organised during  the  past  twelve  months,  was  under- 
taken with  as  little  delay  as  possible. 

When  the  news  of  the  defeat  of  the  Peruvian  army 
reached  Callao,  the  naval  authorities  determined  to 
destroy  the  vessels  in  the  harbour  to  prevent  them 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Chilians.  The  Union  was 
dismantled  of  her  armament  and  wrecked,  the  coast- 
defence  monitor  Atahualpa  was  sunk,  and  the  school 
ships  Apurimac,  Mcteoro,  and  Maranon,  and  the  trans- 
ports Rimac,  Chalaca,  and  Talisman  were  destroyed. 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  conquest  of  Peru  was 
accomplished  when  this  action  was  taken,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  destruction  ot  these  vessels  pro- 
foundly irritated  the  Chilians. 

Towards  the  end  of  March,  General  Baquedano 
resigned  command  of  the  army  of  occupation  and 
returned  to  Chile,  his  successor  being  Admiral  Patricio 
Lynch,  who  had  been  promoted  to  flag  rank  for  his 
services  during  the  campaign.  The  task  of  Admiral 
Lynch  required  more  than  ordinary  ability  to  accomplish 
in  an  efficient  and  successful  manner.  The  Chilian 
Government  was  anxious  to  make  peace  with  the 
Peruvians,  and  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  Peruvian 


494  THE  CHILI  AN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


territory  under  a satisfactory  treaty,  but  the  difficulty 
was  that  no  representative  Peruvian  Government  existed 
with  which  to  deal.  An  attempt  was  made  to  open 
negotiations  with  Sehor  Pierola,  but  he  and  his  friends 
were  irreconcilable  to  any  terms  which  included  the 
permanent  cession  of  Peruvian  territory  to  Chile,  and 
it  was  only  on  those  conditions  that  the  Chilian 
Government  was  prepared  to  discuss  peace  proposals. 
With  the  consent  of  the  military  authorities,  a meeting 
of  prominent  citizens  was  called  in  Lima,  about  one 
hundred  representatives  attending,  and  Dr  Francisco 
Garcia  Calderon  finally  agreed,  as  the  result  of  this 
conference,  to  undertake  the  responsibity  of  forming  an 
Administration.  With  the  sanction  of  Admiral  Lynch, 
the  village  of  Magdalena,  three  miles  from  Lima,  became 
the  headquarters  of  the  new  Government,  and  here  Dr 
Calderon  formally  assumed  his  functions  as  President 
on  March  12.  A ministry  was  appointed,  Admiral 
Montero  was  nominated  as  Vice-President,  and  a 
meeting  was  summoned  of  the  Congress  existing  be- 
fore the  invasion  of  Lima  by  the  Chilians.  A certain 
number  of  these  legislators  assembled  in  due  course  at 
Chorillos  in  the  military  college,  that  building  having 
been  placed  at  the  disposition  of  the  Peruvians  by  order 
of  Admiral  Lynch. 

On  June  23,  1881,  the  Government  presided  over  by 
Dr  Calderon  was  formally  recognised  by  the  United 
States,  and  for  a time  matters  appeared  to  be  in  a fair 
way  towards  the  reconstruction  of  a National  Adminis- 
tration. The  stumbling-block  proved  to  be  the  action 
of  the  Congress  in  refusing  authorisation  to  the  President 
to  agree  to  terms  of  peace  with  Chile  which  were  based 
on  a permanent  alienation  of  any  section  of  Peruvian 
territory,  and  the  Congress  was  dissolved  on  August  23, 
leaving  President  Calderon  without  authority  to  treat 
with  Chile.  In  September,  1881,  Admiral  Lynch  sus- 
pected Dr  Calderon  of  intriguing  with  the  scattered 
Peruvian  forces  in  the  interior  of  the  country  for  further 
resistance  against  the  Chilians,  and  also  of  endeavouring 


1881]  THE  CALDERON  ADMINISTRATION  495 


to  induce  the  United  States  to  intervene  between  Peru 
and  Chile.  Whether  these  suspicions  were  confirmed  or 
not  subsequently  has  never  been  made  clear,  but  acting 
on  them  the  Admiral  caused  the  Calderon  Administra- 
tion to  be  disbanded,  and  the  President  exiled  to  Chile 
as  a person  dangerous  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order. 
In  these  circumstances  Admiral  Montero,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  he  had  been  chosen  Vice-President  under 
Calderon,  arrogated  to  himself  the  position  of  President 
of  Peru,  and  in  August  he  proceeded  to  Arequipa,  where 
the  Peruvians  were  still  in  possession,  and  there  formed 
a government.  His  first  ministry  consisted  of  Captain 
Camilo  Carrillo,  Minister  of  Interior;  Dr  del  Valle, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs ; Dr  Epifanio  Serpe,  Minister 
of  Justice  ; Dr  Oviedo,  Minister  of  Finance  ; and  Colonel 
Manuel  Velarde,  Minister  of  War.  This  Government, 
although  not  recognised  by  Chile,  was  accepted  by  the 
Peruvians,  the  more  readily  as  Senor  Pierola  had 
resigned  his  powers  to  an  Assembly  convoked  by  him 
at  Ayacucho  on  July  28,  1881.  The  delegates  then  pro- 
claimed the  former  Supreme  Chief  as  Provisional  Presi- 
dent ; but,  on  November  28,  Pierola  again  resigned,  and 
leaving  Peru  retired  into  private  life. 

Many  unexpected  complications  arose  during  1882 
to  prevent  Chile  from  obtaining  the  desired  treaty  of 
peace  to  enable  her  to  withdraw  the  army  of  occupation. 
In  the  mountainous  districts  of  the  interior  to  the  east 
of  Lima  the  remnants  of  the  Peruvian  forces  had  been 
collected  by  Colonel  Andres  Caceres,  and  a guerilla 
warfare  Avas  initiated  against  all  isolated  Chilian  detach- 
ments that  could  be  attacked  Avith  a fair  prospect  of 
success.  The  presence  of  these  groups  of  armed  men 
necessitated  constant  small  expeditions  of  Chilian  troops 
to  the  interior  of  the  country,  and  tended  to  a condition 
of  uneasiness  militating  against  Chilian  interests. 
loAvards  the  close  of  the  year  the  position  Avas  rendered 
still  more  difficult  by  the  concentration  of  a Peruvian 
force  of  5000  men  at  Arequipa,  where  a supply  of  arms 
and  ammunition  was  obtained  through  Bolivia,  whose 


496  THE  CHILI  AN-PERU  VLAN  WAR 


Government  bought  war  material  in  Buenos  Aires, 
conveying  it  by  way  of  La  Paz  and  Lake  Titicaca  to 
Admiral  Montero.  When  1883  opened,  there  appeared 
no  better  prospect  of  a settlement  between  Chile  and 
Peru  than  immediately  after  the  capture  of  Lima. 

Admiral  Lynch  was  not  easily  daunted,  and  he 
determined  to  act  so  energetically  against  the  armed 
groups  in  the  interior  and  the  Administration  at 
Arequipa  as  to  convince  the  Peruvians  of  the  futility  of 
further  resistance.  Detachments  of  troops  were 
despatched  against  the  guerilla  bands  of  Colonel 
Caceres,  with  instructions  to  allow  them  no  rest  until 
they  were  crushed,  and  these  orders  were  resolutely 
carried  out.  Against  the  Peruvians  at  Arequipa 
stronger  measures  were  necessary,  and  a well-equipped 
expedition  was  prepared  to  attack  the  district ; the 
troops  detailed  for  these  operations  were  embarked  at 
Callao  in  July,  1883,  and  reached  their  destination  early 
in  the  following  month,  when  a series  of  skirmishes  at 
Huamachuco  and  elsewhere  occurred,  in  which  the 
Peruvians  were  worsted,  Arequipa  was  captured,  and 
the  Administration  of  Admiral  Montero  broken  up,  and 
Admiral  Lynch  then  determined  to  make  another  effort 
to  bring  the  Peruvians  to  listen  to  proposals  for  a treaty 
of  peace.  For  this  purpose  he  turned  to  General 
Iglesias,  the  officer  who  had  commanded  the  division  on 
the  hill  of  Morro  Solar  on  January  13,  1881. 

General  Iglesias  held  more  common-sense  views  on 
the  subject  of  making  peace  than  his  compatriots  in  the 
central  and  southern  sections  of  Peru,  and  previous  to 
the  overtures  made  by  the  Chilian  Commander-in-chief 
he  had  called  a convention  of  his  fellow-countrymen  in 
the  northern  districts  to  discuss  the  advisability  of  some 
arrangement,  no  matter  at  what  sacrifice,  to  ensure  the 
speedy  retirement  of  the  Chilians  from  Lima  and  the 
central  districts.  The  majority  of  the  people  in  the 
north  was  in  favour  of  a policy  that  would  restore  the 
National  Capital  to  them,  even  if  this  entailed  the 
permanent  alienation  of  Tarapaca  ; and  when,  in  August, 


1883]  ADMINISTRATION  OF  IGLESIAS  497 


1883,  a proposal  was  made  by  Admiral  Lynch  to 
General  Iglesias  to  organise  a National  Government 
with  which  the  Chilian  authorities  could  treat  it  was 
favourably  received,  and  an  Administration  was  formed 
by  Iglesias  with  the  co-operation  of  his  friends.  Chilian 
support  was  extended  to  the  new  Government,  and 
early  in  October  matters  had  so  far  advanced  that  the 
basis  of  a treaty  of  peace  between  Chile  and  Peru  was 
discussed.  Shortly  afterwards  the  conditions  were 
formally  accepted,  and  on  October  23,  1883,  they  were 
signed  provisionally  by  the  representatives  of  the  two 
Governments.  It  was  the  only  course  Peru  could 
adopt  at  the  time  to  ensure  the  departure  of  the  Chilian 
army,  and  it  was  undeserving  of  the  bitter  opposition 
shown  by  Colonel  Caceres  and  his  followers  and  by  the 
supporters  of  Montero. 

The  terms  of  the  treaty  did  not  differ  greatly  from 
the  conditions  proposed  by  the  Chilian  representatives 
at  the  abortive  peace  conference  held  on  the  Lackawana 
in  the  harbour  of  Arica  on  October  6,  1880  ; but  certain 
modifications  were  made  in  view  of  the  existing  financial 
condition  of  Peru,  the  principal  being  the  reduction  of 
the  Chilian  claim  for  a money  indemnity,  otherwise  the 
basis  of  the  negotiations,  especially  in  regard  to  the 
absolute  cession  to  Chile  of  Tarapaca  and  the  temporary 
occupation  of  Tacna  and  Arica,  remained  unchanged. 
The  wording  of  the  treaty  is  important,  as  it  has  been  a 
political  factor  ever  since  in  both  countries  and  must 
continue  to  be  the  keynote  of  the  situation  for  some 
time  to  come.  This  document,  known  as  the  Treaty  of 
Ancon,  reads  : — 

TREATY  OF  PEACE  AND  FRIENDSHIP  BETWEEN  THE 
REPUBLICS  OF  CHILE  AND  PERU. 

The  Republic  of  Chile  on  the  one  part,  and  the  Republic  of  Peru 
on  the  other,  wishing  to  establish  friendly  relations  between  the  two 
nations,  have  determined  to  celebrate  a Treaty  of  peace  and  friend- 
ship, and  with  this  object  have  named  and  appointed  their  pleni- 
potentiaries, to  wit : — 

His  Excellency  the  President  of  Chile  appoints  Senor  Jovino 

2 i 


THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


498 

Novoa,  and  His  Excellency  the  President  of  Peru  nominates  Senor 
Jose  Antonio  Lavalle,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  Senor  Mariano 
Castro  Zaldivar.  The  before-mentioned  plenipotentiaries,  after 
having  shown  their  full  powers  and  authority,  and  these  being  in  due 
and  correct  form,  have  agreed  upon  the  following  articles : — 

Article  1.?/. — Relations  of  peace  and  friendship  are  re-established 
between  the  Republics  of  Chile  and  Peru. 

Article  2nd. — The  Republic  of  Peru  cedes  to  the  Republic  of  Chile, 
perpetually  and  unconditionally,  the  territory  of  the  coast  province  of 
Tarapaca,  the  limits  of  which  are  : — On  the  north,  the  valley  and  river 
of  Camarones  ; on  the  south,  the  valley  and  river  of  Loa  ; on  the  east, 
the  Republic  of  Bolivia ; and  on  the  west,  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Article  3rd. — The  territory  of  the  provinces  of  Tacna  and  Arica, 
limited  on  the  north  by  the  river  Sama,  from  its  origin  in  the  Andes 
coterminous  with  Bolivia  to  its  mouth  where  it  flows  into  the  Pacific 
Ocean  ; on  the  south,  by  the  valley  and  river  Camarones  ; on  the  east, 
by  the  Republic  of  Bolivia ; and  on  the  west,  by  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
shall  remain  in  the  possession  of  Chile,  subject  to  Chilian  laws  and 
authorities,  during  the  term  of  ten  years,  to  be  counted  from  the  date 
of  the  ratification  of  the  present  Treaty  of  Peace.  The  term  having 
expired,  a plebiscite  shall  decide  by  popular  vote  if  the  territory  of 
these  provinces  shall  remain  definitely  under  the  dominion  and 
sovereignty  of  Chile,  or  if  they  shall  continue  to  form  part  of  the 
territory  of  Peru.  The  Government  of  the  country  in  whose  favour 
the  provinces  of  Tacna  and  Arica  shall  be  annexed  shall  pay  to  the 
other  ten  millions  of  dollars  ($10,000,000)  Chilian  silver  money  or 
Peruvian  soles,  of  equal  percentage  of  fine  silver  and  of  equal  weight 
as  the  former.  A special  protocol,  which  shall  be  considered  an 
integral  part  of  the  present  Treaty,  shall  establish  the  form  in  which 
the  plebiscite  shall  take  place,  and  the  terms  and  conditions  in  which 
the  ten  millions  of  dollars  shall  be  paid  by  the  nation  remaining  in 
possession  of  Tacna  and  Arica. 

Article  4 th. — In  conformity  with  the  disposition  of  the  Supreme 
Decree  of  February  9,  1882,  by  which  the  Government  of  Chile 
authorised  the  sale  of  a million  tons  of  guano,  the  net  product  of  this 
substance,  after  deducting  all  expenses,  as  indicated  in  Article  13  of 
the  said  Decree,  shall  be  divided  in  equal  parts  between  the  Govern- 
ment of  Chile  and  the  creditors  of  Peru  whose  titles  of  credit  appear 
to  be  based  upon  the  security  of  guano.  On  the  termination  of  the 
sale  of  the  million  tons  referred  to,  the  Government  of  Chile  will 
continue  delivering  to  the  creditors  of  Peru  the  50  per  cent,  of  the 
net  proceeds  of  guano  sold,  as  laid  down  in  Article  13  of  the  before- 
mentioned  Decree,  until  the  debt  of  the  creditors  is  wholly  paid  or 
the  guano  deposits  in  actual  exploitation  are  exhausted.  The  product 
of  the  guano  deposits  that  may  be  discovered  in  the  future  in  the 
territories  ceded  to  Chile  shall  belong  exclusively  to  the  Chilian 
Government. 

Article  5th. — If  deposits  of  guano  be  discovered  in  the  territories 


1883] 


499 


XiiEATY  OF  ANCON 

remaining  under  the  dominion  of  Peru,  both  Governments  in  common 
accord,  in  order  to  avoid  competition  in  the  sale  of  this  substance, 
shall  previously  determine  the  proportions  and  conditions  under 
which  each  shall  dispose  of  this  fertiliser.  This  stipulation  shall  also 
refer  to  the  existence  of  guano  already  discovered  that  may  remain  on 
the  Lobos  Islands  at  the  time  of  the  delivery  of  these  islands  to  Peru, 
in  conformity  with  Article  9 of  the  present  Treaty. 

Article  6 tk. — The  creditors  of  Peru  to  whom  the  concessions 
referred  to  in  Article  4 are  made  shall  submit,  for  the  due  qualifica- 
tions of  their  titles  and  other  proceedings,  to  the  regulations  estab- 
lished by  the  Supreme  Decree  of  February  9,  1882. 

Article  1th. — The  obligation  accepted  by  the  Government  of  Chile 
under  Article  4,  of  delivering  50  per  cent,  of  the  net  product  of  guano 
from  the  deposits  actually  in  exploitation,  shall  hold  good  if  the 
extraction  takes  place  in  conformity  with  the  existing  contract  based 
on  the  sale  of  one  million  of  tons,  or  if  it  be  effected  by  virtue  of 
another  contract  for  the  exclusive  account  of  the  Government  of 
Chile. 

Article  8 tk. — Except  in  virtue  of  the  declarations  specified  in  the 
preceding  Articles,  and  of  the  obligations  the  Government  of  Chile 
has  spontaneously  accepted  under  the  Supreme  Decree  of  March  28, 
1882,  regulating  the  nitrate  property  of  Tarapaca,  the  aforesaid 
Government  of  Chile  will  recognise  no  claims  of  any  class  affecting 
the  new  territories  acquired  by  the  present  Treaty,  whatever  may  be 
their  nature  and  antecedents. 

Article  9th. — The  Lobos  Islands  will  continue  to  be  administered 
by  the  Government  of  Chile  until  the  existing  guano  deposits  have 
furnished  one  million  tons  of  guano,  as  stipulated  by  Articles  4 and  7. 
When  the  million  tons  have  been  extracted,  the  islands  will  be 
returned  to  Peru. 

Article  1(M. — The  Government  of  Chile  declares  that  there  shall 
be  ceded  to  Peru,  from  the  day  that  the  present  Treaty  shall  be 
constitutionally  ratified  and  exchanged,  the  50  per  cent,  corresponding 
to  that  Republic  from  the  product  of  the  guano  from  the  Lobos 
Islands. 

Article  IK/*. — While  no  special  treaty  is  made,  the  mercantile 
relations  between  the  two  countries  shall  subsist  in  the  same  status  as 
existed  before  April  5,  1879. 

Article  12 th. — The  indemnity  owing  by  Peru  to  Chilians  who  have 
suffered  damages  on  account  of  the  war  shall  be  determined  by  a 
tribunal  of  arbitration,  or  by  a mixed  international  commission, 
immediately  after  the  ratification  of  the  present  Treaty,  and  in  the 
form  established  for  the  conventions  recently  agreed  upon  between 
Chile  and  the  Governments  of  England,  France,  and  Italy. 

Article  13 th. — The  contracting  Governments  recognise  and  accept 
the  validity  of  all  administrative  acts  and  judicial  sentences  made  and 
passed  during  the  occupation  of  Peru,  derived  from  martial  law' 
exercised  by  the  Govei'nment  of  Chile. 


500  THE  CHILI AN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


Article  14 Ik. — The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  and  the 
ratifications  exchanged  in  the  city  of  Lima  as  soon  as  possible,  and 
within  a maximum  period  of  one  hundred  and  sixty  days  counting 
from  this  date. 

In  proof  of  which,  the  respective  plenipotentiaries  have  signed  and 
sealed  it  with  their  private  seals. 

Dated  at  Lima,  the  twentieth  day  of  October,  in  the  year  of  our 
Lord  One  thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-three. 

Jovino  Novoa. 

J.  A.  Lavalle. 

Mariano  Castro  Zaldivar. 


While  this  treaty  between  Chile  and  the  Govern- 
ment established  by  General  Iglesias  was  opposed  by 
the  irreconcilable  section  of  Peruvians,  it  was  considered 
by  the  Chilian  authorities  as  sufficiently  binding  to 
meet  the  exigencies  of  the  case,  and  preparations  were 
commenced  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  of  occupa- 
tion. On  October  22,  1883,  the  city  of  Lima  was 
evacuated,  and  the  troops  embarked  for  Chile  as  rapidly 
as  circumstances  permitted ; but  a force  of  5000  men 
was  retained  in  camp  at  Chorillos  pending  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty  by  the  Chilian  and  Peruvian 
legislatures,  and  also  to  support  the  Administration  of 
President  Iglesias  until  the  ratification  was  an  accom- 
plished fact.  The  treaty  finally  was  ratified  on  May  8, 
1884,  and  a few  weeks  later  the  last  of  the  Chilian 
troops  sailed  from  Peru  on  their  homeward  journey — 
five  years  and  three  months  after  the  declaration  of  war 
in  1879. 

While  the  Treaty  of  Ancon  brought  the  war  with 
Peru  to  an  end,  there  remained  the  question  with 
Bolivia.  Negotiations  had  been  opened  in  1882  for 
concluding  a permanent  peace  with  that  country,  but 
were  abortive  in  consequence  of  the  insistence  of  the 
Bolivian  Government  that  Chile  should  treat  simultane- 
ously with  Peru  and  Bolivia  in  the  matter.  A second 
attempt  to  bring  about  an  understanding  with  Bolivia 
proved  equally  futile,  on  account  of  the  Government  of 
the  latter  country  imposing  the  condition  that  Chile 
should  recognise  the  Administration  of  Admiral 


1884]  CHILIAN  AND  BOLIVIAN  TRUCE  501 


Montero  in  Peru.  After  the  Treaty  of  Ancon  the 
Bolivian  Government  took  a more  sensible  view  of 
the  situation,  and  in  December,  1884,  a special  mission, 
consisting  of  Senor  Belisario  Salinas  and  Sehor  Boeto, 
was  despatched  to  Santiago  to  open  negotiations.  The 
envoys  demanded  the  territories  of  Tacna  and  Arica 
for  Bolivia  in  compensation  for  the  coast  region  now 
held  by  Chile ; but  to  this  proposition  the  Chilian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  the  territory  in 
question  was  not  the  absolute  property  of  Chile,  and, 
therefore,  could  not  be  ceded  to  a third  party.  As  the 
Bolivian  representatives  insisted  in  their  demands,  the 
Minister  stated  that  apparently  it  was  impossible  at 
present  to  conclude  a treaty  of  peace  on  terms  satis- 
factory to  the  two  Governments,  and  he  suggested  that 
a truce  should  be  drawn  up  and  formulated  in  order  to 
place  relations  on  a better  footing  and  bring  about  a 
definite  cessation  of  hostilities  until  a more  opportune 
occasion  arrived  to  reopen  the  negotiations  for  a treaty 
of  peace.  After  some  discussion  the  Bolivian  envoys 
consented  to  this  suggestion,  and  what  has  been  known 
since  as  the  “ Pacto  de  Tregua  ” was  signed  on  April  4, 
1884.  The  text  of  this  compact  reads  : — 

AGREEMENT  OF  TRUCE  BETWEEN  CHILE  AND  BOLIVIA. 

Until  the  opportunity  of  celebrating  a definite  Treaty  of  Peace 
between  the  Republics  of  Chile  and  Bolivia  shall  arise,  both  these 
nations  duly  represented,  the  former  by  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  Senor  Anicleto  Vergai'a  Albano,  and  the  latter  by  Senor 
Belisario  Salinas  and  Senor  Boeto,  have  agreed  to  an  Agreement  of 
Truce  on  the  undermentioned  basis  : — 

1.  The  Republics  of  Chile  and  Bolivia  celebrate  an  indefinite 
truce,  and,  in  consequence,  they  declare  the  state  of  war  terminated, 
and  that  the  same  cannot  be  again  carried  on  unless  one  of  the 
contracting  parties  notifies  the  other  with  at  least  one  year  of 
anticipation  of  its  determination  to  resume  hostilities.  In  such  case 
the  notification  shall  be  made  directly,  or  through  the  diplomatic 
representative  of  a friendly  nation. 

2.  The  Republic  of  Chile,  during  the  period  this  Agreement  is  in 
force,  shall  continue  to  govern  according  to  Chilian  law  the  terri- 
tories situated  between  53°  S.  and  the  mouth  of  the  river  Loa,  these 


502  THE  CHILIAN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


territories  being  bounded  on  the  east  by  a line  drawn  from  Zapalegui 
from  the  intersection  of  the  frontier  of  the  Argentine  Republic  to  the 
volcano  of  Licancaur.  From  this  point  the  boundary  extends  to  the 
summit  of  the  extinct  volcano  Cabana,  thence  in  a direct  line  to  the 
spring  of  water  found  to  the  south  of  Lake  Ascotan,  and  from  this 
point  the  limit  will  be  a straight  line  terminating  on  the  volcano  oi 
Ollagua.  From  Ollagua  the  divisional  line  shall  run  to  the  volcano 
of  Tua,  thence  joining  the  frontier  between  Tarapaca  and  Bolivia. 
In  case  of  difficulties  arising,  both  parties  shall  appoint  a commission 
of  engineers  to  fix  the  limits  as  herein  indicated  by  the  landmarks 
described. 

3.  The  property  and  goods  confiscated  from  Chilian  citizens  by 
Government  edict,  or  by  the  order  of  civil  and  military  authorities, 
shall  be  immediately  returned  to  their  owners  or  representatives,  and 
the  products  the  Government  of  Bolivia  may  have  received  from 
these  properties  shall  also  be  returned  upon  the  necessary  proofs 
being  submitted.  The  damages  suffered  by  Chilians  shall  be  indem- 
nified upon  good  and  sufficient  proof  of  the  extent  ot  the  injury  being 
brought  before  the  notice  of  the  Bolivian  Government. 

4.  If  no  settlement  can  be  reached  by  the  Bolivian  Government 
and  the  injured  parties  in  respect  to  the  amount  of  indemnity  to  be 
awarded,  the  disputes  shall  be  submitted  to  a commission  of  arbitration 
composed  of  three  members,  one  named  by  Chile,  one  by  Bolivia, 
the  third  selected  by  Chile  from  the  representatives  of  foreign  nations 
resident  in  Chile. 

5.  Commercial  relations  shall  be  re-established  between  Chile  and 
Bolivia.  In  future  raw  material  produced  in  Chile  and  articles  manu- 
factured in  that  Republic  shall  enter  Bolivia  free  of  all  duties  or 
custom-house  dues ; and  Bolivian  productions  of  the  same  class  and 
manufactured  on  the  same  terms  shall  enjoy  a like  freedom  in  Chile 
on  their  importation  and  exportation  through  a Chilian  port.  The 
commercial  freedom  of  Chilian  and  Bolivian  manufactures  and  the 
enumeration  of  these  products  shall  be  the  subject  of  a special 
protocol.  Nationalised  merchandise  entering  through  the  port  of 
Arica  shall  be  considered  as  foreign  merchandise  for  purposes  of 
custom-house  entry.  Foreign  merchandise  introduced  into  Bolivia 
via  Antofagasta  shall  have  free  passage,  but  subject  to  such  measures 
as  Chile  may  adopt  to  check  smuggling.  Until  a special  convention 
is  made,  Chile  and  Bolivia  shall  enjoy  the  commercial  advantages  and 
freedom  that  either  nation  accords  to  the  most  favoured  nation. 

6.  At  the  port  of  Arica  foreign  merchandise  shall,  even  when 
entered  for  consumption  in  Bolivia,  pay  the  duties  in  force  under  the 
Chilian  tai-iff,  and  this  merchandise  shall  not  pay  any  further  duties 
in  the  interior.  The  sums  received  in  payment  of  these  duties  shall 
be  distributed  as  follows: — 25  per  cent,  shall  be  applied  as  duties 
received  for  goods  to  be  consumed  in  the  territories  of  Tacna  and 
Arica,  and  to  defray  the  cost  of  custom-house  administration,  the 
remaining  75  per  cent,  shall  be  for  account  of  Bolivia.  This  75  per 


1884]  CONDITIONS  OF  THE  TRUCE 


503 

cent,  shall  be  distributed  in  the  following  manner : — 40  units  of  the 
total  shall  be  retained  by  the  Chilian  Administration  to  liquidate  the 
claims  for  which  Bolivia  may  be  responsible  under  Article  3 of  this 
Agreement,  and  for  the  amortisation  of  the  Bolivian  loan  raised  in 
Chile  in  1867  ; the  remainder  shall  be  handed  over  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  Bolivia  in  cash  or  drafts  to  its  order.  The  loan  of  1867 
shall  be  considered  in  regard  to  payment  as  being  on  equal  footing 
with  the  sums  due  for  damages  caused  during  the  war  to  personal 
property.  The  Bolivian  Government  when  it  thinks  proper  is  at 
liberty  to  examine  through  its  agents  the  accounts  of  the  Arica 
custom-house.  As  soon  as  the  indemnity  specified  in  Article  3 has 
been  paid,  and  the  motive  for  the  retention  of  the  40  units  ceases, 
Bolivia  is  at  liberty  to  establish  custom-houses  in  the  interior  of  her 
territory  if  such  a course  be  considered  fit.  In  the  event  of  this 
being  done,  foreign  merchandise  imported  via  Arica  will  be  permitted 
free  passage  at  that  port. 

7.  Any  acts  of  the  subaltern  authorities  of  either  nation  that  tend 
to  alter  the  situation  formed  by  the  present  Agreement  of  Truce, 
especially  where  they  may  concern  the  limits  of  the  territory  in 
Chilian  occupation,  shall  be  suppressed  and  punished  at  the  official 
request  of  the  respective  Governments. 

8.  As  the  object  of  the  contracting  parties  in  celebrating  this 
Agreement  of  Truce  is  to  prepare  and  facilitate  the  way  for  a solid 
and  stable  Treaty  of  Peace  between  the  two  Republics,  they  promise 
to  reciprocally  act  in  a manner  conducive  to  that  end. 

This  Agreement  shall  be  ratified  by  the  Government  of  Bolivia 
within  the  term  of  forty  days,  and  the  ratifications  exchanged  at 
Santiago  during  the  coming  month  of  June. 

In  proof  of  which  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Chile  and 
the  Plenipotentiaries  of  Bolivia  who  showed  their  respective 
authorisation  and  powers,  signed  in  duplicate  the  present  Agreement 
of  Truce  at  Valparaiso,  on  the  fourth  of  April,  in  the  year  One 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  eighty-four. 


A.  Vergara  Albano. 
Belisario  Salinas. 
Belisario  Boeto. 


The  various  points  stipulated  having  been  subse- 
quently regulated  by  a protocol,  the  ratifications  of  this 
agreement  of  truce  were  exchanged  in  Santiago  on 
November  29,  1884.  This  agreement  is  not  only 
important  as  formally  terminating  hostilities,  but  also 
as  having  a direct  bearing  on  the  long-standing  dispute 
which  has  now  reached  an  acute  stage. 

The  result  of  the  struggle  brought  about  by  the 


501  THE  CHILI  AN-PERUVIAN  WAR 


intrigues  of  Peru  in  Bolivia  was  a complete  reversal  of 
the  expectations  with  which  South  America  generally 
had  viewed  the  approach  of  the  conflict  in  1879.  The 
strength  of  Chile  by  land  and  sea  was  then  unknown, 
and  hardly  even  suspected,  by  the  two  countries  which 
dared  her  to  go  to  war  or  lose  all  the  privileges  she 
claimed  for  Chilian  capital  and  labour  in  the  Atacama 
districts.  The  outcome  of  the  conflict  left  Peru  in  a 
condition  of  economic  collapse  and  financial  ruin,  both 
in  regard  to  public  resources  and  private  enterprise, 
and  Bolivia  lost  her  maritime  territory  and  became 
isolated  in  the  interior  of  South  America.  Chile 
enlarged  her  dominion  and  obtained  control  of  districts 
that  offered  an  immediate  rich  return  to  compensate 
her  for  her  sacrifices,  and  provided  a permanent  outlet 
for  capital  and  industry  which  assured  great  additional 
wealth  to  her  people,  and  she  won  for  herself  recogni- 
tion as  the  paramount  military  and  naval  power  on  the 
west  coast  of  South  America. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 


PERU 

Constitution  of  1860.  President  San  Roman.  Revolution  against 
Pezet.  Dispute  with  Spain.  Squadron  under  Admiral  Pinzon. 
Incident  at  Talambo.  Memorandum  of  Spanish  Commissioner. 
The  Chincha  Islands.  Action  of  Bolivia,  Chile,  and  Ecuador. 
Loss  of  the  Triunfo.  Treaty  between  Peru  and  Spain.  Pezet 
driven  from  Office.  War  with  Spain.  Capture  of  the  Covadonga. 
Suicide  of  Spanish  Admiral.  Naval  Fight  near  Abtao.  Bombard- 
ment of  Callao.  Withdrawal  of  Spanish  Squadron.  Dictatorship 
of  Prado.  Revision  of  Constitution.  Prado  proclaimed  President. 
Revolution  against  Prado.  Reforms  of  1867.  Election  of 
Colonel  Balta.  Financial  Embarrassments.  The  Dreyfus  Con- 
tract. Railway  Construction.  Presidential  Candidates  in  1872. 
The  Gutierrez  Conspiracy.  Death  of  Colonel  Silvestre  Gutierrez. 
Assassination  of  Balta.  Death  of  Colonel  Tomas  Gutierrez. 
Presidency  of  Manuel  Pardo.  Economic  Conditions.  Revolu- 
tionary Attempts  of  Pierola.  Foreign  Policy.  Alliance  with 
Bolivia.  Election  of  Prado.  Revolutionary  Outbreak.  The 
Huascar  and  the  Shah  and  Amethyst.  Treaty  with  Spain.  Murder 
of  Pardo.  Complications  with  Chile.  Outbreak  of  Hostilities. 
President  Prado  commands  the  Army.  The  President  abandons 
Peru.  Revolution  under  Pierola.  Fighting  in  Lima.  Pierola 
proclaimed  Supreme  Chief.  Occupation  of  Lima.  Pierola  leaves 
Peru.  Administration  of  Iglesias.  Revolution  under  Caceres. 
Insurgents  attack  Lima.  Second  Assault  on  Lima.  Iglesias 
Resigns.  Election  of  Caceres.  Quiet  Conditions.  Economic 
Crisis.  Presidency  of  Bermudez.  Death  of  Bermudez.  Colonel 
Borgono  assumes  Office.  Revolutionary  Rising.  Chambers 
Dissolved.  Caceres  again  President.  Spread  of  Revolution. 
Pierola  attacks  Lima.  Caceres  Defeated.  Provisional  Adminis- 
tration. Pierola  Elected.  Insurrection  at  Iquitos.  Reforms 
under  Pierola.  Revolution  in  1898.  Election  of  Romaha. 
International  Questions. 

For  the  first  four  decades  after  the  proclamation  of 
independence  in  1821,  Peru  was  a prey  to  internal 

505 


506 


PERU 


disturbances,  which  checked  economic  development  and 
material  prosperity.  In  1860,  during  the  presidency  of 
General  Castilla,  a reform  of  the  Law  of  Constitution 
was  effected,  and  under  its  statutes  the  Government 
has  since  been  conducted. 

In  1862  the  election  to  the  presidency  of  General 
San  Roman  took  place,  and  was  formally  ratified  by 
Congress  in  October  of  that  year,  but  the  President 
only  survived  his  inauguration  a few  months,  dying  on 
April  3,  1863.  The  first  Vice-President  was  General 
Pezet,  at  the  time  absent  in  Europe,  and,  pending  his 
return,  the  presidential  duties  were  discharged  by 
General  Canseco  in  virtue  of  his  position,  as  second 
Vice-President.  In  August,  1863,  General  Pezet  arrived 
and  assumed  control  of  public  affairs,  continuing  at  the 
head  of  the  Administration  until  1865,  but  in  this  latter 
year  he  was  deposed  and  obliged  to  fly  the  country  in 
consequence  of  a revolutionary  movement  initiated  by 
General  Prado  and  actively  supported  by  General 
Canseco. 

The  motive  alleged  by  Prado  and  Canseco  for  the 
revolt  against  Pezet  was  his  vacillating  policy  in  the 
dispute  with  Spain,  which  reached  an  acute  stage  in 
1864,  finally  leading  to  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  between 
the  two  countries.  In  1860  certain  claims  were  put 
forward  by  a group  of  Peruvians  who  held  bonds  of  the 
debt  contracted  in  the  Spanish  colonial  period,  and  who, 
through  the  influence  of  the  authorities  in  Madrid, 
hoped  to  obtain  recognition  of  these  obligations  by  the 
Peruvian  Government.  While  the  question  was  under 
discussion,  a Spanish  naval  squadron  commanded  by 
Rear-Admiral  Pinzbn  was  despatched  to  the  west  coast 
of  South  America,  nominally  for  scientific  purposes  and 
exploration,  which  arrived  in  Peruvian  waters  in  1863. 
This  was  considered  a menace  by  the  authorities,  and 
the  relations  between  the  two  Governments  became 
strained.  The  situation  was  complicated  further  by  an 
unfortunate  affair  which  occurred  near  Talambo  in  the 
Province  of  Chiclayo.  In  the  locality  was  a settlement 


1863] 


SPAIN  AND  PERU 


507 


of  Spanish  Basques,  and  a quarrel  arose  between  these 
settlers  and  some  Peruvians,  resulting  in  a fight  in  which 
a Basque  and  a Peruvian  were  killed.  A demand  from 
Madrid  for  immediate  satisfaction  accentuated  the  exist- 
ing hostility  between  the  two  Governments. 

A special  Commissioner,  under  the  title  of  Comisario 
regio,  was  now  sent  from  Madrid  to  investigate  the 
Talambo  affair.  The  Peruvian  authorities  declined  to 
receive  this  representative  unless  the  nature  of  his 
mission  was  clearly  defined,  and  Senor  Eusebio  Salazar  y 
Mazarredo,  the  Commissioner,  presented  a memorandum 
in  which  it  was  stated  that  no  treaty  of  peace  existed 
between  Spain  and  Peru ; that  the  former  country  con- 
sidered the  truce  in  force  at  an  end ; and  Spain  further 
claimed  the  right  to  regain  possession  of  her  lost  colony 
if  such  policy  was  deemed  advisable.  This  note  occa- 
sioned intense  indignation  in  Peru,  and  when  on  April 
14,  1864,  the  Spanish  squadron  took  possession  of  the 
Chincha  Islands  the  cry  for  war  was  everywhere  popular. 
Moreover,  Chile,  Ecuador,  and  Bolivia,  alarmed  at  the 
attitude  assumed  by  Spain,  gave  the  Peruvians  assur- 
ance of  active  support  in  event  of  hostilities  breaking  out. 
Soon  after  the  occupation  of  the  Chincha  Islands  a dis- 
agreement took  place  between  the  Spanish  Commissioner 
and  Admiral  Pinzon,  and  resulted  in  Senor  Salazar  y 
Mazarredo  returning  to  Europe. 

The  Government  of  Spain  now  showed  an  inclination 
to  draw  back  from  extreme  measures,  and  Lima  was 
notified  that  both  Commissioner  and  Admiral  had 
exceeded  instructions,  and  that  the  seizure  of  the 
Chincha  Islands  was  not  approved  in  Madrid.  Admiral 
Pinzon  was  relieved,  and  his  command  transferred  to 
Admiral  Jose  Manuel  Pareja.  The  accidental  destruc- 
tion of  the  warship  Triunfo  by  fire  reduced  the  Spanish 
naval  forces  in  Peruvian  waters  to  the  frigate  Resolution 
and  the  gunboat  Covadonga.  Matters  now  assumed  a 
more  pacific  aspect,  and  negotiations  were  begun  for  a 
settlement  of  the  dispute.  General  Vivanco  was 
nominated  by  President  Pezet  to  treat  with  Admiral 


508 


PERU 


Pareja ; after  lengthy  discussion  a treaty  was  celebrated, 
providing  for  the  evacuation  of  the  Chincha  Islands  by 
the  Spaniards  on  condition  that  Peru  defrayed  the  cost 
of  the  Spanish  expedition  and  became  responsible  for 
the  bonds  of  the  former  colonial  debt.  Congress  was 
not  in  session  when  this  treaty  was  made,  nor  was  it 
called  together  to  consider  the  arrangement,  and  the 
document  was  signed  on  January  27,  1865.  On  the 
same  day,  it  was  ratified  by  President  Pezet. 

When  the  conditions  of  this  agreement  with  Spain 
were  made  public  there  was  pronounced  dissatisfaction 
with  the  Administration,  and  these  hostile  symptoms 
ripened  into  a determination  to  oust  the  President  from 
office.  On  February  28  the  standard  of  revolt  was 
raised  by  General  Prado  in  the  city  of  Araquipa,  and 
from  all  sections  of  the  country  people  flocked  to  join 
the  movement.  By  the  end  of  June  a formidable  army 
had  been  organised  to  attack  Lima,  where  Pezet  had 
concentrated  all  his  available  strength.  The  revolu- 
tionary forces  were  designated  the  Ejercito  restaurador 
de  la  honra  national,  the  leaders  expressing  the  intention 
of  leaving  no  stone  unturned  to  cancel  the  treaty  with 
Spain,  and  proclaiming  General  Canseco,  the  second 
Vice-President  of  the  Republic,  the  head  of  the  National 
Government.  In  October  a rapid  march  was  made 
towards  Lima,  and  on  November  6,  1865,  the  National 
Capital  was  captured,  President  Pezet  seeking  refuge 
on  board  a British  warship  anchored  off  Callao. 

The  control  of  public  affairs  was  offered  to  General 
Canseco  by  the  victorious  revolutionary  army,  but  was 
declined.  In  these  circumstances  public  opinion 
favoured  the  nomination  of  General  Prado,  and  on 
November  8,  1865,  he  assumed  direction  of  the 

Government.  Arrangements  were  made  with  Chile  for 
an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  on  December  5,  1865, 
and  similar  action  was  taken  in  regard  to  Ecuador  and 
Bolivia.  On  January  14,  1866,  war  against  Spain  was 
declared,  and  the  Peruvian  squadron,  reinforced  by  the 
newly  acquired  corvettes  Union  and  America,  was 


1865] 


VALPARAISO  BOMBARDED 


500 


ordered  to  attack  the  Spanish  vessels.  The  latter 
comprised  the  Resolution,  the  Villa  de  Madrid,  the 
Numancia,  the  Berenguela,  and  the  Blanca,  the  four  last- 
named  ships  having  arrived  recently  from  Spain.  The 
Covadonga  had  been  captured  in  January  by  the  Chilian 
man-of-war  Esmeralda,  and  her  loss  had  preyed  so 
greatly  on  the  mind  of  Admiral  Pareja  that  he  com- 
mitted suicide,  his  place  being  taken  by  Captain  Castro 
Mendez  Nunez.  On  February  6 the  Spanish  squadron 
attacked  the  Peruvian  and  Chilian  vessels  in  the  vicinity 
of  Abtao  ; but  it  was  beaten  off  after  two  hours’  fighting, 
and  the  Spanish  Commander  then  decided  to  bombard 
Valparaiso,  putting  this  resolution  into  effect  on  March 
31.  The  Spanish  ships  then  sailed  northwards,  appear- 
ing off  Callao  on  the  morning  of  April  25,  and  on  the 
following  day  Captain  Nunez  notified  the  foreign  consuls 
that  he  intended  to  attack  the  fortifications  of  the  city, 
and  would  allow  four  days  for  foreign  residents  to  move 
to  a place  of  safety.  During  this  respite  the  Peruvian 
authorities  worked  unceasingly  to  strengthen  the 
defences,  and  succeeded  in  mounting  50  guns. 

On  the  morning  of  May  2,  1866,  preparations  for 
the  bombardment  were  made  by  the  Spanish  squadron. 
Shortly  before  midday  the  enemy  entered  the  bay, 
taking  up  a position  close  to  the  land,  the  Numancia  open- 
ing the  action  and  being  answered  by  the  Merced  tower, 
the  engagement  then  becoming  general,  and  the  ships 
and  shore  batteries  maintaining  a vigorous  cannonade. 
An  hour  after  the  firing  commenced,  the  Villa  de  Madrid 
was  so  badly  injured  that  it  was  necessary  to  tow  her 
out  of  the  port,  and  shortly  afterwards  the  Berenguela 
was  observed  making  signals  that  she  was  in  a sinking 
condition.  Meanwhile  the  defence  suffered  severely. 
A shell  from  the  Numancia  burst  between  the  two  suns  in 
the  Merced  tower  and  exploded  a supply  of  powder, 
killing  the  Minister  of  "War  and  causing  other  casualties. 
At  5 p.m.  the  Spanish  ships  ceased  firing,  and  withdrew 
to  the  shelter  of  San  Lorenzo  Island,  five  miles  from 
Cailao.  In  the  ensasement  200  Peruvians  were  killed 


510 


PERU 


and  500  wounded, while  the  Spanish  loss  was  heavy,  no 
fewer  than  40  men  being  killed  and  200  wounded. 
None  of  the  vessels  escaped  without  serious  damage. 

No  further  offensive  operations  were  attempted  by 
the  Spaniards,  partly  on  account  of  a scarcity  of 
ammunition,  and  partly  for  lack  of  sufficient  force  to 
effect  a landing.  After  remaining  at  San  Lorenzo  for 
ten  days,  Captain  Nunez  sent  a notification  ashore  to 
the  effect  that  having  inflicted  severe  punishment  upon 
the  Peruvians  he  intended  to  raise  the  blockade,  and  set 
sail  for  Spain.  This  decision  of  the  Spanish  Commander 
was  due  to  the  knowledge  that  the  two  new  Peruvian 
war  vessels,  the  Huascar  and  the  Independencia,  were 
daily  expected,  and  that  these  modern  ironclads  would 
prove  formidable  antagonists  for  the  squadron  under  his 
command.  On  May  12  the  Spanish  ships  left  San 
Lorenzo  homeward  bound,  and  the  war  was  ended  ; but 
it  was  not  until  some  years  later  that  a treaty  of  peace 
between  the  two  countries  was  signed. 

After  the  close  of  the  hostilities  with  Spain  the 
direction  of  public  affairs  remained  in  the  hands  of 
General  Prado,  pending  a return  to  normal  political 
conditions,  and  during  a period  of  fourteen  months  he 
exercised  dictatorial  powers.  By  a decree  dated 
July  28,  1866,  presidential  and  congressional  elections 
were  ordered,  and  reforms  in  the  Law  of  Constitution 
were  submitted  to  the  new  Chambers  for  consideration. 
Whilst  the  proposed  alterations  were  under  discussion 
General  Prado  was  proclaimed  Provisional  President. 
The  projected  reforms  met  with  determined  opposition, 
and  this  discontent  found  expression  in  a revolutionary 
movement  headed  by  Castilla.  In  September,  1867,  the 
revised  law  was  approved  by  Congress,  and  promulgated, 
the  immediate  result  being  the  proclamation  of  General 
Prado  as  Constitutional  President.  Following  on  the 
heels  of  this  event  came  a further  outburst  of  revolt 
near  Arequipa,  General  Canseco  being  chosen  leader  of 
the  opposition  to  Prado,  and  his  supporters  demanding 
the  abrogation  of  the  reforms  of  1867,  and  a return  to 


1867]  REVOLUTION  AGxilNST  PRADO  511 

the  Law  of  Constitution  of  1860.  Resistance  to  General 
Prado  gained  further  strength  in  November,  1867,  by  a 
rising  near  Chiclaya  headed  by  Colonel  Jose  Balta,  and 
matters  soon  reached  a critical  stage. 

At  this  juncture  the  President  decided  to  take  the 
field  in  person  to  crush  the  revolt.  Congress  was 
adjourned,  the  presidential  duties  entrusted  to  General 
Luis  La-Fuerta,  and  Prado  at  the  head  of  the  army  set 
out  for  Arequipa.  That  place  was  reached  without 
encountering  serious  obstacles ; but  an  effort  to  assault 
the  city  proved  abortive,  and,  disheartened  at  this 
reverse,  Prado  retreated  to  Lima,  arriving  at  the  National 
Capital  on  January  6,  1868.  Finding  public  opinion 
decidedly  adverse  to  his  cause,  he  determined  to  resign, 
and  next  day  abandoned  the  country  to  seek  asylum  in 
Chile. 

After  the  flight  of  President  Prado  the  adminis- 
tration of  public  affairs  was  assumed  temporarily  by 
General  Canseco,  representing  the  victorious  revolution. 
The  constitutional  reforms  introduced  by  Prado  were 
revoked,  the  law  of  1860  again  declared  in  force,  and 
Congress  convened  for  July  28.  A presidential  election 
was  ordered,  and  on  August  2 Colonel  Jose  Balta  was 
proclaimed  Chief  Magistrate,  his  selection  being  due  to 
the  fact  that  he  was  one  of  the  principal  opponents  to 
General  Prado  in  the  matter  of  constitutional  reform, 
and  because  he  was  thought  to  possess  administrative 
ability. 

President  Balta  found  his  post  no  sinecure.  The 
financial  situation  was  most  unsatisfactory,  the  result  of 
constant  internal  turmoil  and  the  war  with  Spain,  and  a 
reorganisation  of  the  public  services  was  necessary  in 
consequence  of  the  existing  corruption  and  inefficiency. 
One  of  the  main  sources  of  the  national  revenue  was 
the  shipments  of  guano  to  Europe,  and  from  this  product 
Balta  proposed  to  obtain  funds  to  defray  the  obligations 
of  the  National  Administration.  In  1869  a contract 
was  celebrated  with  Messrs  Dreyfus  & Co.  of  Paris, 
for  exportation  of  all  guano  from  Peru  up  to  2,000,000 


512 


PERU 


tons,  in  return  for  monthly  payments  of  700,000  soles  as 
long  as  the  shipments  continued.  This  arrangement 
temporarily  relieved  the  Administration,  the  income 
obtained  sufficing  to  meet  the  expenses  of  government 
and  cover  the  service  of  the  indebtedness.  But  Presi- 
dent Balta  was  not  contented  with  placing  the  financial 
situation  on  a fairly  sound  basis,  and  he  determined  on 
a policy  which  included  the  construction  of  public  works 
to  establish  communication  from  the  seaboard  to  the 
interior  to  develop  the  natural  resources  of  Peru.  For 
this  purpose  loans  were  contracted  in  Europe,  the 
outstanding  obligation  of  £4,000,000  being  raised  to 
£15,000,000  in  1870,  and  further  increased  to  £50,000,000 
in  1872 ; railways  were  built  to  many  districts  hitherto 
inaccessible,  and  to  all  appearances  the  country  was  on 
the  eve  of  an  era  of  prosperity.  While  there  is  no 
doubt  Balta’s  policy  was  guided  by  a patriotic  sense  of 
duty  in  regard  to  these  public  works,  it  must  be  re- 
cognised as  shortsighted,  and  his  schemes  for  better 
means  of  communication  and  transport  were  too 
vast  for  Peru  in  view  of  the  limited  immediate  benefit 
accruing  to  the  national  exchequer.  With  the  stop- 
page of  credit  abroad  before  the  new  undertakings 
were  completed,  the  heavy  obligations  contracted  w^ere 
a most  onerous  burthen,  and  finally  caused  national 
bankruptcy. 

As  the  close  of  Balta’s  term  drew  near  an  unsettled 
feeling  was  apparent.  Seven  candidates  came  forward 
for  the  presidency,  four  being  military  officers ; but  the 
majority  of  the  electors  were  in  favour  of  Senor  Manuel 
Pardo,  who  had  shown  his  ability  as  director  of  the 
Municipality  of  Lima.  In  July,  1872,  sinister  rumours 
were  afloat  of  a military  conspiracy  to  establish  a 
dictatorship,  and  precautions  were  taken  to  guard  the 
Government  palace  and  other  official  centres ; but  Balta 
had  confidence  in  the  senior  military  officers,  and  he  did 
not  fear  any  serious  danger.  It  was  not  until  a few 
days  before  the  expiration  of  the  presidential  period 
that  this  conspiracy  came  to  a head. 


513 


1872]  THE  gutierrez  conspiracy 

In  the  army  were  three  brothers,  by  name  Gutierrez, 
and  ranking  as  colonels.  On  July  22,  1872,  at  2 p.m., 
Colonel  Silvestre  Gutierrez  with  a company  of  the 
Pichincha  Regiment  arrested  Balta,  and  confined  him  in 
the  prison  of  San  Francisco,  and  at  the  same  time 
Colonel  Marcelino  Gutierrez  occupied  the  principal 
square  in  Lima  with  the  Zepita  Regiment  together  with 
a battery  of  artillery,  and  proclaimed  the  revolution  with 
the  cry  of  Viva  el  Caronel  Tomas  Gutierrez!  Muera 
el  traidor  Balta ! An  armed  force  was  despatched  to 
the  Congress  Hall,  the  Chambers  dispersed,  and  orders 
issued  to  seize  Senor  Manuel  Pardo  ; but  the  President- 
elect had  escaped  to  Callao  and  embarked  on  the 
warship  In  depen  denci  a,  the  officers  and  crew  of  that 
vessel  and  the  remainder  of  the  squadron  remaining 
faithful  to  his  cause.  Congress  then  issued  a manifesto 
declaring  Colonel  Tomas  Gutierrez  and  his  fellow 
conspirators  guilty  of  treason,  and  public  opinion  showed 
no  sympathy  with  the  outbreak ; but  for  the  moment 
the  military  element  was  in  control,  and  Colonel  Tomas 
Gutierrez  was  proclaimed  Supreme  Chief  of  Peru.  Only 
four  days,  however,  after  the  arrest  of  Balta,  a reaction 
against  the  conspiracy  took  marked  form.  As  Colonel 
Silvestre  Gutierrez  was  entering  the  railway  station  for 
Callao,  a group  of  persons  raised  the  cry  of  Viva  Pardo ! 
Fuera  Gutierrez!  Colonel  Gutierrez  turned  and  fired 
his  revolver  four  times  at  these  people.  The  shots  were 
answered,  and  Colonel  Gutierrez  fell  close  to  the  entrance 
door  of  the  railway  station,  mortally  wounded.  On  the 
news  of  his  death  reaching  his  brother  Marcelino,  who 
had  remained  in  charge  of  General  Balta,  an  order  was 
given  for  the  President  to  be  shot,  and  he  was  immedi- 
ately assassinated.  The  murder  of  the  President  roused 
the  people  of  Lima  and  Callao  against  the  Gutierrez 
family  and  Colonel  Tomas  Gutierrez,  wTho  shut  himself 
up  in  the  Santa  Catalina  barracks  with  a small  force 
and  here  was  besieged  by  the  populace.  A sortie  was 
made  to  endeavour  to  clear  the  surrounding  streets,  but 
it  proved  unsuccessful,  and  the  supporters  of  the  Dictator 


514  PERU 

were  overpowered  and  Colonel  Gutierrez  was  killed  by 
the  mob. 

While  these  events  were  occurring  in  Lima  the 
people  of  Callao  had  risen  against  the  garrison  com- 
manded by  Colonel  Marcelino  Gutierrez  and  he  was 
forced  to  retreat  to  the  forts  near  the  city,  where 
preparations  were  made  to  open  fire  on  the  town  with 
the  heavy  guns,  but  a stray  bullet  struck  the  Colonel 
and  caused  his  death.  He  was  buried  immediately  in 
one  of  the  ditches  of  the  Baquijano  cemetery,  and  it 
was  not  until  some  hours  later  that  the  inhabitants  of 
Callao  learnt  he  had  been  killed.  With  the  loss  of 
Marcelino  Gutierrez  the  last  resistance  of  the  dictatorial 
movement  disappeared.  The  populace  took  absolute 
control  of  affairs  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  Vice- 
President,  Senor  Mariano  Herencia  Zevallos,  and  Lima 
gave  full  vent  to  the  wave  of  passion  that  had  instigated 
the  reaction  against  the  Gutierrez  family.  The  bodies 
of  Tomas  and  Silvestre  Gutierrez  were  dragged  to  the 
principal  square  on  the  afternoon  of  July  26,  and  there 
were  hanged  to  lamp-posts  for  the  inspection  of  the 
inhabitants.  The  corpse  of  Marcelino  Gutierrez  was 
disinterred  at  Callao  and  brought  to  Lima  to  be  treated 
in  similar  fashion  ; while  the  remains  of  President  Balta 
were  removed  from  the  prison  and  conveyed  to  the 
chapel  of  Santa  Rosa  de  Vitervo,  and  there  installed 
with  ceremonious  state.  On  the  morning  of  July  27, 
the  bodies  of  Colonels  Tomas  and  Silvestre  Gutie'rrez 
were  discovered  suspended  to  two  spires  of  the  Cathedral. 
At  midday  they  were  lowered  to  the  ground  and,  with 
that  of  Marcelino  Gutierrez,  were  burned  in  the  principal 
square,  all  endeavours  of  the  leading  citizens  to  stop 
this  proceeding  being  unavailing  ; and  after  this  holocaust 
was  ended,  the  ashes  of  the  leaders  of  the  recent  con- 
spiracy were  scattered  to  the  winds  as  a last  indignity. 

By  July  28  order  was  re-established  in  Lima  and 
Callao,  and  the  first  Vice-President,  Senor  Mariano 
Zavallos,  assumed  the  duties  of  Chief  Magistrate  for 
the  few  remaining  days  of  the  unexpired  term  for  which 


1872]  PRESIDENT  PARDO  ASSUMES  OFFICE  515 


Colonel  Balta  had  been  elected ; on  the  same  date  Con- 
gress met,  and  on  August  1 proclaimed  Senor  Manuel 
Pardo  duly  elected  to  the  Presidency.  On  July  31  the 
funeral  of  Colonel  Balta  took  place  in  the  Cathedral  at 
Lima,  and  was  conducted  with  all  pomp  as  a State 
ceremony. 

President  Pardo  assumed  office  on  August  2,  1872, 
and  his  Administration  initiated  many  reforms.  He 
represented  the  civilian  interests  of  Peru  as  opposed  to 
the  long  series  of  military  Governments  which  had  con- 
trolled the  country  in  former  years,  and  his  policy  was 
guided  by  a desire  to  improve  the  country  and  restrain 
the  spirit  of  militarism  which  had  played  so  important 
a part  hitherto  in  the  national  destinies.  Public  instruc- 
tion was  a subject  to  which  attention  was  specially 
devoted,  and  schools  for  primary  education  were  estab- 
lished on  a comparatively  extensive  scale.  Scientific 
and  technical  colleges  were  founded,  and  educational 
facilities  encouraged  and  supported  where  privately 
initiated.  Military  and  naval  requirements  were  not 
neglected,  and  a naval  academy  was  created,  and  schools 
instituted  for  the  instruction  of  non-commissioned  officers 
of  the  army.  Reforms  in  military  organisation  were 
introduced,  and  plans  approved  for  placing  the  National 
Guard  on  a serviceable  footing.  Of  the  public  works 
completed  during  the  Pardo  Administration,  the  most 
notable  were  the  railway  from  Lima  to  Magdalena,  the 
monument  at  Callao  in  memory  of  the  defence  of  that 
city  against  the  Spanish  squadron,  and  the  public  hospital 
known  as  the  “2  de  Mayo.” 

Notwithstanding  the  endeavours  of  President  Pardo 
to  advance  the  highest  interests  of  Peru,  a spirit  of 
discontent  was  openly  manifested  during  his  Adminis- 
tration in  both  the  northern  and  southern  districts,  and 
on  several  occasions  this  dissatisfied  feeling  took  the 
form  of  armed  revolt.  The  principal  instigator  of  these 
conspiracies  was  Senor  Nicolas  de  Pierola,  and  on 
November  1,  1874,  he  disembarked  with  a body  of 
insurgents  from  the  steamer  Talisman  at  Pacocha,  pro- 


516 


PERU 


ceeding  thence  to  Moquegua  and  Torata,  and  finally 
occupying  a strong  position  known  as  “ Los  Angeles.” 
When  the  news  of  this  expedition  reached  Lima,  the 
President  asked  permission  from  Congress  to  conduct 
in  person  a force  of  Government  troops  to  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Torata  to  re-establish  public  order,  and  the 
Chambers  approved  the  proposition.  Pardo  lost  no 
time  in  putting  his  plan  into  execution,  and  with  several 
regiments  of  the  regular  army,  strengthened  by  a few 
battalions  of  the  National  Guard,  a rapid  march  was 
made  against  the  insurgent  headquarters  at  “Los 
Angeles,”  and  that  stronghold  was  carried  by  assault. 
With  this  defeat  of  the  insurgents  in  the  south  the 
movement  against  the  Government  was  crushed,  for 
while  Pardo  directed  these  operations  near  Torata 
another  expedition  was  despatched  against  the  rebels 
in  the  northern  provinces  and  no  formidable  resistance 
encountered.  A few  skirmishes  occurred,  but  the 
Government  troops  were  everywhere  victorious  and  the 
opposition  soon  melted  away,  and  in  the  first  few  months 
of  1875  order  was  once  more  established. 

The  weak  point  in  the  Administration  of  Pardo  was 
his  foreign  policy.  The  financial  situation  had  become 
extremely  complicated  owing  to  heavy  obligations  con- 
tracted during  the  preceding  presidential  period,  and  in 
consequence  of  the  decreased  value  of  guano  and  nitrate 
of  soda,  the  two  principal  sources  of  the  national  revenue. 
To  obtain  relief  from  financial  liabilities,  Pardo  con- 
ceived the  idea  of  creating  a monopoly  for  the  production 
of  nitrate  of  soda,  and  to  effect  this  two  things  were 
necessary.  The  first  was  the  expropriation  of  the  nitrate 
properties  in  the  hands  of  private  owners,  and  the  second 
was  joint  action  with  the  Bolivian  authorities  in  restrict- 
ing the  output  of  nitrate  of  soda  to  ensure  abnormally 
high  prices.  So  far  as  the  expropriation  of  private 
ownership  in  the  Tarapaca  district  was  concerned,  no 
great  difficulties  stood  in  the  way,  for  the  concessions 
were  subject  to  the  right  of  the  Government  to  assume 
control  of  the  nitrate  fields  in  return  for  adequate 


1875]  FOREIGN  POLICY  OF  PARDO 


517 


monetary  compensation,  if  such  a course  was  considered 
desirable.  When  the  policy  of  the  President  was  laid 
before  Congress,  the  consent  of  both  Chambers  was 
readily  obtained,  but  with  Bolivia  many  obstacles 
occurred.  The  port  of  Antofagasta  was  the  subject  of 
long  controversy  with  Chile,  and  had  been  ceded  to 
Bolivia  under  conditions  which  prohibited  export  charges 
on  any  products  of  Chilian  industry  in  the  Atacama 
districts,  and  under  such  circumstances  it  was  useless 
to  restrict  the  output  of  nitrate  of  soda  in  Tarapaca. 
The  only  effect  of  such  action  would  be  to  give  an 
enormous  impulse  to  production  near  Antofagasta.  It 
was  under  these  conditions  that  the  Peruvian  authorities 
endeavoured  to  induce  the  Bolivian  Government  to 
adopt  a policy  in  regard  to  the  Atacama  nitrate  industry 
similar  to  that  proposed  for  Tarapaca ; as  this  entailed 
direct  violation  by  Bolivia  of  her  treaty  obligations  to 
Chile,  it  was  only  in  return  for  the  protection  Peru 
could  offer  under  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance 
that  the  Bolivian  Government  consented.  As  a result 
of  many  negotiations,  a secret  alliance  was  celebrated 
between  Bolivia  and  Peru  in  1873,  the  ultimate  conse- 
quences of  this  compact  being  the  war  of  1879-83 
between  Chile  and  the  allies ; but  the  disastrous  events 
which  signalised  this  compact  of  Peru  and  Bolivia  did 
not  take  place  during  the  Pardo  Administration,  and  it 
was  left  to  his  successor  to  face  the  calamities  his  policy 
entailed. 

When  the  term  of  President  Pardo  was  approaching 
completion,  the  question  of  his  successor  excited  wide 
attention.  The  two  candidates  brought  before  the 
electors  were  General  Mariano  Ignacio  Prado  and  Rear- 
Admiral  Lizardo  Montero,  and  the  former,  although 
absent  from  Peru,  carried  most  weight.  General  Prado 
had  commanded  the  garrison  at  Callao  when  the 
Spanish  squadron  attacked  that  city  on  May  2,  1866, 
and  his  name  was  always  associated  with  the  successful 
defence  of  the  town.  He  was  elected  by  the  popular 
vote,  and  returned  from  Chile  to  assume  his  office,  his 


518 


PERU 


presidency  proving  to  be  one  of  the  most  stormy  periods 
in  Peruvian  history.  Internal  disturbances  and  a 
disastrous  foreign  war  caused  loss  of  territory  and 
subsequent  acute  economic  and  financial  depression, 
which  lasted  for  twenty  years. 

Senor  Nicholas  Pierola  promoted  a series  of 
intrigues  and  conspiracies  against  the  constituted 
authorities  in  1876,  and  these  resulted  in  a rising- 
near  Moquegua.  The  movement  was  suppressed  by 
the  defeat  of  the  insurgents  at  Yacango,  but  only  after 
severe  fighting,  in  which  both  sides  sustained  heavy 
losses.  Some  eighteen  months  later  another  revolt  was 
organised  by  Pierola  at  Callao,  and  on  this  occasion  the 
rebels  seized  the  monitor  Huasccir,  and  proceeded  to 
Pacocha.  A decree  of  the  Government  declared  the 
Huascar  a pirate,  and  two  British  men- of- war,  the  Shah 
and  Amethyst,  attempted  her  capture.  A severe 
engagement  took  place  near  Pacocha,  and  the  in- 
surgents on  the  Huascar  found  they  were  outmatched 
and  their  capture  only  a matter  of  time.  Pierola  then 
determined  to  capitulate  to  an  admiral  of  the  Peruvian 
navy  in  the  neighbourhood  rather  than  allow  the  Huascar 
to  fall  into  British  hands.  With  the  surrender  of  the 
Huascar  the  revolution  ended,  and  Pierola  left  the 
country  for  Chile ; but  his  influence  continued  to  be  a 
disturbing  factor  in  the  political  situation. 

The  year  1878  was  memorable  for  two  other  events 
besides  the  revolution ; these  were  the  celebration  of  a 
treaty  of  peace  and  friendship  with  Spain,  and  the 
assassination  of  the  ex-President,  Senor  Manuel  Pardo. 
By  the  terms  of  the  treaty  Spain  recognised  the  in- 
dependence of  Peru,  and  the  differences  which  occa- 
sioned hostilities  between  the  two  countries  in  1865-6 
were  finally  adjusted.  The  murder  of  Senor  Pardo  was 
one  of  those  acts  by  which  the  history  of  South  America 
has  been  so  frequently  besmirched ; when  President  of 
the  Republic,  he  had  performed  his  duties  with  consci- 
entious honesty,  and  the  effect  of  his  foreign  policy 
between  1872  and  1876  was  not  apparent  at  the  time  of 


1878] 


ASSASSINATION  OF  PARDO 


519 


his  death,  and  could  not,  therefore,  be  quoted  to  his 
detriment.  At  the  date  of  his  assassination  he  was 
President  of  the  Senate,  and  in  Congress  had  supported 
a measure  for  certain  military  reforms  by  which  no 
non-commissioned  officer  could  rise  to  commissioned 
rank.  On  September  22,  1878,  as  he  was  leaving  the 
Senate  Chamber  after  a discussion  of  these  measures,  he 
was  shot  at  and  killed  by  the  sergeant  of  the  guard  on 
duty  at  the  Congress  Hall,  a man  named  Montoyo. 
President  Prado  entered  the  Congress  Hall  a few 
moments  after  Senor  Pardo  was  murdered,  and  when 
he  asked  who  had  committed  the  act,  Sergeant  Montoyo 
was  indicated.  The  President  ordered  the  man  to  be 
shot,  but  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  urged  that  if 
such  action  was  taken  the  people  would  infer  that  the 
President  had  instigated  the  murder  and  insisted  upon 
the  execution  of  the  sergeant  to  remove  all  evidence. 
This  argument  prevailed,  and  Sergeant  Montoyo  was 
arrested  and  subsequently  tried  and  condemned  to 
death,  his  execution  taking  place  a few  months  later. 

Towards  the  close  of  1878  the  political  situation 
gave  many  indications  of  complications  with  Chile  in 
consequence  of  strained  relations  between  the  latter 
country  and  Bolivia  in  connection  with  the  nitrate 
industry  of  Atacama.  The  inclination  of  President 
Prado  was  adverse  to  war  with  Chile  ; but  this  was  not 
the  feeling  of  the  majority  of  the  inhabitants,  and 
public  opinion  lost  no  opportunity  of  attempting  to 
force  the  hand  of  the  Government.  In  1879  the  Chilian 
authorities  despatched  an  expeditionary  force  to  occupy 
Antofagasto  and  the  vicinity,  and  no  active  measures 
were  taken  by  General  Prado  to  restrain  this  aggres- 
sion. Discontent  augmented  ; Prado  was  accused  of 
sympathy  with  Chile  as  the  outcome  of  his  long  resi- 
dence in  the  latter  country,  and  dissatisfaction  at  his 
attitude  grew  apace.  Possibly,  if  left  to  follow  his 
own  policy,  Prado  might  have  avoided  war,  but  this 
could  only  be  accomplished  by  breaking  faith  with 
Bolivia.  In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  public 


520 


PERU 


opinion,  the  President  decided  to  abandon  all  idea  of 
conciliation,  and  to  accept  the  alternative  of  an  inter- 
national conflict.  On  April  5,  1879,  the  Chilian  Govern- 
ment formally  declared  war  against  Peru,  and  the 
struggle,  which  ended  in  such  appalling  disaster  for  the 
latter  country,  now  actively  commenced. 

President  Prado,  in  view  of  the  national  danger  from 
the  Chilian  invasion  of  Tarapaca  in  1879,  decided  to 
take  command  of  the  army  in  the  south,  and  Congress 
agreed  to  this  course.  The  operations  in  1879  are 
recorded  in  the  description  of  the  war  between  Chile, 
Bolivia,  and  Peru,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  refer  to 
the  campaign  further  than  to  mention  that  the  disastrous 
outcome  resulted  in  internal  political  changes  deserving 
of  a place  in  history.  In  November,  1879,  Prado,  con- 
vinced that  Peru  could  not  stem  the  Chilian  advance, 
returned  to  Lima,  and  in  a letter  published  on 
December  2 announced  his  arrival  in  the  National 
Capital,  and  his  determination  to  use  every  effort  to 
retrieve  the  misfortunes  which  had  befallen  Peruvian 
arms.  Sixteen  days  after  this  document  was  made 
public  he  issued  a decree  entrusting  the  Administration 
to  the  Vice-President,  General  La  Puerta,  stating  that 
he  intended  to  absent  himself  from  Peruvian  territory 
under  the  permission  conceded  by  the  Chambers  on 
May  2,  1878,  and  next  day  lie  embarked  at  Callao  for 
Europe,  abandoning  his  country  to  any  consequences  the 
war  with  Chile  might  entail. 

The  unpatriotic  action  of  General  Prado  at  this 
crisis  has  never  been  explained.  He  was  not  lacking 
in  physical  courage,  as  had  been  demonstrated  when  he 
commanded  the  defence  of  Callao  against  the  Spanish 
squadron  on  May  2,  1866 ; but  the  services  he  had 
rendered  to  his  country  in  former  days  could  not  con- 
done his  conduct  in  leaving  Peru  when  calamities  were 
falling  thick  upon  her,  and  his  action  caused  an  out- 
burst of  indignation.  It  was  now  that  Senor  Nicolas 
de  Pierola  again  became  prominent.  Pierola  was 
residing  in  Chile  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  between 


1879] 


REVOLT  UNDER  PIEROLA 


521 

that  country  and  Peru  in  1879,  and  on  the  declaration 
of  war  in  April  of  that  year  he  offered  his  services  to 
the  Peruvian  Government.  This  offer  was  accepted, 
and  Pierola  returned  to  Lima,  and  was  nominated  to 
an  important  military  post.  On  the  flight  of  Prado  the 
moment  was  opportune  for  him  to  seize  the  direction 
of  public  affairs,  and  he  organised  a revolutionary 
movement  to  oust  the  authorities  then  in  power.  The 
obstacle  to  the  immediate  success  of  this  conspiracy 
was  the  opposition  offered  by  General  Manuel  Gonzalez 
de  La  Cotera,  then  Minister  of  War,  who  decided  to 
support  the  Vice-President,  General  de  La  Puerta,  and 
counted  on  the  garrison  of  Lima  for  aid.  The  first 
indication  that  mutinous  designs  were  entertained  by 
the  troops  was  the  refusal  of  Colonel  Arguedas  to 
detail  a guard  for  duty  at  the  Palace.  General  de  La 
Cotera  immediately  marched  against  Colonel  Arguedas, 
but  was  forced  to  retire  by  the  heavy  fire  of  a number 
of  disaffected  citizens  on  the  house-tops.  At  this 
juncture,  Pierola,  with  another  body  of  mutineers, 
appeared,  and  a fusillade  was  maintained  for  some 
hours  in  the  principal  square  of  the  city,  the  casualties 
being  60  killed  and  200  wounded.  Soon  afterwards 
the  police  joined  the  revolutionary  cause,  and  the 
position  of  the  Government  momentarily  became  more 
critical.  On  the  evening  of  December  21  Pierola  with  his 
supporters  marched  against  Callao,  occupying  that  city 
without  resistance  early  next  day.  The  Archbishop  of 
Lima  now  intervened  in  the  struggle  and  persuaded  Gene- 
ral de  La  Puerta  to  end  the  conflict  toy  tendering  his 
resignation,  and  on  December  23,  1879,  Pierola  entered 
Lima  once  more,  and  was  proclaimed  Supreme  Chief  of 
the  Republic  pending  the  outcome  of  the  war  with  Chile. 

Senor  Pierola  at  once  commenced  energetic  measures 
to  defend  Peru  against  the  Chilian  invasion  by  organising 
additional  bodies  of  troops,  and  by  fortifying  and  occupy- 
ing a number  of  strategic  positions.  The  Peruvians  were 
so  far  satisfied  with  the  man  now  at  the  head  of  affairs 
that  no  active  opposition  was  raised  to  his  assumption 


522 


PERU 


of  dictatorial  attributes.  But  the  efforts  of  Pierola 
proved  abortive  to  check  the  victorious  onward  progress 
of  the  Chilians,  and  reverse  followed  reverse  in  the 
course  of  the  ensuing  twelve  months  until  the  occupation 
of  Lima  in  January,  1881,  crowned  the  tale  of  defeat. 
After  the  disasters  of  Peru  had  culminated  in  the 
rout  of  the  defence  at  the  battle  of  Miraflores,  the 
power  of  Pierola  for  the  time  was  ended,  and  he  retired 
to  the  interior  of  the  country,  and  there  unsuccessfully 
endeavoured  to  organise  further  resistance ; but  finding 
such  action  of  little  practical  avail,  he  returned  to 
Lima  under  the  protection  of  a safe-conduct  issued  by 
the  Chilian  authorities,  and  then  left  the  country,  to 
reside  first  in  Europe  and  afterwards  in  Chile.  Pierola 
was  still  a young  man,  having  been  born  on  January  5, 
1839,  and  could  count  on  support  from  the  Church  Party, 
for  he  had  been  educated  at  Arequipa,  a stronghold  of 
clerical  influence.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  under  the 
Administrations  of  Senor  Pardo  and  General  Prado  he 
had  been  a constant  menace  to  public  order,  he  retained 
a powerful  following,  and  was  destined  at  a later  period 
to  play  an  important  part  in  the  national  history. 

From  1881  to  1884  the  political  developments  in 
Peru  are  more  particularly  connected  with  the  occupa- 
tion of  the  country  by  the  Chilians  as  the  immediate 
consequence  of  the  war,  and  as  such  are  described  in 
the  account  of  that  struggle.  The  thread  of  the  present 
story,  therefore,  is  picked  up  at  the  point  where  the 
evacuation  of  Peruvian  territory  by  the  Chilian  forces 
took  place.  General  Miguel  Iglesias  had  been  installed 
as  President  by  the  assistance  of  the  Chilian  authorities, 
although  he  was  not  recognised  by  a dissentient  section 
of  the  population  of  which  General  Caceres  was  the 
leader ; but  as  it  was  with  the  Administration  of 
President  Inglesias  that  the  Treaty  of  Ancon  was 
celebrated,  and  as  this  treaty  was  accepted  by  the 
Peruvians,  he  must  be  regarded  as  formally  ranking 
amongst  the  list  of  presidents  holding  office  since  the 
country  became  independent  of  Spain. 


1884]  DISTURBED  INTERNAL  CONDITIONS  523 


From  1884  to  the  end  of  1885  the  country  was  torn 
by  internal  dissensions.  Iglesias  was  supported  in 
Lima  by  the  people  approving  the  treaty  of  peace  made 
in  October,  1883,  and  which  had  led  to  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Chilian  army  of  occupation  ; but  Chilian  influence 
in  1884  was  still  strong,  and  on  this  support  General 
Iglesias  could  rely  at  the  commencement  of  his  Admini- 
stration. The  opposition  was  concentrated  at  Jauja, 
and  it  was  from  this  point  that  General  Caceres 
organised  his  forces  to  attack  the  de  facto  Administration. 
On  March  8,  1884,  the  Chambers  formally  ratified  the 
Treaty  of  Ancon,  and  peaceful  relations  were  established 
with  the  Chilian  Government ; but  this  fact  carried 
small  weight  with  General  Caceres  and  his  friends,  and 
their  preparations  were  continued  for  the  invasion  of 
the  territory  over  which  the  Iglesias  Administration 
was  acknowledged.  In  July  and  August  of  1884 
the  forces  under  Caceres  approached  the  National 
Capital,  and  on  the  24th  of  the  latter  month  Lima  was 
attacked ; but  the  garrison  of  the  city  succeeded  in 
holding  its  own,  and  Caceres  was  repulsed  with  such 
heavy  loss  that  a retreat  to  Arequipa  was  ordered  to 
allow  him  to  reorganise  his  army.  For  the  next  year 
constant  skirmishes  occurred  between  the  two  parties ; 
but  no  decided  successes  were  gained  by  either  side, 
although  Caceres  was  enabled  to  strengthen  his  position, 
and  towards  the  close  of  1885  he  made  a second  attempt 
to  capture  Lima.  In  November  of  that  year  he  moved 
to  the  vicinity  of  the  Peruvian  capital,  and  on  December 
1,  1885,  attacked  the  city,  and  after  hard  fighting  he 
occupied  the  upper  portion  of  the  town  as  far  as  the 
Plaza  de  la  Inquisition.  Next  day  Caceres  and  Iglesias 
held  a conference,  and  both  leaders  agreed  to  resign 
their  pretensions  to  a council  of  Ministers  comprised  of 
Sehor  Antonio  Arenas,  Sehor  Jose  Sanchez,  Monsenor 
Manuel  Tovar  (now  Archbishop  of  Lima),  General 
Manuel  Velarde,  and  Sehor  Pedro  Correa  y Santiago. 
The  duties  of  this  council  were  to  take  steps  for  the 
election  of  the  President,  Vice-President  and  Members 


524 


PERU 


of  Congress,  and  to  administer  public  affairs  until  the 
political  situation  became  normal.  Immediately  after 
surrendering  his  power  to  this  council,  Iglesias  left  the 
country,  while  Caceres  remained  in  Peru  and  worked 
actively  for  his  election  to  the  Presidency.  His  efforts 
were  successful,  and  in  May,  1886,  Congress  declared 
him  chosen  as  Chief  Magistrate,  and  with  his  accession 
to  office  on  June  3,  1886,  all  serious  internal  political 
disturbances  ceased  for  the  time. 

The  Administration  of  President  Andres  Caceres 
from  1886  to  1890  was  barren  of  historical  events.  The 
people  of  Peru  were  wearied  with  a condition  of  warfare 
that  had  existed  first  with  Chile  and  afterwards  against 
the  authority  of  Iglesias,  and  little  energy  was  left  to 
foment  disturbances  against  the  authorities.  Every- 
where was  misery  and  poverty,  for  Peruvian  industrial 
enterprise  had  been  ruined  in  the  struggle  against  Chile, 
and  the  spirit  of  the  inhabitants  was  so  far  broken  that 
small  scope  remained  for  the  establishment  of  new 
undertakings.  The  national  resources  dwindled  away 
to  insignificant  proportions,  the  revenue  was  barely 
sufficient  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Government,  and 
no  funds  were  available  for  the  assistance  of  the 
sufferers  in  the  recent  defence  of  the  country  against 
the  Chilian  invasion  or  the  internal  disturbances 
occurring  between  1884  and  the  end  of  1885.  In  such 
circumstances  the  Administration  of  Caceres  lived  from 
1886  to  1890.  Towards  reconstruction  nothing  was 
attempted,  and  public  affairs  were  allowed  to  drift  in 
haphazard  fashion.  The  national  income  supported  a 
small  favoured  clique,  but  when  this  limited  circle  was 
satisfied  nothing  was  left  for  the  alleviation  of  the 
general  distress.  When  the  term  of  Caceres  ended  in 
1890,  the  official  candidate,  Colonel  Morales  Bermudez, 
was  declared  elected,  and  no  opposition  to  this  arrange- 
ment was  suggested. 

The  first  and  second  Vice-Presidents  for  the  term 
of  Colonel  Morales  Bermudez  were,  respectively,  Senor 
Pedro  A.  del  Solar  and  Colonel  Borgoiio.  This  fact  is 


1890]  PRESIDENT  BERMUDEZ  ELECTED  525 


important,  as  on  it  hinged  a subsequent  revolutionary 
movement  which  spread  through  the  country  in  1894, 
and  which  was  only  ended  after  a severe  struggle, 
entailing  heavy  loss  of  life.  Between  1890  and  1894  the 
power  behind  the  Government  was  Caceres,  and  under 
his  guidance  the  Bermudez  Administration  conducted 
public  affairs  in  uneventful  fashion.  No  effort  at  im- 
provement was  made,  nor  was  there  any  attempt  to  check 
the  corruption  rampant  in  every  official  department.  It 
was  only  natural  that  discontent  arose  among  a large 
section  of  the  inhabitants,  and  this  feeling  became  more 
marked  as  the  population  began  to  recover  from  the 
state  of  depression  which  prevailed  at  the  close  of  the 
war  with  Chile.  Under  Caceres  the  Government  had 
been  practically  a military  dictatorship,  and  small  change 
in  the  system  occurred  under  Bermudez  because  of  the 
influence  of  his  predecessor  over  the  Administration ; 
but  the  civilian  element  recognised  that  a continuance 
of  dictatorial  methods  was  a direct  obstacle  to  sub- 
stantial progress,  and  an  agitation  was  set  afoot  to 
secure  the  election  of  a civilian  to  the  Presidency  when 
the  term  of  Bermudez  expired.  It  was  not  the  intention 
of  Caceres  to  allow  the  control  of  affairs  to  slip  through 
his  hands,  and  he  handled  the  situation  in  such  manner 
as  to  prevent  his  opponents  obtaining  their  object  by 
constitutional  means.  At  the  commencement  of  1894 
it  was  evident  that  he  had  so  manipulated  matters  that 
he  would  be  proclaimed  President  when  the  formal 
result  of  the  election  was  announced. 

An  unexpected  event  marred  the  intrigue.  President 
Bermudez  died  suddenly  on  April  1,  1894,  three  months 
before  the  expiration  of  presidential  term,  and  the  first 
Vice-President,  Sehor  Pedro  del  Solar,  should  have 
succeeded.  Senor  Solar  represented  the  civilian  element, 
and  his  advent  to  office  did  not  accord  with  the  views 
held  by  General  Caceres ; so,  to  avoid  the  complications 
likely  to  arise  if  he  did,  Caceres  induced  Colonel  Borgono, 
the  second  Vice-President,  to  seize  control  of  the 
Government.  This  illegal  proceeding  provoked  a 


526 


PERU 


revolutionary  rising  in  the  south,  which  was  nominally 
headed  by  Senor  Solar,  but  in  reality  directed  by  Pierola 
from  Chilian  territory.  The  Chambers  were  opposed  to 
the  course  taken  by  Colonel  Borgono,  and  in  view  of 
this  hostility  he  dissolved  the  Congress  and  ordered 
elections  to  be  held  to  secure  representatives  to  support 
the  new  Administration.  In  due  course  the  Chambers 
constituted  under  these  conditions  met  in  Lima,  and 
shortly  afterwards  Caceres  was  proclaimed  President, 
assuming  office  formally  on  August  10. 

The  revolutionary  movement  was  continued  against 
General  Caceres,  and  found  many  supporters ; but  the 
army  was  opposed  to  it,  and  for  several  months  the 
insurgents  made  no  substantial  progress.  Arms  and 
ammunition  were  not  easy  to  obtain,  and  little  money 
was  available  for  the  purchase  of  supplies,  but  Pierola 
gradually  succeeded  in  overcoming  the  difficulties  in  the 
formation  of  a force  of  sufficient  strength  to  march  on 
Lima.  From  September,  1894,  to  February,  1895,  a 
series  of  skirmishes  occurred  with  the  troops,  but  no 
marked  advantage  was  obtained  by  either  side.  Mean- 
while the  strength  of  the  rebel  army  had  grown  steadily, 
and  in  March,  1895,  an  order  was  issued  by  Pierola  to 
concentrate  near  Lima,  in  response  to  which  5000 
insurgents  assembled  on  March  15  and  16,  in  the 
locality  indicated.  For  the  defence  of  the  National 
Capital  Caceres  counted  on  4000  men,  but  many  of  the 
officers  could  not  be  trusted  if  the  insurgent  cause 
showed  signs  of  success. 

On  the  morning  of  March  17,  1895,  the  rebel  army 
under  Pierola  attacked,  and  after  desperate  street  fight- 
ing the  upper  portion  of  the  city  was  captured.  For  the 
next  two  days  the  struggle  continued ; but  the  sympathy 
of  the  residents  was  obviously  with  the  revolutionary 
cause.  Caceres  became  convinced  that  further  resist- 
ance was  useless,  and  under  the  protection  of  the 
foreign  diplomatic  corps  he  abandoned  Lima  for  Callao, 
where  he  embarked  on  a neutral  vessel.  In  the  three 
days’  fighting  3000  men  lost  their  lives,  either  killed  or 


[Face  page  526. 


1895]  REVOLUTION  AGAINST  CACERES  527 

dying  afterwards  from  wounds,  and  as  many  more  were 
more  or  less  seriously  injured.  When  the  triumph  of 
the  revolution  was  assured,  steps  were  taken  to  restore 
order ; but  some  days  elapsed  before  the  streets  were 
cleared  of  the  dead  and  dying,  and  normal  conditions 
re-established.  Credit  is  due  to  Mr  Alfred  St  John,  at 
the  time  H.B.M.’s  Consul  in  Peru,  for  arranging  a 
suspension  of  hostilities  on  March  19,  and  it  was 
through  his  representations  that  Caceres  was  induced 
to  abandon  a hopeless  struggle  and  accept  the  protec- 
tion of  the  foreign  diplomats.  The  purpose  of  Mr  St 
John  was  to  avoid  further  bloodshed. 

A Provisional  Administration  was  now  formed 
under  Senor  Candamo,  assisted  by  Senor  Villaran,  Senor 
Espinosa,  Senor  Malpartida,  and  Senor  Bustamante  y 
Salazar.  Elections  were  held,  and  the  dictatorial 
methods  of  Caceres  replaced  by  a constitutional  regime, 
and  when  a condition  of  law  and  order  had  been 
reinstated,  a presidential  election  was  ordered.  This 
resulted  in  the  choice  of  Pierola ; and  on  September  8, 
1895,  the  new  President  was  installed  in  office,  once 
more  assuming  control  of  Peru  after  an  interval  of 
fourteen  years.  The  country  had  obtained  the  object  for 
which  the  struggle  of  1894-5  had  been  undertaken,  and 
military  ascendency  gave  place  to  civil  administration. 

President  Pierola  had  only  been  a few  months  in 
power  when  an  insurrection  broke  out  in  Iquitos,  in  the 
interior  of  the  Republic,  near  the  principal  tributaries  of 
the  Amazon,  but  the  movement  did  not  meet  with  much 
sympathy,  and  was  suppressed  without  great  difficulty 
in  1896.  Several  reforms  with  important  bearing  on 
the  political  and  economic  life  of  Peru  were  introduced 
under  the  new  Administration,  and  an  electoral  law  was 
voted  by  which  a committee  of  nine  members  was 
entrusted  with  the  examination  of  all  electoral  returns 
and  the  proclamation  of  successful  candidates  for  the 
Legislature.  In  the  constitution  of  this  committee  two 
representatives  were  nominated  by  the  Senate,  two  by 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  four  by  the  Supreme  Court, 


528 


PERU 


and  one  by  the  President  with  the  consent  of  the 
Ministry.  Another  important  measure  was  the  legal- 
isation of  marriages  performed  by  foreign  diplomatic 
ministers,  consuls,  and  ministers  of  dissenting  churches, 
when  such  contracts  were  duly  inscribed  in  the  civil 
registers.  A.  third  reform  was  the  adoption  of  a gold 
currency  in  place  of  a fluctuating  silver  one,  the  new 
coinage  providing  for  the  introduction  of  a gold  piece  of 
equal  fineness  and  weight  to  the  pound  sterling,  and 
also  for  this  latter  coin  to  be  exchangeable  for  ten  silver 
soles  of  100  cents.  In  1899,  shortly  before  the  expira- 
tion of  the  presidential  period,  another  attempt  at 
revolution  was  made,  the  alleged  motive  being  the 
temporary  suppression  of  the  electoral  committee  created 
under  the  Law  of  1897.  The  leader  of  the  movement 
was  Senor  Durand,  a man  who  had  played  a prominent 
part  in  the  rebellion  against  Caceres ; but  the  rising  did 
not  find  favour,  and  although  it  lingered  on  for  some 
months,  no  really  serious  fighting  took  place.  In  July, 
1899,  the  country  was  called  upon  to  elect  a successor  to 
Pierola,  and  the  choice  fell  on  Senor  Romana,  a member 
of  a well-known  family  of  Arequipa.  Romana  had  been 
educated  at  Stoneyhurst  in  England,  and  graduated  sub- 
sequently as  a civil  engineer  at  King’s  College,  London, 
and,  although  he  was  a man  of  little  experience  in  politi- 
cal life,  his  election  met  with  unanimous  approval. 

On  September  8,  Senor  Romana  was  installed  as 
President.  The  revolutionary  movement  under  Durand 
gave  intermittent  signs  of  existence,  but  prompt  measures 
were  taken  to  bring  it  to  an  end,  and  when  1899  drew 
to  a close  little  evidence  remained  of  any  desire  to 
dispute  the  authority  of  the  Administration.  The  whole 
population  wished  for  peace,  to  allow  opportunity  for 
economic  development  and  industrial  progress,  and, 
consequently,  the  Romana  Administration  was  not 
embarrassed  by  serious  internal  disturbance,  although 
petty  political  intrigue  was  not  lacking  on  the  part  of 
ambitious  politicians  desiring  to  create  difficulties  to 
serve  the  purposes  of  themselves  and  their  friends. 


1903]  INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  529 

During  the  past  five  years  a greater  sense  of  tranquillity 
has  been  experienced  than  was  known  at  any  former 
period  in  Peru  since  the  establishment  of  republican 
institutions,  and  the  people  are  fully  alive  to  the  bene- 
fits arising  from  the  existing  internal  peace.  In  May, 
1903,  Senor  Manuel  Candamo  was  elected  to  succeed 
Senor  Romaiia  in  the  Presidency,  and  his  selection  en- 
sured a continuance  in  power  of  the  party  which  had  so 
greatly  helped  to  further  the  prosperity  of  the  country  A 

In  regard  to  international  questions,  the  most 
important  is  that  open  with  Chile  in  connection  with 
the  ownership  of  Tacna  and  Arica.  The  settlement  of 
this  matter  should  have  taken  place  in  1894  by  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Ancon,  but  Peru  was  then  in 
such  an  unsettled  state  from  internal  complications  that 
it  was  impossible  to  open  negotiations  on  the  subject. 
For  the  past  ten  years  every  attempt  at  a satisfactory 
agreement  has  proved  abortive.  Peru  mistrusts  the 
policy  of  Chile,  and  believes  she  is  determined  to  remain 
in  possession,  and  acting  in  this  spirit  the  Peruvian 
Legation  has  been  withdrawn  from  Santiago  and  no 
further  effort  is  being  made  to  bring  about  an  under- 
standing. This  attitude  is  regrettable,  for  the  absence  of 
a definite  agreement  with  Chile  keeps  an  old  sore  open. 

In  1895  the  dispute  with  Colombia  regarding  the 
boundary  with  that  Republic  was  brought  to  an 
amicable  conclusion  by  the  withdrawal  of  part  of  the 
claims  put  forward  by  the  Colombian  Government  and 
the  reference  of  the  remaining  points  to  the  arbitration 
of  the  Spanish  Crown,  but  a similar  controversy  with 
Ecuador  has  still  to  be  settled.  With  both  Bolivia  and 
Brazil  the  boundary  of  Peru  has  yet  to  be  definitely 
fixed,  but  in  neither  case  should  there  be  any  difficulty 
unless  unexpected  complications  arise. 

* President  Candamo  died  at  Arequipa  on  May  7,  1904,  and  for 
some  weeks  previously  during  his  illness  the  Government  was  admini- 
stered by  Vice-President  Calderon.  Senor  Calderon  is  a member  of 
the  Civilista  Party,  and  took  part  in  the  opposition  to  President 
Caceres,  which  ended  in  overturning  the  military  regime  that  was  in 
force  from  1884  to  1895. 

2 L 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

peru — continued 

Movement  of  Population.  Effect  of  Wars  and  Revolutions.  Decrease 
of  Inhabitants.  Races  of  Peru.  Conflicting  Elements  in  Popula- 
tion. Japanese  Immigration.  Infantile  Mortality.  Unhygienic 
Conditions.  Alcoholism.  National  Language.  Similarity  with 
Semitic  Customs  and  Words.  Topographical  Zones.  Education. 
Primary  Instruction.  Educational  Statistics.  Secondary  and 
Higher  Education.  Justice.  Legal  Procedure.  Influence  of 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  National  Character.  Municipal 
Government.  Typical  Spanish  Features  in  Lima.  City  of 
Arequipa.  The  Commercial  Situation.  Trade  Conditions. 
Financial  Situation.  Contract  with  Bondholders.  The  Peruvian 
Corporation.  Internal  Debt.  Taxation.  The  Currency  Ques- 
tion. Industrial  Occupations.  Sugar  Enterprise.  Labour 

Question.  Cotton  Production.  Coffee  and  Cacao.  Minor 

Agricultural  Products.  Pastoral  Industry.  Llamas  and  Alpacas. 
Minerals.  Difficulties  of  Mining  Enterprise.  Cerro  de  Pasco. 
Silver  Production.  Petroleum.  Coal.  Borax.  Mining  Laws. 
The  Rubber  Districts.  Manufacturing  Industry.  Cotton  and 
Woollen  Mills.  Panama  Hats.  Motive  Power  for  Manufactur- 
ing. Development  and  Transport. 

The  question  of  the  movement  of  population  is  one  of 
the  many  serious  problems  confronting  Peru  at  the 
present  time.  No  census  has  been  taken  since  1876, 
when  the  total  number  of  inhabitants  was  returned  as 
2,621,844  ; but  these  statistics  were  based  largely  on 
guesswork,  and  the  figures  given  cannot  be  accepted  as 
accurate,  although  they  are  an  indication  of  the  state  of 
affairs  a quarter  of  a century  ago. 

Since  1876  the  conditions  have  been  materially 
modified.  The  war  with  Chile  resulted  in  the  deaths 

530 


President  Romana. 


r Face  page  530. 


ECONOMIC  SITUATION 


531 


1903] 


of  30,000  able-bodied  men  by  land  and  sea  between 
1879  and  1883,  and  as  many  more  died  of  wounds 
received  and  hardships  endured  in  Tarapaca,  Tacna, 
and  Arica,  the  vicinity  of  Lima,  and  in  the  desultory 
warfare  in  the  interior  after  the  Chilian  occupation  of 
the  National  Capital.  In  the  revolutionary  movements 
against  Iglesias  in  1884  and  1885,  and  in  the  rising 
against  Caceres  in  1894  and  1895,  the  loss  of  life  was 
also  heavy,  and  the  misery  resulting  from  this  constant 
turmoil  since  1876  has  told  its  tale  with  overwhelming 
effect,  and  caused  unusually  high  mortality  in  both  towns 
and  country  districts.  Weakened  by  privation  from  an 
insufficiency  of  the  common  necessaries  of  life  the 
people  have  been  unable  to  withstand  sickness,  and 
ordinary  ailments  have  proved  as  disastrous  as  serious 
epidemics  would  have  been  under  different  circum- 
stances. The  outcome  is  that  districts  fairly  well 
populated  when  the  census  of  1876  was  compiled  are 
now  practically  deserted,  and  everywhere  semi- 
abandoned  villages  are  striking  proof  that  a shrinkage 
of  the  population  has  occurred  with  startling  rapidity. 
Nor  has  the  urban  population  increased  to  counter- 
balance the  diminution  in  the  rural  districts,  for  in  most 
cases  there  is  also  a marked  falling  off  in  its  numbers. 
The  authorities  have  hesitated  to  order  another  census 
through  a disinclination  to  show  the  true  state  of 
affairs,  but  the  opinion  of  well-informed  persons  who 
have  devoted  attention  to  the  matter  is  that  an  accurate 
census  to-day  would  fall  short  of  1,500,000 — about  one- 
half  of  the  population  in  1876. 

The  people  of  Peru  comprise  several  distinct  races, 
each  with  its  clearly  defined  traits.  The  dominant 
element  consists  of  the  descendants  of  the  Spanish 
conquerors ; but,  naturally,  in  a community  where  the 
ruling  element  is  small  in  numerical  proportion  to  the 
subjugated  population,  a mixture  of  races  occurred.  In 
the  course  of  the  last  four  centuries,  Indian  blood  has 
filtered  into  the  veins  of  the  Spanish  residents,  and  few 
exceptions  to  this  rule  are  found  at  the  present  time ; 


532 


PERU 


and  amongst  the  Indian  population,  forming  the  great 
mass  of  the  inhabitants,  the  evidence  of  a Spanish  strain 
is  also  apparent  in  every  district,  although  dwarfed  by 
the  preponderance  of  native  blood.  In  place  of  Spanish 
blood  raising  Indian  civilisation  to  a higher  level,  it  has 
been  thrown  into  the  background  by  the  superior  weight 
of  surrounding  circumstances.  Apart  from  the  Spanish 
and  the  Indian  sections  are  the  negroes  and  Asiatics, 
the  former  brought  to  the  country  from  Africa,  and  the 
latter  introduced  as  labourers  after  the  emancipation  of 
the  slaves.  A mongrel  element  has  arisen  in  more 
recent  years  from  a mixture  of  negro  blood  with  Spanish 
and  Indian,  and  Asiatic  with  Indian  and  negro  and 
that  of  Spanish  descent.  Little  love  is  lost  between  the 
varied  people  who  make  up  the  present  population,  and 
racial  quarrels  are  common.  According  to  statistical 
returns  in  the  census  of  1876,  no  less  than  75  per  cent, 
of  the  total  population  consisted  of  Indians ; 23  per 
cent,  was  classified  under  Cholo  (mixed  Indian  and 
Spanish)  and  Zambo  (mixed  negro  and  Spanish) ; the 
remaining  20  per  cent,  was  of  Spanish  descent,  18,000 
Europeans,  and  25,000  Asiatics,  principally  Chinese. 
With  the  exception  of  the  Chinese,  who  have  decreased 
during  the  last  three  decades,  the  proportion  of  nation- 
alities is  now  only  slightly  different  from  the  census  of 
1876. 

Immigration  is  practically  nil.  From  Europe  a few 
persons  drift  to  the  country,  and  from  South  American 
states  individuals  find  their  way  to  Peru,  but  the 
departure  of  foreign  residents  counterbalances  any 
addition  to  the  population  from  outside  sources. 
Recently,  the  experiment  of  introducing  Japanese  for 
work  as  labourers  was  attempted,  but  did  not  prove 
satisfactory.  There  is  little  inducement  for  foreigners 
of  European  or  American  nationality  to  choose  Peru 
for  permanent  settlement ; the  climate  is  uninviting  for 
the  inhabitants  of  northern  Europe,  and  the  people 
from  southern  zones  find  more  suitable  conditions 
prevailing  in  Argentina  and  Brazil,  where  Italians, 


1903]  MOVEMENT  OF  POPULATION 


533 


Spaniards,  and  Portuguese  meet  with  large  colonies  of 
kindred  blood. 

There  are  two  principal  causes  tending  to  check 
increase  in  the  population  of  Peru.  The  first  is  the 
unprecedented  rate  of  infantile  mortality,  the  absence 
of  all  proper  attention  and  nourishment  for  newly-born 
infants  being  the  reason  alleged  for  this  unsatisfactory 
condition.  Extreme  domestic  poverty  is  certainly  con- 
ducive to  carelessness  in  regard  to  children,  and  an 
inability  to  attend  to  their  welfare ; but  the  natural 
physique  of  the  Indian  is  not  sturdy,  and  this  inclination 
to  bodily  weakness  is  unduly  fomented  by  the  unhygienic 
conditions  under  which  the  poorer  portion  of  the 
inhabitants  dwell  in  town  and  country,  and  no  attempt 
is  made  by  national  or  municipal  authorities  to  remedy 
the  existing  unsanitary  state  of  affairs.  The  second 
factor  threatening  the  depopulation  of  Peru  is  alcohol- 
ism, the  abuse  of  strong  drink  largely  contributing 
towards  the  debility  which  characterises  the  infantile 
population.  It  is  impossible  that  the  offspring  of 
drink-sodden  fathers  and  mothers  can  grow  to  maturity 
with  sound  health,  and  unfortunately  poverty  is  no 
obstacle  to  indulgence  in  spirituous  liquor.  The  local 
manufacture  of  cheap  drink  is  extensive,  and  the  product 
is  sold  at  such  low  prices  that  for  a few  cents  a large 
quantity  can  be  purchased.  The  impurity  of  this  cheap 
spirit  is  notorious,  and  the  harmful  result  from  its 
constant  use  cannot  be  overestimated.  The  Government 
could  mitigate  the  evil  by  imposing  restrictive  taxation 
on  its  manufacture ; but  no  steps  have  been  taken  in 
this  direction,  and  it  is  to  this  supine  attitude  in  regard 
to  national  hygiene  and  the  liquor  traffic  that  many  of 
the  economic  difficulties  of  to-day  can  be  traced.  The 
depopulation  of  the  country  means  the  ruin  of  industrial 
enterprise  for  lack  of  labourers,  a condition  yearly 
more  keenly  experienced,  and  which  must  be  rapidly 
accentuated  unless  effective  measures  are  adopted  to 
check  its  course. 

While  Spanish  has  been  the  official  language  of 


534 


PERU 


Peru  since  the  conquest  of  the  Inca  Empire,  a very 
large  proportion  of  the  inhabitants  retain  the  vernacular 
of  Quichua  in  some  districts,  Aymara  in  others ; in  some 
sections  of  the  country  these  latter  tongues  are  the  only 
means  of  communication,  and  this  fact  is  one  evidence 
of  the  limited  efforts  for  the  education  of  the  poorer 
classes.  Both  Quichua  and  Aymara  contain  many 
words  of  Semitic  origin,  and  this  similarity  suggests  the 
theory  that  the  Inca  people  were  not  the  aborigines  of 
South  America,  but  descendants  of  Asiatics.  Although 
no  satisfactory  evidence  has  been  discovered  to  support 
this  supposition,  there  are  many  customs  and  practices 
of  the  Indians  which  bear  striking  resemblance  to  those 
in  vogue  during  the  later  Babylonian  era. 

For  rough  purposes  of  topographical  description, 
Peru  may  be  divided  into  four  zones.  These  are  the 
districts  bordering  on  the  coast-line,  the  lower  ranges 
and  valleys  of  the  country  a short  distance  inland,  the 
great  Cordillera  of  the  Andes,  and  the  section  sloping 
to  the  tributaries  of  the  Amazon.  On  the  coast-line 
there  is  almost  no  rainfall,  except  in  the  territory  a few 
degrees  south  of  the  equator,  and  in  the  second  zone 
little  rain  falls,  but  the  valleys  are  fertile  on  account  of 
abundant  water  from  the  rivers  fed  by  snow  from  the 
high  altitudes.  The  third  zone  comprises  the  great 
Andine  ranges,  many  sections  of  these  lying  above  the 
perpetual  snow-line ; and  the  fourth  consists  of 
mountainous  forest  country  broken  by  high  ridges  and 
deep  valleys,  the  altitude  rapidly  descending  until  the 
vicinity  of  the  rivers  Napo,  Maranon,  and  Beni  is 
reached,  where  the  climate  is  moist  and  warm,  and  the 
country  clothed  with  dense  vegetation. 

Elementary  education  is  more  backward  in  Peru 
than  in  Chile  or  Argentina.  Nominally,  primary  instruc- 
tion is  compulsory,  but  no  efforts  are  made  to  secure 
the  attendance  of  children  by  the  various  municipalities 
which  control  the  system.  So  lax  are  the  methods  that 
no  regular  returns  are  furnished  to  the  National  Govern- 
ment, and  no  regular  inspection  is  attempted.  As  a 


1903] 


EDUCATIONAL  PROGRESS 


535 


rule,  the  payment  of  teachers  is  on  so  low  a scale  that 
few  persons  can  be  induced  to  give  their  services.  In 
addition  to  other  defects,  no  attempt  is  made  to  bring 
the  Indian  population  under  educational  influence,  and 
this  section  of  the  inhabitants,  by  far  the  most  numerous 
in  Peru,  is  regarded  as  so  far  beyond  the  pale  of 
modern  civilisation  that  only  a minute  proportion  arrive 
at  maturity  with  a knowledge  of  reading  and  writing. 
Under  such  conditions,  no  wonder  the  religious  orders 
control  the  educational  system  of  the  country,  for  in 
many  cities  clerical  schools  are  maintained  and  the 
children  are  sent  to  these  in  preference  to  the  public 
establishments. 

According  to  a report  recently  submitted  to  Congress 
by  the  Minister  of  Justice,  Worship,  and  Instruction, 
the  number  of  schools  open  for  primary  education  in 
1898  was  1465,  and  of  these  1152  were  under  official 
and  304  under  private  control.  The  number  of  pupils 
attending  the  official  schools  was  computed  at  32,904 
boys  and  15,830  girls,  and  the  attendance  at  the  private 
establishments  was  returned  as  6643  boys  and  5355  girls. 
If  these  figures  are  approximately  correct,  the  number 
of  children  between  five  and  fifteen  years  undergoing 
elementary  instruction  was  60,663,  or  10  per  cent,  of 
that  part  of  the  population  to  which  the  law  of  com- 
pulsory education  applies.  The  cost  of  primary  instruc- 
tion was  476,889  soles,  about  238,000  gold  dollars,  an 
average  per  head  of  $4.90  for  the  twelve  months.  The 
number  of  male  certificated  teachers  employed  in  public 
schools  was  349,  and  uncertificated  661,  and  of  female 
certificated  teachers  450,  and  uncertificated  158,  while 
the  attendance  in  each  school  was  43,  and  the  average 
salary  paid  to  teachers  in  the  public  schools  was  162 
gold  dollars.  While  these  statistics  are  published  under 
official  authority,  they  cannot  be  considered  reliable, 
returns  being  only  forwarded  by  a small  proportion  of 
the  municipalities. 

For  secondary  education  there  aretwenty-two  colleges 
for  males  and  one  for  females,  and  the  cost  of  their 


536 


PERU 


maintenance  is  defrayed  from  the  national  revenue. 
The  number  of  students  inscribed  in  1898  was  1984, 
the  average  attendance  1403;  out  of  1562  students 
examined  1186  satisfactorily  passed  the  required  test,  and 
the  cost  per  student  for  the  year  was  103.50  gold  dollars. 
The  requirements  of  higher  education  are  met  by  four 
Universities,  situated  respectively  at  Lima,  Arequipa, 
Cuzco,  and  Trujillo,  the  San  Marcos  University  at  Lima 
being  the  most  ancient  in  America,  its  charter  having 
been  granted  by  Carlos  V.  in  1551.  The  Universities 
have  faculties  of  jurisprudence,  medicine,  political 
science,  theology,  and  applied  science,  and  degrees  are 
granted  in  these  subjects.  In  1898  the  number  of 
students  matriculating  was  1551,  and  1220  under- 
graduates passed  satisfactory  final  examinations.  For 
technical  education  a school  of  mines  and  civil  engineer- 
ing was  founded  at  Lima  in  1874,  and  there  is  also  an 
agricultural  college,  while  High  Schools  under  British, 
German,  and  Italian  superintendence  exist  and  are  fairly 
well  supported. 

The  educational  system  of  Peril  inclines  more  to  the 
benefit  of  the  classes  able  to  pay  for  instruction  than 
towards  the  mass  of  the  inhabitants  with  no  available 
funds  for  such  purposes.  For  the  Indian,  who  possesses 
many  qualities  in  the  shape  of  aptitude  for  industrial 
occupations,  nothing  is  done,  nor  has  any  effort  in  this 
direction  been  made  since  the  Spanish  conquest  de- 
stroyed Inca  civilisation. 

The  administration  of  justice  in  Peru  could  not  be 
more  unsatisfactory  than  it  is,  and  to  designate  as  justice 
the  manner  the  laws  are  administered  is  to  convey  an 
erroneous  impression.  To  obtain  a favourable  verdict 
bribery  must  be  practised,  and  it  is  a question  of  who 
has  the  longest  purse  when  a decision  is  reached.  To 
this  widely  sweeping  assertion  there  are  no  exceptions, 
the  Supreme  Court  being  no  cleaner  than  the  lower 
tribunals,  it  differs  only  in  that  payment  must  be  on  a 
higher  scale.  An  example  of  the  existing  conditions 
occurred  recently,  when  an  important  suit  involving 


1903] 


THE  JUDICIARY 


537 


250,000  gold  dollars  was  pending  in  the  Supreme  Court. 
On  the  bench  were  five  judges,  and  the  evidence  on  one 
side  was  clear  and  concise,  leaving  no  doubt  of  the 
rights  of  the  case.  A few  days  before  judgment  was 
delivered,  the  principal  litigant  received  information  that 
an  adverse  verdict  would  be  given  unless  a bribe  was 
forthcoming,  and  not  having  the  necessary  funds,  he 
applied  to  a banker  for  an  advance  of  10,000  gold  dollars 
to  buy  a third  vote,  explaining  that  he  had  secured  two 
others.  The  loan  was  obtained,  and  after  a favourable 
judgment  was  pronounced  the  10,000  dollars  were  paid  to 
the  member  casting  the  deciding  vote.  In  this  case  a 
just  verdict  was  bought,  but  it  happens  quite  as  often 
that  injustice  is  obtained  by  similar  means. 

The  judicial  officials  are,  as  a rule,  too  ignorant  to 
turn  to  best  use  the  legal  power  entrusted  to  them. 
They  are  so  inadequately  remunerated  that  they  are 
tempted  to  corrupt  practices  at  every  turn,  and  it  is 
due  to  these  circumstances  that  blackmailing  has  become 
of  such  common  occurrence.  No  redress  can  be  obtained 
as  affairs  are  conducted  to-day,  and  the  most  hopeless 
feature  of  the  situation  is  that  the  ordinary  citizen  does 
not  appreciate  the  necessity  for  an  impartial  administra- 
tion of  justice.  He  has  a vague  idea  that  there  are  such 
persons  as  honest  judges  in  other  parts  of  the  world, 
but  he  is  not  sure  that  an  upright  judiciary  in  Peru 
would  be  an  unmitigated  blessing. 

The  influence  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  Peru 
is  widespread,  and  its  power  is  felt  in  both  public  and 
private  life.  The  city  of  Arequipa  is  the  clerical  strong- 
hold, and  the  fact  that  better  educational  facilities  are 
afforded  by  its  religious  institutions  than  elsewhere  in 
the  Republic  enables  the  influential  standing  of  the  clergy 
to  be  maintained  to  an  unusual  extent  in  national  affairs. 
It  is  worthy  of  note  that  in  the  many  revolutionary 
movements  the  possession  of  Arequipa  has  almost 
always  been  the  turning-point  of  the  revolt,  and  when 
public  opinion  in  that  city  is  in  accord  with  the  inhabitants 
of  Lima,  the  Government  has  no  reason  to  fear  serious 


538 


PERU 


complications.  The  reverse  is  disastrous,  and  it  was  so 
in  1884  in  the  rising  against  Iglesias,  and  again  in  the 
movement  headed  by  Pierola  in  1894-5,  when  President 
Caceres  was  driven  from  office.  In  regard  to  domestic 
life  the  dominating  influence  of  clerical  authority  is  most 
marked,  even  to  the  dress  of  women  when  attending 
church  services ; and  it  is  an  unwritten  edict  that  they 
appear  at  religious  functions  in  the  manta  in  place  of 
hat  or  bonnet ; so  rigorously  is  this  enforced,  that  it  is 
seldom  any  member  of  a congregation  dare  infringe  the 
custom.  While  the  men  may  not  be  imbued  with 
marked  religious  inclination,  they  dread  disobeying  the 
authority  of  the  Church,  and  among  the  Indian  popula- 
tion the  Catholic  priesthood  is  regarded  with  superstitious 
awe  and  fear.  The  memories  of  the  cruelties  of  past 
centuries  have  been  handed  down,  and  the  conduct  of 
the  clergy  in  recent  years  has  not  inspired  any  great 
confidence  in  the  reserved  and  timid  nature  of  Quichuas 
or  Aymaras,  and  the  fact  cannot  be  ignored  that  the 
parish  priest  in  outlying  districts  has  been  corrupt  and 
oppressive.  Of  course  exceptions  are  to  be  found,  and 
there  are  men  who  labour  to  perform  good  work  in  the 
face  of  many  difficulties,  but  these  are  in  the  minority. 

Any  diagnosis  of  the  national  character  of  the  Indian 
population  is  difficult,  for  there  is  little  in  common 
between  the  descendant  of  the  Spaniard  and  the  survivor 
of  the  Incas.  The  Peruvian  Indian  is  reserved  in  all 
intercourse  with  the  race  which  conquered  him,  and  the 
stamp  of  a vanquished  people  is  everywhere  apparent- 
lie  has  little  individuality,  and  small  effort  is  ever  made 
by  him  to  adopt  the  methods  and  ways  of  the  conquerors. 
There  is  no  communication  of  thought  between  Spaniard 
and  Indian,  the  former  still  retaining  the  traits  of  the 
victor,  and  the  latter  an  attitude  of  patient  endurance 
and  suffering  which  has  become  ingrained,  and  beyond 
this  cloak  the  inner  man  seldom  emerges.  Nor  is  there 
anything  in  the  life  of  the  Indian  to  induce  any  effort 
for  a higher  ideal.  The  civilisation  of  the  Incas  was 
crushed  beyond  any  hope  of  reconstruction,  and  nothing 


1903] 


NATIONAL  CHARACTER 


539 


has  replaced  it.  From  a fairly  high  standard  of  intelli- 
gence enjoyed  five  hundred  years  ago,  the  Indian  has 
sunk  to  a level  little  better  than  that  of  brute  creation  ; 
these  people  labour  that  they  may  gain  a livelihood,  but 
beyond  this  their  mental  capacity  does  not  reach. 

Municipal  government  in  most  of  the  cities  is  far 
behind  the  times.  To  a great  extent  this  is  due  to  the 
poverty-stricken  conditions  prevailing  in  recent  years, 
and  even  in  the  National  Capital,  at  Arequipa,  and  in 
Callao,  little  effort  is  made  to  safeguard  the  inhabitants 
from  disease.  In  the  municipalities  foreigners  are 
accorded  equal  rights  with  natives,  and  in  many  cases 
foreign  residents  are  chosen  as  alcaldes.  In  Lima  some 
progress  has  been  made  recently  in  lighting  and  paving 
the  streets,  but  the  city  lags  far  behind  other  South 
American  centres  in  regard  to  modern  improvements. 
Lima,  however,  has  some  redeeming  features  contrasting 
favourably  with  the  other  more  modern  communities. 
It  is  a bit  of  old  Spain,  and  four  centuries  have  failed  to 
erase  the  typical  features  of  Spanish  architecture  im- 
planted by  the  colonists  who  followed  Pizarro  from  the 
Mother  Country.  Thoroughfares  flanked  by  flat-roofed 
houses  with  their  overhanging  balconies  of  carved 
wood ; great  doorways  leading  to  gaily-coloured  court- 
yards ; open,  sun-bleached  squares  at  intervals ; iron 
gratings  over  doors  and  windows,  rusted  with  age, 
uncared  for,  but  artistic ; these  and  other  reminiscences 
of  Spain  and  Spaniards  are  found  at  every  turn.  In  the 
cathedral  lies  the  body  of  Pizarro,  the  founder  of  Lima, 
his  remains  encased  in  a glass  coffin,  to  satisfy  the 
curiosity  of  the  wayfarer.  From  the  cathedral  steps  on 
the  one  side  can  be  seen  the  quarter  where  the  con- 
spirators assembled  to  assassinate  the  first  viceroy  of 
Peru,  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  square  is  the 
Government  Palace  where  he  was  done  to  death.  His 
murderers  crossed  the  Plaza,  forcing  an  entrance  to  the 
vice-regal  residence,  and  to  escape  his  assailants  Pizarro 
took  refuge  in  the  chapel,  the  assassins  killing  him  on 
the  altar  steps.  Changes  there  have  been,  but  the  main 


540 


PERU 


outlines  of  local  colour  are  hardly  modified  since  the 
time  when  the  conqueror  of  Peru  was  struck  down  by 
the  men  he  had  led  so  often  to  victory. 

A story  illustrates  the  small  intelligent  interest 
taken  by  Peruvians  in  the  history  of  their  country. 
One  day  Mr  Galenga,  the  Times  correspondent,  was 
visiting  the  cathedral  in  company  with  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  paused  to  examine  the  body  of 
Pizarro.  He  remarked  on  the  peculiar  shape  of  the 
head,  and  said  it  showed  many  features  similar  to 
Indian  skulls  he  had  seen  in  Peru.  “ That  is  not 
extraordinary,”  said  the  Minister,  “ nearly  all  Peruvians 
have  Indian  blood  in  their  veins.” 

Another  spot  in  the  Peruvian  capital  which  carries 
one  back  for  many  long  years  is  the  Plaza  de  la 
Inquisition.  The  headquarters  of  that  awful  institution 
were  lodged  in  the  building  now  used  as  the  Congress 
Hall,  and  under  the  great  shade  trees  surrounding  this 
place  and  giving  grateful  protection  from  a tropical  sun, 
was  where  men  and  women  were  sacrificed  for  refusing 
to  acknowledge  a religious  faith  for  which  they  had  no 
sympathy.  Many  houses  in  the  Inquisition  Square  at 
the  present  time  were  standing  when  those  helpless 
victims  were  dragged  from  the  torture  chambers  to 
suffer  the  last  penalty  a distorted  fanaticism  could 
devise. 

Callao  gives  rise  to  other  feelings,  for  it  is  a modern 
town  created  when  Peru  was  wealthy  and  her  foreign 
trade  flourishing.  The  bombardment  by  the  Spanish 
squadron  in  1866  laid  a portion  of  the  city  in  ashes,  and 
the  war  with  Chile  completed  the  ruin.  The  trade  is 
gone,  the  town  reduced  to  one-quarter  its  former  im- 
portance, and  the  population  decreased  to  one-third  of 
the  number  it  contained  in  prosperous  times. 

Arequipa  as  a city  has  a personality  distinct  from 
other  Peruvian  centres.  Often  have  the  streets  been 
laid  in  ruins  by  earthquakes,  and  to  guard  against  such 
destruction  every  room  in  the  one-storied  dwellings  is 
built  like  a cell,  the  curved  stone  roof  of  each  chamber 


1903] 


CITIES  OF  PERU 


541 


rendered  strong  by  the  presence  of  a heavy  keystone. 
Towering  over  the  city  is  the  great  mountain  of  the 
Misti,  regarded  with  superstitious  awe  by  the  inhabitants, 
and  from  its  snow-capped  peak  come  puffs  of  smoke, 
inducing  a sense  of  mystery  that  time  cannot  modify. 
In  Arequipa  black-robed  priests  are  in  every  street ; and 
the  fact  that  it  is  the  stronghold  of  Catholicism  can 
never,  never  be  forgotten,  for  clerical  influence  dominates 
the  community,  and  controls  political  and  social  life  to 
an  extent  that  is  mediaeval  in  effect. 

Commerce  in  Peru  has  passed  through  many 
vicissitudes  in  the  last  quarter  of  a century.  When 
the  exportation  of  guano  reached  high-water  mark 
money  was  abundant,  and  the  trade  of  the  country  was 
benefited  proportionately  ; but  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
with  Chile  in  1879  was  a severe  blow  to  the  commercial 
community,  and  all  business  interests  suffered  in  direct 
ratio  to  the  gravity  of  the  reverses  sustained  by  the 
Peruvian  arms  at  sea  and  on  land. 

The  restoration  of  peace  and  the  evacuation  of 
Peruvian  territory  by  the  Chilians  was  followed  by 
internal  disturbances,  and  this  effectually  checked  any 
revival  of  commercial  prosperity.  The  producing 
centres  of  Peruvian  industry  were  paralysed,  owing  to 
the  large  percentage  of  able-bodied  men  who  had  been 
killed  or  crippled  in  the  war,  and  because  the  country 
had  lost  the  wealth  of  the  nitrate  fields  of  Tarapaca  and 
a part  of  the  guano  deposits,  on  which  the  value  of 
exports  had  largely  depended  in  former  years.  Stagna- 
tion in  all  branches  of  trade  was  inevitable,  and  the 
importance  of  Peru  as  a market  for  foreign  mer- 
chandise dwindled  to  small  proportions.  It  is  true 
that  between  1886  and  1894  no  serious  internal  dis- 
turbances took  place ; but  corruption  in  the  public 
administration  during  that  period  provoked  such  uneasy 
feeling  that  lack  of  confidence  in  the  future  prevented 
any  expansion  of  trade,  and  when  the  revolution  of 
1894-5  broke  out,  the  probability  of  any  immediate 
revival  of  commerce  was  nipped  in  the  bud.  With  the 


542 


PERU 


accession  of  President  Pierola  in  1895  prospects  became 
brighter,  and  continued  to  improve  steadily  until  1898, 
when  the  influence  of  a more  settled  political  situation 
became  clearly  apparent  and  trade  showed  indications 
of  expanding.  The  volume  of  imports  and  exports 
increased  and  a more  hopeful  spirit  in  everyday 
business  transactions  developed,  an  improvement  that 
has  continued  and  that  promises  to  attain  substantial 
proportions  in  the  next  decade. 

Peru,  therefore,  shows  signs  of  emerging  from  the 
intricate  complications  created  by  reckless  borrowings 
and  the  irresponsible  administration  of  former  days. 
An  external  indebtedness  which,  with  arrears  of  interest 
on  the  bonds,  amounted  to  £54,000,000  in  1889,  has 
been  compounded  for  by  a contract  made  to  transfer  to 
the  bondholders  for  a term  of  sixty-six  years  the  State 
railways  and  other  privileges,  including  an  annual 
money  subsidy  of  £80,000.  The  outcome  of  this  trans- 
action was  the  formation  of  the  Peruvian  Corporation, 
a company  in  which  the  Peruvian  State  creditors 
became  ordinary  shareholders.  In  this  way  Peru  was 
relieved  of  her  debt  charge,  the  bondholders  perforce 
accepting  the  terms  offered  as  the  only  chance  left  to 
them.  But  the  contract  has  proved  a fruitful  bone  of 
contention,  and  has  consequently  done  more  to  check 
the  rehabilitation  of  Peruvian  credit  abroad  than  any- 
thing else.  Under  the  agreement  the  Corporation 
undertook  to  construct  extensions  of  the  existing 
railway  system,  the  understanding  being  that  the 
annual  subvention  would  be  utilised  to  defray  the 
interest  on  the  capital  required  for  this  purpose.  But, 
as  was  evident  to  impartial  observers,  this  subvention 
was  greater  than  the  national  resources  could  bear,  and 
the  Government  soon  dropped  into  arrears  with  the 
payments,  whereupon  the  Corporation  abandoned  the 
construction  of  the  additional  railways  until  such  time 
as  the  terms  of  the  contract  were  fulfilled.  The  dispute 
has  dragged  on  to  the  present  date,  the  Government 
declaring  that  the  Corporation  has  forfeited  valuable 


1903]  THE  PERUVIAN  CORPORATION  543 


concessions  granted  under  the  agreement  of  1890 
through  not  completing  the  required  railway  extensions. 
The  Corporation  has  a nominal  capital  of  £9,000,000  in 
ordinary  shares,  £7,500,000  in  4 per  cent,  preference 
shares,  and  debentures  in  circulation  for  £3,700,000,  out 
of  an  authorised  issue  of  £6,000,000.  For  some  years 
it  was  necessary  to  reduce  the  debenture  interest  to 
3 per  cent.,  but  in  1901  the  earnings  were  sufficient  to 
admit  of  a higher  rate,  and  in  1903  payment  in  full  was 
made. 

The  internal  indebtedness  of  the  Peruvian  Govern- 
ment consists  of  the  following  obligations  : — 


Soles. 

1.  Interest-bearing  funded  debt  . . 26,600.000 

2.  Non-interest-bearing  funded  debt  . 5,140.000 

3.  Floating  debt  ....  4,000,000 

4.  Various  claims  ....  500.000 


Total  . . 36,240,000 


Interest  on  the  interest-bearing  funded  debt  is  paid 
at  the  rate  of  1 per  cent,  annualiy,  and  the  stock  is 
quoted  in  the  local  markets  at  7 per  cent,  of  the  face 
value  of  the  bonds.  The  non-interest-bearing  debt  is 
being  liquidated  at  the  rate  of  20,000  soles  per  month  by 
public  tender.  From  these  figures  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  present  total  indebtedness  is  small. 

The  revenue  of  £1,300,000  sterling  is  derived  from 
custom-house  duties  levied  on  imported  and  exported 
merchandise,  yielding  about  60  per  cent,  of  the  total ; 
from  internal  taxes,  which  are  farmed  out  and 
represent  20  per  cent,  of  the  receipts ; from  the  salt 
monopoly ; posts  and  telegraphs ; and  various  small 
items  aggregating  about  1,000,000  soles  annually.  Of 
the  expenditure,  25  per  cent,  is  due  to  the  Department 
of  War  and  Marine ; an  equal  amount  is  devoted  to 
charges  in  connection  with  National  Finances ; the 
Ministry  of  Interior  absorbs  20  per  cent.  ; 15  per  cent, 
is  nominally  expended  on  Justice,  Worship,  and  Educa- 
tion ; and  the  remainder  is  credited  to  the  conduct  of 


544 


PERU 


foreign  affairs,  Congress,  and  public  works.  While 
the  revenue  is  not  large,  it  has  augmented  considerably 
in  the  last  five  years,  and  with  improving  commerce 
there  is  a prospect  of  a substantial  increase  in  the 
receipts  of  the  custom-house,  so  that  the  actual  position 
of  the  Government  is  by  no  means  unsatisfactory.  The 
country  is  poor ; but  there  is  no  heavy  burthen  of 
indebtedness  to  be  confronted,  and  so  long  as  internal 
peace  endures,  the  resources  should  be  sufficient  to 
enable  certain  improvements  to  be  effected  and  to 
obviate  the  danger  of  any  serious  deficit. 

Peru  has  been  through  the  general  experience  of 
South  American  republics  in  regard  to  the  question  of 
currency.  Silver  took  the  place  of  gold  as  the  circulat- 
ing medium,  then  came  the  inconvertible  note  issue ; 
and  in  the  epoch  of  the  war  with  Chile  the  resources  of 
the  Government  were  reduced  to  such  a low  ebb  that 
further  emissions  of  paper  money  were  made.  Gradu- 
ally the  value  of  the  notes  became  depreciated  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  be  practically  worthless,  and  a silver 
currency  was  then  again  established ; but  the  fall  in 
value  of  this  metal  resulted  in  such  violent  fluctuations 
in  the  exchange  rate  of  the  sol  that  the  authorities 
determined  to  revert  to  a gold  standard.  So,  during  the 
Administration  of  President  Pierola  in  1898,  gold  once 
more  became  the  standard  currency  of  the  Republic.  To 
make  matters  more  easy,  the  value  of  the  pound  sterling 
was  fixed  by  law  at  10  soles,  the  half-sovereign  being 
legal  tender  for  5 soles,  and  a limited  number  of 
Peruvian  libras  of  equal  fineness  and  weight  as  the 
English  sovereign  were  coined,  the  supply  being  gradu- 
ally augmented  during  the  last  five  years.  Thus  the 
present  coinage  is  simple  and  convenient ; 1 libra  equals 
10  soles,  1 sol  100  cents,  and  the  change  from  a silver 
to  a gold  standard  was  effected  without  producing  serious 
difficulties,  although  at  the  time  it  was  enforced  the 
exchange  value  of  the  sol  was  only  equal  to  40  gold 
cents,  while  the  new  law  arbitrarily  raised  the  legal 
value  to  50  gold  cents. 


1903] 


INDUSTRIAL  ENTERPRISE 


545 


Industrial  occupation  in  Peru  is  principally  confined 
to  agriculture  and  mining.  The  growth  of  cane  and  the 
manufacture  of  the  juice  into  sugar  is  one  of  the  chief 
sources  of  wealth,  and  affords  employment  to  large 
numbers  of  labourers.  The  total  production  of  sugar  at 
the  present  time  is  about  150,000  tons  annually,  this 
amount  comparing  favourably  with  the  returns  of  half  a 
dozen  years  ago,  when  only  70,000  tons  were  available 
for  export  after  the  home  demand  was  covered.  In 
many  districts  the  climate  offers  exceptional  advantages 
for  the  sugar  industry  ; in  the  valleys  the  soil  is  rich,  and 
when  water  can  be  obtained  for  irrigation  the  yield  is 
unusually  prolific.  The  fact  that  rain  seldom  falls  has 
two  advantages  which  are  lacking  in  Cuba  and  other 
islands  of  the  West  Indies;  first,  a very  high  density  in 
the  juice,  and,  consequently,  less  difficulty  in  evaporation 
during  manufacture ; and  secondly,  the  grinding  of  the 
canes  can  be  continued  the  year  round,  because  there  is 
no  wet  season.  This  dryness  is  of  undoubted  value,  as 
smaller  machinery  is  required  than  in  countries  where 
the  milling  can  only  be  conducted  during  the  short 
period  when  dry  weather  prevails,  and  the  saving 
effected  in  the  amount  of  capital  required  in  a manu- 
facturing plant  permits  of  the  production  of  sugar  at 
such  an  unusually  low  cost  as  allows  profits  to  be  made 
even  in  years  when  prices  were  depreciated  by  the  keen 
competition  of  beet  sugars  grown  under  the  continental 
bounty  system. 

At  present  the  area  under  cultivation  with  cane  is 
estimated  to  be  150,000  acres,  and  an  additional  50,000 
acres  on  the  estates  is  utilised  to  maintain  the  work 
animals  employed  in  the  fields  and  to  grow  food  for  the 
labourers.  In  the  course  of  the  next  few  years  the 
yield  from  this  area  should  reach  200,000  tons  annually, 
and  as  the  local  demand  rarely  exceeds  20,000  tons,  the 
surplus  available  for  shipment  abroad  will  form  a valu- 
able item  in  the  national  wealth.  One,  however,  of  the 
great  difficulties  in  the  sugar  industry  is  an  adequate 
labour  supply,  the  field  hands  employed  being  Indians, 


646 


PERU 


negroes,  and  Chinese.  As  regards  the  Indians  the 
condition  of  affairs  is  not  satisfactory.  Occasionally  an 
ample  supply  of  labourers  can  be  obtained  ; but  the  men 
only  work  when  they  require  money  for  special  purposes, 
and  cannot  be  depended  upon  at  all  seasons  of  the  year. 
Negroes  make  fairly  good  plantation  hands ; but  their 
number  is  limited,  and  they  prove  refractory  and  trouble- 
some when  employed  on  equal  terms  with  Chinamen 
or  Indians.  Chinamen  have  given  the  best  results,  but 
for  some  years  past  the  Chinese  Government  has  refused 
to  allow  emigration  to  Peru,  and  the  number  at  present 
in  the  country  is  rapidly  diminishing.  A few  years  ago 
800  Japanese  coolies  were  introduced  for  plantation 
work  ; but  they  proved  deficient  in  physique  and  unable 
to  withstand  the  long  hours  and  severe  strain  incident 
to  cane  cultivation,  and  the  experiment  has  not  been 
repeated. 

In  former  years  Great  Britain  was  the  market  for 
the  bulk  of  Peruvian  sugars,  but  the  trade  has  changed. 
The  United  States  and  Chile  have  been  the  principal 
purchasers  since  1898,  the  refineries  of  those  two 
countries  offering  better  terms  to  producers  than  could 
be  obtained  in  Europe.  Shipments  of  sugar  to  New 
York  are  made  by  way  of  Panama,  and  by  direct 
steamers  via  the  Straits  of  Magellan ; and  notwith- 
standing the  heavy  freight  charged,  the  Peruvian  product 
competes  successfully  in  New  York  with  that  of  Cuban 
origin. 

The  cultivation  of  cotton  is  another  important 
industry  in  Peru.  In  1898  the  quantity  exported  was 
6712  tons,  the  United  States  being  a purchaser  of  655 
tons,  and  the  bulk  of  the  remainder  being  shipped  to 
Great  Britain.  There  are  six  cotton  mills  in  Reru,  these 
chiefly  producing  the  cheap  calicoes  in  use  among  the 
poorer  classes.  Cotton  seed  and  oil  cake  is  also 
exported,  the  amount  sent  abroad  in  1898  being  3322 
tons  and  1469  tons  respectively.  One  of  the  principal 
cotton-producing  centres  is  Piura  in  the  north,  but  there 
Mie  crop  is  dependent  on  a precarious  rainfall  and  the 


Gold  Drinking-Cup  of  the  Inca  Period. 
(Now  in  possession  of  C.  W.  Gould  of  New  York.) 


[ Face  page  54G. 


1903]  AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTIONS  547 


yield  is  frequently  scanty,  whereas  in  those  sections  of 
the  country  where  the  fields  can  be  irrigated,  this  risk  is 
reduced  to  a minimum.  A large  proportion  of  Peruvian 
cotton  is  long  staple  fibre,  and  is  used  in  many  foreign 
factories  for  mixing  with  silk  and  other  material. 

Next  to  cotton  in  importance  comes  coffee.  This 
industry  was  only  attempted  on  an  extensive  scale 
during  the  last  decade,  and  the  total  area  under  cultiva- 
tion is  only  6000  acres,  the  average  annual  export  being 
1300  tons,  and,  in  addition,  about  800  tons  is  consumed 
locally.  The  districts  in  which  the  development  of  coffee 
plantations  has  principally  taken  place  are  Chanchamayo 
and  the  Pirene,  the  industry  having  been  fostered  by  the 
Peruvian  Corporation  to  give  value  to  the  land  owned 
in  that  neighbourhood  ; but  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
cultivation  have  greatly  hindered  expansion,  labourers 
having  been  scarce  and  transport  to  the  seaboard 
exceedingly  costly.  At  present  the  coffee  is  carried  on 
mules  or  donkeys  for  a journey  of  seven  or  eight  days 
before  the  nearest  railway  point  is  reached,  and  small 
profit  is  left  to  the  grower  when  all  charges  are  paid. 
The  cultivation  of  cacao  is  attended  with  similar 
obstacles.  Cuzco  is  the  centre  of  the  industry,  and  in 
1898  the  surplus  available  for  export  to  foreign  countries 
was  618  tons,  the  bulk  being  sent  to  Germany  and 
Bolivia.  Rice  is  grown  to  some  extent,  and  the  quantity 
shipped  abroad  annually  is  5000  tons.  Peruvian  bark, 
the  coca  leaf,  some  cocaine,  and  other  minor  articles 
find  a market  outside  the  country. 

Pastoral  industry  is  not  attempted  on  any  extensive 
scale.  Cattle  breeding  is  confined  to  an  effort  to  meet 
local  demand  for  beef  animals,  and  the  supply  is  often 
inadequate.  The  hides  are  utilised  for  manufacturing 
leather,  a surplus  of  2127  tons  remaining  for  export  in 
1898,  and  of  this  the  United  States  purchased  509  tons, 
the  greater  part  of  the  rest  being  shipped  to  Great 
Britain.  Sheep  are  raised  for  mutton  and  wool,  but 
are  not  numerous,  and  goats  for  meat  and  their  skins. 
Llamas  and  alpacas  are  bred  for  beasts  of  burthen  and 


548 


PERU 


for  the  wool  they  give,  the  total  of  this  wool  shipped  in 
1898  being  3488  tons.  A considerable  quantity  of  this 
material  is  required  in  the  woollen  factories  at  Lima 
and  Arequipa,  and  a certain  amount  is  consumed  by 
the  Indians  in  the  manufacture  of  handmade  fabrics 
for  use  by  themselves.  Alpaca  wool  is  valuable  ; but  as 
the  animals  are  only  clipped  once  in  every  two  years,  the 
yield  is  not  sufficiently  remunerative  to  induce  any  great 
addition  in  the  number  bred.  Besides,  climatic  condi- 
tions in  Peru  offer  only  limited  inducements  for  pastoral 
industry,  and  little  development  in  this  direction  can  be 
anticipated  in  the  future. 

It  is  in  minerals  that  the  great  natural  wealth  lies. 
At  present  the  immense  deposits  of  copper  have  been 
worked  to  a most  limited  extent,  silver  mines  have  been 
developed  only  when  exceptionally  rich  ores  have  been 
found,  and  the  search  for  gold  has  seldom  been  systema- 
tically attempted.  Difficulty  of  transport  and  disturbed 
internal  conditions  have  been  two  prominent  factors 
against  mining  enterprise,  and  are  largely  responsible  for 
the  small  output  to-day,  the  total  value  exported  hitherto 
not  exceeding  6,000,000  gold  dollars  annually  of  recent 
years.  It  is  only  since  1898  that  the  copper  deposits 
have  received  careful  attention  in  view  of  a possibility 
of  opening  them  up  to  commerce.  The  Cerro  de  Pasco 
district  has  long  been  worked  for  silver,  and  although 
copper  was  known  to  exist  in  that  neighbourhood,  it  was 
considered  worthless  in  view  of  the  heavy  cost  of  trans- 
port to  the  seaboard  ; but  a rise  in  the  value  of  this 
metal  placed  matters  on  a different  footing,  and  investi- 
gation into  the  character  of  the  deposits  near  Cerro  de 
Pasco  revealed  the  fact  that  the  ore  was  extremely  rich 
and  could  be  obtained  in  immense  quantities.  All 
expert  mining  engineers  who  have  visited  the  district 
since  1898  are  agreed  as  to  the  great  possibilities  of  the 
industry,  and  in  spite  of  the  many  difficulties  of  com- 
munication with  the  coast,  much  development  has  taken 
place,  copper  worth  1,500,000  gold  dollars  having  been 
shipped  abroad  in  1899.  In  1900  the  exportation 


1903] 


MINERAL  RESOURCES 


549 


remained  stationary,  but  in  1901  much  greater  activity 
was  noted.  The  project  of  a railway  to  connect  Cerro 
de  Pasco  with  the  Central  Railway  of  Peru  is  now  in 
course  of  realisation,  and  once  this  is  finished  the  pro- 
duction of  copper  ores  in  Cerro  de  Pasco  will  expand  to 
5000  tons  per  month  instead  of  1000  tons  as  at  present, 
if  credence  be  given  to  the  opinion  of  experts  who  have 
examined  the  districts.  According  to  apparently  trust- 
worthy reports  on  these  deposits,  the  supply  of  ore, 
averaging  from  30  to  40  per  cent,  of  copper,  can  be 
calculated  in  millions  of  tons,  and  in  the  vicinity  is  coal 
for  smelting  purposes.  Transport  to  the  seaboard  and 
capital  for  development  are  the  two  things  required  to 
place  the  industry  on  a sound  commercial  basis,  and 
both  these  requisites  will  be  forthcoming  through  the 
aid  of  American  energy,  which  has  now  taken  the  matter 
in  hand. 

The  district  of  Cerro  de  Pasco  promises  also  to  add 
largely  to  the  silver  production  of  Peru.  Its  great  silver 
mines  have  been  flooded  for  a long  period,  but  a company 
has  been  formed  to  drain  them  by  a tunnel,  at  an 
estimated  cost  of  600,000  gold  dollars.  At  present  the 
value  of  silver  exported  from  Peru  is  3,500,000  gold 
dollars  annually ; but  with  the  draining  of  the  flooded 
district  this  should  be  doubled,  and  possibly  more  than 
doubled.  Naturally,  the  low  prices  for  silver  during  the 
past  few  years  have  affected  this  branch  of  mining,  but 
in  spite  of  that  many  mines  have  been  steadily  worked 
over  a wide  area. 

While  gold  is  known  to  exist  in  considerable  quan- 
tities in  Peru,  there  has  not  been  as  yet  any  great 
development  in  this  branch  of  mining,  and  as  a rule 
the  discoveries  of  payable  gold  have  been  made  in 
localities  difficult  of  access,  and  where  the  climate  has 
been  a deterrent.  In  the  districts  of  Carabaya  and 
Sandia  valuable  mines  have  been  worked  during  the 
last  few  years,  and  fair  quantities  of  gold  recovered  from 
both  quartz  reefs  and  alluvial  washings,  and  all  informa- 
tion tends  to  indicate  that  these  sections  of  the  country 


550 


PERU 


are  comparatively  rich  ; but  until  better  protection  for 
life  and  property  is  accorded,  and  communication  with 
the  littoral  made  easier,  there  is  no  great  prospect  of 
rapid  development.  Probably  the  best  known  of  the 
Peruvian  gold  mines  is  Santo  Domingo,  in  Carabaya, 
which  has  been  worked  by  a North  American  syndicate. 

Petroleum  is  found  in  large  quantities  in  the  north, 
and  more  especially  in  the  department  of  Piura,  and 
£400,000  has  been  invested  in  undertakings  to  work 
the  oil  fields,  the  bulk  of  it  British.  The  principal 
concern  is  the  London  Pacific  Company,  established  at 
Talara,  near  Payta,  where  several  wells  have  been  sunk 
to  a depth  of  900  feet,  and  the  crude  oil  is  run  through 
pipes  for  miles  to  the  refining  works  at  Talara. 
Kerosene  is  made  for  local  use  in  Peru,  and  crude  oil 
is  shipped  to  supply  fuel  to  various  factories  and  railways, 
but  no  export  trade  in  this  product  has  been  created. 
Coal  is  found  at  Cerro  de  Pasco,  Trujillo,  and  Hualgayoc, 
and  the  deposits  are  stated  to  be  extensive,  but  lack  of 
transport  has  prevented  it  from  reaching  the  seacoast 
for  general  use.  Several  railways  are  projected  to  tap 
the  coal  districts,  and  it  is  probable  that  one  or  other 
of  these  schemes  may  take  practical  form  in  the  near 
future. 

The  discovery  of  an  extensive  borax  deposit  in  a 
locality  forty-five  miles  to  the  south-east  of  Arequipa 
led  to  an  industrial  development  of  considerable  import- 
ance. The  property  was  purchased  by  a British  syndicate, 
and  a company  known  as  “ Borax  Consolidated  ” com- 
menced active  operations.  In  1897  the  amount  exported 
was  11,850  tons;  in  1898  the  total  shipped  fell  to  7177 
tons ; but  the  work  is  continued  energetically,  and  has 
brought  prosperity  to  the  neighbourhood.  The  supply 
comes  from  a lake  covering  an  area  of  51,000,000 
metres,  and  the  thickness  of  the  deposit  is  stated  to 
be  from  8 to  10  inches. 

In  one  respect  the  Government  could  aid  materially 
in  the  development  of  mining  enterprise  of  all  descrip- 
tions. The  mining  laws  in  force  are  defective  in  many 


1903] 


DEFECTIVE  MINING  LAWS 


551 


directions,  but  especially  because  they  permit  unjust 
claims  against  companies  or  individuals  who  have  pur- 
chased properties  in  good  faith  and  invested  money  in 
development  work.  In  many  such  cases  the  claims 
put  forward  are  of  a blackmailing  order,  yet  no  redress 
can  be  obtained  in  the  Peruvian  courts  because  of  the 
expense  and  worry  the  proceedings  entail,  and  the  know- 
ledge that  these  practices  are  frequent  deters  capitalists 
from  investing  in  Peruvian  mining  ventures. 

In  the  forest  regions  on  the  Atlantic  slope  of  the 
Andine  ranges  Peru  has  a source  of  wealth  not  yet 
touched,  although  the  districts  watered  by  the  tributaries 
of  the  river  Amazon  contain  vast  numbers  of  rubber- 
yielding  trees.  Occasionally,  however,  expeditions  are 
despatched  by  private  enterprise  to  collect  the  gum, 
and  in  the  vicinity  of  Iquitos,  a point  on  the  upper 
waters  of  the  Amazon  to  which  ocean-going  steamers 
regularly  ply,  the  gathering  of  rubber  has  become  an 
established  industry.  In  1898  a route  was  opened  from 
the  terminus  of  the  Oroya  railway  to  Iquitos  to  facilitate 
communication  with  Lima,  and  this  highway  runs  from 
the  end  of  the  line  to  Puerto  Bermudez  on  the  Pichis 
river,  thence  a service  of  steam  launches  under  Govern- 
ment supervision  is  established  to  connect  with  Iquitos. 
Twenty  days  is  required  to  make  the  journey  from  Lima 
to  Iquitos  under  existing  conditions,  while  previous  to 
the  opening  of  this  route  Iquitos  was  inaccessible  for 
all  practical  purposes  from  the  seaboard  of  the  Pacific. 
It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  amount  of  rubber  annually 
exported  from  Peruvian  territory,  for  a percentage  of 
the  total  yield  is  forwarded  through  Brazilian  ports  and 
is  classified  as  coming  from  that  country.  In  1898  the 
official  returns  showed  that  1525  tons  had  been  shipped, 
and  it  is  safe  to  calculate  that  the  quantity  actually 
collected  in  Peru  and  sent  abroad  does  not  fall  short 
of  2000  tons  annually  at  the  present  time.  In  the 
future,  when  communication  to  the  rubber  districts 
becomes  less  difficult,  the  annual  exportation  should  sub- 
stantially increase.  Other  products  of  the  Peruvian 


552 


PERU 


forests  are  Peruvian  bark,  dye  woods,  and  many  valuable 
classes  of  timber,  but  the  lack  of  transport  renders  the 
timber  useless,  although  with  altered  conditions  it  will 
be  an  item  of  no  little  importance  in  the  national 
resources. 

Manufacturing  industry  is  confined  to  six  cotton 
mills  ; two  factories  for  the  production  of  woollen  fabrics, 
one  at  Lima  and  the  other  at  Arequipa  ; a match  factory 
at  Callao,  in  which  United  States  capital  is  invested ; 
concerns  for  making  soap  and  candles ; a brewery  and 
ice  manufactory  at  Lima ; the  local  trade  in  bootmaking 
and  other  leather  work ; and  the  manufacture  of  straw 
hats  near  Payta  and  Piura.  The  hats  are  made  from  a 
fine  straw  imported  from  Ecuador,  and  are  known 
abroad  under  the  name  of  Panama ; the  finer  kinds 
so  delicate  in  workmanship  that  they  can  only  be  made 
at  night,  because  the  heat  during  the  daytime  renders 
the  straw  too  brittle  for  weaving.  In  1898  the  value 
of  the  shipments  was  53,000  gold  dollars.  At  many 
places  in  Peru  abundant  water  supply  is  available  for 
motive  power,  and  coal  will  be  easy  to  obtain  when 
transport  to  the  districts  in  which  the  deposits  lie  is 
established,  so  that  there  is  no  reason  why  manufactures 
should  not  expand. 

But  development  is  eve^where  checked  by  deficient 
means  of  communication  and  transport.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  1901  the  total  length  of  railways  open  was 
917  miles,  and  of  these,  816  miles  belonged  to  the 
Peruvian  Corporation,  47  miles  were  worked  by  the 
National  Government,  and  21  miles  were  in  the  hands 
of  private  companies  ; but  the  majority  of  these  lines  are 
quite  isolated  from  each  other,  and  lateral  branches  are 
everywhere  needed  to  tap  areas  of  territory  rich  in 
mineral  and  agricultural  resources.  The  Cerro  de 
Pasco  district  is  a case  in  point,  where  great  wealth  lies 
unutilised  on  account  of  difficulty  of  access,  and  the 
non-production  of  coal  in  Peru  is  another  example  of 
this  lack  of  equipment.  At  present  the  conveyance  of 
all  merchandise  to  and  from  the  interior  is  largely 


1903]  INADEQUATE  MEANS  OF  TRANSPORT  553 

dependent  on  the  use  of  mules,  donkeys,  or  llamas,  a 
method  at  once  costly  and  tedious.  Eoads  for  wheeled 
traffic  are  found  only  in  a few  isolated  instances  near 
populous  centres  close  to  the  coast-line,  and  where 
these  have  been  constructed  they  are  seldom  properly 
maintained. 

While  the  attention  of  the  Government  has  been 
repeatedly  called  to  these  shortcomings,  little  practical 
effort  is  made  towards  improvement.  Occasionally 
money  is  voted  for  road-making,  as  was  done  in  the 
case  of  the  opening  up  of  communication  to  the  Iquitos 
district ; but  one  such  experiment  exhausts  all  available 
funds,  and  years  elapse  before  anything  more  is 
attempted.  Possibly  the  resources  of  the  National 
Exchequer  may  be  too  limited  to  permit  substantial 
expenditure  on  means  of  transport;  but  the  difficulty 
might  be  overcome  by  granting  concessions  to  private 
individuals  for  the  construction  of  roads  and  railways, 
and  the  establishment  of  more  adequate  wharf  accom- 
modation at  the  various  ports.  In  time,  doubtless, 
better  means  of  communication  will  be  created ; but 
until  then,  the  expansion  of  industrial  enterprise  must 
be  slow. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

BOLIVIA 

Political  Conditions  before  War  with  Chile.  Conservatives  and 
Liberals.  Peruvian  Intrigues.  President  Daza.  Situation  of 
Bolivia  when  Hostilities  Ceased.  President  Campero.  Reform  of 
the  Constitution.  Negotiations  with  Chile.  Presidency  of 
Senor  Pacheco.  President  Arce.  Argentine  and  Chilian 
Pretensions.  Treaty  with  Argentina.  Indian  Outbreak. 
President  Baptista.  Attitude  of  Chile.  Senor  Severo  Alonzo 
succeeds  Baptista.  Sedition  fomented  by  Liberals.  Outbreak 
of  Insurrection.  Abdication  of  Alonzo.  Provisional  Government 
under  Pando.  Casualties  during  the  Revolution.  Election 
of  Pando.  Question  with  Chile.  The  Konig  Note.  The 
Acre  Dispute.  The  National  Capital.  Means  of  Com- 

munication and  Seditious  Outbreaks.  Internal  Politics. 
The  White  Population.  The  Political  Significance  of  the 
Indians.  Stories  of  Indian  Ferocity.  Geographical  Posi- 
tion. Disturbed  Internal  Conditions  and  Economic  Pro- 
gress. Area  and  Population.  Classification  of  Inhabitants. 
Bolivian  Cities.  Topographical  Features.  The  Four  Zones. 

Bolivian  Languages.  Local  Colour.  Native  Customs.  Educa- 
tion. Primary  Instruction.  Secondary  and  Higher  Education. 
Administration  of  Justice.  National  Character.  Communication 
with  Bolivia.  Lack  of  Internal  Transport  Facilities.  Industrial 
Enterprise.  Agriculture.  The  Mining  Industry.  Silver  Pro- 
duction. Indiarubber.  Pastoral  Industry.  The  Financial 
Situation.  Commercial  Conditions. 


The  political  condition  of  Bolivia,  after  its  independ- 
ence from  Spain  and  until  comparatively  modern  times, 
is  aptly  illustrated  by  an  anecdote  told  of  the  treatment 
of  a Consul  for  Holland  by  a certain  President.  The 
Consul,  who  had  suffered  serious  injury  through  illegal 
action  of  the  Executive,  personally  demanded  protection 

554 


1879] 


POLITICAL  SITUATION 


555 


from  the  President,  and  the  latter  stated  he  was  aware 
of  the  circumstances  but  could  not  interfere.  “But,” 
said  the  Consul,  “I  represent  the  Paises  Bajos”  (Low 
Countries).  “Well,”  replied  the  President,  “I  control 
the  Paises  Altos  (High  Countries),  and  if  you  make 
trouble,  I will  put  you  in  prison  and  keep  you  there.” 

Previous  to  the  outbreak  of  war  with  Chile  in  1879, 
political  development  in  Bolivia  was  practically  confined 
to  the  centralisation  of  the  Administration  in  the  hands 
of  a limited  group  of  whites.  This  oligarchy  contained 
two  factions,  classified  under  the  designation  of  Con- 
servatives and  Liberals  ; but  there  was  little  difference  in 
their  political  principles,  and  no  very  marked  variety 
distinguished  their  policy  when  in  office.  The  terms 
Conservative  or  Liberal  merely  served  as  a political  war- 
cry  for  ambitious  politicians  anxious  to  control  public 
affairs,  and  for  this  reason  they  have  survived  through 
the  many  political  vicissitudes  of  the  past  quarter  of 
a century. 

In  the  decade  between  1869  and  1879,  Peruvian 
intrigues  were  active  in  Bolivia,  and  exercised  marked 
influence  on  the  policy  of  the  Government,  more  especi- 
ally in  connection  with  the  attitude  assumed  towards 
Chilian  citizens  and  Chilian  enterprise  near  Antofagasta 
and  other  districts  of  Atacama.  The  result  of  this 
intriguing  was  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  in 
1873,  which  subsequently  led  to  disastrous  results  to  both 
countries.  As  details  of  this  treaty  and  its  consequences 
are  described  in  the  account  of  the  war  of  1879,  it  is 
only  necessary  to  make  this  slight  reference  to  them 
here.  When  the  conflict  with  Chile  broke  out  in  1879, 
President  Hilarion  Daza  was  head  of  the  Executive  in 
Bolivia,  and  it  was  due  to  his  short-sighted  policy  and  to 
the  fact  that  he  lent  a ready  ear  to  the  insinuating 
suggestions  of  the  Peruvian  representatives,  that  Bolivia 
drifted  into  a struggle  from  which  no  satisfactory  result 
was  looked  for  by  those  who  had  any  knowledge  of  the 
facts.  The  incapacity  of  Daza  was  only  too  fully 
demonstrated  as  warlike  operations  developed  and  mis- 


556 


BOLIVIA 


fortunes  rapidly  accumulated,  for  when  the  crisis  came  he 
lacked  energy  to  organise  resistance  to  the  Chilians,  and 
made  no  effort  through  diplomatic  channels  to  mitigate 
the  disaster  into  which  he  had  plunged  his  country. 

Bolivia  was  in  sorry  plight  when  hostilities  ceased. 
The  maritime  provinces  on  the  Pacific  Ocean  were 
occupied  by  the  Chilians ; the  Peruvian  territory  of 
Tacna  and  Arica,  through  which  the  larger  proportion 
of  the  foreign  commerce  of  Bolivia  passed,  was  in  their 
hands ; and  the  control  of  the  valuable  deposits  of 
nitrate  of  soda  in  Atacama  was  lost.  The  country  had 
become  landlocked  as  a result  of  the  war,  and  was  in 
so  friendless  a situation  that  no  effective  resistance  was 
possible  to  any  terms  the  victors  might  propose. 
Thorough  disorganisation  in  domestic  affairs  was  the 
natural  consequence  of  these  misfortunes,  and  confusion 
was  at  its  height  in  foreign  relations  also  when,  in 
December,  1879,  Daza  was  deposed,  and  a temporary 
Administration  formed  for  the  remainder  of  his  term  of 
office. 

The  next  occupant  of  the  Presidency  was  General 
Narcisco  Campero,  who,  like  his  predecessor,  was  a 
soldier,  but  who  entertained  intelligent  ideas  as  to  the 
immediate  necessity  of  establishing  peace  with  Chile 
and  reducing  internal  disorders.  He  introduced  the 
Law  of  Constitution  of  October  28,  1880,  under  which 
Bolivia  is  at  present  administered.  By  its  provisions 
the  executive  power  is  vested  in  a President,  elected 
for  a term  of  four  years  by  direct  popular  vote,  and 
not  eligible  for  re-election  when  that  term  expires,  with 
the  legislative  authority  in  the  hands  of  a Congress 
of  two  Chambers — the  Senate  and  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies.  The  suffrage  is  granted  to  all  adult  male 
Bolivians  qualified  by  a knowledge  of  reading  and  writ- 
ing. The  Senators,  18  in  number,  are  chosen  for  a 
term  of  six  years ; the  Deputies,  of  whom  there  are  64, 
are  elected  for  four  years.  Senators  and  Deputies 
receive  a salary  of  200  pesos  per  month,  and  an  allowance 
to  cover  travelling  expenses — the  latter  no  small  item 


1880] 


LAW  OF  CONSTITUTION 


557 


in  consequence  of  the  long  journeys  necessary  in  a 
country  where  roads  are  few  and  railways  almost 
unknown.  The  Law  of  Constitution  provides  for  two 
Vice-Presidents  and  a Ministry  with  five  portfolios,  viz., 
Foreign  Relations  and  Worship,  Finance  and  Industry, 
Government  and  Colonisation,  Justice  and  Public 
Instruction,  and  War.  In  each  department  the  supreme 
political,  administrative,  and  military  authority  is  vested 
in  a prefect  nominated  by  the  President. 

In  the  direction  of  restoring  internal  order  and 
peaceable  relations  with  Chile,  President  Campero 
accomplished  results  which,  if  not  all  that  could  be 
desired,  were  a distinct  relief  to  the  community. 
Administrative  functions  resumed  a normal  course  after 
a period  of  confusion  following  the  collapse  of  the 
Bolivians  in  their  struggle  with  Chile,  and  in  1882 
negotiations  were  opened  with  Chile,  with  the  result 
that  in  1884  the  Pacto  de  Tregua  (Agreement  of  Truce) 
was  signed.  Five  months  afterwards  the  presidential 
period  expired,  and  Campero  resigned  office  to  his 
successor,  Senor  Pacheco. 

President  Pacheco’s  Administration  lasted  from 
August,  1884,  to  August,  1888,  but  was  not  remarkable 
for  occurrences  exercising  permanent  influence  on  the 
national  history.  Internal  affairs  drifted  along  without 
any  substantial  effort  to  improve  them.  The  modus 
vivendi  established  by  President  Campero  with  Chile 
continued  in  force,  and  no  attempt  was  made  to  bring 
about  a modification  of  the  agreement,  or  to  celebrate 
a permanent  treaty  of  peace  in  place  of  the  temporary 
truce  patched  up  in  1884.  At  the  expiration  of  his 
term  Pacheco  was  succeeded  by  Senor  Arce,  the  official 
candidate  for  the  Presidency,  and  who  had  been  declared 
elected. 

President  Arce  had  not  been  long  in  office  before  he 
turned  his  attention  to  the  Chilian  question.  The 
Bolivian  Government  was  in  no  position  to  negotiate 
directly  with  Chile  for  a mitigation  of  the  conditions 
imposed  in  1884,  and  Arce  determined  to  appeal  to 


558 


BOLIVIA 


Argentine  sympathy  to  strengthen  the  case  of  Bolivia 
in  her  anxiety  to  regain  a seaport  on  the  Pacific,  and 
a section  of  territory  which  would  allow  the  passage  of 
Bolivian  commerce  to  the  seaboard  under  the  Bolivian 
flag.  The  President  in  approaching  the  Argentine 
Government  was  influenced  by  the  fact  that  the  jealous 
feeling  existing  between  Argentina  and  Chile  would 
ensure  a hearing  for  any  proposals  put  forward  by 
Bolivia,  and  he  was  not  far  wide  of  the  mark.  Senor 
Baptista  was  nominated  Minister  to  Argentina,  and  the 
Argentine  authorities  were  carefully  sounded  about 
supporting  Bolivian  pretensions  for  regaining  some 
portion  of  the  lost  territory. 

The  idea  of  any  direct  alliance  between  Bolivia  and 
Argentina  found  small  favour  in  the  latter  country  if 
such  action  was  for  the  sole  purpose  of  assisting  the 
Bolivians,  and  a further  proposal  was  then  made  that 
Bolivia  should  join  the  Argentine  Confederation.  While 
this  project  held  out  many  possibilities  to  the  Argentines, 
it  was  not  acceptable  to  the  Bolivians,  and  after  con- 
siderable discussion  the  matter  was  dropped.  A treaty 
was  concluded  finally  in  1891  by  Senor  Baptista  with 
Argentina,  by  which  the  latter  country  agreed  to  support 
the  Bolivian  cause,  but  only  on  the  understanding  that 
the  question  of  the  absorption  of  Bolivia  by  Argentina 
should  be  brought  forward  again  when  an  opportunity 
occurred.  Subsequent  events  in  the  Administration  of 
Senor  Baptista,  after  he  succeeded  Arce  in  the  Presi- 
dency, made  this  compact  a dead  letter. 

Apart  from  this  endeavour  to  enlist  Argentine 
sympathy  in  favour  of  Bolivia,  little  of  interest  occurred 
during  the  Arce  Administration.  An  outbreak  of  the 
Indian  population  took  place  in  consequence  of  certain 
arbitrary  acts  committed  by  the  Government  in  con- 
nection with  land  to  which  the  Indians  laid  claim,  and 
had  been  accustomed  to  farm  for  generations.  The 
rising  was  not  a serious  danger  to  the  Government,  and 
was  suppressed  without  extraordinary  effort,  although 
not  without  a considerable  sacrifice  of  life  amongst  the 


1891]  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  ARGENTINA  559 


national  forces  and  the  deaths  of  a large  number  of 
Indians  in  the  skirmishes  that  occurred  before  peace 
was  restored. 

In  August  of  1892  President  Arce  vacated  the 
Presidency  in  favour  of  Senor  Baptista,  for  whose 
election  official  influence  had  been  unsparingly  used. 
The  new  President  thoroughly  approved  the  policy  of 
the  former  Administration  in  regard  to  Argentina  as  a 
set  off  against  Chile,  and  endeavoured  to  consummate 
the  task  initiated  by  his  predecessor,  but  events  occurred 
that  put  an  end  to  the  attempt. 

In  1893  the  Chilian  authorities  became  aware  of  the 
negotiations  between  Bolivia  and  Argentina,  and  immedi- 
ately took  steps  to  annul  tho  friendly  understanding  the 
two  neighbours  had  established,  with  such  effect  that  a 
protocol  was  signed  by  which  Chile  promised  to  concede 
to  Bolivia  a port  on  the  Pacific  and  made  many  other 
concessions  that  the  Bolivians  deemed  of  paramount 
importance  to  their  welfare.  Whether  these  conces- 
sions were  made  in  good  faith  or  not  is  impossible  to 
say,  but  they  were  never  carried  out  in  the  spirit  put 
forward  from  1893  to  1895,  when  they  formed  the 
subject  of  negotiation  between  President  Baptista  and 
the  Chilian  Government.  The  practical  result  was  to 
tie  the  hands  of  Baptista  in  dealing  with  Argentina 
and  to  give  time  for  Chile  to  decide,  without  undue 
haste,  upon  the  most  advantageous  attitude  to  adopt 
towards  the  critical  nature  of  the  developments.  While 
all  remained  unsettled  the  term  of  President  Baptista 
expired,  and  in  August,  1896,  he  was  succeeded  by 
Senor  Severo  Fernandez  Alonzo,  who  had  occupied 
the  post  of  Minister  of  War  under  the  Baptista  Ad- 
ministration and  was  the  official  candidate  for  presi- 
dential honours. 

President  Alonzo  had  not  been  many  months  in 
office  before  discontent  was  fomented  by  his  political 
adversaries.  The  so-called  Liberal  Party  had  long 
been  kept  out  of  power,  and  now,  under  the  leadership 
of  Colonel  Pando,  determined  to  make  a strong  effort 


560 


BOLIVIA 


to  obtain  control  of  public  affairs.  The  nominal  issues 
on  which  the  movement  was  based  were  an  agitation 
for  a decentralising  reform  of  the  Law  of  Constitution, 
by  which  the  Departments  would  become  self-governing 
Provinces,  and  to  make  the  city  of  La  Paz  the  National 
Capital.  Alonzo  was  aware  of  the  inclination  of 
Colonel  Pando  to  head  the  revolutionary  outbreak ; but 
he  hoped  to  draw  him  to  his  side  by  making  various 
personal  concessions  to  him,  one  being  the  grant  of  a 
large  tract  of  land  in  the  rubber  districts,  which  for  a 
few  months  so  occupied  Pando’s  attention  that  he 
temporarily  left  political  matters  alone.  On  his  return 
from  these  lands  the  question  of  revolution  was  again 
discussed,  and  in  1898  armed  insurrection  broke  out 
against  the  Administration. 

At  first  the  insurgents  made  little  progress.  Ammu- 
nition and  arms  were  difficult  to  obtain,  and  the  uprising 
was  practically  confined  to  guerilla  warfare  in  the  out- 
lying districts.  Towards  the  close  of  the  year,  however, 
Colonel  Pando  succeeding  in  collecting  a supply  of  war 
material,  and  with  the  aid  of  these  fresh  consignments 
of  rifles  and  cartridges  he  raised  strong  contingents 
from  the  Indian  population  to  swell  the  rebel  ranks. 
Matters  now  began  to  look  serious  for  President  Alonzo, 
and  his  cause  was  sensibly  weakened  in  the  early  part 
of  1899  by  the  desertion  of  many  military  officers  to  the 
insurrection.  The  revolution  was  further  strengthened 
in  April,  1899,  by  a series  of  successful  skirmishes,  the 
prestige  of  which  brought  many  recruits,  so  that 
gradually  the  position  of  Alonzo  became  untenable. 
District  after  district  fell  into  the  hands  of  his  enemies, 
and,  finally,  in  July  he  decided  to  abandon  the  Presi- 
dency— a resolution  carried  into  effect  when  he  with 
his  immediate  supporters  left  the  country  by  way  of  the 
railway  from  Oruro  to  Antofagasta  to  take  refuge  in 
Chile. 

Immediately  after  a Provisional  Government  was 
formed  under  Colonel  Pando,  and  measures  were  taken 
to  hold  a presidential  election.  The  Chambers  were  also 


1899]  ELECTION  OF  PRESIDENT  PANDO  561 


convened  and  other  normal  conditions  re-established. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  with  the  success  of  the 
insurrection  against  the  Alonzo  Administration,  the 
question  of  any  reform  of  the  Law  of  Constitution  for 
the  extension  of  self-government  to  the  Departments 
was  dropped,  as  well  as  the  agitation  for  making  La 
Paz  the  National  Capital.  The  two  objects  for  which 
the  revolution  had  been  ostensibly  supported  were 
entirely  lost  sight  of,  and  the  fact  at  once  became 
obvious  that  the  movement  had  been  initiated  only  to 
oust  President  Alonzo  and  his  followers,  and  to  permit 
the  Liberals  under  Colonel  Pando  to  obtain  control  of 
the  country. 

Although  the  insurrection  had  continued  for  eighteen 
months  and  reports  of  battles  and  heavy  losses  of  life 
on  both  sides  had  been  freely  circulated  abroad,  the 
actual  number  of  casualties  throughout  the  period  of 
disturbance  was  extremely  limited.  In  place  of  the 
thousands  of  men  supposed  to  have  been  killed  and 
wounded  during  the  operations,  the  official  reports 
published  after  the  restoration  of  peace  showred  that 
only  157  deaths  had  occurred,  and  that  the  number  of 
wounded  was  not  large.  Some  difficulty  was  experi- 
enced in  disarming  the  Indians,  who  had  formed  a 
strong  section  of  the  insurgent  forces,  but  it  was 
accomplished  in  the  end  without  serious  trouble. 

In  due  course  the  presidential  election  was  held  and 
Colonel  Pando  formally  declared  Chief  Magistrate,  for 
no  opposition  was  offered,  his  defeat  of  President  Alonzo 
having  given  him  such  prestige  that  he  carried  all 
before  him  when  the  question  came  before  the  con- 
stituencies. The  term  of  Colonel  Pando  expired  in 
1904.  He  had  been  confronted  with  some  intricate 
problems,  but  he  held  common- sense  views  on  domestic 
and  international  affairs,  and  proved  of  service  to  Bolivia 
when  the  complicated  dispute  with  Chile  required  much 
tact,  and  also  when  occurrences  in  connection  with  the 
district  of  Acre  threatened  to  strain  relations  with 
Brazil. 

2 N 


562 


BOLIVIA 


The  crux  of  the  dispute  with  Chile  is  the  keen 
desire  of  Bolivia  to  recover  a seaport  on  the  Pacific. 
In  1895  the  Chilian  Government  promised  to  concede 
an  outlet  to  the  coast-line  as  the  consideration  for  a 
definite  treaty  of  peace  by  which  Chilian  ownership 
of  the  territory  occupied  since  the  war  of  1879  should 
be  formally  recognised.  Certain  developments  occurred 
which  prevented  Chile  making  this  concession,  and  at 
the  close  of  1900  a note  was  presented  to  the  Bolivian 
Government  by  Senor  Konig,  the  Chilian  minister, 
suggesting  other  means  of  settling  the  differences 
between  the  two  countries  without  the  seaport.  This 
new  proposal  is  not  palatable  to  the  Bolivians,  but  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  they  can  obtain  better  terms.  They 
have  no  military  force  to  resist  the  conditions  Chile 
may  impose,  and  active  assistance  from  Argentina 
cannot  now  be  expected.  In  regard  to  Acre  the  danger 
lay  in  the  possibility  of  a conflict  with  Brazil  through 
the  majority  of  the  inhabitants  being  Brazilians  ; but, 
with  the  exception  of  an  insignificant  portion,  the 
territory  was  recognised  as  belonging  to  Bolivia  by 
boundary  treaties  between  the  two  countries.  The 
inhabitants,  however,  objected  to  the  establishment  of 
Bolivian  authority,  and  this  feeling  led  to  the  proclama- 
tion of  Acre  as  an  independent  State,  a step  followed  in 
1900  by  the  despatch  of  troops  under  General  Velesco  to 
overthrow  the  new  Republic  and  install  Bolivian  officials. 
Early  in  1901  Velesco  reported  that  his  mission  had 
been  successful,  and  the  dispute  has  since  been  settled 
amicably  by  mutual  concessions  embodied  in  a treaty 
defining  the  boundary,  signed  in  November,  1903. 

The  existing  arrangement  as  to  the  National  Capital 
is  inconvenient  for  the  inhabitants,  and  unsatisfactory 
from  a political  point  of  view.  The  official  seat  of 
Government  alternates  between  La  Paz,  Sucre,  Oruro, 
and  Cochabamba,  and  the  Congress  is  convoked  some- 
times at  one  and  sometimes  at  another  of  these  places, 
with  the  result  that  Government  offices  have  to  be  moved 
and  archives  transferred  at  great  expense  and  risk. 


[ Face  page  564. 


Indian  Hut  at  Cochabamba. 


1904] 


THE  NATIONAL  CAPITAL 


563 


Only  a few  years  ago  a baggage  train  conveying  most 
important  documents  and  official  records  was  crossing  a 
swollen  ford  when  the  animals  were  swept  away,  and  a 
large  amount  of  most  valuable  Government  property 
was  irretrievably  lost.  Sucre  is  generally  regarded  as 
the  political  headquarters  of  the  Government,  but  the 
Constitution  obliges  Congress  to  hold  sessions  at  all 
these  places,  and  official  work  is  consequently  dis- 
organised and  retarded.  While  Sucre  is  central  and 
has  a suitable  climate,  it  is  so  isolated  that  the  journey 
occupies  a week  by  horse  or  mule  from  the  nearest 
railway.  La  Paz  is  the  commercial  capital  and  is  fairly 
easy  of  access,  and  from  time  to  time  agitations  arise 
calling  for  it  to  be  made  the  permanent  centre  of 
Government.  Individual  interests  have  hitherto  pre- 
vented this  change,  although  it  would  be  for  the  general 
benefit  of  the  community. 

It  is  the  difficulty  of  communication  throughout 
Bolivia  that  makes  its  political  organisation  so  insecure 
whenever  discontent  is  fomented  against  the  Adminis- 
tration. A district  up  in  arms  against  the  Government 
can  be  assured  of  ample  time  to  organise  rebellion 
before  the  authorities  are  able  to  send  troops  into  it. 
Permanent  political  quiet  cannot  be  anticipated  until 
the  problem  of  transport  between  the  principal  centres 
of  population  is  solved. 

In  the  political  situation  of  Bolivia  there  are  two 
principal  factors  with  which  the  Government  has  to 
reckon  in  the  question  of  the  preservation  of  peace. 
The  first  is  the  comparatively  scanty  white  element  of 
the  population,  with  whom,  however,  a revolutionary 
outbreak  is  the  invariable  product  of  discontent,  and  it 
is  the  office-seeking  proclivity  of  this  section  of  the 
inhabitants  that  most  frequently  leads  to  disturbances. 
Moreover,  when  one  or  other  of  the  political  parties 
obtains  control,  it  is  seldom  that  anything  short  of 
actual  force  can  again  bring  the  Opposition  into  power. 
Practically,  all  elections  for  the  Presidency  and  National 
Congress  are  a farce,  and  official  influence  is  so  unstint- 


564 


BOLIVIA 


ingly  exercised  to  ensure  the  return  of  the  Government 
candidate  that  no  peaceable  political  combination  is 
allowed  sufficient  latitude  to  attempt  to  secure  a 
majority  at  the  polls.  Hence  the  governing  element 
has  become  an  oligarchy,  sometimes  represented  by 
so-called  Conservatives,  as  was  the  case  before  the 
uprising  of  1898,  and  at  others  by  an  equally  restricted 
circle  of  Liberals,  as  at  present. 

The  second  prominent  force  in  the  political  life  of 
the  Republic  is  the  Indian  and  half-caste,  or  cholo, 
population.  So  far  as  active  participation  in  public 
affairs  is  concerned,  the  Indians  and  cholos  show  no 
desire  to  exercise  the  privileges  they  are  entitled  to 
under  the  Constitution  ; but  when  any  question  affecting 
lands  or  other  property  arises  care  is  necessary  to 
avoid  serious  disturbances.  The  low  standard  of 
intelligence  amongst  this  portion  of  the  inhabitants 
does  not  permit  them  to  discriminate  in  regard  to  the 
justice  of  measures  dealing  with  landed  property.  In 
their  eyes  long  residence  on  any  section  of  national 
territory  constitutes  a claim  to  ownership  with  which 
the  Government  has  no  manner  of  right  to  interfere, 
and  their  great  numerical  superiority  makes  it  no  light 
matter  for  the  authorities  to  disregard  this  feeling. 
It  often  serves  to  restrict  the  development  of  mineral 
and  agricultural  resources  that  the  Government  may 
desire  to  foster. 

Apart  from  this  question  of  land  occupancy  the 
Bolivian  Indians  are  docile  when  treated  with  ordinary 
justice,  the  many  stories  circulated  illustrative  of  their 
tendency  to  serious  crimes  being  much  exaggerated. 
For  example,  in  1899,  a Swede,  his  wife  of  Bolivian 
nationality,  and  a companion,  also  a Swede,  took  a 
journey  to  the  seaboard  when  the  last  revolution  was  in 
progress.  On  arriving  at  a frontier  village  the  party 
were  told  by  the  authorities  that  they  could  not  proceed 
without  the  necessary  written  permission  to  leave  the 
country.  Having  none  such  they  were  detained 
pending  enquiries.  A hut  was  allotted  to  them  in  the 


1904] 


INDIAN  ATROCITIES 


565 


village,  and  the  Indian  population  crowded  round  to 
satisfy  their  curiosity  about  the  newcomers.  At  this 
the  travellers  became  alarmed,  took  it  into  their  heads 
that  the  Indians  intended  to  murder  them  after  torture, 
and  opened  fire  with  their  rifles  on  the  villagers. 
When  their  ammunition  was  nearly  exhausted,  the  first 
Swede  shot  his  wife,  and  then  the  two  men  committed 
suicide.  This  incident  was  characterised  far  and  near 
as  a brutal  murder  by  the  Indians,  whereas  the  facts  of 
the  case  did  not  justify  any  such  assertion.  At  present, 
the  Indian  inhabitants  are  controlled  by  caciques , or 
native  chiefs,  and  it  is  through  these  that  the  Govern- 
ment is  forced  to  work  when  measures  affecting  this 
part  of  the  population  are  enacted.  The  Indian 
standard  of  intelligence  must  be  raised  to  a higher  level 
before  any  other  system  of  administration  is  possible. 

The  geographical  position  of  Bolivia  in  South 
America  and  its  resources  are  not  dissimilar  to  the 
characteristic  features  of  the  Transvaal.  Access  to  the 
seaboard,  however,  has  been  secured  to  the  Transvaal 
by  various  lines  of  railway,  whereas  only  in  the  western 
section  of  Bolivan  territory  has  any  attempt  been  made 
to  provide  facilities  of  transport.  Like  the  Transvaal, 
the  chief  source  of  wealth  lies  in  the  mineral  deposits, 
but  difficulty  of  communication  has  prevented  any  ade- 
quate development  of  the  mining  industry. 

As  already  detailed,  many  causes  have  arisen  in 
Bolivia  in  the  last  quarter  of  a century  to  check  pro- 
gress and  accentuate  its  isolation,  and  only  now  are 
indications  becoming  visible  that  some  practical  attempt 
will  be  made  to  break  down  the  barriers  which  caused 
the  country  to  be  regarded  as  a terra  incognita  to 
Europeans  and  North  Americans,  in  spite  of  the  records 
of  fabulous  riches  extracted  by  the  Spaniards  between 
1600  and  1800. 

While  Bolivia  claims  840,000  square  miles  of  terri- 
tory, the  actual  area  under  her  jurisdiction  is  con- 
siderably less,  the  Department  of  Antofagasta  containing 
29,010  square  miles  which  must  be  considered  as 


566 


BOLIVIA 


Chilian,  because  Chile  sticks  to  it.  Futhermore,  the 
ownership  of  one  section  of  territory  is  claimed  by 
both  Bolivia  and  Brazil,  the  whole  of  it  being  included 
in  the  official  estimates  of  the  extent  of  Bolivia.  The 
eight  Departments  of  which  the  area  is  approximately 
known  are  : — 


Departments. 

Area, 

square  miles. 

Population. 

1.  La  Paz  de  Ayacucho 

171,130 

593,779 

2.  Potosi  ...... 

52,100 

360,400 

3.  Oruro  ...... 

21,350 

189,840 

4.  Chuquisaea  (Sucre)  .... 

39,890 

286,710 

5.  Cochabamba  ..... 

21,430 

360,220 

6.  Beni  ...... 

100,580 

26,750 

7.  Santa  Cruz  de  la  Sierra  . 

126,340 

112,200 

8.  Tarija  ...... 

34,610 

89,650 

Total  .... 

567,430 

2,019,549 

This  estimate  of  a population  of  2,019,549  was  made 
in  1893,  and  shows  an  average  density  of  3 5 persons  to 
the  square  mile,  and  it  includes  all  classes  of  whites, 
half-breeds,  civilised  and  wild  Indians.  Approximately, 
there  are  250,000  persons  of  white  blood  ; 500,000  half- 
breeds  ; 1,000,000  domesticated  Indians,  and  250,000 
uncivilised  Indians. 

La  Paz,  with  a population  of  62,320,  is  the  chief 
city,  and  the  recognised  commercial  centre.  It  lies  at 
the  foot  of  the  beautiful  mountain  of  Yllamani,  in  the 
basin  forming  the  head  of  the  Yungas  Valley  at  an  eleva- 
tion of  11,000  feet  above  sea  level,  within  reach  of 
perpetual  snow  on  the  one  side  and  semi-tropical 
valleys  on  the  other.  So  marked  a feature  is  this 
proximity  to  extremes  of  hot  and  cold  that  the  saying 
is  common  in  La  Paz  that  two  messengers  despatched 
in  the  early  morning  can  return  in  time  for  the  midday 
meal,  the  one  bearing  ice  for  the  household  and  the 


1904] 


PRINCIPAL  CITIES 


567 


other  pineapples  and  such  tropical  fruits.  Sucre,  the 
present  political  capital,  has  a population  of  27,345,  and 
is  situated  at  an  elevation  of  7000  feet  above  sea  level, 
in  the  midst  of  an  agricultural  district.  Other  important 
towns  are,  Oruro,  with  15,900  residents  ; Cochabamba, 
with  20,530;  Santa  Cruz,  with  12,100;  and  Tarija,  with 
11,942. 

For  topographical  description,  Bolivia  may  be 
divided  into  four  zones.  The  first  contains  the  higher 
peaks  and  mountain  ranges  above  the  line  of  perpetual 
snow.  Next  comes  the  great  plateau,  lying  at  an 
altitude  between  10,000  and  14,000  feet  above  sea  level, 
and  there  the  principal  mineral  deposits  are  known. 
In  these  regions  the  mean  temperature  seldom  exceeds 
43  F.  At  the  northern  end  of  this  plateau,  at  an 
altitude  of  13,000  feet,  is  the  great  inland  sea  of 
Titicaca,  replenished  by  melting  snows  from  the 
Andes.  Within  sight  of  Titicaca  is  the  snow-capped 
peak  of  Sorata  and  the  magnificent  pyramid-shaped 
mountain  of  Yllimani— two  of  the  most  remarkable 
features  of  the  Cordillera  of  the  Andes.  The  third 
zone  comprises  the  semi-tropical  valleys,  at  elevations  of 
from  4000  to  8000  feet,  for  the  most  part  containing  soil 
and  climate  adapted  for  all  sub-tropical  agricultural 
enterprise.  The  fourth  section  embraces  the  low-lying 
lands  sloping  towards  the  river  Paraguay,  and  the  rivers 
Madera  and  Beni,  and  other  tributaries  of  the  Amazon. 
Here  the  conditions  are  tropical,  the  climate  moist,  and 
the  country  clothed  with  dense  vegetation.  In  these 
localities  the  Indians  classified  as  uncivilised  are  chiefly 
found,  their  means  of  sustenance  being  the  products  of 
the  chase  or  fruit  and  roots  which  grow  wild  in  the 
forests. 

While  Spanish  is  the  official  language  of  Bolivia,  it  is 
by  no  means  universal.  Among  the  Indians,  the  use  of 
Quichua  or  Aymara,  and  in  some  districts  Guarani,  is 
more  common  than  Castilian.  The  half-breeds  are 
inclined  to  adopt  the  language  of  their  surroundings 
rather  than  that  of  a higher  civilisation,  and  they  more 


568 


BOLIVIA 


often  grow  to  maturity  accustomed  to  speak  Aymard  or 
Quichua  than  Spanish.  One  of  the  most  curious 
linguistic  traits  in  Bolivia  is  that  frequently  in  a 
district  where  Quichua  is  the  common  means  of  com- 
munication, an  isolated  settlement  is  found  where 
Aymara  is  commonly  used.  The  explanation  is  that 
the  practice  of  the  Inca  dynasty  was  to  transport  bodily 
a whole  community  inclined  to  disaffection,  the  tribe 
participating  in  seditious  practices  being  removed  to 
some  distant  spot  and  refused  permission  to  communi- 
cate with  people  of  its  own  clan.  Thus  the  exiles 
preserved  their  language  and  customs,  and  their 
descendants  to-day,  after  five  centuries,  retain  the 
habits  of  their  forebears. 

Bolivia  is  rich  in  local  colour.  The  troops  of  llamas 
patiently  journeying  from  sunrise  to  sunset,  with  their 
loads  of  100  lbs.  weight  strapped  upon  their  backs, 
are  constantly  in  the  path  of  the  traveller,  and  following 
these  beasts  of  burthen  are  the  Indian  drivers,  trudging 
along  through  the  heat  of  the  day  barefooted,  and  dressed 
only  in  cotton  trousers  and  shirt,  with  a rough  home- 
spun  poncho  over  their  shoulders  and  a broad-brimmed 
hat  of  coarse  straw  on  their  heads.  Each  carries  his 
pouch  of  coca  leaves  and  box  of  lime,  and  with  no  more 
sustenance  than  is  obtained  by  chewing  these  two 
ingredients,  they  cover  long  stretches  of  country  without 
feeling  the  pangs  of  hunger.  The  custom  of  the 
Bolivian  Indians  is  to  spin  yarn  for  their  domestic  use 
as  they  tramp  monotonously  after  the  llamas,  carrying  a 
wooden  spindle  for  the  purpose,  and  it  is  in  this  manner 
that  much  of  the  wool  from  the  alpacas  and  vicunas 
passes  through  the  first  stage  of  manufacture  for  the 
clothing  used  by  the  peasant  classes.  In  the  cities  the 
Indian  characteristics  of  these  people  are  markedly 
apparent,  and  in  the  market-places  the  vendors  spread 
their  wares  on  the  ground  and  squat  beside  their  scanty 
stores  of  local  produce,  to  await  the  coming  of  a pur- 
chaser. The  women,  with  bright-coloured  handkerchief 
on  head  and  neck,  make  typical  examples  of  Inca 


1904] 


NATIVE  TRAITS 


569 


civilisation,  and  their  ceaseless  chatter  in  the  drawling 
Aymara  heightens  the  effect,  and  leaves  an  impression 
that  modern  methods  and  European  ways  have  made 
small  alteration  in  the  prevailing  customs  of  centuries 
ago. 

The  authorities  have  paid  little  attention  to  the 
subject  of  the  education  of  the  majority  of  the  popula- 
tion, although  nominally  primary  instruction  is  gratuitous 
and  obligatory ; but  the  latter  clause  is  a dead  letter  for 
all  practical  purposes,  and  no  efforts  are  made  to  enforce 
the  attendance  of  children  at  the  schools.  Public 
elementary  education  is  in  charge  of  the  various  muni- 
cipalities, and  in  1897  there  were  866  primary  schools, 
on  which  an  aggregate  sum  of  139,566  bolivianos  (silver 
dollars)  was  expended,  while,  in  addition,  there  were 
121  private  establishments  for  elementary  instruction, 
and  82  industrial  schools ; at  which  in  all  there  were 
36,690  pupils  enrolled,  or  less  than  2 per  cent,  of  the 
total  population.  Difficulties  of  language  are  one  reason 
why  the  attendance  is  sparse,  the  instruction  being  in 
Spanish  while  the  common  idioms  are  Quichua,  Aymara, 
or  Guarani ; but  it  is  more  to  the  apathy  of  the  people 
in  all  matters  concerning  the  education  of  their  children 
that  the  slow  progress  of  primary  instruction  is  due. 
The  majority  of  the  domesticated  Indians  have  no 
ambition  to  acquire  a knowledge  of  reading  and  writing, 
and  until  this  attitude  is  greatly  mitigated  it  is  unlikely 
that  education  in  Bolivia  will  show  substantial  advance- 
ment. 

Secondary  instruction  is  provided  for  by  eight 
colleges,  five  establishments  under  the  direct  autho- 
rity of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  four  lyceums, 
the  number  of  teachers  employed  being  91,  and  of 
students  under  instruction  2057.  For  higher  educa- 
tion there  are  six  universities  with  506  students  in 
1895,  and  at  four  of  these  medical  science  is  taught. 
Seminaries  exist  for  the  education  of  aspirants  to  the 
priesthood,  and  were  attended  in  1897  by  146  students. 
There  is  a military  college  with  60  pupils  under  a staff 


570 


BOLIVIA 


of  nine  professors,  and  three  schools  of  arts  and  trades 
founded  at  the  initiative  of  the  Salesian  Mission,  the 
members  of  this  Order  imparting  a knowledge  of  the 
ordinary  mechanical  crafts.  Bolivia  is  a field  offering 
wide  scope  for  missionary  work  in  connection  with 
education,  and  it  is  from  this  direction  rather  than 
through  action  by  the  Government  that  improvement 
may  be  expected  in  the  immediate  future. 

Justice  in  Bolivia  is  administered  by  a Supreme 
Court,  eight  District  Courts,  and  a number  of  local  minor 
courts  presided  over  by  magistrates  empowered  to  deal 
with  petty  crimes.  The  judiciary  is  corrupt  and  legal 
process  is  dilatory  and  costly,  and  in  the  civil  courts 
blackmailing  practices,  especially  in  connection  with 
mining  claims,  are  so  notorious  that  few  people  refer 
disputes  to  the  judicial  power,  preferring  to  pay  or  make 
some  other  arrangement  to  avoid  legal  proceedings,  no 
matter  how  far  in  the  right  they  may  be.  Bolivian  law, 
as  that  of  other  South  American  states,  is  founded  on 
that  existing  under  the  former  Spanish  regime,  is  codified 
in  all  branches,  and  not  ill-adapted  to  serve  the  ends  of 
justice  if  intelligently  and  impartially  administered. 

In  any  attempt  to  analyse  Bolivian  national  char- 
acter, it  must  be  remembered  that  the  whites  have 
retained  to  a great  extent  the  methods  of  thought  and 
habits  of  life  of  their  Spanish  forefathers,  and  the  fact 
that  they  have  been  brought  in  contact  with  little  else 
has  resulted  in  the  maintenance  of  Spanish  customs  to 
even  a more  marked  degree  than  in  Argentina,  Chile,  or 
Peru.  Bolivia’s  isolation  has  tended  to  restrict  the 
mental  perspective  of  the  whites  to  narrow  limits  in  both 
political  and  private  affairs,  and  living  for  generations 
amongst  Indians,  who  are  treated  as  an  inferior  race  not 
far  removed  from  serfdom,  has  developed  an  arrogant 
bearing  out  of  keeping  with  surrounding  circumstances. 

It  is  with  Indian  rather  than  Spanish  character  that 
interest  lies ; but  the  descendants  of  the  Incas  were  so 
crushed  by  their  Spanish  conquerors  that  pride  or 
national  spirit  has  small  place  in  their  lives.  They  are 


1904] 


NATIONAL  CHARACTER 


571 


simple  people  enough,  asking  little  more  than  to  go 
their  ways  in  peace,  and  so  long  as  they  are  not  under 
alcoholic  influence  they  seldom  interfere  with  any  way- 
farer, be  he  Bolivian  or  stranger ; but  unfortunately 
they  have  developed  the  curse  of  drink  to  an  abnormal 
extent,  and  in  their  cups  they  are  often  dangerous. 
Nominally  they  are  Christians,  and  recognise  the  authority 
of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  all  matters  pertaining 
to  religion,  and  their  superstitious  tendency  makes  them 
show  outward  reverence  to  Church  ritual ; but  their 
general  ignorance  on  all  subjects  beyond  their  limited 
domestic  life  renders  it  unlikely  that  they  hold  any 
religious  convictions.  It  is  this  same  ignorance  that 
strengthens  the  influence  of  the  clergy,  and  causes  the 
priesthood  to  be  regarded  with  superstitious  awe. 
While  easily  led,  these  Indians  are  difficult  to  drive,  and 
in  many  cases  where  trouble  has  occurred  among  the 
workmen  in  the  mines,  the  cause  has  been  traced  to 
some  stupidity  interpreted  by  the  Indians  as  an  injustice 
in  the  method  of  superintendence  rather  than  to  any 
deliberate  tendency  on  their  part  towards  criminal  acts. 

There  are  five  routes  by  which  Bolivia  communicates 
with  the  outside  world,  the  principal  one  for  traffic  being 
Antofagasta,  the  centre  of  the  seaboard  seized  by  Chile 
in  1879.  Between  this  outlet  and  the  Bolivian  town  of 
Oruro,  a distance  of  600  miles,  a twenty-eight  inch 
gauge  railway  has  been  built  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Huanchaca  Mining  Company,  and  between  these  two 
points  the  journey  is  made  in  three  days.  Owing  to 
the  narrow  gauge  and  the  sharp  curves  on  this  line,  the 
trains  are  only  run  in  daylight,  and  then  at  slow  speed. 
The  second  route  is  by  Arica,  in  the  occupation  of  the 
Chilians,  thence  by  train  to  Tacna,  a distance  of  forty- 
seven  miles  ; from  Tacna  a journey  of  six  days  on  mule- 
back  over  mountain  ranges,  ascending  to  15,000  feet, 
brings  the  traveller  to  La  Paz.  A third  route  is  via  the 
Peruvian  port  of  Mollendo  by  railway  to  Arequipa  and 
Puno,  thence  by  steamer  across  Lake  Titicaca  to  Bolivian 
territory,  and  from  the  shores  of  the  lake  to  La  Paz, 


572 


BOLIVIA 


distant  thirty-five  miles.  On  the  north,  Bolivia  is  acces- 
sible by  the  Amazon  to  the  rivers  Beni  and  Madera. 
On  the  south,  a route,  formerly  much  frequented,  ran 
through  Tupiza  to  the  frontier  of  Argentina,  thence  to 
Salta  or  Jujuy  to  Tucuman,  and  thence  to  Rosario  or 
Buenos  Aires.  This  route  is  no  longer  much  used  now 
that  the  railway  runs  between  Oruro  and  the  port  of 
Antofagasta.  There  is  a project  afoot  to  extend  the 
Argentine  railway  system  from  Salta  or  Jujuy,  the 
present  terminal  points,  to  the  central  districts  of 
Bolivia,  whose  Government  would  arrange  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  sections  of  the  line  within  its  territory, 
and  the  execution  of  this  proposal  will  give  Bolivia 
direct  railway  communication  with  the  river  Plate. 
This  would  mean  an  immense  advance,  the  journey 
to  Europe  becoming  possible  in  twenty-five  days  in 
place  of  six  weeks  as  now.  No  great  outlay  is  in- 
volved, the  estimated  cost  of  the  line  from  the  southern 
frontier  to  the  town  of  Sucre  being  but  £3,000,000,  a 
small  amount  in  comparison  to  the  benefit  to  be  con- 
ferred. 

Not  only  is  access  to  Bolivia  difficult  and  tedious, 
but  when  once  the  country  is  reached  there  is  a lack  of 
all  modern  methods  of  transport  everywhere.  Roads 
for  wheeled  traffic  do  not  exist  except  in  very  few  places, 
and  then  only  for  limited  distances ; passengers  and 
cargo  are  carried  on  muleback,  ten  or  twelve  days’  travel 
in  such  fashion  being  of  common  occurrence.  No 
wonder  progress  of  all  kinds  is  checked.  During  the 
dry  season  on  the  high  plateau,  of  which  Oruro  is  the 
centre,  it  is  possible  to  haul  cargo  in  carts  over  a large 
area  of  country,  and  industrial  expansion  has  taken 
place  to  a restricted  extent ; but  in  the  wet  season  in 
these  districts,  and  at  all  times  of  the  year  in  many 
others,  when  agricultural  or  mineral  products  must  be 
carried  on  mules  or  llamas,  the  heavy  cost  and  the  delay 
attendant  on  the  conveyance  of  merchandise  and  produce 
is  an  insuperable  bar  to  the  development  of  industry 
and  trade.  Railways  and  roads  are  everywhere  needed, 


[Face  page  572. 


Indians  in  Gala  Costume. 


1904] 


INDUSTRIAL  ENTERPRISE 


573 


but,  once  established,  capital  and  energy  will  be  forth- 
coming to  push  forward  commerce  and  production. 

Agriculture  makes  little  progress  in  Bolivia,  and  the 
cereals  produced  are  insufficient  to  meet  home  necessities, 
limited  though  the  consumption  of  bread  stuffs  is.  In 
the  plateau  lands  near  La  Paz  and  Oruro,  and  in  the 
country  between  these  two  cities,  barley  is  grown,  and 
a considerable  area  annually  sown  with  potatoes ; but  the 
yield  of  both  crops  is  meagre,  in  consequence  of  poor 
soil  and  the  constant  frosts  which  occur  at  night  during 
summer.  The  potatoes  are  partly  consumed  fresh,  and 
partly  made  into  what  is  known  as  chuno,  by  a process  of 
freezing  and  drying.  The  wants  of  this  primitive  people 
are  few,  and  with  a stock  of  chum,  some  coarse  barley 
or  maize  meal,  and  a supply  of  coca  leaf  to  keep  off  the 
cravings  of  hunger,  most  Indian  families  exist  the  year 
round  in  a condition  which  in  their  imaginations  is  one 
of  comparative  comfort,  animal  food  being  looked  upon 
as  a luxury  and  only  indulged  in  by  the  poorer  classes 
on  holidays. 

The  semi-tropical  valleys  produce  fruit  in  great 
abundance,  and  there  the  banana,  pineapple,  yam,  and 
sweet  potato  form  the  principal  diet.  In  sections  of 
the  lower  lands,  especially  those  in  the  Yungas  Valley, 
the  cultivation  of  coffee  and  cacao  is  carried  on,  and 
here  also  are  the  principal  plantations  of  coca.  Both 
the  coffee  and  cacao  of  Bolivia  have  a high  reputation, 
and  small  shipments  are  regularly  made  to  Chile  and 
Argentina ; but  the  bulk  of  the  produce  is  required  to 
meet  the  local  demands,  while  in  regard  to  the  coca  leaf 
the  small  surplus  finds  its  way  abroad  chiefly  in  the 
form  of  cocaine.  Sugar-cane  is  grown  in  the  valleys, 
and  utilised  for  distillation  into  rum,  only  a very  small 
proportion  being  manufactured  into  sugar. 

It  is  in  the  mineral  wealth  of  Bolivia  that  the  main 
industrial  enterprise  is  centred.  According  to  ancient 
records  in  connection  with  the  Royal  Mint  at  Potosi,  the 
gold  and  silver  bullion  shipped  to  Spain  between  the 
date  of  the  Spanish  conquest  and  Bolivia’s  independence 


574 


BOLIVIA 


reached  the  value  of  £120,000,000.  But  for  the  last 
hundred  years  all  mining  industry  has  been  checked 
by  internal  disorders,  and  the  development  of  the  rich 
deposits  known  to  exist  that  might  have  taken  place  has 
yet  to  occur — probably  within  the  next  decade.  In 
spite,  however,  of  many  difficulties,  silver  mining  has  been 
conducted  on  a comparatively  large  scale,  notably  so  by 
the  Huanchaca  Company,  which  exported  8,000,000 
ounces  annually  between  1892  and  1897.  In  the  latter 
year  the  lower  workings  of  the  Pulacayo  mine,  from 
which  this  Company  extracted  the  bulk  of  its  ores,  were 
flooded  with  hot  water  and  temporarily  abandoned ; but 
steps  are  now  being  taken  to  drain  it.  Other  important 
silver-mining  districts  are  Colquechaca,  output  1,500,000 
ounces  annually ; Oruro,  the  same  ; Guadaloupe,  700,000 
ounces  ; Potosi,  400,000  ounces ; and  other  districts  with 
an  aggregate  yield  of  8,000,000  ounces  annually.  In 
normal  circumstances  the  total  yearly  output  of  the 
Bolivian  silver  mines  is  15,000,000  ounces,  and  this 
weight  could  be  doubled  if  adequate  facilities  of 
transport  existed. 

Another  valuable  metal  to  which  attention  in 
Bolivia  has  been  turned  of  late  is  tin.  Hitherto  the 
chief  deposits  worked  have  been  those  near  Huanuni  in 
the  district  to  the  south  of  Oruro,  and  the  amount 
shipped  abroad  through  Antofagasta  7000  tons  annually, 
but  the  high  prices  ruling  render  probable  a substantial 
increase  in  the  near  future.  Copper  is  mined  to  some 
extent,  8000  tons  in  the  form  of  barilla  passing  through 
Mollendo  each  year  for  shipment  to  Europe,  but  such 
minerals  as  antimony,  bismuth,  and  borax  are  only 
exported  on  a small  scale.  About  gold  mining  little  is 
known  beyond  the  fact  that  prospectors  report  rich 
alluvial  and  quartz  deposits  in  different  localities;  but 
they  lie,  as  a rule,  above  the  line  of  perpetual  snow,  or 
in  such  isolated  spots  as  the  Tapuani  Eiver,  and  diffi- 
culties of  communication  have  prevented  their  develop- 
ment. 

Another  valuable  product  of  which  the  extent  is  not 


1 904] 


NATURAL  RESOURCES 


575 


yet  known  is  rubber.  Throughout  the  great  forest  area 
adjoining  the  rivers  Beni  and  Madera  rubber  trees  exist 
in  great  numbers,  and  expeditions  are  sent  from  time  to 
time  to  collect  the  gum,  the  bulk  of  which  is  shipped 
down  the  Amazon,  passing  through  the  Brazilian  port  of 
Pard  on  its  way  to  foreign  markets.  It  is  estimated  by 
the  Bolivian  authorities  that  the  yearly  amount  gathered 
in  Bolivian  territory  exceeds  5000  tons  of  a value  of 
£1,200,000.  Of  other  forest  products  a small  quantity 
of  Peruvian  bark  (Cinchona)  is  collected  on  the  Atlantic 
slope  of  the  Andes  and  exported  to  Europe.  In  the 
province  of  Santa  Cruz,  and  to  the  south-east  of  the 
Republic,  are  lands  suitable  for  pastoral  enterprise,  and 
in  some  of  these  districts  herds  of  cattle  are  numerous. 

Bolivian  state  finance  places  no  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  the  future  development  of  the  country,  the  public 
debt  being  insignificant  and  taxation  comparatively  light. 
The  monetary  unit  is  the  silver  dollar,  known  as  the 
boliviano . At  present  the  mint  at  Potosi  issues  only 
silver  coins  of  50  cents,  20  cents,  10  cents  and  5 cents, 
and  10  and  5 cent  nickel  pieces.  In  1896  the  national 
revenue  was  3,566,777  bolivianos,  and  the  expenditure 
4,264,681  bolivianos,  the  principal  sources  of  revenue 
being  the  duties  levied  on  imported  merchandise  and 
exported  products,  the  sale  of  stamps  and  stamped 
paper,  and  the  amount  collected  from  licenses. 

Bolivia’s  external  debt  originated  in  the  claims  for 
damages  done  to  the  properties  of  Chilian  citizens  in  the 
war  of  1879,  but  the  total  amount  outstanding  in  1898 
was  only  1,084,555  bolivianos.  Its  service  is  met  by  40 
per  cent,  of  the  duties  on  merchandise  for  Bolivia  passing- 
through  the  Chilian  custom-house  at  Arica,  these  being 
collected  by  Chilian  authorities  at  that  port.  The 
Government  had  an  internal  debt  in  1898,  consisting  of 
advances  from  banks  and  other  borrowings  amounting 
to  3,707,541  bolivianos,  so  the  total  debt  of  all  kinds  was 
only  4,000,000  bolivianos,  or  about  £400,000. 

The  commerce  of  Bolivia  is  principally  in  the  hands 
of  Chilian,  German,  and  native  merchants,  the  two  first 


576 


BOLIVIA 


having  a strong  hold  over  both  wholesale  and  retail 
trade.  Imports,  consisting  chiefly  of  hardware,  liquors, 
cotton  and  woollen  textiles,  silks  and  ready-made 
clothing,  were  valued  in  1897  at  24,467,100  bolivianos, 
and  exports  at  23,121,320  bolivianos,  comprising  silver, 
bullion,  copper,  tin,  bismuth,  antimony,  rubber,  hides 
and  skins,  and  other  articles  of  minor  value. 

In  spite  of  the  backward  economic  condition  of 
Bolivia  and  her  people  there  are  signs  of  substantial 
progress,  at  least  in  the  direction  of  mineral  development. 
For  the  last  few  years  many  districts  have  been  care- 
fully prospected  by  experts ; the  result  is  seen  already 
in  the  beginning  of  fresh  mining  ventures.  Once  the 
question  of  transport  is  solved,  progress  is  assured.  A 
flourishing  mining  industry  will  bring  immigrants  from 
all  parts  of  the  world,  whose  arrival  must  eventually 
effect  a decided  change,  let  us  hope  for  the  better,  in  its 
national  life. 


Fill,  BOLIVIA, 

vVNl) 

HOETHEIH  CHILE 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

ECUADOR 

Acts  of  Constitution.  Administration  of  President  Moreno,  and  his 
Assassination.  Presidency  of  Dr  Borrero.  Revolt  under  General 
Veintemilla.  Defeat  of  the  Government.  Provisional  Admini- 
stration. Election  of  Veintemilla.  Veintemilla  declared  Dictator. 
Revolt  against  Veintemilla,  and  his  Flight.  Administration  of 
Dr  Placido  Caamano.  Seditious  Conspiracies.  Election  of  Dr 
Flores,  and  his  Policy.  Presidency  of  Dr  Luis  Cordero.  The 
Esmeralda  Incident.  Indignation  against  Cordero.  Revolution 
under  General  Alfaro.  Flight  of  Cordero.  Provisional  Govern- 
ment under  Alfaro,  and  his  Election.  Alfaro  and  the  Clergy. 
Conspiracies  against  Alfaro.  Laws  regarding  Sedition.  Political 
Conditions  and  Economic  Progress.  Lack  of  Immigration. 
Area  and  Population.  Cities  of  Ecuador.  Fii’es  in  Guayaquil. 
Topography  of  Ecuador.  Educational  Progress.  Justice. 
National  Character.  Indian  Characteristics.  Means  of  Com- 
munication. Industrial  Enterprise.  Pastoral  Pursuits.  Mineral 
Wealth.  Financial  Situation.  Revenue  and  Expenditure. 
Commercial  Situation.  Future  Prospects. 


Ecuador,  in  common  with  Colombia  and  Venezuela, 
has  passed  through  stormy  times  since  the  country 
became  a separate  Republic  as  a result  of  the  civil  war 
in  New  Granada  after  independence  from  Spanish 
dominion  was  established.  It  was  first  created  a 
Republic  by  the  Act  of  Constitution  dated  May  11, 
1830,  but  since  that  year  no  fewer  than  ten  Acts  have 
been  sanctioned  by  assemblies  summoned  to  effect 
radical  alterations  for  the  conduct  of  the  Adminis- 
tration. 

These  different  Acts  and  their  duration  are  im- 


578  ECUADOR 

portant,  They  were  approved  and  promulgated  at  the 
following  places : — 


Place. 

Duration. 

1.  Riobamba 

1830-1835 

2.  Arnbato 

1835-1843 

3.  Quito  .... 

1843-1845 

4.  Cuenca  .... 

1845-1850 

5.  Quito  .... 

1850-1852 

6.  Guayaquil 

1852-1859 

7.  Quito  .... 

1861-1869 

8.  Quito  .... 

1869-1876 

9.  Arnbato 

1877-1883 

10.  Quito  .... 

1883- 

The  Law  of  Constitution  of  1883,  promulgated  in 
1884,  was  amended  in  1887  and  again  in  1896.  Each 
change  inferred  a complete  political  upheaval,  and  was 
rarely  achieved  without  severe  fighting  and  heavy 
sacrifice  of  life.  So  it  is  not  difficult  to  understand 
why  Ecuador  has  been  racked  by  internal  dissensions  in 
the  past  three-quarters  of  a century.  The  early  portion 
of  her  political  history  relating  to  the  struggle  against 
the  Spanish  Crown  and  the  revolutionary  movements 
between  1830  and  1870  has  been  already  told,  and  it 
is  with  the  record  of  the  last  thirty  years  that  this 
chronicle  deals. 

In  1875  an  unsettled  political  situation  existed  under 
President  Moreno.  The  suppression  of  a series  of 
revolutionary  outbreaks  and  the  severe  punishment  of 
the  leaders  of  these  movements  led  to  a feeling  of  bitter 
hostility  against  the  President,  the  outcome  of  which 
was  a conspiracy  for  his  assassination,  which  was  carried 
out  in  August,  1875,  when  he  was  murdered  at  Quito. 
Dr  Borrero  succeeded,  but  discontent  with  his  Adminis- 
tration also  spread  rapidly,  and  in  the  following  year 
General  Veintemilla,  the  military  commandant  of 
Guayaquil,  headed  a revolt.  By  seizing  Guayaquil,  the 


1876]  REVOLUTION  UNDER  VEINTEMILLA  579 


principal  port  of  Ecuador,  the  leaders  of  this  insurrection 
were  able  to  cut  off  supplies  from  the  Government  and 
obtain  the  war  material  they  needed,  thus  making  the 
position  of  President  Borrero  difficult  from  the  first. 
For  months  strong  efforts  were  made  to  reduce  the 
rebels  to  submission,  but  with  little  success.  Towards 
the  close  of  1876  the  insurgent  forces  commanded  by 
General  Veintemilla  advanced  into  the  interior,  and  a 
decisive  battle  was  fought  near  Galte  on  December  14 
with  the  Government  troops  under  General  Aparicio. 
It  ended  in  a complete  victory  for  the  revolutionists, 
who  occupied  Quito  shortly  afterwards  without  further 
serious  opposition.  President  Borrero,  finding  his 
position  untenable,  left  the  country,  and  a Provisional 
Administration  was  established  under  General  Veinte- 
milla, who  was  virtually  invested  with  dictatorial 
powers. 

In  1878  this  victorious  leader  of  revolt  determined 
to  be  legally  appointed  to  the  Presidency,  and  ordered 
an  election  accordingly,  thereby  getting  himself  declared 
President  for  the  next  four  years.  The  first  half  of 
this  period  passed  in  comparative  quiet,  Veintemilla’s 
enemies  lacking  strength  to  make  any  effective  demon- 
stration against  his  authority ; but  the  discontented 
feeling  was  only  latent,  and  became  more  apparent  as 
his  presidential  term  drew  to  a close.  The  General 
saw  that  he  could  not  secure  continuance  of  power  if 
he  was  dependent  on  a free  election,  and  in  1882  he 
took  matters  into  his  own  hands  by  declaring  himself 
Dictator,  assuming  absolutely  autocratic  powers.  This 
action  defeated  itself,  setting  on  foot  a revolutionary 
propaganda  which  brought  on  a general  rising  early  in 
1883.  For  some  months  the  Dictator  maintained  his 
position  ; but  his  authority  rapidly  became  undermined, 
and,  finding  his  cause  hopeless,  he  fled  the  country  on 
July  9,  after  having  been  its  strong  man  for  seven  years. 
Little  had  been  attempted  though,  under  his  Adminis- 
tration, towards  improving  the  state  of  the  country,  his 
tyrannical  methods  of  government  causing  constant 


580 


ECUADOR 


intrigues  against  him  and  entailing  heavy  drains  on  the 
exchequer  to  maintain  sufficient  force  to  hold  his  enemies 
in  check. 

After  the  fall  of  Veintemilla  the  Administration  was 
temporarily  confided  to  Dr  Placido  Caamano,  and  in 
February,  1884,  a presidential  election  was  held,  which 
made  him  chief  magistrate  for  the  usual  term ; but  the 
friends  of  the  fallen  dictator  had  no  idea  of  permitting 
the  new  President  to  discharge  his  duties  in  peace. 
Revolutionary  outbreaks  were  fomented  in  various 
quarters,  but  the  majority  of  the  Ecuadorians  gave 
them  little  support,  being  tired  of  a continual  state  of 
warfare.  So  the  Government  experienced  small  diffi- 
culty in  suppressing  conspiracies  which  never  developed 
sufficient  importance  to  be  really  dangerous  to  piffilic 
authority.  In  1888  the  term  of  President  Caamano 
ended,  and  the  election  held  in  February  of  that  year 
put  Dr  Antonio  Flores  in  his  place. 

In  comparison  to  former  Administrations,  that  of 
President  Flores  proved  to  be  the  most  enlightened  yet 
known.  Civil  rights  were  respected,  and  reforms  intro- 
duced in  many  directions  to  check  the  corrupt  practices 
which  had  developed  to  marked  extent  in  every  depart- 
ment of  the  Government.  The  question  of  primary 
instruction  for  the  people  was  given  serious  considera- 
tion, and  several  projects  were  proposed  to  place  this 
important  factor  on  a satisfactory  footing.  Four  years 
of  office  was  too  limited  a period  to  permit  of  the 
majority  of  the  reforms  President  Flores  advocated 
being  put  into  practice,  and  he  actually  accomplished 
little  more  than  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  subsequent 
realisation  of  his  ideas ; but  what  he  did  succeed  in 
was  to  reduce  to  order  the  chaos  into  which  the  Govern- 
ment had  drifted  before  his  assumption  of  the  Presidency. 
That  the  people  of  Ecuador  appreciated  his  policy  and 
methods  of  Government  was  proved  by  the  fact  that 
during  his  term  no  serious  attempts  were  made  to 
disturb  the  public  peace,  a state  of  affairs  foreign  to 
Ecuador  these  many  years.  When  in  1892  Dr  Flores’ 


1891] 


PRESIDENT  FLORES 


581 


term  closed,  he  refused  to  allow  himself  to  be  renomi- 
nated for  all  his  supporters  could  say.  So  Dr  Luis 
Cordero  took  his  turn  in  February  1892. 

The  public  hoped  that  Cordero  might  amplify  the 
reforms  introduced  into  the  administration  of  national 
affairs  by  President  Flores,  and  that  projected  improve- 
ments would  crystallise  into  facts ; but  it  was  doomed 
to  disappointment.  The  new  President  was  only  a few 
months  in  office  before  the  corrupt  methods  which  his 
predecessor  had  tried  to  eliminate  became  again  pain- 
fully apparent,  and,  this  seen,  discontent  spread  so 
rapidly  that  before  he  had  been  a year  at  the  head  of 
affairs  active  conspiracies  for  his  downfall  were  afoot. 
These  internal  troubles  involved  extraordinary  expendi- 
ture which  the  treasury  could  not  bear,  and  in  July, 
1894,  default  took  place  in  the  service  of  the  external 
debt. 

In  November  of  that  same  year  Cordero  lent  himself 
to  a transaction  that  brought  about  a movement  which 
eventually  led  to  his  ejection  from  the  Presidency.  The 
war  between  China  and  Japan  was  in  progress,  and  the 
Japanese  Government,  desirous  of  acquiring  warships, 
sounded  Chile  on  the  subject  of  the  purchase  of  the 
cruiser  Esmeralda.  The  Chilian  Administration  was 
fully  aware  of  the  breach  of  international  law  entailed 
by  the  disposal  of  this  vessel  in  view  of  active  hostilities 
between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese,  but  at  the  same 
time  urgently  wished  to  sell.  Under  these  circumstances 
President  Cordero  was  approached  with  an  offer  of  a 
substantial  commission  in  money  if  he  would  arrange 
for  the  vessel  to  be  transferred  from  the  Chilian  flag 
to  that  of  Ecuador,  and  subsequently  handed  over  to 
Japanese  representatives  in  Ecuadorian  waters.  A firm 
in  New  York  acted  for  Japan,  and  the  transfer  of  the 
cruiser  to  Ecuador  was  made  in  the  harbour  of  Val- 
paraiso, whence  the  vessel  was  taken  to  Chatham  Island, 
in  the  Galapagos  group,  and  there  turned  over  to  the 
Japanese. 

When  this  flagrant  abuse  of  the  national  flag  was 


582 


ECUADOR 


known  an  outburst  of  violent  indignation  occurred, 
giving  the  opportunity  that  the  enemies  of  the  President 
had  been  waiting  for.  They  took  advantage  of  it  to  stir 
up  a popular  rising,  and  under  the  leadership  of  General 
Eioy  Alfaro  a revolutionary  movement  was  organised 
and  supported  in  nearly  all  districts.  Guayaquil,  the 
commercial  capital  of  Ecuador,  was  occupied,  and  became 
an  important  element  in  the  success  of  the  insurgent 
cause.  President  Cordero  was  not  to  be  driven  from 
power  without  a struggle,  and  collecting  all  available 
forces  he  determined  to  retain  possession  of  Quito  and 
trust  to  some  lucky  stroke  of  fortune  for  means  to 
defeat  the  rebels  if  they  attempted  to  attack  the  city. 
For  nearly  a year  the  country  was  a prey  to  the  desultory 
warfare  between  the  Government  and  the  insurgents, 
but  gradually  Cordero  found  his  enemies  gaining  strength, 
and  in  1895  he  realised  that  his  position  was  no  longer 
tenable.  Unable  to  make  terms  with  the  rebel  leaders, 
the  President  fled  the  country,  leaving  public  affairs  at 
the  mercy  of  General  Alfaro  and  his  friends. 

An  Administration  was  now  formed  by  General 
Alfaro,  who  took  the  title  of  Supreme  Chief  of  the 
Nation  with  dictatorial  functions,  and  no  change  was 
made  in  this  autocratic  form  of  Government  until  1897, 
when  he  determined  to  be  proclaimed  the  constitutional 
President  of  the  Republic.  This  was  done  on  February 
6,  when  the  Dictator  became  legal  President  for  a term 
of  four  years  ending  in  February,  1901.  The  new  head 
of  the  State  lost  no  opportunity  of  curtailing  the  power 
of  the  Church,  no  easy  matter  in  a country  where  the 
inhabitants  were  so  priest-ridden.  This  attitude  of 
Alfaro  towards  the  clergy  aroused  bitter  hostility  in 
many  quarters,  and  on  more  than  one  occasion  efforts 
were  made  to  fan  it  into  revolutionary  action  against 
the  authorities  ; but  the  various  seditious  outbreaks  that 
took  place  between  1896  and  1900  were  not  of  serious 
importance,  and  were  for  the  most  part  nipped  in  the 
bud  before  the  leaders  could  consolidate  their  resources. 
Alfaro  was  therefore  able  to  maintain  his  position  until 


1901] 


IMMUNITY  FOR  SEDITION 


583 


the  end  of  his  term,  and  was  succeeded  in  office  by 
General  Leonidas  Plaza,  elected  under  official  influence 
as  usual. 

Unfortunately  the  laws  of  Ecuador  are  of  small  avail 
in  checking  revolutionary  outbreaks,  and  until  stronger 
penalties  are  provided  against  seditious  practices  there 
is  little  hope  of  durable  peace.  When  political  motives 
are  pleaded  in  excuse  of  treasonable  acts  punishment  is 
seldom  inflicted,  and  only  in  rare  instances  is  the 
property  of  persons  taking  part  in  insurrections  con- 
fiscated. Under  the  Law  of  Constitution,  passed  in 
1883  and  promulgated  in  1884,  the  death  penalty  for 
political  offences  wTas  abolished.  This  was  modified  in 
1887  and  again  in  1896,  and  now  reads  : — “ There  shall 
be  no  death  penalty  for  political  offences  except  in  the 
case  of  those  who  are  armed  and  organised  as  regular 
military  forces,  and  shall  attempt  any  armed  movement 
against  the  constitutional  authorities.”  Practically 
every  civilian  can  conspire  with  impunity  against  the 
Government,  risking  only  his  life  if  he  happens  to  be 
present  at  a fight,  but  not  endangering  his  civil  rights 
in  event  of  defeat,  and  no  change  in  this  respect  appears 
likely  soon  to  take  place.  Nominally,  the  authorities 
are  placed  in  power  by  the  people ; in  reality,  the 
Government  is  in  the  hands  of  two  small  political 
factions,  neither  of  which  wishes  to  see  any  radical 
change.  Although  the  Indians  were  admitted  to  the 
rights  of  citizenship  in  1896,  they  take  no  part  in  the 
political  life  of  the  country,  which  is  left  to  the  white 
population,  who  form  only  7 per  cent,  of  the  total. 

It  is  easy,  therefore,  to  understand  why  Ecuador 
has  had  few  opportunities  for  economic  development. 
Occasionally  an  interval  of  quiet,  such  as  the  Adminis- 
tration of  President  Flores,  has  allowed  some  progress 
to  be  made,  engendering  hope  of  a change  for  the  better 
in  the  future  : but  these  periods  of  lucidity  have  been 
brief,  and  the  result  is  seen  to-day  in  the  extremely 
backward  state  of  civilisation  in  this  part  of  South 
America.  Ecuador,  too,  has  been  so  isolated  from  the 


584 


ECUADOR 


remainder  of  the  world  that  neither  European  nor 
North  American  example  has  counted  for  much  in  her 
evolution,  and  no  immigration  except  from  other  South 
American  countries  has  taken  place  since  her  independ- 
ence. A few  foreigners  have  wandered  into  the 
country,  but  only  in  such  limited  numbers  as  to  have 
no  influence,  and  what  civilisation  there  is  has  been 
inherited  from  Spanish  ancestors.  What  should  have 
been  normal  progress  has  been  hindered  at  every  turn 
by  the  unrestful  state  of  internal  politics,  that  constant 
bar  to  all  moral  expansion  and  material  development. 

To  turn  to  details.  The  area  of  Ecuador  is  stated  to 
be  120,000  square  miles ; but  no  survey  of  the  country 
has  been  made,  and  the  figures  given  are  necessarily  far 
from  accurate.  A similar  vagueness  exists  in  regard  to 
the  number  of  inhabitants,  but  the  estimate  of  popula- 
tion now  generally  accepted  places  the  total  number  of 
inhabitants  at  1,270,000,  including  100,000  whites, 

300.000  of  mixed  blood,  and  870,000  Indians.  If 
these  estimates  of  area  and  population  are  relatively 
correct,  they  mean  a density  of  only  15  inhabitants  to 
the  square  mile,  which  is  smaller  than  in  any  other  South 
American  State. 

Of  the  towns  of  Ecuador  the  national  capital,  Quito, 
has  a population  of  35,000,  and  contains  1800  inhabited 
houses.  The  city  is  very  old,  for  it  was  at  Quito  that 
Atahualpa  held  liis  court.  It  stands  at  an  altitude  of 

10.000  feet  above  sea  level,  and  is  seven  days  from  the 
port  of  Guayaquil  in  the  present  state  of  communica- 
tion. As  the  political  centre  of  the  country  alone  is 
Quito  important ; for  it  enters  but  little  into  either  the 
commercial  or  economic  side  of  national  life,  no  trade 
radiating  from  it,  and  no  produce  of  any  value  coming 
from  its  vicinity.  Guayaquil  is  the  headquarters  of  all 
commercial  business,  both  imports  and  exports  being 
centred  at  this  port,  and  30,000  persons  dwelling  in  the 
municipal  limits  in  addition  to  a considerable  floating 
population,  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  the  only  seaport  at 
which  foreign  shipping  regularly  calls.  This  city  is 


1903] 


ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS 


585 


built  chiefly  of  wooi,  and  has  been  singularly  unfortunate 
in  damage  by  fire,  a conflagration  taking  place  in  1899, 
when  nearly  one-third  of  the  buildings  were  totally 
destroyed,  followed  by  another  almost  equally  disastrous. 
The  other  important  cities  of  Ecuador  are  Cuenca,  with 
25,000  inhabitants ; Eiobamba,  with  12,000  ; Ambato, 
Loja,  and  Latacunga,  each  with  10,000. 

The  three  principal  topographical  features  of  Ecuador 
are  the  low-lying  lands  on  the  sea  coast  and  near  the 
river  Guayas,  the  great  mountain  ranges  of  the  interior, 
and  the  valleys  that  intersect  them.  The  flat  country 
near  the  seaboard  contains  a large  area  of  fertile  soil, 
but  the  malarious  climate  precludes  all  idea  of  the  land 
being  available  for  settlement  by  immigration  from 
abroad.  In  the  valleys  at  elevations  of  4000  feet  and 
upwards,  the  climate  is  temperate  and  combined  with 
rich  virgin  lands,  suggesting  a possibility  of  develop- 
ment some  day  when  means  of  transport  are  created  to 
overcome  the  physical  obstacles  to  locomotion  which 
now  hinder  all  progress.  From  the  higher  mountain 
ranges  rise  up  the  great  peaks  of  the  Andes,  among 
which  the  most  notable  are  Cayambi,  Antisana,  Cotopaxi, 
Llanganati,  Sincholagua,  Sangai,  Sara-urcu,  Tunguragua, 
Collanes,  and  Assnay  in  the  eastern  Cordillera ; and 
Chimborazo,  Illiniza,  Casalagua,  Cotacachi,  Pichincha, 
Corazon,  Atacazo,  Chiles,  Carahuiraso,  Yana-urcu,  and 
Quilindana  to  the  west,  all  covered  with  perpetual  snow. 
At  the  junction  of  the  eastern  and  western  Cordilleras 
is  the  mountain  of  Imbabura,  remarkable  for  its  vast 
eruptions  of  mud  and  water.  Cayambi  is  situated 
exactly  on  the  equator,  and  is  consequently  distinguished 
from  every  other  snow-capped  peak  in  the  world,  and  is 
the  highest  mountain  of  the  eastern  Cordillera.  Chim- 
boraso,  the  “ Mountain  of  Snow,”  in  the  western 
Cordillera,  is  one  of  the  most  beautiful  peaks  in  South 
America  and  rises  to  21,420  feet. 

Ecuador  economically  is  the  most  backward  of  all 
South  American  countries,  and  not  least  in  education, 
for  which  little  has  been  accomplished  since  the  effort 


586 


ECUADOR 


made  by  President  Flores  between  1888  and  1892. 
For  primary  instruction,  there  are  1090  schools,  and 
the  number  of  pupils  on  the  rolls  in  1898  was  68,380, 
but  the  attendance  is  most  irregular.  Instruction  is 
gratuitous  and  obligatory ; but  no  adequate  measures 
are  taken  to  enforce  the  attendance  of  the  children  to 
which  the  law  applies,  nor  is  it  possible  to  do  so  in 
many  cases  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  communication  in 
the  districts  of  the  interior.  As  in  Colombia  and 
Venezuela,  the  lower  classes  are  apathetic,  and  slow  to 
take  advantage  of  existing  facilities.  For  secondary 
and  higher  education,  there  are  35  schools,  and  9 other 
establishments  for  more  advanced  instruction ; and  at 
Quito  there  is  the  University,  with  a staff  of  32 
professors  and  an  attendance  in  1898  of  216  students. 
University  Faculties  exist  also  at  Guayaquil  and  Cuenca, 
and  technical  and  commercial  schools  at  both  Quito 
and  Guayaquil.  In  all  matters  of  education,  the 
Church  until  recently  has  exercised  a strong  influence, 
but  latterly  the  attitude  of  President  Alfaro  towards 
the  clergy  has  tended  to  restrict  the  direct  interference 
of  the  priesthood,  especially  in  primary  instruction. 

In  the  administration  of  justice,  Ecuador  lags 
behind  the  standard  of  other  republics  in  South 
America — a severe  condemnation,  for  in  none  is  it  on  a 
satisfactory  footing  from  the  standpoint  of  modern 
civilisation.  Less  is  heard  abroad  of  corrupt  methods 
in  the  Ecuadorian  courts  because  the  number  of  foreign 
residents  is  limited,  but  the  entire  system  is  degenerate. 
The  laws,  as  in  all  former  Spanish  colonies,  are  founded 
on  those  in  force  before  independence,  and  reproduce 
the  worst  faults  of  the  Spanish  system,  with  the 
additional  mischief  of  interpretation  by  ignorant  officials, 
who  possess  neither  capacity  nor  intelligence  to  dis- 
charge the  duties  of  their  posts.  The  Supreme  Court 
is  at  Quito,  and  there  are  six  superior  courts  which  sit 
at  different  centres,  with  the  addition  of  33  superior, 
and  359  subordinate  magistrates  to  deal  with  civil, 
criminal,  and  commercial  cases  in  the  country  districts, 


1903] 


NATIONAL  CHARACTER 


587 


while  Consular  courts  are  held  at  Quito,  Guayaquil, 
and  Cuenca.  Ecuador  has  only  one  penitentiary,  at 
Quito,  and  in  this  male  and  female  prisoners  convicted 
of  serious  crimes  are  confined  ; but  as  a general  rule,  the 
people  have  small  tendency  towards  really  serious 
offences,  although  petty  crime  is  frequent  in  all  parts  of 
the  country.  The  police  system  is  under  municipal 
authority,  with  the  exception  of  a small  force  maintained 
by  the  National  Government  at  Quito  and  elsewhere 
for  special  duty. 

In  any  consideration  of  the  national  character  of  the 
Ecuadorians  the  fact  must  be  always  remembered  that 
there  is  only  a small  community  of  white  residents, 
people  of  European  origin,  who  retain  the  characteristic 
features  of  their  Spanish  ancestry,  modified  by  local 
conditions  and  the  effect  of  many  generations  of  life 
amongst  Indian  tribes  treated  as  a lower  race,  whose 
lot  is  not  far  removed  from  the  slavery  under  Inca  rule. 
The  preponderance  of  Indian  blood  has  been  so  great, 
that  in  mixed  marriages  the  offspring  has  been  absorbed 
into  the  Indian  population,  burying  there  the  traits  of 
character  inherited  from  the  alien  race  that  conquered 
the  land  400  years  ago,  and  amongst  this  Indian 
population  the  influence  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church 
is  paramount.  The  majority  of  the  people  are  ignorant 
and  superstitious,  and  the  outward  forms  of  Christianity, 
as  preached  by  the  Catholic  priesthood,  appeal  forcibly 
to  their  imaginations ; but  that  they  possess  intelligent 
ideas  of  the  principles  of  religion  is  doubtful,  although 
they  are  fearful  of  the  penalties  they  are  taught  to 
expect  for  direct  disobedience  to  priestly  injunctions. 
It  is  difficult  to  conceive  the  existence  of  any  other 
mental  condition  amongst  a race  whose  traditions 
include  the  fate  meted  out  to  Atahualpa  under  the  guise 
of  Christianity,  and  who  have  never  known  modern 
civilisation  except  such  as  was  forced  on  them  by 
the  Spanish  conquerors. 

Means  of  communication  in  Ecuador  are  most 
primitive.  The  one  railway  open  to  public  service 


588 


ECUADOR 


connects  Duran,  near  Guayaquil,  with  Chimbo.  It  is 
58  miles  long,  and  is  to  be  continued  to  Quito,  con- 
siderable work  in  this  direction  having  been  accom- 
plished under  a concession  granted  in  1896.  The 
difficulties,  however,  in  the  way  of  bringing  this 
enterprise  to  a successful  termination  are  great  and 
the  available  traffic  on  the  route  so  limited  that  con- 
nection with  Quito  depends  on  the  ability  of  the  Govern- 
ment to  maintain  substantial  monetary  subventions 
to  the  constructors.  Of  roads  there  are  few,  except  a 
highway  built  to  facilitate  communication  between 
Quito  and  Guayaquil  for  115  miles,  which  of  recent 
years  has  fallen  into  bad  repair,  and  bridle  paths  are 
the  means  by  which  the  conveyance  of  passengers  and 
cargo  to  the  interior  is  effected.  The  rivers  Guayas, 
Daule,  and  Vinces  afford  waterways  to  the  lower  lands 
at  the  foot  of  the  western  Cordillera,  and  a service  of 
steamers  carries  the  traffic,  the  majority  of  these  river 
boats  being  the  property  of  an  American  Syndicate. 

Industrial  enterprise,  with  the  exception  of  the 
production  of  food  stuffs  for  home  consumption,  has 
been  confined  chiefly  to  the  cultivation  of  cacao,  mostly 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  the  river  Guayas,  where  the 
rich  soil  is  moist  and  the  climate  warm,  all  admirably 
adapted  for  it.  In  1895  the  cacao  shipped  abroad 
reached  16,122  tons;  in  1896  the  amount  was  15,327 
tons ; and  in  1897  the  total  exports  wTere  14,800  tons, 
valued  at  £960,031.  Coffee  is  also  grown  to  some 
extent,  and  the  area  of  the  plantations  is  increasing,  the 
value  sent  abroad  in  1896  being  £94,105,  and  a year 
later  £49,640,  a decrease  due  to  the  fall  in  prices. 
Sugar  is  manufactured,  but  only  a small  quantity  is 
exported.  Large  tracts  covered  by  rubber  trees  exist 
in  the  forests,  and  the  collection  of  the  gum  has  attracted 
some  attention  since  high  prices  ruled,  with  the  result 
that  in  1897  the  shipments  were  valued  at  £47,232. 
Stock-keeping  is  only  attempted  on  a small  scale,  neither 
climate  nor  general  conditions  offering  strong  induce- 
ments for  cattle  breeding.  Although  mineral  wealth, 


1903]  INDUSTRY  AND  PRODUCTION 


589 


and  especially  gold  and  silver,  is  known  to  exist, 
attempts  at  systematic  mining  work  have  been  few  ; but 
at  Zarama,  in  the  province  of  Oro,  quartz  crushing  is 
carried  out  with  ore  averaging  over  1 ounce  to  the  ton,  and 
at  Esmeralda  a company  is  extracting  gold  by  hydraulic 
methods  from  gravel  beds  which  are  stated  to  yield  50 
cents  to  the  cubic  yard.  A little  gold  is  annually 
washed  by  the  Indians  in  different  parts  of  the  country, 
but  not  in  sufficient  quantities  to  be  important.  Other 
minerals  known  to  exist,  but  not  worked,  are  petroleum, 
copper,  iron,  lead,  and  coal.  With  improved  means  of 
transport  the  mining  industry  may  develop  and  become 
an  important  source  of  wealth,  but  until  the  mountainous 
districts  are  made  accessible  by  railways  or  roads  all 
progress  must  be  difficult. 

The  foreign  indebtedness  of  Eucador  is  her  share  of 
the  Colombian  external  obligations  when  the  separation 
of  Venezuela  and  Ecuador  from  Colombia  took  place, 
the  original  amount  allotted  to  Ecuador  being  £1,820,000 
in  1830.  At  intervals  payments  were  made  to  the 
bondholders,  although  in  1891  the  arrears  of  interest 
reached  £428,640,  and  in  1892  an  arrangement  was 
made  by  which  the  capital  of  the  debt  was  reduced  to 
£750,000 ; but  in  1894  its  service  again  fell  into  default. 
In  1898  the  bonds  in  circulation  amounted  to  £693,160, 
and  arrangements  were  then  made  by  the  concessionaires 
of  the  projected  railway  to  Quito  to  assume  responsibility 
for  this  obligation  as  one  of  the  conditions  of  the  conces- 
sion. While  there  is  a large  internal  floating  debt  due  by 
the  Government  to  various  creditors,  no  details  of  this 
liability  are  available.  To  meet  all  expenses  the  revenue 
is  £1,000,000  in  round  figures,  70  per  cent,  of  this  being 
derived  from  Custom-house  duties,  and  the  remainder 
from  taxes  on  cacao,  real  estate,  rum  distilled  in  the 
country,  tobacco,  the  salt  and  gunpowder  monopolies, 
stamps  and  stamped  paper,  and  the  receipts  of  the 
telegraph  department.  As  a rule  the  revenue  falls 
short  of  the  expenditure,  and  it  is  in  consequence  of 
these  recurring  deficits  that  the  floating  debt  has  been 


590 


ECUADOR 


acumulated.  The  commerce  of  Ecuador  has  been 
severely  depressed  recently  on  account  of  low  prices  for 
cacao  and  coffee.  Yet  the  value  of  imported  merchandise 
has  averaged  £1,000,000  annually  during  the  past  few 
years,  and  the  exports  £1,200,000  for  same  period. 

The  future  of  Ecuador  is  wrapped  in  obscurity. 
The  condition  of  the  people  could  be  greatly  improved 
by  education  and  a more  honourable  and  impartial 
administration  of  justice,  but  without  immigration  from 
abroad  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  present  characteristic 
defects  are  to  be  eliminated  within  reasonable  time,  and 
there  is  no  incentive  to  immigration  from  the  north.  It 
is  possible  that  the  opening  of  the  Panama  canal  may 
influence  affairs  beneficially  by  bringing  Ecuador  within 
easier  reach  of  the  outside  world  ; but  the  assistance 
towards  economic  progress  can  be  little  more  than 
tentative  until  better  means  of  transport  to  the  interior 
of  the  country  exist,  and  before  substantial  development 
can  occur  railways  and  roads  must  be  constructed,  and 
of  this  there  is  small  present  prospect. 


CHAPTER  XXXII 


COLOMBIA 

Various  Titles  of  Colombia.  Internal  Political  Troubles.  Political 
Parties.  Election  of  Senor  Rafael  Nunez.  Revolution  in  1881. 
Settlement  with  Costa  Rica.  President  Laldua.  General 
Obaldra.  Liberals  support  Senor  Nunez.  Boundary  Question 
with  Venezuela.  President  Nunez  in  1884.  Nunez  and  the 
Conservatives.  Rebellion  in  1885.  Re-establishment  of  Peace. 
Occupation  of  Panama  and  Colon  by  United  States  Forces. 
President  Nunez  at  Cartagena.  Revision  of  the  Law  of  Consti- 
tution. Discontent  between  1888  and  1892.  Nunez  again 
elected.  Senor  Miguel  Caro  Vice-President.  Death  of  Nunez. 
Revolt  in  1895.  Election  of  Senor  Sanclemente.  Senor 
Marroquin  as  Vice-President.  Revolution  in  1898.  President 
Sanclemente  temporarily  Resigns.  Vice-President  Marroquin 
supercedes  Sanclemente.  Panama  Secedes.  Incapacity  of 
Colombians  for  Independent  Government.  Topography  and 
Revolutionary  Practices.  Reason  of  Present  Political  Conditions. 
Economic  Progress  and  Political  Disturbances.  Topographical 
Features.  Climate.  Area  and  Population.  Hygienic  Con- 
ditions. Education.  Primary  Instruction.  The  Peasant  Class 
and  Education.  Secondary  and  Higher  Education.  Justice. 
The  Roman  Catholic  Church.  Religious  Seminaries.  Missionary 
Work  and  the  Indians.  National  Character.  Alcoholism. 
Industrial  Enterprise.  Mining.  Manufactures.  The  Pradera 
Iron  Works.  The  Panama  Canal.  Financial  Situation.  Future 
Prospects. 

The  present  Republic  of  Colombia  has  been  known 
under  several  different  titles  since  it  was  a Spanish 
colony.  In  1810  the  inhabitants  obtained  their  inde- 
pendence from  Spain,  and  on  December  27  of  that  year 
the  country  was  officially  proclaimed  as  the  United 
States  of  Colombia.  On  February  29,  1832,  the 

591 


territory 


592 


COLOMBIA 


was  divided  into  three  States,  each  with  independent 
Administrations  under  the  names  of  Venezuela,  Ecuador, 
and  the  Republic  of  New  Granada. 

Under  the  reformed  Constitution  of  April  1,  1858, 
this  Republic  of  New  Granada  was  altered  to  a con- 
federation of  eight  vStates,  and  adopted  the  title  of 
Confederation  Granadina.  Another  alteration  occurred 
on  September  20,  1861,  when  it  was  constituted  into 
the  United  States  of  New  Granada  with  nine  States ; 
and  on  May  8,  1863,  a new  Law  converted  the  Republic 
into  the  United  States  of  Colombia.  Again,  in  August, 
1886,  another  revision  of  the  Law  of  Constitution 
abolished  the  autonomous  privileges  of  the  several 
States,  and  changed  them  into  provinces  administered 
by  Governors  nominated  by  the  President  of  the 
Republic,  the  original  designation  of  the  Republic  of 
Colombia  being  once  more  adopted.  Colombia,  in 
common  with  Venezuela  and  Ecuador,  has  been  the 
scene  of  constant  internal  strife  during  the  nineteenth 
century,  which  has  checked  the  moral  and  material 
development  of  the  community  at  every  turn,  and  for 
the  present  there  are  no  indications  of  immediate  radical 
change  in  this  respect.  The  opening  of  the  new  century 
found  the  country  devastated  by  armed  insurrection 
against  the  constituted  authorities. 

The  two  great  political  parties  in  Colombia  are  the 
usual  Conservatives  and  Liberals,  and  it  has  been  the 
endless  struggle  for  office  between  these  two  factions 
that  has  caused  constant  recurrence  of  revolutionary  out- 
breaks. While,  however,  the  incentive  for  frequent 
bloodshed  between  the  two  parties  is  largely  due  to  a 
desire  of  the  opposition  to  enjoy  the  spoils  that  fall  to 
the  Administration  and  its  friends,  there  are  yet  certain 
clearly  defined  political  principles  forming  a raison  detre 
for  a difference  of  opinion  as  to  which  faction  should 
govern.  The  Conservatives  are  essentially  the  Church 
and  State  party,  and  they  wish  to  establish  clerical 
influence  as  a dominant  factor  in  all  educational 
questions.  The  Liberals  advocate  the  severance  of 


1875]  CONSERVATIVES  AND  LIBERALS  593 


Church  and  State,  education  on  a basis  entirely  free 
from  Church  influence,  and  a general  restriction  of  the 
power  the  priesthood  has  hitherto  exercised  in  political 
and  domestic  affairs.  Doubtless  the  Liberals  have 
grounds  for  their  objection  to  the  influence  the  clergy 
have  wielded  in  the  past,  and  the  part  they  play  to-day 
in  the  national  destinies ; but  too  often  the  movements 
ostensibly  set  afoot  for  a more  progressive  policy  in  the 
public  Administration  have  degenerated  into  attempts 
to  obtain  control  of  the  Government  for  the  personal 
ends  of  ambitious  political  adventurers  who  are  far  from 
seeking  reforms  for  the  general  welfare ; and  while  the 
principles  of  the  Liberals  may  be  worthy  of  support  the 
instruments  chosen  for  their  execution  are  too  often 
faulty.  Under  these  circumstances  the  Conservatives, 
aided  by  Church  influence,  have  maintained  their  position 
as  the  dominant  faction  in  spite  of  the  strenuous  efforts 
of  their  political  adversaries. 

For  the  five  years  previous  to  1880,  during  the  presi- 
dencies of  Aquiles  Parra  and  Trujillo,  the  Liberals  made 
steady  progress  in  national  politics,  although  unable  to 
command  a majority  for  the  presidential  election. 
Under  President  Trujillo  several  reforms  were  initiated, 
greater  political  freedom  was  permitted,  efforts  were 
made  to  place  the  national  finances  on  a more  satis- 
factory basis,  and  material  prosperity  was  increased  by 
a substantial  reduction  in  the  public  indebtedness.  As 
a result,  the  Liberal  representation  in  Congress  became 
an  important  force  in  politics ; and  in  1880,  when 
President  Trujillo  completed  his  term  of  office,  the 
question  of  the  nomination  of  his  successor  created  deep 
public  interest.  The  Liberals,  convinced  that  they 
could  not  then  hope  to  bring  in  a man  of  their  own 
political  colour  as  Chief  Magistrate,  determined  to 
support  the  candidacy  of  Senor  Rafael  Nunez,  a member 
of  the  Conservative  party,  but  strongly  imbued  with 
advanced  ideas  in  regard  to  public  administration.  By 
following  this  course,  they  hoped  to  gain  ground  to  an 
extent  that  would  enable  them  at  no  distant  date  to 

2 p 


594 


COLOMBIA 


claim  a majority  over  their  opponents,  hopes  not 
unjustified  although  events  occurred  to  deter  their 
fulfilment.  While  President  Nunez  was  prepared  to 
deal  fairly  with  the  Liberal  Party,  many  of  his  Conserva- 
tive supporters  held  different  views  on  the  subject,  and 
they  forced  him  in  1881  to  bring  official  influence  to 
bear  in  various  electoral  matters  and  appointments  to 
high  offices,  to  the  detriment  of  the  Liberal  cause. 
These  unpopular  acts  led  to  an  armed  uprising  in  the 
provinces  of  Cauca  and  Antioquia  supported  by  a 
number  of  the  Liberal  leaders,  and  although  the  move- 
ment was  suppressed  by  the  authorities,  this  was  only 
done  at  a considerable  sacrifice  of  life.  The  result  of 
the  outbreak  was  injurious  to  Liberal  influence,  and  it 
left  the  Opposition  powerless  to  resist  the  nomination 
for  the  Presidency  of  the  Conservative  candidate,  Senor 
Laldua. 

During  the  period  President  Nunez  was  in  power, 
important  questions  came  up  for  settlement  or  discussion. 
The  long-standing  dispute  concerning  the  boundary  with 
Costa  Rica  was  definitely  settled  in  July,  1880.  A 
proposal  for  the  confederation  of  the  Republica  of 
Colombia,  Venezuela  and  Ecuador  was  made  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  approved  by  that  branch  of 
the  legislature,  but  fell  through  in  consequence  of 
objections  raised  by  Venezuela  and  Ecuador  to  the  terms 
on  which  the  amalgamation  of  the  three  countries  was 
projected.  Efforts  were  also  made  by  Nunez  to  deal 
with  the  education  problem,  but  not  with  much  success, 
although  increased  facilities  for  primary  instruction  were 
provided  and  attention  drawn  to  some  of  the  defects  of 
the  existing  system  for  secondary  and  higher  education. 

President  Laldua,  who  succeeded  Nunez,  was  only  a 
brief  period  in  office  when  he  died  suddenly  in  1883, 
and  this  led  to  the  accession  of  the  Vice-President, 
General  Otalora.  The  Liberals  now  determined  to 
make  another  attempt  to  improve  their  position,  and 
decided  to  support  the  candidacy  of  Senor  Nunez,  rely- 
ing on  his  progressive  policy  to  help  their  cause.  Nunez 


1881]  NUNEZ  AGAIN  ELECTED  595 

was  in  Europe  at  this  time,  but  in  April,  1884,  while 
still  absent,  he  was  elected  to  succeed  General  Otalora. 
The  only  event  of  importance  occurring  during  the  short 
presidential  term  of  General  Otalora  was  the  settlement 
of  the  boundary  dispute  with  Venezuela,  which  it  was 
agreed  in  1883  to  refer  to  the  arbitration  of  the  Spanish 
Crown.  A Commission  of  five  members  was  nominated 
by  King  Alfonso  XII.  to  investigate  the  contending 
claims,  but  the  decision  was  not  reached  until  eight 
years  later,  in  April,  1891,  when  the  Queen-Regent  of 
Spain  gave  her  verdict. 

With  the  assumption  of  office  by  Nunez  in  1884, 
there  began  a period  in  which  he  was  virtually  Dictator 
of  Colombia,  occupying  a similar  position  to  that  of 
General  Guzman  Blanco  in  Venezuela,  and  he  kept  the 
control  until  his  death  on  September  18,  1894.  His 
ideas  had  undergone  a marked  change  during  his  visit 
to  Europe,  and  the  Liberals  soon  recognised  to  their 
dismay  that  the  man  they  had  assisted  to  power  had 
become  saturated  with  the  opinions  they  most  disliked 
amongst  the  Conservatives.  This  change  meant  that 
the  influence  of  the  Church  again  became  paramount 
in  politics.  The  Liberals  found  themselves  stripped  of 
the  concessions  they  had  obtained  under  former  Adminis- 
trations, and  all  participation  in  public  affairs  was 
denied  to  them.  If  they  wanted  to  be  heard  it  was 
clear  that  the  only  course  open  to  them  was  to  take 
sword  in  hand  and  by  force  of  arms  win  for  themselves 
a recognition  of  their  civic  rights.  Discontent  spread 
rapidly  in  1884,  and  in  the  beginning  of  the  ensuing 
year  several  conspiracies  were  discovered.  In  outlying 
districts  the  standard  of  revolt  was  raised,  and  in  April, 
1885,  the  insurrectionary  spirit  had  so  far  developed 
that,  with  little  warning,  the  country  was  plunged  into 
a civil  war  of  more  serious  proportions  than  any  which 
had  taken  place  since  the  Colombians  fought  the 
Spaniards  for  their  freedom. 

The  rebellion  centred  mainly  in  the  provinces  of 
Panama,  Boyaca,  Magdalena,  and  Cundinamarca,  and 


596 


COLOMBIA 


Generals  Keyes  and  Velez  were  its  principal  leaders. 
While  the  Government  was  not  taken  by  surprise  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  insurrection  the  strength  of  the 
insurgents  was  underrated,  and  before  an  adequate 
number  of  troops  could  be  placed  in  the  field  the  rebels 
had  obtained  several  successes,  adding  greatly  to  their 
prestige  and  bringing  many  recruits  to  their  ranks. 
President  Nunez  was  not  wanting  in  energy  when 
occasion  demanded,  and  in  the  course  of  a couple  of 
months  he  had  10,000  men  equipped  and  ready  for 
service.  Several  engagements  were  fought  with  the  in- 
surgents in  July,  1885,  the  legal  forces  generally  obtaining 
the  advantage  because  better  supplied  with  arms  and 
ammunition.  These  repeated  reverses  discouraged  the 
leaders  of  the  revolt,  a feeling  accentuated  when  they 
found  desertions  from  their  cause  becoming  every  day 
more  frequent.  At  the  end  of  July  peace  negotiations 
were  proposed  by  the  Government,  and  General  Reyes 
and  his  companions,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  they  now 
saw  small  chance  of  victory,  agreed  to  lay  down  their 
arms.  Accordingly,  on  August  4,  the  formal  surrender 
of  the  rebel  leaders  took  place,  and,  on  Sept  ember  5, 1885, 
a proclamation  announcing  the  restoration  of  peace 
throughout  Colombia  was  issued  by  the  Government. 
The  result  of  this  struggle  was  that  the  Administration 
of  President  Nunez  and  the  Conservative  Party  obtained 
absolute  control  of  the  country.  All  war  material 
possessed  by  the  insurgents  was  confiscated,  and  the 
Liberals  found  themselves  with  their  hopes  shattered, 
and  with  no  prospect  in  the  immediate  future  of  being 
able  to  offer  effective  resistance  to  any  policy  Nunez  and 
his  friends  might  pursue. 

During  this  rebellion  active  hostilities  occurred  on 
several  occasions  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  From 
Colon  on  the  Atlantic  to  Panama  on  the  Pacific  coast, 
runs  the  railway  built  by  a company  registered  in  the 
United  States,  and  working  under  a concession  from 
the  Colombian  Government.  By  the  terms  of  this  con- 
cession the  railway  company  was  permitted  to  appeal 


1885]  AMERICAN  TROOPS  AT  PANAMA  597 


for  protection  to  the  United  States  Government,  should 
their  property  be  threatened  by  internal  political  dis- 
turbances, and  Colombia  agreed  in  such  event  to  put. 
no  obstacles  in  the  way  of  troops  landed  by  that 
Government  in  response  to  the  appeal.  Now  in  1885 
the  civil  war  in  Colombia  did  seriously  menace  the  rail- 
way traffic,  and  in  this  emergency  the  officials  of  the 
company  applied  to  the  Administration  of  President 
Cleveland  for  protection.  It  promptly  complied,  landing 
detachments  of  marines  at  Colon  and  Panama  to  occupy 
those  towns  and  insure  the  railway  against  molestation. 
This  is  interesting,  as  an  example  of  armed  forces  from 
the  United  States  being  disembarked  in  foreign  territory 
to  protect  a private  corporation,  for  the  Panamd  Railway 
Company  certainly  comes  under  that  description,  no 
matter  how  important  its  maintenance  may  be  for 
United  States  national  interests  in  connection  with 
transcontinental  trade. 

When  President  Nunez  returned  to  Colombia  after 
his  election  to  the  Presidency  in  1884,  he  had  pleaded 
physical  incapacity  as  an  excuse  for  not  residing  in 
Bogota,  the  National  Capital,  and  not  without  reasonable 
grounds,  for  Bogota  stands  10,000  feet  above  sea  level, 
and  Senor  Nunez  was  not  in  good  health.  While 
nominally  President  of  the  Republic,  he  exercised  his 
authority  through  a deputy,  directing  affairs  from  his 
own  house  near  Cartagena.  This  was  highly  incon- 
venient, in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  journey  from 
Cartagena  to  Bogotd  could  not  be  accomplished  in  less 
than  ten  days,  that  telegraphic  communication  was 
irregular,  and  that  no  important  action  could  be  under- 
taken without  the  personal  knowledge  and  consent  of 
the  President.  When  the  revolutionary  troubles  in 
1885  seriously  menaced  his  Administration,  he  tem- 
porarily emerged  from  his  retirement  and  assumed 
the  direction  of  the  Government,  but  when  peace  was 
restored  and  certain  measures  necessary  to  guard  against 
a repetition  of  the  recent  disturbances  arranged,  he 
returned  to  his  home  to  rule  by  deputy  as  before. 


598 


COLOMBIA 


To  safeguard  the  country  against  further  revolutionary 
movements,  a drastic  reform  in  the  Constitution  was 
promulgated  on  August  6,  1886.  It  provided  for  the 
abolition  of  the  federal  system  of  government,  the  States 
being  deprived  of  their  semi-independent  administrations 
and  becoming  provinces  under  the  control  of  a governor 
nominated  directly  by  the  President ; and  in  each 
Province  or  Department  a local  assembly,  elected  by 
the  inhabitants,  was  created  to  superintend  local  affairs. 
The  life  of  the  National  Congress — Senate  and  House 
of  Representatives — together  with  the  presidential  term 
was  extended  to  six  years,  in  place  of  two  as  hitherto, 
and  other  minor  changes  decreed.  Murder  had  hitherto 
been  punishable  by  imprisonment  for  only  ten  years, 
and  by  allowances  for  good  behaviour  during  confinement 
this  could  be  reduced  to  two-tliirds  of  the  sentence,  but 
by  the  new  act  the  penalty  became  death.  The  Press 
was  made  responsible  for  libellous  and  seditious  publi- 
cations, and  other  means  were  taken  to  check  the  spread 
of  disaffection.  After  the  promulgation  of  this  revised 
law  Nunez  was  again  elected  President  for  the  six 
years  to  August  7, 1892.  In  1888  Senor  Carlos  Holguin 
was  appointed  to  discharge  provisionally  the  duties  of 
the  head  of  the  Administration,  but  the  real  control 
remained  as  formerly  in  the  hands  of  President  Nunez, 
and  all  important  matters  were  submitted  to  him  at 
Cartagena  for  his  advice  and  approval. 

For  a brief  period  there  was  comparative  internal 
peace.  The  defeat  of  the  revolutionary  movement 
organised  by  the  Liberals  in  1885  had  been  so  decisive 
that  no  immediate  outbreak  was  possible,  but  the  spirit 
of  insurrection  was  scorched,  not  killed.  The  Opposi- 
tion began  secretly  to  arrange  plans  of  action  against 
opportunity,  and  between  1888  and  1892  the  discontented 
faction  fomented  a feeling  of  irritation  and  dissatisfaction 
against  Nunez,  and  more  than  once  this  took  the  form 
of  armed  resistance ; but  such  local  risings  were  sup- 
pressed with  small  difficulty,  and  when,  in  1892,  the 
term  of  Nunez  expired,  his  hold  upon  the  country  was 


1892] 


DEATH  OF  NUNEZ 


599 


so  strong  that  he  was  again  installed  for  the  ensuing 
six  years.  The  plea  of  ill-health  was  once  more  put 
forward  as  an  excuse  to  avoid  residence  at  Bogota,  and 
his  duties  were  as  before  delegated  to  the  Vice-President, 
Senor  Miguel  Caro.  For  the  next  two  years  no  develop- 
ments of  special  interest  occurred,  but  the  Liberals 
gained  ground  in  many  directions,  and  from  time  to 
time  incidents  happened  tending  to  show  that  a serious 
movement  against  the  Government  would  not  be  long 
deferred.  Nunez  died  in  September,  1894,  and  his 
death  was  the  signal  for  a renewal  of  the  internal 
disturbances  which  his  Administration  had  held  in 
check  for  nine  years. 

As  Vice-President  of  the  Republic,  Senor  Miguel 
Caro  assumed  the  Presidency  for  the  unexpired  portion 
of  the  term  for  which  Nunez  had  been  nominated  in 
1892.  Once  again  the  Liberals  determined  to  make  an 
effort  to  wrest  control  of  the  country  from  the  Con- 
servatives, their  leaders  imagining  that  success  would 
be  less  difficult  against  the  new  President  than  against 
his  predecessor ; but  in  this  they  were  mistaken. 
Revolt  broke  out  in  several  districts,  but  little  progress 
was  made  against  the  Government  forces ; and  although 
the  revolutionary  movement  was  not  entirely  stamped 
out,  it  never  attained  greater  proportions  than  those  of 
a desultory  guerilla  warfare  conducted  in  inaccessible 
mountain  regions.  It  was  never  dangerous  to  the 
Administration,  but  it  served  the  purpose  of  the  Liberals 
in  keeping  alive  a spirit  of  unrest  under  cover  of  which 
intrigues  could  be  set  afoot  for  a more  widely  extended 
conspiracy  at  a later  date.  Such  was  the  state  of 
internal  affairs  until  1898,  when  President  Caro’s  term 
expired. 

To  succeed  Caro  the  Conservatives  chose  Senor  M. 
A.  Sanclemente,  a man  imbued  with  the  extreme  political 
views  of  his  party  and  a strong  supporter  of  clericalism. 
The  Vice-President  nominated  was  Senor  J.  M.  Mar- 
roquin,  and  it  soon  became  evident  that  he  was  a man 
to  be  reckoned  with.  No  sooner  was  President 


600 


COLOMBIA 


Sanclemente  in  the  chair  than  the  insurrection  promoted 
by  the  Liberals  rapidly  assumed  more  serious  propor- 
tions, and  in  Antioquia,  Cauca,  and  Panama  the 
insurgents  gained  ground  in  spite  of  all  efforts  of  the 
Government  to  check  them.  Arms  and  ammunition 
were  obtained  by  the  rebels  from  Venezuelan  sources, 
but  the  supply  was  limited,  and  it  was  due  to  this  that 
greater  results  were  not  obtained  by  the  insurrection. 
President  Sanclemente,  then  eighty  years  of  age,  was 
unable  to  withstand  the  strain,  and,  his  health  giving 
way,  he  temporarily  abandoned  his  duties  to  the  Vice- 
President,  Sehor  Marroquin. 

In  spite  of  the  attempts  of  the  Vice-President  to 
crush  the  insurrection,  the  rebels  held  their  ground  at 
nearly  all  points  and  gained  occasional  success.  On  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  severe  fighting  occurred,  and  the 
insurgents  succeeded  in  capturing  the  city  of  Panama 
and  the  town  of  Colon,  but  subsequently  were  forced 
to  evacuate  both  positions  on  the  arrival  of  reinforce- 
ments of  Government  troops.  During  the  latter  months 
of  1900  reports  were  published  by  the  Government  from 
time  to  time  that  the  rebellion  has  been  completely 
suppressed,  but  how  little  reliance  could  be  placed  on 
such  statements  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  some  revolu- 
tionary success  almost  invariably  occurred  within  a few 
days  of  these  announcements.  Such  an  event  was  the 
sinking  of  the  steamer  Lautaro  off  Panama  in  January, 
1902,  when  General  Alban,  Governor  of  Panama,  on 
board  at  the  time,  was  drowned. 

In  1900  Vice-President  Marroquin  determined  to  be 
President  in  name  as  well  as  act.  With  the  assistance 
of  a group  of  his  political  friends  in  Bogota,  a plan  was 
formed  to  depose  President  Sanclemente  and  proclaim 
Senor  Marroquin  as  President,  and  this  plot  was  executed 
without  resistance.  Marroquin  was  duly  recognised  as 
President  for  the  unfinished  portion  of  the  term  for 
which  Sanclemente  was  chosen,  and  which  expires  on 
August  7,  1904.  Sanclemente  died  eighteen  months 
after  his  deposition. 


1900]  THE  PANAMA  QUESTION  601 

In  1900  the  question  of  the  construction  of  the 
Panama  Canal  was  actively  taken  up  by  the  United 
States  Government.  The  Clayton- Bui wer  Treaty,  which 
had  been  a stumbling-block,  was  abrogated  in  1901,  and 
a new  agreement  reached  with  the  British  Government 
by  which  the  United  States  was  to  construct  an  inter- 
oceanic  canal.  The  next  step  was  the  negotiation  of 
treaties  with  Colombia,  Nicaragua,  and  Costa  Rica  for 
the  right  to  build  a waterway,  and  these  were  duly 
signed  and  subsequently  ratified  by  Nicaragua  and 
Costa  Rica,  but  rejected  by  Colombia.  It  was  under- 
stood that  Colombia  could  have  been  placated  by  an 
increased  money  indemnity,  but  this  was  unacceptable 
in  Washington.  Colombian  opposition  therefore  threat- 
ened to  deprive  Panama  of  the  immense  benefit  antici- 
pated from  the  construction  of  the  canal,  and  to  transfer 
it  to  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica.  Here  was  the 
Opposition’s  opportunity.  For  three  years  the  revolu- 
tionary leaders  had  preached  the  doctrine  that  opposition 
in  Bogota  to  a canal  treaty  was  a deathblow  to  Panama, 
and  this  bore  fruit  when  the  treaty  was  rejected  in 
1903.  The  people  of  Panama,  incited  by  the  insurgent 
leaders  and  others  interested  in  the  Isthmus,  announced 
the  secession  of  Panama  from  Colombia,  and  proclaimed 
it  an  independent  republic  in  November,  1903.  The  new 
State  was  recognised  immediately  by  the  United  States 
Government,  and  aid  was  lent  by  American  warships 
to  prevent  the  landing  of  Colombian  force  to  suppress 
the  revolt.  By  this  help  the  insurgents  for  the  moment 
gained  their  object  and  obtained  a territory,  where  they 
could  not  only  participate  in  the  Government,  but  also 
secure  a place  for  the  organisation  of  future  action 
against  the  Administration  at  Bogota.  As  for  the 
United  States,  they  have  doubtless  removed  an  obstacle 
to  the  Panama  route  for  the  canal,  but  in  the  manner 
of  doing  so  they  have  roused  hostility  and  suspicion 
throughout  every  section  of  Latin  America. 

This  short  epitome  of  Colombian  events  during  the 
past  quarter  of  a century  seems  to  demonstrate  the 


602 


COLOMBIA 


incapacity  of  the  inhabitants  for  independent  Govern- 
ment. On  the  part  of  the  rulers  there  is  a constant 
tendency  towards  dictation  and  absolutism,  and  the  con- 
sequence is  a widespread  spirit  of  unrest.  The  Liberals 
foment  dissatisfaction  by  every  means  in  their  power  to 
assist  their  own  political  aim,  the  overthrow  of  the 
Conservatives  ; but  whether  Liberals  or  Conservatives 
be  in  power  there  is  small  prospect  of  contentment  with 
political  surroundings,  for  what  has  occurred  during  the 
past  twenty-five  years  has  happened  ever  since  the 
revolt  against  Spanish  jurisdiction.  The  result  of 
generation  after  generation  growing  to  manhood  amongst 
a series  of  insurrectionary  outbreaks,  is  an  utter  want 
of  appreciation  of  the  benefits  of  peace  and  administra- 
tive stability.  Colombia  does  not  stand  alone  in  this 
respect,  for  similar  conditions  prevail  in  Ecuador  and 
Venezuela.  Moreover,  the  topography  of  these  countries 
lends  itself  to  revolutionary  practices ; in  the  mountain 
fastnesses  of  the  northern  part  of  South  America  it  is 
easy  to  defy  with  impunity  any  law  which  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  day  may  wish  to  enforce,  and  the  naturally 
unruly  temperament  of  these  Latin  people  is  thereby 
encouraged. 

The  present-day  insurgents  of  Colombia  are  not  far 
separated  from  brigands,  and  the  political  character 
given  to  the  revolutions  is  generally  a cloak  to  cover 
illegal  forms  of  pillage  and  rapine.  It  is  from  such 
elements  that  political  adventurers  of  one  or  other  party 
factions,  striving  to  control  the  Administration,  draw 
elements  for  armed  revolt  against  the  authorities,  and 
the  rank  and  file  of  the  men  who  enter  the  contest  know 
little,  and  care  less,  about  the  merits  of  the  cause.  It 
is  convenient  for  them  to  maintain  the  fiction  that  they 
are  engaged  in  this  or  that  struggle  for  patriotic  motives, 
rather  than  be  classified  as  robbers  and  outlaws,  and 
this  spirit  makes  armed  insurrection  easy  in  Colombia. 
Nor  does  any  punishment  follow  an  unsuccessful  re- 
bellion. Property  is  seldom  confiscated,  treason  is 
rarely  made  an  offence  demanding  severe  castigation, 


1904]  PRESENT  POLITICAL  SITUATION  603 


participation  in  seditious  conspiracies  entails  no  loss 
of  civic  rights  ; this  immunity  being  probably  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  individual  privileges  of  citizens  are  so 
mythical  as  to  be  thought  little  of  where  respect  for  law 
and  order  is  practically  unknown.  In  this  part  of  South 
America,  the  general  conditions  more  closely  resemble 
the  early  middle  ages  in  Europe  than  anything  in  modern 
civilisation  ; the  injured  must  seek  redress  by  the  sword, 
or  bear  without  remonstrance  all  indignities  heaped 
upon  them. 

Both  Conservatives  and  Liberals  in  Colombia  strive 
to  rule  the  country  by  a limited  oligarchy.  The  Con- 
servatives have  done  this  during  the  last  two 
decades ; and  the  Liberals,  in  attempting  to  reach  the 
same  end,  have  never  been  chary  of  sacrificing  human 
life  or  devastating  the  country.  When  it  is  remembered 
that  more  than  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  population  cannot 
read  or  write,  it  is  easy  to  realise  how  small  a part  in 
the  lives  of  the  people  any  political  action  of  the 
Government  can  play ; and  in  such  circumstances  it  is  a 
farce  for  the  leaders  of  the  political  parties  to  urge,  as 
they  constantly  do,  that  the  inhabitants  are  in  favour  of 
any  particular  policy.  President  Nunez  showed  his 
appreciation  of  this  state  of  affairs  by  revising  the  Law 
of  Constitution  in  1886,  and  reducing  the  semi- 
independent States  to  Departments  over  which 
governors  appointed  by  the  Central  Government 
exercised  absolute  control.  To  deem  the  Government 
of  Colombia  republican  in  principle  is  therefore  mislead- 
ing, if  not  absurd. 

Colombia  suffers  as  an  organic  State  from  the  nature 
of  the  country  and  the  extreme  difficulty  of  intercom- 
munication. With  the  exception  of  the  district  border- 
ing on  the  headwaters  of  the  river  Orinoco,  and,  to  a 
less  important  extent,  the  territory  touching  the  tribu- 
taries of  the  river  Amazon,  Colombia  consists  of  a net- 
work of  mountain  ranges  rising  to  elevations  of  12,000 
to  14,000  feet.  As  the  crow  flies,  the  distance  to  the 
headquarters  of  any  Department  may  be  only  200  miles. 


604 


COLOMBIA 


but  the  journey  over  mountains  and  valleys  occupies 
many  days.  Communities  are  thus  isolated  from  the 
outside  world  and  from  each  other,  and  communication 
with  the  National  Capital  is  only  possible  at  compara- 
tively long  intervals  by  the  tedious  process  of  saddle 
mules,  with  poor  accommodation  by  the  wayside.  Each 
district  is  perforce  wrapped  up  in  its  own  small  life,  and 
the  advent  of  strangers  is  uncommon.  Little  knowledge 
of  what  passes  in  the  outside  world  is  disseminated 
amongst  the  residents,  with  the  result  that  the  mental 
perspective  of  the  people  is  abnormally  contracted.  It 
is  easy,  therefore,  to  understand  that  when  a representa- 
tive of  the  National  Administration  comes  from  Bogota 
to  make  a change,  generally  an  increase,  in  taxation,  or 
to  perform  other  attributes  of  government  distasteful  to 
these  people  in  the  wilderness,  he  meets  with  a short 
shrift  if  he  insists  on  carrying  out  his  instructions  in 
defiance  of  the  popular  will.  In  many  parts  of  the 
interior  the  people  are  practically  savages,  and  in  such 
districts  as  the  country  inland  from  Buenaventura  travel- 
ling is  impossible  for  a foreigner,  in  consequence  of  the 
hostility  of  the  natives. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  how  immediate  improvement  is 
to  be  effected.  All  hinges  on  the  question  of  better 
facilities  for  transport  and  communication,  and  so  long 
as  these  are  absent,  there  is  small  hope  for  the  better- 
ment of  the  political  status  of  the  inhabitants.  The 
problem  to  be  solved  is  to  find  money  for  the  con- 
struction of  railways  and  roads  to  unite  the  isolated 
districts  with  Bogota  or  some  other  centre,  and  so  open 
the  way  for  a consolidation  of  the  sciittered  units  of 
population  into  one  homogeneous  nationality.  With  the 
establishment  of  transport  through  the  country,  foreign 
immigration  will  filter  into  the  Republic  in  search  of  the 
natural  wealth  that  lies  waiting  for  the  hand  of  man  to 
give  it  to  the  world,  and  contact  with  foreigners  will  do 
much  to  broaden  the  ideas  of  the  Colombians  in  regard 
to  the  advantages  of  modern  civilisation.  Efforts  have 
been  made  by  different  Administrations  to  interest 


1904] 


ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS 


605 


European  capitalists  in  providing  railway  transport  for 
Colombia,  but  the  bad  faith  shown  towards  such 
undertakings  has  deterred  all  progress.  If  the 
Government  could  assure  adequate  protection  for  capital, 
a railway  system  of  sufficient  proportions  to  remove  the 
obstacles  now  choking  development  would  be  speedily 
provided,  and  the  fact  that  no  such  protection  has  been 
forthcoming  has  stopped  all  progress.  Nor  are  there 
any  indications  that  immediate  marked  change  in  this 
respect  is  probable  ; but  the  fact  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  the  Atlantic  coast  of  Colombia  is  only  five  days  by 
steamer  from  New  York,  and  it  is  almost  inevitable  that 
in  time  the  influence  of  the  United  States  will  extend 
to  this  quarter  and  overcome  the  obstacles  now  existing 
to  moral  and  material  advancement. 

Under  existing  circumstances,  almost  insuperable 
obstacles  check  industrial  and  commercial  expansion ; 
there  is  no  inducement  for  the  investment  of  capital  to 
exploit  the  latent  wealth  when  vested  interests  are 
threatened  continually  by  civil  war  or  insurrectionary 
outbreaks,  and  labourers  for  mining  or  agricultural 
undertakings  are  subject  to  compulsory  conscription  in 
the  Government  ranks  or  revolutionary  forces.  The 
same  causes  equally  hinder  moral  progress ; education, 
especially  primary  instruction,  is  neglected,  and  the 
administration  of  justice  is  on  a low  standard  and  deeply 
lainted  with  political  corruption.  On  all  sides  the 
interests  of  the  people  are  lost  sight  of  in  the  struggle 
for  place  and  power. 

The  principal  topographical  features  of  Colombia 
are  the  great  mountain  ranges  rising  precipitously  from 
the  seaboard  ; the  fertile  valleys  intersecting  this  region  ; 
and  the  vast  plains  stretching  away  towards  the  river 
Orinoco,  known  as  the  llanos.  In  the  mountain  ranges 
lies  the  mineral  wealth  that  proved  so  strong  an 
attraction  to  the  early  Spanish  settlers ; the  valleys  are 
abundantly  watered  by  rivers  and  mountain  streams, 
and  the  soil  is  rich ; and  the  plains  to  the  south-east 
provide  all  the  requirements  for  pastoral  industry. 


606 


COLOMBIA 


Climatic  conditions  vary,  as  in  Venezuela,  with  the 
elevation  above  sea  level.  The  malarious  belt  lies  on 
the  shores  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  Oceans,  stretches 
across  the  isthmus  of  Panama,  and  embraces  certain 
areas  of  the  low-lands  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Orinoco  and 
the  Amazon.  The  valleys  above  3000  feet  have  a 
temperate  climate  not  unlike  the  late  spring  in  northern 
countries,  and  there  is  no  menace  to  health  for 
Europeans  who  may  settle  in  these  districts,  the  heat 
seldom  interfering  with  outdoor  work  during  the 
daytime.  On  the  high  peaks  of  the  mountain  ranges 
snow  is  often  seen,  and  in  cases  such  as  the  Sierra 
Nevada,  at  23,779  feet  the  line  of  perpetual  snow  is 
reached.  Thus  there  is  the  choice  of  climate  from 
tropical  to  extreme  cold,  the  mean  average  temperature 
at  Bogota  being  63°  Fahrenheit. 

The  estimated  area  of  Colombia  is  513,938  square 
miles,  about  one-sixth  that  of  the  United  States.  Of 
this,  330,756  square  miles  lie  to  the  north  and  the 
remainder  to  the  south  of  the  equator.  No  census  has 
been  taken  since  1870,  when  the  population  was 
2,951,323,  but  an  official  estimate  published  in  1881 
showed  3,878,600  inhabitants  distributed  as  follows  : — 


Departments. 

Area, 
sq.  miles. 

Pop. 

Density 

per 

sq.mile. 

Capital. 

Pop. 

Antioquia 

22,316 

470,000 

21 

Medellin 

40,000 

Bolivar 

21,345 

280,000 

13 

Cartagena  . 

20,000 

Boyaca 

33,351 

702,000 

21 

Tunja  . 

8,000 

Cauca  . 

257,462 

621,000 

2-4 

Popayan 

10,000 

Cundinamarca 

79,810 

569,000 

7 

Bogota 

120,000 

Magdelena  . 

24,440 

90,000 

3-7 

Santa  Marta 

6,000 

Panama 

31,571 

285,000 

9 

Panama 

30,000 

Santander 

16,409 

555,600 

35 

Bucaramanga 

20,000 

Tolima 

18,069 

306,000 

17 

Ibague 

12,000 

Total 

504,773 

3,878,600 

7-7  , ...  | ... 

1904] 


VITAL  STATISTICS 


607 


This  estimate  includes  220,000  uncivilised  Indians, 
the  majority  of  whom  dwell  near  the  Orinoco.  One- 
third  of  the  population  is  classified  as  white,  the 
remainder  as  half-breeds  or  Indians.  Of  negroes  the 
number  is  limited,  and  they  are  principally  found  on  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama  or  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Buena- 
ventura on  the  Pacific  coast. 

Accurate  vital  statistics  are  impossible  to  obtain, 
and  the  official  returns  are  little  better  than  guess- 
work, but  they  must  be  accepted  as  some  indication  of 
the  standard  of  health.  In  1898  the  death-rate  was  21 
per  1000  inhabitants,  and  of  this  20  per  cent,  was 
credited  to  infants  of  less  than  twelve  months,  and  30 
per  cent,  to  children  under  five  years  of  age.  Epidemics 
of  smallpox  are  frequent  and  the  mortality  heavy,  and 
yellow  fever  occasionally  breaks  out  in  the  malarious 
districts  of  Panama  and  other  towns  near  the  sea  coast, 
no  proper  precautions  being  taken  to  check  the  spread 
of  the  disease.  With  ordinary  sanitary  measures  in  the 
cities  and  towns  the  general  hygienic  conditions  would 
compare  favourably  with  many  countries  in  the  world 
far  removed  from  tropical  latitudes,  for  it  is  only  on  the 
low-lying  lands  on  the  sea  coast  and  near  the  Orinoco 
that  the  prevailing  conditions  are  inimical  to  health,  and 
these  districts  only  comprise  one-fifth  of  the  total  area. 

Colombia  has  the  reputation  in  South  America  of 
possessing  more  than  average  educational  facilities,  and 
in  higher  education  there  may  be  some  foundation  for 
this,  but  in  primary  instruction  the  methods  are  defective 
and  unsatisfactory  from  every  point  of  view.  Elementary 
education  is  controlled  by  the  municipal  authorities,  and 
money  grants-in-aid  are  made  by  the  National  Govern- 
ment, but  no  adequate  supervision  is  attempted  by  the 
Central  Government  to  ensure  the  maintenance  of  the 
requisite  number  of  schools,  nor  is  any  inspection  made 
to  see  that  a satisfactory  standard  is  reached.  Primary 
instruction  is  free,  but  not  obligatory.  Large  numbers 
of  children  naturally,  therefore,  receive  no  tuition,  but 
to  some  extent  this  is  due  to  the  sparsity  of  the  popula- 


608 


COLOMBIA 


tion  and  the  difficulty  of  reaching  school  in  districts 
where  the  mountainous  country  renders  all  journeying 
arduous.  In  addition  to  these  physical  obstacles  there 
is  the  apathetic  indifference  of  the  peasant  class  to 
education,  and  they  care  little  whether  their  offspring 
can  read  and  write  even  when  schools  are  near  at  hand 
and  the  benefit  of  primary  instruction  has  been  carefully 
explained  to  them.  The  children  themselves  are  seldom 
sufficiently  interested  in  their  own  welfare  to  attend 
school  voluntarily,  but  more  striking  evidence  of  the 
small  value  placed  on  education  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
peasants  who  have  learned  to  read  and  write  in  their 
youth  practise  these  two  accomplishments  so  rarely  that 
they  forget  entirety  these  rudiments  of  knowledge  a few 
years  after  reaching  manhood. 

Statistics  about  education  are  also  far  from  reliable, 
the  national  authorities  complaining  that  the  munici- 
palities are  dilatory  and  careless  in  making  the  returns, 
therefore  such  figures  as  are  given  must  be  considered 
partly  guesses.  The  number  of  primary  schools  is 
stated  to  be  1820,  and  the  children  on  the  rolls  86,000, 
showing  that  only  2 '2  per  cent,  of  the  total  population 
is  receiving  elementary  instruction,  even  allowing  for 
the  regular  attendance  of  all  children  enrolled.  In  all 
probability  the  actual  attendance  does  not  average  more 
than  1 5 per  cent,  of  the  population — a result  telling  its 
own  tale.  For  secondary  education  there  are  34  public 
and  private  colleges  to  which  the  children  of  more 
wealthy  parents  are  sent,  the  private  concerns  being 
under  the  guidance  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. 
For  the  education  of  teachers  there  are  15  normal 
schools,  and  at  these  600  students  attend ; while  the 
requirements  of  higher  education  are  filled  by  four 
Departmental  and  one  National  University,  with  a total 
attendance  of  1100  students.  The  four  technical  schools 
are  patronised  by  800  pupils,  and  a School  of  Arts  is 
attended  by  160  students.  There  is  also  an  Artisans 
Institute  and  a Salesian  Institute,  the  former  with  150 
and  the  latter  with  200  pupils.  Bogota  has  a national 


1904] 


THE  JUDICIARY 


609 


free  library  containing  40,000  volumes,  and  a museum 
where  national  products  and  antiquities  are  exhibited. 

The  Government  annually  devotes  400,000  gold 
dollars  to  education,  a sum  inadequate  for  the  require- 
ments, but  little  improvement  can  be  expected  until 
present  conditions  are  radically  changed.  In  place  of 
the  miserable  pittance  doled  out  to  the  teachers  in 
primary  schools,  a living  wage  must  be  regularly  paid, 
and  the  system  of  public  education  superintended  by 
the  National  Government;  adequate  inspection  of 
schools  should  also  be  provided  for,  and  the  attendance 
of  the  children  made  obligatory. 

The  administration  of  justice  in  Colombia  is  on  no 
more  satisfactory  footing  than  in  Venezuela  and 
Ecuador,  the  procedure  in  the  courts  being  dilatory 
and  costly,  and  corrupt  practices  frequent.  But  con- 
stant protests  against  this  state  of  affairs  pass  unheeded, 
and  no  attempt  at  reform  has  been  made  during  the 
past  quarter  of  a century.  Both  civil  and  criminal  law 
is  codified,  and  does  not  in  itself  offer  ground  for  serious 
complaints.  It  is  only  the  interpretation  that  fails. 
The  basis  is  Spanish  law,  as  everywhere  in  Latin 
America,  and  the  Supreme  Court  consists  of  seven 
members  appointed  for  life,  who  elect  one  of  their 
number  as  President  for  four  years.  Superior  tribunals 
sit  in  the  various  departments,  where  are  also  inferior 
courts  and  a number  of  magistrates  ( jueces  de  paz) 
appointed  for  the  rural  districts,  these  officials  frequently 
gaining  considerable  local  power  and  using  their  influ- 
ence most  unjustly.  The  National  Government 
maintains  a police  force  of  1000  men  to  ensure  order 
in  the  capital  and  at  a few  other  points,  but  these  men 
are  more  often  utilised  as  troops  to  suppress  revolu- 
tionary outbreaks  than  for  ordinary  police  duty.  The 
municipalities  furnish  local  police,  occasionally  effective, 
at  other  times  affording  no  protection  against  crime. 

The  influence  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  is  still 
most  powerful,  in  spite  of  the  edict  issued  by  the  Arch- 
bishop of  Bogota  in  1874,  forbidding  the  clergy  to  take 

2 Q 


610 


COLOMBIA 


part  in  political  questions.  It  permeates  the  Adminis- 
tration now,  and  a large  proportion  of  the  educational 
establishments,  especially  secondary  schools,  are  under 
its  direction.  It  has  a widespread  influence  over  both 
upper  and  lower  classes  in  the  affairs  of  everyday  life, 
and  it  regards  with  intense  jealousy  any  attempt  of 
other  religious  sects  to  establish  places  of  worship. 
The  law  admits  the  right  to  practise  all  creeds  provided 
that  they  are  not  contrary  to  morality  or  subversive  to 
the  public  welfare,  but  this  concession  has  only  been 
taken  advantage  of  to  a limited  extent,  Catholicism  being 
so  deeply  rooted  that  there  is  small  scope  for  missionary 
work  of  other  denominations.  Numerically,  moreover, 
the  Roman  Catholic  Church  is  strong,  with  an  arch- 
bishop, 10  bishops,  8 vicars-general,  and  2170  priests 
in  holy  orders,  serving  270  Catholic  churches  and  312 
chapels,  while  monastic  and  religious  orders  occupy  10 
houses  with  750  inmates.  In  every  diocese  there  is  a 
seminary  for  training  students  for  the  priesthood  over 
which  the  State  has  no  control,  nor  does  it  contribute 
towards  their  support.  The  opportunity  offered  to  the 
priesthood  to  educate  and  civilise  is  of  a most  wide 
description,  but  little  taken  advantage  of ; for,  as  in 
many  other  South  American  countries,  the  priesthood  is 
often  recruited  from  the  lower  strata  of  the  community, 
and  the  men  have  neither  tradition  nor  ambitious  desire 
to  spur  them  on  to  the  work  of  regeneration  so  urgently 
required.  Foreign  priests  from  Spain  and  Italy,  of 
whom  there  are  many  in  Colombia,  make  no  determined 
effort  either  to  bring  about  any  strong  reaction  against 
the  low  moral  standard  everywhere  apparent. 

In  national  character  the  white  Colombians  resemble 
their  Spanish  ancestors  more  closely  than  elsewhere, 
owing  to  the  isolated  position  of  their  country  during 
the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Few  foreigners 
visit  Bogota  by  reason  of  its  inaccessibility,  and  this  has 
caused  the  Spanish  spoken  by  its  residents  to  retain  more 
purity  of  pronunciation  than  elsewhere  in  South  America. 
In  nearly  all  circumstances  the  people  are  courteous  and 


1904] 


EFFECTS  OF  ALCOHOLISM 


611 


hospitable  to  compatriots  and  strangers  without  distinc- 
tion— a survival  of  the  custom  of  extending  shelter  to 
the  traveller  when  facilities  of  transport  were  even  more 
difficult  than  at  present.  In  Bogota  and  some  of  the 
older  settlements  at  high  elevations,  the  principal  families 
have  kept  the  race  pure,  with  seldom  any  strain  of  Indian 
blood ; but  on  the  low-lying  lands  near  the  Orinoco  and 
in  the  valleys  close  to  the  sea  coast,  the  copper-coloured 
skins  and  the  general  features  of  the  natives  show  far 
more  of  Indian  than  white  blood. 

The  drink  curse,  prevalent  here,  accounts  to  some 
extent  for  the  inertia  of  the  national  character,  and  it  is 
curious  that  this  love  of  strong  drink  is  chiefly  confined 
in  South  America  to  people  living  in  high  altitudes.  In 
Venezuela,  Ecuador,  Peru,  Chile,  and  Mexico  the  con- 
sumption of  alcohol,  as  in  Colombia,  is  abnormally  great, 
whereas  in  Argentina,  where  the  bulk  of  the  population 
dwells  in  the  plains,  drunkenness  is  rare.  No  effort  is 
made  in  Colombia  to  check  this  blight,  whether  by  the 
Government  or  the  clergy,  and  its  evil  effects  are  seen  in 
the  high  infantile  mortality  and  the  frequency  of  criminal 
violence  in  all  parts  of  the  country. 

Industrial  occupation  in  Colombia  includes  agri- 
culture, coffee  and  cacao  production,  pastoral  industry, 
mining,  the  collection  of  indiarubber  for  export,  and  a 
few  minor  local  manufactures.  In  farming,  little  energy 
or  initiative  is  shown,  although  both  soil  and  climate 
over  a large  area  are  well  adapted  for  cereal  and  root 
crops,  and  the  annual  output  is  insufficient  for  home 
demands,  considerable  quantities  of  breadstuff's  being 
imported  annually.  With  cheap  land  suitable  for  wheat, 
barley,  maize,  and  other  grains,  and  with  local  labour 
fairly  abundant  and  cheap,  such  a condition  can  only  be 
explained  by  the  disturbed  internal  state  of  the  Republic 
and  the  indolence  of  the  population. 

Coffee  has  hitherto  formed  the  staple  industry,  but 
the  low  prices  of  late  years  have  seriously  menaced  the 
prosperity  of  the  plantations.  In  1895  the  total  exported 
was  20,504  tons,  valued  at  8,504,312  dollars;  and  in 


612 


COLOMBIA 


1896,  28,521  tons,  worth  10,474,752  dollars  ; but  in  1897 
the  total  fell  to  17,564  tons.  In  addition,  however,  to 
these  shipments,  a further  allowance  of  5 per  cent,  must 
be  made  for  Colombian  coffee  despatched  through  the 
Venezuelan  port  of  Maracaibo,  and  not  appearing  in  the 
Colombian  returns.  The  area  under  cultivation  covers 
75,000  acres,  and  the  bean  is  of  high  grade,  bringing 
much  better  prices  than  the  Brazilian  product,  a fact 
that  has  enabled  the  majority  of  the  plantation  owners 
to  continue  working  their  properties  in  spite  of  the  low 
prices  of  the  last  few  years.  The  area  devoted  to  cacao 
is  not  large,  the  output  being  principally  used  for  home 
demand.  Sugar-cane  is  also  cultivated,  and  the  juice 
manufactured  into  rum  and  sugar  for  local  use.  Tobacco 
is  raised  in  some  districts  and  made  into  cigars  and 
cigarettes,  also  for  home  consumption. 

Of  other  vegetable  products,  the  most  important  is 
indiarubber,  collected  in  the  forest  area  near  the 
Orinoco  and  the  tributaries  of  the  Amazon.  Its 
increased  value  in  recent  years  has  turned  attention  to 
this  commodity,  and  the  number  of  expeditions  sent 
into  the  forests  has  been  greatly  augmented,  but  there 
is  still  room  for  expansion.  Ivory  nuts  are  another 
article  of  value  in  exports,  and  dyewoods,  copaiba  and 
balsam  of  tolu  also  figure.  Official  statements  classify 
no  less  than  68 '8  per  cent,  of  the  population  as  engaged 
in  agricultural  pursuits  or  dependent  on  agricultural 
production  for  a livelihood. 

Pastoral  industry  is  widely  distributed,  live  stock 
being  reared  in  nearly  all  valleys  where  cultivation  of 
the  soil  is  attempted,  and  also  on  the  lower  lands  wher- 
ever grass  is  abundant.  It  is,  however,  on  the  llanos, 
the  great  plains  stretching  away  towards  the  Orinoco, 
that  the  principal  centre  of  the  cattle  breeding  is  found. 
No  reliable  statistics  of  the  number  of  animals  are 
available,  but  it  is  estimated  that  the  horned  cattle 
reach  a total  of  3,500,000.  The  herds  are  composed  of 
small-bodied,  long-horned  animals,  descendants  of  the 
live  stock  brought  from  Europe  by  Spanish  colonists, 


1904] 


INDUSTRIAL  ENTERPRISE 


613 


and  practically  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  improve 
the  breed  by  introducing  foreign  blood.  The  hides  of 
these  cattle  are  valuable,  and  during  the  scarcity  of  beef 
animals  in  Cuba  in  1898  and  1899  many  shipments  of 
bullocks  were  made  to  that  island  from  Cartagena. 
Both  sheep  and  goats  are  raised  to  supply  the  local 
demand  for  wool  and  mutton,  and  swine  are  bred  for 
home  use,  but  with  the  exception  of  cattle  pastoral 
industry  in  Colombia  is  unimportant. 

The  great  mineral  wealth  of  the  country  is  almost 
untouched,  but  how  important  the  mining  industry  was 
formerly  may  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  during  the 
300  years  of  Spanish  dominion  gold  and  silver  to  the 
value  of  £60,000,000  was  extracted  in  various  sections  of 
what  is  now  Colombian  territory.  At  present  mining 
enterprise  is  directed  towards  the  search  for  gold  and 
emeralds,  little  attention  being  paid  to  the  large  deposits 
of  silver-bearing  ore  known  to  exist.  From  the  depart- 
ment of  Antioquia,  gold  to  the  value  of  £40,000  has  been 
exported  annually  of  late  years,  and  in  all  other  districts 
the  average  annual  output  is  reputed  to  be  between 
£600,000  and  £800,000.  In  1891  the  number  of  mines 
on  which  taxes  were  paid  was  4961  ; of  these,  3398  were 
in  Antioquia,  794  in  Tolima,  and  571  in  Cauca.  Deposits 
of  coal  are  found,  and  iron  ore  of  exceptionally  rich 
quality  is  abundant.  Other  minerals  known,  but  not 
worked  in  consequence  of  difficulty  of  transport,  are 
copper,  platinum,  tin,  cinnabar,  petroleum  and  sulphur. 
The  salt  mines  are  a Government  monopoly  and  form  a 
valuable  source  of  revenue.  In  July,  1899,  a wild 
outburst  of  speculation  occurred  in  connection  with 
emeralds,  gems  to  the  value  of  £800,000  changing  hands 
in  a few  weeks,  and  often  at  higher  prices  than  their 
value  in  foreign  markets. 

Manufacturing  industry  exists  on  only  a very  limited 
scale.  A few  establishments  are  found,  but  play  no 
part  in  the  national  life,  the  most  important  concern 
being  the  Pradera  Iron  Works  situated  to  the  north-east 
of  Bogota,  whose  plant  has  a daily  capacity  of  thirty  tons 


614 


COLOMBIA 


of  pig-iron  ; and  the  manufacture  of  wrought  iron,  rails, 
sugar  mills,  castings  for  machinery,  and  other  articles  for 
local  use  is  carried  on  with  some  success.  Near  these 
works  are  deposits  of  coal,  iron,  limestone,  sand, 
manganese,  and  fire-clay.  Other  branches  of  manu- 
facture comprise  breweries,  distilleries,  soap  and  candle 
factories,  tanneries,  leather  works,  and  cigar  and  cigarette 
making.  With  coal  close  at  hand  and  raw  material  easy 
to  produce,  there  is  no  reason  why  manufacturing  enter- 
prise in  Colombia  should  not  expand  under  properly 
directed  energy. 

That  Colombia  will  benefit  by  the  completion  of  the 
canal  across  Panama  cannot  be  doubted.  Up  to  the 
present  time  the  expenditure  on  the  works  has  been 
772,545,412  francs  by  the  old,  and  65,000,000  francs  by 
the  new  company,  but  for  a very  large  proportion  of  this 
sum  there  is  nothing  to  show.  The  transit  trade  across 
the  isthmus  averages  130,000  tons  for  outward  and 
120,000  tons  for  homeward  freights  annually,  and  this 
Avill  increase  substantially  when  the  canal  is  opened,  if 
the  statistics  and  estimates  of  the  United  States  Panama 
Canal  Commission  are  approximately  correct. 

The  financial  situation  in  Colombia  is  not  a happy 
one.  The  external  indebtedness  in  1896  was  £3,514,442, 
chiefly  due  to  British  creditors  ; in  1897  new  bonds  for 
£2,700,000  were  issued  to  cancel  this  obligation,  these 
to  bear  1 J per  cent,  interest,  increasing  at  the  rate  of  £ 
per  cent,  every  three  years  until  3 per  cent,  is  reached  ; 
but  the  debt  is  again  in  default.  The  internal  funded 
debt  is  6,000,000  pesos,  and  the  floating  obligations 
7,000,000  pesos,  but  the  situation  is  complicated  by  an 
inconvertible  paper  currency  issued  by  the  Government 
through  the  Banco  Nacional,  and  amounting  to  50,000,000 
pesos.  The  exchange  value  of  these  notes  constantly 
fluctuates,  and  complicates  all  commercial  business.  On 
the  Isthmus  of  Panama  the  Colombian  silver  dollar  of 
25  grammes  weight  and  '825  fine  is  in  use,  and  for 
purposes  of  convenience  the  national  revenue  and 
expenditure  is  calculated  in  this  money,  and  also  the 


1904] 


THE  NATIONAL  FINANCES 


615 


published  statements  of  Colombian  trade.  The  exchange 
value  of  the  silver  dollar  varies  from  45  to  50  cents  in 
United  States  currency.  While  the  French  metric 
system  has  been  adopted  for  the  legal  standard  of 
weights  and  measures,  it  is  seldom  used  in  commercial 
transactions  in  the  interior,  the  Spanish  pound  of 
1T02  pounds  avoirdupois,  the  arroba  of  25  pounds,  and 
the  carga  of  250  pounds,  being  generally  accepted  ; but 
corn  is  measured  by  the  fanega.  Lineal  measurement  is 
calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  vara  of  80  centimetres. 

The  national  revenue  and  expenditure  is  sanctioned 
by  the  Congress  for  biennial  periods.  The  budgets  of 
1893  to  1900  were  : — 


Revenue. 

Expenditure. 

1893-1894 

1895-1896 

1897-1898 

1899-1900 

Pesos. 

22,312,381 

26,266,300 

34.361.000 

34.305.000 

Pesos. 

33,502,386 

35,773,882 

35,771,013 

34,000,000 

The  principal  sources  of  revenue  are  the  Custom- 
house duties  on  imported  merchandise  and  exported 
produce,  these  producing  13,697,823  pesos  in  1896,  and 
13,256,353  pesos  in  1897,  but  in  this  latter  year  the 
export  duty  on  coffee  was  abolished.  Other  taxes 
contributing  are  the  charge  on  the  meat-drying  establish- 
ments ( saladeros ),  the  sale  of  stamped  paper,  the  match 
monopoly,  the  cigarette  monopoly,  and  the  receipts  of 
the  post  and  telegraph  offices.  Of  the  expenditure  the 
War  Department  absorbs  annually  5,000,000  pesos , and 
a much  larger  sum  in  years  when  revolution  is  active. 

Future  development  is  dependent  on  the  freedom 
from  internal  disturbance,  and  improved  transport 
facilities.  With  great  natural  advantages  of  soil  and 
climate,  mineral  wealth,  large  forest  reserves  of  valuable 
timber,  and  admirable  conditions  for  pastoral  enterprise, 


616 


COLOMBIA 


rapid  progress  would  take  place  if  a strong  Administra- 
tion was  established.  Moreover,  the  comparative 
proximity  of  Colombia  to  the  markets  of  the  United 
States  is  a factor  that  will  benefit  her  greatly  when 
internal  tranquillity  is  assured.  With  peace  from  political 
disputes  will  come  the  construction  of  railways  and 
other  means  of  transport,  and  the  land  and  mineral 
deposits  will  no  longer  be  allowed  to  lie  idle. 


CHAPTEE  XXXIII 


VENEZUELA 

Internal  Dissensions.  Struggle  between  the  “Yellows”  and  the 
“ Blues.”  General  Blanco.  Revolt  under  General  Salazar. 
Policy  of  Blanco.  Conspiracy  in  1889.  Blanco  Overthrown. 
Election  of  General  Palacios.  Revolt  under  Crespo.  Provisional 
Government.  Crespo  Elected.  Revolution  under  Dr  Rojas 
Paul.  Boundary  Question  with  Great  Britain.  The  Uruan 
Incident.  Venezuela  and  the  United  States.  Mr  Olney  and 
the  Marquess  of  Salisbury.  The  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  United 
States  and  Great  Britain.  The  Cleveland  Message.  Venezuela 
and  British  Trade.  Dignified  Attitude  of  Crespo.  Boundary 
Dispute  centres  in  Washington.  The  Cleveland  Commission. 
The  Arbitration  Tribunal.  The  Award.  Diplomatic  Relations 
between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela.  The  Crespo  Administra- 
tion. Election  of  Senor  Andrade.  Revolt  against  Andrade 
Administration.  Death  of  Crespo.  Victory  of  the  Revolution. 
Election  of  President  Castro.  Modification  of  the  Constitution. 
Political  Division  of  Venezuela.  Seditious  Practices.  Revolu- 
tionary Tendencies.  Climate  and  Topography.  Statistics  of 
Population.  Immigration.  Municipalities.  Public  Education. 
Justice.  Influence  of  the  Church.  Aversion  to  the  Marriage 
Ceremony.  The  Priesthood.  National  Character.  Indian 
Characteristics.  Industrial  Enterprise.  Mining  Enterprise. 
Manufacturing  Industry.  Means  of  Communication.  Financial 
Situation.  Estimates  for  1899-1900.  The  Commercial  Situation. 
Low  Prices  for  Coffee.  Imported  Merchandise.  Exports.  Com- 
parison of  British  and  United  States  Trades.  German  Competi- 
tion. Future  Prospects. 


The  political  history  of  Venezuela  is  an  almost  unin- 
terrupted record  of  internal  dissension,  armed  uprisings, 
civil  war,  and  an  absence  of  all  respect  for  law  and  order. 
Since  the  Venezuelans  threw  off  Spanish  dominion  in 

C17 


618 


VENEZUELA 


1830,  after  a long-drawn  struggle,  and  obtained  their 
independence  as  a part  of  Nueva  Granada,  no  fewer 
than  fifty-one  revolutionary  movements  have  swept  over 
the  country,  and  of  these  eleven  overturned  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  day  and  obtained  control  of  public  affairs. 

The  great  majority  of  these  insurrections  were  the 
outcome  of  ambitious  designs  of  politicians  desirous  of 
the  spoils  of  office,  and  it  was  easy  for  such  men  to 
collect  a following  and  take  the  field  once  that  arrange- 
ments were  made  to  acquire  arms  and  ammunition.  To 
the  Venezuelan  there  were  many  inducements  to  revolt 
against  the  legal  authorities,  for  rebellion  meant  oppor- 
tunity for  looting,  freedom  from  manual  labour,  sub- 
stantial reward  if  the  movement  was  victorious,  and 
the  fact  that  if  the  peasant  class  did  not  join  the 
insurrection  they  were  impressed  into  the  Government 
ranks  and  obliged  to  fight  with  no  prospect  of  remunera- 
tion when  hostilities  ended. 

The  period  now  under  review  begins  when  General 
Guzman  Blanco  was  the  central  figure  on  the  stage,  and  it 
was  in  the  long  struggle  between  the  “Yellows”  and  the 
“Blues”  that  he  first  became  prominent.  The  former 
ostensibly  represented  a Liberal  policy,  and  the  two 
factions  may  be  considered  as  the  Liberals  and  Con- 
servatives of  Venezuelan  political  life,  but  so  far  as 
fundamental  principles  were  concerned  in  actual  methods 
of  Government  there  was  no  choice  between  them. 
From  1847  to  1870  there  was  continual  friction  between 
the  “Yellows”  and  the  “Blues”  for  the  upper  hand,  and 
it  was  not  until  the  country  was  brought  to  the  verge 
of  ruin  by  the  civil  war  lasting  from  1866  to  1870  that 
the  former  obtained  a decisive  success.  Blanco,  who 
had  been  a leading  personality  on  the  winning  side 
during  this  five  years  conflict,  was  now  called  upon  to 
undertake  the  reorganisation  of  the  political  and  economic 
situation,  and  to  deal  with  the  financial  chaos  to  which 
the  national  exchequer  was  reduced.  He  was  then 
forty-one  years  of  age,  having  been  born  in  1829,  and 
was  clever  and  ambitious,  fairly  well  educated,  and 


1870]  GUZMAN  BLANCO  619 

possessed  remarkable  energy  and  determination  of 
character. 

Although  nominally  elected  President  for  the  usual 
term,  Blanco  became  virtually  Dictator  of  Venezuela  for 
twenty  years,  his  authority  being  absolute  between  1870 
and  1889.  He  actually  occupied  the  Presidency  from 
1870  to  1877,  again  from  1879  to  1884,  and  also  from 

1886  to  1887  ; but  when  not  formally  in  the  chair  he 
exercised  power  through  one  of  his  partisans,  whom 
he  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Executive  on  the  under- 
standing that  all  official  acts  must  be  submitted  to  him 
for  his  approval,  and  that  the  policy  of  the  administration 
at  home  and  abroad  should  be  dictated  by  him.  The 
position  of  Blanco  was  not  undisputed  by  his  enemies, 
for  many  efforts  were  made  to  oust  him  from  power, 
and  one  of  these,  headed  by  General  Salazar,  threatened 
serious  consequences,  but  this  was  finally  crushed  in  1872 
and  the  insurgent  leader  captured  and  shot.  Although 
the  government  of  Blanco  was  autocratic,  it  was  not 
without  substantial  benefit  in  many  directions  to  the 
Venezuelans.  The  construction  of  railways  was  en- 
couraged, roads  into  the  interior  for  wheeled  traffic  were 
opened,  improvements  were  effected  in  the  principal 
cities,  the  building  of  a harbour  at  La  Guayra  was 
undertaken,  and  measures  were  adopted  to  encourage 
foreign  trade.  Blanco  spent  the  years  when  his  sub- 
stitutes filled  the  Presidency  in  Europe,  accredited  as 
Minister  Plenipotentiary  to  France,  and  directing  Vene- 
zuelan affairs  from  Paris.  To  all  outward  appearance 
his  popularity  was  assured  after  his  first  years  of  power ; 
statues  were  erected  to  him  in  Caracas  and  other  centres, 
and  he  was  commonly  depicted  as  the  “ Illustrious 
American  ” and  the  regenerator  of  his  country. 

Underlying  this  outward  show  of  satisfaction  with 
the  Blanco  regime  there  was  a current  of  deep  hostility 
only  awaiting  opportunity  to  come  to  the  surface.  In 

1887  General  Lopez  was  placed  in  office  by  Blanco  as 
his  substitute  for  the  ensuing  two  years,  Blanco  then 
proceeding  to  Paris,  as  was  his  custom.  An  active 


620 


VENEZUELA 


conspiracy  was  set  afoot  in  1888  to  excite  public  opinion 
against  the  Administration,  and  in  1889  this  movement 
came  to  a head,  the  Venezuelan  Congress  declaring  that 
the  Republic  would  no  longer  endure  the  dictatorship  of 
Blanco,  and  driving  his  nominee,  Dr  Rojas  Paul,  who  had 
succeeded  General  Lopez,  from  the  Presidency.  Once 
the  power  of  Blanco  was  broken,  the  bitter  feeling  long 
dormant  against  him  burst  out  with  unrestrained  fury. 
A mob  took  possession  of  the  principal  streets  of  Caracas, 
the  statues  of  Blanco,  of  which  there  were  half  a dozen 
in  different  parts  of  the  municipality,  were  thrown  from 
their  pedestals  and  broken  in  pieces,  and  pictures  of  the 
Dictator  were  torn  from  their  frames  and  cut  to  strips. 
Every  possible  insult  was  offered  to  the  man  who  for 
many  years  had  controlled  Venezuelan  destinies,  and  the 
temper  of  the  people  was  such  that  they  talked  openly 
of  assassination  if  he  attempted  to  return. 

While  there  was  no  justification  for  the  usurpation 
of  dictatorial  power  by  General  Blanco,  in  some  respects 
the  continuity  of  policy  it  ensured  was  distinctly  advan- 
tageous to  the  Venezuelans.  The  country  enjoyed  a 
more  quiet  condition  of  internal  affairs  between  1872 
and  1887  than  at  any  period  in  its  history,  and  economic 
amelioration  progressed  steadily  in  so  far  as  expansion 
of  industrial  enterprise  was  concerned.  Moreover,  it 
was  under  Blanco  that  the  national  finances  were  placed 
on  a fairly  satisfactory  footing,  and  the  debt  service 
attended  to  with  a certain  degree  of  regularity.  In 
1887  his  autocratic  character  was  clearly  demonstrated 
by  his  attitude  towards  Great  Britain  in  connection  with 
the  boundary  dispute  between  Venezuela  and  British 
Guiana,  when  he  insisted  that  the  question  of  the  owner- 
ship of  all  territory  to  the  west  of  the  river  Essequibo 
should  be  submitted  to  arbitration.  Her  Britannic 
Majesty’s  Government  pointed  out  that  certain  sections 
of  this  region  were  indisputably  British,  and  that  no 
arbitration  in  regard  to  such  portions  was  possible,  but 
that  where  doubt  existed,  as  in  the  case  of  the  country 
near  the  Uruan  and  Cuyuni  rivers,  they  were  prepared 


1889] 


REVOLT  UNDER  CRESPO 


621 


to  meet  the  views  of  Venezuela.  In  reply  to  this  com- 
munication, General  Blanco  sent  the  British  Minister, 
Mr  St  John,  his  passports.  Although  efforts  were  made 
by  Blanco  to  induce  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  Great  Britain  in 
connection  with  this  dispute,  they  were  unavailing  at  the 
time,  and  it  was  not  until  nine  years  later  that  active 
measures  were  taken  in  Washington  for  a settlement  of 
the  question.  After  the  events  of  1889,  Blanco  made  no 
attempt  to  regain  control  of  Venezuela,  and  settled 
down  with  his  family  in  Paris,  where  he  died  in  1898. 

After  the  overthrow  of  Blanco,  the  Congress  elected 
General  Palacios  for  the  statutory  term  of  two  years. 
His  Administration  was  uneventful,  except  for  a proposal 
to  reform  the  Law  of  Constitution  to  extend  the  presi- 
dential term  from  two  to  four  years,  and  to  effect  some 
other  minor  modifications,  and  on  the  question  of  this 
extension  of  the  presidential  period  important  develop- 
ments arose.  In  1892  President  Palacios  completed 
the  two  years  for  which  he  had  been  elected,  but  insisted 
that  the  reform  of  the  law  then  projected  entitled  him 
to  remain  until  1894,  and  his  refusal  to  vacate  office  led 
to  the  outbreak  of  a serious  revolution  under  the  leader- 
ship of  General  Joaquin  Crespo.  It  was  not  until 
October,  1892,  after  many  months  of  severe  fighting,  that 
peace  was  restored  by  the  victory  of  the  insurgents  and 
the  flight  of  Palacios  and  his  ministers  from  the  country. 
A Provisional  Government  was  then  installed  under 
General  Crespo,  the  Chambers  convened,  and  the  reform 
in  regard  to  the  four  years  tenure  of  the  Presidency 
approved  and  promulgated.  In  the  following  year  the 
election  was  held,  the  choice  falling  on  General  Crespo, 
the  leader  of  the  recent  revolt ; and  in  March,  1894,  the 
new  President  assumed  his  duties,  but  had  not  been 
long  in  power  before  a revolutionary  movement,  instigated 
by  Dr  Rojas  Paul,  broke  out.  Although  this  insurrection 
lingered  on  with  some  show  of  force  until  February, 
1896,  it  was  never  really  dangerous  to  the  Administra- 
tion and  was  only  supported  in  the  outlying  districts. 


022 


VENEZUELA 


General  Crespo  himself  took  the  field  in  command  of 
the  Government  troops,  and  his  success  against  the 
insurgents  added  to  his  prestige  and  popularity. 

Illustrative  of  presidential  authority  in  Venezuela,  a 
story  is  told  of  an  occasion  when  General  Crespo  was 
ailing  and  ordered  by  his  doctor  to  a small  village  near 
La  Guayra  for  change  of  air.  One  of  the  Ministers 
protested  that  by  law  the  President  could  not  leave  the 
Federal  District  without  permission  from  Congress,  and 
that  this  village  was  outside  such  limits.  “ Make  it  part 
of  the  Federal  District  at  once,”  said  Crespo.  Forthwith 
a decree  was  issued  to  that  effect. 

Early  in  1895  the  Guiana  boundary  question  again 
cropped  up.  The  authorities  of  British  Guiana  had 
established  a police  post  on  the  river  Uruan,  in  territory 
claimed  by  Venezuela,  and  the  Venezuelan  Government 
instructed  their  representative  to  eject  the  British  officials 
and  occupy  the  disputed  ground.  These  orders  were 
executed,  the  two  British  European  police  officers, 
Inspector  Baker  and  sub-inspector  Barnes,  arrested  and 
conveyed  inland,  and  the  half  dozen  native  constables 
ordered  away  from  the  locality,  the  British  flag  being 
hauled  down  and  that  of  Venezuela  hoisted  at  the  post. 
Strong  representations  were  forwarded  to  the  British 
Government  by  the  authorities  at  Demerara  when  news 
of  this  occurrence  was  received.  These  communications 
were  repeated  on  the  return  of  Inspector  Baker  and  his 
companion,  who  had  been  released  by  the  Venezuelans 
after  suffering  some  weeks  of  confinement  and  consider- 
able hardships.  With  no  direct  diplomatic  relations  with 
Venezuela,  the  British  Government  could  only  proceed 
through  the  German  Minister,  who  was  in  charge  of 
British  interests  in  Caracas,  to  ask  for  an  explanation 
of  the  affair.  President  Crespo  gave  little  satisfaction 
by  his  reply,  and  for  several  months  nothing  was  heard 
from  either  side  ; but  the  fire  was  only  smouldering,  and 
soon  burst  into  flame. 

In  the  middle  of  1895  the  Venezuelan  Government 
was  informed  that  a demand  would  shortly  be  made  by 


1895] 


THE  URUAN  INCIDENT 


623 


Great  Britain  for  an  apology  and  indemnity  for  the 
incident  on  the  river  Uruan.  In  these  circumstances 
President  Crespo  decided  to  lay  the  matter  before  the 
United  States  Government  for  advice  and  assistance, 
and  the  situation  was  explained  to  Mr  Olney,  then 
Secretary  of  State,  by  Senor  Andrade,  the  Venezuelan 
Minister  in  Washington.  In  July  and  August,  1895, 
notes  were  exchanged  between  Mr  Olney  on  behalf  of 
the  United  States  Administration,  and  the  Marquess  of 
Salisbury  in  regard  to  Venezuela.  Mr  Olney  brusquely 
demanded  that  the  difference  between  Her  Majesty’s 
Government  and  that  of  Venezuela  in  connection  with 
the  boundary  between  the  latter  country  and  British 
Guiana  should  be  submitted  to  arbitration.  The  Uruan 
affair  was  only  a side  issue  in  this  controversy,  the 
policy  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  being  the  motive  ostensibly 
given  for  the  action  of  the  Washington  authorities,  based 
on  the  supposition  that  the  British  Government  was 
deliberately  encroaching  on  Venezuelan  territory.  The 
reply  of  Lord  Salisbury  to  Mr  Olney  was  most  temperate 
in  tone,  and  he  pointed  out  that  the  title  of  Great 
Britain  to  that  part  of  South  America  over  which  juris- 
diction was  claimed  by  the  authorities  of  British  Guiana 
was  abundantly  clear  and  thoroughly  established,  with 
the  exception  of  a comparatively  small  area  which  Her 
Majesty’s  Government  had  repeatedly  offered  to  submit 
to  arbitration. 

This  answer  did  not  satisfy  President  Cleveland  and 
Mr  Olney.  A further  request  for  arbitration  on  practi- 
cally the  same  basis  as  that  made  by  the  Venezuelan 
Government  in  1887  was  put  forward,  and  this  brought 
strained  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain.  Meanwhile,  preparations  were  in  progress  for 
the  formal  demand  on  Venezuela  by  Her  Majesty’s 
Government  for  reparation  for  the  treatment  of  the  two 
police  officials,  Inspector  Baker  and  Sub-Inspector 
Barnes.  There  was  no  change  in  the  situation  until 
December,  1895,  but  on  the  18th  of  that  month, 
President  Cleveland  sent  a message  to  Congress  which 


624 


VENEZUELA 


nearly  caused  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  He  declared  that  unless 
Her  Majesty’s  Government  agreed  to  the  demands  of  the 
United  States  Administration  concerning  arbitration  in 
connection  with  the  Venezuelan  question,  force  would 
be  used  to  compel  the  evacuation  of  all  such  territory 
as  a Commission  appointed  by  the  United  States  authori- 
ties considered  rightfully  belonged  to  Venezuela.  This 
action  of  President  Cleveland  placed  the  dispute  between 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  on  an  altered  footing,  and 
the  Uruan  incident  dropped  into  insignificance  beside  the 
complication  which  now  threatened  to  develop  into  a 
war  between  two  great  nations.  Although  the  demand 
for  compensation  for  the  outrage  on  the  two  British 
police  officials  was  made  in  due  time,  and  £1500  paid  by 
the  Venezuelan  Government  to  settle  the  affair,  the 
matter  no  longer  occasioned  any  interest  in  view  of  the 
more  important  question  which  had  arisen. 

When  the  news  of  the  Cleveland  message  reached 
Venezuela,  a scene  of  frantic  excitement  ensued.  The 
text  of  the  document  was  cabled  to  Caracas,  printed 
copies  were  immediately  posted  in  every  section  of  the 
city,  and  the  announcement  of  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States  in  the  dispute  with  Great  Britain  was  telegraphed 
far  and  wide  throughout  the  country,  meetings  being 
held  to  applaud  the  action  taken  by  President  Cleveland 
and  to  shower  abuse  on  the  British.  Processions 
paraded  the  streets  of  Caracas  with  banners  and  flags, 
speeches  were  made  glorifying  the  magnanimous  conduct 
of  the  United  States  in  protecting  republican  institutions 
in  South  America,  patriotic  displays  of  all  kinds  were 
the  order  of  the  day ; but  the  Venezuelans  entirely  failed 
to  distinguish  between  the  policy  of  President  Cleveland 
as  prompted  by  a desire  to  establish  a principle  of  the 
Monroe  doctrine,  and  the  situation  created  by  the  attack 
on  the  British  police  post  on  the  river  Uruan.  In  the 
minds  of  the  great  majority  of  the  people  the  idea  was 
fixed  that  the  United  States  had  taken  up  the  cudgels 
for  Venezuela  because  Great  Britain  had  demanded 


1895]  THE  GUIANA  BOUNDARY  DISPUTE  625 


reparation  for  the  outrage  perpetrated  on  the  British 
representatives,  and  that  from  motives  of  philanthropy 
the  moral  and  material  force  of  the  Americans  was  to  be 
used  to  drive  the  British  out  of  all  territory  to  which 
Venezuela  laid  claim,  as  well  as  to  prevent  any  aggressive 
action  by  England  in  connection  with  the  Uruan 
incident.  In  speeches  delivered  to  crowded  meetings  in 
Caracas,  this  theory  was  advanced  in  such  form  as  to 
amount  to  a definite  statement  of  fact  that  the  conflict 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  was  a 
struggle  between  republican  and  monarchial  institutions, 
and  that  all  the  republican  governments  of  the  world 
would  join  forces  with  the  United  States  in  the  contest. 
It  is  no  wonder  that  the  people  lost  their  heads  under 
the  influence  of  inflammatory  rhetoric  of  this  description, 
gravely  expounded  by  leading  members  of  the  Govern- 
ment. 

Leagues  were  formed  in  Caracas  and  at  other  points 
hostile  to  British  trade,  the  members  binding  themselves 
to  purchase  no  merchandise  of  British  origin,  and  pre- 
parations were  begun  for  the  embodiment  of  the  militia 
forces  in  event  of  the  outbreak  of  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  while  the  project  of 
an  invasion  of  British  Guiana  was  freely  discussed. 
Batteries  were  mounted  near  La  Guayra  to  protect  the 
harbour  against  attack  from  the  sea,  and  the  newspapers 
were  replete  with  bellicose  articles,  urging  the  people  to 
show  patriotic  feeling  in  every  possible  manner ; but  in 
spite  of  all  this  excitement  few  cases  occurred  where 
personal  outrage  was  offered  to  British  residents  in 
Venezuela.  Only  one  authenticated  instance  is  recorded, 
and  that  was  in  connection  with  the  British  Vice-consul 
in  the  town  of  Barcelona,  on  the  river  Orinoco.  This 
man  was  a merchant,  and  his  life  was  menaced  by  a 
group  of  ill-disposed  neighbours ; threats  were  made  to 
the  effect  that  his  property  would  be  destroyed  if  he  did 
not  abandon  the  city,  but  the  authorities  intervened 
before  mischief  could  be  done. 

In  the  carnival  festivities  in  February,  1896,  the 

2 R 


626 


VENEZUELA 


feeling  of  hostility  against  the  British  reached  its  height. 
It  is  customary  to  arrange  representations  of  prominent 
events,  and  these  are  paraded  through  the  principal 
thoroughfares  during  carnival  week,  and  on  this  occasion 
some  clever  emblematic  devices  were  to  the  fore,  in  which 
Venezuela  and  Great  Britain  were  the  chief  figures. 
Venezuelan  soldiers  dragging  British  troops  and  sailors 
along  the  streets  formed  a centre  of  attraction  and 
roused  the  wildest  enthusiasm  amongst  the  spectators, 
while  caricatures  of  Englishmen,  many  of  these  extremely 
comical,  were  another  favourite  exhibition.  In  equal 
ratio  to  the  hostility  towards  everything  British  was  the 
sympathy  for  all  designs  representative  of  the  United 
States ; but  the  carnival  proved  to  be  the  culminating 
point  of  the  excitement,  the  temper  of  the  people 
rapidly  cooling  down  when  they  realised  that  for  the 
present  there  would  be  no  war  between  England  and 
America.  A slight  recrudescence  of  hostile  feeling 
occurred  in  March,  when  a rumour  reached  Caracas  that 
a British  squadron  had  called  at  the  Island  of  Cura^oa, 
bound  for  Venezuela,  to  enforce  the  demand  for  indemnity 
in  connection  with  the  Uruan  incident,  but  this  flash  in 
the  pan  died  away  when  it  was  found  that  Her  Majesty’s 
Government  held  no  such  intention.  While  the 
Venezuelans  still  bore  a latent  hostility  towards  Great 
Britain,  no  sign  of  it  was  visible  on  the  surface  in  April, 
1896,  and  all  resolutions  in  regard  to  the  cessation  of  the 
purchase  of  British  goods  disappeared  completely,  the 
people  discovering  that  a large  portion  of  the  merchandise 
they  most  needed  could  be  imported  more  cheaply  from 
Great  Britain  than  elsewhere,  and  this  was  sufficient  to 
counterbalance  the  agitation  set  afoot  against  the 
trade. 

The  one  man  in  Venezuela  who  never  lost  his  head 
while  these  developments  were  taking  place  between 
the  British  and  the  United  States  Governments  was 
President  Crespo,  and  his  attitude  throughout  the 
controversy  was  worthy  of  all  praise.  He  was  quiet 
and  dignified,  reserved  in  regard  to  the  questions  at 


i896j  THE  CLEVELAND  COMMISSION  627 


issue,  and  showed  no  outward  sign  of  hostility  towards 
the  British.  Crespo  took  a sensible  view  of  the  situation, 
asserting  that  he  neither  wished  nor  expected  to  see 
war  result  from  the  action  of  the  United  States 
Administration  in  connection  with  the  boundary  dispute, 
but  sincerely  hoped  that  the  question  of  the  frontier 
would  now  be  settled  once  for  all  by  arbitration,  and 
that  a long-standing  cause  of  dissatisfaction  would  be 
thereby  eliminated.  It  was  this  moderate  attitude  of 
the  President  that  led  to  the  peaceable  arrangement  for 
the  payment  of  the  indemnity  to  Her  Majesty’s  Govern- 
ment on  account  of  the  Uruan  affair,  in  spite  of  the 
strong  opposition  this  policy  evoked  on  the  part  of  many 
politicians  entertaining  more  narrow-minded  views. 

All  interest  in  the  boundary  question  was  now 
transferred  to  Washington,  where  the  Commission 
nominated  by  President  Cleveland  to  inquire  into  the 
validity  of  the  Venezuelan  claims  held  constant  sittings. 
Venezuela  was  represented  by  Senor  Andrade,  the 
Minister  accredited  to  the  United  States,  by  Mr 
Storrow,  a well-known  lawyer  of  Boston,  and  by  Mr 
Scruggs,  a former  diplomatic  representative  of  the 
United  States  in  Caracas.  The  task  of  this  Commission 
was  to  examine  all  documentary  evidence  bearing  on 
the  Venezuelan  cause,  and  to  report  to  President 
Cleveland  the  result  of  the  inquiry,  but  it  was  not  long 
before  the  inconvenience  of  this  arrangement  became 
evident  to  the  United  States  authorities.  There  could 
be  at  best  only  an  ex-parte  statement  under  the 
circumstances,  for  Great  Britain  was  unrepresented, 
although  it  was  chiefly  with  British  interests  that  the 
Commission  was  concerned.  An  investigation  of  this 
nature  could  only  lead  to  a communication  to  Her 
Majesty’s  Government  of  the  deductions  drawn  by  the 
Commission  in  Washington, .and  if  these  were  favourable 
to  Venezuela,  to  a further  request  for  arbitration.  Under 
such  conditions  the  danger  of  war  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  would  again  be  imminent,  a 
possibility  which  President  Cleveland  had  no  wish  to 


628 


VENEZUELA 


provoke,  in  view  of  the  injurious  effect  on  financial  and 
commercial  interests  such  action  would  entail.  Towards 
the  end  of  1896,  therefore,  a modus  vivendi  was 
suggested  for  an  arbitration  tribunal  to  decide  the  merits 
of  British  and  V enezuelan  claims,  the  representatives  of 
those  two  nations  in  Washington  formulating  the 
arrangement.  A treaty  in  this  sense  was  signed  on 
June  14,  1897,  and  the  tribunal  subsequently  met  in 
Paris  under  the  presidency  of  Dr  Martens,  a most 
distinguished  Russian  jurist.  With  the  acceptance  of 
this  arbitration  by  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  the 
intervention  of  the  United  States  in  the  matter  ceased, 
and  the  Commission  appointed  by  President  Cleveland 
was  dissolved,  no  report  of  its  proceedings  being 
submitted.  In  October,  1899,  the  award  of  the  Paris 
tribunal  was  given,  and,  although  not  satisfying  the 
extreme  pretensions  of  the  Venezuelan  advocates,  was 
loyally  accepted  by  General  Crespo.  This  decision  was 
closely  in  accord  with  the  delimitation  shown  by  the 
Schomburk  line,  but  while  giving  Barima  Point  and  the 
Cuyuni  gold  fields  to  Venezuela,  it  confirmed  the  British 
title  to  60,000  square  miles  of  the  territory  claimed  by 
the  Venezuelans.  Diplomatic  relations  were  subse- 
quently renewed  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela, 
Mr  Haggard  being  appointed  Minister-Resident  at 
Caracas,  and  Dr  Pietri  representing  Venezuela  at  the 
Court  of  St  James. 

In  March,  1898,  the  presidential  term  of  General 
Crespo  expired,  and  he  vacated  office  in  favour  of  his 
successor.  His  Administration  more  nearly  satisfied 
the  needs  of  the  country  than  any  former  one  had  done, 
and  although  he  was  a soldier  and  attained  power 
through  a successful  revolutionary  movement,  he  gave  no 
place  to  militarism  in  his  direction  of  public  affairs. 
His  Government  was  firm  without  being  despotic,  and 
he  showed  undeniable  tact  in  dealing  with  domestic  and 
foreign  questions,  and  that  the  people  felt  confidence  in 
him  was  demonstrated  by  the  improvement  in  the  public 
credit  during  his  term  of  office. 


1898] 


ELECTION  OF  ANDRADE 


629 


To  succeed  General  Crespo,  the  choice  fell  on  Senor 
Andrade,  the  Venezuelan  Minister  in  the  United  States. 
It  was  not  an  unnatural  choice,  in  view  of  the  important 
services  he  had  rendered  in  connection  with  the 
boundary  question,  for  it  was  due  to  the  course 
followed  by  him  in  his  diplomatic  relations  with  the 
Cleveland  Administration  that  the  intervention  of  the 
United  States  between  Venezuela  and  Great  Britain 
occurred,  and  the  attitude  assumed  by  President 
Cleveland  in  the  matter  was  precisely  what  the 
Venezuelans  most  desired.  Although  the  candidature 
of  Senor  Andrade  was  supported  by  General  Crespo,  no 
undue  influence  was  brought  to  bear  on  the  Federal 
Council  to  secure  his  election ; moreover,  none  of  the 
other  aspirants  to  presidential  honours  combining  such 
substantial  claims  to  the  position.  When  the  decision 
of  the  Council  was  made  public,  the  general  impression 
Avas  favourable  to  the  neAv  president,  and  he  assumed 
office  with  the  good  wishes  of  nearly  the  whole 
community. 

Senor  Andrade  did  not  prove  a success  as  President, 
and  his  temporary  popularity  soon  disappeared.  His 
weak  and  vacillating  policy  in  regard  to  internal  politics 
created  discontent,  and  afforded  the  opportunity  that 
the  Opposition  had  awaited  to  sow  the  seeds  of  sedition. 
ToAvards  the  end  of  1898  the  promoters  of  this  revolu- 
tionary spirit  decided  that  the  time  had  arrived  for 
armed  insurrection  against  the  Government,  and  the 
standard  of  revolt  Avas  raised  in  the  western  districts 
and  in  the  State  of  Carabobo ; but  it  was  not  the  wish 
of  General  Crespo  to  see  President  Andrade  ousted 
from  office,  and  he  took  the  field  in  command  of  the 
Government  troops  to  suppress  the  outbreak.  The 
insurgents  Avere  scantily  supplied  Avith  arms  and 
ammunition,  and  could  make  little  progress  against  the 
legal  forces,  the  operations  being  confined  chiefly  to 
guerilla  warfare.  Gradually,  therefore,  order  Avas  restored 
under  the  direction  of  Crespo,  and  early  in  1899  the 
movement  Avas  apparently  nearing  its  end,  but  unfortun- 


630 


VENEZUELA 


ately  for  the  Government  a disaster  occurred  at  this 
stage  to  change  the  current  of  events.  In  a skirmish 
between  a small  body  of  troops  and  a band  of  rebels  a 
stray  bullet  struck  General  Crespo  in  the  head,  killing 
him  instantly,  and  his  death  at  once  brought  about  a 
revival  of  the  insurrection.  In  a few  months  the 
insurgents  were  in  control  of  the  greater  portion  of  the 
country,  and  prepared  to  march  on  Caracas,  and  it  was 
evident  that  the  Government  cause  was  lost.  On  the 
approach  of  the  rebel  army  President  Andrade,  with  his 
ministers,  abandoned  the  capital  and  sought  refuge  in 
the  Dutch  colony  of  Curacoa. 

A period  of  anarchy  ensued,  but  at  length  order  was 
re-established  by  the  revolutionary  leaders,  and  a Pro- 
visional Government  formed.  General  Castro,  who  had 
been  prominent  in  the  revolt  against  Andrade,  was 
elected  President,  and  although  various  conspiracies 
were  hatched  against  his  authority,  they  were  suppressed 
without  difficulty.  The  disturbances  in  1899  had 
brought  many  financial  and  economic  afflictions  in  their 
train,  notably  widespread  distress  after  the  restoration 
of  peace,  and  the  fall  in  the  price  of  coffee,  the  staple 
export  from  Venezuela,  tended  to  accentuate  the 
general  distress.  Under  these  circumstances  it  was  not 
surprising  that  the  exchequer  was  without  funds  to 
meet  the  public  obligations,  the  expenditure  in  1898  and 
1899  having  been  abnormally  heavy  in  consequence  of 
internal  disturbances,  and  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century  found  Venezuela  in  the  position  of  a defaulting 
Government  on  the  internal  and  external  public  debts, 
and  in  such  economic  distress  that  discontent  was 
apparent  amongst  all  sections  of  the  population. 

In  February,  1902,  General  Castro  was  again  elected 
to  the  Presidency,  and  during  his  second  term  of  office 
some  interesting  events  occurred.  Damage  to  the 
property  of  foreign  residents  had  been  extensive  in  the 
various  revolutionary  outbreaks  during  recent  years,  and 
claims  for  compensation  were  preferred  against  the 
Government.  No  consideration  being  accorded  to  these 


1902]  BLOCKADE  OF  LA  GUAYRA 


631 


demands,  the  matter  passed  into  the  hands  of  the 
foreign  diplomatic  representatives,  and  to  them,  also, 
no  satisfaction  was  given.  When  diplomacy  failed, 
Great  Britain,  Germany,  and  Italy  determined  to  nse 
force  as  the  only  means  of  securing  a just  settlement  for 
their  subjects.  Towards  the  end  of  1902  the  three 
powers  established  a blockade  of  La  Guayra  and  seized 
the  Custom-house,  announcing  that  they  would  remain 
in  possession  until  sufficient  funds  had  been  collected  to 
satisfy  their  demands.  Through  the  mediation  of  the 
United  States  a protocol  was  signed  on  February  13, 
1903,  agreeing  to  refer  the  dispute  to  the  Hague 
Tribunal,  and  the  conditions  were  set  forth  in  a treaty 
on  May  7 of  the  same  year.  Under  this  agreement  not 
only  the  blockading  powers,  but  all  other  nationalities 
were  entitled  to  claim  for  damages  suffered.  On 
February  22,  1904,  the  award  of  the  Hague  Tribunal 
was  given,  and  while  admitting  claims  of  all  nationalities, 
it  established  a precedent  in  International  Law  in  that  a 
preferential  right  to  the  30  per  cent,  of  the  Customs  dues 
set  aside  was  allowed  to  the  three  powers  which  had 
taken  active  steps  to  enforce  payment,  and  that  only 
after  their  claims  were  satisfied  could  other  nations 
participate.  The  United  States  Government  was 
requested  to  execute  the  award. 

The  Venezuelan  Law  of  Constitution  differs  from 
that  of  other  South  American  States,  and  requires  some 
explanation  for  the  political  situation  to  be  understood. 
Congress  appoints  a Federal  Council  consisting  of  19 
members  for  two  years,  and  this  Council  elects  a President 
from  its  own  members,  who  is  also  President  of  the 
Republic  for  a term  of  four  years  under  the  modification 
introduced  in  1893,  and  since  extended  to  six  years. 
Congress  comprises  the  Senate  and  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, three  Senators  being  elected  for  each  State 
for  four  years  by  the  local  Legislatures,  and  representa- 
tives in  the  proportion  of  one  to  every  35,000  inhabitants 
are  chosen  by  popular,  direct  and  public  election.  Until 
1881  the  political  division  of  Venezuela  was  twenty-one 


632 


VENEZUELA 


States  and  their  territories,  but  in  that  year  the  country 
was  rearranged  into  eight  States,  the  Federal  District, 
two  national  settlements,  and  eight  territories.  These 
States  are : — Miranda,  Carabobo,  Bermudez,  Zamora, 
Lara,  Los  Andes,  Falcon  and  Zulia,  and  Bolivar.  The 
territories  were : — Goajira,  Alto  Orinoco,  Amazonas, 
Coldn,  Yurnari,  Caura,  Delta  and  Armisticio ; but  in 
1891  the  territory  of  Yuruari  was  reincorporated  into 
the  State  of  Bolivar,  so  that  only  seven  of  the  eight 
territories  created  in  1881  now  exist.  In  1899  a 
measure  was  sanctioned  for  the  re-creation  of  the  twenty 
States  under  the  Act  of  1864,  and  this  was  again 
modified  by  a decree  dated  August  4,  1900,  by  which 
the  Bepublic  was  apportioned  into  the  fifteen  political 
divisions  already  described. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  politics  in  Venezuela, 
attention  must  be  called  to  one  clause  in  the  Law  of 
Constitution  which  offers  a premium  on  revolutionary 
practices  and  explains  why  the  country  is  a constant 
prey  to  internal  disturbance.  It  is  specially  enacted 
that  insurgents  taking  up  arms  from  political  motives 
shall  be  accorded  belligerent  rights,  and  that  all  property 
of  persons  participating  in  political  risings  is  exempt 
from  confiscation.  In  other  words,  any  ambitious 
citizen  can  join  a rebellion  with  a light  heart,  knowing 
that  he  cannot  be  punished  for  treasonable  acts,  and  that 
his  vested  interests  in  land  or  other  property  are  safe 
whether  the  cause  he  supports  emerges  victorious  or 
defeated  from  the  struggle.  So  long  as  these  conditions 
continue  there  can  be  small  hope  for  peace  in  this 
insurrection -ridden  community. 

With  half  a hundred  revolutionary  outbreaks  in  a 
period  of  seventy  years,  the  economic  development  of 
Venezuela  has  necessarily  been  slow.  Presidents  and 
Administrations  disappeared  with  such  startling  rapidity 
in  the  first  forty  years  of  V enezuelan  Independence,  that 
little  opportunity  occurred  for  careful  consideration  of 
the  means  best  fitted  to  promote  the  general  welfare. 
Even  when  measures  of  improvement  were  initiated, 


1904]  CLIMATE  AND  TOPOGRAPHY  633 

political  disturbances  invariably  arose  to  obstruct  con- 
tinuity of  policy  in  the  proposed  reforms. 

It  was  not  until  General  Guzman  Blanco  acceded  to 
power  in  1870  that  any  practical  effort  was  made  to 
inaugurate  a system  permitting  mental  and  material 
development  to  assume  definite  shape,  the  first  by  the 
institution  of  elementary  education,  and  the  second  by 
the  advent  of  an  epoch  of  comparative  peace  which  gave 
breathing  space  for  industrial  enterprise  to  expand ; 
but  after  his  overthrow  backsliding  took  place  as  a 
consequence  of  constant  internal  unrest.  A prospect  of 
a more  happy  state  of  affairs  opened  under  General 
Crespo  between  1894  and  1898,  but  his  successor  was 
unable  to  maintain  this  improvement.  For  the  last 
seven  years,  therefore,  Venezuela  had  been  a prey  to  the 
intrigues  of  unscrupulous  politicians,  and  the  attendant 
evils  of  ever-recurring  conspiracies  against  the  authorities, 
and,  as  a consequence,  the  economic  situation  has  been 
confronted  by  innumerable  difficulties. 

The  climate  and  topography  of  Venezuela  are  factors 
of  such  variable  quantities  as  to  require  description. 
The  coast  line  on  the  northern  and  eastern  boundary  is 
swampy  and  unhealthy  at  all  seasons  in  consequence  of 
malaria ; but  this  low-lying  land  only  extends  for  a very 
short  distance  into  the  interior,  precipitous  mountain 
ranges  then  rising  abruptly  to  5000  feet  above  sea  level, 
and  at  the  back  of  these  lofty  chains  are  great  valleys 
where  a fertile  soil  and  abundance  of  water  offer  many 
facilities  for  coffee  plantations  and  other  branches  of 
agricultural  industry.  In  one  of  these  valleys  is  the 
city  of  Caracas,  at  an  elevation  of  3000  feet  above  the 
sea,  and  endowed  with  the  climatic  attributes  of  per- 
petual springtime.  There  is  little  variation  in  tempera- 
ture the  year  round,  the  thermometer  in  the  shade 
seldom  marking  higher  than  76°  F.  during  the  daytime 
or  falling  below  65°  at  night.  These  conditions  are 
repeated  in  more  or  less  degree  in  the  succession  of 
valleys  in  the  mountain  area,  the  greater  or  lower 
altitude  modifying  heat  or  cold.  Where  districts  are 


634 


VENEZUELA 


above  an  altitude  of  2000  feet  the  climate  is  not  injurious 
to  immigrants  from  northern  countries ; malarious  fevers 
are  few,  and  epidemic  disease  rarely  encountered. 
Towards  the  south-west  the  character  of  the  country 
changes,  the  mountain  ranges  disappearing  and  giving 
place  to  great  open  plains  stretching  away  to  the  banks 
of  the  river  Orinoco,  at  which  point  heavy  forest 
replaces  the  grass  lands  of  the  more  central  districts. 
These  open  plains  are  the  llanos , and  here  the  climate  is 
hot  and  humid,  malaria  playing  havoc  with  residents 
accustomed  to  live  in  temperate  regions.  With  the 
exception  of  the  llanos  the  greater  portion  of  Venezuela 
is  heavily  wooded  with  excellent  timber  trees  of  many 
different  kinds. 

In  regard  to  population,  no  accurate  statistics  are 
available,  the  census  returns  being  unreliable.  In  1873 
official  figures  showed  a total  population  of  2,032,476 ; 
in  1891  this  estimate  was  increased  to  2,323,527,  com- 
prising 1,137,139  males  and  1,186,388  females.  In  1890 
the  Indian  population  was  given  as  326,000 ; of  these, 
66,000  were  classified  as  independent,  20,000  as  under 
control,  and  240,000  as  civilised.  In  1894  another  esti- 
mate gave  2,444,816,  including  44,129  foreigners  of  the 
following  nationalities  : — Spanish,  13,558  ; Colombians, 
11,081;  British,  6154;  Dutch,  3729;  Italians,  3179; 
French,  2545 ; Germans,  962.  The  area  of  Venezuela, 
after  deducting  the  60,000  square  miles  awarded  to 
Great  Britain  by  the  arbitration  proceedings  in  1899,  is 
placed  at  533,943  square  miles.  The  distribution  of  the 
population  in  1891  is  shown  by  the  following  table. 
Information  regarding  the  movement  of  population  is 
seldom  published,  the  latest  returns  being  for  1889. 
These  show  6705  marriages,  76,187  births,  and  55,218 
deaths,  as  taking  place  during  the  twelve  months.  Of 
immigration  there  is  little ; in  1890  the  arrivals  were 
1555,  but  these  were  offset  by  an  equal  number  of 
departures.  During  the  last  few  years  there  have  been 
occasional  endeavours  to  induce  foreigners  to  settle,  and 
contracts  were  made  subsequent  to  1896  for  the  intro- 


1904] 


POPULATION 


635 


duction  of  immigrants  to  form  colonies  on  national  lands, 
but  nothing  has  really  been  done. 


State. 

Area, 
sq.  miles. 

Population 

1891. 

I 

Population 

per 

sq.  mile. 

Federal  District  . 

45 

89,133 

1,980-7 

Miranda 

33,969 

484,509 

14-2 

Carabobo 

2,984 

198,021 

60-6 

Bermudez  . 

32,243 

300,597 

9-3 

Zamora 

25,212 

246,676 

9-6 

Lara  .... 

9,296 

246,760 

26-5 

Los  Andes  . 

14,719 

336,146 

22-8 

Falcon  and  Zulia  . 

36,212 

224,566 

6-2 

Bolivar 

88,701 

50,289 

0-5 

Various  Territories 

290,562 

146,830 

0-5 

Total  . 

533,943 

2,323,527 

4-3 

Of  Venezuelan  cities  the  most  important  are  Caracas, 
with  a population  of  72,429;  Valencia,  with  38,654; 
Maracaibo,  with  34,284;  Barquisimeto,  with  31,476; 
Ciudad  de  Cura,  with  12,198;  Barcelona,  with  12,785; 
Ciudad  Bolivar,  with  11,686 ; and  Guanara,  with 
10,880.  Little  has  been  accomplished  in  the  matter  of 
improvements  by  the  municipal  authorities  of  these 
towns.  Caracas,  the  National  Capital,  is  without 
drainage,  and  has  a deficient  water  supply,  is  ill-paved 
and  dirty,  and  the  enforcement  of  ordinary  hygienic 
regulations  are  entirely  neglected.  Of  other  Venezuelan 
cities  Valencia  is  the  most  attractive,  broad  streets 
shaded  by  well-grown  trees  lending  a picturesque 
appearance  to  the  thoroughfares. 

In  regard  to  public  education,  Venezuela  is  one  of 
the  most  backward  of  the  South  American  States,  and 
previous  to  1870  no  system  existed  for  public  instruc- 
tion. It  was  due  to  General  Guzman  Blanco  that  free 
elementary  schools  were  established,  and  the  attendance 
of  children  between  the  ages  of  six  and  fourteen  made 


636 


VENEZUELA 


obligatory ; but  the  law  of  compulsory  attendance  has 
never  been  enforced,  and  children  who  should  be 
receiving  instruction  are  sent  by  their  parents  to  work 
on  the  coffee  plantations,  or  occupied  in  other  employ- 
ments. There  are  1415  Federal  elementary  schools, 
and  150  maintained  under  the  different  State  Govern- 
ments, and  the  number  of  pupils  on  the  rolls  is  returned 
as  100,026,  but  the  attendance  is  not  regular.  For  the 
Federal  institutions  the  sum  annually  expended  is 
2,500,000  francs,  or  about  20  francs  for  each  child 
enrolled.  Away  from  the  towns  no  effort  is  made  to 
furnish  primary  instruction  for  the  children  of  the 
labouring  classes,  the  employers  of  thousands  of  workers 
on  the  principal  coffee  estates  finding  neither  school 
houses  nor  teachers.  Occasionally,  rudiments  of  educa- 
tion are  imparted  by  the  parish  priests,  but  such 
innovations  receive  small  encouragement  from  the 
plantation  owners,  and  seldom  lead  to  substantial  result. 
For  secondary  education  there  are  twenty-two  colleges 
for  boys  and  eleven  establishments  for  girls,  and  also 
twenty-six  private  institutions,  while  for  higher  educa- 
tion two  Universities  exist.  On  the  Federal  colleges 
and  universities  the  National  Government  spends 
annually  850,000  francs,  an  amount  totally  inadequate 
for  the  purpose.  Among  the  lower  social  classes  in 
Venezuela,  the  question  of  public  instruction  is  regarded 
with  apathetic  indifference,  and  parents  consider  them- 
selves hardly  used  when  some  unusually  zealous  official 
insists  on  the  attendance  of  children  at  the  public 
schools. 

The  administration  of  justice  is  based  on  a very  low 
standard,  and  corruption  is  deep-rooted  in  both  higher 
and  lower  branches  of  the  judiciary.  The  laws  are 
codified,  but  the  procedure  is  tedious  and  costly,  and 
all  litigation  is  avoided  as  much  as  possible,  no  matter 
how  just  may  be  the  cause  in  dispute.  The  necessity 
of  purifying  the  judicial  system  is  not  appreciated  by  the 
Venezuelans,  even  the  more  highly  educated  section  of 
the  population  being  content  to  allow  matters  to  rest 


1904] 


CHURCH  INFLUENCE 


637 


in  the  existing  unsatisfactory  condition  rather  than  exert 
their  influence  to  eradicate  the  scandal  which  present  cir- 
cumstances constantly  provoke.  In  the  various  munici- 
palities detachments  of  police  are  maintained,  but  they  are 
more  often  utilised  as  armed  troops  to  suppress  seditious 
outbreaks  than  as  constables.  Murder,  robbery,  and 
other  serious  crimes  are  of  common  occurrence,  and  are 
regarded  with  indifference. 

The  influence  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  in 
Venezuela  is  of  a negative  character.  So  far  as  the 
educated  men  are  concerned,  the  tendency  towards  free 
thought  in  matters  religious  is  strongly  developed ; but 
whether  this  attitude  arises  from  the  restraint  imposed 
by  Church  ritual  on  their  methods  of  life,  or  is  the 
result  of  a careful  consideration  of  religious  belief,  is  not 
clearly  defined.  With  the  women  of  the  higher  social 
classes  the  Catholic  doctrines  are  predominant,  and  the 
rites  and  ceremonies  of  the  church  sincerely  venerated ; 
but  it  is  with  the  lower  grades  of  the  community  that 
the  V enezuelan  clergy  have  most  power.  The  ignorance 
of  the  peasantry  is  so  dense  that  superstition  plays  a 
great  part  in  their  lives,  and  the  priesthood  can  instill 
into  their  minds  an  outward  respect  for  religious  forms 
and  dread  of  direful  consequences  to  follow  disobedience 
to  priestly  injunctions.  In  one  respect,  however,  the 
clergy  have  failed  to  impress  on  the  peasant  classes  a 
standard  of  morality  similar  to  that  appertaining  to  most 
other  countries.  In  so  far  as  the  ceremony  of  marriage 
is  concerned,  the  lower  grades  of  the  community  do  not 
conform  to  modern  ideas,  and  more  often  than  not  the 
man  and  woman  living  together  and  bringing  up  a family 
of  half  a dozen  children  are  not  married.  Frequently  it 
is  the  woman  who  objects  to  being  legally  bound,  aver- 
ring that  she  has  a stronger  position  when  simply 
cohabiting  with  the  man  than  if  he  could  claim  any 
legal  rights  as  a wife.  Nor  is  any  social  degradation 
attached  to  this  form  of  concubinage,  which  probably 
originated  in  the  fact  that  the  fees  charged  by  the 
priests  for  a marriage  ceremony  are  unduly  heavy,  often 


638 


VENEZUELA 


prohibitive.  Hence  the  “ free  love  ” habits,  and  no 
arguments  on  the  part  of  the  clergy  of  to-day  have  been 
successful  in  changing  the  practice  of  past  generations. 
An  example  of  the  attitude  of  the  peasants  towards 
marriage  is  related  by  a French  priest  in  one  of  the 
country  districts.  A woman  brought  her  child  to  him 
to  be  baptised,  and  was  asked  the  name  of  the  father. 
“No  sc,  Senor  Padre ,”  was  the  reply,  in  a tone  per- 
fectly unconscious  of  any  uncommon  occurrence.  The 
priesthood  in  Venezuela  is  recruited  from  men  of  low 
intellectual  ability,  and  no  endeavour  is  made  by  its 
members  to  formulate  a means  by  which  the  people’s 
morals  may  in  this  respect  be  improved.  The  clergy 
are  content  to  find  their  limited  authority  respected, 
and  show  small  desire  for  any  expansion  of  the  narrow- 
minded train  of  reasoning  that  now  controls  their 
action. 

There  is  a tale  concerning  the  present  Archbishop 
of  Caracas  which  endears  him  to  the  Venezuelans.  One 
day  his  carriage  mules  jibbed  when  ascending  a steep 
hill,  and  the  language  of  the  driver  became  more  forcible 
as  his  efforts  to  make  the  animals  move  proved  unavail- 
ing. The  Archbishop  put  his  head  out  of  the  window 
and  called,  “ No  tanto  hombre,  no  tanto  ” in  reproof,  and 
alighted  to  try  his  powers  of  persuasion.  He  had  driven 
mules  in  his  youth,  and  warmed  to  his  work  with  a will, 
forgetting  his  episcopal  dignity  until  reminded  of  his 
position  by  a voice  behind  him  remarking,  “No  tanto 
hombre,  no  tanto.”  Thereafter  that  expression  came  into 
general  use  whenever  bad  language  overstepped  con- 
ventional limits. 

The  national  character  has  hardly  reached  a stage  of 
development  to  permit  an  accurate  diagnosis.  Among 
the  upper  social  grades  Spanish  traits  are  toned  down 
by  local  surroundings,  but  are  always  present.  The 
white  Venezuelans  are  impulsive  in  all  political  affairs, 
and  impatient  of  control,  the  insubordinate  spirit  showing 
as  plainly  now  as  in  former  days  in  Spain  when  it  led 
to  pronunciamientos  on  the  part  of  influential  men  at 


1904] 


VENEZUELAN  CHARACTER 


639 


variance  with  the  authorities.  These  features  are  to-day 
characteristic  of  the  educated  classes,  and  account  in  large 
measure  for  the  political  turmoil  in  which  the  country 
is  so  often  involved.  The  uneducated  masses  have  a 
greater  proportion  of  Indian  than  Spanish  blood ; they 
preserve  the  national  traits  of  their  Indian  forefathers, 
and  although  the  level  of  their  intelligence  is  low,  yet 
they  are  crafty  and  cunning  in  their  dealings  to  an  extent 
not  suspected  at  first  by  the  casual  observer.  Simple  in 
their  habits  of  life,  these  people  care  little  for  modern 
civilisation,  nor  have  they  at  present  any  ambition  to  better 
their  social  condition ; content  with  a hand-to-mouth 
existence,  they  rarely  make  any  provision  for  the  future. 
They  are  clay  awaiting  the  hand  of  the  potter  to  mould 
them  into  shape,  and  years  must  elapse  before  their 
animal  and  half  savage  existence  is  sufficiently  expanded 
to  allow  of  mental  development. 

Industries  and  occupations  in  Venezuela  may  be 
divided  into  three  groups : — The  cultivation  of  coffee, 
cacao  and  sugar-cane ; the  raising  of  cattle ; and  gold 
mining.  The  principal  wealth  is  derived  from  coffee,  the 
exportation  in  recent  years  averaging  50,000  tons  annually, 
worth,  approximately,  £2,000,000.  There  are  now  33,000 
coffee  plantations  in  the  country,  and  the  cultivated  area  is 
200,000  acres.  As  a rule,  the  bushes  are  protected  from 
the  sun  by  shade  trees  planted  when  the  estate  is  first 
opened.  It  is  seldom  that  any  great  care  is  shown  in 
the  methods  of  cultivation.  Two  or  three  times  each 
year  the  grass  and  weeds  are  cleared  away,  and  after 
the  crop  is  gathered  the  bushes  are  pruned,  nature  then 
doing  all  else  that  is  needed  to  bring  abundant  crops 
for  the  ensuing  season,  and  it  says  much  for  soil  and 
climate  that  with  this  minimum  of  labour  the  plantations 
in  most  districts  have  yielded  heavily.  In  a few  instances 
coffee  plantations  are  owned  by  foreigners,  but  the 
industry  is  controlled  by  Venezuelans. 

The  cacao  plantations  are  conducted  on  similar 
lines,  and  there  are  5000  estates  devoted  to  the  pro- 
duction of  this  article,  the  amount  shipped  abroad  in 


640 


VENEZUELA 


1897  being  4000  tons,  chiefly  from  La  Guayra,  and 
worth  £200,000.  In  addition  to  the  crude  cacao  ex- 
ported, a certain  quantity  annually  finds  its  way  into 
foreign  markets  in  the  form  of  manufactured  chocolate, 
that  from  Caracas  being  especially  esteemed  for  its 
purity  and  flavour. 

For  the  cultivation  of  sugar-cane  the  conditions  in 
Venezuela  are  not  particularly  favourable,  but  there  are 
1100  estates  devoted  to  it,  although  as  a rule  the 
output  has  been  limited,  and  in  some  cases  not  more 
than  a few  tons  of  sugar  were  manufactured.  Often 
the  machinery  employed  is  of  most  primitive  descrip- 
tion, and  wooden  rollers  for  crushing  the  cane  turned 
by  horses  or  mules  are  frequently  seen  in  operation. 
The  inducement  to  cultivate  cane  and  manufacture 
sugar  has  been  the  prohibitive  duty  imposed  upon 
foreign  sugars,  this  charge  amounting  to  one  franc  the 
kilo,  but  recently  this  high  tariff  has  been  modified, 
and  the  industry  may  be  expected  to  diminish  rapidly, 
if  not  to  disappear  altogether  in  the  course  of  a few 
years. 

To  the  growth  of  cereals  little  attention  is  paid.  A 
small  amount  of  maize  is  produced  for  home  use,  but 
the  cultivation  of  wheat  is  rarely  attempted,  flour  being 
imported  to  supply  the  needs  of  the  population.  Yams, 
beans,  and  other  vegetables  are  grown  to  meet  local 
demand,  but  agricultural  farming  is  everywhere  neglected, 
in  spite  of  the  favourable  conditions  prevailing  in  various 
districts. 

The  principal  centre  of  pastoral  industry  is  in  the 
llanos,  the  great  plains  stretching  away  to  the  river 
Orinoco.  No  accurate  information  as  to  the  number  of 
horned  cattle  in  Venezuela  is  available,  the  calculation 
made  in  1888  of  8,476,300  head  being  obviously  at  fault, 
and  a revised  estimate  in  1896  of  from  4,000,000  to 
5,000,000  being  hardly  more  definite.  This  section 
where  cattle  breeding  establishments  are  situated  is 
difficult  of  access,  and  details  in  regard  to  the  industry 
are  scanty.  The  herds  consist  of  long-horned,  small- 


1904] 


MINERAL  RESOURCES 


641 


bodied  animals,  descended  from  the  cattle  introduced 
by  the  Spaniards  when  this  country  was  first  colonised, 
and  at  present  there  is  no  market  to  which  they  can 
be  shipped,  so  that  they  are  only  of  value  for  their 
hides.  Other  branches  of  pastoral  industry  are  the 
breeding  of  goats  and  sheep,  the  total  number  being 
estimated  at  6,000,000.  Of  horses  and  mules  Venezuela 
contains  600,000 ; of  donkeys,  850,000 ; and  of  swine, 
2,000,000.  In  1898  the  total  amount  of  hides  and 
skins  shipped  abroad  was  3440  tons. 

The  mining  industry  is  chiefly  confined  to  the 
neighbourhood  of  the  Cuyuni  River  and  the  Yuruari 
Territory,  the  once  famous  Callao  mine,  from  which 
fabulous  profits  were  obtained,  being  in  this  latter  locality. 
The  quantity  of  gold  exportedfrom  these  districts  between 
1884  and  1897  was  : — 


Ounces. 

Ounces. 

1884 

233,935 

1891 

49,050 

1885 

172,037 

1892 

46,560 

1886 

217,135 

1893 

47,950 

1887 

95,352 

1894 

52,925 

1888 

71,594 

1895 

47,588 

1889 

88,834 

1896 

60,674 

1890 

85,931 

1897 

43,500 

The  falling-off  in  the  amount  of  gold  is  due  to  the 
rich  placer  mining  having  become  exhausted,  and  the 
difficulty  of  transport  for  heavy  machinery  to  work  the 
quartz  reefs  near  the  Callao  property.  Projects  have 
been  made  during  the  past  decade  to  build  a railway 
into  this  district,  but  none  of  the  suggestions  put  forward 
have  materialised.  Gold  is  also  found  in  other  districts, 
but  no  important  undertakings  have  been  attempted. 
On  the  right  bank  of  the  river  Orinoco  is  an  immense 
deposit  of  hematite  ore,  from  which  trail  shipments  have 
been  made  to  Philadelphia  with  encouraging  results,  but 


642 


VENEZUELA 


the  property  has  been  the  subject  of  lengthy  litigation  and 
development  has  been  retarded.  Silver  mines  exist  in 
the  States  of  Bermudez,  Lara,  and  Los  Andes.  Other 
minerals,  such  as  asphalt,  sulphur,  lead,  copper,  and  tin 
are  also  found.  Coal  is  mined,  but  is  of  poor  quality 
and  seldom  used.  The  salt  deposits,  a Government 
monopoly,  constitute  a valuable  resource,  and  the  income 
derived  from  them  in  1894  reached  1,727,490  francs. 
Under  more  settled  conditions  there  is  little  doubt  that 
mining  enterprise  is  capable  of  rapid  development  and 
extension. 

Of  manufacturing  industry  there  is  none  in  Venezuela 
except  a few  concerns  for  preparing  chocolate,  some 
distilleries  and  breweries,  and  a few  cigar  and  cigarette 
factories.  Practically  all  manufactured  articles  in  use 
are  imported  from  abroad.  There  is  no  reason  why  this 
should  be  the  case,  the  rivers  and  streams  providing 
abundant  water  for  motive  power  to  drive  machinery, 
and  raw  material  being  available  for  the  manufacture  of 
most  goods  in  common  use. 

Additional  facilities  of  transport  are  urgently  needed 
for  the  economic  development  of  V enezuela.  At  present 
only  529  miles  of  railway  are  open  to  the  public  service, 
and  these  lines  are  built  only  to  give  access  to  the  high- 
lands from  the  sea  coast,  none  existing  for  transit  to  the 
central  districts.  Roads  for  wheeled  traffic  have  been 
constructed  in  some  districts,  but  so  little  attention  has 
been  paid  to  their  maintenance  that  they  are  frequently 
impassible,  and  resort  is  necessary  to  mules  and  donkeys 
for  the  conveyance  of  merchandise,  a method  at  once 
costly,  inconvenient,  and  tardy.  In  a matter  which  is 
of  vital  importance  to  industrial  progress,  the  authorities 
maintain  a most  apathetic  attitude.  Under  Blanco  an 
effort  was  made  to  encourage  railway  enterprise,  but  the 
bad  faith  of  subsequent  Administrations  in  regard  to  the 
obligations  contracted  with  the  various  companies  has 
deterred  the  investment  of  fresh  capital  for  extending 
the  railway  system.  Until,  therefore,  the  present 
impediments  are  mitigated  or  removed,  it  is  impossible 


1904 j 


PUBLIC  DEBT 


643 


that  the  great  natural  resources  can  be  thoroughly 
recognised  or  adequately  developed.  No  practical  effort 
is  made  to  utilise  the  river  Orinoco  and  its  tributaries 
for  the  development  of  the  rich  territories  near  this 
magnificent  waterway,  although  in  the  neighbourhood 
are  forests  of  valuable  timber,  large  areas  where  india- 
rubber  exists,  and  districts  where  many  medicinal  barks 
and  herbs  can  be  obtained.  These  riches  remain 
untouched  for  lack  of  transport. 

The  financial  situation  of  Venezuela  is  unsatisfactory, 
although  the  public  indebtedness  is  not  inordinately 
large.  This  is  due  more  to  the  circumstance  that  the 
credit  of  the  country  has  not  been  sound  enough  to 
allow  large  borrowings,  rather  than  to  any  unwillingness 
of  successive  Administrations  to  contract  loans.  The 
foreign  debt  originated  in  the  share  of  the  old  Colombian 
debt  assumed  by  Venezuela  when  the  two  States  separ- 
ated, and  in  1834  the  amount  allotted  to  Venezuela  was 
£1,888,396,  and  there  is  £906,400  for  arrears  of  interest. 
In  1881  bonds  for  the  conversion  of  this  debt  were 
issued  for  £2,750,000,  the  amount  in  circulation  in  1897 
being  £2,638,400,  and  since  then  the  service  has  been 
in  default.  In  1896  a further  external  obligation  was 
contracted  to  settle  claims  made  by  the  railway  com- 
panies for  a sum  of  50,000,000  bols.,  representing 
£1,949,742,  but  no  interest  on  this  loan  has  been  paid 
since  July,  1898.  The  internal  bonds  in  circulation 
amount  to  79,783,511  francs,  and,  in  addition,  there 
is  a floating  debt  of  30,000,000  francs.  The  total  of 
the  public  obligations  outstanding  at  the  present  time 
may  be  placed  at  £10,000,000,  including  arrears  of 
interest. 

The  financial  difficulties  have  arisen  through  an 
excess  of  expenditure  over  revenue,  a product  of  revolu- 
tionary outbreaks,  and  a lax  administration  of  the 
exchequer.  For  the  year  1899-1900  the  revenue  and 
expenditure  were  estimated  to  balance,  but  a heavy 
deficit  occurred  in  consequence  of  further  insurrectionary 
troubles.  The  estimates  for  that  year  are  a fair  indica- 


644  VENEZUELA 

tion  of  the  normal  resources  and  expenses.  They 
were  : — 


Revenue. 

Bolivars. 

Expenditure. 

Bolivars. 

Customs  Duties  . 

26,000,000 

Public  Services  . 

19,893,456 

Stamps 

2,669,680 

Internal  Debt 

4,967,000 

Internal  Taxes  . 

2,593,300 

External  Debt 

2,155,203 

Transit  Dues 

4,722,500 

,,  (loan  of  1896) 

3,000,000 

Salt  Taxes  . 

900,000 

Foreign  Claims 

887,321 

,,  (additional) 

1,960,000 

Public  Works 

2,340,000 

Mining  and  Lands 

32,000 

State  Subventions 

5,654,500 

Total 

38,877,480 

Total 

38,877,480 

The  transit  dues  consist  of  the  additional  duties  on 
imported  merchandise  levied  by  the  National  Govern- 
ment in  place  of  the  interstate  charges  formerly  made  by 
the  several  States,  and  nominally  are  returned  to  the 
different  States,  or  expended  for  their  benefit  in  the 
construction  of  public  works.  Customs  duties  form  the 
principal  source  of  revenue,  the  duties  on  imported  goods 
being  40  per  cent,  of  the  invoice  value.  There  is  little 
possibility  in  the  near  future  of  any  substantial  expansion 
of  the  national  income,  the  poverty  of  the  population 
being  so  pronounced  that  any  large  increase  of  internal 
taxation  is  impossible. 

Commercially  the  country  has  been  embarrassed 
during  the  last  few  years  by  the  low  price  for  coffee.  It 
is  the  practice  of  merchants  to  make  advances  against 
the  coffee  crop  and  recoup  themselves  from  the  proceeds 
of  the  sales,  and  the  drop  of  50  per  cent,  in  value  in  the 
course  of  four  or  five  years  restricted  all  transactions  of 
this  kind.  This,  combined  with  the  effect  of  internal 
political  disturbances,  hurt  all  trade.  Although  the 
Venezuelans  are  numerically  in  the  majority,  Germans, 
British,  French,  Italians,  Dutch  and  Spaniards,  are  all 
interested  in  the  general  business  of  the  country.  During 


1904] 


COMMERCE 


645 


the  past  seven  years  the  value  of  imported  merchandise 
has  averaged  100,000,000  francs,  exports  being  worth 
slightly  more.  In  1898  Venezuela  purchased  British 
goods  for  £468,822,  and  sold  to  England  produce  worth 
£45,599,  and  during  the  same  year  the  imports  from  the 
United  States  were  82,704,908,  while  Venezuelan  articles, 
chiefly  coffee,  to  the  value  of  87,722,564  were  sent  to 
New  York.  These  figures  show  that  the  United  States 
purchases  40  per  cent,  of  the  total  exports  of  Venezuela, 
and  sells  to  her  only  12  per  cent,  of  her  imports.  Great 
Britain,  on  the  other  hand,  in  1898  sold  to  Venezuela 
12  per  cent,  of  her  total  imported  merchandise  and 
bought  1 ^ per  cent,  of  her  surplus  produce,  and  this 
proportion  was  approximately  maintained  in  the  four 
years  from  1895  to  1898.  The  balance  of  Venezuelan 
trade  goes  to  Germany,  France,  Holland,  Italy  and 
Spain.  For  imported  merchandise  the  position  of 
Germany  in  comparison  with  other  countries  is  steadily 
improving,  German  manufacturers  taking  more  pains  to 
study  the  wants  and  peculiarities  of  the  Venezuelan 
trade,  and  the  system  on  which  German  trading  is 
conducted  being  more  convenient  for  the  buyer  on 
account  of  longer  credits  and  other  concessions  accorded. 

The  country  is  rich  in  resources,  and  has  a soil  and 
climate  unrivalled  for  many  valuable  products  for  which 
the  world  has  need.  Mineral  wealth  exists  and  virgin 
forests  remain  untouched.  The  geographical  position 
also  offers  many  advantages,  the  journey  from  New  York 
to  Caracas  taking  only  five  days  now,  and  capable  of 
being  greatly  expedited  if  any  inducement  arose.  It 
is  unlikely  that  Venezuela  can  remain  many  years  longer 
an  unknown  land,  only  occasionally  coming  before  the 
eyes  of  the  world  in  connection  with  some  such  incident 
as  the  controversy  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  in  1895,  or  when  exceptionally  bloodthirsty 
revolutionary  outbreaks  occur.  As  yet  there  are  no 
indications  of  the  dawning  of  peaceful  times,  and  at  the 
opening  of  the  twentieth  century  insurgents  were  every- 
where up  in  arms.  It  would  seem  that  nothing  short  of 


646 


VENEZUELA 


iron  despotism  can  give  breathing  space  to  the  unfortu- 
nate people,  and  there  is  no  present  sign  of  deliverance 
either  through  a prolonged  dictatorship  or  of  the  advent 
among  the  ruling  classes  of  a higher  conception  of 
patriotic  duty. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV 

CONCLUSION 

The  Republics  and  Internal  Dissensions.  Spanish  and  Portuguese 
Influence  on  the  Inhabitants.  South  America  and  Cuba. 
Spanish  Traits  modified.  More  Peaceful  Future  Conditions. 
Measures  for  Consolidation.  Necessity  of  Closer  Relations 
between  South  American  Republics.  Free  Interchange  of 
Commodities.  Europe  and  South  America.  Reasons  why 
Progress  watched.  Outlet  for  Emigration  from  Latin  Countries. 
Wheat,  Maize,  Beef,  Mutton  and  Coffee.  Simon  Bolivar  and  the 
Spanish  Colonies.  The  Ideals  of  Sucre  and  San  Martin.  The 
Development  of  South  America.  United  States  Influence.  The 
Panama  Canal.  Chilian  Influence  on  the  Pacific  Coast.  The 
United  States  and  Chile.  Bolivian  Mineral  Wealth  and  Foreign 
Immigration. 


A witty  diplomatist  in  one  of  the  South  American 
republics  not  long  since  remarked  to  a deputation  of 
merchants  coming  to  him  with  claims  against  the  Govern- 
ment to  which  lie  was  accredited,  “ Gentlemen,  you 
appear  to  think  that  this  is  a country  equipped  with  a 
Government  with  which  I can  deal.  It  is  nothing  of 
the  sort.  It  is  a hunting  ground.” 

Hitherto  there  has  been  only  too  much  cause  to 
justify  the  sarcasm  underlying  this  diplomatic  jest. 
Glancing  back  over  the  period  which  this  history  covers, 
there  is  everywhere  the  sense  of  human  sacrifice,  the  all- 
pervading  smell  of  bloodshed,  no  matter  whether  the 
country  under  review  is  Argentina,  Brazil,  Uruguay,  or 
Paraguay ; the  first  three  are  torn  and  bleeding  from 
internal  dissensions,  and  Paraguay  still  mourns  for  her 

647 


648 


CONCLUSION 


victims  in  the  unequal  struggle  against  an  invading  army 
of  vastly  superior  numbers  and  resources.  Is  it  possible 
to  think  that  this  section  of  South  America  has  yet 
emerged  from  a condition  of  affairs  that  in  the  course  of 
the  last  forty  years  outrivalled  the  worst  epoch  of  the 
Middle  Ages  in  the  Old  World?  From  the  troublous 
times  in  Europe  before  and  after  the  fifteenth  and 
sixteenth  centuries,  sprung  nations  hardened  by  the 
lessons  of  adversity  taught  by  experience  in  the  severe 
school  of  civil  wars  when  men  fought  for  a principle 
rather  than  suffer  unjust  oppression.  Spain  with  her 
grasping  policy  of  obtaining  all  possible  tribute  from  her 
colonies  and  her  methods  of  bringing  pressure  to  bear 
on  individuals  under  the  doctrines  of  the  Inquisition, 
drove  her  subjects  across  the  seas  into  a revolt  that  only 
ended  with  freedom  from  the  Spanish  yoke.  In  that 
struggle  the  South  American  colonists  were  deserving  of 
all  sympathy.  It  was  an  uprising  against  the  worst  form 
of  tyranny.  The  unanimity  of  this  feeling  was  irresistible, 
victory  a natural  consequence,  but  Spain  learnt  nothing 
from  the  disasters  she  suffered.  The  history  of  the 
South  American  revolt  was  repeated  in  Cuba,  under  not 
dissimilar  circumstances,  until  the  intervention  of  the 
United  States  Government  in  1898.  The  question 
raised  by  investigation  into  affairs  of  these  South 
American  republics  is  whether  they  have  profited  as 
they  should  have  done  after  their  hard-fought  battle  for 
their  independence.  The  feeling  against  a continuance 
of  Spanish  dominion  had  many  sound  reasons  to  justify 
its  existence ; but  the  colonists  were  Spaniards  after 
they  gained  their  freedom,  and  Spanish  character  was 
then,  and  is  now,  the  prominent  influence  amongst  the 
inhabitants.  The  strain  is  inherited.  It  is  to  this  fact 
that  revolution,  civil  war,  political  turmoil  and  other 
calamities  can  be  traced  ; for  this  reason  the  river  Plate 
has  made  such  tardy  economic  progress,  in  spite  of 
magnificent  natural  advantages.  Yet  there  are  signs 
that  the  influence  of  Spanish  character  is  slowly  losing 
its  baneful  grip  over  this  continent.  After  a century  of 


1904] 


CONCLUSION 


649 


unrest  the  truth  is  coming  home  by  degrees  to  the 
people  that  there  is  something  more  satisfactory  than  a 
condition  of  affairs  where  the  hand  of  every  man  is 
against  his  neighbour.  The  old  spirit  is  not  yet 
eliminated ; but  it  is  nearing  its  end,  and  to  Argentina 
belongs  the  credit  for  having  prepared  its  funeral  dirge. 
The  lesson  that  freedom  does  not  mean  anarchy  has 
taken  long  to  learn,  but  every  year  it  is  better  under- 
stood. 

The  new  century  opens  with  the  dawn  of  peace  in 
this  quarter  of  the  globe.  Possibly  it  may  be  the  false 
light  seen  in  eastern  countries  before  the  real  daylight  is 
at  hand,  but  it  is  none  the  less  a signal  that  darkness 
cannot  endure  much  longer.  Seditious  movements  in 
Argentina  are  out  of  fashion  to-day.  Small  tendency  is 
shown  towards  a revival  of  practices  that  brought  little 
else  than  misery.  In  Uruguay  evolutionary  progress  has 
been  slower  than  in  Argentina.  Political  conditions  are 
such  that  the  demon  of  armed  strife  is  harder  to  kill  in 
consequence  of  the  bitter  feud  between  Colorado  and 
Blancos.  Yet  it  is  nearing  its  end,  although  the  two 
factions  have  again  met  on  the  field  of  battle.  Even 
Paraguay,  with  the  disjointed  elements  which  constitute 
its  Government,  is  drifting  away  from  insurrectionary 
methods,  and  slowly  adopting  the  theory  and  practice  of 
conducting  public  affairs  without  recourse  to  the  throat- 
cutting  policy  of  a few  years  ago. 

If  these  republics  would  suppress  their  military 
establishments  and  rid  themselves  of  the  armaments  they 
have  collected,  tranquillity  would  be  ensured.  They  are 
fond  of  posing  as  large  nations  while  still  in  their 
swaddling  clothes.  The  possession  of  great  stores  of 
war  material  is  a temptation  to  try  conclusions  with  their 
neighbours.  Even  in  this  respect,  however,  improvement 
is  noticeable.  There  is  less  disposition  nowadays  to  rush 
into  a quarrel,  and  the  growing  desire  for  internal  and 
external  peace  is  a most  hopeful  sign. 

What  is  necessary  to  consolidate  peace  is  the  adequate 
administration  of  justice  throughout  these  republics, 


650 


CONCLUSION 


protection  for  civil  rights,  and  a more  liberal  system  of 
public  education.  No  great  ability,  no  extraordinary 
effort,  no  costly  expenditure  of  money,  is  necessary  to 
achieve  these  results.  Honest  administration,  supported 
by  the  goodwill  of  the  inhabitants,  is  all  that  is  required 
to  place  these  countries  on  a sound  basis.  The  present 
position  of  the  River  Plate  Republics  and  Brazil  is  an 
anomaly.  Relations  between  Argentina,  Uruguay, 
Paraguay,  and  Brazil  should  be  drawn  closer.  For  these 
countries  to  maintain  impassible  trade  barriers  in  the 
shape  of  tariff  restrictions  is  folly.  A zollverein  estab- 
lishing free  interchange  for  all  merchandise  could  only 
prove  beneficial.  Buenos  Aires  in  such  circumstances 
would  become  the  acknowledged  metropolis  of  this 
section  of  the  Continent.  With  extended  intercourse,  an 
expansion  of  mental  perspective  would  follow.  This 
would  lead  to  the  Governments  taking  joint  action  in 
all  matters  of  general  interest  in  this  part  of  the  world. 

It  is  often  asserted  that  the  European  has  small  reason 
to  pay  close  attention  to  River  Plate  affairs,  on  account 
of  the  isolated  position  of  Brazil  and  Argentina.  This 
may  have  been  true  in  the  past,  but  is  so  no  longer. 
There  are  two  substantial  reasons  for  watching  develop- 
ments in  these  republics.  The  first  is  that  the  temperate 
regions  of  South  America  provide  an  outlet  for  the 
surplus  population  of  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  France. 
The  Anglo-Saxon  has  a choice  of  British  Colonies  to 
which  to  emigrate,  and  the  Teuton  there  finds  also  con- 
ditions to  his  taste.  The  United  States  provides  a 
further  field  for  both  these  nationalities.  In  the  case  of 
the  people  of  Latin  countries  the  situation  is  different. 
In  South  America  the  surroundings  are  in  accordance 
with  their  traditional  customs.  For  the  Spaniard  and 
Portuguese  there  is  the  inducement  of  a like  language, 
while  for  the  Italian  the  difference  is  easily  overcome. 
The  River  Plate  Republics  are  so  essentially  Latin  in 
character  that  they  form  the  natural  resting  place  for  the 
people  of  European  Latin  countries,  who  may  be  forced 
to  leave  their  homes  in  consequence  of  increasing  com- 


1904] 


CONCLUSION 


651 


petition  in  the  straggle  for  existence.  To  these  people 
the  River  Plate  or  Brazil  is  a haven  of  refuge.  Under 
improved  economic  conditions  it  will  become  infinitely 
more  attractive  for  the  inhabitants  of  over-crowded 
European  centres. 

The  second  reason  why  Europe  cannot  afford  to 
neglect  progress  in  the  River  Plate  and  Brazil  is  because 
South  America  is  rapidly  taking  rank  as  one  of  the 
principal  purveyors  of  food  for  European  markets. 
Wheat,  maize,  coffee,  beef  and  mutton  are  received  in 
constantly  increasing  quantities  from  this  quarter,  and  a 
sudden  cessation  of  supplies  would  entail  serious  conse- 
quences to  those  countries  which  are  accustomed  to 
depend  upon  shipments  of  cereals,  coffee,  and  meat  from 
Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Uruguay.  It  is  not,  however, 
with  the  possibility  of  decrease,  but  with  the  probability 
of  a substantial  increase,  of  the  supply  of  food  stuffs  that 
Europe  is  most  concerned.  Argentina  and  Uruguay  at 
present  export  to  Europe  100,000,000  bushels  of  wheat 
and  50,000,000  bushels  of  maize  annually.  This  amount 
will  be  trebled  in  the  next  decade,  and  that  means  cheap 
bread  stuffs  for  Europe.  It  has  another  bearing  also 
upon  the  European  situation.  So  long  as  production  in 
cereal  crops  steadily  augments  in  the  River  Plate,  the 
agricultural  industry  in  Europe  must  be  confronted  with 
prices  leaving  small  margin  of  profit  to  the  farmer. 

In  regard  to  the  meat  trade  with  Europe,  the  River 
Plate  has  no  cause  to  fear  competition  by  the  United 
States  or  the  British  colonies.  The  United  States  will 
soon  have  no  surplus  to  send  abroad,  the  rapidly  increas- 
ing home  population  annually  requiring  additional 
supplies.  The  conditions  of  the  River  Plate  trade  are  so 
much  more  favourable  than  those  for  Australia  or  New 
Zealand  that  the  latter  countries  cannot  compete  success- 
fully in  beef,  and  only  to  a moderate  extent  in  mutton. 
When  it  is  remembered  that  Argentina  and  Uruguay 
possess  more  than  30,000,000  head  of  horned  cattle  and 
130,000,000  sheep,  it  will  be  recognised  they  must  be  a 
factor  of  special  interest  to  Europe,  the  more  so  as  there 


652 


CONCLUSION 


is  ample  room  to  double  these  numbers.  Nor  is  the 
River  Plate  unknown  in  smaller  matters.  The  British 
Government  recently  purchased  in  Argentina  35,000 
horses  and  mules  for  military  service  in  South  Africa, 
and  relies  on  further  supplies  whenever  necessity  arises. 
It  is  therefore  evident  that  the  progress  of  these  countries 
will  be  closely  watched. 

The  prosperity  of  these  River  Plate  Republics  rests 
entirely  in  the  hands  of  their  people.  If  they  are 
desirous  of  better  administration  they  must  look  to 
themselves  to  obtain  it.  They  cannot  regard  corrupt 
practices  with  apathy  until  stirred  into  action  by  some 
political  leader  who  sees  in  the  conditions  of  the  moment 
an  opportunity  to  further  his  own  ambitious  designs. 
The  people  must  look  to  the  education  of  their  children. 
It  is  from  the  residents,  whether  natives  or  foreigners, 
that  a movement  for  reform  in  the  judicial  system  must 
come.  They  must  cut  themselves  adrift  from  the 
lethargy  prevailing  hitherto  in  regard  to  economic  pro- 
gress. They  must  break  away  from  the  idea  that  all 
efforts  for  improvement  should  be  initiated  by  the 
authorities.  The  system  of  paternal  government  so 
long  in  vogue  has  proved  a failure.  It  is  a relic  of 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  Administration.  The  time  has 
come  to  discard  it.  The  Press  is  free.  The  right  of 
public  meeting  is  not  denied.  Through  these  two 
.agencies  much  good  can  be  effected  if  the  people  are 
determined  to  help  themselves  towards  better  things. 
Plato  says  that  the  people  of  a country  obtain  the 
government  they  deserve.  That  maxim  should  be  driven 
into  the  brains  of  the  population  of  the  River  Plate 
Republics  and  Brazil. 

So  much  may  be  said  for  the  present  conditions 
in  the  principal  countries  on  the  east  coast  of  South 
America ; on  the  west  coast  of  the  continent  and  in  the 
northern  sections  the  developments  of  the  last  century 
have  brought  about  many  characteristics  of  a different 
complexion. 

When  Simon  Bolivar,  abandoned  by  his  former 


1904] 


CONCLUSION 


653 


friends,  was  dying,  he  wrote  his  political  testament, 
reviewing  the  tragedy  of  his  life  in  connection  with  the 
struggle  of  the  Spanish  colonies  for  independence,  and 
their  conduct  after  they  became  sovereign  States.  He 
tells  nothing  of  his  bitterness  of  heart  at  the  ingratitude 
of  a people  who  had  conferred  on  him  the  title  of 
Liberator,  and  then  accused  him  of  seeking  self- 
aggrandisement ; but  he  comments  on  the  deathblow  to 
his  hopes  of  establishing  a New  Spain  across  the  seas, 
and  the  inability  of  his  fellow-countrymen  to  appreciate 
the  sacred  boon  of  liberty  that  his  hand  had  won  for 
them.  This  historical  document  concludes  sadly  with 
the  words,  “I  have  ploughed  in  the  sea.” 

It  is  impossible  not  to  sympathise  with  Bolivar  in  his 
disappointment  over  the  failure  to  realise  his  ideals  in 
connection  with  the  great  heritage  of  the  Spanish 
Colonists.  If  we  turn  to  San  Martin  and  Sucre  we  find 
that  they  underwent  experiences  similar  to  those  of 
Bolivar,  for  the  people  they  had  served  so  faithfully 
requited  their  patriotism  with  abuse  and  ingratitude. 
Like  Bolivar,  they  reached  the  conclusion  that  they  had 
laboured  in  vain  for  the  happiness  and  welfare  of  their 
compatriots  and  country.  The  idea  of  those  three  great 
leaders  was  the  establishment  of  a Confederation  of 
Spanish  America,  embracing  the  whole  southern  continent; 
they  appreciated  the  vast  natural  resources  of  this  section 
of  the  world,  and  they  saw  that  with  unity  of  interests 
amongst  the  different  groups  of  colonists  one  great  com- 
munity would  combine  such  elements  of  strength  as  to 
be  practically  unassailable  by  outside  influence.  They 
realised  before  they  died  that  internal  dissensions  made 
the  fulfilment  of  their  dream  impossible,  and  they  resigned 
all  hope  that  even  at  a later  period  a fusion  of  interests 
might  be  effected.  A feeling  of  despondency  in  the 
present  gave  a gloomy  colouring  to  future  prospects,  and 
Bolivar,  Sucre,  and  San  Martin  all  expressed  doubts  of 
the  outcome  of  the  change  they  had  wrought  when  they 
helped  to  wrest  the  colonies  from  Spain.  From  the 
ashes  of  the  shattered  hopes  formed  when  independence 


654 


CONCLUSION 


was  first  won,  have  now  risen  communities  widely  differ- 
ing in  national  character  and  material  interests. 

That  the  development  of  South  America  can  long 
continue  at  the  present  tardy  pace  is  not  possible,  for 
all  the  elements  for  great  commercial  prosperity  are 
there,  save  one.  Population  only  is  lacking  to  create 
the  necessity  for  the  exploitation  of  the  vast  natural 
resources  lying  almost  untouched  at  the  present  time, 
and  it  cannot  be  many  years  before  the  overcrowded 
centres  of  Europe  must  disgorge  millions  of  their  inhabi- 
tants to  these  sparsely  inhabited  regions.  When  that 
stage  arrives  the  transformation  will  be  rapid,  and  with 
increased  population  life  in  South  America  will  radically 
alter.  Where  a livelihood  is  possible  to-day  with  a 
minimum  of  labour,  competition  will  banish  the  indolent 
habits  which  now  check  producing  power  at  every  turn. 
With  coal  and  iron,  immense  mineral  deposits  of  all 
kinds,  extraordinary  facilities  for  every  branch  of 
agricultural  and  pastoral  industry,  and  with  easy  access 
to  districts  where  all  tropical  products  are  found,  there 
is  the  practical  certainty  of  substantial  progress  in  the 
future.  It  will  be  a natural  development  when  it  comes, 
and  it  will  crush  the  existing  incapacity  for  public 
administration  which  has  throttled  advancement  in  all 
South  American  States. 

For  some  years  past  it  has  seemed  that  the  influence 
of  the  United  States  might  enter  so  far  into  South 
American  politics  as  to  form  the  starting-point  of  a new 
era  for  Latin  America.  Strong  efforts  have  been  made 
by  the  North  Americans  to  cement  a warmer  friendship 
with  the  South  American  Republics  by  the  promotion 
of  the  Pan-American  Congress  in  Washington  in  1888 
and  a similar  conference  in  Mexico  in  1901.  The 
championship  of  the  Venezuelan  cause  against  Great 
Britain  in  1895  was  another  proof  of  the  anxiety  at 
Washington  to  extend  American  influence  in  South 
America,  but  unexpected  incidents  have  counteracted 
these  endeavours  to  create  closer  ties  between  the  two 
continents.  The  misunderstanding  with  Chile  in  con- 


1904] 


CONCLUSION 


655 


nection  with  the  “ Baltimore  ” dispute  in  1891  engendered 
ill-feeling  in  that  quarter,  and  is  not  yet  forgotten,  and 
the  recent  action  of  Mr  Roosevelt’s  Government  in 
regard  to  Panama  has  roused  distrust  all  over  South 
America.  There  has  been  for  many  years  a lack  of 
confidence  on  the  part  of  Spanish-speaking  Americans 
in  regard  to  the  policy  of  the  United  States,  and  in  view 
of  the  Panama  affair  a long  time  must  elapse  before  this 
is  removed.  Under  such  conditions  it  is  probable  that 
European  rather  than  North  American  influence  will 
play  the  more  important  part  in  the  immediate  future 
development  of  the  States  which  have  inherited  the  old 
Spanish  dominions. 

Of  course,  the  proximity  of  the  United  States  to 
Venezuela  and  Colombia  must  not  be  forgotten,  nor  the 
fact  that  the  construction  of  the  Panama  canal  will  bring 
United  States  interests  into  closer  touch  with  the 
northern  section  of  the  southern  continent.  No  matter 
how  great  the  hostility  of  Colombians  and  Venezuelans 
may  be,  they  cannot  ignore  the  influence  of  their  northern 
neighbour,  and  it  must  be  weighed  carefully  in  any 
consideration  of  future  developments  in  these  two 
countries.  United  States  capital  is  invested  already  in 
a few  undertakings  in  both  Colombia  and  Venezuela, 
and  will  extend  in  other  directions,  and  any  attempt  to 
obstruct  legitimate  business  enterprise  will  involve  a 
conflict  with  Washington  which  can  only  result  to  their 
detriment.  With  Argentina,  Uruguay,  Brazil,  and  Para- 
guay circumstances  are  different,  for  those  countries  are 
in  closer  communication  with  Europe  than  with  New 
York,  and  a constant  stream  of  European  immigration 
helps  to  foster  commercial  relationship  and  friendly 
feeling. 

It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  opening  of  the 
Panama  canal  will  exercise  any  very  great  influence  on 
the  trade  of  South  America  in  the  immediate  future. 
For  several  years  past  the  railway  across  the  isthmus 
has  worked  in  harmony  with  the  steamship  lines  having 
business  relations  with  Colon  and  Panama,  and  through 


656 


CONCLUSION 


freight  rates  have  been  established  at  prices  which  have 
permitted  cargo  from  the  Pacific  coast  to  be  sent  direct 
from  Peru  and  Ecuador  to  the  United  States  and 
Europe.  No  doubt  the  canal  will  lead  to  cheaper 
transport,  and  this  will  encourage  increased  production 
on  the  southern  coast,  but  the  reduction  in  cost  will  not 
be  sufficient  at  first  to  swell  the  volume  of  trade  to  any 
great  extent.  As  regards  passenger  traffic,  the  canal 
will  be  a distinct  gain,  avoiding  the  tedious  and  expensive 
transhipment  now  incidental  to  a journey  to  South 
America  via  Panama,  and  it  will  make  intercourse 
between  the  Pacific  coast  and  New  York  and  Europe 
more  frequent,  thus  improving  future  economic  condi- 
tions ; but  this  influence  can  only  extend  gradually,  and 
will  not  show  substantial  results  for  another  generation. 

At  present  Chilian  influence  is  dominant  on  the 
Pacific  Coast  of  South  America.  Since  the  war  with 
Peru  and  Bolivia,  the  political  position  of  the  Adminis- 
tration in  Santiago  has  been  strengthened  and  extended 
whenever  opportunity  offered,  and  it  has  now  an  important 
bearing  on  the  conditions  existing  from  the  isthmus  of 
Panama  to  the  Straits  of  Magellan.  In  Bolivia,  the 
attempt  of  Argentina  to  oppose  the  Chilian  policy  has 
not  been  successful,  but  it  may  enter  into  the  situation 
at  a later  date  when  communication  between  Buenos 
Aires  and  Sucre  becomes  less  difficult  by  the  extension 
of  the  Argentine  railway  system  to  join  the  lines  now 
projected  by  the  Bolivian  Government.  The  over- 
powering military  and  naval  strength  of  Chile  has  given 
her  a free  hand  to  pursue  any  policy  she  has  wished  for 
the  past  twenty  years  in  regard  to  Peru,  Ecuador,  and 
Bolivia,  but  no  effort  has  been  made  to  establish  such 
commercial  relations  with  those  countries  as  to  bind 
them  to  her  by  strong  commercial  ties.  Indeed,  rather 
the  reverse  has  been  the  case,  and  the  arrogant  attitude 
of  Santiago  in  recent  dealings  with  her  neighbours  has 
created  deep-rooted  hostility  both  in  Bolivia  and  Peru. 

The  extension  of  United  States  influence  to  Panama 
brings  an  important  factor  into  play.  It  is  questionable 


1904] 


CONCLUSION 


657 


whether  distrust  of  United  States  intentions  or  dislike 
of  Chilian  pretensions  will  be  the  stronger,  but  in  any 
case  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that  one  will  be  used 
against  the  other  when  opportunity  offers.  It  is  not 
unlikely  that  Chile  may  now  bestir  herself  to  establish 
more  friendly  relations  with  Bolivia  and  Peru,  for  she 
has  much  to  lose  and  nothing  to  gain  by  allowing  United 
States  influence  to  undermine  her  position  on  the 
Pacific  seaboard.  She  can  consolidate  her  interests  by 
agreeing  to  generous  terms  for  the  settlement  of  the 
Tacna  and  Arica  question  with  Peru,  and  by  certain 
concessions  to  Bolivia.  On  the  other  hand,  if  she  does 
not  adopt  some  such  policy  she  must  become  more  and 
more  isolated  as  time  passes,  and  as  the  great  natural 
resources  of  Argentina  develop,  Chile’s  political  import- 
ance in  South  America  will  become  dwarfed. 

It  is  from  Bolivia  that  a great  and  sudden  economic 
upheaval  is  likely  to  come  and  prove  the  beginning  of  a 
new  era  of  development  in  South  America.  The  vast 
mineral  wealth  of  that  country  cannot  fail  to  attract 
immigration  from  all  quarters  when  once  the  difficulty 
of  transport  is  solved,  and  the  solution  of  the  problem  is 
within  reasonable  distance  now  that  the  extension  of  the 
Argentine  railway  system  to  the  Bolivian  frontier  has 
been  arranged.  The  deposits  of  gold,  silver,  tin  and 
copper  in  Bolivia  offer  inducements  unequalled  in  South 
America  for  profitable  mining  enterprise,  and  their 
existence  is  becoming  knoAvn  gradually  to  the  outside 
world. 


ADDITIONAL  CHAPTER 


BRINGING  UP  TO  DATE  THE  POLITICAL  AND 
ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS 

Genera]  conditions.  Political  relations  between  Europe  and  South 
America.  Relations  with  the  United  States.  Activity  in 
Washington  concerning  South  American  affairs.  South  American 
suspicion  of  United  States  policy.  Progress  in  Argentina. 
President  Roque  Saenz  Pena  and  Dr  Victorino  de  la  Plaza. 
Bolivian  boundary  incident.  Argentine  Centenary  of  Independ- 
ence. Development  of  agricultural  and  pastoral  wealth  in 
Argentina.  Increased  transport  facilities.  Position  in  Brazil. 
Extension  of  public  works.  Improvements  in  Rio  de  Janeiro. 
Chile  and  Brazil  reach  an  understanding.  The  coffee  industry 
and  the  valorisation  scheme.  Past  and  present  rubber 
production.  Naval  revolt  at  Rio  de  Janeiro.  Agricultural 
development  in  Southern  Brazil.  The  situation  in  Chile. 
Effects  of  the  disaster  at  Valparaiso.  Administration  of  President 
Pedro  Montt.  Chilian  policy  in  connection  with  Peru.  Tacna 
and  Arica.  Chile  and  Bolivia.  Economic  conditions  in  Chile. 
The  nitrate  of  soda  industry.  Character  of  the  Chilians. 
Conditions  in  Peru.  Foreign  capital  and  Peruvian  mineral 
resources.  Relations  with  Chile  hinder  progress.  Internal 
dissensions.  Bolivia  and  President  Pando.  Great  value  of 
Bolivian  mineral  deposits.  Disturbed  situation  in  Paraguay. 
Probable  future  of  Paraguay.  Venezuela  and  President  Castro. 
Colombia  and  increased  facilities  of  transport.  The  Panama 
Republic.  Education  and  Immigration  the  two  most  important 
questions  to-day  in  South  America.  Necessity  for  properly 
conducted  colonisation  methods.  Value  of  the  tropical  sections 
of  South  America.  The  question  of  Chinese  immigration  for 
Northern  Brazil.  Comparison  between  Eastern  and  Western 
methods  in  regard  to  production. 

During  the  past  seven  years  the  political  and  economic 
development  of  the  South  American  republics  has 
shown  steady  advancement.  From  time  to  time  pro- 

658 


GRADUAL  PROGRESS 


659 


gress  has  been  checked  in  one  or  another  direction  by 
political  disturbances,  but  resort  to  armed  revolution 
against  constituted  authority  becomes  less  and  less 
frequent  as  means  of  communication  are  extended 
and  outlying  districts  rendered  accessible  for  the 
enforcement  of  law  and  order  by  the  central 
administrations  of  the  various  states.  In  these 
circumstances  a short  review  of  the  principal  events 
since  1904,  when  this  book  was  published,  is  necessary 
to  bring  up  to  date  the  History  of  South  America. 

Political  relations  between  Europe  and  South 
America  are  now  on  a more  satisfactory  footing, 
generally  speaking,  than  has  been  the  case  at  any 
period  since  the  former  colonies  of  Spain  and  Portugal 
broke  away  from  Spanish  and  Portuguese  domination. 
This  condition  is  due  to  the  fact  that  a considerable 
measure  of  internal  peace  has  permitted  the  develop- 
ment of  the  great  natural  resources  of  the  Continent 
and,  consequently,  the  establishment  of  an  era  of 
prosperity  undreamed  of  in  former  years.  Good 
prices  have  prevailed  for  agricultural  and  pastoral 
products,  with  the  result  that  individual  enterprise 
has  been  well  rewarded,  the  collection  of  revenue 
taxes  regularly  made,  the  payment  of  financial 
obligations  of  the  various  governments  discharged 
with  fair  promptitude,  and  little  cause  has  arisen  for 
disputes  with  foreign  creditors.  In  view  of  these 
circumstances  South  American  credit  has  improved 
steadily,  and  large  sums  of  European,  especially 
British,  capital  have  been  forthcoming  for  the 
construction  and  extension  of  the  railway  systems, 
harbour  facilities,  docks,  city  improvement  works, 
and  other  necessary  adjuncts  to  modern  civilisation. 
More  adequate  steamer  services  have  been  established 
between  Europe  and  the  principal  ports  of  South 
America,  and  this  fact  has  induced  a great  increase 
in  travel  and  a better  knowledge  by  Europeans  of 
the  customs,  habits,  and  resources  of  the  South 
American  people,  and  resulted  in  less  friction  in  all 


660  EFFORTS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


international,  political,  and  commercial  dealings. 
These  conditions  stand  out  to  a marked  degree  in 
regard  to  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and  Peru,  and 
are  making  their  influence  distinctly,  if  only  gradually, 
felt  in  Bolivia,  Colombia,  and  Venezuela. 

While  international  relations  with  Europe  have 
developed  along  normal  lines  those  with  the  United 
States  have  been  subject  to  somewhat  different 
influences.  The  Administration  at  Washington  has 
used  extraordinary  efforts  to  establish  closer  political 
and  commercial  ties  with  the  various  South  American 
republics.  To  this  end  Mr  Root,  Secretary  of  State, 
was  despatched  on  a mission  to  all  the  republics  in 
1909,  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  personal 
acquaintance  of  the  leading  public  men  of  each 
country  and  of  obtaining  at  first  hand  detailed 
information  as  to  the  natural  resources  and  com- 
mercial possibilities  of  the  different  sections  of  South 
America.  This  policy  was  strengthened  by  the  visit 
of  a powerful  United  States  squadron  to  the  principal 
South  American  ports.  Instructions  were  issued  to 
all  consular  and  diplomatic  representatives  in  South 
America  to  assist  in  pushing  the  commerce  and  trade 
of  the  United  States  whenever  opportunity  occurred. 
The  leading  bankers  and  merchants  of  New  York 
and  other  great  commercial  centres  were  invited  by 
the  Administration  at  Washington  to  use  their  influence 
to  secure  a strong  footing  for  United  States  trade 
in  the  markets  of  South  America,  and  were  given 
to  understand  that  any  legitimate  enterprises  under- 
taken for  this  purpose  would  receive  the  approval 
and  support  of  the  United  States  Government. 
Through  the  Bureau  of  South  American  Republics 
arrangements  were  made  to  hold  a Pan-American 
Congress  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  in  1906,  and  at  Buenos 
Aires  in  1910.  The  Legation  in  Brazil  was  raised 
to  the  rank  of  an  Embassy,  and  a similar  step  is  now 
contemplated  in  regard  to  Argentina. 

The  result  of  the  active  attitude  of  Washington 


DISTRUST  OF  THE  NORTH 


661 


in  regard  to  South  American  affairs  is  a marked 
expansion  of  trade  in  the  principal  markets  of  the 
Southern  Continent,  both  in  imported  and  exported 
merchandise,  the  latter  including  agricultural  and 
other  machinery,  railway  material,  and  steel  products. 
A substantial  amount  of  American  capital  has  been 
invested  in  various  industrial  enterprises,  especially 
in  the  frozen  meat  business.  In  the  north  and  south 
of  Brazil  a group  of  New  York  and  Canadian  bankers 
has  become  interested  in  railway  and  tramway  construc- 
tion. In  Peru  the  great  copper  deposits  of  the  Cerro 
de  Pasco  have  attracted  capital  from  the  north.  In 
fact,  on  all  sides  are  signs  that  the  monopoly  practically 
exercised  by  European  financiers  in  the  matter  of 
exploiting  the  rich  natural  resources  of  South  America 
will  very  shortly  be  a thing  of  the  past,  and  strong 
competition  will  take  place  between  the  United  States 
and  Europe  for  the  right  to  construct  public  works  and 
provide  the  necessary  funds  for  industrial  undertakings. 
No  better  evidence  of  this  condition  of  affairs  is  wanted 
than  the  fact  that  the  contracts  made  in  1910  for  the 
building  of  war  vessels  of  the  Dreadnought  type  for 
the  Argentine  Government  were  awarded  to  a company 
in  the  United  States. 

In  spite  of  the  decided  improvement  in  the  relations 
between  the  two  Continents  there  still  exists  in  South 
America  a strong  current  of  latent  suspicion  of  the 
future  outcome  of  United  States  policy.  Many  years 
must  elapse  before  the  effect  of  the  action  of  the 
Washington  Administration  in  connection  with  Chilian 
affairs  in  1891  and  the  Isthmus  of  Panamd  in  1903  is 
eliminated,  and  the  feeling  of  alarm  and  distrust  then 
aroused  is  forgotten.  Nor  will  the  South  Americans 
tolerate  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
to  play  the  role  of  policeman  over  the  Southern 
Continent. 

International  relations  between  the  various  South 
American  republics  have  improved  also  of  late  years, 
and  are  established  on  a more  friendly  and  satisfactory 


662 


SETTLEMENT  OF  FRONTIERS 


footing  than  at  any  former  period.  The  question 
of  the  boundaries  dividing  the  different  states 
has  been  settled  in  nearly  all  cases,  and  without  any 
recourse  to  an  appeal  to  arms  which  threatened  only  a 
few  years  ago  to  raise  a conflagration  throughout  the 
whole  Continent.  This  happy  result  has  been  achieved 
by  tactful  arbitration,  and  the  decisions  reached  by  the 
arbitrators  have  been  accepted  as  a rule  by  the  interested 
governments  with  a dignity  and  respect  worthy  of  all 
admiration.  There  are,  however,  some  delicate  points 
still  to  be  arranged  in  connection  with  Chile,  Peru,  and 
Bolivia,  and  to  these  further  reference  will  be  made 
when  dealing  with  those  countries.  Greater  facilities 
for  travel  undoubtedly  have  done  much  to  break  down 
the  prejudices  formerly  existing  between  the  different 
South  American  nationalities.  Brazil,  Argentina,  Peru, 
and  Chile  are  now  linked  up  with  railways,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  next  five  years  direct  communication  will 
be  established  via  Bolivia  from  Buenos  Aires  to  Callao. 
With  the  opening  of  the  Panamd  canal  in  1913  a 
further  inducement  will  be  offered  to  travellers  from 
north  to  south  to  make  the  journey  by  land,  and  so  will 
aid  in  spreading  a more  general  knowledge  of  the 
countries  traversed.  Similarity  of  language  will  help 
towards  a mutual  understanding,  and  under  such  condi- 
tions the  animosities  of  former  years  must  show  rapid 
diminution. 

Dealing  with  the  various  republics  separately,  it  is  in 
Argentina  that  the  most  marked  progress  has  been 
made  in  political  and  economic  development.  The 
election  of  Dr  Quintana  to  the  Presidency  with  Dr 
Alcorta  as  Vice-President  in  1904,  was  a significant  era 
in  Argentine  history.  The  former  was  a native  of 
Buenos  Aires  and  therefore  represented  the  porteno 
interests ; the  latter  coming  from  Cordoba  embodied  the 
political  ideas  of  the  provincial  electors.  This  combina- 
tion in  the  Federal  Administration  signified  the  final 
elimination  of  the  struggle  for  political  ascendency 
which  had  been  maintained  by  the  two  factions  with 


ARGENTINA 


663 


such  disastrous  results  for  nearly  one  hundred  years. 
To  ex-President  Roca  was  due  in  great  measure  this 
merging  of  party  interests  into  a national  policy,  and 
the  lasting  nature  of  this  political  condition  was  proved 
by  the  presidential  election  of  1910,  when  Dr  Roque 
Saenz  Pena  from  Buenos  Aires,  and  Dr  Victorino  de  la 
Plaza,  a native  of  Salta,  were  chosen  respectively  as 
President  and  Vice-President  of  the  Republic.  These 
two  elections  also  showed  that  the  factor  of  military 
influence  had  ceased  to  dominate  the  political  situation 
and  that  constitutional  methods  were  established  on  a 
firm  footing.  After  less  than  two  years  of  office  Dr 
Quintana  died,  and  Dr  Alcorta  became  Chief  of  the 
Executive.  During  this  administration  nothing  of  any 
great  political  importance  occurred.  The  decision  given 
in  Washington  in  regard  to  the  Argentine-Bolivian 
frontier  led  to  some  rioting  by  irresponsible  persons  in 
La  Paz,  and  the  Argentine  flag  was  insulted.  The 
failure  of  the  Bolivian  Government  to  make  immediate 
apologies  for  this  act  led  to  the  rupture  of  diplomatic 
relations  between  the  two  countries  in  1909,  and  it  was 
not  until  nearly  two  years  later  that  General  Pando,  in 
charge  of  a special  mission  to  Argentina,  effected  a 
reconciliation  and  concluded  a treaty  of  friendship  and 
commerce  between  the  two  Governments. 

The  celebration  of  the  Argentine  Centenary  of 
Independence  took  place  in  1910,  during  the  term  of 
office  of  President  Alcorta,  and  was  made  an  event  of 
great  national  importance  and  rejoicing.  Special 
embassies  were  sent  to  Buenos  Aires  by  all  the  chief 
governments  of  Europe,  the  United  States,  and  the 
principal  Latin-American  republics.  The  Spanish 
Crown  was  represented  by  the  Infanta  Princess  Eulalie, 
and  every  effort  was  made  to  show  her  that  the 
former  Spanish  Colony  no  longer  harboured  any  sign  of 
resentment  against  the  Mother  Country.  In  honour  of 
the  Centenary  a great  international  exhibition  was  held 
at  Buenos  Aires,  and  the  part  taken  in  this  by  the 
principal  nations  of  the  world  showed  plainly  the  desire 


664 


PROGRESS  OF  AGRICULTURE 


of  the  manufacturers  of  Europe  and  the  United  States 
to  push  their  wares  in  the  Argentine  market.  As  a 
tribute  of  respect  for  the  Centenary  the  British  Govern- 
ment despatched  the  Fourth  Cruiser  Squadron  to  visit 
Argentine  waters  in  November  1910. 

In  the  presidential  contest  of  1910,  the  principal 
opposition  to  the  election  of  Dr  Roque  Saenz  Pena  was 
organised  by  a small  but  noisy  group  of  portenos , who 
advocated  the  candidature  of  Dr  Udaondo  for  the  chief 
magistracy.  They  made,  however,  a very  poor  showing 
at  the  polls,  and  never  had  any  real  chance  of  success. 
President  Pena  is  48  years  of  age,  comes  of  a well- 
known  porteno  family,  is  wealthy,  has  travelled 
extensively  in  Europe  and  America,  and  has  been  the 
diplomatic  representative  of  Argentina  in  Italy  and 
other  countries.  Since  his  election  he  has  shown  con- 
servative tendencies  in  all  branches  of  his  administra- 
tion, and  he  has  the  advice  and  support  of  the  most 
influential  men  in  the  republic.  He  took  office 
unpledged  to  any  political  party,  and  at  first  doubts 
were  expressed  as  to  his  ability  to  administer  the 
government  under  such  circumstances.  By  his  careful 
selection  of  ministers  during  the  past  two  years  he  has 
gained  the  confidence  of  his  fellow-countrymen  in 
regard  to  his  executive  capacity,  and  his  administration 
bids  fair  to  be  a distinct  public  benefit  alike  to 
Argentine  and  foreign  interests. 

During  the  past  decade  the  development  of  agri- 
cultural and  pastoral  wealth  has  proceeded  with 
astonishing  rapidity.  Where  ten  years  ago  whole 
provinces  were  dependent  on  pastoral  industry  only, 
to-day,  from  Tucuman  to  Patagonia,  great  areas  of  land 
are  occupied  by  farmers  producing  wheat,  maize,  barley, 
oats,  linseed,  sugar,  tobacco,  and  vines.  In  all  directions 
the  soil  is  being  broken  up  for  agricultural  purposes  and 
the  national  wealth  proportionately  augmented.  The 
vineyards  of  Mendoza  and  San  Juan  have  been 
increased  tenfold  by  the  inclusion  of  large  tracts  along 
the  foothills  of  the  Andes,  where  the  proper  storage  of 


CATTLE-BREEDING 


665 


the  water  from  the  mountain  streams  has  made 
irrigation  possible.  Land  that  a few  years  ago  was 
considered  valueless  is  now  readily  saleable  at  15  and 
20  dollars  an  acre  for  vine  cultivation  purposes  or  for 
growing  alfalfa  for  the  breeding  and  fattening  of  cattle. 
In  all  sections  of  the  republic  agricultural  lands  are 
eagerly  sought  after  by  colonists  of  Italian  and  other 
nationalities.  As  a result  of  this  agricultural  develop- 
ment Argentine  grain  has  become  a factor  in  the 
world’s  market,  and  each  year  adds  to  its  importance  in 
that  respect. 

The  expansion  of  agricultural  industry,  however, 
does  not  mean  a decreased  production  in  regard  to 
pastoral  enterprise.  Rather  is  it  that  cattle-breeding 
has  undergone  a radical  change  and  entered  on  a new 
phase.  Fine  animals  of  Durham,  Hereford,  and  other 
imported  strains  have  taken  the  place  of  the  native  and 
half-bred  herds  which  were  seen  commonly  a few  years 
since  in  all  parts  of  the  country.  Improved  systems  of 
stock-farming  have  been  adopted  everywhere,  and 
grazing  lands  are  made  to  carry  double  and  treble  the 
amount  of  livestock  that  they  did  formerly.  In  many 
districts  fodder  is  grown  for  winter  feed,  and  as  much 
care  taken  of  the  animals  as  in  European  countries. 
The  beef  produced  is  sold  to  the  freezing  companies  for 
shipment  abroad,  and  of  late  the  prices  paid  have  been 
so  high  that  cattle-farming  has  proved  a most  profitable 
undertaking. 

With  the  expansion  of  agricultural  and  pastoral 
industry  there  arose  the  necessity  for  increased  trans- 
port facilities.  In  all  directions  railways  have  been 
extended,  harbour  works  enlarged,  roads  constructed, 
telegraph  and  telephone  lines  erected.  In  point  of 
tonnage,  Buenos  Aires  has  become  the  fourth  port  of 
importance  in  the  world.  The  import  trade  has  trebled 
in  the  last  seven  years,  and,  as  a consequence,  the 
revenues  of  the  Federal  Government  have  risen  enor- 
mously in  comparison  with  the  returns  of  the  former 
decade.  Manufacturing  industry  also  has  increased 


666 


BRAZIL 


steadily  in  various  directions,  and  if  the  oil  deposits 
now  being  tested  in  Patagonia  provide  a permanent  fuel 
supply  a great  impetus  will  be  given  to  the  establish- 
ment of  factories  for  cotton  and  woollen  goods,  leather 
work,  and  many  branches  of  furniture  making. 

In  Brazil  no  political  events  of  national  importance 
have  occurred  since  President  Campos  Salles  vacated 
the  presidential  office  in  favour  of  Dr  Rodriguez  Alves 
in  1902.  During  the  administration  of  Dr  Alves  the 
payment  of  the  interest  on  the  national  debt  was 
resumed,  and  various  questions  in  connection  with  the 
boundaries  with  Bolivia  were  settled.  In  a few  outlying 
districts  some  abortive  attempts  were  made  to  defy  the 
constituted  authorities,  but  these  proved  to  be  of  no 
political  significance  and  were  speedily  quelled.  The 
presidential  term  of  Dr  Alves  was  noteworthy  chiefly 
for  the  public  works  undertaken  in  connection  with  the 
harbours  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Santos,  for  the  improve- 
ments effected  in  the  general  conditions  of  the  city  of 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  and  for  the  drastic  measures  successfully 
adopted  for  the  suppression  of  yellow  fever  and  other 
tropical  diseases  in  the  neighbourhood.  In  1906  Dr 
Affonso  Penna  was  elected  to  the  Presidency,  and  the 
following  four  years  passed  without  any  striking 
occurrences,  although  a closer  political  understanding 
with  Chile  and  the  celebration  of  further  treaties  with 
that  country  caused  considerable  uneasiness  in  Argentina, 
at  one  time  threatening  serious  complications.  During 
the  administration  of  Dr  Penna  the  plan  of  the  valorisa- 
tion of  coffee  was  brought  into  effect  under  the  following 
circumstances.  In  1908  the  production  of  coffee  in 
Brazil  was  nearly  2,000,000  tons,  and  the  Government 
feared  that  this  large  amount,  if  forced  upon  the  market, 
would  entail  a very  great  drop  in  values  and  entail  the 
ruin  of  the  Brazilian  industry.  To  avoid  this  danger  it 
was  decreed  that  only  a certain  percentage  of  the 
production  should  be  exported  yearly,  and  the  balance 
purchased  by  the  Government  by  means  of  the  issue  of 
warrants  against  quantity  and  value.  To  carry  out  this 


THE  COFFEE  INDUSTRY 


667 


operation  required  the  employment  of  some  £25,000,000, 
and  this  was  arranged  through  the  Government  of  the 
State  of  Sao  Paulo,  with  the  support  of  the  Federal 
authorities.  The  result  of  this  action  was  to  raise  the 
price  of  coffee  the  world  over,  and  to  benefit  greatly  the 
industry  in  Brazil,  but  it  is  a moot  question  as  to 
whether  such  national  interference  is  sound  from  a 
financial  point  of  view.  At  the  time  it  was  undertaken 
the  coffee  industry  of  the  East  was  at  a very  low  ebb, 
owing  to  the  enormous  damage  it  had  suffered  from 
leaf  disease  ( hcemilia  vastatrix ) and  other  pests,  and  the 
low  prices  prevailing  threatened  the  absolute  extinction 
of  the  plantations ; indeed,  in  Ceylon,  many  districts  of 
India,  and  in  Malay  the  industry  had  been  abandoned, 
and  in  Java  and  Sumatra  it  was  rapidly  dwindling 
away  to  vanishing  point.  The  rise  in  prices  due  to 
the  Brazilian  action  has  put  a different  complexion  on 
the  situation.  In  Java,  Sumatra,  and  some  districts 
of  the  Malay  Peninsula  new  varieties  of  seed  have 
been  introduced  and  high  yields  obtained,  with  the 
result  that  large  areas  of  land  are  now  being  placed 
under  cultivation,  and  these,  in  the  course  of  the  next 
five  years,  will  prove  serious  competitors  with  Brazil 
in  the  supply  of  coffee  for  the  world’s  consumption. 
Indeed,  it  is  quite  possible  that  in  view  of  the  cheapness 
of  labour  in  the  East,  the  cost  of  production  may  be  so 
reduced  as  to  render  the  Brazilian  industry  no  longer 
profitable,  and  thus  bring  about  the  precise  conditions 
which  the  Brazilian  Government  has  made  such  costly 
and  strenuous  efforts  to  avoid. 

In  1910  General  Hermes  da  Fonseca  was  elected 
as  President  of  the  Republic.  His  accession  to  office 
was  signalised  by  a mutiny  on  board  the  warships  in 
the  bay  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  and  for  the  moment  matters 
looked  as  if  the  evil  days  of  the  praetorian  system 
of  government  immediately  following  the  overthrow 
of  the  empire  in  1889  were  to  be  repeated.  The 
movement,  however,  died  down  after  considerable  blood- 
shed in  the  conflicts  that  occurred  between  the  naval 


668 


THE  FUTURE  OF  RUBBER 


forces  and  the  military.  At  the  enquiry  held  subse- 
quently as  to  the  cause  of  the  revolt  it  was  stated 
officially  that  the  outbreak  was  owing  to  discontent 
on  the  part  of  the  petty  officers  and  men  at  the  treat- 
ment accorded  to  them  by  their  superiors ; that  state- 
ment is  accepted  now  as  generally  correct,  although 
there  are  many  people  who  assert  that  the  discontent 
was  fostered  by  certain  interested  politicians.  There 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  President  da  Fonseca 
should  desire  to  revive  the  praetorianism  of  twenty 
years  ago,  for  he  was  not  placed  in  power  by  the 
supporters  of  any  such  system  and  has  nothing  to  gain 
for  the  country  or  himself  by  adopting  it. 

Attention  has  been  drawn  to  the  harm  to  the 
Brazilian  coffee  industry  by  possible  competition  from 
the  East.  From  the  same  direction  serious  danger 
menaces  the  rubber  industry,  the  other  great  natural 
resource  of  the  republic.  For  many  years  the  Amazon 
River  exports  of  rubber  have  dominated  the  markets 
of  the  world,  but  the  time  is  approaching  rapidly 
when  they  will  sink  into  insignificance  in  comparison 
with  the  exports  of  Ceylon,  India,  Malay,  and  the 
Dutch  colonies.  To-day  the  total  production  of  rubber 
in  the  world  is  approximately  80,000  tons,  and  of 
this  Brazil  contributes  nearly  one-lialf.  Within  five 
years  the  East  will  produce  200,000  tons  under  such 
conditions  that  it  can  be  sold  profitably  at  Is.  6d.  per 
lb.  as  compared  to  5s.  at  present.  What  then  will 
be  the  position  of  such  states  as  Para  and  Amazonas 
when  this  situation  is  an  accomplished  fact  ? Relying 
on  the  yield  of  the  wild  rubber  trees  in  the  forests 
they  have  neglected  to  establish  any  other  main  branches 
of  industry,  nor  have  they  formed  rubber  plantations 
near  easy  means  of  transport  to  economise  costs.  At 
this  late  hour  they  are  faced  with  a crisis  which 
threatens  them  with  bankruptcy  unless  they  can  put 
their  hands  to  the  plough  and  save  themselves  by  the 
development  of  new  agricultural  resources.  They 
cannot  hope  to  maintain  their  position  in  the  rubber 


4 


CHILE  669 

market,  and  the  sooner  this  fact  is  realised  the  better 
it  will  be  for  all  concerned. 

It  is  clear  that  Brazil  has  no  easy  row  to  hoe  in  the 
immediate  future.  In  the  north  the  commercial  exist- 
ence of  a great  area  of  territory  is  threatened  with 
the  gravest  economic  disturbance ; in  the  south  the 
coffee  industry  is  menaced  with  severe  competition  by 
Eastern  producers.  But  if  the  great  industry  of  southern 
Brazil  was  to  be  extinguished  within  the  next  few 
years  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  the  southern 
section  of  the  republic  is  to  be  ruined,  or  indeed  pass 
through  anything  more  than  a temporary  acute  crisis. 
For  the  south  possesses  valuable  agricultural  and 
pastoral  lands  which  require  only  population  and  trans- 
port to  ensure  immediate  returns  in  crops  of  grain 
and  yield  of  cattle  products.  Under  the  auspices  of 
the  Brazil  Southern  Railway  Company,  supported  by 
powerful  financial  groups  in  London,  Paris,  and  New 
York,  the  railway  system  of  the  south  is  being  extended 
rapidly  and  construction  is  well  advanced  throughout 
the  states  of  Parana,  Santa  Catarina,  Rio  Grande  do 
Sul,  and  in  other  directions.  Moreover,  preparations 
are  afoot  to  arrange  for  the  immigration  of  large 
numbers  of  Italians  and  other  colonists  and  their  settle- 
ment on  the  fertile  lands  of  the  plateau  lying  between 
Sao  Paulo  and  the  River  Uruguay.  Within  the  next 
five  years  this  extensive  district  will  export  wffieat, 
maize,  linseed,  beef,  and  other  temperate  zone  products. 

In  Chile  political  events  have  drifted  along  in  a 
somewhat  purposeless  manner  during  the  last  decade. 
President  Riesco  acceded  to  office  in  1901,  and 
although  a Liberal  by  party  associations,  endeavoured 
to  consolidate  his  administration  by  giving  representa- 
tion in  his  ministries  to  all  political  sections.  But 
he  experienced  the  same  difficulties  as  his  predecessors 
in  the  attempt  to  work  on  parliamentary  lines  under 
the  Chilian  constitution,  with  the  result  that  changes 
in  the  Cabinet  Avere  fast  and  frequent,  and  little  useful 
legislation  was  achieved.  It  was  during  the  presi- 


670 


CHILE  AND  PERU 


dential  term  of  Dr  Riesco  that  the  terrible  earthquake 
of  Valparaiso  occurred,  causing  great  damage  to  life 
and  property  in  that  city,  and  precipitating  a 
commercial  and  economic  crisis  throughout  the  central 
districts  of  the  republic.  The  country  is  still  suffering 
from  the  effects  of  that  crisis,  and  some  years  must 
elapse  before  they  are  completely  eliminated.  In  1906 
Dr  Pedro  Montt  was  elected  President,  and  from  his 
administration  much  was  expected,  for  he  was  a man 
of  marked  ability,  had  held  many  important  official 
posts  at  home  and  abroad,  and  as  the  son  of  one 
of  the  most  able  statesmen  Chile  had  produced  was 
thoroughly  familiar  with  the  conduct  of  public  life 
and  the  requirements  of  the  country.  Without  doubt 
President  Montt  entered  upon  his  presidential  duties 
with  the  firm  intention  of  raising  the  political  life  of 
Chile  to  a higher  level  and  establishing  a policy  of 
conciliation  in  connection  with  the  neighbouring 
republics,  especially  in  so  far  as  Bolivia  and  Peru 
were  concerned.  Ill  health,  however,  interfered 
seriously  with  his  working  ability  from  the 
commencement  of  his  administration,  and  in  1909 
he  was  urged  by  his  medical  advisers  to  proceed  to 
Europe  for  the  purpose  of  undergoing  a surgical 
operation  in  Berlin.  There  he  succumbed  to  his 
maladies  in  the  early  part  of  1910.  At  the  presidential 
election  of  1911,  the  choice  fell  on  Senor  Ramon 
Barros  Luco,  a much  respected  member  of  the 
Conservative  party,  a man  of  wealth  and  assured 
position  in  private  and  public  life,  and  one  who  had 
held  many  high  official  positions  in  former  years. 

In  her  relations  with  Peru  and  Bolivia  the  policy  of 
Chile  is  not  to  be  commended.  No  real  effort  has  been 
made  to  solve  the  complicated  questions  emanating 
from  the  situation  following  the  conclusion  of  the  war 
with  Peru  in  1884.  Under  the  Treaty  of  Ancon  the 
Chilian  occupation  of  the  Peruvian  provinces  of  Tacna 
and  Arica  was  to  continue  for  a term  of  ten  years 
and  then  a.  plebiscite  was  to  decide  under  which  flag 


BOLIVIA 


671 


the  territory  should  remain,  and  a money  indemnity 
of  $10,000,000  was  to  be  paid  by  Peru  if  the  decision 
was  in  her  favour.  At  the  time  the  ten  years  elapsed 
it  was  clear  that  the  plebiscite  vote  would  be  in  favour 
of  Peru,  but  owing  to  internal  dissensions  and  other 
causes  she  was  unable  to  raise  the  requisite  funds  to 
indemnify  Chile.  Taking  advantage  of  the  Peruvian 
situation  the  Chilian  Government  allowed  matters 
to  drift,  and  since  that  date  have  evaded  every  attempt 
on  the  part  of  Peru  to  reach  a settlement  of  the 
question.  On  several  occasions  negotiations  have  been 
opened  on  the  subject,  but  invariably  broken  down 
before  completion  owing  to  the  selfish  attitude  of  Chile 
and  her  refusal  to  submit  the  disputed  points  to  arbitra- 
tion. This  dog  in  the  manger  policy  on  the  part  of 
Chile  is  a poor  one  and  has  redounded  to  her  discredit 
throughout  South  America.  President  Pedro  Montt 
on  his  accession  to  office  had  determined  to  bring 
to  an  end  the  question  with  Peru  and  rid  his  country 
of  this  constant  cause  of  friction,  but  he  met  with 
severe  opposition  on  this  point,  and  in  consequence 
of  ill  health  ending  in  his  death  he  was  unable  to  effect 
the  reconciliation  between  the  two  Governments  he  had 
so  earnestly  desired. 

In  regard  to  Bolivia,  the  policy  followed  by  Chile 
has  been  on  very  similar  lines  to  that  dominating  her 
dealings  with  Peru.  No  settlement  of  the  issues 
arising  out  of  the  part  played  by  Bolivia  in  the  Chilian - 
Peruvian  war  has  been  possible  under  existing  circum- 
stances, and  the  conclusion  forced  upon  any  impartial 
observer  is  that  Chile  wishes  to  keep  a rod  in  pickle 
with  which  to  chastise  Bolivia  whenever  an  advan- 
tageous opportunity  offers.  This  attitude  creates 
distrust  abroad,  especially  in  Argentina,  where  the 
conviction  is  deep  rooted  that  sooner  or  later  Chile 
intends  to  endeavour  to  obtain  possession  of  a portion 
of  Bolivian  territory  unless  the  Bolivian  Government 
acquiesces  in  subordinating  her  actions  in  every  way 
to  Chilian  interests. 


672 


BAD  PROSPECTS  FOR  CHILE 


The  economic  situation  in  Chile  can  only  be  regarded 
with  serious  misgivings  as  to  what  the  near  future  may 
hold  in  store.  To-day  she  is  dependent  for  her 
revenues  on  the  export  duties  levied  on  nitrate  of  soda 
and  on  the  customs  charges  on  imported  merchandise 
brought  to  the  country  by  the  purchasing  power  drawn 
from  the  nitrate  shipments.  Practically  all  other 
industries  are  neglected  and  will  remain  so  while  the 
great  wealth  of  the  nitrate  fields  continues  to  supply 
the  necessary  funds  to  meet  all  official  requirements. 
At  the  present  rate  of  production  the  deposits  of 
nitrate  will  be  exhausted  for  all  practical  purposes  in 
the  course  of  the  next  fifteen  years,  and  then  must 
come  a struggle  for  existence  which  will  tax  to  the 
utmost  the  powers  of  the  Chilian  people  to  hold  their 
position  in  the  comity  of  South  American  republics. 
It  is  not  that  Chile  is  devoid  of  resources  other 
than  the  nitrate  of  soda  deposits.  She  possesses 
valuable  coal,  copper,  iron,  and  silver  mines,  large 
areas  of  fine  agricultural  lands,  sections  of  country 
well  adapted  for  grazing  livestock,  important  reserves 
of  fine  timber,  and  a temperate  climate  admirably 
adapted  for  European  colonisation.  But  the  acquisition 
of  the  wealth  coming  from  the  nitrate  industry  after 
the  war  with  Peru  has  degenerated  the  character  of 
the  Chilian  people  and  they  have  lost  that  ability  and 
energy  to  fight  nature  that  was  so  marked  a feature 
with  them  before  they  gained  their  victories  over  the 
Peruvians.  The  ill  effects  of  confirmed  alcoholism  are 
apparent  to-day  in  Chile  to  an  alarming  extent,  and 
the  physique  of  the  people  has  deteriorated  in  conse- 
quence in  every  section  of  the  country.  New  blood 
must  come  in  and  the  curse  of  strong  drink  be 
eradicated  before  the  Chilian  people  can  recover  the 
virile  attributes  of  their  forefathers. 

In  Peru  order  has  slowly  evolved  out  of  chaos 
during  the  past  decade.  Under  the  successive 
administrations  of  Presidents  Romana,  Caudamo, 
Calderon,  and  Leguia  method  has  been  introduced 


PERU  AND  BOLIVIA  673 

into  the  internal  affairs  of  the  republic,  and  this  has 
allowed  economic  development  to  make  considerable 
progress.  The  effects  of  the  complete  collapse  of 
industrial  enterprise  resulting  from  the  war  with 
Chile  are  disappearing  gradually  and  would  have  done 
so  completely  had  the  country  enjoyed  freedom  from 
internal  dissensions  and  disastrous  outbreaks  of  armed 
revolution.  Foreign  capital  has  been  invested  in 
copper  mines,  oil-fields,  and  other  undertakings,  and 
substantial  profits  have  been  earned.  The  export 
of  rubber  from  the  forest-clad  slopes  of  the  eastern 
side  of  the  Andine  ranges  has  added  to  the  public 
wealth,  and  high  prices  for  sugar  and  cotton  have 
helped  various  enterprises  in  that  direction.  Another 
valuable  asset  as  yet  untouched  consists  of  the 
extensive  coal  deposits  in  the  northern  section  of 
Peru,  which  should  accpiire  greatly  added  importance 
when  the  Panama  canal  is  opened  to  traffic ; and 
a like  result  will  occur  in  connection  with  the  oil- 
bearing areas  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Paita.  The 
great  hindrance  to  Peruvian  development  at  the 
present  time  is  the  constant  uncertainty  of  her 
relations  with  Chile  and  the  danger  that  a conflict 
may  break  out  between  the  two  republics  in  conse- 
quence of  the  situation  in  regard  to  Tacna  and  Arica. 
Once  this  difficulty  is  removed  rapid  development  of 
the  mineral  resources  will  take  place  and  general 
progress  throughout  the  country  will  be  assured. 

After  a long  period  of  revolutionary  disturbances 
Bolivia  entered  on  a period  of  prosperity  under  the  able 
guidance  of  President  Pando.  During  the  six  years  of 
his  term  of  office  the  work  of  reconstruction  he  initiated 
proceeded  apace,  and  he  left  law  and  order  established 
on  a secure  basis  when  in  1909  he  vacated  the 
presidency  to  his  successor  Dr  Eliodoro  Villazon.  But 
General  Pando  did  not  withdraw  his  services  when  the 
new  administration  came  into  power.  For  the  last 
three  years  he  has  assisted  the  Government  by  taking 
charge  of  difficult  posts,  one  of  the  most  important 

2 U 


674 


PARAGUAY 


being  that  of  special  commissioner  to  Argentina  in 
1910-11  to  arrange  for  the  resumption  of  diplomatic 
relations  and  the  celebration  of  the  treaty  of  friendship 
and  commerce  already  referred  to.  At  the  initiative  of 
General  Pando,  the  railway  system  of  Bolivia  was 
extended  in  many  directions,  and  roads  were  built  to 
give  access  to  the  rubber-bearing  forests  situated  on  the 
tributaries  to  the  River  Amazon  in  Bolivian  territory 
and  to  the  cattle-breeding  districts  towards  the 
Argentine  frontier.  These  much-needed  transport 
facilities  have  proved  of  the  utmost  benefit  and 
materially  helped  on  the  progress  of  this  section  of  the 
country. 

The  mineral  wealth  of  Bolivia  comprises  gold,  silver, 
copper,  tin,  and  other  metals.  It  is  also  rich  in 
petroleum,  and  large  areas  are  suitable  for  agricultural 
and  pastoral  industry,  and  also  for  the  growth  of  sub- 
tropical products.  Lack  of  communication  has  pre- 
vented the  development  of  these  great  natural  resources, 
but  the  linking  up  of  the  Bolivian  and  Argentine 
systems,  now  practically  completed,  will  eliminate  this 
difficulty,  and  the  isolation  that  has  surrounded  Bolivia 
in  past  years  will  disappear  as  soon  as  her  great  natural 
advantages  are  better  understood  in  Europe  and  the 
United  States. 

Paraguay  has  done  little  to  justify  her  existence 
as  a separate  state.  She  is  disturbed  by  constant 
pronuncimientos  from  groups  of  individuals  endeavour- 
ing to  control  the  executive  power  for  the  benefit  of 
themselves  and  their  friends,  and  small  chance  is  given 
for  the  development  of  industrial  enterprise.  Excellent 
pastoral  lands  and  valuable  forests  of  timber  are  found 
within  her  boundaries,  and  with  freedom  from  internal 
dissensions  both  could  be  turned  to  good  account.  The 
signs  of  the  times  are  that  at  no  distant  date 
Paraguayan  independence  will  disappear  and  the 
territory  be  divided  between  Argentina,  Bolivia,  and 
Brazil.  Too  much  jealousy  exists  to  allow  of  her 
annexation  as  a single  state  to  any  one  of  her  neigh- 


VENEZUELA,  COLOMBIA,  AND  PANAMA  675 

bours,  but  no  such  feeling  is  apparent  when  the 
subject  is  considered  from  the  standpoint  of  piece- 
meal absorption. 

Of  Venezuela  there  is  not  much  to  be  said  with  regard 
to  the  conditions  of  the  last  ten  years.  President 
Castro,  who  had  arrogated  to  himself  a position  similar 
to  that  of  President  Guzman  Blanco  in  former  years, 
was  thrown  out  of  power  and  exiled  from  the  country 
by  his  political  opponents  and  a constitutional  regime 
once  more  established.  But  there  is  such  a small 
amount  of  stability  in  Venezuelan  affairs  that  years 
must  elapse  before  confidence  in  her  political  situation 
is  restored.  Her  natural  resources  are  important  so 
far  as  tropical  and  sub-tropical  products,  mineral  and 
pastoral  industry  are  concerned,  and  her  comparative 
proximity  to  the  markets  of  the  United  States  is  a 
great  point  in  her  favour,  but  nothing  really  counts  as 
of  value  until  such  time  as  immunity  from  revolu- 
tionary outbreaks  is  assured  and  the  administration 
of  justice  made  possible. 

Colombia  is  building  railway  communication  between 
the  seaboard  and  Bogata,  and  when  this  is  completed 
and  easy  facilities  of  travel  afforded,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  her  mineral  resources  will  attract  renewed  attention 
in  the  United  States  and  Europe.  Her  exports  of  fruit 
and  cattle  will  increase  in  the  near  future  as  the  needs 
of  the  United  States  become  more  urgent  in  the  matter 
of  the  importations  of  food  supplies.  Ecuador  makes 
slow  progress  in  the  ways  of  modern  civilisation,  and 
her  history  of  late  years  is  a repetition  of  the  story  of 
political  intrigue  against  the  office  holders  of  the  moment. 
She,  no  more  than  Paraguay,  deserves  the  position  of  a 
state  endowed  with  sovereign  rights.  The  privileges  of 
statehood  carry  certain  responsibilities  which  such 
communities  as  Ecuador  and  Paraguay  are  unable  or 
unwilling  to  recognise. 

Of  the  new-born  republic  of  Panama  there  is  little 
to  be  said.  That  state  owes  her  existence  to  the  action 
of  the  United  States  Government  in  1903,  and  her 


670  EDUCATION  & POPULATION  REQUIRED 

independence  can  only  be  maintained  at  the  price  of 
her  subserviency  to  American  interests.  The  construc- 
tion of  the  canal  gives  importance  to  this  former 
Colombian  province,  and  the  close  surveillance  of  the 
United  States  authorities  located  in  the  canal  zone 
ensures  a proper  respect  for  law  and  order  throughout 
Panamanian  territory. 

Taking  a broad  view  of  South  American  conditions 
at  the  present  juncture  the  two  points  standing  out 
most  prominently  are  the  questions  of  education  and 
population.  The  former  is  necessary  to  allow  the 
inhabitants  of  this  great  continent  to  understand  and 
appreciate  their  heritage  and  the  magnificent  resources 
it  contains.  They  must  learn  that  to  enjoy  the  wealth 
provided  by  nature  entails  a logical  administration  of 
public  affairs  and  a certain  measure  of  self-respect  in 
private  life  in  order  to  establish  a standard  of  conduct 
calculated  to  create  and  maintain  confidence  of  an 
international  character.  For  many  years  to  come  the 
people  of  South  America  will  need  assistance  from 
abroad,  and  therefore  their  financial  and  political  credit 
must  be  a matter  of  the  highest  importance  to  them 
both  now  and  in  the  future.  Education  is  needed  to 
teach  the  South  Americans  how  to  apply  their  physical 
and  moral  energies  to  the  development  of  their  surround- 
ings in  order  to  obtain  a reasonable  rate  of  progress  in 
the  march  of  modern  civilisation. 

To-day  the  total  population  of  the  South  American 
Continent  is  less  than  40,000,000  people  scattered  over 
a territory  easily  capable  of  sustaining  ten  times  that 
number.  The  natural  increase  of  population  is  slow 
and  it  is  very  necessary  to  stimulate  it  by  European 
immigration  to  the  temperate  zones  of  the  southern 
section  and  to  the  high-lying  plateau  lands  of  the  centre. 
The  sources  are  many  from  whence  desirable  immigrants 
may  be  drawn,  for  the  surplus  populations  of  Italy, 
Spain,  Portugal,  the  Balkans,  and  Hungary  are  admirably 
adapted  for  colonising  purposes  in  South  America,  as  is 
proved  by  experience  in  Argentina  and  Southern  Brazil. 


THE  TROPICS 


677 


For  the  fertile  tropical  lands  of  the  Amazon  River 
and  its  tributaries  and  the  River  Orinoco  a solution  has 
yet  to  be  found  as  regards  a class  of  population  capable 
of  tilling  the  soil  under  tropical  climatic  conditions.  All 
logical  deductions  point  to  the  colonisation  of  these 
sections  of  South  America  by  the  Chinese,  for  the  cost 
of  transport  from  China  to  Brazil  will  be  no  deterrent 
to  such  immigration  when  the  Panama  canal  is  opened 
to  traffic.  The  settlement  of  a European  population  in 
these  low-lying  tropical  regions  is  impossible  from  a 
practical  point  of  view,  for  the  reason  that  children  of 
European  parents  cannot  be  reared  with  physically 
satisfactory  results  under  such  climatic  circumstances. 

Doubt  is  frequently  expressed  as  to  the  possibility 
of  the  tropical  sections  of  South  America,  where  labour 
is  costly,  competing  successfully  with  the  Far  East 
with  all  the  advantages  of  extremely  low  wage-rates 
for  all  classes  of  field  work.  In  this  matter,  however, 
natural  conditions  have  evolved  the  remedy.  In  the 
East  collective  effort  under  highly  paid  European 
supervision  is  the  rule;  the  West  relies  on  individual 
energy  and  the  greater  productive  power  thereby 
obtained.  Eastern  production  depends  on  the  employ- 
ment of  large  bodies  of  labourers  with  no  practical 
interest  in  their  work  beyond  the  fact  that  it  provides 
for  them  the  bare  necessities  of  life,  and  with  the 
drawback  that  any  serious  mistake  on  the  part  of  the 
supervisors  entails  extensive  and  disastrous  results. 
In  the  West  the  individual  exerts  his  energy  to  gain 
something  more  than  the  actual  cost  of  living  in  order 
to  make  provision  for  the  upbringing  of  his  children 
and  save  a competence  for  himself  in  old  age.  The 
failure  of  the  individual  under  Western  methods 
affects  himself  personally,  but  at  most  can  only  be 
regarded  as  a temporary  inconvenience  to  the 
community.  Perhaps  the  best  example  of  collective 
as  against  individual  effort  is  seen  in  connection  with 
sugar  production,  respectively,  in  Java,  with  cheap 
labour,  and  Cuba,  with  a very  high  wage-rate,  where 


678 


CHINESE  IMMIGRATION 


climate,  soil,  yield,  and  natural  conditions  are  on  a 
similar  footing.  In  the  former  country  each  estate 
owns  its  factory  and  employs  great  numbers  of  labourers 
under  European  superintendents  to  grow  the  cane 
required  to  feed  the  mills.  In  Cuba  central  factories 
buy  the  necessary  cane  from  the  individual  producers 
and  pay  only  for  value  received.  The  result  is  that 
the  output  of  sugar  per  pound  in  Cuba  costs  consider- 
ably less  than  is  the  case  in  Java. 

Experience  in  California  and  elsewhere  shows  that 
the  Chinese  translated  to  Western  surroundings  readily 
assimilate  Western  methods  in  regard  to  the  conditions 
of  labour.  Hence  it  is  to  Chinese  immigration  for  the 
settlement  of  the  sparsely  populated  tropical  regions 
of  South  America  that  the  greatest  hope  of  the  success- 
ful solution  of  this  difficult  problem  must  be  looked 
for  in  the  near  future. 


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INDEX 


Abtao , Chilian  Warship,  354,  442,  454 
Aceval,  Emilio,  President  of  Paraguay, 
191 

Acha,  Gen.,  President  of  Bolivia,  31 
Aconcagua,  Chile,  324,  421 
Aconcagua  River,  370 
Aconcagua,  Chilian  Warship,  354 
Acre  Territory,  Dispute  between  Brazil 
and  Bolivia,  settled  1903,  308,  561- 
562 

Acuerdo  Party  in  Argentina,  see  under 
Argentina 

Adams,  Mr,  U.S.  Minister  in  Bolivia, 
480 

African  Negroes  in  South  America,  10 
Agriculture  : in  South  America,  17,  664  ; 
in  the  River  Plate  Republics,  651- 
652  ; in  Argentina,  127,  664 ; in 
Paraguay,  192;  in  Uruguay,  228- 
230  ; in  Chile,  426-429  ; in  Peru,  545  ; 
in  Bolivia,  573  ; in  Ecuador,  588  ; in 
Colombia,  611-613;  in  Venezuela, 
640-641 

Agua  Santa,  Peru,  461-462 
Aguas  Blancas,  Chile,  423 
Aguero,  Jose  de  la  Riva,  President  of 
Peru,  29 

Aguirre,  Anastasio,  President  of  Uru- 
guay, 32,  131-135 

Aguirre,  Capt.  Elias,  Peruvian  Naval 
Commander,  456 
Aguirre,  J.  J.,  of  Chile,  387 
Alagoa,  Warship,  166 
Alamos,  Lieut. -Col.  Gabriel,  of  Chile,  348 
Alban,  Gen.,  Governor  of  Panama,  6U0 
Albano,  Anicleto  Vergara,  of  Chile,  501 
Albarracain,  Col. , Peruvian  Commander, 
470 

Albuquerque,  Brazil,  136 
Alcalde,  Manuel,  of  Chile,  434 
Alcerrica,  Gen.,  of  Chile,  371-380 
Alcoholism:  in  Chile,  413-414,  672;  in 
Colombia,  611  ; in  Peru,  533 
079 


Alcorta,  Senor,  Argentine  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  119-120,  662 
Aldea,  Serjeant,  452 
Alegre,  Gen.  Porto,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  156-163 

Alegrete,  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  Brazil, 

255 

Alem,  Dr  Leandro, 

Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of 
Argentina,  66,  67 

Organiser  of  the  Union  Civica  in 
Argentina,  75,  79 

Dr  Alem  and  the  Union  Civica  Radical 
in  Argentina,  93-96,  102-103 
Alen,  Col.,  173 

Alencar,  Capt.  Alexandrino  de,  of 
Brazil,  278 

Alfaro,  Gen.  Aloy,  President  of  Ecuador, 
582,  586 

Alfonso  XII.  of  Spain,  595 
Alfonso  Alberquerque,  Portuguese  War- 
ship, 280 

Almagro  at  Cuzco,  8 
A Imirante  Blanco  Encalada , Chilian 
Warship,  328 ; in  the  Chilian  Peru- 
vian War,  442-443,  449-458,  476, 
488;  in  the  Chilian  Civil  War, 
1890-1,  346,  352,  355-357  ; destroyed, 
1891,  357 

A Imirante  Blanco  Encalada , New 
Chilian  Warship,  399 
Almirante  Cochrane,  Chilian  Warship, 
328 ; in  the  Chilian-Peruvian  War, 
442-460,  472 ; in  the  Chilian  Civil 
War,  1891,  346,  349,  354,  374 
Almirante  lamandard,  Brazilian  Cruiser, 
166,  263 

Almonacid,  Dr,  of  La  Rioja,  49 
Alonzo,  Severo  Fernandez,  President 
of  Bolivia,  1896,  559-560 
Altamirano,  Eulogio,  of  Chile,  360,  362, 
480-481 

Alto  del  Puerto,  Chile,  377-379 


680 


INDEX 


Alves,  Dr  Rodriguez,  President  of 
Brazil,  1902,  308,  666 
Amambaliy,  Paraguayan  Ship,  135 
Amapa  Dispute  between  Braz.il  and 
French  Guiana,  306 
Amazonas,  Brazil,  258 
Amazonas , Brazilian  Warship,  263 
Amazonas,  Chilian  Transport,  349,  477 
Ambato,  Ecuador,  585 
Amengual,  Col.,  Chilian  Commander, 
470 

America,  Peruvian  Corvette,  508 
Amethyst,  British  Warship,  518 
Amunategui,  Miguel  Luis,  of  Chile,  329, 
339 

Amunategui,  Col.,  Chilian  Commander, 
470 

Ancon,  Peru,  478-479 
Ancon,  Treaty  of,  Oct.  20,  1883,  497- 
500  ; ratified.  May  8,  1884,  332,  403, 
407,  500,  523,  529 
Anc6n,  German  Cruiser,  286 
Andes  Mts.,  567,  585 
Andrade,  Senor, 

President  of  Venezuela,  629-630 
Other  References,  623,  627 
Anqamos,  Chilian  Transport,  347,  357, 
‘ 476,  483 

Angostura,  Paraguay,  173-180 
Antelo,  Dr,  of  Entre  Rios,  49 
Antioquia,  Colombia,  594,  600,  613 
Antofagasta,  Chile  : 

Antofagasta  in  the  Chilian  Civil  War, 
1891,  355-356 

Antofagasta  in  the  Chilian-Peruvian 
War,  439,  446-448,  454,  458 
Antofagasta  Province,  420,  565-566 
Bolivian  Province  and  Town.  437-438 
The  Port  of  Antofagasta,  422-423,  425, 
517,  571,  574 

Antunez,  Carlos,  of  Chile,  338,  339 
Aparicio,  Col.  Timoteo, 

Uruguayan  Commander,  134 
Leader  of  Blanco  Revolution  in  Uru- 
guay, 1870-72,  199-203,  206,  208 
Aparicio,  Gen.,  of  Ecuador,  1876,  579 
Apostolo,  Brazilian  Newspaper,  299 
Apurimac,  Peruvian  Schoolship,  493 
Aquidaban  River,  185-186 
Aquidaban,  Brazilian  Warship,  in  the 
Revolt  in  Brazil,  1893-94,  260-286 
Aquila,  Chilian  Transport,  363,  365 
Arayuary,  Brazilian  Warship,  263 
Arana,  Barros,  of  Chile,  328 
Araueanian  Indians,  15,  412 
Arauco,  Chile,  421,  425 
Arbolito,  Uruguay,  218-219 
Arce,  Senor,  President  of  Bolivia,  1884, 
557 

Arenas,  Antonio,  of  Peru,  480-481,  523 


Arequipa,  Peru : 

A Clerical  Stronghold,  537,  541 
Other  References,  16,  354,  495-496, 
508,  510,  511,  536,  539,  540 
Argentine  Republic : 

Custom-house  at  Cordoba,  1602,  11 
British  Aggression,  19 
Revolution  at  Buenos  Aires,  1810,  21 
Struggle  for  Independence,  23 
Viceroy  Baltasar  de  Cisneros  deposed, 
1810,  24 

Puyredon,  Dictator,  1816,  24,  32 
Act  of  Independence  of  the  United 
Provinces  of  the  Rio  de  la  Plata 
ratified,  1816,  24 

Treaty  between  Argentina  and  Great 
Britain,  1825,  24 
President  Rivadavia,  1825,  32 
Federal  or  Unitarian  Form  of  Govern- 
ment, 32,  33,  42 

Buenos  Aires  as  the  centre  of  Govern- 
ment, 32 

Vicente  Lopez,  President,  32 
Centre  of  Government  moved  to  Santa 
Fe,  32 

Conflict  between  Federalists  and 
Unitarians,  33 

Defeat  of  Gen.  Lavalle  by  Rosas, 
1829,  33 

Rosas,  Governor  and  Captain-General 
of  Buenos  Aires,  33-37 
River  Parana  as  a Waterway,  33 
French  Expedition,  1851,  34 
Tyranny  of  Rosas,  34 
Revolution  under  Gen.  Urquiza  and 
Flight  of  Rosas,  1852,  36-37 
The  Portenos  of  Buenos  Aires,  37 
et  seq. 

Tension  between  Buenos  Aires  and  the 
Provinces,  38 

Revolution  in  Buenos  Aires  against 
Gen.  Mitre,  1860,  38 
Victory  by  Gen.  Mitre  at  Pavon,  1861, 

38,  40 

Gen.  Mitre,  President,  1861,  38-40,  42 
The  National  Capital,  38 
Strained  Relations  between  Argentina 
and  Uruguay,  1864,  131,  134 
Aggressive  Policy  of  Gen.  Lopez  of 
Paraguay  towards  Argentina,  39. 
The  Paraguayan  Wa& — Argentina, 
Uruguay,  and  Brazil  against 
Paraguay,  1865-1870,  39,  130-195, 
210 

Paraguayan  Occupation  of  Cor- 
rientes,  Apr.  1865,  138-139,  141- 
142. 

The  Alliance  between  Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Uruguay,  against 
Paraguay,  May  1,  1865,  139,  210 


INDEX 


681 


Argentine  Republic — continued 
The  Paraguayan  War — continued 
Recapture  of  Cornentes  by  the 
Argentines,  May  25,  1S65,  142 
Defection  of  Gen.  Urquiza  in  Entre 
Rios,  144 

Evacuation  of  Corrientes  by  Para- 
guayan Troops,  1865,  14S 
Corrientes  the  Base  of  Operations  of 
the  Allied  Troops,  1865,  151- 
152 

The  Parana  River,  151-154 
The  Argentine  National  Guard,  152 
Engagements  at  Paso  de  la  Patria, 
etc.,  1866,  152,  153 
Engagement  at  Tuyutl,  Nov.  1867, 
164-165 

Peace,  July  1870,  186 
Other  References  to  the  Paraguayan 
War,  see  under  Paraguay 
Revolution  in  Mendoza,  etc.,  1867, 
161 

Cholera  in  Buenos  Aires,  1868,  40 
Dr  Sarmiento,  President,  1868,  40-41, 
43,  123 

Yellow  Fever  in  Buenos  Aires,  1871, 

41 

Political  Status  of  Argentina  in  1874, 

42 

Cordoba  and  the  Presidential  Election 
of  1874,  43 

Dr  Nicolas  Avellaneda,  President,  43- 
47,  52 

Corrientes  and  the  Portenos,  44 
The  Tiro  Nac-ional  (Volunteers)  of 
Buenos  Aires,  45-46 
The  Cordoba  League,  46,  70 
Buenos  Aires  and  the  Provinces,  47 
Boundary  Dispute  with  Chile,  1878-79, 
330,  335 

Gen.  Roca  and  Dr  Tejedor,  Candidates 
for  the  Presidency  in  1880,  47 
Carlos  Pellegrini,  Minister  of  War, 
1880,  48,  54,  55 

The  Portenos  and  the  Cordoba  Pro- 
gramme, 49 

Military  Preparations  of  Buenos  Aires, 
50 

Conspiracy  against  Cordoba,  51-53 
Rioting  in  Buenos  Aires,  53 
Commencement  of  Civil  War,  53 
Defence  of  Buenos  Aires,  54 
Col.  Arias  and  the  Volunteers,  55 
Engagement  at  Olivera,  56 
Assault  on  Buenos  Aires,  56-59 
Armistice  and  Peace  Negotiations,  59 
Terms  of  Surrender  of  Buenos  Aires, 
59. 

Dr  Jose  M.  Moreno,  Governor  of 
Buenos  Aires,  60 


Argentine  Republic — continued 

Buenos  Aires  Federal  Capital,  1880, 

60,  62 

Roca,  President,  1880,  60-68,  71 
Conciliation  of  Portenos,  62 
Absolute  Power  of  Roca,  62 
Railway  Extension,  63 
Industrial  Prosperity,  64 
Foreign  Loans,  1884,  64 
Pellegrini  Minister  of  War,  1885,  65 
Revolutionary  Outbreaks,  65 
Discontent  in  Buenos  Aires,  65 
La  Plata,  Provincial  Capital  of  Buenos 
Aires,  65 

New  Docks  at  Ensenada,  65 
Candidates  for  the  Presidency,  1885, 
66-6S 

Financial  Policy  of  Roca,  67 
Suspension  of  Specie  Payments,  68 
Dr  Victorino  de  la  Plaza,  Finance 
Minister,  68 

Dr  Miguel  Juarez  Celman,  President, 
1886,  69-86 

Mode  of  electing  a President,  69-70. 
Roca  and  Celman,  71-72 
Currency  Conversion  and  Paper  Issues, 
72 

Administrative  Corruption,  72-73 
Pellegrini  as  Vice-President,  73 
Financial  Necessities,  73-74 
General  Discontent,  74 
The  Union  Civica,  75-86 
The  Mortgage  Banks  under  Celman,  77 
Foreign  Residents  and  the  National 
Government,  78 

Open  Hostility  to  the  Government,  79 
General  Revolt,  July  1S90,  SO-85 
The  Navy  and  the  Rebel  Cause,  82 
National  Reinforcements,  83 
Armistice  and  Peace  Proposals,  83-84 
Argentina,  and  the  Bolivian  Question 
with  Chile,  1888,  557-558. 
Resignation  of  President  Celman, 

1890,  84-86 

Pellegrini,  President,  1890,  85-9S 
Gen.  Roca,  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
88,  97 

Dr  Vicente  Lopez,  Minister  of  Finance, 

3S 

The  Financial  Situation  in  1890,  SS-91 
Argentina  and  Baring  Brothers,  90 
Patriotic  Loan,  92 

Attempt  to  assassinate  Roca  in  1891, 
92 

Treaty  with  Bolivia,  1891,  558 

Col.  Camus  of  Chile  in  Argentina, 

1891,  356 

The  Argentine  Legation  in  Chile  and 
Ex-President  Balmaceda  of  Chile, 
1891,  385-387 


682 


TNDEX 


Argentine  Republic — continued 
Pellegrini’s  Administration,  92 
Gen.  Bartolome  Mitre  and  the  Presi- 
dency, 92 

Agreement  between  Mitre  and  Roca, 

93,  94 

Dr  Leandro  Alem  and  the  Union 
Civica  Radical,  93-90,  102-103 
A New  State  Bank,  94 
Dr  Luis  Saenz  Pena,  Acuerdo  Candi- 
date for  the  Presidency,  94 
Dr  Bernardo  Irigoyen,  Union  Civica 
Radical  Candidate  for  the  Presi- 
dency, 95 

Political  Parties  in  1892,  95 
Dr  Pena,  President,  1892,  96-108 
Dr  Jose  Uriburu,  Vice-President,  96 
Wreck  of  the  Rosales,  98,  107 
President  Pena’s  Policy,  99-108 
Cabinet  of  Dr  Aristobulo  del  Valle, 
100-101 

Return  of  Dr  Alem,  100,  103 
Revolt  in  San  Luis,  101 
Governor  Julio  Costa  of  Buenos  Aires, 
101-102,  105 

Dr  Lucio  V.  Lopez,  Governor  of 
Buenos  Aires,  102,  105-106 
Revolution  in  Buenos  Aires  and  Santa 
Fe,  101-103 

Political  Conditions  in  1893,  105 
President  Pena’s  Financial  Policy,  105 
The  Executive  and  the  Chambers,  106 
Hostility  to  President  Pena  and  Minis- 
terial Crisis,  107 

Resignation  of  President  Pena,  1895, 

107- 108 

Dr  Uriburu,  President,  1895,  108-113 
The  Chilian  Boundary  Dispute,  1895, 

108- 109 

The  Misiones  Dispute  with  Brazil,  137, 
245  ; settled,  1895,  109,  112,  116, 
289 

Chile  and  the  Negotiations  between 
Bolivia  and  Argentina,  1893-96, 

559 

Congress  and  Railway  Guarantees, 

109- 110 

The  Financial  Position  in  1897,  110 
Gen.  Roca,  President,  1897,  110-120 
Dr  Quirno  Costa,  Vice-President,  111 
The  Chilian  Boundary  Dispute,  1898, 
406-407 

The  Puno  de  Atacama  Dispute  with 
Chile  and  Bolivia:  in  1898,  111- 
112;  in  1899,  113-114 
Conference  between  President  Roca 
and  President  Erraguriz  of  Chile, 
1899,  114 

Reform  of  the  Federal  Courts,  1899, 
115,  125 


Argentine  Republic — continued 

Dr  B.  Irigoyen,  Governor  of  Buenos 
Aires,  189S-99,  116-117 
Unrest  in  La  Rioja  and  Catamarca,  117 
The  Currency  Question,  118 
Public  Works,  118 

Senor  Alcorta,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  119-120 

Visit  of  President  Roca  to  Brazil,  1899, 
116,  307 

Commercial  Treaty  between  Argentina 
and  Brazil,  307 

Visit  of  President  Salles  of  Brazil  to 
Buenos  Aires,  1900,  118-119 
Argentina  and  the  Bolivian  Question 
with  Chile : in  1888,  557-558  ; in 
1891,  558;  in  1893-96,  559 
The  Puno  de  Atacama  Dispute  be- 
tween Argentina,  Chile,  and 
Bolivia:  in  1898,  111-112;  in 

1899,  113-114;  in  1900,  407 
Argentine  Boundary  Disputes  with 
Chile  : in  1878-79,  330,  335  ; in  1895, 
108-109;  in  1898,  406-407  ; in 
1901-2,  119-120 

Treaty  between  Argentina  and  Chile, 
June  1902,  120 

Increase  of  the  Navy,  1895-1901,  402 
Candidates  for  Presidency,  1904,  120 
Argentina  To-day,  649-652,  663 
Centenary  of  Independence,  663 
Population,  64,  121-122 
Education,  41,  123-125 
Administration  of  Justice,  125 
Religion,  125-126 
National  Character,  126 
Railways,  63,  109-110 
Finance  and  Industries,  64,  67-68,  72- 
74,  77,  88-92,  94,  105,  110,  118, 
122  127 

The  Welsh  Settlement  on  the  Chubut, 
114-115 

Patagonia,  9,  15,  114-115,  118,  430 
Tierra  del  Fuego,  420,  421,  425,  430 
Argollo,  Gen.,  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
166,  168,  175-177,  187 
Argollo,  Gen.,  of  Brazil,  285 
Arguedas,  Col.,  of  Peru,  521 
Arias,  Col.,  of  Corrientes  : 

His  Campaign  in  Buenos  Aires,  54-59 
Other  Reference,  45 
Arica : 

Chilian  Invasion  and  Capture  of  Arica 
from  Peru,  1880,  468-473,  481 
Bolivia  and  Peru  and  the  Chilian 
Occupation  of  Arica,  403-404,  407, 
473,  498,  502,  529,  556 
Other  References,  354,  420,  450,  575 
Armagao,  near  Nictheroy,  Brazil,  263. 
274,  275-277 


INDEX 


683 


Arrate,  Col.,  of  Chile,  354 
Arredondo,  Avelino,  Assassin,  220-221, 
226 

Arredondo,  Gen.  Jose  Miguel,  in 
Uruguay, 211 

Arrieta,  J.,  of  Uruguay,  387 
Arrue,  Col.  Julio,  in  Uruguay,  207 
Arteaga,  Col.  Luis,  Chilian  Commander, 
465-467 

Arteaga  Alemparte  Brothers,  334 
Artigas,  Gen.,  Dictator  of  Uruguay,  24 
Asiatics  in  Peru,  532-534,  546 
Astecs  of  Mexico  and  South  America, 
7,  8 

Astrogildo,  Gen. , of  Brazil,  255 
Asumpcao,  Col.,  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
143 

Asuncion,  Paraguay,  135,  162,  166 
Atacama  District : 

The  Guano  Deposits  and  the  Nitrate 
Industry  and  the  Disputes  between 
Bolivia  and  Chile,  Peruvian  In- 
trigues in  Bolivia,  and  the  Chilian 
War  with  Peru  and  Bolivia,  1879- 
84,  433-504,  517,  555-556 
Other  References,  324,  356,  420,  421 
Atahualpa,  7,  584,  587 
Atahualpa,  Peruvian  Monitor,  443,  476; 

destroyed,  1881,  493 
Athas,  Major,  of  Chile,  369 
Australians  in  Paraguay,  194 
Avellaneda,  Dr  Nicolas, 

President  of  Argentina,  43-47,  52,  63 
His  Attitude  to  the  Tiro  Nacional,  45- 
47 

Ayacucho,  Peru,  23,  495 
Ayahueca  Indians,  16 
Aymara  Indians  and  Aymara  Language, 
16,  534,  538,  567-569 

Bage,  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  Brazil,  216, 

255 

Bahia,  Brazil : 

Early  History,  12-13 
Bahia  and  the  Jaguneos,  297-303 
Bahia,  Warship,  166 
Baker,  Inspector, and  the  Uruan  Incident 
in  British  Guiana,  1895,  622-628 
Ballivian,  Gen.,  President  of  Bolivia,  31 
Balmaceda,  Jose  Manuel, 

Biographical,  333 

His  Political  Ideals,  and  His  Participa- 
tion in  Chilian  Politics,  1851-86, 
334-337 

President  of  Chile,  1886,  332-385 
His  Administration,  338-340 
Conflict  between  the  President  and 
Congress  and  Revolution  in  Chile, 
1891,  341-382 

His  Dictatorial  Attitude,  347 


Balmaceda—  continued 
Attempted  Assassination  of  President 
Balmaceda,  362,  364,  367 
Abdication  of  President  Balmaceda, 
1891,  380-382 

Suicide  of  Balmaceda,  1891,  385-387, 
389 

His  Political  Testament,  387-388 
Balta,  Col.  Jose, 

President  of  Peru,  1862,  30 
Leader  of  Revolt  in  Peru,  1867,  511 
President  of  Peru,  1868,  511-513 
Assassination  of  Balta,  1872,  513-514 
Baltimore,  U.S.  Cruiser  in  Chilian 
Waters,  1891-92,  380,  391-396,  400, 
655 

Banados,  Senor,  of  Chile,  380 
Baptista,  Mariano, 

President  of  Bolivia,  1892,  559 
Other  References,  480-481,  558 
Baquedano,  Gen.  Manuel, 

Chilian  Commander  in  the  Chilian- 
Peruvian  War,  468-473,  482,  485, 
486,  488,  493 

Acting  President  in  Chile,  380-384 
Other  Reference,  365 
Barbosa,  Col.  Orozimbo,  Chilian  Com- 
mander, 469,  470,  482,  485 
Barbosa,  Gen.  Ruy,  303,  348,  371-380 
Barbot,  Conspirator  in  Uruguay,  199 
Barcelo,  Col.,  Chilian  Commander,  470 
Bareelo,  Jose,  of  Chile,  387 
Barcelona,  Venezuela,  635 
Baredo,  President,  of  Paraguay,  189 
Baring  Brothers  and  Argentina,  90 
Barnes,  Sub-Inspector,  and  the  Uruan 
Incident  in  British  Guiana,  1895, 
622-628 

Barquisimeto,  Venezuela,  635 
Barracouta,  British  Ship,  at  Trinidade, 
Brazil,  292 

Barreto,  Gen.  Menna,  Brazilian  Com- 
mander, 132-133,  164,  179,  183,  184, 
187 

Barrios,  Gen.,  Paraguayan  Commander, 
135,  142,  148,  164 

Barros,  Dr  Prudente  de  Moraes,  see 
Moraes  (Dr) 

Basques  in  Argentina,  121 
Batlle,  Gen.  Lorenzo,  President  of 
Uruguay,  186S,  199-203 
Batlle,  Jose,  y Ordonez,  President  of 
Uruguay, 223 
Bedoya,  Jose  Diaz,  181 
Belgrano,  Gen.,  Revolutionary  Leader 
in  Argentina  and  Paraguay,  24 
Bello  Horizonte,  Brazil,  314 
Belzii,  Gen.,  President  of  Bolivia,  31 
Benham,  Adm.,  in  Brazilian  Waters, 
276-277 


INDEX 


681 


Be.renguda,  Spanish  Warship,  509 
Berges,  Sehor,  of  Paraguay,  106,  173 
Bermudez,  Col  . Morales,  President  of 
Peru,  1890,  521-525 
Bermudez,  Venezuela,  642 
Berro,  President  of  Uruguay,  31 
Berro,  Dr,  of  Uruguay,  221 
Berro,  Bernardo  P.,  Conspirator  in 
Uruguay,  198-199 

Bettancourt,  Gen.  de,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  172 

Billinghurst,  Latorre  Protocol,  Apr.  1898, 
407 

Bitteneourt,  Gen.,  Minister  of  War  in 
Brazil,  300,  303 
Bio-Bio,  Chile,  421 
Bio-Bio,  Chilian  Transport,  368-369 
Blanca,  Spanish  Warships,  509 
Blanco,  Guzman,  Presidentof  Venezuela, 
28,  618-621,  633,  635,  675 
Blanco,  Dr  Juan  Carlos,  of  Uruguay, 
212 

Blanco  Encalada,  see  Almirante  Blanco 
Encahula 

Blancos  of  Uruguay,  131,  144,  147,  151, 
165,  197-207,  216-224,  649 
Blanes,  J.  M.,  Artist,  41 
“ Blues  ” of  Venezuela,  618 
Blumenau,  Santa  Catharina,  Brazil,  236 
Bocayuva,  Minister,  of  Brazil,  245 
Boeto,  Belisario,  of  Bolivia,  501 
Bogoti,  Colombia,  21,  597,  675 
Bolivar,  Simon  : 

Liberator,  652-653 

Leader  of  Rebellion  in  Venezuela,  21 
Dictator  of  Venezuela,  21 
President  of  Colombia,  22,  27 
Emancipator  of  Ecuador,  22 
His  Part  in  the  Emancipation  of  Peru, 
23 

His  Failure  to  federate  South  American 
Republics,  27 
Bolivia : 

Insurrection  in  1809,  21 
Emancipation  from  Spain,  1825,  23 
Gen.  Sucre,  President,  1826,  23,  30 
Gen.  Santa  Cruz,  President,  1827,  30 
Gen.  Velasco,  President,  1839,  30 
Gen.  Ballivian,  President,  1841,  31 
Gen.  Velasco,  re-elected  President,  31 
Gen.  Belzu,  President,  31 
Gen.  Cordoba,  President,  1855,  31 
Dr  Linares,  President,  1858,  31 
Gen.  Acha,  President,  1861,  31 
Boundary  Dispute  between  Bolivia  and 
Brazil,  about  1864,  136 
Gen.  Belzu  re-elected  President,  1865, 
31 

Col.  Melgarejo,  President  till  1809,  31, 
137 


Bolivia — continued 

Bolivia  and  the  Paraguayan  War, 

1865,  136 

Bolivia,  Ecuador,  Chile,  and  Peru,  and 
the  War  with  Spain,  1865-66, 

326 

The  Guano  Deposits  and  the  Nitrate 
Industry  of  Atacama  and  the  Dis- 
putes between  Bolivia  and  Chile, 
Peruvian  Intrigues  in  Bolivia,  the 
Chilian  Warwith  Peru  and  Bolivia, 
1879-84,  and  the  Chilian  Occu- 
pation of  Atacama,  Tacna,  Arica, 
etc.,  433-504 

Chile  and  Bolivia  and  the  Atacama 
Guano  District,  433-436 
Bolivian  Claims,  1843-64,  434-435 
Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Chile, 
1866,  435-436 

Bad  Faith  of  Bolivia,  1871,  436 
Secret  Compact  between  Peru  and 
Bolivia,  1873,  436,  441,  517 
Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Chile, 
1874,  436-437,  440 
Peruvian  Intrigues,  437-438,  555 
Export  Duty  on  Nitrate  of  Soda, 
1878,  438 

Chilian  Ultimatum,  Jan.  3,  1879, 

438 

Occupation  of  Antofagasta,  etc.,  by 
Chilians,  Feb.  1879,  439,  446- 
447,  519 

Bolivian  Declaration  of  War  against 
Chile,  Mar.  1,  1879,  439,  -440, 
441 

Peruvian  Proposal  of  Arbitration, 

439-440 

The  Bolivian  Army,  445 
Calama  captured  by  Chilians,  Mar. 

23,  1879,  447-448 

Battle  of  Tacna,  May  26,  1879,  468- 
471 

Battle  of  Arica,  June  7,  1879,  472- 
473 

Bolivia  and  the  Chilian  Demands, 

1880,  480-481 

Truce  (Pacto  de  Tregua)  between 
Chile  and  Bolivia,  Apr.  4,  1884, 
332,  500-503 ; ratified,  Nov.  29, 
1884,  503-504,  557 

Bolivia  and  Peru,  and  the  Chilian 
Occupation  of  Tacna  and  Arica, 
403-404,  407,  468-473,  481,  498, 
502,  529,  556 

Peruvian  Intrigues  and  Bolivian 
Export  Duties  in  Atacama, 

436-439 

The  Chilian  Occupation  of  Atacama 
and  the  Nitrate  Industry  lost  to 
Bolivia,  437,  517,  555-556 


INDEX 


685 


Bolivia — continued 

The  Guano  Deposits,  etc.  — continued 
Bolivia,  Chile,  and  Peru,  and  the 
Chilian  Occupation  of  Tarapaca. 
421-422,  516 

Argentina  and  the  Bolivian  Question 
with  Chile  : in  1888,  557-558  ; in 
1891,  558  ; in  1893-96,  559 
Dispute  with  Chile  as  to  Seaport, 
1900,  562 

Other  References  to  the  Chilian- 
Peruvian  War,  etc.,  see  under 
Chile,  Peru 

Political  Conditions  before  1879,  555 
Conservatives  and  Liberals,  555 
Hilarion  Daza,  President,  438,  459-460, 
462,  555 

President  Daza  deposed,  1879,  556 
Temporary  Administration,  556 
Gen.  Narcisco  Campero,  President, 
1880,  556-557 

Law  of  Constitution,  Oct.  28,  1880, 
556-557 

Negotiations  with  Chile,  1884,  557 
Senor  Pacheco,  President,  1884,  557 
Senor  Arce,  President,  1888,  557 
Argentina  and  the  Bolivian  Question 
with  Chile,  1888,  557-558 
Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Argentina, 
1891,  558 

Indian  Outbreak,  1891,  558 

Col.  Camus  of  Chile  in  Bolivia,  Mar. 

1891,  356 

Bolivia  and  the  Revolution  in  Chile, 
May  1891,  363 

Senor  Baptista,  President,  1892,  559 
Argentina  and  the  Bolivian  Question 
with  Chile,  1893-1896,  559 
Severo  Fernandez  Alonzo,  President, 
1896,  559-560 

Insurrection  of  the  Liberal  Party  under 
Col.  Pando,  1898-99,  560-561 
Provisional  Government  under  Col. 
Pando,  1899,  560 

Col.  Pando,  Chief  Magistrate,  561 
The  Puno  de  Atacama  Dispute  between 
Argentina,  Bolivia,  and  Chile:  in 
1898,111-112;  in  1899, 113-111;  in 
1900,  407 

Dispute  with  Chile  as  to  Seaport,  1900, 
562 

The  Acre  Territory  Dispute  between 
Brazil  and  Bolivia  settled,  1903, 
308,  561-562 

The  Constitution,  556-557 
National  Capital,  562-563 
Political  Situation,  563-564 
Cities  of  Bolivia,  566 
Topographical  Features,  567 
Population,  564-566 


Bolivia — continued 
Stories  of  Indian  Atrocities,  564-565 
Indian  Traits,  568-569,  571 
Language,  567 
Education,  569-570 
Administration  of  Justice,  570 
National  Character,  570-571 
Railways  and  Transport,  571-572 
Agriculture  and  Industries,  573-575 
Mineral  Wealth,  574-575,  657,  673 
Financial  Situation,  575-576 
Future  Prospects,  576 
Bolivia  To-day,  656-657,  673 
Bolognesi,  Col.  Francisco,  Peruvian 
Commander,  471 

Bonaparte,  Joseph,  and  the  Spanish 
Crown,  19,  20 

Borax  : in  Chile,  424-425  ; in  Peru,  550 
Borax  Consolidated  (Syndicate),  550 
Borda,  Juan  Idiarte, 

President  of  Uruguay,  215-221 
Assassination  of  Borda,  220-221,  226 
Borgado,  Priest,  173 
Borgono,  Col.,  Vice-President  of  Peru, 
1890,  525-526 

Borrero,  President,  of  Ecuador,  578-579 
Bover,  Gen.,  in  Venezuela,  21 
Boyaca,  Colombia,  595 
Brazil : 

Early  History,  12-15 
A Spanish  Colony,  12 
Portugese  Action,  12 
Bahia,  &c.,  under  Spanish  Rule,  12 
Holland  in  possession  of  Bahia,  &c.,  13 
Portuguese  Authority  re-established, 
1649,  13 

French  Attacks  on  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
1710  and  1711,  13 

Joao  VI.  of  Portugal  and  the 
Kingdom  of  Portugal,  Brazil,  and 
Alagarres,  1808-15,  14-15 
Pedro  I.,  1822,  14 
Independence  recognised,  1825,  14 
Boundary  Dispute  between  Bolivia 
and  Brazil,  1864,  136 
The  Paraguayan  War,  1865-1870,  130- 
195: 

Strained  Relations  between  Uru- 
guay and  Brazil  and  the 
Mission  of  Conselheiro  Saraiva 
to  Uruguay,  131-132 
Adm.  Tamandare  and  the  Uru- 
guayan Warship  Villa  del  Salto 
on  the  River  Uruguay,  132 
Brazil  and  the  Revolt  in  Uruguay 
under  Gen.  Flores,  132 
Paraguayan  Declaration  of  War 
against  Brazil,  1864,  135 
Invasion  of  Matto  Grosso  by  Para- 
guayans, 1864,  135-137,  148 


686 


INDEX 


Brazil — continued 
The  Paraguayan  War — continued 
Capture  of  Paysandu  by  Brazilians, 
Jan.  2,  1865,  133 

Alliance  between  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Uruguay  against  Paraguay, 
May  1,  1865,  139 

Naval  Battle  on  the  Riachuelo  River 
and  defeat  of  Paraguayans, 
June  11,  1865,  143 
Invasion  of  Rio  Grande  by  Para- 
guayans, 144 

Paraguayan  Occupation  of  Uru- 
guayana,  Sept.  18,  1865  146- 
147 

The  Lopez  Administration  in  Matto 
Grosso,  148 

Decision  of  Brazil  and  Allied  Forces 
to  invade  Paraguay,  151 
Disaster  to  the  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Aug. 
1866,  157-158 

Brazilian  Victory  at  Curuzu,  Aug. 
1866,  157-158 

The  Situation  in  Matto  Grosso,  162 
Other  References  to  the  War  in 
Paraguay,  see  under  Para- 
guay. 

Brazil  after  the  Paraguayan  War, 

231- 232 

Pedro  II.,  Emperor,  1840-89,  14-15, 

232- 244 

Princess  Isabel  and  the  Conde  d’Eu, 

234- 240 

Positivism  and  Republican  Principles, 

235 

Sao  Paulo  and  the  Republican  Move- 
ment, 235-239,  243,  244,  246,  251, 
254 

Revolt  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  1878, 

235- 236 

Development  of  Brazil,  236 
Pedro's  Visits  to  Europe,  232,  236 
Princess  Isabel,  Regent,  236-240 
Emancipation  of  Slaves,  237-238 
Sao  Paulo  and  the  Slavery  Question, 
237-240 

Sedition,  239-240 
Return  of  Pedro,  1888,  240 
Vizconde  de  Ouro  Preto’s  Administra- 
tion, 241 

Military  Conspiracy  under  Gen. 
Deodoro  da  Fonseca  and  Gen. 
Floriano  Peixoto,  242-243 
Deposition  of  Pedro  and  Republican 
Form  of  Government  established, 
1889,  243-244 

Separation  of  Church  and  State,  1890, 
245 

Law  of  New  Constitution  passed 
1891,  245-249 


Brazil — continued 

Gen.  Deodoro  da  Fonseca,  President, 

1891,  246-256 

Gen.  Floriano  Peixoto,  Vice-President, 

246-256 

The  United  States  of  Brazil,  246 
Praetorian  Administration,  244,  251 
Manifestoes  condemning  Federal 
Authorities  and  accusing  Presi- 
dent da  Fonseca,  251 
The  Chambers  dissolved,  and  Martial 
Law  established,  Nov.  3,  1891, 
252-254 

Rising  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  against 
the  Government,  255-256 
Naval  Revolt  in  Rio  de  Janeiro,  255- 

256 

Resignation  of  President  da  Fonseca, 

1891,  256 

Gen.  Floriano  Peixoto,  President, 
1891,  256-288 

Abrogation  of  the  Decree  of  Nov.  3, 

257 

Article  42  of  the  Constitution,  257, 

258 

Deposition  of  the  Governors  of  Matto 
Grosso,  Amazonas,  and  Ceara, 

258 

Military  Despotism,  258 
Dr  Julhode  Castilhos  in  Rio  Grande 
do  Sul,  259 

Resignation  of  Adm.  C.  de  Mello  and 
Dr  S.  Correa,  259 

Revolt  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  under 
Gumercindo  Saraiva,  259 
Adm.  Wandenkolk,  Leader  of  Insur- 
rection, 259 

Naval  Revolt  under  Adm.  C.  de 
Mello,  1893,  260-266 
Adm.  Mello’s  Manifesto,  260 
Martial  Law,  262 
Warships  of  the  Insurgents,  263 
Bombardment  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  264 
Expedition  to  the  South,  264 
Provisional  Government  at  Desterro 
with  Capt.  Lorena  as  President, 
1893,  265-286 

Fort  Villegaignon  in  revolt,  265 
Explosion  at  Gouvernador,  266 
Adm.  de  Mello  at  Desterro,  265,  266 
Adm.  S.  da  Gama  in  Command  of 
Rebel  Forces,  265,  266-283 
Civil  War,  Dec.  1893,  267 
The  Government  Flotilla,  268 
Firing  against  the  Rebel  Squadron, 
269,  279 

Fighting  at  Gouvernador  and  Mo- 
cangue,  269 

The  Insurgents  as  Belligerents,  271 
Adm.  de  Mello  at  Desterro,  1894,  271 


INDEX 


687 


Brazil — continued 

Gumercindo  Saraiva  in  the  North,  271 
Adm.  de  Mello’s  Expedition  with  the 
Republic.a  and  seizure  of  Para- 
nagua,  273 

Occupation  of  Curityba  and  Lapa  by 
Rebels,  273 

Peixoto’s  Plan  of  Campaign,  274 
Attempt  of  Rebels  to  capture  the 
Armaijao,  275-276 

U.S.  Adm.  Staunton  and  Adm.  de 
Mello,  276 

U.S.  Adm.  Benham  and  the  Revolt, 
277 

Situation  of  Rebels,  277-278 
Adm.  de  Mello  and  the  Republica  and 
the  Aquidaban,  278-280 
Loss  of  the  Venus,  279 
Rebel  Council  of  War,  279-280 
Adm.  da  Gama  and  Insurgents  con- 
veyed by  Portuguese  Warships 
to  Neutral  Territory,  280-281 
Diplomatic  Relations  between  Portugal 
and  Brazil  broken  off,  281 
End  of  the  Revolt  in  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
280-281,  283-284 
Incident  of  the  Sirius,  281 
Adm.  de  Mello  at  Curityba,  283 
Council  of  War  of  Insurgent  Leaders, 
283 

Dr  Prudente  de  Moraes  Barros, 
President,  1894,  283-304,  306 
Rebel  Attack  on  Rio  Grande  do  Sul, 
284-286 

Insurgent  Troops  landed  in  Uruguay 
and  Rebel  Ships  delivered  to 
Argentine  Authorities,  285-286 
Naval  Expedition  against  Desterro, 
286 

Capt.  Lorena  and  Insurgents  shot, 
286-287 

French  Victims  and  Indemnity  to 
France,  287 

Death  of  Gumercindo  Saraiva,  287 
Revolution  crushed,  288 
Amnesty  to  Rebels,  1895,  289 
Outbreak  at  Military  School,  290 
Diplomatic  Relations  resumed  with 
Portugal,  290 

Revolt  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul  against 
Governor  Castilhos  led  by  Aparicio 
Saraiva  and  Adm.  da  Gama,  290- 
293 

Peace  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  292-293 
England  and  Trinidade,  292 
Claims  of  Italian  Residents,  293 
Financial  Legislation,  293 
Temporary  Retirement  of  President 
Moraes  and  Dr  Victorino  Pereira, 
Acting-President,  1896,  294 


Brazil — continued 

Return  of  President  Moraes,  1897,  296 
Antonio  Maciel  or  Antonio  Conselheiro 
and  the  Jagun^o  Settlement  at 
Canudos,  296 

Expedition  under  Col.  Moreira  against 
Canudos,  1897,  298 
Repulse  of  Col.  Moreira,  298 
Riots  in  Rio  de  Janeiro,  299 
Second  Expedition  under  Gen.  Oscar 
against  Canudos,  299-302 
Jacobino  Riot  in  Rio  de  Janeiro,  302 
Murder  of  Gen.  Bittencourt,  Minister 
of  War,  303 

Conspiracy  against  President  Moraes, 
303-304 

Dr  Manuel  Campos  Salles,  President, 
1898,  304-308 

Dr  Rosa  E.  Silva,  Vice-President,  304 
Critical  Financial  Situation,  305 
Condition  of  Brazil,  1894  and  1898, 
306 

Brazil  and  the  Chilian  Revolution, 
1891,  361-362 

Boundary  Dispute  between  Bolivia 
and  Uruguay,  1894,  191 
The  Misiones  Dispute  with  Argentina, 
137,  245,  settled  in  favour  of 
Brazil,  1895,  109,  112,  116,  289 
The  Amapa  Question  with  French 
Guiana,  1899,  307 

Visit  of  President  Roca  of  Argentina 
to  Brazil,  1899,  116,  307 
Commercial  Treaty  between  Argen- 
tina and  Brazil,  307 
Visit  of  President  Salles  to  Buenos 
Aires  in  1900,  118-119 
Fiscal  Legislation,  307 
Bubonic  Plague,  308 
Dr  Rodriguez  Alves,  President,  1902, 
308 

The  Acre  Territory  Dispute  between 
Brazil  and  Bolivia  settled,  1903, 

308,  561-562 

Economic  Conditions,  305-307,  308- 

309,  651 

Population,  309-310 

German  Settlements,  235-236,  310 

Portuguese  in  Brazil,  311 

National  Character  of  Brazilians,  311 

Education,  312-313 

Administration  of  Justice,  313 

Bello  Horizonte,  314 

Railways  and  Transport,  236,  315-317 

Telegraph  Service,  316 

Coffee,  667 

Rubber,  668 

Brazil,  Dr  Assis,  of  Brazil,  255 
Brown,  Adm.,  U.S.  Commander,  391-392 
Bubonic  Plague  in  Brazil,  30S 


688 


INDEX 


Buchanan,  Minister,  and  the  Chilian 
Boundary  Dispute  in  1899,  113 
Buendia,  Gen.  Juan,  Peruvian  Com- 
mander in  the  Chilian-Peruvian  War, 
459-467,  486,  489 

Buenos  Aires,  see  under  Argentina 
Bulnes,  Gen.,  President  of  Chile,  30, 

323 

Bulwer-Clayton  Treaty,  1850,  601 
Bustamante,  Jose  Candido,  Candidate 
for  the  Presidency  in  Uruguay, 
199 

Bustamante,  Senor,  of  Salazar,  of  Peru, 

527 

Bustos  in  Argentina,  32 

Caacupi,  Paraguay,  184 
Caamano,  Dr  Placido,  President  of 
Ecuador,  1884,  580 

Caballero,  Gen.,  President  of  Paraguay, 
189 

Cabral,  Pedro,  and  Brazil,  12 
Cabrita,  Lieut. -Col. , Brazilian  Com- 
mander, 153 

Cacao-Growing : in  Peru,  547 ; in 

Ecuador,  588 ; in  Venezuela,  639- 
640 

Ca^apava,  Brazil,  255 
Caceres,  Col.  Andres  Avelino, 

Peruvian  Commander,  459,  465,  484, 
486,  487,  495-497 

Leader  of  Revolt  against  President 
Iglesias,  1884-85,  523-524 
President  of  Peru,  1886,  524-525 
President  of  Peru,  1894,  526-527,  531, 

538 

Other  Reference,  522-523 
Cachapoal,  Chilian  Warship,  349 
Caciques  of  Bolivia,  565 
Calama,  Atacama  District,  355,  356,  446- 
448 

Caldera,  Chile,  356-357,  366,  454 
Calderon,  Dr  Francisco  Garcia,  President 
of  Peru,  494-495,  672 
Caleta  Buena,  Chile,  422 
Callao,  Fortress  in  Chile,  374 
Callao,  Peru  : 

Spanish  Bombardment,  May  1866, 
509-510,  517,  520 

The  Gutierrez  Conspiracy,  1872,  513- 
514 

Revolt  under  Pierola,  1878,  518 
Blockade  by  Chilians,  1880-81,  475-479, 
483,  493 

Other  References,  23,  443,  515,  539, 
540  ' 

Camacho,  Col.  Eleodoro,  Bolivian  Com- 
mander, 468,  470-471 
Camalotes  or  Floating  Islands,  167-168 
Caminos,  Senor,  of  Paraguay,  186 


Campero,  Gen.  Narcisco, 

Bolivian  Commander,  468,  470-471,  475 
President  of  Bolivia,  1880,  556-557 
Campo  Grande,  Paraguay,  185 
Campo  Osorio,  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  291 
Campos,  Col.  Julio,  in  Buenos  Aires,  45, 
50,  54,  58 

Camus,  Col.  Hermogenes,  of  Chile,  355- 

356,  373 

Cana  Indians,  16 
Canabe  River,  174,  175,  177 
Candamo,  Manuel, 

President  of  Peru,  1903,  529 
Other  Reference,  527 
Candelaria,  137 
Canelones,  Uruguay,  203 
Cannevaro,  Gen.,  141,  147 
Canning,  George,  referred  to,  24,  26 
Canseco,  Gen., 

Leader  of  Revolts  in  Peru,  506,  508, 
510-511 

Provisional  President  of  Peru,  511 
Canseco,  Lieut.  Diaz,  Peruvian  Naval 
Commander,  1879,  454 
Canterac,  Gen. , in  Peru,  23 
Canto,  Gen.  Estanislao,  of  Chile,  358, 
368,  370-379 

Cantuaria,  Gen.,  of  Brazil,  299 
Canudos,  Brazil,  and  the  Jagun^os,  296- 

302 

Carabaya,  Peru,  549-550 
Caraballo,  Gen.  Francisco, 

Commander  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
177 

Leader  of  Revolt  in  Uruguay,  199 
Commander  of  Troops  against  Blanco 
Revolution  in  Uruguay,  200-201 
Carabobo,  Venezuela,  22,  629 
Caracas,  Venezuela,  20,  619,  620,  624, 
633,  635 

Caracoles,  Atacama  District,  Chile,  447 
Carbajal,  Capt.  Manuel,  Peruvian  Naval 
Commander,  456 
Carelmapu,  Chile,  334 
Carillo,  Juan,  of  Bolivia,  480 
Carlos  IV.  of  Spain,  19 
Carlos  V.,  536 

Caro,  Miguel,  President  of  Colombia, 

1894,  599 

Carreros,  Senor,  173 
Carrillo,  Capt.  Camilo,  of  Peru,  495 
Carrillo,  Major  Lucas,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  180 

Carrizal,  Chile,  454 
Cartagena,  Colombia,  22,  597 
Casal,  Dr  Barros,  of  Brazil,  255 
Casas,  Padre,  quoted,  6 
Castelli  in  Argentina,  24 
Castilhos,  Capt.,  Portuguese  Naval  Com- 
mander, 280-281 


INDEX 


689 


Castilhos,  Julho  de,  Governor  of  Rio 
Grande  do  Sul,  255,  259,  290-291 
Castilla,  Gen. , 

Leader  of  Revolt  in  Peru,  1866,  510 
President  of  Peru,  29,  30,  506 
Castillo,  Col.  Romualdo,  assassinated, 
205 

Castro,  President,  of  Venezuela,  1899 
and  1902,  630-631,  675 
Castro,  Gen.  Enrique,  in  Uruguay,  203, 
211 

Castro,  Col.  Gentil  de,  of  Brazil,  299 
Catamarca,  Argentina,  117 
Catholic  Church : 

The  Inquisition,  4,  540 
Catholicism  in  South  America,  7,  9 ; 
in  Argentina,  125-126  ; in  Uruguay, 
227  ; in  Brazil,  236,  245  ; in  Chile, 
417 ; in  Peru,  537  ; in  Bolivia, 
571 ; in  Ecuador,  .587  ; in  Colom- 
bia, 609-610  ; in  Venezuela,  637- 
638 

Question  of  Separation  of  Church  and 
State  in  Chile,  1884,  336,  337 
Cattle- Farming,  etc.  : in  Argentina,  128, 
665  ; in  Uruguay,  228  ; in  Chile, 
430  ; in  Peru,  547-548  ; in  Colombia, 
612-613;  in  Venezuela,  640-641  ; in 
the  River  Plate  Republics,  651-652 
Cauca,  Colombia,  594,  600,  613 
Cauta,  Peru,  489 
Cautin,  Chile,  424 

Cavalcanti,  E.  de  B.  de  Lacerda,  of 
Brazil,  362,  387 

Caxias,  Marshal,  of  Brazil,  in  the  Para- 
guayan War,  160-188 
Cayambi,  Ecuador,  585 
Caypam,  Brazil,  302 
Ceara,  Brazil,  258 
Celman,  Dr  Marcos  Juarez,  49,  83 
Celman,  Dr  Miguel  Juarez, 

Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of  Argen- 
tina, 66 

President  of  Argentina,  69-86 
Roca  and  Celman,  71-72 
Celman’s  Mal-Administration,  72-86 
The  Union  Civica  and  Revolt  against 
Celman,  75-86 
Other  References,  49,  52 
Celosa,  Chile,  355 
Celso,  Alfonso,  of  Brazil,  299 
Cemeteries  freed  in  Chile,  332,  336 
Cerda,  Senor,  y Ossa,  of  Santiago, 
Chile,  385 

Cerro  Colorado,  Uruguay,  219 
Cerro  Largo,  Uruguay,  203 
Cerro  Leon,  Paraguay,  135-141 
Cerro  de  Pasco,  Peru,  548-549,  550,  552 
Cerros  Blancos,  Uruguay,  219  [661 

Chacabuco,  Chile,  25 


Cliacabuco , Chilian  Corvette,  327,  442 
Chalaca,  Peruvian  Transport,  493 
Chanaral,  Chile,  364,  454 
Chanca  Indians,  16 
Chancay,  Peru,  478-479 
Chanchamayo,  Peru,  547 
Charleston,  U.S.  Cruiser,  277,  360 
Charras,  Col.,  55 
Chiclayo,  Peru,  479 
Chile : 

Revolution,  1809,  21 
The  Separatist  Movement,  1810,  25 
Spanish  Rule  re-established,  1813,  25 
Royalists  defeated  at  Chacabuco,  1817 
25 

Government  under  Gen.  O’Higgins, 
1818,  25,  30 

Royalist  Victory  at  Concha  Rayada, 
1818,  25 

Defeat  of  Royalists  at  Maypu,  Apr.  5, 
1818,  25 

Independence  secured,  1818,  25 
Gen.  Freire,  President,  1823,  30 
Federal  v.  Unitarian  Form  of  Govern- 
ment, 30 

Gen.  Pinto,  President,  1827,  30 
Gen.  Lastera,  President,  1829,  30 
Gen.  Pinto  again  President,  Dec.  1829, 
30 

Gen.  Prieto,  President,  1831,  30,  321- 
323 

Gen.  Prieto  again  President,  1835,  30, 
323 

Gen.  Bulnes,  President,  1841,  30,  323 
Independence  of  Chile  recognised  by 
Spain,  30 

Manuel  Montt,  President,  1851,  30, 

323- 324 

The  Law  of  Constitution,  321-322 
The  Presidential  Term,  322,  327 
Administration,  1833-61,  323-324 
Jose  Joaquin  Perez,  President,  1861, 

324- 327 

Fire  at  the  Compania  Church , Santiago, 
1863,  325 

Chile  and  the  Paraguayan  War,  1865, 
137,  151 

War  with  Spain  of  Chile  and  Peru, 
1865-66,  326-327,  508-510 
Spanish  Bombardment  of  Valpa- 
raiso, Mar.  31,  1866,  326,  509 
Capture  of  the  Coradonga  from 
Spain,  Jan.  1866,  326,  509 
Truce  with  Spain,  1867,  327 ; and 
Treaty  with  Spain,  1879,  327 
Other  references  to  the  War,  see 
under  Peru 

Foundation  of  the  Chilian  Navy,  327 
Re-election  of  President  Perez,  1866, 
327-328 

2 x 


690 


INDEX 


Chile — continued 

Federico  Errazuriz,  President,  1871, 

328-329 

New  Warships,  328 
Public  Works,  329 

Candidates  for  the  Presidency,  1876, 

329 

Anibal  Pinto,  President,  1876,  329- 
331 

Economic  Crisis,  330 

Boundary  Dispute  with  Argentina, 

1878- 79,  330,  335 
Treaty  with  Spain,  1879,  327 

The  Guano  Deposits  and  the  N itrate  In- 
dustry of  Atacama  and  the  Dis- 
putes between  Bolivia  and  Chile, 
Peruvian  Intrigues  in  Bolivia,  the 
Chilian  War  with  Peru  and  Bolivia, 

1879- 84,  and  the  Chilian  Occupa- 
tion of  Atacama,  Tarapaca,  Tacna 
and  Arica,  433-504 

Atacama  and  Its  Guano,  433 
Chilian  Vice-Royalty,  434 
The  Chilian  Exportation  Law,  1842, 
434 

Bolivian  Claim,  1843,  434,  435 
Revision  of  Chilian  Titles,  1845, 

434 

Bolivian  Demands,  1847,  434 
Bolivian  Demands,  1858,  434 
Further  Discussion,  1859-61,  434-435 
War  threatened  between  Bolivia  and 
Chile,  1863-64,  435 
Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Chile, 
1866,  435-436 

Bad  Faith  of  Bolivia,  1871,  436 
Secret  Compact  between  Peru  and 
Bolivia,  1873,  436,  441,  517 
Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Chile, 
1874,  436-437,  440 

Peruvian  Intrigues  in  Bolivia,  437- 
438 

Bolivian  Export  Duty  on  Nitrate  of 
Soda,  1878,  438 

Chilian  Ultimatum  to  Bolivia,  Jan. 
3,  1879,  438-439 

Occupation  of  Antofagasta,  etc. , by 
Chilians,  Feb.  1879,  439,  446- 
447,  519 

Bolivian  Declaration  of  War  against 
Chile,  Mar.  1,  1879,  439,  440, 
441 

Peruvian  Proposal  for  Arbitration, 
439-440 

Chilian  Declaration  of  War  against 
Peru,  Apr.  5,  1879,  440-441,  520 
The  Chilian  Fleet,  442-444 
Military  Forces,  444-446 
Capture  of  Calama,  Mar.  23,  447- 
448 


Chile — continued 

The  Guano  Deposits,  etc. — continued 
Occupation  of  Tocopilla  and  Cobija, 

448 

Blockade  of  Iquique,  448 
Bombardment  of  Pisagua,  449 
Naval  Action  off  Iquique,  May  20 ; 
and  Loss  of  the  Esmeralda,  450- 
453 

Peruvian  Reprisals,  453-454 
Capture  of  the  Huascar,  Peruvian 
Warship,  Oct.  8,  454,  457 
Capture  of  the  Pilcomayo  from  Peru- 
vians, Nov.  17,  457 
Invasion  of  Tarapaca,  Oct.,  458-460 
Battle  of  Pisagua,  Nov.  2,  460-461 
Occupation  of  Junin,  461 
Skirmish  near  Agua  Santa,  Nov.  6, 
461-462 

Battle  at  San  Francisco,  Dolores, 
Nov.  16,  462-464 

Occupation  of  Iquique,  Nov.  20,  464 
Battle  of  Tarapaca,  Nov.  27,  465- 
467 

Invasion  of  Tacna  and  Arica,  Feb. 
1880,  468-470 

Battle  of  Tacna,  May  26,  470-471 
Battle  of  Arica,  June  7,  472-473 
Blockade  of  Callao,  1880,  475-479, 
483 

Loss  of  the  Janequeo,  May  25,  477 
Loss  of  the  Loa,  July  3,  478 
Loss  of  the  Covadonya,  478-479 
Bombardment  of  Chorillos,  etc., 
479-480 

Efforts  of  the  United  States  for 
Peace,  Oct.  1880,  and  Confer- 
ence on  the  Lackawana,  480- 
481 

Chilian  Demands  rejected,  481 
Preparations  for  Advance  to  Lima, 
481-485 

Occupation  of  Pisco  and  Yea.  Nov 
1880,  482 

Naval  Action  at  Callao,  Dec.  6,  483 
Battle  of  Chorillos,  Jan.  13,  1881, 
485-487 

Fighting  on  Moro  Solar,  Jan.  13, 

487 

Armistice,  Jan.  15,  488 

Battle  of  Miraflores,  Jan.  15,  488- 

489,  522 

Occupation  of  Lima,  Jan.  16,  489- 
500 

Vandalism  of  Chilians  in  Lima,  490- 

493 

Adm.  Patricio  Lynch,  Commander 
in  Peru,  493-497 

Capture  of  Arequipa,  Aug.  1883, 
496 


INDEX 


691 


Chile — continued 

The  Guano  Deposits,  etc. — continued 

Treaty  of  Peace  (Treaty  of  Ancon) 
between  Chile  and  Peru,  Oct. 
20,  1883,  497-500;  ratified,  May 
8,  1884,  332,  403,  407,  500,  523, 
529 

Evacuation  of  Lima,  Oct.  22,  1883, 
500 

Truce  (Pacto  de  Tregua),  Apr.  4, 
1884,  between  Chile  and  Bolivia, 
500-503  ; ratified,  Nov.  29,  1884, 
332,  503-504 

Bolivia  and  Peru  and  the  Chilian 
Occupation  of  Tacna  and  Arica, 
403-404,  407,  468-473,  481,  498, 
502,  529,  556 

Chilian  Occupation  of  Atacama,  437, 
517,  555-556 

Chilian  Occupation  of  Tarapaca,  414, 
420-423,  437,  480,  498,  516-517, 
520 

Argentina  and  the  Bolivian  Question 
with  Chile  : in  1888,  557-558  ; in 
1891,  558  ; in  1893-96,  559 

Bolivian  Dispute  with  Chile  as  to 
Seaport,  1900,  562 

Other  References  to  the  War,  see 
under  Bolivia,  Peru 
Domingo  Santa  Maria,  President,  1881, 

331- 333,  335,  336 

Congressional  Elections,  1882,  1885, 

332- 333,  336 

Jose  Manuel  Balmaceda  in  Chilian 
Politics,  1851-86,  333-337 
The  Reform  Party  and  La  Libertad, 
334 

Programme  of  the  Reform  Party,  1875, 

334,  336 

Civil  Registry,  332,  336 
The  Civil  Marriage  Law,  332,  336 
The  Freeing  of  Cemeteries,  332,  336 
Question  of  Separation  of  Church  and 
State,  1884,  336,  337 
Jost;  Manuel  Balmaceda,  President, 
1886,  332-382,  387-389 
The  Cabinet,  Oct.  1886,  338 
The  Cabinet,  Nov.  1886,  338 
The  Cabinet,  June  1887-Apr.  1888,  339 
Congressional  Elections,  Mar.  1888, 
339 

Ten  Cabinets,  Apr.  1888-Oct.  1890,  340 
Argentina  and  the  Bolivian  Question 
with  Chile,  1888,  557-558 
Conflict  between  President  and  Con- 
gress, 1889-90,  341-344 
The  Comision  Conservadora,  1890,  342- 
344,  398 

Treaty  between  Bolivia  and  Argentina, 
1891,  558 


Chile — continued 

Pretext  for  Revolt,  Jan.  1891,  343 
Preparations  for  Rebellion,  345 
Naval  Revolt,  345 

Occupation  of  Coquimbo  and  Serena, 

347 

Fighting  at  Pisagua,  347 
Attitude  of  the  President,  347 
Serena  and  Coquimbo  reoccupied  by 
Government  Troops,  348 
The  Act  of  Deposition  published  in  the 
Heraldo,  Jan.  7,  349 
Surrender  of  Pisagua  to  Congres- 
sionalists,  Feb.  6,  349-350 
Fight  near  Dolores  and  Defeat  of  Gen. 

Robles,  Feb.  15,  350-351 
Congressionalist  Defeat  at  Huara,  Feb. 
16,  351 

Occupation  of  Iquique,  Feb.  16,  351- 

352 

Attempt  to  recapture  Iquique  and 
Intervention  of  Adm.  Hotham, 
Feb.  19,  352 

Gen.  Robles  defeated  at  Pozo  Almonte, 
Mar.  7,  353-354 

Arica,  Tacna,  and  Tarapaca  in  posses- 
sion of  Revolutionists,  354 
Occupation  of  Antofagasta,  Mar.  20, 

355 

Occupation  of  Calama,  Mar.  29,  356 
Occupation  of  Caldera,  Apr.  22,  356 
The  Blanco  Encalada  torpedoed,  Apr. 
23,  357 

Treatment  of  Suspected  Persons,  358 
Financial  Difficulties,  358 
Provisional  Government  on  Junta  de 
Gobierno  under  Capt.  Jorge  Montt, 

358 

The  ltata  Incident,  June,  359-360,  391 
Peace  Conference  at  Santiago,  May 
5,  360-362 

Attempted  Assassination  of  the  Presi- 
dent, 362 

The  Condell  and  the  Lynch  and  the 
Case  of  Richard  Cumming,  363- 
364 

Sympathy  with  Revolution  abroad, 

364-365 

The  Congressionalist  Army,  365-366 
The  President’s  Attitude  to  the  Revolu- 
tionists, 366-368 

Massacre  of  Lo  Canas,  Aug.  19,  367 
Landing  of  Congressionalists  at  Quin- 
teros, Aug.  18,  368-370 
Strength  of  the  Revolutionary  Army 
and  of  the  Balmacedists,  370 
Battle  of  Concon,  Aug.  21,  371-373 
Advance  on  Vina  del  Mar,  373-374 
Concentration  of  Congressionalist 
Troops  at  Quilpue,  375 


692 


INDEX 


Chile — continued 

Battle  of  Placilla,  Aug.  28,  376-3S0 
Occupation  of  Valparaiso,  Aug.  28, 
379 

Resignation  of  President  Balmaceda, 
Aug.  29,  380-382 

Gen.  Baquedano,  Acting  President, 
Aug.  29,  1891,  380 

The  Junta  de  Gobierno  at  Santiago, 

382,  383,  389 

Resignation  of  Gen.  Baquedano,  Aug. 
31,  1891,  383-384 

Proclamation  of  Adm.  Jorje  Montt, 
Sept  1891,  384 

Work  of  Reconstruction,  384-385 
Suicide  of  Balmaceda,  385-387 
Political  Testament  of  Balmaceda,  387- 
389 

New  Congress,  Nov.  1891,  and  Resig- 
nation of  the  Junta  de  Gobierno, 

389 

The  Tesorerfa  General  de  la  Escuadra 
abolished,  389 

Cost  of  the  Revolution,  389-390 
Adm.  Montt,  President,  1891,  390- 
405 

Promotion  for  Services,  390-391 
Law  of  Amnesty,  391 
Strained  Relations  between  Chile  and 
the  United  States,  1891-2,  391-396 
The  Baltimore  Incident,  380,  392-396, 
400,  655 

Message  of  President  Harrison  to  the 
U.S.  Congress,  Dec.  9,  1891,  393 
Telegram  from  Santiago  to  Chilian 
Representative  in  Washington, 
Dec.  11,  1891,  394-395 
United  States  Ultimatum  to  Chile, 
Jan.  22,  1892,  395 

Apology  to  U.S.  Government,  395- 

396 

Real  Issues  of  the  Civil  War,  397 
Political  Situation  in  1892,  398 
Increase  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  398- 
399,  402 

The  Irarrazaval  Ministry,  1S92,  400 
The  Barros  Luco  Ministries,  400 
The  Eduardo  Matte  Ministry,  400 
The  Political  Situation  in  1894,  399-400 
The  Pedro  Montt  Ministry,  1894,  400 
New  Municipal  Law,  400 
Conversion  of  the  Currency,  401 
Political  Parties  in  Congress,  401-402 
Complications  with  Argentina,  402 
Argentina  and  the  Bolivian  Question 
with  Chile,  1893-96,  559 
Sale  of  the  Esmeralda  to  Japan,  1894, 
402,  581 

Understanding  with  Peru  re  Tacnaand 
Arica,  1895,  403-404,  670 


Chile — continued 

Candidates  for  the  Presidency,  404 
Federico  Errazuriz,  President,  1896, 
404-409 

Congressional  Elections,  1897,  405-406 
Conference  between  President  Roca  of 
Argentinaand  President  Errazuriz, 

1899,  114 

Jerman  Riesco,  President,  1901,  408- 
409 

Boundary  Disputes  with  Argentina : 
in  1878-79,  330,  335  ; in  1895,  108- 
109;  in  1898,  406-407;  in  1901- 
1902,  119-120 

The  Puno  de  Atacama  Dispute  between 
Argentina,  Chile,  and  Bolivia : in 
1898,  111-112;  in  1899,  113-114  ; in 

1900,  407 

Final  Settlement  of  Dispute  with 
Argentina,  1902,  409 
Treaty  between  Argentina  and  Chile, 
June  1902,  120 

Effect  of  Foreign  Wars  and  Internal 
Disturbances,  410-411 
Movement  of  Population,  411-412 
Araucanian  Indians,  412 
Alcoholism  in  Chile,  413-414 
Chilians  and  the  Government,  414- 
415 

Education,  328,  415-417 
Religion,  417-418 
Administration  of  Justice,  418 
National  Character,  418-419 
Finance,  Economic  Development,  330, 
419-432 

Railways,  Roads,  etc.,  328,  419-420 
Mineral  Wealth,  421-426 
Nitrate  Industry,  421-423 
Copper,  423-424 
Silver,  424 
Coal,  425 
Borax,  425-426 
Agriculture,  etc.,  426-431 
Vine-Growing,  429-430 
Cattle  and  Sheep-Farming,  420,  430 
Fisheries,  431 
Manufactures,  431-432 
Chilian  Influence  on  the  Pacific  Coast, 
656-657 

Chile,  Chilian  Warship,  435 
Chiloe  Id.,  421 
Chimboraso,  Ecuador,  585 
Chimbote,  Peru,  479 
Chincha  Ids. , Peru  : Dispute  with  Spain, 
1864,  326,  333,  507-508 
Chinese  in  Peru,  546 
Cholera : in  Buenos  Aires,  40 ; in 
Uruguay,  199 

Cliolo  People  in  Peru,  532 ; in  Bolivia, 
564 


INDEX 


693 


Chorillos,  Peru : 

Battle,  Jan.  13,  1881,  486-487 
Other  References,  479,  484 
Christiancy,  Mr,  U.S.  Minister  in  Peni, 
480 

Christianity  in  South  America,  see 
Catholic  Church 

Chubut  River,  Argentina,  114-115 
Chuno,  573 

Cisneros,  Viceroy  Baltasar  de,  of  Argen- 
tina, deposed,  24 
Ciudad  Bolivar,  Venezuela,  635 
Ciudad  de  Cura,  Venezuela,  635 
Civil  Registry  in  Chile,  332,  336 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  1850,  601 
Cleopatra , German  Steamer,  346 
Cleveland,  President, 

His  Verdict  in  the  Misiones  Dispute, 
1895,  109,  112,  116,  2S9 
The  President  and  the  Boundary 
Dispute  between  Venezuela 
and  British  Guiana,  1895,  622- 
628 

Coal  in  Chile,  425 
Cobija,  Chile,  446,  448 
Cobras  Island,  Brazil,  263,  280 
Cochabamba,  Bolivia,  562,  567 
Cochrane,  Lord,  in  Peru,  23 
Cochrane,  see  Almirante  Cochrane 
Cocorobd,  Brazil,  300 
Coffee-Growing : in  Peru,  547  ; in 

Ecuador,  588  ; in  Colombia,  611-612  ; 
in  Venezuela,  539,  644  ; in  Brazil,  667 
Colehagua,  Chile,  421 
Colla  Indians,  16 
Colmo,  Chile,  370-372 
Colo-Calo,  Chilian  Torpedo-Boat,  477 
Colombia : 

Spanish  Rule,  10 
Revolution  at  Bogota,  1810,  21 
Bolivar  in  New  Granada,  1813,  21 
Gen.  Morilla  at  Cartagena,  1815,  22 
New  Granada  and  Venezuela  under 
the  Republic  of  Colombia,  22, 
591-592 

Bolivar,  President,  1821,  22 
Secession  of  Venezuela  and  Ecuador, 
(9.  v.),  27,  591-592 

Gen.  Santander,  Chief  Magistrate, 
1831,  27 

Panama  and  Colon  Free  Ports,  28 
Panamd  Treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Colombia,  2S  ; renewed. 

1865,  28 

Dr  Marquez,  President,  1836,  28 
Gen.  Harran,  President,  28 
Gen.  Mosquera,  President,  28 
Mariana  Ospina,  President,  28 
Federal  v.  Unitarian  Form  of  Govern- 
ment, 28 


Colombia — continued 

The  United  States  of  Colombia,  1819, 

591-592 

The  Confederaeion  Granadina,  1858, 
592 

The  United  States  of  New  Granada, 
1861,  592 

The  United  States  of  Colombia,  1863, 
592 

The  Republic  of  Colombia,  1866,  592 
Internal  Political  Troubles,  592 
Political  Parties,  592-593 
President  Trujillo,  593 
Ratael  Nunez,  President,  1880,  593- 

594 

Revolution  in  1881,  594 
Settlement  of  Boundary  Dispute  with 
Costa  Rica,  594 
President  Laldua,  1883,  594 
General  Otalora,  President,  1883,  594 
Boundary  Question  with  Venezuela, 

595 

Rafael  Nunez,  President,  1884,  595 
President  Nunez  andtheConservatives, 
595 

Rebellion  in  1885,  595-596 
Occupation  of  Panama  and  Colon  by 
United  States  Forces,  596-597 
Revision  of  the  Law  of  Constitution, 

1886,  598 

President  Nunez  re-elected  1886,  598 
President  Nunez  re-elected  1892,  598 
Miguel  Caro,  Vice-President,  599 
Death  of  President  Nunez,  1894,  599 
Miguel  Caro,  President,  1894,  599 
Revolt  in  1S95,  599 

Boundary  Dispute  with  Peru,  1895, 

529 

M.  A.  Sanclemente,  President,  1S98, 

599 

J.  M.  Marroquin,  Vice-President,  599- 

600 

Revolution  in  1898,  600 
J.  M.  Marroquin,  President,  1900,  600 
The  Panama  Canal  and  the  Secession 
of  Panama,  1903,  601,  614,  655- 
656 

Topography  and  Revolutionary 
Practices,  602 

Political  Situation,  1904,  603-604 
Economic  Conditions,  604-605 
Topographical  Features  and  Climate, 
605-606 

Area  and  Population,  606-607 
Hygienic  Conditions,  607 
Education,  607-609 
Administration  of  Justice,  609 
The  Roman  Catholic  Church,  609-610 
National  Character,  610-611 
Effects  of  Alcoholism,  611 


694 


INDEX 


Colombia — continued 

Agriculture  and  Industries,  611-614 
Financial  Situation,  614-615 
Future  Prospects,  615-616,  675 
Colon,  Colombia : 

The  Port,  28,  655 

Occupation  by  United  States  Forces, 
1885,  596-597 

Capture  of  Colon  by  Insurgents,  1900, 
600 

Colonia,  Uruguay,  207 
Colorados  of  Uruguay,  131,  137,  197-204, 
216-224,  649 

Colorados  Net  os  of  Uruguay,  204-207 
Colorados  Principistas  of  Uruguay,  204- 
207 

Colquechaca,  Bolivia,  574 
Columbus  referred  to,  5 
Comisario  Regio  in  Peru,  507 
Comisidn  Conservadoru  in  Chili,  342-344, 
398 

Commercio,  Brazilian  Newspaper,  299 
Comte,  Auguste,  and  His  Theories  in 
Brazil,  235 

Conce^-ao  Id.,  Brazil,  276 
Concepcion,  Chile,  324,  421,  425,  431 
Concha,  Sefior,  y Toro,  of  Chile,  360, 

362,  386,  387 

Concha  Rayada,  Chile,  25 
Conchuco  Indians,  16 
Concon,  Chile,  367,  370-375 
Concordia,  Argentina,  132,  143-145 
Condell,  Capt.,  Chilian  Naval  Com- 
mander, 450,  452-453 
Condell,  Chilian  Torpedo-Boat,  357,  363, 
364 

Condor,  Chilian  Warship,  368 
Conessa,  Col.,  156 

Conselheiro  or  Maciel,  Antonio,  and  the 
Jaguncjos  of  Canudos,  296-302 
Constant,  Benjamin,  Positivist,  235 
Copper : in  Chile,  423-424  ; in  Peru, 

548,  661 

Coquimbo,  Chile,  326,  347,  348,  364, 
382,  421 

Cordero,  Luis,  President  of  Ecuador, 

1892,  581-582 

Cordoba,  Gen.,  President  of  Bolivia, 

30 

Cordoba,  Argentina,  see  under  Argen- 
tina 

Coronel,  Chile,  425 

Corralito,  Uruguay,  200 

Correa,  Pedro,  y Santiago,  of  Peru, 

523 

Correa,  Dr  Serzedello,  of  Brazil,  259 
orrientes,  Argentina,  in  the  Para- 
guayan War,  138,  140-143,  151-152 
Cortes,  Fernando,  Conqueror  of  Mexico, 
7 


CorumbA,  Brazil,  136 
Costa,  Dr  Julio,  Governor  of  Buenos 
Aires,  101-102,  105 

Costa,  Dr  Quirno,  Vice-President  of 
Argentina,  111 
Costa  Rica : 

Boundary  Dispute  with  Colombia, 

594 

Costa  Rica  and  the  Panama  Canal, 
601 

Cotton  Industry  in  Peru,  546-547,  552 
Covadoruja,  Spanish  Gunboat,  326,  507 ; 
captured  by  Chilians,  Jan.  1866, 
326,  509 ; in  the  Chilian-Peruvian 
War,  442,  450-454,  472 ; destroyed, 
1880,  478-479t 
C-ragosta,  Brazil,  269 
Crespo,  Gen.  Joaquin 

Leader  of  Revolution  in  Venezuela, 
1892,  621 

President  of  Venezuela,  1894,  621- 

628,  633 

President  Crespo  and  the  Boundary 
Dispute  between  Venezuela  and 
British  Guiana,  622-628 

Death  of  Gen.  Crespo,  630 
Cuadra,  Pedro  Lucio,  of  Chile,  339, 
340 

Cuba  under  Spanish  Rule,  5,  7,  648 
Cuenca,  Ecuador,  585,  586,  587 
Cuestas,  Juan  Lindolfo,  President  of 
Uruguay  in  1897,  221-223;  in  1899, 
223 

Cullen,  Gen.,  of  Argentina,  33 
Cumming,  Richard,  in  Chile,  364 
Cundinamarca,  Colombia,  595 
Curayaco,  Peru,  482 
Curico,  Chile,  421 

Curityba,  Paranagua,  Brazil,  236,  273, 
283,  284,  287,  288 
Curupaiti,  Paraguay,  157-160,  168 
Curuzu,  Paraguay,  157-160 
Cuzco,  Peru,  8,  536,  547 

Daule  River,  588 

Davila,  Col.  Justo  Pastor,  Peruvian 
Commander,  459,  484-486 
Daza,  Gen.  Hilarion,  President  of 
Bolivia,  438,  459-460,  462,  555-556 
Defrance,  A. , in  Chile,  362 
Desterro,  Santa  Catharina,  Brazil,  265, 
266,  271,  272,  280,  284 
Detroit,  U.S.  Warship,  277 
Diario  de  Commercio,  Brazilian  News- 
paper, 256 

Dios  Leon,  Col.  Juan  de,  of  Chile,  376 
Dolores,  Tarapaca,  350,  351,  462 
Donoso,  Gregorio,  of  Chile,  360 
Dorrego  of  Argentina,  33 
Dourado,  Brazil,  136 


INDEX 


695 


Dreyfus  & Co.,  of  Paris,  511-512 
Drink  Traffic,  see  Alcoholism 
Duarte,  Major,  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
143-148 

Duclerc  and  Brazil,  13 
Durand,  Senor,  of  Peru,  528 
Dutch  in  Brazil,  see  under  Brazil 

Echenique,  Gen.,  President  of  Peru, 
29 

Ecuador : 

Defeat  of  Gonzalo  Pizarro  at  Quito, 
1546,  11 

Revolution  at  Quito,  1809,  20,  21 
Battle  of  Pichincha,  1822,  and 
Emancipation  of  Ecuador  by 
Bolivar,  22 

Separation  from  Colombia,  1830,  27, 
577,  591-592 

Gen.  Flores  President,  1830,  28-29 
Vicente  Rocafuerte,  President,  29 
Gen.  Flores  re-elected  President, 
1839  and  1843,  29 

Ecuador,  Bolivia,  Chile,  Peru,  and 
the  War  with  Spain,  1865-66,  326- 
327 

Acts  of  Constitution,  1830-96,  577- 

578 

Administration  of  President  Moreno, 
1875,  27,  578 

Assassination  of  President  Moreno, 
1875,  578 

Dr  Borrero,  President,  1875,  578-579 
Revolt  under  Gen.  Veintemilla,  1876, 
578-579 

Defeat  of  the  Government,  579 
Gen.  Veintemilla,  President,  1878, 

579 

Gen.  Veintemilla,  Dictator,  579 
Revolt  against  Gen.  Veintemilla,  1883, 

579 

Dr  Placido  Caamano,  President,  1884, 

580 

Dr  Antonio  Flores,  President,  1888, 
580,  583,  586 

Dr  Luis  Cordero,  President,  1892,  581 
The  Esmeralda  Incident,  1894,  402, 

581 

Revolution  against  Dr  Cordero,  1894, 

582 

Provisional  Government  under  Gen. 

Alfaro,  1895,  582 
Boundary  Disputes,  1895,  529 
Gen.  Alfaro,  President,  1897,  582 
Gen.  Alfaro  and  the  Clergy,  582 
Conspiracies  against  Gen.  Alfaro,  582 
Gen.  Leonidas  Plaza,  President,  1901, 

583 

Laws  regarding  Sedition,  583 
Political  Conditions,  583 


Ecuador — continued 

Economic  Conditions,  583 
Area  and  Population,  584 
Cities  of  Ecuador,  584 
Topographical  Features,  585 
Education,  586 

Administration  of  Justice,  586 
National  Character,  587 
Railways,  587-588 
Industry  and  Production,  588-589 
Financial  Situation,  589-590 
Future  Prospects,  590 
Education  : in  Argentina,  41,  123-125  ; in 
Paraguay,  194  ; in  Uruguay. 208,  225- 
226  ; in  Brazil, 312;  in  Chile, 328,  415- 
417  ; in  Peru, 51 5,534-536  ; in  Bolivia, 
569-570;  in  Ecuador,  585-586;  in 
Colombia,  607-609;  in  Venezuela, 
635-636  ; in  S.  America,  676 
Edwards,  Augustin,  of  Chile,  338,  339 
Egan,  Patrick,  U.S.  Minister  in  Chile, 
1891,  361-362,  392-396 
Egusquiza,  E.  D.,  181 
Egusquiza,  J.  B.,  President  of  Paraguay, 
1894,  190-191 

Ejercito  Restaurador  de  la  Honra 
Nacional  in  Peru,  508 
Ellauri,  Dr  Jose,  President  of  Uruguay, 
1873,  204-206 

England  and  South  America : 

British  Action  in  Brazil,  13 
British  Aggression  in  Argentina,  19 
Treaty  between  Argentina  and 
England,  1825,  24 

British  Action  in  Uruguay,  182S,  24 
English  Recognition  of  the  Independ- 
ence of  South  America,  26 
Conflict  with  Uruguay,  31 
England  and  the  Paraguayan  War, 
1865,  151 

Adm.  Hotham  and  the  Chilian  Revolu- 
tion, 1891,  352,  360 
The  Sirius  in  Brazilian  Waters,  1893-94, 
265-266,  281 

The  Racer  in  Brazilian  Waters,  1893, 
265-266 

Occupation  of  Trinidade,  Brazil,  1895, 
292 

Boundary  Dispute  between  Venezuela 
and  British  Guiana,  1887,  0_0-621 
Boundary  Dispute  between  Venezuela 
and  British  Guiana,  1895-99, 
622-628,  654 

England  and  the  Chilian  Boundary 
Disputes,  in  1895,  108-109 ; in 
1899,  111-112,  113-114  ; in  1901, 
119-120 

Blockade  of  La  Guayra,  Venezuela, 
by  England,  Germany,  and  Italy, 
1902,  631 


606 


INDEX 


Ensenada,  Argentina,  65,  285 
Entre  Rios,  Argentina,  138,  140-144 
Enxadas  Id.,  Brazil,  263,  275,  280,  281 
Errazuriz,  Federico,  President  of  Chile, 
1871,  114,  328-329,  388,  404-409 
Escala,  Gen.,  Chilian  Commander,  458, 
461,  465 

Escobar,  President,  of  Paraguay,  190 
Escurra,  Juan  B. , President  of  Paraguay, 
191 

Esmeralda,  Ecuador,  589 
Esmeralda,  Chilian  Warship : in  Ata- 
cama, 1863,  435  ; in  the  War  with 
Spain,  1866,  326  ; in  the  Chilian- 
Peruvian  War,  1879,  443,  450-452  ; 
destroyed  by  Peruvians,  1879,  452 
Esmeralda , New  Chilian  Warship,  399  ; 
in  the  Civil  War  in  Chile,  1891,  346, 
366,  368,  374  ; sold  to  Japan,  1894, 
402,  581 

Esperanca.  Brazilian  Ship,  266 
Espina,  Col.,  102 

Espinar,  Col.,  Peruvian  Commander,  463 
Espinosa,  Senor,  of  Peru,  527 
Espinosa,  Col.  Julio  Banados,  of  Chile, 
348,  386-387,  392 
Esperito-Santo,  Ship,  303 
Estanislas,  Gen.,  del  Canto,  of  Chile, 
390 

Estero  Vellaco,  153 

Estigarribia,  Col.,  Paraguayan  Com- 
mander, 143-148 
Eten,  Peru,  479 
d’Eu,  Conde, 

Commander  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
147,  181-187 

Other  References,  234,  240 

Favella  Hill,  Canudos,  301 
Febronio,  Major,  of  Brazil,  298 
Federal  v.  Unitarian  Form  of  Govern- 
ment : in  Colombia,  28  ; in  Chile,  30  ; 
in  Argentina,  32,  33,  42  ; in  Brazil, 
249 

Felix,  Jose,  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  256 
Ferdinand  and  Isabella  of  Spain,  4 
Ferdinand  VII.  of  Spain,  19,  20,  21 
Ferrari,  Pablo,  Chilian  Commander,  478 
Fidanza,  Capt. , 173 

Fidelis,  Col.,  Brazilian  Commander,  134 
Figueira,  Andrade,  of  Brazil,  238,  239 
Fisheries  of  Chile,  431 
Flores,  Antonio,  President  of  Ecuador, 

1888,  580,  583,  586 

Flores,  Col.  Fortunato,  in  Uruguay,  197 
Flores,  Gen.  Venaneio, 

President  of  Ecuador,  1830,  1839,  and 
1843,  28-29 

Leader  of  Revolt  in  Uruguay,  1863-65, 
131-135 


Flores,  Gen.  V. — continued- 
President  of  Uruguay,  1865,  135,  197- 

198 

President  Flores  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  139-160,  187 

Assassination  of  Gen.  Flores,  1868,  198 
Flores,  Buenos  Aires,  56 
Florida,  U.S.,  207 
Florida,  Uruguay,  203,  206 
Fonseca,  Gen.  Deodoro  da,  of  Brazil : 
Leader  of  Military  Conspiracy,  242-243 
Provisional  President  of  Brazil,  243- 
245 

President  of  Brazil,  246-256 
Fonseca,  General  Hermes  da,  President 
of  Brazil,  667 

Fontecilla,  Manuel  Sanchez,  of  Chile, 
340 

France  and  South  America  : 

French  Action  in  Brazil,  1711,  13 
Portugal  and  French  Guiana,  1807- 
15,  13-14 

Conflict  with  Uruguay,  1851,  31 
Conflict  with  Rosas  in  Argentina,  1894, 

33-34 

France  and  the  Paraguayan  War,  1865, 
151 

France  and  the  Revolution  in  Chile, 
1891,  361-362 

French  Victims  in  Brazilian  Revolt, 
and  Brazilian  Indemnity  to  France, 
1894,  287 

French  in  Argentina,  122 
Francia,  Dr  Rodriguez  de,  First  Consul 
in  Paraguay,  25 

Francisco,  Col.  Joao,  of  Brazil,  291 
Franklin,  Benjamin,  referred  to,  26 
Freire,  Col.,  in  Uruguay,  1868,  198 
Freire,  Gen.,  President  of  Chile,  1823,  30 
Freire,  Francisco,  of  Chile,  1886,  338 
Fresia,  Chilian  Torpedo-Boat,  476,  483 
Frias,  Col.  Anibal,  of  Chile,  370 
Frias,  Felix,  46 

Fruit-Growing:  in  Paraguay,  192;  in 
Uruguay,  229-230  ; in  Chile,  429 ; in 
Bolivia,  573 

Fuenzalida,  Ensign,  of  Chile,  379 
Funes,  Naval  Commander,  98-99,  107 

Gainza,  Gen.  Martin,  45 
Galenga,  Mr,  of  the  Times,  540 
Galvez,  Lieut,  Peruvian  Commander, 
477 

Gama,  Adm.  Saldanha  da, 

Personality  of  Adm.  da  Gama,  270 
Commander  of  Rebel  Forces  in  Brazil, 
1893,  265-283 

Leader  of  Revolt  in  Rio  Grande  do 
Sul,  1895,  290-293 
Other  References,  263,  311 


INDEX 


697 


Gamarra,  Col.,  Peruvian  Commander, 
1880,  469 
Gamarra,  Gen., 

President  of  Peru,  1829,  29 
Peruvian  Leader  in  Bolivia,  1839,  30 
Gana,  Gen.,  Jose  Francisco,  of  Chile, 
348 

Garcia,  Capt.  Aureteo,  y Garcia, 
Peruvian  Commander,  4S0-481,  486, 
489 

Garezon,  Lieut.  Pedro,  Peruvian  Naval 
Commander,  456-457 
Garibaldi,  Gen.,  in  Uruguay,  31 
Gatica,  Major,  of  Chile,  348 
Gazeta  da  Tarde,  Brazilian  Newspaper, 
299 

Geliy,  Gen.,  y Obes,  Argentine  Com- 
mander, 165,  176,  179,  187 
Germany  and  South  America  : 

Blockade  of  La  Guayra,  Venezuela, 
by  England,  Germany,  and  Italy, 
1902,  631 

Germans  in  Argentina,  122 ; in  Brazil, 
235,  310  ; in  Chile,  416 
Gill,  President,  of  Paraguay,  189 
Glycerio,  Francisco,  of  Brazil,  251,  302 
Godoy,  Domingo,  Minister  in  Chile, 
1891,  362,  392 

Godoy,  Joaquin,  Minister  in  Chile,  1886, 
338 

Gold:  in  Peru,  549  ; in  Colombia,  613; 
in  Venezuela,  641 

Gomensoro,  Tomas,  President  of 
Uruguay,  203,  205 

Gomez,  Col.  Leandro,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  132-133 

Gonzalez,  President,  of  Paraguay,  1890, 
190 

Gonzalez,  Col.  Genuardo,  of  Paysandii, 
1875,  207 

Gorostiaga,  Dr  Benjamin,  Candidate  for 
the  Presidency  of  Argentina,  66,  67 
Gouvernador  Id.,  Brazil,  266,  269 
Gragoata,  Brazil,  274 
Grammer,  Juan,  of  Chile,  358 
Grande,  Ilha,  Brazil,  271 
Grau,  Adm.  Miguel,  Peruvian  Naval 
Commander,  in  the  Chilian-Peruvian 
War,  450-457 

Great  Britain,  see  England 
Guacoldo,  Chilian  Torpedo-Boat,  477, 
483 

Guadaloupe,  Bolivia,  574 
Guaitecas  Id.,  421 
Guale,  Chilian  Torpedo-Boat,  358 
Gualeguay,  Argentine  Warship,  138 
Guanabara,  Brazilian  Warship,  263 
Guanara,  Venezuela,  635 
Guano : 

Exports  from  Peru,  1869,  511-512 


Guano — continued 

The  Guano  Deposits  of  Atacama  and 
the  Disputes  between  Bolivia  and 
Chile,  the  Chilian-Peruvian  War, 
1879-84,  and  the  Chilian  Occupa- 
tion of  Atacama,  433-504 
Guano  in  the  Lobos  Ids.,  498 
Guaviyu,  Uruguay,  211 
Guayaneco  Id.,  421 

Guayaquil,  Ecuador,  578,  582,  584,  586, 

587 

Guayas  River,  588 
Guerrero,  Adolfo,  365 
Guiana,  British,  and  the  Venezuelan 
Boundary  Dispute : in  18S7,  620- 
621 ; in  1895-99,  622-628,  654 
Guiana,  French, 

Portugal  and  French  Guiana,  1807- 
15,  13-14 

Amapa  Dispute  with  Brazil,  1897-99, 

306 

Guimaraes,  Adm.,  of  Brazil,  255 
Gustavo  Sampaio,  Brazilian  Torpedo- 
Catcher,  269,  286 

Gutierrez,  Cols.  Mareelino,  Silvestre, 
and  Tomas,  Peruvian  Conspirators, 
513-514 

Gutschmid,  Baron,  in  Chile,  360,  387 

Haggabd,  Mr,  referred  to,  628 
Hague  Tribunal,  631 
Hamilton,  Alexander,  referred  to,  26 
Harrison,  Benjamin,  and  the  Relations 
between  Chile  and  the  United 
States,  1891,  393-395 
Heraldo , Chilian  Newspaper,  349 
Heredia,  Gen.,  of  Argentina,  33 
Herran,  Gen.,  President  of  Colombia,  28 
Herrera,  Emilia  Toro,  Wife  of  President 
Balmaeeda,  334 

Holdieh,  Sir  Thomas,  and  the  Chilian 
Boundary  Question,  119 
Holguin,  Carlos,  of  Colombia,  598 
Holleben,  Baron  von,  59 
Holland  : Dutch  Action  in  Brazil,  13 
Holley,  Gen.  Adolfo,  of  Chile,  353,  355- 
356,  368,  390 

Hornos,  Gen.,  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
164 

Hotham,  Adm.,  of  the  Warspite , in  Chile, 

1891,  352,  360 

Hotham,  Lieut.,  of  the  Sirius,  in  Brazil, 
1894,  281 

Huaeho,  Peru,  479 
Huaita  Ford,  Atacama,  Chile,  447 
Hualgayoc,  Peru,  550 
Huamachueo,  Peru,  496 
Huamachuco  Indians,  16 
Huanca  Indians,  16 
Huanchaca,  Bolivia.  356 


698 


INDEX 


Huanchaca  Mining  Company,  Bolivia, 
571,  574 

Huara,  Chile,  351 

Huascar , Peruvian  Monitor:  built  1866, 
443 ; in  the  Peruvian  War  with 
Spain,  1866,  510;  in  the  Peruvian 
Revolution,  1878,518;  intheChilian- 
Peruvian  War,  1879,  443,  450-454 ; 
captured  by  Chilians,  1879,  455-458  ; 
Chilian  Monitor  in  the  Chilian- 
Peruvian  War,  1880-81,  476-477,  488  ; 
in  Chilian  Civil  War,  1891,  346 
Huasco,  Chile,  366,  454 
Huemel,  Chilian  Warship,  368 
Huerta,  Manuel  Garcia  de  la,  of  Chile, 
339 

Humaitd,  Paraguay,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  1865-68, 139, 141,  148,  157,  162- 
171 ; bombarded  by  Allies,  Apr.- 
July  1868,  168-171 

Humboldt,  Alexander  von,  referred  to,  9 
Husares  Constitutionales  of  Chile,  376 

IbaSez,  Adolfo,  of  Chile,  340 
Iglesias,  Gen.  Miguel, 

Peruvian  Commander  in  the  Chilian- 
Peruvian  War,  1881,  484,  486, 
487 

President  of  Peru,  1883,  496-497,  522- 
524,  531,  538 

Ignacio,  Adm.,  Brazilian  Commander 
in  the  Paraguayan  War,  160,  161, 
181 

Iguatemy , Brazilian  Warship,  263 
Imperial,  Chilian  Transport,  363 
Incas  of  Peru,  7,  8,  16 
Independencia,  Peruvian  Ironclad  : built 
1865,  443  ; in  the  Peruvian  War  with 
Spain,  1866,  510;  in  the  Chilian- 
Peruvian  War,  1879,  443,  450-453 ; 
destroyed,  1879,  453,  479;  Other 
Reference,  513 

Independencia,  Peruvian  Armed  Steam 
Launch, 477 

Indians:  of  South  America,  15,  412;  of 
Peru,  532-533,  538,  546;  of  Bolivia, 
558-559,  565,  568-571  ; of  Ecuador, 
587 

Inquisition,  4,  540 
Intemperance,  see  Alcoholism 
Iquique,  Tarapacd : 

Peruvian  Port,  448 

Naval  Battle  between  Chile  and  Peru, 
1879,  450-452 

Chilian  Port  in  the  Chilian  Civil  War, 
1891,  346,  348,  351-353,  360,  364- 
366 

Other  References,  412,  422 
Iquitos,  Peru,  527,  551,  553 
Irarrazaval,  Senor,  of  Chile,  400 


Irigoyen,  Dr  Bernardo, 

Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of 
Argentina,  66,  67 
Partisan  of  the  Union  Civica,  73 
Partisan  of  the  Union  Civica  Radical, 
93 

Governor  of  Buenos  Aires,  116-117 
Iriondo,  Dr,  of  Santa  Fe,  49 
Isabel,  Princess, 

Regent  of  Brazil,  234-240 
Her  EmanciDation  of  the  Slaves,  237- 
240 

Italy  and  South  America  : 

Conflict  with  Uruguay,  1851,  31 
Uruguayan  Question  with  Italy,  1882, 
210 

Brazilian  Question  with  Italy,  1896,  293 
Blockade  of  La  Guayra,  Venezuela, 
by  England,  Germany,  and  Italy, 
1902,  631 

Italians  in  Argentina,  121 ; in  Brazil, 

237,  309 

Itapiru,  Fort,  Paraguay,  153 
Itaroro  River,  Paraguay,  176 
Itata,  Chilian  Transport,  359,  391,  395 
Itati,  Argentina,  152 

Jacobinos  of  Brazil,  302-304 
Jacques,  Gen.,  of  Brazil,  290 
Jaguarao,  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  Brazil, 

255 

Jagun^os  of  Canudos,  296-302 
Janequeo,  Chilian  Torpedo-Boat,  476- 
477 
Japan  : 

Japanese  Purchase  of  the  Chilian 
Warship  Esmeralda,  402,  581 
Japanese  in  Peru,  532,  546 
Jauja,  Peru,  523 

Javary,  Brazilian  Warship,  263,  269 
Jews  in  Spain,  4,  6 
Joao  VI.  of  Portugal  in  Brazil,  13 
Jornal  de  Brazil,  299 
Jornal  de  Comercio,  Brazilian  News- 
paper, 258 

Jovellanos,  Salvador,  President  of  Para- 
guay, 1872,  188 
Juan  Fernandez,  431 
Jueces  de  Paz  in  Colombia,  609 
Junin  : 

Battle,  Aug.  6,  1824,  23 
Other  References,  422,  460,  461 
Junta  de  Gobierno  in  Chile,  358-382, 

383,  389 

Jupiter,  Brazilian  Merchant  Ship,  259, 
263 

Kennedy,  John  Gordon,  in  Chile,  360 
Konig,  Senor,  Chilian  Minister  in 
Bolivia,  1900,  408,  562 


INDEX 


699 


Korner,  Gen.  Emilio,  in  Chile,  357,  359, 
370,  382,  390,  399 

Lackaioana,  U.S.  Corvette,  at  Arica, 
Oct.  1880,  480,  483,  497 
La  Cotera,  Gen.  Manuel  Gonzalez  de, 
of  Peru,  521 

Ladario,  Baron  de,  of  Brazil,  243 
Lage,  Brazil,  263,  264 
Lagomarsino,  Capt.,  Chilian  Naval 
Commander,  472 

Lagos,  Col.  Hilario,  in  Argentina,  1880, 
45,  50,  54,  57 

Lagos,  Col.,  Chilian  Commander,  1880- 
81,  471-472,  481,  486,  488 
La  Guayra,  Venezuela : 

Blockade  by  England,  Germany,  and 
Italy,  1902,  631 
Other  References,  625,  640 
Laldua,  President,  of  Colombia,  594 
Lamar,  Gen.,  President  of  Peru,  29 
Lamas,  Col.  Diego,  Leader  of  Rising 
against  President  Borda  of  Uru- 
guay, 217 ; assassinated,  222 
Lambayeque,  Peru,  479 
Lambton,  Capt.,  in  Chile,  352 
Lapa,  Brazil,  273 

La  Paz,  Bolivia,  561,  562,  563,  566 
La  Plata,  see  under  Argentina 
La  Puerta,  Gen.  Luis  de,  Vice-President 
of  Peru,  474-475,  511,  520-521 
Lara,  Venezuela,  642 
La  Rioja,  Argentina,  117,  161 
Larreta,  Dr  Aureliano  Rodriguez,  of 
Uruguay,  212,  221 
Las  Cadenas,  Chile,  376-377 
Las  Cruces,  Chile,  375 
Lastera,  Gen.,  in  Chile,  30 
Las  Zorras,  Chile,  376-377 
Latacunga,  Ecuador,  5S5 
Latin  America  and  Pan-American  Con- 
gresses, 654 

Latorre,  Capt.,  Chilian  Naval  Com- 
mander, 454-455 
Latorre,  Major  Lorenzo, 

Commander  in  Uruguay,  205,  208 
Dictator  of  Uruguay,  208-209 
President  of  Uruguay,  209 
Lantaro,  Steamer  sunk  off  Panama,  1902, 
600 

Lavadenz,  Gen.,  Peruvian  Commander, 
463 

Lavalle,  Gen. , in  Argentina,  33,  58 
Lavalle,  Jose  Antonio,  of  Peru,  439-440, 
498 

Lavalle,  Lopez,  of  Iquique,  464 
Law:  Administration  of  Justice;  in 

Argentina,  115,  125;  in  Uruguay, 
226;  in  Brazil,  313;  in  Chile,  418; 
in  Peru,  536-537  ; in  Bolivia,  570 ; in 


Law — continued 

Ecuador,  586-587  ; in  Colombia,  609  ; 
in  Venezuela,  636-637 
Lebu,  Chile,  346 
Leipzig,  German  Warship,  379 
Letelier,  Col.,  Chilian  Commande,.  482 
Liberdade,  Brazilian  Cruiser,  276 
Liherdade,  Brazilian  Newspaper,  299 
Liberta^ao  do  Ventre,  237 
IAbertad,  Chilian  Newspaper,  334 
Liliedale,  Dr  Oscar,  of  Argentina,  75-76, 
93 

Lillo,  Eusebio,  of  Chile,  338,  339,  480 
Lima,  Viana  de,  of  Brazil,  135 
Lima,  Peru : 

The  Gutierrez  Conspiracy,  1872,  513- 
514 

Insurrection,  1879.  475 
Chilian  Occupation,  Jan.  16,  1881,  489 
Attack  of  Lima  by  Rebel  Armies, 
1884-85,  523;  1895,  526-527 
San  Marcos  University,  536 
The  Plaza  de  la  Inquisicion,  540 
Other  References,  483,  536,  537,  539, 
551,  552 

Lima,  Cruiser,  167-168 
Limache,  Chile,  380,  431 
Limena,  Peruvian  Steamer,  473 
Linares,  Dr,  President  of  Bolivia,  31 
Linnares,  Chile,  421 
Liquor  Traffic,  see  Alcoholism 
Lira,  Carlos,  of  Chile,  387 
Listarria,  Sehor,  of  Chile,  340 
Llamas,  568,  572 

Liana,  J'ulian  de  la,  in  Uruguay,  207 
Llanos,  17,  605,  612,  634,  640 
Llanquihue,  Chile,  416,  421,  430 
Loa,  Chilian  Armed  Transport,  454-455  ; 

destroyed,  1880,  478-479 
Lobo,  Aristides,  of  Brazil,  251 
Lobo,  Dr  Fernando,  of  Brazil,  304 
Lobos,  Ids.,  499 
Lo  Canas,  Chile,  367 
Locumba  River,  469 
Loja,  Ecuador,  585 
Lomas  Valentinas  (Hills),  174,  179 
London  Pacific  Company,  550 
Lopez,  Gen.,  of  Venezuela,  1SS7,  619 
Lopez,  Benigno,  173 
Lopez,  Don  Carlos,  First  Consul  in  Para- 
guay, 25 

Lopez,  Gen.  Francisco  Solano, 
Biographical,  140 
First  Consul  in  Paraguay,  25 
Dictator  of  Paraguay,  39 
Gen.  Lopez  and  Uruguay.  131,  134 
His  War  against  Brazil,  135 
Gen.  Lopez  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
39,  135-186 

Marshal  of  the  Army,  137 


700 


INDEX 


Lopez,  Gen.  Francisco  Solano — cont. 

Death  of  Gen.  Lopez,  1870,  186 
Lopez,  Dr  Lucio  V. , 

Governor  of  Buenos  Aires,  1893,  102, 
105-106 

Dr  Lopez  and  Col.  Sarmiento,  105-106 
Lopez,  Dr  Luzio,  and  the  Union  Civica 
in  Argentina,  1887,  75,  76 
Lopez,  Dr  Vicente, 

President  of  Argentina,  32,  33 
Partisan  of  the  Union  Civica,  75,  76,  79 
Minister  of  Finance  in  Argentina,  8S 
Lorena,  Capt.,  Provisional  President  of 
Brazil,  265-286 
Los  Andes,  Venezuela,  642 
Los  Angeles,  Peru,  516 
Lota,  Chile,  425 

Lubiaga,  Lieut.  Col.,  Peruvian  Com- 
mander, 459 

Lucena,  Baron,  of  Brazil,  252 
Luco,  Ramon  Barros,  of  Chile,  340,  346, 
389-391,  400,  670 
Lujan,  Buenos  Aires,  56 
Lynch,  Capt.  Patricio,  Chilian  Com- 
mander in  the  Chilian-Peruvian  War, 
479-480,  481-487,  493-495 
Lynch,  Madame,  referred  to,  140,  185, 
186 

Lynch,  Chilian  Torpedo-Boat,  357,  363, 
364,  379 

MacCavn,  Adm.,  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  Revolution  in  Chile,  1891, 
360,  363 

Maciel  or  Conselheiro,  Antonio,  and  the 
Jaguncos  of  Canudos,  296-302 
Mackenna,  Benjamen  Vicuna,  of  Chile, 
329 

Madeira,  Brazilian  Warship,  263 
Madeiros,  Col.,  of  Brazil,  300 
Magalhaes,  Coelho,  162 
Magalhaes,  Col.  Marciano  de  of  Brazil, 
251 

Magallanes,  Chile,  421 

Mayallanes,  Chilian  Gunboat,  328,  346, 

' 347,  349,  442,  454 
Magdalena,  Colombia,  21,  595 
Magdalena,  near  Lima,  Peru,  494 
Magellan,  Straits  of,  420,  425 
Magnasco,  Dr,  of  Argentina,  115,  124, 
125 

Maipo,  Chilian  Transport,  365,  366 
Maipti,  Chilian  Warship,  354 
Maypu,  Chile:  Battle  Apr.  5,  1818,  25 
Maldonado,  Uruguay,  207 
Malleco,  Chile,  421 
Malpartida,  Seiior,  of  Peru,  527 
Manantiales  de  San  Juan,  Uruguay,  203 
Manco  Capac,  Peruvian  Monitor,  443, 
468,  472 


Manduvira  River,  182 
Manuelita,  Daughter  of  Dictator  Rosas, 
36-37 

Mapocho,  Chilian  Steamer,  365 
Maracaibo,  Venezuela,  612,  635 
Marajd,  Brazilian  Warship,  263  ' 
Marah.on,  Peruvian  Schoolship,  493 
Marcilio  Dias,  Brazilian  Warship,  263, 
264 

Maria  of  Portugal,  14 
Marohas,  Uruguay,  200 
Marquez,  Dr,  President  of  Colombia,  28 
Marquis  d'Olinda,  Brazilian  Ship,  135 
Marriage  Laws,  etc.  : in  Uruguay,  210; 
in  Chile,  332,  336;  in  Peru,  528;  in 
Venezuela,  637 
Marroquin,  J.  M., 

Vice-President  of  Colombia,  599-600 
President  of  Colombia,  600 
Marie,  Brazilian  Merchant  Ship,  263 
Martens,  Dr,  referred  to,  628 
Martinez,  Col. , of  Chile,  486 
Martinez,  Carlos  Walker,  of  Chile,  360, 
386-387 

Martyr,  Major  Diocletiano,  Brazilian 
Conspirator,  304 

Matias  Cuusiho,  Chilian  Transport,  454, 
476 

Matta,  Juan  Gonzalo,  365 
Matte,  Augusto,  of  Chile,  339,  364 
Matte,  Eduardo,  of  Chile,  360,  392-395, 
400 

Mattera,  Mgr.  Gigi,  59 
Matto  Grosso,  Brazil,  135-136,  140-142, 
149,  151,  153,  162 

Maturana,  Gen.,  Chilian  Commander, 

482 

Maule,  Chile,  421 
Mejillones,  435-436,  454,  457 
Meigarejo,  Col.,  President  of  Bolivia,  31, 
137 

Mello,  Adm.  Custodio  de,  of  Brazil : 
Leader  of  Risings  in  Rio  de  Janeiro, 
255-256,  259.  286 
His  Manifesto,  Sepr.  1893,  260 
Other  References,  251,  311 
Mello,  Marcellino  Bispo  de,  Assassin,  303 
Mendez,  Lopez,  in  Venezuela,  22 
Mendoza,  Don  Andres  Hurtado  de,  11 
Mendoza,  Major,  in  Uruguay,  198 
Mendoza,  Argentina,  161 
Mercedes,  Uruguay,  207 
Meteoro,  Peruvian  Schoolship,  493 
Mexico  : 

Spanish  Conquest  of  Mexico.  7,  8 
Montezuma  and  the  Astecs,  7 
Meza,  Pedro  Tablo,  of  Chile,  358 
Minas,  Uruguay,  208 
Minas  Geraes,  Brazil,  309,  314 
Mindello,  Portuguese  Warship,  280 


INDEX 


701 


Mines  and  Mineral  Wealth : of  South 
America,  17,  654  ; of  Chile,  421-425  ; 
of  Peru,  548-551  ; of  Bolivia,  573- 
574;  of  Ecuador,  589  ; of  Colombia, 
613-614;  of  Venezuela,  641-642 
Mi  rati  ores,  Peru  : 

Battle,  Jan.  1881,  488-489,  522 
Other  References,  484,  487 
Miranda,  Brazil,  136 

Misiones  Dispute  between  Brazil  and 
Argentina,  137,  245  ; settled,  1895, 
109,  112,  116,  289 
Mitre,  Gen.  Bartolome, 

Leader  of  the  Portenos,  38,  47 
President  of  Argentina,  1861,  38-40, 
42 

President  Mitre  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  134-166,  187 

Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of  Argen- 
tina, 1874,  43 

His  Attitude  to  the  Tiro  Nacional  of 
Buenos  Aires,  45 
Mitre  and  Itoea,  92-93,  94 
Other  References,  54,  161,  165 
Mitre,  Gen.  Emilio,  45 
Mocangue,  Brazil,  269 
Molina,  Rear-Adm.  Francisco,  of  Chile, 
390 

Mollendo,  Peru,  449,  469,  574 
Monagas,  Gen.,  President  of  Venezuela, 
28 

Monroe  Doctrine  and  South  America,  25- 

26,  623 

Monte  Santo,  Brazil,  300 
Montero,  Adm.  Lizardo, 

Peruvian  Commander,  468,  470,  474, 
486 

Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of  Peru, 
1875,  517 

Vice-President  of  Peru,  Mar.  1881,  494 
President  of  Peru,  Aug.  1881,  495,  501, 
506 

Monteverde,  Gen.,  in  Venezuela,  21 
Montezuma  and  the  Astecs,  7 
Montoyo,  Sergeant,  Assassin,  519 
Moult,  Ismael  Perez,  of  Chile,  392 
Montt,  Adm.  Jorge, 

Chilian  Naval  Commander,  346,  379 
Provisional  Government  at  Iquique 
(Apr.  1891)  under  Capt.  Montt, 
358 

Proclamation  of  Adm.  Montt,  Sept. 
1891,  384,  389 

President  of  Chile,  Dec.  1891-Sept. 
1896,  390-405 

His  Administration,  397-405 
Montt,  Manuel,  President  of  Chile,  30, 

323-324 

Montt,  Pedro,  of  Chile,  338,  339,  360, 
361,  394-395,  400,  408-409,  670 


Moore,  Capt.,  Peruvian  Naval  Com- 
mander, 450,  453 
Moors  in  Spain,  4,  6 
Moquegua,  Peru,  469,  481,  518 
Moraes,  Col.  Mendes  de,  303 
Moraes,  Dr  Prudente  de. 

Republican,  239,  251 
President  of  Brazil,  1894,  283-304,  306 
The  President  and  the  Pacification  of 
Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  1895,  290-293 
Temporary  Retirement  of  President 
Moraes,  1896,  294 

His  Return  to  Rio  de  Janeiro,  1897, 

296 

The  Canudos  Campaigns,  296-302 
Conspiracy  against  President  Moraes, 
303 

Morales,  Col.,  in  Buenos  Aires,  56,  58 
Moreira,  Col., 

Military  Commandant  at  Desterro,  286 
Commander  of  Expedition  against 
Canudos,  298-301 
Moreno  of  Argentina,  24,  32 
Moreno,  President,  of  Ecuador,  assassin- 
ated, 1875,  29,  578 

Moreno,  Dr,  and  the  Chilian  Boundary 
Commission  in  1899,  113-114 
Morilla,  Gen.,  at  Cartagena,  22 
Moriiiigo,  President,  of  Paraguay,  1894, 
190 

Morris,  Rev.  Mr,  of  Buenos  Aires,  124- 
125 

Morro  Hill,  Arica,  471-473 
Morro  Solar:  Fighting,  Jan.  13,  1881, 
484,  486-487 

Mosquera,  Gen.,  President  of  Colombia, 

28 

Mowbray,  Lieut.  Beauchamp,  266 
Munecas,  Dr,  of  Tucuman,  49 
Municipal  Government,  etc.  : in  Chile, 
400 ; in  Peru,  539 ; in  Venezuela, 

635 

Munis,  Col.  Angel,  of  Uruguay,  207 
Munoz,  Col.,  in  Brazil,  134 
Munoz,  Dr  Jose  Maria,  Candidate  for 
the  Presidency  of  Uruguay,  204 

Nauuco,  Joaquin,  of  Brazil,  238,  307 
Napoleon  and  the  Peninsidar  War,  13 
Navarro,  Dr,  of  Catamarca,  49 
Negroes  : in  South  America,  10  ; in  Peru, 
532 

Netto,  Gen.,  Brazilian  Commander,  133, 
141,  155 

New  Granada,  see  Colombia 
New  York , U.S.  Warship,  277 
Newark , U.S.  Warship,  277 
Nicaragua  and  the  Panama  Canal,  601 
Nictheroy,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Brazil,  253, 
262,  263,  265,  266 


702 


INDEX 


Nielheroy , Brazilian  Warship,  268 
Nitrate  Industry  of  Atacama,  Tarapaca, 
etc. , the  Dispute  of  Peru  with  Chile, 
and  the  Chilian  Occupation  of  Ata- 
cama, Tarapaca,  etc.,  414,  420-423, 
437,  480,  498,  516-517,  520,  555-556 
Novidades,  Brazilian  Newspaper,  256 
Novo  Friburgo,  Brazil,  310 
Novoa  Jovino,  of  Chile,  498 
Nuble,  Chile,  421 
Nueva  Coimbra,  Brazil,  135 
Numancia,  Spanish  Warship,  326,  509 
Nunez,  Capt.  Castro  Mendez,  Spanish 
Naval  Commander,  326,  509-510 
Nunez,  Rafael,  President  of  Colombia, 
1880,  593-594;  1884-94,  595-599 
Nunez,  Velasco,  de  Vela,  11 

Obes,  Dr  Julio  Herrera  y.  President  of 
Uruguay,  213-215 
O’Connor,  Capt,  of  Argentina,  82 
O’Higgins,  Gen.,  in  Chile,  25,  30 
O'Higgins,  Chile,  421 
O' Higgins,  Chilian  Corvette,  327  ; in  the 
Chilian-Peruvian  War,  1879-81, 
442,  449-460,  488 ; in  the  Chilian 
Civil  War,  1891,  346,  347,  349,  354 
O'Higgins,  New  Chilian  Warship,  399 
Oil  Industry  in  Peru,  550,  673 
Olaneto,  Senor,  of  Bolivia,  434 
Olave,  Col.,  in  Uruguay,  198 
Oliveira,  Major,  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
185 

Oliveira,  Joao  Alfredo  Correa  de,  of 
Brazil,  238 

Olivera,  Argentina,  56 
Olmos,  Col.  Lisandro,  at  Cordoba,  52, 
66 

Olney,  Richard,  and  the  Boundary 
Dispute  between  Venezuela  and 
British  Guiana,  623 

Oribe,  Ignacio,  President  of  Uruguay, 
31 

Oribe,  Manuel,  President  of  Uruguay, 
31 

Orinoco  River,  643 
Orion,  Brazilian  Warship,  263 
Ortiz,  Gregorio,  Assassin,  212 
Oruro,  Bolivia,  562,  567,  571,  574 
Osborn,  Mr,  U.S.  Minister  at  Santiago, 
480 

Oscar,  Gen.  Arturo,  Commander  in 
Expedition  against  Canudos,  299- 
302 

Oscurra,  Paraguay,  184 
Osorio,  Gen.,  in  Chile,  1818,  25 
Osorio,  Gen.,  Brazilian  Commander  in 
the  Paraguayan  War,  133,  153-187 
Osorio,  Gen.  Rocha,  of  Brazil,  1891,  255 
Osorno,  Chile,  416 


Ospina,  Mariano,  President  of  Colombia, 

28 

Otalora,  Gen.,  President  of  Colombia, 

594-595 

Ouro  Preto,  Vizconde  de,  of  Brazil,  241, 

299 

Ouro  Preto,  Brazil,  314 
Ovalle,  Juan,  of  Chile,  358 
Ovalle,  Chile,  347 
Ovando,  Gen. , of  Colombia,  28 
Oviedo,  Dr,  of  Peru,  495 

Pacasmayo,  Peru,  479 
Pacheco,  Senor,  President  of  Bolivia, 
1884,  557 

Pacocha,  Peru,  468,  515 

Pacto  de  Tregua,  Apr.  4,  1884,  332,  501 ; 

ratified,  Nov.  29, 1884,  503,  557 
Padilla,  Major  Julio,  376 
Paez,  Gen., 

Hero  in  the  War  of  Independence  in 
Venezuela,  22 
President  of  Venezuela,  28 
Palacios,  Bishop,  referred  to,  173 
Palacios,  President,  of  Venezuela,  1889, 
621 

Palacios,  Lieut.  Enrique,  Peruvian 
Naval  Commander,  1879,  456 
Pallas,  Brazilian  Merchant  Ship,  264, 
273 

Palleja,  Col.,  on  the  Battle  of  Yatay, 
145-146 

Palomas,  Uruguay,  208 
Pampas,  17 

Panama,  Isthmus  and  Canal : 

Treaty  with  the  United  States,  28; 
renewed  1865,  28 

Panama  Canal,  28,  601,  614,  655-656 
Secession  from  Colombia,  1903,  601 
Other  References,  595,  600,  675 
Panama  City : 

Free  Port,  28 

United  States  Troops,  at  Panama, 
1885,  597 

Capture  of  Panama  by  Insurgents, 

1898,  600 

Panama  Hats,  552 
Pando,  Col., 

Leader  of  Insurrection  in  Bolivia,  1898- 
99,  560-561 

Chief  Magistrate  of  Bolivia,  561,  673 
Para,  Brazil,  255,  575 
Para,  Warship,  166 
Paraguay : 

Early  Catholic  Missions,  9 
Defeat  of  Gen.  Brengano,  1810,  24 
Emancipation  from  Spain,  1811,  25 
Dr  R.  de  Francia  and  F.  Yegros 
nominated  First  Consuls,  1811, 
25 


INDEX 


70S 


Paraguay — continued 
Don  Carlos  Lopez,  First  Consul,  1841, 
25 

Gen.  Francisco  Solano  Lopez,  First 
Consul,  1862,  25 

Aggressive  Attitude  of  Gen.  Lopez 
towards  Argentina,  39 
The  Paraguayan  War  — Argentina, 
Uruguay,  and  Brazil  against 
Paraguay,  1865-70,  39,  130-195, 
210 

Origin  of  the  War,  131-135 
Entente  between  Uruguay  and  Para- 
guay, 131 

Alliance  with  Bolivia,  136 
Gen.  Lopez  and  Uruguay,  134 
Declaration  of  War  in  Brazil,  1864, 

135 

Invasion  of  Matto  Grosso,  1864,  135- 

136 

Capture  of  Nueva  Coimbra,  Dec., 

1864,  135 

Congress  at  Asuncion,  137 
The  Army  in  1865,  138 
Occupation  of  Corrientes,  Apr. , 1865, 
138-139,  141-142 

Alliance  between  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Uruguay  against  Paraguay, 
May  1,  1865,  139,  210 
Importance  of  the  Parana  and  Para- 
guay Rivers,  137,  139,  140 
Plan  of  Campaign,  140,  141,  148 
Distribution  of  the  Army,  141 
Recapture  of  Corrientes  by  the 
Argentines,  May  25,  1865,  142 
Battle  of  the  Riachuelo,  June  11, 

1865,  143 

Advance  towards  Uruguay,  145 
Operations  near  San  Borge,  June  15, 
1865,  143 

Invasion  of  Rio  Grande,  144 
Mutiny  in  Entre  Rios,  Argentina, 
144 

Gen.  Flores  appointed  Commander 
of  the  Allied  Vanguard,  144 
Conditions  in  Uruguay,  145 
Battle  of  Yatay,  Aug.  17,  1865,  145 
Occupation  of  Uruguayana,  Sept, 
1865,  146-147 

Surrender  of  Col.  Estigarribia,  Sept 
18,  1865,  147 

Preparations  for  Defence  of  Para- 
guay, 148 

The  Lopez  Administration  in  Matto 
Grosso,  148 

Consultation  of  Argentine,  Brazilian, 
and  Paraguayan  Representa- 
tives, 150 

Peace  Proposals  refused  by  Brazil, 
151 


Paraguay — continued 
The  Paraguayan  War — continued 
Corrientes  as  the  Base  of  Operations, 
151 

Defences  of  the  Parana,  151,  152 
Engagements  at  Paso  de  La  Patria, 
152,  153 

Raid  to  Itati,  Feb.,  1866,  152 
Reconnaissance  of  Paraguayan  Posi- 
tions, 153 

Engagements  on  the  Parana,  Apr., 

1866,  153 

Camp  near  Fort  Itapiru,  153 
Surprise  of  Allies,  154 
Advance  into  Paraguay,  154 
Battle  of  May  20,  1866,  154 
Discontent  in  Allied  Army,  156 
Engagements  of  July  15  and  18, 1866. 
156 

Expedition  against  Curupaite,  157 
Engagement  at  Curuzii,  Sept.  2, 

1866,  157 

Garrison  of  Curuzu,  158 
Peace  Proposals  by  Lopez,  158,  159 
Attack  upon  Curupaiti,  Sept,  1866, 
159-160 

Military  Changes,  160 

Marshal  Caxias’s  Invasion,  July, 

1867,  161-162 

Occupation  of  Rio  Hondo,  162 
Situation  in  Matto  Grosso,  162 
Operations  at  Humaita,  163,  164, 
165,  166 

Capture  of  Villa  del  Pilar,  and  Tayi, 
Sept.  1867,  164 

Engagement  at  Tuyuti,  Nov.,  1867, 
164-165 

Capture  of  Rojas,  1868,  168 
Capitulation  of  Curupaiti,  1868,  168 
Bombardment  of  Humaita,  Apr., 

1868,  168 

Attempt  to  seize  the  Monitor  Rio 
Grande,  169 

Assault  on  Humaita,  July,  1868, 
169 

Occupation  of  Humaita  by  the 
Allies,  July,  1868,  170-171 
Conditions  at  Tibicuari,  172-173 
Fighting  on  the  River  Canabe,  Sept. , 
1868,  175,  176,  177,  179 
Assault  on  Agostura,  Dec.,  1868,  176, 
177 

Capture  of  Villeta,  Dec.,  1868,  177 
Hostilities  resumed,  Dec.  20,  1868, 
179 

Action  of  Dec.  20,  1868,  180 
Surrender  of  Agostura,  Dec.  30, 
1868,  180 

Occupation  of  Asuncion,  180 
Mission  of  Senor  Parunhos,  181 


704 


INDEX 


Paraguay — continued 

The  Paraguayan  War — continued 
Provisional  Government  at  Asun- 
cion, 182 

Engagement  at  the  River  Manduvira, 

" 182 

Fight  at  Sapucay,  July,  1869,  183 
Attack  on  Peribebuy,  July  12,  1869, 
183-184 

Evacuation  of  Oscurra  and  Caacupf 
by  Lopez,  184 

Engagement  at  Yagari,  Aug.,  1869, 

185 

Action  at  Campo  Grande,  185 
Death  of  Lopez,  Mar.,  1870,  186 
Treaty  of  Peace,  July,  1870,  186 
Uruguay  and  the  War  Indemnity, 
210 

Death  of  Gen.  Lopez,  Mar.,  1870, 
186 

Cirilo  Rivarola,  President,  1870,  186- 

188 

Population  of  Paraguay,  1870,  187 
Political  Situation,  188-189 
Resignation  of  President  Rivarola, 
1872,  188 

Assassination  of  Ex-President  Rivarola, 
1872,  188 

Salvador  Jovellanos,  President,  1872, 
188-189 

Senor  Gill,  President,  1874,  189 
President  Gill  assassinated,  1875,  189 
Senor  Uriarte,  President,  1875,  187, 

189 

Senor  Baredo,  President,  1875,  189 
Senor  Saguier,  President,  1875,  189 
Gen.  Caballero,  President,  1882,  189 
Senor  Escobar,  President,  1886,  190 
Senor  Gonzalez,  President,  1890,  190 
President  Gonzalez  deposed,  1894, 

190 

Senor  Morinigo,  President,  1894,  190 
J.  B.  Egusquiza,  President,  1894,  190- 

191 

Boundary  Dispute  with  Bolivia,  191 
Relations  with  Uruguay,  191 
Emilio  Aceval,  President,  1898,  191 
Juan  B.  Escurra,  President,  1902,  191 
The  Constitution  of  Paraguay,  188 
Agriculture,  etc. , 1 92 
Population,  187,  193 
Australians  at  San  Cosme,  194 
Education,  194 
Paraguay  River,  139-140 
Parana,  Brazil,  283,  310 
Parana  River : 

The  Parana  as  a Waterway,  33 
The  Parana  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
137-148,  151-154 

Paranagua,  Brazil,  273,  280,  284 


Pardo,  Manuel, 

Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of  Peru, 

512-513 

President  of  Peru,  1872,  515-517 
Assassination  of  Pardo,  1878,  518-519 
Pareja,  Adm.  Jose  Manuel,  Spanish 
Commander,  326,  507-509 
Parish,  Sir  Woodbine,  in  Argentina,  24 
Paroja,  Gen.,  in  Chile,  25 
Parra,  Aquites,  President  of  Colombia, 
593 

Parunhos,  Senhor,  of  Brazil,  181 
Paso  de  la  Patria,  152,  153 
Patagonia : 

Catholic  Missions,  9 
Patagonian  Indians,  15 
Public  Works,  118 
Sheep-Farming,  430 
President  Roca  in  Patagonia  in  1899, 
114-115 

Unpromising  Future,  674 
Patillos,  Chile,  348 

Paul,  Dr  Rojas,  of  Venezuela,  620,  621 
Paunero.Gen. , Argentine  Commander  in 
the  Paraguayan  War, 143-147, 161, 187 
Pavon,  Argentina  : Battle,  Oct.  1861,  38, 
40 

Paysandu,  Uruguay,  132-133,  201,  202, 
205,  207,  208 
Payta,  Peru,  479 

Paz,  Dr  Maximo,  Governor  of  Buenos 
Aires,  84 
Pedro  I.,  14 
Pedro  II.  : 

His  Personality,  232,  233 
Emperor  of  Brazil,  14-15,  232-244,  313 
Pedro  and  the  Paraguayan  War,  147, 
151,  160 

His  Visits  to  Europe,  232,  236 
His  Return  to  Brazil,  1888,  240 
Deposition  of  the  Emperor,  and  His 
Return  to  Portugal,  1889,  243 
Death  of  Pedro,  1891,  257 
Peixoto,  Gen.  Floriano,  of  Brazil 
Republican,  239 

Leader  of  Military  Conspiracy,  242 
Vice-President  of  Brazil,  245 
President  of  Brazil,  1891,  256-288 
Revolt  against  the  President,  258-288 
Pellegrini,  Carlos, 

Biographical.  48 

Argentine  Minister  of  War  in  1880,  54, 
55 

Argentine  Minister  of  War  in  1885,  65 
Vice-President  of  Argentina  in  1886, 
73 

President  of  Argentina,  S5-98 
Other  Reference,  110 
Pelotas,  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  Brazil,  255 
Pena,  Capt.,  Chilian  Commander,  478 


INDEX 


705 


Pena,  Benigno,  of  Chile,  358 
Pena,  Dr  Luis  Saenz,  Candidate  for  the 
Presidency  of  Argentina,  94-96 
President  of  Argentina,  96-108 
His  Financial  Policy,  105 
His  Resignation,  107-108 
Pena,  Dr  Roque  Saenz,  President  of 
Argentina,  663 
Pena  Blanca,  Chile,  375 
Peninsular  War  and  Brazil,  13 
Penna,  Dr  Affonso,  666 
Pereira,  Leite,  173 
Pereira,  Luis,  of  Chile,  396 
Pereira,  Dr  Victorino,  Vice-President  of 
Brazil,  294,  296 

Pereyra,  Leonardo,of  Argentina, 75-76, 93 
Perez,  Gen.,  Bolivian  Commander,  470 
Perez,  Jose  Joaquin, 

President  of  Chile,  1861,  324-327 
His  Policy  in  the  War  with  Spain, 
1865-66,  326-327 

President  of  Chile,  1866,  327-328 
Perez,  Col.  Maximo,  Leader  of  Revolt 
in  Uruguay,  199,  205 
Perez,  Dr  Roque,  of  Buenos  Aires,  41 
Peribebuy,  Paraguay,  182,  183 
Pernambuco,  Brazil,  274 
Peru  : Inca  Civilisation,  7,  8,  16 
Spanish  Rule,  8,  10,  12 
Defeat  of  Almagro  at  Cuzco,  1538,  8 
Francisco  and  Gonzalo  Pizarro,  8,  10- 
11,  539-540 

Viceroy  Velasco  Nunez  de  Vela  de- 
feated near  Quito,  1546,  11 
Don  Andres  Hurtado  de  Mendoza, 
Viceroy,  11 

Spanish  Monopoly  of  Official  Posts,  12 
The  Aymara  Indians,  16,  534,  538 
Struggle  for  Independence,  23 
Spanish  defeated  by  Lord  Cochrane, 
1820,  23 

Gen.  San  Martin  at  Lima,  Callao, 
etc.,  23 

Defeat  of  Spanish  by  Bolivar  at  Junin, 
Aug.  6,  1824,  23 

Spanish  defeated  by  Gen.  Sucre  at 
Ayacueho,  Dec.  9,  1824,  43 
Jose  de  la  Riva  Aguero,  President, 
1823,  29 

Gen.  Lamar,  President,  1827,  29 
Gen.  Gamarra,  President,  1829,  29 
Gen.  Santa  Cruz  and  Gen.  Salaverry, 
29 

Gen.  Ramon  Castilla,  President,  1845, 

29,  30 

Gen.  Echenique,  President,  29 
President  Echenique  deposed,  1855, 
29 

Gen.  Ramon  Castilla,  President,  1855, 

30,  506 


Peru — continued 
Constitution  of,  1860,  505-506 
Col.  Balta,  President,  1862,  30 
Gen.  San  Roman,  President,  1862,  506 
Gen.  Pezet,  Vice-President,  506-508 
Gen.  Canseco,  Second  Vice-President, 
506 

Disputes  with  Spain,  1863,  506-508 
Spanish  Squadron  in  Peruvian  Waters, 
1863,  506-508 

Incident  at  Talambo,  1863,  506-507 
Revolt  under  Gen.  Prado  and  Gen. 

Canseco,  Feb.-Nov.,  1865,  506-508 
Gen.  Prado,  President,  1865,  508-511 
Peru  and  the  Paraguayan  War,  1865, 
137,  151 

Alliances  with  Chile,  Ecuador,  and 
Bolivia,  Dec.,  1865,  326-327,  508 
The  Chincha  Ids.,  Dispute  between 
Spain  and  Peru,  1864-65,  326,  333, 
507-508 

War  with  Spain  of  Chile  and  Peru, 
1865-66,  326-327,  508-510 
Naval  Engagement  near  Abtao, 
Feb.  6,  1866,  509 

Spanish  Bombardment  of  Val- 
paraiso, Mar.  31,  326-327,  509 
Spanish  Bombardment  of  Callao, 
May  2,  509-510,  517-520 
Withdrawal  of  Spanish  Squadron, 
May  12,  510 

Other  References  to  the  War,  see 
under  Chile 

Dictatorship  of  Gen.  Prado,  510 
Revision  of  the  Constitution,  1867, 
510 

Gen.  Prado,  Constitutional  President, 
1867,  510 

Revolt  against  President  Prado  under 
Gen.  Canseco  and  Col.  Jose 
Balta,  1867,  510-511 
Gen.  Luis  de  La  Fuerta,  Vice- 
President,  511 

Resignation  of  President  Prado,  Jan. 
6,  1868,  511 

Gen.  Canseco,  Acting  President,  511 
Constitutional  Reforms  of  1867  re- 
voked, 511 

Col.  Jose  Balta,  President,  Aug.,  1868, 
511-513 

The  Financial  Situation,  511-512 
Public  Works,  512 

The  Gutierrez  Conspiracy  in  Lima 
and  Callao,  1872,  512-514 
Assassination  of  President  Balta,  1872, 
513-514 

Mariano  Herencia  Zevallos,  Vice- 
President,  514 

Manuel  Pardo,  President  of  Peru, 
1872.  512-513,  515-517 

2 Y 


706 


INDEX 


Peru — continued 
Reforms,  515 

Revolt  under  Nicolas  de  Pierola,  1874, 
515-516 

Pardo’s  Foreign  Policy,  516-517 
Secret  Alliance  between  Bolivia  and 
Peru,  1873,  436,  441,  517,  555 
Gen.  Prado  re-elected  President,  1875, 
450,  474-475,  517-520 
Gen.  La  Puerta,  Vice-President,  474 
Conspiracies  under  Nicolas  de  Pierola, 
1876  and  1878,  518 
Treaty  with  Spain,  1878,  518 
Assassination  of  Ex-President  Pardo, 
Sept.  22,  1878,  518-519 
The  Guano  Deposits  and  the  Nitrate 
Industry  of  Atacama,  and  the 
Disputes  between  Bolivia  and 
Chile,  Peruvian  Intrigues  in 
Bolivia,  the  Chilian  War  with 
Peru  and  Bolivia,  1879-84,  and 
the  Chilian  Occupation  of  Ata- 
cama, Tarapaca,  Tacna  and  Arica. 
433-504 

Atacama  and  its  Guano  Deposits 
and  Nitrate  Industry,  433  et 
seq.,  519-520 

Peruvian  Intrigues  in  Bolivia,  and 
Secret  Treaty  between  Peru  and 
Bolivia,  1873,  436,  441,  517, 
555 

Peruvian  Intrigues  in  Bolivia,  1875- 
78,  437-438,  555 

Peruvian  Proposal  of  Arbitration 
between  Bolivia  and  Chile,  439- 
440 

Chilian  Declaration  of  War  against 
Peru,  Apr.  5,  1879,  440-441,  520 
The  Peruvian  Navy,  443 
Military  Forces,  444-445 
President  Prado,  Commander  of  the 
Peruvian  Army,  474,  520 
Operations  of  the  Chilian  Squadron, 
448-449 

Pisagua  bombarded  by  Chilians, 

449 

Naval  Action  off  Iquique,  May  20, 
and  Loss  of  the  Independencia, 
450-453 

Peruvian  Reprisals,  463-454 
The  Huascar  captured  by  Chilians, 
Oct.  8,  454-457 

The  Pilcomayo  captured  by  Chilians, 
Nov.  17,  457 

Chilian  Invasion  of  Tarapaca,  458- 
460,  520 

Battle  of  Pisagua,  Nov.  2,  460-461 
Chilian  Occupation  of  Junin,  461 
Skirmish  near  Agua  Santa,  Nov. 
6,  461-462 


Peru — continued 

The  Guano  Deposits,  etc. — continued 
Battle  at  San  Francisco,  Dolores, 
Nov.  16,  462-464 

Chilian  Occupation  of  Iquique,  Nov. 

20,  464 

Battle  of  Tarapaca,  Nov.  27,  465- 
467 

Adm.  Montero  in  Command  of  the 
Peruvian  Army,  Nov.  26,  1879, 
474 

Chilian  Invasion  of  Tacna  and  Arica, 
Feb.  1880,  468-470 
Battle  of  Tacna,  May  26,  470-471 
Battle  of  Arica,  June  7,  472-473 
Blockade  of  Callao  by  Chilians, 
1880,  475-479,  483,  493 
Chorillos,  etc.,  bombarded  by 
Chilians,  Sept.  1880,  479-480 
Efforts  of  the  United  States  for 
Peace,  Oct.,  1880,  and  Confer- 
ence on  the  Lackawana,  480- 
481 

Chilian  Demands  rejected,  481 
Pisco  and  Yea  occupied  by  Chilians, 
Nov.,  1880,  482 

Naval  Action  at  Callao,  Dec.  6, 

483 

Defences  of  Lima,  483-485 
Battle  of  Chorillos,  Jan.  13,  1881, 
485-487 

Fighting  on  Morro  Solar,  Jan.  13, 
487 

Armistice,  Jan.  15,  488 
Battle  of  Miraflores,  Jan.  15,  488- 
489,  522 

Lima  occupied  by  Chilians,  Jan.  16, 
489-500 

Panic  in  Lima,  490-491 
The  Urban  Guard,  491 
Chilian  Acts  of  Vandalism,  492-493 
Peruvian  Guerilla  Warfare  against 
Chilians,  1882,  495-496 
Capture  of  Arequipa  by  Chilians, 
Aug.,  1883,  496 

Gen.  Iglesias  and  Peace,  496-497 
Treaty  of  Peace  (Treaty  of  Ancon) 
between  Chile  and  Peru,  Oct. 
20,  1883,  497-500 ; ratified,  May 
8,  1884,  332,  403,  407,  500-501, 
523,  529 

Lima  evacuated  by  Chilians,  Oct. 
22,  1883,  500 

Tarapaca  ceded  to  Chile,  498 
Chilian  Occupation  of  Tarapaca, 
414,  420-423,  437,  480,  498,  516- 
517,  520 

Chilian  Occupation  of  Tacna  and 
Arica,  • 403-404,  407,  468-473, 
481,  498,  502,  529,  556 


INDEX 


707 


Peru — continued 

The  Guano  Deposits,  etc. — continued 
Chilian  Occupation  of  Atacama,  437, 
517,  555-556 

Other  References  to  the  War,  see 
under  Bolivia,  Chile 
President  Prado’s  Flight  to  Europe, 
Dec.,  1879,  474-475,520 
Conspiracy  under  Nicolas  de  Pierola, 
Dec.,  1879,  475,520-521 
Resignation  of  Gen.  de  La  Puerta,  Vice- 
President,  Dec.,  1879,  520-521 
Nicolas  de  Pierola,  President,  1879, 
475,  520-522 

Dr  F.  G.  Calderon,  President,  Mar.  12, 
1881,  494-495 

Adm.  Montero,  Vice-President,  494 
Adm.  Montero,  President,  Aug.  1881, 
495 

Ministry  of  Capt.  Camilo  Carrillo,  495 
Nicolas  Pierola,  Provisional  President, 
1881,  495 

Gen.  Miguel  Iglesias,  President,  1883, 
496-497,  522-524 

Revolt  under  Gen.  Caceres,  1884-85, 
523-524 

Gen.  Caceres,  President,  1886,  524-525 
Col.  Morales  Bermudez,  President, 
1890,  524-525 

Pedro  A.  del  Solar  and  Col.  Borgono, 
Vice-Presidents,  525-526 
Col.  Arrate  of  Chile  in  Peru,  Apr. , 1891, 
354 

Gen.  Caceres,  President,  1894,  526 
Revolt  under  Pierola,  1894-95,  526-527, 
538 

Provisional  Government  under  Senor 
Candamo,  1895,  527 
Pierola,  President,  1895,  527-528,  542, 
544 

Insurrection  in  Iquitos,  527 
New  Electoral  Law,  527-528 
Civil  Marriages,  528 
Boundary  Dispute  with  Colombia, 
1895,  529 

Other  Boundary  Disputes,  529 
Senor  Ilomana,  President,  1899,  528- 
529 

Revolution  under  Senor  Durand,  528 
Manuel  Candamo,  President,  1903,  529 
Population,  530-534 
Races  of  Perii,  531-534 
Alcoholism,  533 
Language,  533-534 
Topography,  534 
Education,  534-536 
Administration  of  Justice,  536-537 
The  Catholic  Church,  537-538,  540,  541 
National  Character,  538-539 
Municipal  Government,  539 


Peru — continued 
Finance,  541-544 
Industries,  545-552 
Sugar-Growing,  545-546 
Cotton  Industry,  546-547,  552 
Coffee,  etc.,  547 
Cattle  and  Sheep,  547-548 
Mineral  Wealth,  548-550 
Oil,  550 

Guano  Exports,  1869,  511-512 
Borax,  550 

Rubber,  Gum,  etc.,  551-552 
Manufactures,  552 

Railways,  Roads,  etc.,  549,  551,  552- 
553 

Peruvian  Corporation,  542,  547 

Petroleum  Industry  in  Peru,  550 

Petropolis,  Brazil,  310 

Pezet,  Gen.,  President  of  Peru,  506-508 

Pichincha,  Ecuador,  22 

Pierola,  Nicolas  de, 

Peruvian  Conspirator,  1874,  515-516 ; 
1876,  etc.,  518 

Leader  of  Revolt  in  Peru,  1879,  475, 
520-521 

President  of  Peru,  1879,  475,  520-522 
Commander  in  the  Chilian-Peruvian 
War,  1880-81,  484-489,  494 
Provisional  President  of  Peru,  1881,  495 
Leader  of  Revolt  in  Peru,  1894-95,  526, 
538 

President  of  Peru,  1895,  527-528,  542, 
544 

Pietri,  Dr,  referred  to,  628 
Pilcomayo , Peruvian  Sloop,  443 ; captured 
by  Chilians,  1879,  457,  476,  479,  488 
Pincon,  Vincent  Yanez,  and  Brazil,  12 
Pinto,  Gen.,  President  of  Chile : in  1827, 
30;  in  1829,  30 

Pinto,  Anibal,  President  of  Chile,  1876, 

329-331 

Pinto,  Col.,  Bolivian  Commander,  470 
Pinto,  Senor,  Salvador  Minister  in  Peru, 

488 

Pinzon,  Rear-Adm.,  Spanish  Com- 
mander, 506,  507 
Pipon,  Capt,  of  the  Sirius , 281 
Pirene,  Peru,  547 
Pisagua : 

Pisagua  in  the  Chilian-Peruvian  War, 
1879,  449,  459-461 

Pisagua  in  the  Chilian  Civil  War,  1891, 
347,  349-350,  364 
Other  References,  422,  449 
Pisco,  Peru,  482 
Piura,  Peru,  546,  550 
Pizarro,  Francisco, 

Pizarro  and  Atahualpa,  7,  584,  587 
Founder  of  Lima,  539-540 
Other  References,  8,  10 


708 


INDEX 


Plzarro,  Gonzalo,  8,  11 
Placilla,  Chile,  376-380 
Plague  in  Brazil,  308 
Plate  River  Republics,  650-652 
Plaza,  Gen.  Leonidas,  President  of 
Ecuador,  1901,  583 

Plaza,  Dr  Victorino  de  la,  Minister  of 
War  in  Argentina,  68,  663 
Polidoro,  Gen.,  Brazilian  Commander  in 
the  Paraguayan  War,  158-160,  183 
Population  : of  South  America,  9-11,  15- 
16,  650,  676  ; of  Paraguay,  193;  of 
Brazil,  309 ; of  Chile,  411-412 ; of 
Peru,  530-534  ; of  Bolivia,  566;  of 
Ecuador,  584  ; of  Colombia,  606-607  ; 
of  Venezuela,  634-635 
Portales,  Gen.,  in  Chile,  30 
Portenos  of  Buenos  Aires,  see  under 
Argentina 

Porto  Alegre,  Brazil,  235,  310 
Portugal  and  South  America : 

Portuguese  Dominion  of  Brazil,  1500- 
1578,  and  1649,  12-14 
The  Portuguese  Seat  of  Government 
in  Brazil,  1808,  13 

Invasion  of  French  Guiana,  1808,  13 
Joao  VI.,  1807-21,  13 
Pedro  I.,  1822,  14 

Portuguese  Aggression  in  Uruguay 
till  1828,  24 

Pedro  II.,  1840,  14,  232-244,  257,  313 
The  Portuguese  and  Brazilian  Insur- 
gents in  1894,  280-281 
Diplomatic  Relations  between  Portugal 
and  Brazil  broken  off,  281 ; and 
resumed,  1895,  290 
Portuguese  in  Brazil,  309,  311 
Positivism  in  Brazil,  235 
Potosi,  Bolivia,  574 

Pozo  Almonte,  Battle,  Mar.  7,  1891,  353- 
355 

Pradera  Iron  Works,  Colombia,  613 
Prado,  B.,  of  Chile,  360,  362 
Prado,  Gen.  Mariano  Ignacio, 

Leader  of  Rebellion  in  Peru,  1865,  506- 
508 

President  of  Peru,  1865,  508-511 
Defender  of  Callao  against  Spain,  1866, 
517,  520 

President  of  Peru,  1875,  450,  474-475, 
517-520 

Commander  of  the  Peruvian  Army  in 
the  Chilian-Peruvian  War,  1879, 
450,  474,  520 

His  Flight  to  Europe,  Dec.,  1879,  474- 
475,  520 

Prado,  Lieut.,  of  Peru,  468 
Prat,  Capt.,  Chilian  Naval  Commander 
in  the  Chilian-Peruvian  War,  450- 

451 


Prats,  Belisario,  of  Chile,  340 
Presidente  Errazuriz,  Chilian  Cruiser, 
358,  363 

Presidente  Pinto,  Chilian  Cruiser,  358, 363 
Prieto,  Gen. , President  of  Chile : in 
1831,  30,  321-323  ; in  1835,  30,  323 
Puerto  del  Ingles,  Uruguay,  202 
Puig,  Ship,  207 
Pulucayo  Mine,  Bolivia,  574 
Puno  de  Atacama  Dispute  between 
Argentina,  Chile,  and  Bolivia : in 
1898,  111-112  ; in  1899,  113-114;  in 
1900,  407 

Punta  Arenas,  Chile,  420,  425,  430 
Punta  Gruesa,  Chile,  453 
Punto  Grosso,  Brazil,  283 
Puy,  Gen.,  in  Venezuela,  21 
Puyredon,  Dictator,  in  Argentina,  24,  32 

Queimadas,  Brazil,  298 
Queiros,  Gen.  Innocencio  Galvao  de,  of 
Brazil,  292 

Quichua  Indians  and  the  Quichua  Lan- 
guage, 16,  534,  538,  567-569 
Quilloga,  Chile,  355 
Quillota,  Chile,  347,  375 
Quilpue,  Chile,  373-376 
Quintana,  Dr,  and  the  Presidency  of 
Argentina,  120,  662 

Quinteros,  Chile,  131,  346,  368-369,  370, 
391-396 

Quiroga,  Gen. , in  Argentina,  32,  33 
Quito,  Ecuador,  21,  579,  584,  586,  587 

Racedo,  Col.,  in  Buenos  Aires,  55,  56, 
57 

Rarer,  British  Ship,  265-266 
Railways : in  Argentina,  64,  109-110  ; in 
Uruguay,  227 ; in  Brazil,  236,  315; 
in  Chile,  328,  419-420 ; in  Peru,  512, 
515,  551-552;  in  Bolivia,  571-572; 
in  Ecuador,  587-588 ; in  Colombia, 
604  ; in  Venezuela,  642 
Ramirez,  Col. , Chilian  Commander,  448, 
466 

Ramirez,  Dr  Jose  Pedro,  of  Uruguay, 

212,  221 

llasquim,  Gen.,  of  Paraguay,  186 
ltaycraft,  Mr,  in  Chile,  393 
liebolledo,  Rear-Adm.  Juan  Williams, 
Chilian  Naval  Commander,  326,  448- 
454 

Recarbarren,  Col.  Isaac,  Peruvian  Com- 
mander, 459-461,  487 
Registration  Law  in  Chile,  332,  336 
lieinafe,  Gen. , of  Argentina,  33 
Religion  in  South  America,  see  Catholic 
Church 

Republic,  Brazilian  Warship,  in  the 
Revolt  in  Brazil,  1893-94,  263-285 


INDEX 


709 


Resolution,  Spanish  Frigate,  507,  509 
Reyes,  Gen. , of  Colombia,  596 
Reyes,  Vicente,  of  Chile,  404 
Riachuelo  River,  56,  143 
Riachuelo,  Brazilian  Cruiser,  255 
Ribera,  Fructuoso,  President  of  Uruguay, 
31 

Riesco,  Jerman,  President  of  Chile,  1901, 
388,  409,  669 

Riggin.  Quartermaster,  of  the  Baltimore, 
393 

Riman,  Chilian  Transport : captured  by 
Peru,  1879,  454  ; in  the  Chilian- 
Peruvian  War,  1880,  481  ; destroyed, 
Jan.  1881,  493 
Rio  Branco  Law,  237 
Rio  Grande,  Brazil : 

Rio  Grande  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
134,  141,  144 
Revolt  in  1878,  235-236 
Revolt  in  1893,  259,  265 
Attack  on  Rio  Grande  by  Rebels, 
Apr.,  1894,  284-286 
Revolt,  1895,  290-293 
Rio  Grande,  Monitor,  169 
Rio  Honda,  162 

Rio  de  Janeiro,  see  under  Brazil 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  Brazilian  Warship,  157 
Riobamba,  Ecuador,  585 
Rioja,  Argentina,  117,  161 
Rios,  CoL,  Peruvian  Commander,  464, 
466 

Riquelme,  Lieut-Col.,  of  Chile,  351 
Rivadavia,  President  of  Argentina,  24,  32 
Rivarola,  Cirilo,  President  of  Paraguay, 
186,  188 

Rivas,  Gen.  Ignacio,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  169,  170 

Riveros,  Rear-Adm.  Galvarino,  Chilian 
Commander,  454-455,  475,  479 
Robles,  Gen.,  Paraguayan  Commander, 
137,  138,  148 

Robles,  Gen.  Eulojio,  of  Chile,  348-354 
Roca,  Gen.  Julio, 

Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of 
Argentina,  47,  54,  55 
President  of  Argentina,  60-6S,  71 
His  Administration,  61-68 
Roca  and  Celman,  71-72 
Argentine  Minister  of  the  Interior,  88, 
97 

Attempted  assassination  of  Roca  in 
1891,  92 

Mitre  and  Roca,  93,  94 
Commander  in  Santa  Fe,  102 
Again  President  of  Argentina,  110-120 
His  Meeting  with  President  Errazuriz 
of  Chile,  114 

His  Visit  to  Patagonia,  114-115 
His  Visit  to  Brazil,  1899,  116,  307 


Rocafuerte,  Vicente,  President  of 
Ecuador,  29 

Rocha,  Dr  Dardo,  of  Argentina,  49,  66-67 
Rocha,  Uruguay,  207 
Rodriguez,  Senor,  of  Uruguay,  181 
Rodriguez,  Lieut.,  Peruvian  Naval  Com- 
mander, 456 

Rogers,  Lieut.,  Chilian  Naval  Com- 
mander, 456-457 

Rojas,  Argentina,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  154-161.  168 

Romana,  Senor,  President  of  Peru.  1899, 
528-529,  672 

Rome,  Church  of,  see  Catholic  Church 
Root,  Mr,  Mission  to  S.  America,  660 
Rosa,  Almeida,  of  Brazil,  139 
Rosales,  Torpedo-Catcher,  wrecked,  98, 
107 

Rosario,  Santa  Fe,  Argentina,  38,  56 
Rosas,  Juan  Manuel, 

His  Action  in  Uruguay  31 
Governor  and  Captain-General  of 
Buenos  Aires,  33 

His  Attitude  towards  French  Settlers, 
33-34 

Tyranny  and  Downfall  of  Rosas,  36- 
37 

Ross,  Augustin,  365,  366 
Rubber  Industry : of  Peru,  551 ; of 

Bolivia,  575;  of  Ecuador,  588;  of 
Colombia,  612  ; of  Brazil,  668 
Rucanas,  16 

Saa,  Gen.,  Uruguayan  Commander, 

133 

Saavedra,  Gen.  Cornelio,  Chilian  Com- 
mander, 489,  492 

Saguier,  President,  of  Paraguay,  1875. 
189 

St  John,  Mr,  in  Venezuela,  1887, 
621 

St  John,  Alfred,  British  Consul  in  Peru, 

1895,  527 

St  John,  Sir  Spencer,  British  Minister  in 
Peru,  1881,  488,  491 
Salado  River,  434-435 
Salaverry,  Gen.,  in  Peru,  29 
Salaverry,  Peru,  479 
Salazar,  Gen.,  of  Venezuela,  619 
Salazar,  Eusebio,  y Mazarredo,  of  Spain, 
507 

Saldana,  CoL  Atanasildo,  of  Uruguay, 
207 

Salgado,  Col.,  of  Brazil,  272,  284-285 
Salinas,  Belisario,  of  Bolivia,  501 
Salisbury,  Marquis  of,  and  the  Boundary 
Dispute  between  Venezuela  and 
Guiana,  623 

Salles,  Bernardino  de  Campos,  of  Brazil, 
251,  666 


710 


INDEX 


Salles,  Dr  Manoel  F.  Campos, 

Personality  of  Dr  Campos  Salles, 
305 

Republican,  239,  251 
President  of  Brazil,  1898,  304-308 
His  Visit  to  Europe,  306 
His  Visit  to  Argentina,  1900,  118- 
119 

Salt  Mines  : in  Colombia,  613  ; in  Vene- 
zuela, 642 

Salto,  Uruguay,  131,  207 
Sama  River,  469 

San  Bartolome  (Hill),  Peru,  485,  489 
San  Borge,  Brazil,  143 
San  Clemento,  California,  359 
San  Cosm^,  152,  194 
San  Cristoval  (Hill),  Peru,  489 
San  Diego,  California,  359,  360 
San  Francisco,  Dolores,  Peru,  Battle  of, 
1879,  462-463 

San  Francisco,  U.S.  Cruiser,  in  Chilian 
Waters,  277,  380,  391-392,  395 
San  Juan,  Argentina,  161 
San  Juan  (Hill),  Peru,  484,  486-487 
San  Lorenzo,  Peru,  476,  509-510 
San  Luis,  Argentina,  101,  161 
San  Martin,  Gen.,  Argentine  Com- 
mander, 23,  25,  653 

San  Roman,  Gen.,  President  of  Peru, 
1862,  506 

Sanchez,  Evaristo,  of  Chile,  338 
Sanchez  Jose,  of  Peru,  523 
Sanelemente,  M.  A.,  President  of  Colom- 
bia, 1898,  599 
Sandia,  Peru,  549 
Sanfuentes,  Sehor,  of  Chile,  340 
Santa  Anna  de  Liviamento,  Brazil,  255 
Santa  Catharina,  Brazil,  283,  310 
Santa  Cruz,  Gen.,  in  Peru,  29;  in 
Bolivia,  1827-39,  30 

Santa  Cruz,  Col.,  Chilian  Commander, 
1879,  466 

Santa  Cruz,  Bolivia,  567,  575 
Santa  Cruz,  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  Brazil, 
257,  263,  264,  265,  269,  274,  279 
Santa  Lucia  Chico,  River,  200 
Santa  Maria,  Domingo,  President  of 
Chile,  1881,  331-333,  335,  336 
Santa  Teresa  (Hill)  Peru,  484,  486 
Santander,  Gen. , President  of  Colombia, 
27,  28 

Santiago,  Chile : 

Fire  at  the  Compania  Church,  1863, 
325 

Other  References,  to  Town  and  Pro- 
vince, 348,  356,  365,  380-384,  411- 
412,  416,  421,  431 

Santibanez,  Jos6  Maria,  of  Bolivia,  434 
Santibanez,  Ramon,  of  Chile,  358 
Santo  Domingo,  Peru,  550 


Santos,  Gen.  Maximo, 

Chief  Adviser  to  President  Vidal  of 
Uruguay,  209-210 

President  of  Uruguay,  1882,  210-211 
Commander-in-Chiet,  211 
Revolt  against  Gen.  Santos,  211 
Captain-General,  211 
President  of  Uruguay,  1886,  211-212 
Attempted  Assassination  of  President 
Santos,  212 

Sao  Francisco  Xavier,  Brazil,  299 
Sao  Joao  Baptista,  Brazil,  263,  264,  265, 
269,  274,  279 
Sao  Paulo,  Brazil  : 

Sao  Paulo  in  the  Republican  Move- 
ment, 235-239,  243,  244,  246,  251, 
254 

Sao  Paulo  and  the  Slavery  Question, 

237-240 

Other  References,  264,  265,  284,  288, 
299,  309-310 

Sapucay,  Paraguay,  183 
Saraiva,  Aparicio, 

Leader  of  Risings  in  Uruguay,  217- 
222,  224 

Leader  of  Rising  in  Rio  Grande  do  Sul, 
290 

Saraiva,  Conselheiro,  Brazilian  Envoy  to 
Uruguay,  132 

Saraiva,  Gumercindo,  Leader  of  Revolt 
in  Brazil,  259,  271-287 
Sarmiento,  Col. , and  Dr  Lucio  V.  Lopez, 
1894,  106 

Sarmiento,  Dr,  President  of  Argentina, 
1868-74,  40-41,  43,  63,  123-125 
Saraget,  Gen.,  of  Brazil,  299-300 
Schley,  Capt. , of  the  Baltimore,  393 
Scruggs,  Mr,  referred  to,  627 
Seguier,  Vice-President,  of  Paraguay, 
189 

Senoret,  Lieut.,  Chilian  Commander 

477 

Sepulveda,  Capt.,  Chilian  Commander 
461 

Serena,  Chile,  347,  348 
Sergipe,  Brazil,  300 
Serpe,  Dr  Epifanio,  of  Peru,  495 
Serrano,  Lieut.  Ignacio,  Chilian  Naval 
Commander,  452 
Serzedello,  Major,  of  Brazil,  251 
Sete  de  Seplembre,  Brazilian  Warship,  263 
Shah,  British  Warship,  518 
Shannon,  British  Warship,  464 
Sheep-Farming,  etc.  : in  Argentina,  127- 
128  ; in  Uruguay,  228-229  ; in  Chile, 
420,  430 ; in  Peru,  547-548 ; in 
Colombia,  612  ; in  Venezuela,  641 
Silva,  Gen.,  Peruvian  Commander,  4S6 
Silva,  Gen.  Jos6  da,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  176,  184 


INDEX 


711 


Silva,  Rodrigo  Augusto  da,  of  Brazil,  238 
Silva,  Dr  Rosa  E. , Vice-President  of 
Brazil,  1898,  304 

Silva,  Waldo,  of  Chile,  346,  389-391 
Silver:  in  Chile,  424;  in  Peru,  549;  in 
Bolivia,  573-574;  in  Venezuela, 
642 

Simeao,  Jose,  of  Brazil,  251 
Simpson,  Lieut.,  Chilian  Naval  Com- 
mander, 456-457 

Sirius,  British  Ship,  265-266,  281 
Slavery : Emancipation  of  Slaves  in 

Brazil,  237-240 
Sodrf',  Lauro,  of  Brazil,  304 
Solar,  Javier  Vial,  365 
Solar,  Pedro  A.  del,  Vice-President  of 
Peru,  1890,  525-526 
Soriano,  Uruguay,  207 
Soto,  Col.,  of  Chile,  1891,  351-352 
Soto,  Senor,  of  Chile,  1891,  379 
Sotomayor,  Gen.,  Chilian  Commander, 
446-448,  481,  486-487 
Sotomayor,  Rafael,  Chilian  War  Minister, 
458,  470 

South  America  (see  also  Argentina, 
Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia, 
Ecuador,  Paraguay,  Patagonia,  Peru, 
U ruguay) : 

Geographical  Position,  17 
Mineral  Wealth,  17,  654 
Agriculture,  etc.,  17,  651 
The  Spanish  Conquest  of  South 
America  and  Spanish  Colonial 
Policy,  6-10 

Emancipation  of  South  America  from 
Spanish  Rule,  12-34,  653 
Proposed  Federation  of  Republics,  27, 

653 

The  Republics  and  Internal  Dissen- 
sions, 647 

Spanish  and  Portuguese  Influence,  648- 
650 

The  River  Plate  Republics,  650-652 
Pan-American  Congresses,  654 
The  United  States  and  South  America, 
651-657 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  25-26 
The  Panama  Canal,  28,  601,  614,  655- 
656 

Souza,  Gen.  Guillermo,  in  the  Para- 
guayan War,  156 

Souza,  Gen.  Juan  da,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  180-182 
Spain : 

Traits  of  Spanish  Character,  3 
Reign  of  Ferdinand  and  Isabella,  4 
Treatment  of  Moors  and  Jews,  4 
The  Inquisition,  4,  540 
The  People  of  Spain  in  the  15th 
Century,  6 


Spain — continued 

Early  Spanish  Colonists  and  their 
Treatment  of  Natives  in  South 
America,  etc.,  6 
Spanish  Colonial  Policy,  10 
Emancipation  of  Spanish  Colonies, 
12-34,  653 

Peruvian  Disputes  with  Spain,  506- 
507 

Spanish  Squadron  in  Peruvian  Waters, 
1863-64,  506-507 

The  Talambo  Incident  in  Peru,  1863, 
507 

Dispute  with  Peru  re  the  Chincha 
Ids.,  1864,  326,  333,  507-508 
Chilian  War  with  Spain,  1865-66,  326- 
327 

Peruvian  War  with  Spain,  Jan.  14, 
1866-May  12,  1866,  508-510 
Bolivia,  Ecuador,  Chile,  and  Peru, 
and  the  War  with  Spain,  1865-66, 
326-327,  508 

The  Covadonga  captured  by  Chilians, 
Jan.  1866,  326,  509 

Naval  Engagement  of  Spain  against 
Chile  and  Peru  near  Abtao,  Feb. 
6,  1866,  509 

Spanish  Bombardment  of  Valparaiso, 
Mar.  31,  1866,  326-327,  509 
Spanish  Bombardment  of  Callao,  May 
2,  1866,  509-510,  517,  520 
Chilian  Truce  with  Spain,  1867,  327 ; 

and  Treaty,  1879,  327 
Spanish  Arbitration  in  the  Boundary 
Dispute  between  Venezuela  and 
Colombia,  1883-1891,  595 
Spain  and  Cuba,  5,  7,  648 
Spanish  Influence  in  South  America, 
648-650 

Staunton,  Adm.,in  Brazilian  Waters,  276 
Stephan,  Col.,  of  Chile,  356 
Stewart,  Duncan,  of  Uruguay,  215 
Storrow,  Mr,  627 
Suarez,  Col.,  in  Peru,  1824,  23 
Suarez,  Gen.,  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
1866,  152 

Suarez,  Col.  Belisario,  Peruvian  Com- 
mander, 1879-81,  459,  464,  467, 
470,  484,  486,  489 
Suarez,  Gen.  Jose  Gregorio, 

Candidate  for  the  Presidency  in 
Uruguay,  1868,  199 
Commander  of  Troops  against  Blanco 
Revolutionists  in  Uruguay,  1870, 
200-202 

Suarez,  Lieut.-Col.  Manuel,  Peruvian 
Commander,  1879,  466 
Sucre,  Gen.,  of  Bolivia: 

Commander  at  Pichincha,  1822,  22 
President  of  Bolivia,  1825,  23,  30,  653 


712 


INDEX 


Sucre,  Bolivia,  562,  563,  567 
Sugar-Cultivation  : in  Peru,  545-546 ; in 
Venezuela,  640 
Supe,  Peru,  479 

Switzerland  and  the  Araapa  Dispute 
between  Brazil  and  French  Guiana, 
306-307 

Tacna  : 

Chilian  Invasion  and  Battle  of  Tacna, 
May  26,  1880,  468-471,  481 
Bolivia  and  Peru  and  the  Chilian 
Occupation  of  Tacna,  403-404, 
407,  498,  502,  529,  556 
Other  References,  354,  420 
Tacuarembo,  Uruguay,  208 
Tage,  Brazil,  136 
Tajes,  Gen.  Maximo, 

Commander  in  Uruguay,  211 
President  of  Uruguay,  212-213 
Talambo,  Peru,  506-507 
Talara,  Peru,  550 
Talea,  Chile,  324 
Talcahuano,  Chile,  346 
Talisman , Peruvian  Transport,  493,  515 
Taltal,  Chile,  364,  421,  423,  454 
Tamandare,  Adm.,  Brazilian  Com- 
mander, 132,  133,  139,  158-160,  187 
Tamandari , see  Almirante  Tamandare 
Tamarugal,  Chile,  429,  462 
Tara  para  (see  also  Iquique) 

The  Nitrate  Industry,  the  Dispute  of 
Peru  with  Chile,  and  the  Chilian 
Occupation,  414,  420-423,  437, 
480,  498,  516-517,  520 
Borax  in  Tarapaca,  426 
Battle  of  Tarapacd,  1879,  464-467 
Other  References,  to  Town  and  Pro- 
vince, 354,  459,  462 
Tarija,  Bolivia,  567 

Tavares,  Gen.,  Jose  da  Silva,  of  Brazil, 
255,  292-293,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  185 

Tayf,  Paraguay,  164,  172 
Tejeda,  Capt  M.,  of  Chile,  359-360 
Tejedor,  Dr  Carlos, 

Governor  of  Buenos  Aires,  45,  47 
Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of 
Argentina,  47,  53 
Telegraph  Service  in  Brazil,  316 
Telles,  Gen.,  of  Brazil,  269 
Tesoreria  General  de  la  Escuadra  in 
Chile,  389 

Tibicuarf,  Paraguay,  173-174 
Tierra  del  Fuego,  420,  421,  425,  430 
Timbo,  Argentina,  166 
Tiradentes  of  Brazil,  13 
Tiro  Nacional  (Volunteers)  of  Buenos 
Aires,  45-46 
Titicaca  Region,  16 


Toco,  Chile,  423 

Toeopilla,  Chile,  359,  422,  446,  448,  454 

Tolima,  Colombia,  613 

Topater  Ford,  Atacama,  Chile,  447 

Torata,  Peru,  469,  516 

Torico,  Rufino,  of  Lima,  Peru,  489 

Toro,  Domingo,  y Herrera,  of  Chile,  387 

Toro,  Chilian  Ship,  488 

Tovar,  Manuel,  Archbishop  of  Lima,  523 

Trajano,  Brazilian  Warship,  263,  277 

Transvaal  referred  to,  565 

Tres  Arboles,  Uruguay,  219 

Trinidade,  Brazil;  British  Occupation, 292 

Trmnfo,  Spanish  Warship,  507 

Trouin,  Adm.  Duguay,  and  Brazil,  13 

Trujillo,  President,  of  Colombia,  593 

Trujillo,  Peru,  536,  550 

Trumbull,  Senor,  364 

Truxillo,  Peru,  479 

Tucapul,  Chilian  Torpedo-Boat,  477,  483 
Tucuman,  Argentina,  24 
Tupi-Guarani  Indians,  15 
Tapper,  Alvaro  Bianchi,  365 
Tupper,  Lieut.  C.  G.,  266 
Tuyiitf,  Argentina,  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  159-165 

UnAONno,  Dr, 

Governor  of  Buenos  Aires,  116 
Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of 
Argentina,  120,  664 

Union,  Peruvian  Corvette : in  the  War 
with  Spain,  1866,  508  ; in  the 
Chilian  - Peruvian  War,  1879-81, 
443,  454-457,  476,  483;  wrecked, 
1881,  493 

Union  Civica  in  Argentina,  see  under 
Argentina 

Union  Civica  Radical  in  Argentina,  see 
under  Argentina 

Unitarian  v.  Federal  Form  of  Govern- 
ment : in  Colombia,  28 ; in  Chile, 
30 ; in  Argentina.  32,  33,  42 ; in 
Brazil,  249 
United  States : 

The  United  States  and  South  America, 
651-657,  660 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  25-26 
The  United  States  and  the  Paraguayan 
War,  1865,  151 

The  United  States  and  the  Chilian- 
Peruvian  War,  Oct.,  1880,  480-481 
The  United  States  Forces  in  Colon  and 
Panama,  1885,  596-597 
The  United  States  and  the  Boundary 
Dispute  between  British  Guiana 
and  Venezuela,  1887,  620-621 
The  Chilian  Transport  ltata  detained 
at  San  Diego,  Cal.,  1891,  859- 
360,  391,  395 


INDEX 


713 


United  States — continued 
Patrick  Egan  and  the  Peace  Conference 
in  Chile,  May,  1891,  361-363 
Strained  Relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Chile,  1891,  391-396 
The  San  Francisco  at  Quinteros,  1891, 
380,  391-392,  395 

The  Baltimore  Incident  at  Valparaiso, 
1891,  380,  392-396,  400,  655 
The  U.S.  Squadron  in  Brazilian  Waters. 
1893,  276-277 

Arbitration  in  the  Misiones  Dispute 
between  Brazil  and  Argentina  in 
1895,  109,  112 

The  United  States  and  Spanish  Misrule 
in  Cuba,  5,  7,  648 

Minister  Buchanan  and  the  Chilian 
Boundary  Question  in  1899,  US- 
114 

The  United  States  and  the  Venezuelan 
Boundary  Question,  1895-99,  622- 
628,  654 

The  Panama  Canal,  28,  601,  614,  655- 
656 

Uranus,  Brazilian  Merchant  Ship,  263, 
264,  273 

Uriarte,  President,  of  Paraguay,  1875, 
187,  189 

Uribe,  Lieut.,  452 
Uriburu,  Dr  Jose, 

Argentine  Minister  in  Chile,  1891,  385- 
387 

Vice-President  of  Argentina,  1892,  97 
President  of  Argentina,  1895,  108-113 
Candidate  for  the  Presidency  of  Argen- 
tina in  1904,  120 

Urmaneta,  Geronimo,  of  Chile,  434 
Urguiza,  Gen., 

Leader  of  Revolution  in  Buenos  Aires, 
1852,  36-38 

Commander  in  the  Paraguayan  War, 
137-144,  151,  165 
Other  Reference,  31 
Urriola,  Col.,  468 
Urrutia,  Gen.,  of  Chile,  351 
Uruan  River  Incident  in  the  Venezuelan 
Boundary  Dispute,  623-624 
Uruguay: 

Montevideo  captured  by  Brazil,  1817 
and  1823,  14 

Revolution  in  Montevideo  in  1809,  21 
Gen.  Artigas,  Dictator,  24 
Portuguese  Aggression,  24 
Independence  acknowledged,  1828,  24 
Fructuoso  Ribera,  President,  1830,  31 
Manuel  Oribe  and  Ignacio  Oribe, 
Presidents,  1835,  31 
Warfare  of  Ribera  against  Ignacio 
Oribe  aided  by  Rosas  of  Buenos 
Aires,  1838-51,  31 


Uruguay — continued 

Conflict  with  England,  France,  and 
Italy,  31 

President  Berro,  31 

Anastasio  Aguirre,  President,  1864,32, 
131 

Civil  War,  1863-65,  131,  197 
The  Blancos,  131,  144-147,  151,  165, 
197-230 

The  Colorados,  197-204,  230,  649 
Gen.  Venancio  Flores,  Leader  of 
Revolt,  1863-65,  131-135 
Strained  Relations  between  Argentina 
and  Uruguay,  131,  134 
Relations  with  Paraguay,  131,  191 
Strained  Relations  between  Uruguay 
and  Brazil,  131-132 

Brazilian  Mission  of  Conselheiro  Saraiva 
to  Uruguay,  132 

Paysandii  captured  by  Brazilians,  Jan. 
1,  1865,  132 

Villa  del  Salto  fired  on,  132 
Uruguayan  Expedition  to  Rio  Grande 
do  Sul,  134 

Peace  Negotiations,  Feb.  1865,  135 
Gen.  Venancio  Flores,  President,  1865, 
135,  197-198 

Alliance  between  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Uruguay  against  Paraguay, 
May  1,  1865,  139 

War  against  Paraguay  of  Uruguay, 
Argentina,  and  Brazil,  1865-70, 
see  under  Paraguay 
President  Flores  in  the  Paraguayan 
War,  139-160,  187 

Revolt  of  CoL  Fortunato  Flores,  1867, 
197 

Dr  Pedro  Varela,  President,  1868,  198 
Blanco  Conspiracy  and  Assassination 
of  Gen.  Flores,  1868,  198 
Gen.  Batlle,  President,  1868,  199-204 
Cholera  Epidemic,  1868,  199 
Outbreaks  under  Maximo  Perez  and 
Gen.  Caraballo,  199 
Blanco  Revolution  under  Col.  Aparicio, 
1870-72,  199-203 
Fighting  at  Corralito,  etc. , 200 
Siege  of  Montevideo,  201-202 
Defeat  of  Insurgents,  202,  203 
Peace,  1872,  203 

Tomas  Gomensoro,  President,  1872, 
203,  205 

Colorados  Netos  and  Colorados  Princi- 
pistas,  204 

Candidates  for  the  Presidency,  1873,  204 
Dr  Ellauri,  President,  1873,  204-206 
Assassination  of  CoL  Romualdo  Cas- 
tillo, 1874,  205 
Revolt  in  Soriano,  1875,  205 
Municipal  Election  in  Montevideo,  205 


714 


INDEX 


U ruguay — continued 
Pedro  Varela,  President,  1875,  206-208 
Political  Exiles,  207 
La  Revolucion  Tricolor,  207-208 
Major  Lorenzo  Latorre,  Dictator,  1S76, 

208- 209 

Major  Latorre,  President,  209 
Dr  Francisco  A.  Vidal,  President,  1880, 

209- 210 

Gen.  Maximo  Santos,  209-210 
Gen.  Santos,  President,  1882,  210-211 
Dr  Vidal  re-elected  President,  1886,  211 
Gen.  Santos,  Commander-in-Chief,  211 
Revolution  against  Gen.  Santos,  sup- 
pressed by  Gen.  Tajes,  211 
Gen.  Santos  re-elected  President,  1886, 
211 

Attempted  assassination  of  President 
Santos,  212 

The  Ministerio  de  la  Conciliacion  of  Dr 
Jose  Pedro  Ramirez,  212 
Gen.  Tajes,  President,  1886,  212-213 
Dr  Julio  Herrera  y Obes,  President, 
1890,  213-215 
Financial  Crisis,  215 
Administration  of  Duncan  Stewart,  215 
Juan  Idiarte  Borda,  President,  1894, 
215-221 

Revival  of  Corruption,  216 
Boundary  Dispute  between  Bolivia  and 
Uruguay,  1894,  191 
Congressional  Elections,  1896,  216 
Revolution  under  Aparicio  Saraiva  and 
CoL  Diego  Lamas,  1897,  216-220 
Fighting  at  Arbolito,  Cerro  Colorado, 
etc.,  218-219 

The  Venus  Insurgent  Expedition,  219- 
220 

Armistice  and  Peace  Negotiations,  220 
Assassination  of  President  Borda,  1897, 
220-221,  226 

Juan  Lindolfo  Cuestas,  President,  1897, 

221-223 
Peace,  221-222 

Policy  of  the  New  Administration,  222 
Juan  Lindolfo  Cuestas,  President,  1899, 
223 

Military  Revolt,  1899,  223 
Jose  Batlle  y Ordonez,  President, 
1903,  223 

Blanco  Rebellion,  223-224 
Climate,  224 
Population,  224 
Education,  208,  225-226 
Administration  of  Justice,  226 
National  Character,  226 
Religion,  227 

Railways,  Waterways,  etc.,  227-228 
Agriculture,  etc.,  228-230,  651  - 
Landed  Proprietors,  230 


Uruguay  River,  132,  137,  141,  144-140 
Uruguay,  Warship,  132 
Uruguayana,  Brazil,  146-147,  255 
Uspallata  Pass,  Argentina,  356 
Uyuni,  Bolivia,  356 

Vat.derrama,  Adolfo,  of  Chile,  338 
Valdivia,  Chile,  416,  421,  431 
Valencia,  Venezuela,  635 
Valentine  Hills,  Paraguay,  179 
Valenzuela,  Major  Marco  Aurelio,  of 
Chile,  347,  350 
Valenzuela,  Paraguay,  183 
Valiente,  Bernardo,  181 
Valle,  Dr  del,  of  Peru,  1881,  495 
Valle,  Dr  Aristobulo  del. 

Partisan  of  the  Union  Civica  in  Argen- 
tina, 1887,  75,  76,  79 
Dr  del  Valle’s  Ministry,  1893,  100-101 
Other  Reference,  46 
Valparaiso,  Chile : 

Bombardment  by  Spanish,  1866,  326- 

327,  509 

Skirmish  at  Valparaiso,  Jan.,  1891,  346 
Occupation  by  Congressional  Troops, 
Aug.,  1891,  379-380 
The  Baltimore  Incident,  Aug.,  1891, 
380,  392-396 

Other  References  to  Town  and  Pro- 
vince, 364,  365-366,  368,  373-376, 
410-413,  418,  421,  431 
Varela,  Senor,  of  Argentina,  1869,  181 
Varela,  Dr  Hector,  of  Buenos  Aires, 
1871,  41 

Varela,  Don  Jose,  206,  209 
Varela,  Dr  Pedro, 

President  of  Uruguay,  1868,  198 
President  of  Uruguay,  1875,  206-208 
Varela,  Rufina,  46 
Vargas,  Col. , of  Chile.  380 
Veintemilla,  Gen.,  of  Ecuador,  578-580 
Vela,  Velasco  Nunez  de,  11 
Velarde,  Gen.  Manuel,  Peruvian  Com- 
mander, 459,  470,  495,  523 
Velarde,  Lieut.,  452 

Velasco,  Gen.,  President  of  Bolivia,  30, 
31 

Velasquez,  Gen.  Jose,  of  Chile,  348,  482 
Velesco,  Gen. , of  Bolivia,  562 
Velez,  Gen.,  of  Colombia,  596 
Venezuela : 

Caracas  and  Emancipation  from 
Spanish  Rule,  20 

Rebellion  under  Simon  Bolivar,  21 
Bolivar,  Dictator,  1813,  21 
Gen.  Paez’s  Operations  against  the 
Spanish,  22 

Venezuela  and  New  Granada  under 
Colombia,  1819,  22 
Battle  of  Carabobo,  1821,  22 


INDEX 


715 


Venezuela — continued 

Separation  irom  Colombia,  1830,  27 
Gen.  Paez,  President,  1830,  28 
Gen.  Monagas,  President,  1847,  28 
Internal  Dissensions  since  1830,  617- 
618 

Struggle  between  the  Yellows  and  the 
Blues,  618 

Gen.  Guzman  Blanco,  Dictator,  1870- 
89,  28,  618-621,  633,  635,  642 
Revolt  under  Gen.  Salazar  crushed 
1872,  619 

Boundary  Dispute  with  British  Guiana, 
1887,  620-621 

Gen.  Lopez  and  Dr  Rojas  Paul,  1887- 
89,  619-620 

Conspiracy  in  1889,  620 
Gen.  Blanco  deposed,  1889,  620 
Gen.  Palacios,  President,  1889,  621 
Settlement  of  Boundary  Dispute  with 
Colombia,  1891,  595 
Revolt  under  Gen.  Joaquin  Crespo, 
1892,  621 

Provisional  Government,  621 
Gen.  Crespo,  President,  1S94,  621-628, 
633 

Revolt  under  Dr  Rojas  Paul,  621 
Boundary  Dispute  with  British  Guiana, 
1895-99,  622-628,  654 
The  Uruan  Incident,  622-623 
Venezuela  and  the  United  States,  623 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,  623 
President  Cleveland’s  Message  to 
Congress,  Dec.  1895,  623-624 
The  Cleveland  Commission,  1896,  627 
The  Arbitration  Tribunal  in  Paris, 
1897,  628 

The  Award  of  the  Tribunal,  Oct.  1899, 
628 

Senor  Andrade,  President,  1898,  629 
Revolt,  1898,  629 
Death  of  Gen.  Crespo,  1899,  630 
Victory  of  the  Revolution,  630 
Gen.  Castro,  President,  1899,  630 
Gen.  Castro,  President,  1902,  630-631 
Question  of  Compensation  for  Damage 
to  Foreign  Residents,  1902,  630- 
631 

La  Guayra  blockaded  by  England, 
Germany,  and  Italy,  1902,  631 
Award  of  the'  Hague  Tribunal,  Feb.  22, 
1904,  631 

Law  of  Constitution,  621,  631-632 
Political  Divisions,  631-632 
Seditious  Practices,  632 
Revolutionary  Tendencies,  632 
Climate  and  Topography,  633-634 
Population,  634-635 
Municipalities,  635 
Education,  635-636 


Venezuela — continued'. 

Administration  ol  Justice,  636 
Religion,  637-638 
Marriage,  637-638 
National  Character,  638-639 
Agriculture  and  Industries,  639-640 
Mineral  Resources,  641-642 
Transport,  642 
Financial  Situation,  643-645 
Future  Prospects,  645-646,  675 
Venus,  Brazilian  Merchant  Ship  1879, 
263 ; Brazilian  Armed  Transport, 
destroyed,  1894,  279 
Venus,  Insurgent  Expedition  to  Uru- 
guay, 1897,  219-220 
Vera,  Gregorio,  of  Chile,  358 
Vergara,  Col.,  Chilian  Minister  of  War, 
1880,  480 

Vergara,  Col.  Jose,  Chilian  Commander, 
1879-80,  461,  469-470 
Vergara,  Jose  Francisco,  of  Chile,  536, 

337 

Vergara,  Luis,  of  Chile,  385 
Vergara,  Ramon  Donoso,  of  Chile,  340 
Vespucci,  Amerigo,  and  Bahia,  12 
Victorica,  Naval  Commander,  98-99.  107 
Vicuna,  Claudio,  of  Chile,  340,  341.  342, 
364,  380,  387,  391,  409 
Vicuna,  Nicolas  Pena,  of  Chile,  338 
Vidal,  Dr  Francisco  A.,  President  of 
Uruguay:  18S0,  209-210  ; 1886,  211 
Vieyra,  and  Brazil,  13 
Villa  de  Madrid,  Spanish  Warship,  326, 
509 

Villa  del  Pilar,  Paraguay,  164,  172 
Villa  del  Salto,  Uruguayan  Warship,  132 
Villagran,  Col.,  Chilian  Commander, 

466 

Villagras,  Col.,  of  Chile,  351 
Villalba,  Dr,  of  Uruguay,  135 
Villamil,  Col.,  459-461 
Villar,  Gen.,  Commander  in  Uruguay, 

219 

Villaran,  Senor,  of  Peru,  527 
Villazon,  Dr  Eliodoro,  President  of 
Bolivia,  673 

Villegaignon,  Fort,  Brazil,  263,  265,  268, 
269,  279,  280 

Villegas,  CoL,  of  Chile,  1891,  355 
Villegas,  Gen.,  Peruvian  Commander, 
1879,  463 

Villeta,  Paraguay,  174,  177 
Vina  del  Mar,  Chile,  371-376 
Vinces  River,  588 
Vine-Growing  in  Chile,  429 
Viso,  Dr,  of  Cordoba,  49,  52 
Vivanco,  Gen.,  of  Peru,  507 
Vosges,  M.  de,  French  Minister  in  Peru, 
488 

Vulcarel  in  Argentina,  24 


716 


INDEX 


Wandenkolk,  Adm.,  of  Brazil,  Leader 
of  Insurgents  in  Rio  de  Janeiro,  255- 
256,  259 

Wars  pile,  British  Warship,  352,  360 
Washington,  George,  referred  to,  26 
Waudle,  Steamer,  366 
Welsh  Settlement  on  the  Chubut  River, 
114-115 
West  Indies  : 

Spanish  Expeditions,  6 
Spanish  Rule  in  Cuba,  5,  7,  648 

Yacango,  Peru,  518 
Yagari  River,  Paraguay,  184 
Yaguaron,  Brazil,  134 
Yarza,  Enrique  and  Miguel,  of  Uru- 
guay. 207 

Yatay,  Battle  of,  Aug.  17,  1865,  145-146 


Yea,  Peril,  482 

Yegros,  Eulgencio,  First  Consul  in 
Paraguay,  25 

Yellow  Fever  in  Buenos  Aires,  41 
Yellows  of  Venezuela,  618 
Ylo,  Peru,  468-469 

Zaldivar,  Mariano  Castro,  of  Peru,  498 

Zambo  People  in  Peru,  533 

Zaiiartu,  Anibal,  of  Chile,  339,  340, 

409 

Zanartii,  Manuel,  of  Chile,  385 
Zapata,  Dr,  of  Antofagasta,  447 
Zaramo,  Ecuador,  589 
Zevallos,  Mariano  Herencia,  Vice- 
President  of  Peru,  514 
Zubiaga,  Col.,  Peruvian  Commander, 
466 


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DATE  DUE 

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